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linux-next/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c

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gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct plugin This randstruct plugin is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. The randstruct GCC plugin randomizes the layout of selected structures at compile time, as a probabilistic defense against attacks that need to know the layout of structures within the kernel. This is most useful for "in-house" kernel builds where neither the randomization seed nor other build artifacts are made available to an attacker. While less useful for distribution kernels (where the randomization seed must be exposed for third party kernel module builds), it still has some value there since now all kernel builds would need to be tracked by an attacker. In more performance sensitive scenarios, GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE can be selected to make a best effort to restrict randomization to cacheline-sized groups of elements, and will not randomize bitfields. This comes at the cost of reduced randomization. Two annotations are defined,__randomize_layout and __no_randomize_layout, which respectively tell the plugin to either randomize or not to randomize instances of the struct in question. Follow-on patches enable the auto-detection logic for selecting structures for randomization that contain only function pointers. It is disabled here to assist with bisection. Since any randomized structs must be initialized using designated initializers, __randomize_layout includes the __designated_init annotation even when the plugin is disabled so that all builds will require the needed initialization. (With the plugin enabled, annotations for automatically chosen structures are marked as well.) The main differences between this implemenation and grsecurity are: - disable automatic struct selection (to be enabled in follow-up patch) - add designated_init attribute at runtime and for manual marking - clarify debugging output to differentiate bad cast warnings - add whitelisting infrastructure - support gcc 7's DECL_ALIGN and DECL_MODE changes (Laura Abbott) - raise minimum required GCC version to 4.7 Earlier versions of this patch series were ported by Michael Leibowitz. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-05-06 14:37:45 +08:00
/*
* Copyright 2014-2016 by Open Source Security, Inc., Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
* and PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
* Licensed under the GPL v2
*
* Note: the choice of the license means that the compilation process is
* NOT 'eligible' as defined by gcc's library exception to the GPL v3,
* but for the kernel it doesn't matter since it doesn't link against
* any of the gcc libraries
*
* Usage:
* $ # for 4.5/4.6/C based 4.7
* $ gcc -I`gcc -print-file-name=plugin`/include -I`gcc -print-file-name=plugin`/include/c-family -fPIC -shared -O2 -o randomize_layout_plugin.so randomize_layout_plugin.c
* $ # for C++ based 4.7/4.8+
* $ g++ -I`g++ -print-file-name=plugin`/include -I`g++ -print-file-name=plugin`/include/c-family -fPIC -shared -O2 -o randomize_layout_plugin.so randomize_layout_plugin.c
* $ gcc -fplugin=./randomize_layout_plugin.so test.c -O2
*/
#include "gcc-common.h"
#include "randomize_layout_seed.h"
#if BUILDING_GCC_MAJOR < 4 || (BUILDING_GCC_MAJOR == 4 && BUILDING_GCC_MINOR < 7)
#error "The RANDSTRUCT plugin requires GCC 4.7 or newer."
