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linux-next/arch/x86/xen/setup.c

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xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 09:37:04 +08:00
/*
* Machine specific setup for xen
*
* Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com>, XenSource Inc, 2007
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/pm.h>
#include <linux/memblock.h>
#include <linux/cpuidle.h>
#include <linux/cpufreq.h>
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 09:37:04 +08:00
#include <asm/elf.h>
#include <asm/vdso.h>
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 09:37:04 +08:00
#include <asm/e820.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
#include <asm/acpi.h>
xen/boot: Disable NUMA for PV guests. The hypervisor is in charge of allocating the proper "NUMA" memory and dealing with the CPU scheduler to keep them bound to the proper NUMA node. The PV guests (and PVHVM) have no inkling of where they run and do not need to know that right now. In the future we will need to inject NUMA configuration data (if a guest spans two or more NUMA nodes) so that the kernel can make the right choices. But those patches are not yet present. In the meantime, disable the NUMA capability in the PV guest, which also fixes a bootup issue. Andre says: "we see Dom0 crashes due to the kernel detecting the NUMA topology not by ACPI, but directly from the northbridge (CONFIG_AMD_NUMA). This will detect the actual NUMA config of the physical machine, but will crash about the mismatch with Dom0's virtual memory. Variation of the theme: Dom0 sees what it's not supposed to see. This happens with the said config option enabled and on a machine where this scanning is still enabled (K8 and Fam10h, not Bulldozer class) We have this dump then: NUMA: Warning: node ids are out of bound, from=-1 to=-1 distance=10 Scanning NUMA topology in Northbridge 24 Number of physical nodes 4 Node 0 MemBase 0000000000000000 Limit 0000000040000000 Node 1 MemBase 0000000040000000 Limit 0000000138000000 Node 2 MemBase 0000000138000000 Limit 00000001f8000000 Node 3 MemBase 00000001f8000000 Limit 0000000238000000 Initmem setup node 0 0000000000000000-0000000040000000 NODE_DATA [000000003ffd9000 - 000000003fffffff] Initmem setup node 1 0000000040000000-0000000138000000 NODE_DATA [0000000137fd9000 - 0000000137ffffff] Initmem setup node 2 0000000138000000-00000001f8000000 NODE_DATA [00000001f095e000 - 00000001f0984fff] Initmem setup node 3 00000001f8000000-0000000238000000 Cannot find 159744 bytes in node 3 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) IP: [<ffffffff81d220e6>] __alloc_bootmem_node+0x43/0x96 Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 3.3.6 #1 AMD Dinar/Dinar RIP: e030:[<ffffffff81d220e6>] [<ffffffff81d220e6>] __alloc_bootmem_node+0x43/0x96 .. snip.. [<ffffffff81d23024>] sparse_early_usemaps_alloc_node+0x64/0x178 [<ffffffff81d23348>] sparse_init+0xe4/0x25a [<ffffffff81d16840>] paging_init+0x13/0x22 [<ffffffff81d07fbb>] setup_arch+0x9c6/0xa9b [<ffffffff81683954>] ? printk+0x3c/0x3e [<ffffffff81d01a38>] start_kernel+0xe5/0x468 [<ffffffff81d012cf>] x86_64_start_reservations+0xba/0xc1 [<ffffffff81007153>] ? xen_setup_runstate_info+0x2c/0x36 [<ffffffff81d050ee>] xen_start_kernel+0x565/0x56c " so we just disable NUMA scanning by setting numa_off=1. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-and-Tested-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@amd.com> Acked-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-08-17 22:22:37 +08:00
#include <asm/numa.h>
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 09:37:04 +08:00
#include <asm/xen/hypervisor.h>
#include <asm/xen/hypercall.h>
#include <xen/xen.h>
#include <xen/page.h>
#include <xen/interface/callback.h>
#include <xen/interface/memory.h>
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 09:37:04 +08:00
#include <xen/interface/physdev.h>
#include <xen/features.h>
#include <xen/hvc-console.h>
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 09:37:04 +08:00
#include "xen-ops.h"
#include "vdso.h"
#include "mmu.h"
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 09:37:04 +08:00
#define GB(x) ((uint64_t)(x) * 1024 * 1024 * 1024)
/* Amount of extra memory space we add to the e820 ranges */
struct xen_memory_region xen_extra_mem[XEN_EXTRA_MEM_MAX_REGIONS] __initdata;
/* Number of pages released from the initial allocation. */
unsigned long xen_released_pages;
/* E820 map used during setting up memory. */
static struct e820entry xen_e820_map[E820MAX] __initdata;
static u32 xen_e820_map_entries __initdata;
/*
* Buffer used to remap identity mapped pages. We only need the virtual space.
* The physical page behind this address is remapped as needed to different
* buffer pages.
*/
#define REMAP_SIZE (P2M_PER_PAGE - 3)
static struct {
unsigned long next_area_mfn;
unsigned long target_pfn;
unsigned long size;
unsigned long mfns[REMAP_SIZE];
} xen_remap_buf __initdata __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
static unsigned long xen_remap_mfn __initdata = INVALID_P2M_ENTRY;
/*
* The maximum amount of extra memory compared to the base size. The
* main scaling factor is the size of struct page. At extreme ratios
* of base:extra, all the base memory can be filled with page
* structures for the extra memory, leaving no space for anything
* else.
*
* 10x seems like a reasonable balance between scaling flexibility and
* leaving a practically usable system.
*/
#define EXTRA_MEM_RATIO (10)
static bool xen_512gb_limit __initdata = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XEN_512GB);
static void __init xen_parse_512gb(void)
{
bool val = false;
char *arg;
arg = strstr(xen_start_info->cmd_line, "xen_512gb_limit");
if (!arg)
return;
arg = strstr(xen_start_info->cmd_line, "xen_512gb_limit=");
if (!arg)
val = true;
else if (strtobool(arg + strlen("xen_512gb_limit="), &val))
return;
xen_512gb_limit = val;
}
static void __init xen_add_extra_mem(unsigned long start_pfn,
unsigned long n_pfns)
{
int i;
/*
* No need to check for zero size, should happen rarely and will only
* write a new entry regarded to be unused due to zero size.
*/
for (i = 0; i < XEN_EXTRA_MEM_MAX_REGIONS; i++) {
/* Add new region. */
if (xen_extra_mem[i].n_pfns == 0) {
xen_extra_mem[i].start_pfn = start_pfn;
xen_extra_mem[i].n_pfns = n_pfns;
break;
}
/* Append to existing region. */
if (xen_extra_mem[i].start_pfn + xen_extra_mem[i].n_pfns ==
start_pfn) {
xen_extra_mem[i].n_pfns += n_pfns;
break;
}
}
if (i == XEN_EXTRA_MEM_MAX_REGIONS)
printk(KERN_WARNING "Warning: not enough extra memory regions\n");
memblock_reserve(PFN_PHYS(start_pfn), PFN_PHYS(n_pfns));
}
static void __init xen_del_extra_mem(unsigned long start_pfn,
unsigned long n_pfns)
{
int i;
unsigned long start_r, size_r;
for (i = 0; i < XEN_EXTRA_MEM_MAX_REGIONS; i++) {
start_r = xen_extra_mem[i].start_pfn;
size_r = xen_extra_mem[i].n_pfns;
/* Start of region. */
if (start_r == start_pfn) {
BUG_ON(n_pfns > size_r);
xen_extra_mem[i].start_pfn += n_pfns;
xen_extra_mem[i].n_pfns -= n_pfns;
break;
}
/* End of region. */
if (start_r + size_r == start_pfn + n_pfns) {
BUG_ON(n_pfns > size_r);
xen_extra_mem[i].n_pfns -= n_pfns;
break;
}
/* Mid of region. */
if (start_pfn > start_r && start_pfn < start_r + size_r) {
BUG_ON(start_pfn + n_pfns > start_r + size_r);
xen_extra_mem[i].n_pfns = start_pfn - start_r;
/* Calling memblock_reserve() again is okay. */
xen_add_extra_mem(start_pfn + n_pfns, start_r + size_r -
(start_pfn + n_pfns));
break;
}
}
memblock_free(PFN_PHYS(start_pfn), PFN_PHYS(n_pfns));
}
/*
* Called during boot before the p2m list can take entries beyond the
* hypervisor supplied p2m list. Entries in extra mem are to be regarded as
* invalid.
*/
unsigned long __ref xen_chk_extra_mem(unsigned long pfn)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < XEN_EXTRA_MEM_MAX_REGIONS; i++) {
if (pfn >= xen_extra_mem[i].start_pfn &&
pfn < xen_extra_mem[i].start_pfn + xen_extra_mem[i].n_pfns)
return INVALID_P2M_ENTRY;
}
return IDENTITY_FRAME(pfn);
}
/*
* Mark all pfns of extra mem as invalid in p2m list.
*/
void __init xen_inv_extra_mem(void)
{
unsigned long pfn, pfn_s, pfn_e;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < XEN_EXTRA_MEM_MAX_REGIONS; i++) {
if (!xen_extra_mem[i].n_pfns)
continue;
pfn_s = xen_extra_mem[i].start_pfn;
pfn_e = pfn_s + xen_extra_mem[i].n_pfns;
for (pfn = pfn_s; pfn < pfn_e; pfn++)
set_phys_to_machine(pfn, INVALID_P2M_ENTRY);
}
}
/*
* Finds the next RAM pfn available in the E820 map after min_pfn.
* This function updates min_pfn with the pfn found and returns
* the size of that range or zero if not found.