#endif
#define ORIG_TYPE_NAME(node) \
(TYPE_NAME(TYPE_MAIN_VARIANT(node)) != NULL_TREE ? ((const unsigned char *)IDENTIFIER_POINTER(TYPE_NAME(TYPE_MAIN_VARIANT(node)))) : (const unsigned char *)"anonymous")
#define INFORM(loc, msg, ...) inform(loc, "randstruct: " msg, ##__VA_ARGS__)
#define MISMATCH(loc, how, ...) INFORM(loc, "casting between randomized structure pointer types (" how "): %qT and %qT\n", __VA_ARGS__)
__visible int plugin_is_GPL_compatible;
static int performance_mode;
static struct plugin_info randomize_layout_plugin_info = {
.version = "201402201816vanilla",
.help = "disable\t\t\tdo not activate plugin\n"
"performance-mode\tenable cacheline-aware layout randomization\n"
};
struct whitelist_entry {
const char *pathname;
const char *lhs;
const char *rhs;
};
static const struct whitelist_entry whitelist[] = {
/* NIU overloads mapping with page struct */
{ "drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c", "page", "address_space" },
/* unix_skb_parms via UNIXCB() buffer */
{ "net/unix/af_unix.c", "unix_skb_parms", "char" },
/* big_key payload.data struct splashing */
{ "security/keys/big_key.c", "path", "void *" },
/* walk struct security_hook_heads as an array of struct hlist_head */
{ "security/security.c", "hlist_head", "security_hook_heads" },
gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct plugin This randstruct plugin is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. The randstruct GCC plugin randomizes the layout of selected structures at compile time, as a probabilistic defense against attacks that need to know the layout of structures within the kernel. This is most useful for "in-house" kernel builds where neither the randomization seed nor other build artifacts are made available to an attacker. While less useful for distribution kernels (where the randomization seed must be exposed for third party kernel module builds), it still has some value there since now all kernel builds would need to be tracked by an attacker. In more performance sensitive scenarios, GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE can be selected to make a best effort to restrict randomization to cacheline-sized groups of elements, and will not randomize bitfields. This comes at the cost of reduced randomization. Two annotations are defined,__randomize_layout and __no_randomize_layout, which respectively tell the plugin to either randomize or not to randomize instances of the struct in question. Follow-on patches enable the auto-detection logic for selecting structures for randomization that contain only function pointers. It is disabled here to assist with bisection. Since any randomized structs must be initialized using designated initializers, __randomize_layout includes the __designated_init annotation even when the plugin is disabled so that all builds will require the needed initialization. (With the plugin enabled, annotations for automatically chosen structures are marked as well.) The main differences between this implemenation and grsecurity are: - disable automatic struct selection (to be enabled in follow-up patch) - add designated_init attribute at runtime and for manual marking - clarify debugging output to differentiate bad cast warnings - add whitelisting infrastructure - support gcc 7's DECL_ALIGN and DECL_MODE changes (Laura Abbott) - raise minimum required GCC version to 4.7 Earlier versions of this patch series were ported by Michael Leibowitz. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-05-06 14:37:45 +08:00
{ }
};
/* from old Linux dcache.h */
static inline unsigned long
partial_name_hash(unsigned long c, unsigned long prevhash)
{
return (prevhash + (c << 4) + (c >> 4)) * 11;
}
static inline unsigned int
name_hash(const unsigned char *name)
{
unsigned long hash = 0;
unsigned int len = strlen((const char *)name);
while (len--)
hash = partial_name_hash(*name++, hash);
return (unsigned int)hash;
}
static tree handle_randomize_layout_attr(tree *node, tree name, tree args, int flags, bool *no_add_attrs)
{
tree type;
*no_add_attrs = true;
if (TREE_CODE(*node) == FUNCTION_DECL) {
error("%qE attribute does not apply to functions (%qF)", name, *node);
return NULL_TREE;
}
if (TREE_CODE(*node) == PARM_DECL) {
error("%qE attribute does not apply to function parameters (%qD)", name, *node);