*/
static unsigned long __init xen_find_pfn_range(unsigned long *min_pfn)
xen/setup: Populate freed MFNs from non-RAM E820 entries and gaps to E820 RAM When the Xen hypervisor boots a PV kernel it hands it two pieces of information: nr_pages and a made up E820 entry. The nr_pages value defines the range from zero to nr_pages of PFNs which have a valid Machine Frame Number (MFN) underneath it. The E820 mirrors that (with the VGA hole): BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 00000000000a0000 (usable) Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000080800000 (usable) The fun comes when a PV guest that is run with a machine E820 - that can either be the initial domain or a PCI PV guest, where the E820 looks like the normal thing: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) Xen: 000000000009ec00 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000020000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000020000000 - 0000000020200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000020200000 - 0000000040000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000040000000 - 0000000040200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000040200000 - 00000000bad80000 (usable) Xen: 00000000bad80000 - 00000000badc9000 (ACPI NVS) .. With that overlaying the nr_pages directly on the E820 does not work as there are gaps and non-RAM regions that won't be used by the memory allocator. The 'xen_release_chunk' helps with that by punching holes in the P2M (PFN to MFN lookup tree) for those regions and tells us that: Freeing 20000-20200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing 40000-40200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing bad80-badf4 pfn range: 116 pages freed Freeing badf6-bae7f pfn range: 137 pages freed Freeing bb000-100000 pfn range: 282624 pages freed Released 283999 pages of unused memory Those 283999 pages are subtracted from the nr_pages and are returned to the hypervisor. The end result is that the initial domain boots with 1GB less memory as the nr_pages has been subtracted by the amount of pages residing within the PCI hole. It can balloon up to that if desired using 'xl mem-set 0 8092', but the balloon driver is not always compiled in for the initial domain. This patch, implements the populate hypercall (XENMEM_populate_physmap) which increases the the domain with the same amount of pages that were released. The other solution (that did not work) was to transplant the MFN in the P2M tree - the ones that were going to be freed were put in the E820_RAM regions past the nr_pages. But the modifications to the M2P array (the other side of creating PTEs) were not carried away. As the hypervisor is the only one capable of modifying that and the only two hypercalls that would do this are: the update_va_mapping (which won't work, as during initial bootup only PFNs up to nr_pages are mapped in the guest) or via the populate hypercall. The end result is that the kernel can now boot with the nr_pages without having to subtract the 283999 pages. On a 8GB machine, with various dom0_mem= parameters this is what we get: no dom0_mem -Memory: 6485264k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 1813812k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 7619036k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 680040k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=3G -Memory: 2616536k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5682540k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2703776k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5595300k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=max:3G -Memory: 2696732k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 448932k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2702204k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 443460k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) And the 'xm list' or 'xl list' now reflect what the dom0_mem= argument is. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v2: Use populate hypercall] [v3: Remove debug printks] [v4: Simplify code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 22:07:11 +08:00
{
const struct e820entry *entry = xen_e820_map;
xen/setup: Populate freed MFNs from non-RAM E820 entries and gaps to E820 RAM When the Xen hypervisor boots a PV kernel it hands it two pieces of information: nr_pages and a made up E820 entry. The nr_pages value defines the range from zero to nr_pages of PFNs which have a valid Machine Frame Number (MFN) underneath it. The E820 mirrors that (with the VGA hole): BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 00000000000a0000 (usable) Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000080800000 (usable) The fun comes when a PV guest that is run with a machine E820 - that can either be the initial domain or a PCI PV guest, where the E820 looks like the normal thing: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) Xen: 000000000009ec00 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000020000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000020000000 - 0000000020200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000020200000 - 0000000040000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000040000000 - 0000000040200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000040200000 - 00000000bad80000 (usable) Xen: 00000000bad80000 - 00000000badc9000 (ACPI NVS) .. With that overlaying the nr_pages directly on the E820 does not work as there are gaps and non-RAM regions that won't be used by the memory allocator. The 'xen_release_chunk' helps with that by punching holes in the P2M (PFN to MFN lookup tree) for those regions and tells us that: Freeing 20000-20200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing 40000-40200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing bad80-badf4 pfn range: 116 pages freed Freeing badf6-bae7f pfn range: 137 pages freed Freeing bb000-100000 pfn range: 282624 pages freed Released 283999 pages of unused memory Those 283999 pages are subtracted from the nr_pages and are returned to the hypervisor. The end result is that the initial domain boots with 1GB less memory as the nr_pages has been subtracted by the amount of pages residing within the PCI hole. It can balloon up to that if desired using 'xl mem-set 0 8092', but the balloon driver is not always compiled in for the initial domain. This patch, implements the populate hypercall (XENMEM_populate_physmap) which increases the the domain with the same amount of pages that were released. The other solution (that did not work) was to transplant the MFN in the P2M tree - the ones that were going to be freed were put in the E820_RAM regions past the nr_pages. But the modifications to the M2P array (the other side of creating PTEs) were not carried away. As the hypervisor is the only one capable of modifying that and the only two hypercalls that would do this are: the update_va_mapping (which won't work, as during initial bootup only PFNs up to nr_pages are mapped in the guest) or via the populate hypercall. The end result is that the kernel can now boot with the nr_pages without having to subtract the 283999 pages. On a 8GB machine, with various dom0_mem= parameters this is what we get: no dom0_mem -Memory: 6485264k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 1813812k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 7619036k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 680040k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=3G -Memory: 2616536k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5682540k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2703776k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5595300k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=max:3G -Memory: 2696732k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 448932k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2702204k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 443460k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) And the 'xm list' or 'xl list' now reflect what the dom0_mem= argument is. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v2: Use populate hypercall] [v3: Remove debug printks] [v4: Simplify code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 22:07:11 +08:00
unsigned int i;
unsigned long done = 0;
for (i = 0; i < xen_e820_map_entries; i++, entry++) {
xen/setup: Populate freed MFNs from non-RAM E820 entries and gaps to E820 RAM When the Xen hypervisor boots a PV kernel it hands it two pieces of information: nr_pages and a made up E820 entry. The nr_pages value defines the range from zero to nr_pages of PFNs which have a valid Machine Frame Number (MFN) underneath it. The E820 mirrors that (with the VGA hole): BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 00000000000a0000 (usable) Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000080800000 (usable) The fun comes when a PV guest that is run with a machine E820 - that can either be the initial domain or a PCI PV guest, where the E820 looks like the normal thing: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) Xen: 000000000009ec00 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000020000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000020000000 - 0000000020200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000020200000 - 0000000040000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000040000000 - 0000000040200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000040200000 - 00000000bad80000 (usable) Xen: 00000000bad80000 - 00000000badc9000 (ACPI NVS) .. With that overlaying the nr_pages directly on the E820 does not work as there are gaps and non-RAM regions that won't be used by the memory allocator. The 'xen_release_chunk' helps with that by punching holes in the P2M (PFN to MFN lookup tree) for those regions and tells us that: Freeing 20000-20200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing 40000-40200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing bad80-badf4 pfn range: 116 pages freed Freeing badf6-bae7f pfn range: 137 pages freed Freeing bb000-100000 pfn range: 282624 pages freed Released 283999 pages of unused memory Those 283999 pages are subtracted from the nr_pages and are returned to the hypervisor. The end result is that the initial domain boots with 1GB less memory as the nr_pages has been subtracted by the amount of pages residing within the PCI hole. It can balloon up to that if desired using 'xl mem-set 0 8092', but the balloon driver is not always compiled in for the initial domain. This patch, implements the populate hypercall (XENMEM_populate_physmap) which increases the the domain with the same amount of pages that were released. The other solution (that did not work) was to transplant the MFN in the P2M tree - the ones that were going to be freed were put in the E820_RAM regions past the nr_pages. But the modifications to the M2P array (the other side of creating PTEs) were not carried away. As the hypervisor is the only one capable of modifying that and the only two hypercalls that would do this are: the update_va_mapping (which won't work, as during initial bootup only PFNs up to nr_pages are mapped in the guest) or via the populate hypercall. The end result is that the kernel can now boot with the nr_pages without having to subtract the 283999 pages. On a 8GB machine, with various dom0_mem= parameters this is what we get: no dom0_mem -Memory: 6485264k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 1813812k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 7619036k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 680040k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=3G -Memory: 2616536k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5682540k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2703776k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5595300k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=max:3G -Memory: 2696732k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 448932k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2702204k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 443460k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) And the 'xm list' or 'xl list' now reflect what the dom0_mem= argument is. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v2: Use populate hypercall] [v3: Remove debug printks] [v4: Simplify code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 22:07:11 +08:00
unsigned long s_pfn;
unsigned long e_pfn;
if (entry->type != E820_RAM)
continue;
xen: populate correct number of pages when across mem boundary (v2) When populate pages across a mem boundary at bootup, the page count populated isn't correct. This is due to mem populated to non-mem region and ignored. Pfn range is also wrongly aligned when mem boundary isn't page aligned. For a dom0 booted with dom_mem=3368952K(0xcd9ff000-4k) dmesg diff is: [ 0.000000] Freeing 9e-100 pfn range: 98 pages freed [ 0.000000] 1-1 mapping on 9e->100 [ 0.000000] 1-1 mapping on cd9ff->100000 [ 0.000000] Released 98 pages of unused memory [ 0.000000] Set 206435 page(s) to 1-1 mapping -[ 0.000000] Populating cd9fe-cda00 pfn range: 1 pages added +[ 0.000000] Populating cd9fe-cd9ff pfn range: 1 pages added +[ 0.000000] Populating 100000-100061 pfn range: 97 pages added [ 0.000000] BIOS-provided physical RAM map: [ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) [ 0.000000] Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) [ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000000100000 - 00000000cd9ff000 (usable) [ 0.000000] Xen: 00000000cd9ffc00 - 00000000cda53c00 (ACPI NVS) ... [ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000100000000 - 0000000100061000 (usable) [ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000100061000 - 000000012c000000 (unusable) ... [ 0.000000] MEMBLOCK configuration: ... -[ 0.000000] reserved[0x4] [0x000000cd9ff000-0x000000cd9ffbff], 0xc00 bytes -[ 0.000000] reserved[0x5] [0x00000100000000-0x00000100060fff], 0x61000 bytes Related xen memory layout: (XEN) Xen-e820 RAM map: (XEN) 0000000000000000 - 000000000009ec00 (usable) (XEN) 00000000000f0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) (XEN) 0000000000100000 - 00000000cd9ffc00 (usable) Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com> [v2: If xen_do_chunk fail(populate), abort this chunk and any others] Suggested by David, thanks. Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-07-18 13:06:39 +08:00
e_pfn = PFN_DOWN(entry->addr + entry->size);
xen/setup: Populate freed MFNs from non-RAM E820 entries and gaps to E820 RAM When the Xen hypervisor boots a PV kernel it hands it two pieces of information: nr_pages and a made up E820 entry. The nr_pages value defines the range from zero to nr_pages of PFNs which have a valid Machine Frame Number (MFN) underneath it. The E820 mirrors that (with the VGA hole): BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 00000000000a0000 (usable) Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000080800000 (usable) The fun comes when a PV guest that is run with a machine E820 - that can either be the initial domain or a PCI PV guest, where the E820 looks like the normal thing: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) Xen: 000000000009ec00 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000020000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000020000000 - 0000000020200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000020200000 - 0000000040000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000040000000 - 0000000040200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000040200000 - 00000000bad80000 (usable) Xen: 00000000bad80000 - 00000000badc9000 (ACPI NVS) .. With that overlaying the nr_pages directly on the E820 does not work as there are gaps and non-RAM regions that won't be used by the memory allocator. The 'xen_release_chunk' helps with that by punching holes in the P2M (PFN to MFN lookup tree) for those regions and tells us that: Freeing 20000-20200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing 40000-40200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing bad80-badf4 pfn range: 116 pages freed Freeing badf6-bae7f pfn range: 137 pages freed Freeing bb000-100000 pfn range: 282624 pages freed Released 283999 pages of unused memory Those 283999 pages are subtracted from the nr_pages and are returned to the hypervisor. The end result is that the initial domain boots with 1GB less memory as the nr_pages has been subtracted by the amount of pages residing within the PCI hole. It can balloon up to that if desired using 'xl mem-set 0 8092', but the balloon driver is not always compiled in for the initial domain. This patch, implements the populate hypercall (XENMEM_populate_physmap) which increases the the domain with the same amount of pages that were released. The other solution (that did not work) was to transplant the MFN in the P2M tree - the ones that were going to be freed were put in the E820_RAM regions past the nr_pages. But the modifications to the M2P array (the other side of creating PTEs) were not carried away. As the hypervisor is the only one capable of modifying that and the only two hypercalls that would do this are: the update_va_mapping (which won't work, as during initial bootup only PFNs up to nr_pages are mapped in the guest) or via the populate hypercall. The end result is that the kernel can now boot with the nr_pages without having to subtract the 283999 pages. On a 8GB machine, with various dom0_mem= parameters this is what we get: no dom0_mem -Memory: 6485264k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 1813812k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 7619036k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 680040k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=3G -Memory: 2616536k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5682540k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2703776k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5595300k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=max:3G -Memory: 2696732k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 448932k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2702204k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 443460k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) And the 'xm list' or 'xl list' now reflect what the dom0_mem= argument is. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v2: Use populate hypercall] [v3: Remove debug printks] [v4: Simplify code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 22:07:11 +08:00
/* We only care about E820 after this */
if (e_pfn <= *min_pfn)
xen/setup: Populate freed MFNs from non-RAM E820 entries and gaps to E820 RAM When the Xen hypervisor boots a PV kernel it hands it two pieces of information: nr_pages and a made up E820 entry. The nr_pages value defines the range from zero to nr_pages of PFNs which have a valid Machine Frame Number (MFN) underneath it. The E820 mirrors that (with the VGA hole): BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 00000000000a0000 (usable) Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000080800000 (usable) The fun comes when a PV guest that is run with a machine E820 - that can either be the initial domain or a PCI PV guest, where the E820 looks like the normal thing: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) Xen: 000000000009ec00 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000020000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000020000000 - 0000000020200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000020200000 - 0000000040000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000040000000 - 0000000040200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000040200000 - 00000000bad80000 (usable) Xen: 00000000bad80000 - 00000000badc9000 (ACPI NVS) .. With that overlaying the nr_pages directly on the E820 does not work as there are gaps and non-RAM regions that won't be used by the memory allocator. The 'xen_release_chunk' helps with that by punching holes in the P2M (PFN to MFN lookup tree) for those regions and tells us that: Freeing 20000-20200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing 40000-40200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing bad80-badf4 pfn range: 116 pages freed Freeing badf6-bae7f pfn range: 137 pages freed Freeing bb000-100000 pfn range: 282624 pages freed Released 283999 pages of unused memory Those 283999 pages are subtracted from the nr_pages and are returned to the hypervisor. The end result is that the initial domain boots with 1GB less memory as the nr_pages has been subtracted by the amount of pages residing within the PCI hole. It can balloon up to that if desired using 'xl mem-set 0 8092', but the balloon driver is not always compiled in for the initial domain. This patch, implements the populate hypercall (XENMEM_populate_physmap) which increases the the domain with the same amount of pages that were released. The other solution (that did not work) was to transplant the MFN in the P2M tree - the ones that were going to be freed were put in the E820_RAM regions past the nr_pages. But the modifications to the M2P array (the other side of creating PTEs) were not carried away. As the hypervisor is the only one capable of modifying that and the only two hypercalls that would do this are: the update_va_mapping (which won't work, as during initial bootup only PFNs up to nr_pages are mapped in the guest) or via the populate hypercall. The end result is that the kernel can now boot with the nr_pages without having to subtract the 283999 pages. On a 8GB machine, with various dom0_mem= parameters this is what we get: no dom0_mem -Memory: 6485264k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 1813812k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 7619036k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 680040k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=3G -Memory: 2616536k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5682540k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2703776k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5595300k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=max:3G -Memory: 2696732k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 448932k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2702204k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 443460k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) And the 'xm list' or 'xl list' now reflect what the dom0_mem= argument is. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v2: Use populate hypercall] [v3: Remove debug printks] [v4: Simplify code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 22:07:11 +08:00
continue;
xen: populate correct number of pages when across mem boundary (v2) When populate pages across a mem boundary at bootup, the page count populated isn't correct. This is due to mem populated to non-mem region and ignored. Pfn range is also wrongly aligned when mem boundary isn't page aligned. For a dom0 booted with dom_mem=3368952K(0xcd9ff000-4k) dmesg diff is: [ 0.000000] Freeing 9e-100 pfn range: 98 pages freed [ 0.000000] 1-1 mapping on 9e->100 [ 0.000000] 1-1 mapping on cd9ff->100000 [ 0.000000] Released 98 pages of unused memory [ 0.000000] Set 206435 page(s) to 1-1 mapping -[ 0.000000] Populating cd9fe-cda00 pfn range: 1 pages added +[ 0.000000] Populating cd9fe-cd9ff pfn range: 1 pages added +[ 0.000000] Populating 100000-100061 pfn range: 97 pages added [ 0.000000] BIOS-provided physical RAM map: [ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) [ 0.000000] Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) [ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000000100000 - 00000000cd9ff000 (usable) [ 0.000000] Xen: 00000000cd9ffc00 - 00000000cda53c00 (ACPI NVS) ... [ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000100000000 - 0000000100061000 (usable) [ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000100061000 - 000000012c000000 (unusable) ... [ 0.000000] MEMBLOCK configuration: ... -[ 0.000000] reserved[0x4] [0x000000cd9ff000-0x000000cd9ffbff], 0xc00 bytes -[ 0.000000] reserved[0x5] [0x00000100000000-0x00000100060fff], 0x61000 bytes Related xen memory layout: (XEN) Xen-e820 RAM map: (XEN) 0000000000000000 - 000000000009ec00 (usable) (XEN) 00000000000f0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) (XEN) 0000000000100000 - 00000000cd9ffc00 (usable) Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com> [v2: If xen_do_chunk fail(populate), abort this chunk and any others] Suggested by David, thanks. Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-07-18 13:06:39 +08:00
s_pfn = PFN_UP(entry->addr);
/* If min_pfn falls within the E820 entry, we want to start
* at the min_pfn PFN.
xen/setup: Populate freed MFNs from non-RAM E820 entries and gaps to E820 RAM When the Xen hypervisor boots a PV kernel it hands it two pieces of information: nr_pages and a made up E820 entry. The nr_pages value defines the range from zero to nr_pages of PFNs which have a valid Machine Frame Number (MFN) underneath it. The E820 mirrors that (with the VGA hole): BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 00000000000a0000 (usable) Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000080800000 (usable) The fun comes when a PV guest that is run with a machine E820 - that can either be the initial domain or a PCI PV guest, where the E820 looks like the normal thing: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) Xen: 000000000009ec00 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000020000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000020000000 - 0000000020200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000020200000 - 0000000040000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000040000000 - 0000000040200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000040200000 - 00000000bad80000 (usable) Xen: 00000000bad80000 - 00000000badc9000 (ACPI NVS) .. With that overlaying the nr_pages directly on the E820 does not work as there are gaps and non-RAM regions that won't be used by the memory allocator. The 'xen_release_chunk' helps with that by punching holes in the P2M (PFN to MFN lookup tree) for those regions and tells us that: Freeing 20000-20200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing 40000-40200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing bad80-badf4 pfn range: 116 pages freed Freeing badf6-bae7f pfn range: 137 pages freed Freeing bb000-100000 pfn range: 282624 pages freed Released 283999 pages of unused memory Those 283999 pages are subtracted from the nr_pages and are returned to the hypervisor. The end result is that the initial domain boots with 1GB less memory as the nr_pages has been subtracted by the amount of pages residing within the PCI hole. It can balloon up to that if desired using 'xl mem-set 0 8092', but the balloon driver is not always compiled in for the initial domain. This patch, implements the populate hypercall (XENMEM_populate_physmap) which increases the the domain with the same amount of pages that were released. The other solution (that did not work) was to transplant the MFN in the P2M tree - the ones that were going to be freed were put in the E820_RAM regions past the nr_pages. But the modifications to the M2P array (the other side of creating PTEs) were not carried away. As the hypervisor is the only one capable of modifying that and the only two hypercalls that would do this are: the update_va_mapping (which won't work, as during initial bootup only PFNs up to nr_pages are mapped in the guest) or via the populate hypercall. The end result is that the kernel can now boot with the nr_pages without having to subtract the 283999 pages. On a 8GB machine, with various dom0_mem= parameters this is what we get: no dom0_mem -Memory: 6485264k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 1813812k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 7619036k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 680040k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=3G -Memory: 2616536k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5682540k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2703776k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5595300k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=max:3G -Memory: 2696732k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 448932k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2702204k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 443460k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) And the 'xm list' or 'xl list' now reflect what the dom0_mem= argument is. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v2: Use populate hypercall] [v3: Remove debug printks] [v4: Simplify code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 22:07:11 +08:00
*/
if (s_pfn <= *min_pfn) {
done = e_pfn - *min_pfn;
xen/setup: Populate freed MFNs from non-RAM E820 entries and gaps to E820 RAM When the Xen hypervisor boots a PV kernel it hands it two pieces of information: nr_pages and a made up E820 entry. The nr_pages value defines the range from zero to nr_pages of PFNs which have a valid Machine Frame Number (MFN) underneath it. The E820 mirrors that (with the VGA hole): BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 00000000000a0000 (usable) Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000080800000 (usable) The fun comes when a PV guest that is run with a machine E820 - that can either be the initial domain or a PCI PV guest, where the E820 looks like the normal thing: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) Xen: 000000000009ec00 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000020000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000020000000 - 0000000020200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000020200000 - 0000000040000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000040000000 - 0000000040200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000040200000 - 00000000bad80000 (usable) Xen: 00000000bad80000 - 00000000badc9000 (ACPI NVS) .. With that overlaying the nr_pages directly on the E820 does not work as there are gaps and non-RAM regions that won't be used by the memory allocator. The 'xen_release_chunk' helps with that by punching holes in the P2M (PFN to MFN lookup tree) for those regions and tells us that: Freeing 20000-20200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing 40000-40200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing bad80-badf4 pfn range: 116 pages freed Freeing badf6-bae7f pfn range: 137 pages freed Freeing bb000-100000 pfn range: 282624 pages freed Released 283999 pages of unused memory Those 283999 pages are subtracted from the nr_pages and are returned to the hypervisor. The end result is that the initial domain boots with 1GB less memory as the nr_pages has been subtracted by the amount of pages residing within the PCI hole. It can balloon up to that if desired using 'xl mem-set 0 8092', but the balloon driver is not always compiled in for the initial domain. This patch, implements the populate hypercall (XENMEM_populate_physmap) which increases the the domain with the same amount of pages that were released. The other solution (that did not work) was to transplant the MFN in the P2M tree - the ones that were going to be freed were put in the E820_RAM regions past the nr_pages. But the modifications to the M2P array (the other side of creating PTEs) were not carried away. As the hypervisor is the only one capable of modifying that and the only two hypercalls that would do this are: the update_va_mapping (which won't work, as during initial bootup only PFNs up to nr_pages are mapped in the guest) or via the populate hypercall. The end result is that the kernel can now boot with the nr_pages without having to subtract the 283999 pages. On a 8GB machine, with various dom0_mem= parameters this is what we get: no dom0_mem -Memory: 6485264k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 1813812k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 7619036k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 680040k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=3G -Memory: 2616536k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5682540k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2703776k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5595300k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=max:3G -Memory: 2696732k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 448932k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2702204k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 443460k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) And the 'xm list' or 'xl list' now reflect what the dom0_mem= argument is. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v2: Use populate hypercall] [v3: Remove debug printks] [v4: Simplify code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 22:07:11 +08:00
} else {
done = e_pfn - s_pfn;
*min_pfn = s_pfn;
xen/setup: Populate freed MFNs from non-RAM E820 entries and gaps to E820 RAM When the Xen hypervisor boots a PV kernel it hands it two pieces of information: nr_pages and a made up E820 entry. The nr_pages value defines the range from zero to nr_pages of PFNs which have a valid Machine Frame Number (MFN) underneath it. The E820 mirrors that (with the VGA hole): BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 00000000000a0000 (usable) Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000080800000 (usable) The fun comes when a PV guest that is run with a machine E820 - that can either be the initial domain or a PCI PV guest, where the E820 looks like the normal thing: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) Xen: 000000000009ec00 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000020000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000020000000 - 0000000020200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000020200000 - 0000000040000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000040000000 - 0000000040200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000040200000 - 00000000bad80000 (usable) Xen: 00000000bad80000 - 00000000badc9000 (ACPI NVS) .. With that overlaying the nr_pages directly on the E820 does not work as there are gaps and non-RAM regions that won't be used by the memory allocator. The 'xen_release_chunk' helps with that by punching holes in the P2M (PFN to MFN lookup tree) for those regions and tells us that: Freeing 20000-20200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing 40000-40200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing bad80-badf4 pfn range: 116 pages freed Freeing badf6-bae7f pfn range: 137 pages freed Freeing bb000-100000 pfn range: 282624 pages freed Released 283999 pages of unused memory Those 283999 pages are subtracted from the nr_pages and are returned to the hypervisor. The end result is that the initial domain boots with 1GB less memory as the nr_pages has been subtracted by the amount of pages residing within the PCI hole. It can balloon up to that if desired using 'xl mem-set 0 8092', but the balloon driver is not always compiled in for the initial domain. This patch, implements the populate hypercall (XENMEM_populate_physmap) which increases the the domain with the same amount of pages that were released. The other solution (that did not work) was to transplant the MFN in the P2M tree - the ones that were going to be freed were put in the E820_RAM regions past the nr_pages. But the modifications to the M2P array (the other side of creating PTEs) were not carried away. As the hypervisor is the only one capable of modifying that and the only two hypercalls that would do this are: the update_va_mapping (which won't work, as during initial bootup only PFNs up to nr_pages are mapped in the guest) or via the populate hypercall. The end result is that the kernel can now boot with the nr_pages without having to subtract the 283999 pages. On a 8GB machine, with various dom0_mem= parameters this is what we get: no dom0_mem -Memory: 6485264k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 1813812k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 7619036k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 680040k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=3G -Memory: 2616536k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5682540k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2703776k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5595300k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=max:3G -Memory: 2696732k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 448932k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2702204k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 443460k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) And the 'xm list' or 'xl list' now reflect what the dom0_mem= argument is. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v2: Use populate hypercall] [v3: Remove debug printks] [v4: Simplify code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 22:07:11 +08:00
}
break;
}
xen/setup: Populate freed MFNs from non-RAM E820 entries and gaps to E820 RAM When the Xen hypervisor boots a PV kernel it hands it two pieces of information: nr_pages and a made up E820 entry. The nr_pages value defines the range from zero to nr_pages of PFNs which have a valid Machine Frame Number (MFN) underneath it. The E820 mirrors that (with the VGA hole): BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 00000000000a0000 (usable) Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000080800000 (usable) The fun comes when a PV guest that is run with a machine E820 - that can either be the initial domain or a PCI PV guest, where the E820 looks like the normal thing: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) Xen: 000000000009ec00 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000020000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000020000000 - 0000000020200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000020200000 - 0000000040000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000040000000 - 0000000040200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000040200000 - 00000000bad80000 (usable) Xen: 00000000bad80000 - 00000000badc9000 (ACPI NVS) .. With that overlaying the nr_pages directly on the E820 does not work as there are gaps and non-RAM regions that won't be used by the memory allocator. The 'xen_release_chunk' helps with that by punching holes in the P2M (PFN to MFN lookup tree) for those regions and tells us that: Freeing 20000-20200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing 40000-40200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing bad80-badf4 pfn range: 116 pages freed Freeing badf6-bae7f pfn range: 137 pages freed Freeing bb000-100000 pfn range: 282624 pages freed Released 283999 pages of unused memory Those 283999 pages are subtracted from the nr_pages and are returned to the hypervisor. The end result is that the initial domain boots with 1GB less memory as the nr_pages has been subtracted by the amount of pages residing within the PCI hole. It can balloon up to that if desired using 'xl mem-set 0 8092', but the balloon driver is not always compiled in for the initial domain. This patch, implements the populate hypercall (XENMEM_populate_physmap) which increases the the domain with the same amount of pages that were released. The other solution (that did not work) was to transplant the MFN in the P2M tree - the ones that were going to be freed were put in the E820_RAM regions past the nr_pages. But the modifications to the M2P array (the other side of creating PTEs) were not carried away. As the hypervisor is the only one capable of modifying that and the only two hypercalls that would do this are: the update_va_mapping (which won't work, as during initial bootup only PFNs up to nr_pages are mapped in the guest) or via the populate hypercall. The end result is that the kernel can now boot with the nr_pages without having to subtract the 283999 pages. On a 8GB machine, with various dom0_mem= parameters this is what we get: no dom0_mem -Memory: 6485264k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 1813812k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 7619036k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 680040k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=3G -Memory: 2616536k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5682540k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2703776k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5595300k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=max:3G -Memory: 2696732k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 448932k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2702204k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 443460k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) And the 'xm list' or 'xl list' now reflect what the dom0_mem= argument is. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v2: Use populate hypercall] [v3: Remove debug printks] [v4: Simplify code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 22:07:11 +08:00
return done;
}
xen/setup: Populate freed MFNs from non-RAM E820 entries and gaps to E820 RAM When the Xen hypervisor boots a PV kernel it hands it two pieces of information: nr_pages and a made up E820 entry. The nr_pages value defines the range from zero to nr_pages of PFNs which have a valid Machine Frame Number (MFN) underneath it. The E820 mirrors that (with the VGA hole): BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 00000000000a0000 (usable) Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000080800000 (usable) The fun comes when a PV guest that is run with a machine E820 - that can either be the initial domain or a PCI PV guest, where the E820 looks like the normal thing: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) Xen: 000000000009ec00 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000020000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000020000000 - 0000000020200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000020200000 - 0000000040000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000040000000 - 0000000040200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000040200000 - 00000000bad80000 (usable) Xen: 00000000bad80000 - 00000000badc9000 (ACPI NVS) .. With that overlaying the nr_pages directly on the E820 does not work as there are gaps and non-RAM regions that won't be used by the memory allocator. The 'xen_release_chunk' helps with that by punching holes in the P2M (PFN to MFN lookup tree) for those regions and tells us that: Freeing 20000-20200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing 40000-40200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing bad80-badf4 pfn range: 116 pages freed Freeing badf6-bae7f pfn range: 137 pages freed Freeing bb000-100000 pfn range: 282624 pages freed Released 283999 pages of unused memory Those 283999 pages are subtracted from the nr_pages and are returned to the hypervisor. The end result is that the initial domain boots with 1GB less memory as the nr_pages has been subtracted by the amount of pages residing within the PCI hole. It can balloon up to that if desired using 'xl mem-set 0 8092', but the balloon driver is not always compiled in for the initial domain. This patch, implements the populate hypercall (XENMEM_populate_physmap) which increases the the domain with the same amount of pages that were released. The other solution (that did not work) was to transplant the MFN in the P2M tree - the ones that were going to be freed were put in the E820_RAM regions past the nr_pages. But the modifications to the M2P array (the other side of creating PTEs) were not carried away. As the hypervisor is the only one capable of modifying that and the only two hypercalls that would do this are: the update_va_mapping (which won't work, as during initial bootup only PFNs up to nr_pages are mapped in the guest) or via the populate hypercall. The end result is that the kernel can now boot with the nr_pages without having to subtract the 283999 pages. On a 8GB machine, with various dom0_mem= parameters this is what we get: no dom0_mem -Memory: 6485264k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 1813812k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 7619036k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 680040k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=3G -Memory: 2616536k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5682540k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2703776k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5595300k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=max:3G -Memory: 2696732k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 448932k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2702204k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 443460k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) And the 'xm list' or 'xl list' now reflect what the dom0_mem= argument is. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v2: Use populate hypercall] [v3: Remove debug printks] [v4: Simplify code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 22:07:11 +08:00
static int __init xen_free_mfn(unsigned long mfn)
{
struct xen_memory_reservation reservation = {
.address_bits = 0,
.extent_order = 0,
.domid = DOMID_SELF
};
set_xen_guest_handle(reservation.extent_start, &mfn);
reservation.nr_extents = 1;
return HYPERVISOR_memory_op(XENMEM_decrease_reservation, &reservation);
}
/*
* This releases a chunk of memory and then does the identity map. It's used
* as a fallback if the remapping fails.