return NULL_TREE;
}
if (TREE_CODE(*node) == VAR_DECL) {
error("%qE attribute does not apply to variables (%qD)", name, *node);
return NULL_TREE;
}
if (TYPE_P(*node)) {
type = *node;
} else {
gcc_assert(TREE_CODE(*node) == TYPE_DECL);
type = TREE_TYPE(*node);
}
if (TREE_CODE(type) != RECORD_TYPE) {
error("%qE attribute used on %qT applies to struct types only", name, type);
return NULL_TREE;
}
if (lookup_attribute(IDENTIFIER_POINTER(name), TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(type))) {
error("%qE attribute is already applied to the type %qT", name, type);
return NULL_TREE;
}
*no_add_attrs = false;
return NULL_TREE;
}
/* set on complete types that we don't need to inspect further at all */
static tree handle_randomize_considered_attr(tree *node, tree name, tree args, int flags, bool *no_add_attrs)
{
*no_add_attrs = false;
return NULL_TREE;
}
/*
* set on types that we've performed a shuffle on, to prevent re-shuffling
* this does not preclude us from inspecting its fields for potential shuffles
*/
static tree handle_randomize_performed_attr(tree *node, tree name, tree args, int flags, bool *no_add_attrs)
{
*no_add_attrs = false;
return NULL_TREE;
}
/*
* 64bit variant of Bob Jenkins' public domain PRNG
* 256 bits of internal state
*/
typedef unsigned long long u64;
typedef struct ranctx { u64 a; u64 b; u64 c; u64 d; } ranctx;
#define rot(x,k) (((x)<<(k))|((x)>>(64-(k))))
static u64 ranval(ranctx *x) {
u64 e = x->a - rot(x->b, 7);
x->a = x->b ^ rot(x->c, 13);
x->b = x->c + rot(x->d, 37);
x->c = x->d + e;
x->d = e + x->a;
return x->d;
}
static void raninit(ranctx *x, u64 *seed) {
int i;
x->a = seed[0];
x->b = seed[1];
x->c = seed[2];
x->d = seed[3];
for (i=0; i < 30; ++i)
(void)ranval(x);
}
static u64 shuffle_seed[4];
struct partition_group {
tree tree_start;
unsigned long start;
unsigned long length;
};
static void partition_struct(tree *fields, unsigned long length, struct partition_group *size_groups, unsigned long *num_groups)
{
unsigned long i;
unsigned long accum_size = 0;
unsigned long accum_length = 0;
unsigned long group_idx = 0;
gcc_assert(length < INT_MAX);
memset(size_groups, 0, sizeof(struct partition_group) * length);
for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
if (size_groups[group_idx].tree_start == NULL_TREE) {
size_groups[group_idx].tree_start = fields[i];
size_groups[group_idx].start = i;
accum_length = 0;
accum_size = 0;
}
accum_size += (unsigned long)int_size_in_bytes(TREE_TYPE(fields[i]));
accum_length++;
if (accum_size >= 64) {
size_groups[group_idx].length = accum_length;
accum_length = 0;
group_idx++;
}
}
if (size_groups[group_idx].tree_start != NULL_TREE &&
!size_groups[group_idx].length) {
size_groups[group_idx].length = accum_length;
group_idx++;
}
*num_groups = group_idx;
}
static void performance_shuffle(tree *newtree, unsigned long length, ranctx *prng_state)
{
unsigned long i, x;
struct partition_group size_group[length];
unsigned long num_groups = 0;
unsigned long randnum;
partition_struct(newtree, length, (struct partition_group *)&size_group, &num_groups);
for (i = num_groups - 1; i > 0; i--) {
struct partition_group tmp;
randnum = ranval(prng_state) % (i + 1);
tmp = size_group[i];
size_group[i] = size_group[randnum];
size_group[randnum] = tmp;
}
for (x = 0; x < num_groups; x++) {
for (i = size_group[x].start + size_group[x].length - 1; i > size_group[x].start; i--) {
tree tmp;
if (DECL_BIT_FIELD_TYPE(newtree[i]))
continue;
randnum = ranval(prng_state) % (i + 1);
// we could handle this case differently if desired
if (DECL_BIT_FIELD_TYPE(newtree[randnum]))
continue;
tmp = newtree[i];
newtree[i] = newtree[randnum];
newtree[randnum] = tmp;
}
}
}
static void full_shuffle(tree *newtree, unsigned long length, ranctx *prng_state)
{
unsigned long i, randnum;
for (i = length - 1; i > 0; i--) {
tree tmp;
randnum = ranval(prng_state) % (i + 1);
tmp = newtree[i];
newtree[i] = newtree[randnum];
newtree[randnum] = tmp;
}
}
/* modern in-place Fisher-Yates shuffle */
static void shuffle(const_tree type, tree *newtree, unsigned long length)
{
unsigned long i;
u64 seed[4];
ranctx prng_state;
const unsigned char *structname;
if (length == 0)
return;
gcc_assert(TREE_CODE(type) == RECORD_TYPE);
structname = ORIG_TYPE_NAME(type);
#ifdef __DEBUG_PLUGIN