*/
static void __init xen_set_identity_and_release_chunk(unsigned long start_pfn,
unsigned long end_pfn, unsigned long nr_pages)
{
unsigned long pfn, end;
int ret;
WARN_ON(start_pfn > end_pfn);
/* Release pages first. */
end = min(end_pfn, nr_pages);
for (pfn = start_pfn; pfn < end; pfn++) {
unsigned long mfn = pfn_to_mfn(pfn);
/* Make sure pfn exists to start with */
if (mfn == INVALID_P2M_ENTRY || mfn_to_pfn(mfn) != pfn)
continue;
ret = xen_free_mfn(mfn);
WARN(ret != 1, "Failed to release pfn %lx err=%d\n", pfn, ret);
if (ret == 1) {
xen_released_pages++;
if (!__set_phys_to_machine(pfn, INVALID_P2M_ENTRY))
break;
} else
break;
}
set_phys_range_identity(start_pfn, end_pfn);
}
/*
* Helper function to update the p2m and m2p tables and kernel mapping.
*/
static void __init xen_update_mem_tables(unsigned long pfn, unsigned long mfn)
{
struct mmu_update update = {
.ptr = ((uint64_t)mfn << PAGE_SHIFT) | MMU_MACHPHYS_UPDATE,
.val = pfn
};
/* Update p2m */
if (!set_phys_to_machine(pfn, mfn)) {
WARN(1, "Failed to set p2m mapping for pfn=%ld mfn=%ld\n",
pfn, mfn);
BUG();
xen/setup: Populate freed MFNs from non-RAM E820 entries and gaps to E820 RAM When the Xen hypervisor boots a PV kernel it hands it two pieces of information: nr_pages and a made up E820 entry. The nr_pages value defines the range from zero to nr_pages of PFNs which have a valid Machine Frame Number (MFN) underneath it. The E820 mirrors that (with the VGA hole): BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 00000000000a0000 (usable) Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000080800000 (usable) The fun comes when a PV guest that is run with a machine E820 - that can either be the initial domain or a PCI PV guest, where the E820 looks like the normal thing: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) Xen: 000000000009ec00 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000020000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000020000000 - 0000000020200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000020200000 - 0000000040000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000040000000 - 0000000040200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000040200000 - 00000000bad80000 (usable) Xen: 00000000bad80000 - 00000000badc9000 (ACPI NVS) .. With that overlaying the nr_pages directly on the E820 does not work as there are gaps and non-RAM regions that won't be used by the memory allocator. The 'xen_release_chunk' helps with that by punching holes in the P2M (PFN to MFN lookup tree) for those regions and tells us that: Freeing 20000-20200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing 40000-40200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing bad80-badf4 pfn range: 116 pages freed Freeing badf6-bae7f pfn range: 137 pages freed Freeing bb000-100000 pfn range: 282624 pages freed Released 283999 pages of unused memory Those 283999 pages are subtracted from the nr_pages and are returned to the hypervisor. The end result is that the initial domain boots with 1GB less memory as the nr_pages has been subtracted by the amount of pages residing within the PCI hole. It can balloon up to that if desired using 'xl mem-set 0 8092', but the balloon driver is not always compiled in for the initial domain. This patch, implements the populate hypercall (XENMEM_populate_physmap) which increases the the domain with the same amount of pages that were released. The other solution (that did not work) was to transplant the MFN in the P2M tree - the ones that were going to be freed were put in the E820_RAM regions past the nr_pages. But the modifications to the M2P array (the other side of creating PTEs) were not carried away. As the hypervisor is the only one capable of modifying that and the only two hypercalls that would do this are: the update_va_mapping (which won't work, as during initial bootup only PFNs up to nr_pages are mapped in the guest) or via the populate hypercall. The end result is that the kernel can now boot with the nr_pages without having to subtract the 283999 pages. On a 8GB machine, with various dom0_mem= parameters this is what we get: no dom0_mem -Memory: 6485264k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 1813812k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 7619036k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 680040k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=3G -Memory: 2616536k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5682540k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2703776k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5595300k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=max:3G -Memory: 2696732k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 448932k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2702204k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 443460k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) And the 'xm list' or 'xl list' now reflect what the dom0_mem= argument is. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v2: Use populate hypercall] [v3: Remove debug printks] [v4: Simplify code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 22:07:11 +08:00
}
/* Update m2p */
if (HYPERVISOR_mmu_update(&update, 1, NULL, DOMID_SELF) < 0) {
WARN(1, "Failed to set m2p mapping for mfn=%ld pfn=%ld\n",
mfn, pfn);
BUG();
}
/* Update kernel mapping, but not for highmem. */
if (pfn >= PFN_UP(__pa(high_memory - 1)))
return;
if (HYPERVISOR_update_va_mapping((unsigned long)__va(pfn << PAGE_SHIFT),
mfn_pte(mfn, PAGE_KERNEL), 0)) {
WARN(1, "Failed to update kernel mapping for mfn=%ld pfn=%ld\n",
mfn, pfn);
BUG();
}
xen/setup: Populate freed MFNs from non-RAM E820 entries and gaps to E820 RAM When the Xen hypervisor boots a PV kernel it hands it two pieces of information: nr_pages and a made up E820 entry. The nr_pages value defines the range from zero to nr_pages of PFNs which have a valid Machine Frame Number (MFN) underneath it. The E820 mirrors that (with the VGA hole): BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 00000000000a0000 (usable) Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000080800000 (usable) The fun comes when a PV guest that is run with a machine E820 - that can either be the initial domain or a PCI PV guest, where the E820 looks like the normal thing: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) Xen: 000000000009ec00 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000020000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000020000000 - 0000000020200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000020200000 - 0000000040000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000040000000 - 0000000040200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000040200000 - 00000000bad80000 (usable) Xen: 00000000bad80000 - 00000000badc9000 (ACPI NVS) .. With that overlaying the nr_pages directly on the E820 does not work as there are gaps and non-RAM regions that won't be used by the memory allocator. The 'xen_release_chunk' helps with that by punching holes in the P2M (PFN to MFN lookup tree) for those regions and tells us that: Freeing 20000-20200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing 40000-40200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing bad80-badf4 pfn range: 116 pages freed Freeing badf6-bae7f pfn range: 137 pages freed Freeing bb000-100000 pfn range: 282624 pages freed Released 283999 pages of unused memory Those 283999 pages are subtracted from the nr_pages and are returned to the hypervisor. The end result is that the initial domain boots with 1GB less memory as the nr_pages has been subtracted by the amount of pages residing within the PCI hole. It can balloon up to that if desired using 'xl mem-set 0 8092', but the balloon driver is not always compiled in for the initial domain. This patch, implements the populate hypercall (XENMEM_populate_physmap) which increases the the domain with the same amount of pages that were released. The other solution (that did not work) was to transplant the MFN in the P2M tree - the ones that were going to be freed were put in the E820_RAM regions past the nr_pages. But the modifications to the M2P array (the other side of creating PTEs) were not carried away. As the hypervisor is the only one capable of modifying that and the only two hypercalls that would do this are: the update_va_mapping (which won't work, as during initial bootup only PFNs up to nr_pages are mapped in the guest) or via the populate hypercall. The end result is that the kernel can now boot with the nr_pages without having to subtract the 283999 pages. On a 8GB machine, with various dom0_mem= parameters this is what we get: no dom0_mem -Memory: 6485264k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 1813812k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 7619036k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 680040k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=3G -Memory: 2616536k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5682540k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2703776k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5595300k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=max:3G -Memory: 2696732k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 448932k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2702204k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 443460k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) And the 'xm list' or 'xl list' now reflect what the dom0_mem= argument is. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v2: Use populate hypercall] [v3: Remove debug printks] [v4: Simplify code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 22:07:11 +08:00
}
/*
* This function updates the p2m and m2p tables with an identity map from
* start_pfn to start_pfn+size and prepares remapping the underlying RAM of the
* original allocation at remap_pfn. The information needed for remapping is
* saved in the memory itself to avoid the need for allocating buffers. The
* complete remap information is contained in a list of MFNs each containing
* up to REMAP_SIZE MFNs and the start target PFN for doing the remap.
* This enables us to preserve the original mfn sequence while doing the
* remapping at a time when the memory management is capable of allocating
* virtual and physical memory in arbitrary amounts, see 'xen_remap_memory' and
* its callers.
*/
static void __init xen_do_set_identity_and_remap_chunk(
unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long size, unsigned long remap_pfn)
{
unsigned long buf = (unsigned long)&xen_remap_buf;
unsigned long mfn_save, mfn;
unsigned long ident_pfn_iter, remap_pfn_iter;
unsigned long ident_end_pfn = start_pfn + size;
unsigned long left = size;
unsigned int i, chunk;
WARN_ON(size == 0);
BUG_ON(xen_feature(XENFEAT_auto_translated_physmap));
mfn_save = virt_to_mfn(buf);
for (ident_pfn_iter = start_pfn, remap_pfn_iter = remap_pfn;
ident_pfn_iter < ident_end_pfn;
ident_pfn_iter += REMAP_SIZE, remap_pfn_iter += REMAP_SIZE) {
chunk = (left < REMAP_SIZE) ? left : REMAP_SIZE;
/* Map first pfn to xen_remap_buf */
mfn = pfn_to_mfn(ident_pfn_iter);
set_pte_mfn(buf, mfn, PAGE_KERNEL);
/* Save mapping information in page */
xen_remap_buf.next_area_mfn = xen_remap_mfn;
xen_remap_buf.target_pfn = remap_pfn_iter;
xen_remap_buf.size = chunk;
for (i = 0; i < chunk; i++)
xen_remap_buf.mfns[i] = pfn_to_mfn(ident_pfn_iter + i);
/* Put remap buf into list. */
xen_remap_mfn = mfn;
/* Set identity map */
set_phys_range_identity(ident_pfn_iter, ident_pfn_iter + chunk);
left -= chunk;
}
/* Restore old xen_remap_buf mapping */
set_pte_mfn(buf, mfn_save, PAGE_KERNEL);
}
/*
* This function takes a contiguous pfn range that needs to be identity mapped
* and:
*
* 1) Finds a new range of pfns to use to remap based on E820 and remap_pfn.
* 2) Calls the do_ function to actually do the mapping/remapping work.
*
* The goal is to not allocate additional memory but to remap the existing
* pages. In the case of an error the underlying memory is simply released back
* to Xen and not remapped.
*/
static unsigned long __init xen_set_identity_and_remap_chunk(
unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long end_pfn, unsigned long nr_pages,
unsigned long remap_pfn)
{
unsigned long pfn;
unsigned long i = 0;
unsigned long n = end_pfn - start_pfn;
while (i < n) {
unsigned long cur_pfn = start_pfn + i;
unsigned long left = n - i;
unsigned long size = left;
unsigned long remap_range_size;
/* Do not remap pages beyond the current allocation */
if (cur_pfn >= nr_pages) {
/* Identity map remaining pages */
set_phys_range_identity(cur_pfn, cur_pfn + size);
break;
}
if (cur_pfn + size > nr_pages)
size = nr_pages - cur_pfn;
remap_range_size = xen_find_pfn_range(&remap_pfn);
if (!remap_range_size) {
pr_warning("Unable to find available pfn range, not remapping identity pages\n");
xen_set_identity_and_release_chunk(cur_pfn,
cur_pfn + left, nr_pages);
break;
}
/* Adjust size to fit in current e820 RAM region */
if (size > remap_range_size)
size = remap_range_size;
xen_do_set_identity_and_remap_chunk(cur_pfn, size, remap_pfn);
/* Update variables to reflect new mappings. */
i += size;
remap_pfn += size;
}
/*
* If the PFNs are currently mapped, the VA mapping also needs
* to be updated to be 1:1.
*/
for (pfn = start_pfn; pfn <= max_pfn_mapped && pfn < end_pfn; pfn++)
(void)HYPERVISOR_update_va_mapping(
(unsigned long)__va(pfn << PAGE_SHIFT),
mfn_pte(pfn, PAGE_KERNEL_IO), 0);
return remap_pfn;
}
static void __init xen_set_identity_and_remap(unsigned long nr_pages)
{
phys_addr_t start = 0;
unsigned long last_pfn = nr_pages;
const struct e820entry *entry = xen_e820_map;
int i;
/*
* Combine non-RAM regions and gaps until a RAM region (or the
* end of the map) is reached, then set the 1:1 map and
* remap the memory in those non-RAM regions.
*
* The combined non-RAM regions are rounded to a whole number
* of pages so any partial pages are accessible via the 1:1
* mapping. This is needed for some BIOSes that put (for
* example) the DMI tables in a reserved region that begins on
* a non-page boundary.
*/
for (i = 0; i < xen_e820_map_entries; i++, entry++) {
phys_addr_t end = entry->addr + entry->size;
if (entry->type == E820_RAM || i == xen_e820_map_entries - 1) {
unsigned long start_pfn = PFN_DOWN(start);
unsigned long end_pfn = PFN_UP(end);
if (entry->type == E820_RAM)
end_pfn = PFN_UP(entry->addr);
if (start_pfn < end_pfn)
last_pfn = xen_set_identity_and_remap_chunk(
start_pfn, end_pfn, nr_pages,
last_pfn);
start = end;
}
}
pr_info("Released %ld page(s)\n", xen_released_pages);
}
/*
* Remap the memory prepared in xen_do_set_identity_and_remap_chunk().
* The remap information (which mfn remap to which pfn) is contained in the
* to be remapped memory itself in a linked list anchored at xen_remap_mfn.
* This scheme allows to remap the different chunks in arbitrary order while
* the resulting mapping will be independant from the order.
*/
void __init xen_remap_memory(void)
{
unsigned long buf = (unsigned long)&xen_remap_buf;
unsigned long mfn_save, mfn, pfn;
unsigned long remapped = 0;
unsigned int i;
unsigned long pfn_s = ~0UL;
unsigned long len = 0;
mfn_save = virt_to_mfn(buf);
while (xen_remap_mfn != INVALID_P2M_ENTRY) {
/* Map the remap information */
set_pte_mfn(buf, xen_remap_mfn, PAGE_KERNEL);
BUG_ON(xen_remap_mfn != xen_remap_buf.mfns[0]);
pfn = xen_remap_buf.target_pfn;
for (i = 0; i < xen_remap_buf.size; i++) {
mfn = xen_remap_buf.mfns[i];
xen_update_mem_tables(pfn, mfn);
remapped++;
pfn++;
}
if (pfn_s == ~0UL || pfn == pfn_s) {
pfn_s = xen_remap_buf.target_pfn;
len += xen_remap_buf.size;
} else if (pfn_s + len == xen_remap_buf.target_pfn) {
len += xen_remap_buf.size;
} else {
xen_del_extra_mem(pfn_s, len);
pfn_s = xen_remap_buf.target_pfn;
len = xen_remap_buf.size;
}
mfn = xen_remap_mfn;
xen_remap_mfn = xen_remap_buf.next_area_mfn;
}
if (pfn_s != ~0UL && len)
xen_del_extra_mem(pfn_s, len);
set_pte_mfn(buf, mfn_save, PAGE_KERNEL);
pr_info("Remapped %ld page(s)\n", remapped);
}
static unsigned long __init xen_get_pages_limit(void)
{
unsigned long limit;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
limit = GB(64) / PAGE_SIZE;
#else
limit = MAXMEM / PAGE_SIZE;
if (!xen_initial_domain() && xen_512gb_limit)
limit = GB(512) / PAGE_SIZE;
#endif
return limit;
}
static unsigned long __init xen_get_max_pages(void)
{
unsigned long max_pages, limit;
domid_t domid = DOMID_SELF;
long ret;
limit = xen_get_pages_limit();
max_pages = limit;
xen: only limit memory map to maximum reservation for domain 0. d312ae878b6a "xen: use maximum reservation to limit amount of usable RAM" clamped the total amount of RAM to the current maximum reservation. This is correct for dom0 but is not correct for guest domains. In order to boot a guest "pre-ballooned" (e.g. with memory=1G but maxmem=2G) in order to allow for future memory expansion the guest must derive max_pfn from the e820 provided by the toolstack and not the current maximum reservation (which can reflect only the current maximum, not the guest lifetime max). The existing algorithm already behaves this correctly if we do not artificially limit the maximum number of pages for the guest case. For a guest booted with maxmem=512, memory=128 this results in: [ 0.000000] BIOS-provided physical RAM map: [ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000000000000 - 00000000000a0000 (usable) [ 0.000000] Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) -[ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000008100000 (usable) -[ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000008100000 - 0000000020800000 (unusable) +[ 0.000000] Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000020800000 (usable) ... [ 0.000000] NX (Execute Disable) protection: active [ 0.000000] DMI not present or invalid. [ 0.000000] e820 update range: 0000000000000000 - 0000000000010000 (usable) ==> (reserved) [ 0.000000] e820 remove range: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (usable) -[ 0.000000] last_pfn = 0x8100 max_arch_pfn = 0x1000000 +[ 0.000000] last_pfn = 0x20800 max_arch_pfn = 0x1000000 [ 0.000000] initial memory mapped : 0 - 027ff000 [ 0.000000] Base memory trampoline at [c009f000] 9f000 size 4096 -[ 0.000000] init_memory_mapping: 0000000000000000-0000000008100000 -[ 0.000000] 0000000000 - 0008100000 page 4k -[ 0.000000] kernel direct mapping tables up to 8100000 @ 27bb000-27ff000 +[ 0.000000] init_memory_mapping: 0000000000000000-0000000020800000 +[ 0.000000] 0000000000 - 0020800000 page 4k +[ 0.000000] kernel direct mapping tables up to 20800000 @ 26f8000-27ff000 [ 0.000000] xen: setting RW the range 27e8000 - 27ff000 [ 0.000000] 0MB HIGHMEM available. -[ 0.000000] 129MB LOWMEM available. -[ 0.000000] mapped low ram: 0 - 08100000 -[ 0.000000] low ram: 0 - 08100000 +[ 0.000000] 520MB LOWMEM available. +[ 0.000000] mapped low ram: 0 - 20800000 +[ 0.000000] low ram: 0 - 20800000 With this change "xl mem-set <domain> 512M" will successfully increase the guest RAM (by reducing the balloon). There is no change for dom0. Reported-and-Tested-by: George Shuklin <george.shuklin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Reviewed-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2011-12-14 20:16:08 +08:00
/*
* For the initial domain we use the maximum reservation as
* the maximum page.
*
* For guest domains the current maximum reservation reflects
* the current maximum rather than the static maximum. In this
* case the e820 map provided to us will cover the static
* maximum region.
*/
if (xen_initial_domain()) {
ret = HYPERVISOR_memory_op(XENMEM_maximum_reservation, &domid);
if (ret > 0)
max_pages = ret;
}
return min(max_pages, limit);
}
static void __init xen_align_and_add_e820_region(phys_addr_t start,
phys_addr_t size, int type)
{
phys_addr_t end = start + size;
/* Align RAM regions to page boundaries. */
if (type == E820_RAM) {
start = PAGE_ALIGN(start);
end &= ~((phys_addr_t)PAGE_SIZE - 1);
}
e820_add_region(start, end - start, type);
}
static void __init xen_ignore_unusable(void)
x86/xen: do not identity map UNUSABLE regions in the machine E820 If there are UNUSABLE regions in the machine memory map, dom0 will attempt to map them 1:1 which is not permitted by Xen and the kernel will crash. There isn't anything interesting in the UNUSABLE region that the dom0 kernel needs access to so we can avoid making the 1:1 mapping and treat it as RAM. We only do this for dom0, as that is where tboot case shows up. A PV domU could have an UNUSABLE region in its pseudo-physical map and would need to be handled in another patch. This fixes a boot failure on hosts with tboot. tboot marks a region in the e820 map as unusable and the dom0 kernel would attempt to map this region and Xen does not permit unusable regions to be mapped by guests. (XEN) 0000000000000000 - 0000000000060000 (usable) (XEN) 0000000000060000 - 0000000000068000 (reserved) (XEN) 0000000000068000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) (XEN) 0000000000100000 - 0000000000800000 (usable) (XEN) 0000000000800000 - 0000000000972000 (unusable) tboot marked this region as unusable. (XEN) 0000000000972000 - 00000000cf200000 (usable) (XEN) 00000000cf200000 - 00000000cf38f000 (reserved) (XEN) 00000000cf38f000 - 00000000cf3ce000 (ACPI data) (XEN) 00000000cf3ce000 - 00000000d0000000 (reserved) (XEN) 00000000e0000000 - 00000000f0000000 (reserved) (XEN) 00000000fe000000 - 0000000100000000 (reserved) (XEN) 0000000100000000 - 0000000630000000 (usable) Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v1: Altered the patch and description with domU's with UNUSABLE regions] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2013-08-16 22:42:55 +08:00
{
struct e820entry *entry = xen_e820_map;
x86/xen: do not identity map UNUSABLE regions in the machine E820 If there are UNUSABLE regions in the machine memory map, dom0 will attempt to map them 1:1 which is not permitted by Xen and the kernel will crash. There isn't anything interesting in the UNUSABLE region that the dom0 kernel needs access to so we can avoid making the 1:1 mapping and treat it as RAM. We only do this for dom0, as that is where tboot case shows up. A PV domU could have an UNUSABLE region in its pseudo-physical map and would need to be handled in another patch. This fixes a boot failure on hosts with tboot. tboot marks a region in the e820 map as unusable and the dom0 kernel would attempt to map this region and Xen does not permit unusable regions to be mapped by guests. (XEN) 0000000000000000 - 0000000000060000 (usable) (XEN) 0000000000060000 - 0000000000068000 (reserved) (XEN) 0000000000068000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) (XEN) 0000000000100000 - 0000000000800000 (usable) (XEN) 0000000000800000 - 0000000000972000 (unusable) tboot marked this region as unusable. (XEN) 0000000000972000 - 00000000cf200000 (usable) (XEN) 00000000cf200000 - 00000000cf38f000 (reserved) (XEN) 00000000cf38f000 - 00000000cf3ce000 (ACPI data) (XEN) 00000000cf3ce000 - 00000000d0000000 (reserved) (XEN) 00000000e0000000 - 00000000f0000000 (reserved) (XEN) 00000000fe000000 - 0000000100000000 (reserved) (XEN) 0000000100000000 - 0000000630000000 (usable) Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v1: Altered the patch and description with domU's with UNUSABLE regions] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2013-08-16 22:42:55 +08:00
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < xen_e820_map_entries; i++, entry++) {
x86/xen: do not identity map UNUSABLE regions in the machine E820 If there are UNUSABLE regions in the machine memory map, dom0 will attempt to map them 1:1 which is not permitted by Xen and the kernel will crash. There isn't anything interesting in the UNUSABLE region that the dom0 kernel needs access to so we can avoid making the 1:1 mapping and treat it as RAM. We only do this for dom0, as that is where tboot case shows up. A PV domU could have an UNUSABLE region in its pseudo-physical map and would need to be handled in another patch. This fixes a boot failure on hosts with tboot. tboot marks a region in the e820 map as unusable and the dom0 kernel would attempt to map this region and Xen does not permit unusable regions to be mapped by guests. (XEN) 0000000000000000 - 0000000000060000 (usable) (XEN) 0000000000060000 - 0000000000068000 (reserved) (XEN) 0000000000068000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) (XEN) 0000000000100000 - 0000000000800000 (usable) (XEN) 0000000000800000 - 0000000000972000 (unusable) tboot marked this region as unusable. (XEN) 0000000000972000 - 00000000cf200000 (usable) (XEN) 00000000cf200000 - 00000000cf38f000 (reserved) (XEN) 00000000cf38f000 - 00000000cf3ce000 (ACPI data) (XEN) 00000000cf3ce000 - 00000000d0000000 (reserved) (XEN) 00000000e0000000 - 00000000f0000000 (reserved) (XEN) 00000000fe000000 - 0000000100000000 (reserved) (XEN) 0000000100000000 - 0000000630000000 (usable) Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v1: Altered the patch and description with domU's with UNUSABLE regions] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2013-08-16 22:42:55 +08:00
if (entry->type == E820_UNUSABLE)
entry->type = E820_RAM;
}
}
static unsigned long __init xen_count_remap_pages(unsigned long max_pfn)
{
unsigned long extra = 0;
xen: avoid another early crash of memory limited dom0 Commit b1c9f169047b ("xen: split counting of extra memory pages...") introduced an error when dom0 was started with limited memory occurring only on some hardware. The problem arises in case dom0 is started with initial memory and maximum memory being the same. The kernel must be configured without CONFIG_XEN_BALLOON_MEMORY_HOTPLUG for the problem to happen. If all of this is true and the E820 map of the machine is sparse (some areas are not covered) then the machine might crash early in the boot process. An example E820 map triggering the problem looks like this: [ 0.000000] e820: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000000000-0x000000000009d7ff] usable [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000000009d800-0x000000000009ffff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000000e0000-0x00000000000fffff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000100000-0x00000000cf7fafff] usable [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cf7fb000-0x00000000cf95ffff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cf960000-0x00000000cfb62fff] ACPI NVS [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfb63000-0x00000000cfd14fff] usable [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfd15000-0x00000000cfd61fff] ACPI NVS [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfd62000-0x00000000cfd6cfff] ACPI data [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfd6d000-0x00000000cfd6ffff] ACPI NVS [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfd70000-0x00000000cfd70fff] usable [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfd71000-0x00000000cfea8fff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfea9000-0x00000000cfeb9fff] ACPI NVS [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfeba000-0x00000000cfecafff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfecb000-0x00000000cfecbfff] ACPI NVS [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfecc000-0x00000000cfedbfff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfedc000-0x00000000cfedcfff] ACPI NVS [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfedd000-0x00000000cfeddfff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfede000-0x00000000cfee3fff] ACPI NVS [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfee4000-0x00000000cfef6fff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfef7000-0x00000000cfefffff] usable [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000e0000000-0x00000000efffffff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fec00000-0x00000000fec00fff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fec10000-0x00000000fec10fff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fed00000-0x00000000fed00fff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fed40000-0x00000000fed44fff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fed61000-0x00000000fed70fff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fed80000-0x00000000fed8ffff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000ff000000-0x00000000ffffffff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000100001000-0x000000020effffff] usable In this case the area a0000-dffff isn't present in the map. This will confuse the memory setup of the domain when remapping the memory from such holes to populated areas. To avoid the problem the accounting of to be remapped memory has to count such holes in the E820 map as well. Reported-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