fprintf(stderr, "Shuffling struct %s %p\n", (const char *)structname, type);
#ifdef __DEBUG_VERBOSE
debug_tree((tree)type);
#endif
#endif
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
seed[i] = shuffle_seed[i];
seed[i] ^= name_hash(structname);
}
raninit(&prng_state, (u64 *)&seed);
if (performance_mode)
performance_shuffle(newtree, length, &prng_state);
else
full_shuffle(newtree, length, &prng_state);
}
static bool is_flexible_array(const_tree field)
{
const_tree fieldtype;
const_tree typesize;
const_tree elemtype;
const_tree elemsize;
fieldtype = TREE_TYPE(field);
typesize = TYPE_SIZE(fieldtype);
if (TREE_CODE(fieldtype) != ARRAY_TYPE)
return false;
elemtype = TREE_TYPE(fieldtype);
elemsize = TYPE_SIZE(elemtype);
/* size of type is represented in bits */
if (typesize == NULL_TREE && TYPE_DOMAIN(fieldtype) != NULL_TREE &&
TYPE_MAX_VALUE(TYPE_DOMAIN(fieldtype)) == NULL_TREE)
return true;
if (typesize != NULL_TREE &&
(TREE_CONSTANT(typesize) && (!tree_to_uhwi(typesize) ||
tree_to_uhwi(typesize) == tree_to_uhwi(elemsize))))
return true;
return false;
}
static int relayout_struct(tree type)
{
unsigned long num_fields = (unsigned long)list_length(TYPE_FIELDS(type));
unsigned long shuffle_length = num_fields;
tree field;
tree newtree[num_fields];
unsigned long i;
tree list;
tree variant;
tree main_variant;
expanded_location xloc;
bool has_flexarray = false;
if (TYPE_FIELDS(type) == NULL_TREE)
return 0;
if (num_fields < 2)
return 0;
gcc_assert(TREE_CODE(type) == RECORD_TYPE);
gcc_assert(num_fields < INT_MAX);
if (lookup_attribute("randomize_performed", TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(type)) ||
lookup_attribute("no_randomize_layout", TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(TYPE_MAIN_VARIANT(type))))
return 0;
/* Workaround for 3rd-party VirtualBox source that we can't modify ourselves */
if (!strcmp((const char *)ORIG_TYPE_NAME(type), "INTNETTRUNKFACTORY") ||
!strcmp((const char *)ORIG_TYPE_NAME(type), "RAWPCIFACTORY"))
return 0;
/* throw out any structs in uapi */
xloc = expand_location(DECL_SOURCE_LOCATION(TYPE_FIELDS(type)));
if (strstr(xloc.file, "/uapi/"))
error(G_("attempted to randomize userland API struct %s"), ORIG_TYPE_NAME(type));
for (field = TYPE_FIELDS(type), i = 0; field; field = TREE_CHAIN(field), i++) {
gcc_assert(TREE_CODE(field) == FIELD_DECL);
newtree[i] = field;
}
/*
* enforce that we don't randomize the layout of the last
* element of a struct if it's a 0 or 1-length array
* or a proper flexible array
*/
if (is_flexible_array(newtree[num_fields - 1])) {
has_flexarray = true;
shuffle_length--;
}
shuffle(type, (tree *)newtree, shuffle_length);
/*
* set up a bogus anonymous struct field designed to error out on unnamed struct initializers
* as gcc provides no other way to detect such code
*/
list = make_node(FIELD_DECL);
TREE_CHAIN(list) = newtree[0];
TREE_TYPE(list) = void_type_node;
DECL_SIZE(list) = bitsize_zero_node;
DECL_NONADDRESSABLE_P(list) = 1;
DECL_FIELD_BIT_OFFSET(list) = bitsize_zero_node;
DECL_SIZE_UNIT(list) = size_zero_node;
DECL_FIELD_OFFSET(list) = size_zero_node;
DECL_CONTEXT(list) = type;
// to satisfy the constify plugin
TREE_READONLY(list) = 1;
for (i = 0; i < num_fields - 1; i++)
TREE_CHAIN(newtree[i]) = newtree[i+1];
TREE_CHAIN(newtree[num_fields - 1]) = NULL_TREE;
main_variant = TYPE_MAIN_VARIANT(type);
for (variant = main_variant; variant; variant = TYPE_NEXT_VARIANT(variant)) {
TYPE_FIELDS(variant) = list;
TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(variant) = copy_list(TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(variant));
TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(variant) = tree_cons(get_identifier("randomize_performed"), NULL_TREE, TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(variant));
TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(variant) = tree_cons(get_identifier("designated_init"), NULL_TREE, TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(variant));
if (has_flexarray)
TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(type) = tree_cons(get_identifier("has_flexarray"), NULL_TREE, TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(type));
}
/*
* force a re-layout of the main variant
* the TYPE_SIZE for all variants will be recomputed
* by finalize_type_size()