2015-08-20 00:53:11 +08:00
unsigned long start_pfn, end_pfn;
const struct e820entry *entry = xen_e820_map;
int i;
xen: avoid another early crash of memory limited dom0 Commit b1c9f169047b ("xen: split counting of extra memory pages...") introduced an error when dom0 was started with limited memory occurring only on some hardware. The problem arises in case dom0 is started with initial memory and maximum memory being the same. The kernel must be configured without CONFIG_XEN_BALLOON_MEMORY_HOTPLUG for the problem to happen. If all of this is true and the E820 map of the machine is sparse (some areas are not covered) then the machine might crash early in the boot process. An example E820 map triggering the problem looks like this: [ 0.000000] e820: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000000000-0x000000000009d7ff] usable [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000000009d800-0x000000000009ffff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000000e0000-0x00000000000fffff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000100000-0x00000000cf7fafff] usable [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cf7fb000-0x00000000cf95ffff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cf960000-0x00000000cfb62fff] ACPI NVS [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfb63000-0x00000000cfd14fff] usable [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfd15000-0x00000000cfd61fff] ACPI NVS [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfd62000-0x00000000cfd6cfff] ACPI data [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfd6d000-0x00000000cfd6ffff] ACPI NVS [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfd70000-0x00000000cfd70fff] usable [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfd71000-0x00000000cfea8fff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfea9000-0x00000000cfeb9fff] ACPI NVS [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfeba000-0x00000000cfecafff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfecb000-0x00000000cfecbfff] ACPI NVS [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfecc000-0x00000000cfedbfff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfedc000-0x00000000cfedcfff] ACPI NVS [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfedd000-0x00000000cfeddfff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfede000-0x00000000cfee3fff] ACPI NVS [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfee4000-0x00000000cfef6fff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfef7000-0x00000000cfefffff] usable [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000e0000000-0x00000000efffffff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fec00000-0x00000000fec00fff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fec10000-0x00000000fec10fff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fed00000-0x00000000fed00fff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fed40000-0x00000000fed44fff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fed61000-0x00000000fed70fff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fed80000-0x00000000fed8ffff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000ff000000-0x00000000ffffffff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000100001000-0x000000020effffff] usable In this case the area a0000-dffff isn't present in the map. This will confuse the memory setup of the domain when remapping the memory from such holes to populated areas. To avoid the problem the accounting of to be remapped memory has to count such holes in the E820 map as well. Reported-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
2015-08-20 00:53:11 +08:00
end_pfn = 0;
for (i = 0; i < xen_e820_map_entries; i++, entry++) {
xen: avoid another early crash of memory limited dom0 Commit b1c9f169047b ("xen: split counting of extra memory pages...") introduced an error when dom0 was started with limited memory occurring only on some hardware. The problem arises in case dom0 is started with initial memory and maximum memory being the same. The kernel must be configured without CONFIG_XEN_BALLOON_MEMORY_HOTPLUG for the problem to happen. If all of this is true and the E820 map of the machine is sparse (some areas are not covered) then the machine might crash early in the boot process. An example E820 map triggering the problem looks like this: [ 0.000000] e820: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000000000-0x000000000009d7ff] usable [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000000009d800-0x000000000009ffff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000000e0000-0x00000000000fffff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000100000-0x00000000cf7fafff] usable [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cf7fb000-0x00000000cf95ffff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cf960000-0x00000000cfb62fff] ACPI NVS [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfb63000-0x00000000cfd14fff] usable [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfd15000-0x00000000cfd61fff] ACPI NVS [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfd62000-0x00000000cfd6cfff] ACPI data [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfd6d000-0x00000000cfd6ffff] ACPI NVS [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfd70000-0x00000000cfd70fff] usable [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfd71000-0x00000000cfea8fff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfea9000-0x00000000cfeb9fff] ACPI NVS [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfeba000-0x00000000cfecafff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfecb000-0x00000000cfecbfff] ACPI NVS [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfecc000-0x00000000cfedbfff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfedc000-0x00000000cfedcfff] ACPI NVS [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfedd000-0x00000000cfeddfff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfede000-0x00000000cfee3fff] ACPI NVS [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfee4000-0x00000000cfef6fff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfef7000-0x00000000cfefffff] usable [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000e0000000-0x00000000efffffff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fec00000-0x00000000fec00fff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fec10000-0x00000000fec10fff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fed00000-0x00000000fed00fff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fed40000-0x00000000fed44fff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fed61000-0x00000000fed70fff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fed80000-0x00000000fed8ffff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000ff000000-0x00000000ffffffff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000100001000-0x000000020effffff] usable In this case the area a0000-dffff isn't present in the map. This will confuse the memory setup of the domain when remapping the memory from such holes to populated areas. To avoid the problem the accounting of to be remapped memory has to count such holes in the E820 map as well. Reported-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
2015-08-20 00:53:11 +08:00
start_pfn = PFN_DOWN(entry->addr);
/* Adjacent regions on non-page boundaries handling! */
end_pfn = min(end_pfn, start_pfn);
if (start_pfn >= max_pfn)
xen: avoid another early crash of memory limited dom0 Commit b1c9f169047b ("xen: split counting of extra memory pages...") introduced an error when dom0 was started with limited memory occurring only on some hardware. The problem arises in case dom0 is started with initial memory and maximum memory being the same. The kernel must be configured without CONFIG_XEN_BALLOON_MEMORY_HOTPLUG for the problem to happen. If all of this is true and the E820 map of the machine is sparse (some areas are not covered) then the machine might crash early in the boot process. An example E820 map triggering the problem looks like this: [ 0.000000] e820: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000000000-0x000000000009d7ff] usable [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000000009d800-0x000000000009ffff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000000e0000-0x00000000000fffff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000100000-0x00000000cf7fafff] usable [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cf7fb000-0x00000000cf95ffff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cf960000-0x00000000cfb62fff] ACPI NVS [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfb63000-0x00000000cfd14fff] usable [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfd15000-0x00000000cfd61fff] ACPI NVS [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfd62000-0x00000000cfd6cfff] ACPI data [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfd6d000-0x00000000cfd6ffff] ACPI NVS [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfd70000-0x00000000cfd70fff] usable [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfd71000-0x00000000cfea8fff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfea9000-0x00000000cfeb9fff] ACPI NVS [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfeba000-0x00000000cfecafff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfecb000-0x00000000cfecbfff] ACPI NVS [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfecc000-0x00000000cfedbfff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfedc000-0x00000000cfedcfff] ACPI NVS [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfedd000-0x00000000cfeddfff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfede000-0x00000000cfee3fff] ACPI NVS [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfee4000-0x00000000cfef6fff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000cfef7000-0x00000000cfefffff] usable [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000e0000000-0x00000000efffffff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fec00000-0x00000000fec00fff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fec10000-0x00000000fec10fff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fed00000-0x00000000fed00fff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fed40000-0x00000000fed44fff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fed61000-0x00000000fed70fff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fed80000-0x00000000fed8ffff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000ff000000-0x00000000ffffffff] reserved [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000100001000-0x000000020effffff] usable In this case the area a0000-dffff isn't present in the map. This will confuse the memory setup of the domain when remapping the memory from such holes to populated areas. To avoid the problem the accounting of to be remapped memory has to count such holes in the E820 map as well. Reported-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
2015-08-20 00:53:11 +08:00
return extra + max_pfn - end_pfn;
/* Add any holes in map to result. */
extra += start_pfn - end_pfn;
end_pfn = PFN_UP(entry->addr + entry->size);
end_pfn = min(end_pfn, max_pfn);
if (entry->type != E820_RAM)
extra += end_pfn - start_pfn;
}
return extra;
}
bool __init xen_is_e820_reserved(phys_addr_t start, phys_addr_t size)
{
struct e820entry *entry;
unsigned mapcnt;
phys_addr_t end;
if (!size)
return false;
end = start + size;
entry = xen_e820_map;
for (mapcnt = 0; mapcnt < xen_e820_map_entries; mapcnt++) {
if (entry->type == E820_RAM && entry->addr <= start &&
(entry->addr + entry->size) >= end)
return false;
entry++;
}
return true;
}
/*
* Find a free area in physical memory not yet reserved and compliant with
* E820 map.
* Used to relocate pre-allocated areas like initrd or p2m list which are in
* conflict with the to be used E820 map.
* In case no area is found, return 0. Otherwise return the physical address
* of the area which is already reserved for convenience.
*/
phys_addr_t __init xen_find_free_area(phys_addr_t size)
{
unsigned mapcnt;
phys_addr_t addr, start;
struct e820entry *entry = xen_e820_map;
for (mapcnt = 0; mapcnt < xen_e820_map_entries; mapcnt++, entry++) {
if (entry->type != E820_RAM || entry->size < size)
continue;
start = entry->addr;
for (addr = start; addr < start + size; addr += PAGE_SIZE) {
if (!memblock_is_reserved(addr))
continue;
start = addr + PAGE_SIZE;
if (start + size > entry->addr + entry->size)
break;
}
if (addr >= start + size) {
memblock_reserve(start, size);
return start;
}
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Like memcpy, but with physical addresses for dest and src.
*/
static void __init xen_phys_memcpy(phys_addr_t dest, phys_addr_t src,
phys_addr_t n)
{
phys_addr_t dest_off, src_off, dest_len, src_len, len;
void *from, *to;
while (n) {
dest_off = dest & ~PAGE_MASK;
src_off = src & ~PAGE_MASK;
dest_len = n;
if (dest_len > (NR_FIX_BTMAPS << PAGE_SHIFT) - dest_off)
dest_len = (NR_FIX_BTMAPS << PAGE_SHIFT) - dest_off;
src_len = n;
if (src_len > (NR_FIX_BTMAPS << PAGE_SHIFT) - src_off)
src_len = (NR_FIX_BTMAPS << PAGE_SHIFT) - src_off;
len = min(dest_len, src_len);
to = early_memremap(dest - dest_off, dest_len + dest_off);
from = early_memremap(src - src_off, src_len + src_off);
memcpy(to, from, len);
early_memunmap(to, dest_len + dest_off);
early_memunmap(from, src_len + src_off);
n -= len;
dest += len;
src += len;
}
}
/*
* Reserve Xen mfn_list.
*/
static void __init xen_reserve_xen_mfnlist(void)
{
phys_addr_t start, size;
if (xen_start_info->mfn_list >= __START_KERNEL_map) {
start = __pa(xen_start_info->mfn_list);
size = PFN_ALIGN(xen_start_info->nr_pages *
sizeof(unsigned long));
} else {
start = PFN_PHYS(xen_start_info->first_p2m_pfn);
size = PFN_PHYS(xen_start_info->nr_p2m_frames);
}
if (!xen_is_e820_reserved(start, size)) {
memblock_reserve(start, size);
return;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
/*
* Relocating the p2m on 32 bit system to an arbitrary virtual address
* is not supported, so just give up.
*/
xen_raw_console_write("Xen hypervisor allocated p2m list conflicts with E820 map\n");
BUG();
#else
xen_relocate_p2m();
#endif
}
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 09:37:04 +08:00
/**
* machine_specific_memory_setup - Hook for machine specific memory setup.
**/
char * __init xen_memory_setup(void)
{
unsigned long max_pfn, pfn_s, n_pfns;
phys_addr_t mem_end, addr, size, chunk_size;
u32 type;
int rc;
struct xen_memory_map memmap;
unsigned long max_pages;
unsigned long extra_pages = 0;
int i;
int op;
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 09:37:04 +08:00
xen_parse_512gb();
max_pfn = xen_get_pages_limit();
max_pfn = min(max_pfn, xen_start_info->nr_pages);
mem_end = PFN_PHYS(max_pfn);
memmap.nr_entries = E820MAX;
set_xen_guest_handle(memmap.buffer, xen_e820_map);
op = xen_initial_domain() ?
XENMEM_machine_memory_map :
XENMEM_memory_map;
rc = HYPERVISOR_memory_op(op, &memmap);
if (rc == -ENOSYS) {
BUG_ON(xen_initial_domain());
memmap.nr_entries = 1;
xen_e820_map[0].addr = 0ULL;
xen_e820_map[0].size = mem_end;
/* 8MB slack (to balance backend allocations). */
xen_e820_map[0].size += 8ULL << 20;
xen_e820_map[0].type = E820_RAM;
rc = 0;
}
BUG_ON(rc);
BUG_ON(memmap.nr_entries == 0);
xen_e820_map_entries = memmap.nr_entries;
x86/xen: do not identity map UNUSABLE regions in the machine E820 If there are UNUSABLE regions in the machine memory map, dom0 will attempt to map them 1:1 which is not permitted by Xen and the kernel will crash. There isn't anything interesting in the UNUSABLE region that the dom0 kernel needs access to so we can avoid making the 1:1 mapping and treat it as RAM. We only do this for dom0, as that is where tboot case shows up. A PV domU could have an UNUSABLE region in its pseudo-physical map and would need to be handled in another patch. This fixes a boot failure on hosts with tboot. tboot marks a region in the e820 map as unusable and the dom0 kernel would attempt to map this region and Xen does not permit unusable regions to be mapped by guests. (XEN) 0000000000000000 - 0000000000060000 (usable) (XEN) 0000000000060000 - 0000000000068000 (reserved) (XEN) 0000000000068000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) (XEN) 0000000000100000 - 0000000000800000 (usable) (XEN) 0000000000800000 - 0000000000972000 (unusable) tboot marked this region as unusable. (XEN) 0000000000972000 - 00000000cf200000 (usable) (XEN) 00000000cf200000 - 00000000cf38f000 (reserved) (XEN) 00000000cf38f000 - 00000000cf3ce000 (ACPI data) (XEN) 00000000cf3ce000 - 00000000d0000000 (reserved) (XEN) 00000000e0000000 - 00000000f0000000 (reserved) (XEN) 00000000fe000000 - 0000000100000000 (reserved) (XEN) 0000000100000000 - 0000000630000000 (usable) Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v1: Altered the patch and description with domU's with UNUSABLE regions] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2013-08-16 22:42:55 +08:00
/*
* Xen won't allow a 1:1 mapping to be created to UNUSABLE
* regions, so if we're using the machine memory map leave the
* region as RAM as it is in the pseudo-physical map.
*
* UNUSABLE regions in domUs are not handled and will need
* a patch in the future.
*/
if (xen_initial_domain())
xen_ignore_unusable();
x86/xen: do not identity map UNUSABLE regions in the machine E820 If there are UNUSABLE regions in the machine memory map, dom0 will attempt to map them 1:1 which is not permitted by Xen and the kernel will crash. There isn't anything interesting in the UNUSABLE region that the dom0 kernel needs access to so we can avoid making the 1:1 mapping and treat it as RAM. We only do this for dom0, as that is where tboot case shows up. A PV domU could have an UNUSABLE region in its pseudo-physical map and would need to be handled in another patch. This fixes a boot failure on hosts with tboot. tboot marks a region in the e820 map as unusable and the dom0 kernel would attempt to map this region and Xen does not permit unusable regions to be mapped by guests. (XEN) 0000000000000000 - 0000000000060000 (usable) (XEN) 0000000000060000 - 0000000000068000 (reserved) (XEN) 0000000000068000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) (XEN) 0000000000100000 - 0000000000800000 (usable) (XEN) 0000000000800000 - 0000000000972000 (unusable) tboot marked this region as unusable. (XEN) 0000000000972000 - 00000000cf200000 (usable) (XEN) 00000000cf200000 - 00000000cf38f000 (reserved) (XEN) 00000000cf38f000 - 00000000cf3ce000 (ACPI data) (XEN) 00000000cf3ce000 - 00000000d0000000 (reserved) (XEN) 00000000e0000000 - 00000000f0000000 (reserved) (XEN) 00000000fe000000 - 0000000100000000 (reserved) (XEN) 0000000100000000 - 0000000630000000 (usable) Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v1: Altered the patch and description with domU's with UNUSABLE regions] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2013-08-16 22:42:55 +08:00
/* Make sure the Xen-supplied memory map is well-ordered. */
sanitize_e820_map(xen_e820_map, ARRAY_SIZE(xen_e820_map),
&xen_e820_map_entries);
max_pages = xen_get_max_pages();
/* How many extra pages do we need due to remapping? */
xen: avoid early crash of memory limited dom0 Commit b1c9f169047b ("xen: split counting of extra memory pages...") introduced an error when dom0 was started with limited memory. The problem arises in case dom0 is started with initial memory and maximum memory being the same and exactly a multiple of 1 GB. The kernel must be configured without CONFIG_XEN_BALLOON_MEMORY_HOTPLUG for the problem to happen. In this case it will crash very early during boot due to the virtual mapped p2m list not being large enough to be able to remap any memory: (XEN) Freed 304kB init memory. mapping kernel into physical memory about to get started... (XEN) traps.c:459:d0v0 Unhandled invalid opcode fault/trap [#6] on VCPU 0 [ec=0000] (XEN) domain_crash_sync called from entry.S: fault at ffff82d080229a93 create_bounce_frame+0x12b/0x13a (XEN) Domain 0 (vcpu#0) crashed on cpu#0: (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.5.2-pre x86_64 debug=n Not tainted ]---- (XEN) CPU: 0 (XEN) RIP: e033:[<ffffffff81d120cb>] (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000000206 EM: 1 CONTEXT: pv guest (d0v0) (XEN) rax: ffffffff81db2000 rbx: 000000004d000000 rcx: 0000000000000000 (XEN) rdx: 000000004d000000 rsi: 0000000000063000 rdi: 000000004d063000 (XEN) rbp: ffffffff81c03d78 rsp: ffffffff81c03d28 r8: 0000000000023000 (XEN) r9: 00000001040ff000 r10: 0000000000007ff0 r11: 0000000000000000 (XEN) r12: 0000000000063000 r13: 000000000004d000 r14: 0000000000000063 (XEN) r15: 0000000000000063 cr0: 0000000080050033 cr4: 00000000000006f0 (XEN) cr3: 0000000105c0f000 cr2: ffffc90000268000 (XEN) ds: 0000 es: 0000 fs: 0000 gs: 0000 ss: e02b cs: e033 (XEN) Guest stack trace from rsp=ffffffff81c03d28: (XEN) 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff81d120cb 000000010000e030 (XEN) 0000000000010006 ffffffff81c03d68 000000000000e02b ffffffffffffffff (XEN) 0000000000000063 000000000004d063 ffffffff81c03de8 ffffffff81d130a7 (XEN) ffffffff81c03de8 000000000004d000 00000001040ff000 0000000000105db1 (XEN) 00000001040ff001 000000000004d062 ffff8800092d6ff8 0000000002027000 (XEN) ffff8800094d8340 ffff8800092d6ff8 00003ffffffff000 ffff8800092d7ff8 (XEN) ffffffff81c03e48 ffffffff81d13c43 ffff8800094d8000 ffff8800094d9000 (XEN) 0000000000000000 ffff8800092d6000 00000000092d6000 000000004cfbf000 (XEN) 00000000092d6000 00000000052d5442 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 (XEN) ffffffff81c03ed8 ffffffff81d185c1 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 (XEN) ffffffff81c03e78 ffffffff810f8ca4 ffffffff81c03ed8 ffffffff8171a15d (XEN) 0000000000000010 ffffffff81c03ee8 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 (XEN) ffffffff81f0e402 ffffffffffffffff ffffffff81dae900 0000000000000000 (XEN) 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff81c03f28 ffffffff81d0cf0f (XEN) 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff81db82e0 (XEN) 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 (XEN) ffffffff81c03f38 ffffffff81d0c603 ffffffff81c03ff8 ffffffff81d11c86 (XEN) 0300000100000032 0000000000000005 0000000000000020 0000000000000000 (XEN) 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 (XEN) 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 (XEN) Domain 0 crashed: rebooting machine in 5 seconds. This can be avoided by allocating aneough space for the p2m to cover the maximum memory of dom0 plus the identity mapped holes required for PCI space, BIOS etc. Reported-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
2015-08-20 00:52:34 +08:00
max_pages += xen_count_remap_pages(max_pfn);
if (max_pages > max_pfn)
extra_pages += max_pages - max_pfn;
xen/setup: Populate freed MFNs from non-RAM E820 entries and gaps to E820 RAM When the Xen hypervisor boots a PV kernel it hands it two pieces of information: nr_pages and a made up E820 entry. The nr_pages value defines the range from zero to nr_pages of PFNs which have a valid Machine Frame Number (MFN) underneath it. The E820 mirrors that (with the VGA hole): BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 00000000000a0000 (usable) Xen: 00000000000a0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000080800000 (usable) The fun comes when a PV guest that is run with a machine E820 - that can either be the initial domain or a PCI PV guest, where the E820 looks like the normal thing: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: Xen: 0000000000000000 - 000000000009e000 (usable) Xen: 000000000009ec00 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000000100000 - 0000000020000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000020000000 - 0000000020200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000020200000 - 0000000040000000 (usable) Xen: 0000000040000000 - 0000000040200000 (reserved) Xen: 0000000040200000 - 00000000bad80000 (usable) Xen: 00000000bad80000 - 00000000badc9000 (ACPI NVS) .. With that overlaying the nr_pages directly on the E820 does not work as there are gaps and non-RAM regions that won't be used by the memory allocator. The 'xen_release_chunk' helps with that by punching holes in the P2M (PFN to MFN lookup tree) for those regions and tells us that: Freeing 20000-20200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing 40000-40200 pfn range: 512 pages freed Freeing bad80-badf4 pfn range: 116 pages freed Freeing badf6-bae7f pfn range: 137 pages freed Freeing bb000-100000 pfn range: 282624 pages freed Released 283999 pages of unused memory Those 283999 pages are subtracted from the nr_pages and are returned to the hypervisor. The end result is that the initial domain boots with 1GB less memory as the nr_pages has been subtracted by the amount of pages residing within the PCI hole. It can balloon up to that if desired using 'xl mem-set 0 8092', but the balloon driver is not always compiled in for the initial domain. This patch, implements the populate hypercall (XENMEM_populate_physmap) which increases the the domain with the same amount of pages that were released. The other solution (that did not work) was to transplant the MFN in the P2M tree - the ones that were going to be freed were put in the E820_RAM regions past the nr_pages. But the modifications to the M2P array (the other side of creating PTEs) were not carried away. As the hypervisor is the only one capable of modifying that and the only two hypercalls that would do this are: the update_va_mapping (which won't work, as during initial bootup only PFNs up to nr_pages are mapped in the guest) or via the populate hypercall. The end result is that the kernel can now boot with the nr_pages without having to subtract the 283999 pages. On a 8GB machine, with various dom0_mem= parameters this is what we get: no dom0_mem -Memory: 6485264k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 1813812k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 7619036k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 680040k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=3G -Memory: 2616536k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5682540k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2703776k/9435136k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 5595300k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) dom0_mem=max:3G -Memory: 2696732k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 448932k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) +Memory: 2702204k/4281724k available (5817k kernel code, 1136060k absent, 443460k reserved, 2899k data, 696k init) And the 'xm list' or 'xl list' now reflect what the dom0_mem= argument is. Acked-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> [v2: Use populate hypercall] [v3: Remove debug printks] [v4: Simplify code] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-04-06 22:07:11 +08:00
/*
* Clamp the amount of extra memory to a EXTRA_MEM_RATIO
* factor the base size. On non-highmem systems, the base
* size is the full initial memory allocation; on highmem it
* is limited to the max size of lowmem, so that it doesn't
* get completely filled.
*
* Make sure we have no memory above max_pages, as this area
* isn't handled by the p2m management.
*
* In principle there could be a problem in lowmem systems if
* the initial memory is also very large with respect to
* lowmem, but we won't try to deal with that here.
*/
extra_pages = min3(EXTRA_MEM_RATIO * min(max_pfn, PFN_DOWN(MAXMEM)),
extra_pages, max_pages - max_pfn);
i = 0;
addr = xen_e820_map[0].addr;
size = xen_e820_map[0].size;
while (i < xen_e820_map_entries) {
bool discard = false;
chunk_size = size;
type = xen_e820_map[i].type;
if (type == E820_RAM) {
if (addr < mem_end) {
chunk_size = min(size, mem_end - addr);
} else if (extra_pages) {
chunk_size = min(size, PFN_PHYS(extra_pages));
pfn_s = PFN_UP(addr);
n_pfns = PFN_DOWN(addr + chunk_size) - pfn_s;
extra_pages -= n_pfns;
xen_add_extra_mem(pfn_s, n_pfns);
xen_max_p2m_pfn = pfn_s + n_pfns;
} else
discard = true;
}
if (!discard)
xen_align_and_add_e820_region(addr, chunk_size, type);
addr += chunk_size;
size -= chunk_size;
if (size == 0) {
i++;
if (i < xen_e820_map_entries) {
addr = xen_e820_map[i].addr;
size = xen_e820_map[i].size;
}
}
}
/*
* Set the rest as identity mapped, in case PCI BARs are
* located here.
*/
set_phys_range_identity(addr / PAGE_SIZE, ~0ul);
/*
* In domU, the ISA region is normal, usable memory, but we
* reserve ISA memory anyway because too many things poke
* about in there.
*/
e820_add_region(ISA_START_ADDRESS, ISA_END_ADDRESS - ISA_START_ADDRESS,
E820_RESERVED);
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 09:37:04 +08:00
sanitize_e820_map(e820.map, ARRAY_SIZE(e820.map), &e820.nr_map);
/*
* Check whether the kernel itself conflicts with the target E820 map.
* Failing now is better than running into weird problems later due
* to relocating (and even reusing) pages with kernel text or data.
*/
if (xen_is_e820_reserved(__pa_symbol(_text),
__pa_symbol(__bss_stop) - __pa_symbol(_text))) {
xen_raw_console_write("Xen hypervisor allocated kernel memory conflicts with E820 map\n");
BUG();
}
/*
* Check for a conflict of the hypervisor supplied page tables with
* the target E820 map.
*/
xen_pt_check_e820();
xen_reserve_xen_mfnlist();
/* Check for a conflict of the initrd with the target E820 map. */
if (xen_is_e820_reserved(boot_params.hdr.ramdisk_image,
boot_params.hdr.ramdisk_size)) {
phys_addr_t new_area, start, size;
new_area = xen_find_free_area(boot_params.hdr.ramdisk_size);
if (!new_area) {
xen_raw_console_write("Can't find new memory area for initrd needed due to E820 map conflict\n");
BUG();
}
start = boot_params.hdr.ramdisk_image;
size = boot_params.hdr.ramdisk_size;
xen_phys_memcpy(new_area, start, size);
pr_info("initrd moved from [mem %#010llx-%#010llx] to [mem %#010llx-%#010llx]\n",
start, start + size, new_area, new_area + size);
memblock_free(start, size);
boot_params.hdr.ramdisk_image = new_area;
boot_params.ext_ramdisk_image = new_area >> 32;
}
/*
* Set identity map on non-RAM pages and prepare remapping the
* underlying RAM.
*/
xen_set_identity_and_remap(max_pfn);
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 09:37:04 +08:00
return "Xen";
}
/*
* Machine specific memory setup for auto-translated guests.
*/
char * __init xen_auto_xlated_memory_setup(void)
{
struct xen_memory_map memmap;
int i;
int rc;
memmap.nr_entries = E820MAX;
set_xen_guest_handle(memmap.buffer, xen_e820_map);
rc = HYPERVISOR_memory_op(XENMEM_memory_map, &memmap);
if (rc < 0)
panic("No memory map (%d)\n", rc);
xen_e820_map_entries = memmap.nr_entries;
sanitize_e820_map(xen_e820_map, ARRAY_SIZE(xen_e820_map),
&xen_e820_map_entries);
for (i = 0; i < xen_e820_map_entries; i++)
e820_add_region(xen_e820_map[i].addr, xen_e820_map[i].size,
xen_e820_map[i].type);
/* Remove p2m info, it is not needed. */
xen_start_info->mfn_list = 0;
xen_start_info->first_p2m_pfn = 0;
xen_start_info->nr_p2m_frames = 0;
return "Xen";
}
/*
* Set the bit indicating "nosegneg" library variants should be used.
* We only need to bother in pure 32-bit mode; compat 32-bit processes
* can have un-truncated segments, so wrapping around is allowed.
*/
static void __init fiddle_vdso(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
u32 *mask = vdso_image_32.data +
vdso_image_32.sym_VDSO32_NOTE_MASK;
*mask |= 1 << VDSO_NOTE_NONEGSEG_BIT;
#endif
}
x86: delete __cpuinit usage from all x86 files The __cpuinit type of throwaway sections might have made sense some time ago when RAM was more constrained, but now the savings do not offset the cost and complications. For example, the fix in commit 5e427ec2d0 ("x86: Fix bit corruption at CPU resume time") is a good example of the nasty type of bugs that can be created with improper use of the various __init prefixes. After a discussion on LKML[1] it was decided that cpuinit should go the way of devinit and be phased out. Once all the users are gone, we can then finally remove the macros themselves from linux/init.h. Note that some harmless section mismatch warnings may result, since notify_cpu_starting() and cpu_up() are arch independent (kernel/cpu.c) are flagged as __cpuinit -- so if we remove the __cpuinit from arch specific callers, we will also get section mismatch warnings. As an intermediate step, we intend to turn the linux/init.h cpuinit content into no-ops as early as possible, since that will get rid of these warnings. In any case, they are temporary and harmless. This removes all the arch/x86 uses of the __cpuinit macros from all C files. x86 only had the one __CPUINIT used in assembly files, and it wasn't paired off with a .previous or a __FINIT, so we can delete it directly w/o any corresponding additional change there. [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/5/20/589 Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2013-06-19 06:23:59 +08:00
static int register_callback(unsigned type, const void *func)
{
struct callback_register callback = {
.type = type,
.address = XEN_CALLBACK(__KERNEL_CS, func),
.flags = CALLBACKF_mask_events,
};
return HYPERVISOR_callback_op(CALLBACKOP_register, &callback);
}
x86: delete __cpuinit usage from all x86 files The __cpuinit type of throwaway sections might have made sense some time ago when RAM was more constrained, but now the savings do not offset the cost and complications. For example, the fix in commit 5e427ec2d0 ("x86: Fix bit corruption at CPU resume time") is a good example of the nasty type of bugs that can be created with improper use of the various __init prefixes. After a discussion on LKML[1] it was decided that cpuinit should go the way of devinit and be phased out. Once all the users are gone, we can then finally remove the macros themselves from linux/init.h. Note that some harmless section mismatch warnings may result, since notify_cpu_starting() and cpu_up() are arch independent (kernel/cpu.c) are flagged as __cpuinit -- so if we remove the __cpuinit from arch specific callers, we will also get section mismatch warnings. As an intermediate step, we intend to turn the linux/init.h cpuinit content into no-ops as early as possible, since that will get rid of these warnings. In any case, they are temporary and harmless. This removes all the arch/x86 uses of the __cpuinit macros from all C files. x86 only had the one __CPUINIT used in assembly files, and it wasn't paired off with a .previous or a __FINIT, so we can delete it directly w/o any corresponding additional change there. [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/5/20/589 Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2013-06-19 06:23:59 +08:00
void xen_enable_sysenter(void)
{
int ret;
unsigned sysenter_feature;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
sysenter_feature = X86_FEATURE_SEP;
#else
sysenter_feature = X86_FEATURE_SYSENTER32;
#endif
if (!boot_cpu_has(sysenter_feature))
return;
ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_sysenter, xen_sysenter_target);
if(ret != 0)
setup_clear_cpu_cap(sysenter_feature);
}
x86: delete __cpuinit usage from all x86 files The __cpuinit type of throwaway sections might have made sense some time ago when RAM was more constrained, but now the savings do not offset the cost and complications. For example, the fix in commit 5e427ec2d0 ("x86: Fix bit corruption at CPU resume time") is a good example of the nasty type of bugs that can be created with improper use of the various __init prefixes. After a discussion on LKML[1] it was decided that cpuinit should go the way of devinit and be phased out. Once all the users are gone, we can then finally remove the macros themselves from linux/init.h. Note that some harmless section mismatch warnings may result, since notify_cpu_starting() and cpu_up() are arch independent (kernel/cpu.c) are flagged as __cpuinit -- so if we remove the __cpuinit from arch specific callers, we will also get section mismatch warnings. As an intermediate step, we intend to turn the linux/init.h cpuinit content into no-ops as early as possible, since that will get rid of these warnings. In any case, they are temporary and harmless. This removes all the arch/x86 uses of the __cpuinit macros from all C files. x86 only had the one __CPUINIT used in assembly files, and it wasn't paired off with a .previous or a __FINIT, so we can delete it directly w/o any corresponding additional change there. [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/5/20/589 Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2013-06-19 06:23:59 +08:00
void xen_enable_syscall(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
int ret;
ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_syscall, xen_syscall_target);
if (ret != 0) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Failed to set syscall callback: %d\n", ret);
/* Pretty fatal; 64-bit userspace has no other
mechanism for syscalls. */
}
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL32)) {
ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_syscall32,
xen_syscall32_target);
if (ret != 0)
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL32);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
}
void __init xen_pvmmu_arch_setup(void)
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 09:37:04 +08:00
{
HYPERVISOR_vm_assist(VMASST_CMD_enable, VMASST_TYPE_4gb_segments);
HYPERVISOR_vm_assist(VMASST_CMD_enable, VMASST_TYPE_writable_pagetables);
HYPERVISOR_vm_assist(VMASST_CMD_enable,
VMASST_TYPE_pae_extended_cr3);
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 09:37:04 +08:00
if (register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_event, xen_hypervisor_callback) ||
register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_failsafe, xen_failsafe_callback))
BUG();
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 09:37:04 +08:00
xen_enable_sysenter();
xen_enable_syscall();
}
/* This function is not called for HVM domains */
void __init xen_arch_setup(void)
{
xen_panic_handler_init();
if (!xen_feature(XENFEAT_auto_translated_physmap))
xen_pvmmu_arch_setup();
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 09:37:04 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
if (!(xen_start_info->flags & SIF_INITDOMAIN)) {
printk(KERN_INFO "ACPI in unprivileged domain disabled\n");
disable_acpi();
}
#endif
memcpy(boot_command_line, xen_start_info->cmd_line,
MAX_GUEST_CMDLINE > COMMAND_LINE_SIZE ?
COMMAND_LINE_SIZE : MAX_GUEST_CMDLINE);
/* Set up idle, making sure it calls safe_halt() pvop */
disable_cpuidle();
disable_cpufreq();
WARN_ON(xen_set_default_idle());
fiddle_vdso();
xen/boot: Disable NUMA for PV guests. The hypervisor is in charge of allocating the proper "NUMA" memory and dealing with the CPU scheduler to keep them bound to the proper NUMA node. The PV guests (and PVHVM) have no inkling of where they run and do not need to know that right now. In the future we will need to inject NUMA configuration data (if a guest spans two or more NUMA nodes) so that the kernel can make the right choices. But those patches are not yet present. In the meantime, disable the NUMA capability in the PV guest, which also fixes a bootup issue. Andre says: "we see Dom0 crashes due to the kernel detecting the NUMA topology not by ACPI, but directly from the northbridge (CONFIG_AMD_NUMA). This will detect the actual NUMA config of the physical machine, but will crash about the mismatch with Dom0's virtual memory. Variation of the theme: Dom0 sees what it's not supposed to see. This happens with the said config option enabled and on a machine where this scanning is still enabled (K8 and Fam10h, not Bulldozer class) We have this dump then: NUMA: Warning: node ids are out of bound, from=-1 to=-1 distance=10 Scanning NUMA topology in Northbridge 24 Number of physical nodes 4 Node 0 MemBase 0000000000000000 Limit 0000000040000000 Node 1 MemBase 0000000040000000 Limit 0000000138000000 Node 2 MemBase 0000000138000000 Limit 00000001f8000000 Node 3 MemBase 00000001f8000000 Limit 0000000238000000 Initmem setup node 0 0000000000000000-0000000040000000 NODE_DATA [000000003ffd9000 - 000000003fffffff] Initmem setup node 1 0000000040000000-0000000138000000 NODE_DATA [0000000137fd9000 - 0000000137ffffff] Initmem setup node 2 0000000138000000-00000001f8000000 NODE_DATA [00000001f095e000 - 00000001f0984fff] Initmem setup node 3 00000001f8000000-0000000238000000 Cannot find 159744 bytes in node 3 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) IP: [<ffffffff81d220e6>] __alloc_bootmem_node+0x43/0x96 Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 3.3.6 #1 AMD Dinar/Dinar RIP: e030:[<ffffffff81d220e6>] [<ffffffff81d220e6>] __alloc_bootmem_node+0x43/0x96 .. snip.. [<ffffffff81d23024>] sparse_early_usemaps_alloc_node+0x64/0x178 [<ffffffff81d23348>] sparse_init+0xe4/0x25a [<ffffffff81d16840>] paging_init+0x13/0x22 [<ffffffff81d07fbb>] setup_arch+0x9c6/0xa9b [<ffffffff81683954>] ? printk+0x3c/0x3e [<ffffffff81d01a38>] start_kernel+0xe5/0x468 [<ffffffff81d012cf>] x86_64_start_reservations+0xba/0xc1 [<ffffffff81007153>] ? xen_setup_runstate_info+0x2c/0x36 [<ffffffff81d050ee>] xen_start_kernel+0x565/0x56c " so we just disable NUMA scanning by setting numa_off=1. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-and-Tested-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@amd.com> Acked-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-08-17 22:22:37 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
numa_off = 1;
#endif
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 09:37:04 +08:00
}