*/
TYPE_SIZE(main_variant) = NULL_TREE;
layout_type(main_variant);
gcc_assert(TYPE_SIZE(main_variant) != NULL_TREE);
return 1;
}
/* from constify plugin */
static const_tree get_field_type(const_tree field)
{
return strip_array_types(TREE_TYPE(field));
}
/* from constify plugin */
static bool is_fptr(const_tree fieldtype)
{
if (TREE_CODE(fieldtype) != POINTER_TYPE)
return false;
return TREE_CODE(TREE_TYPE(fieldtype)) == FUNCTION_TYPE;
}
/* derived from constify plugin */
static int is_pure_ops_struct(const_tree node)
{
const_tree field;
gcc_assert(TREE_CODE(node) == RECORD_TYPE || TREE_CODE(node) == UNION_TYPE);
for (field = TYPE_FIELDS(node); field; field = TREE_CHAIN(field)) {
const_tree fieldtype = get_field_type(field);
enum tree_code code = TREE_CODE(fieldtype);
if (node == fieldtype)
continue;
if (code == RECORD_TYPE || code == UNION_TYPE) {
if (!is_pure_ops_struct(fieldtype))
return 0;
gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct plugin This randstruct plugin is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. The randstruct GCC plugin randomizes the layout of selected structures at compile time, as a probabilistic defense against attacks that need to know the layout of structures within the kernel. This is most useful for "in-house" kernel builds where neither the randomization seed nor other build artifacts are made available to an attacker. While less useful for distribution kernels (where the randomization seed must be exposed for third party kernel module builds), it still has some value there since now all kernel builds would need to be tracked by an attacker. In more performance sensitive scenarios, GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE can be selected to make a best effort to restrict randomization to cacheline-sized groups of elements, and will not randomize bitfields. This comes at the cost of reduced randomization. Two annotations are defined,__randomize_layout and __no_randomize_layout, which respectively tell the plugin to either randomize or not to randomize instances of the struct in question. Follow-on patches enable the auto-detection logic for selecting structures for randomization that contain only function pointers. It is disabled here to assist with bisection. Since any randomized structs must be initialized using designated initializers, __randomize_layout includes the __designated_init annotation even when the plugin is disabled so that all builds will require the needed initialization. (With the plugin enabled, annotations for automatically chosen structures are marked as well.) The main differences between this implemenation and grsecurity are: - disable automatic struct selection (to be enabled in follow-up patch) - add designated_init attribute at runtime and for manual marking - clarify debugging output to differentiate bad cast warnings - add whitelisting infrastructure - support gcc 7's DECL_ALIGN and DECL_MODE changes (Laura Abbott) - raise minimum required GCC version to 4.7 Earlier versions of this patch series were ported by Michael Leibowitz. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-05-06 14:37:45 +08:00
continue;
}
gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct plugin This randstruct plugin is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. The randstruct GCC plugin randomizes the layout of selected structures at compile time, as a probabilistic defense against attacks that need to know the layout of structures within the kernel. This is most useful for "in-house" kernel builds where neither the randomization seed nor other build artifacts are made available to an attacker. While less useful for distribution kernels (where the randomization seed must be exposed for third party kernel module builds), it still has some value there since now all kernel builds would need to be tracked by an attacker. In more performance sensitive scenarios, GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE can be selected to make a best effort to restrict randomization to cacheline-sized groups of elements, and will not randomize bitfields. This comes at the cost of reduced randomization. Two annotations are defined,__randomize_layout and __no_randomize_layout, which respectively tell the plugin to either randomize or not to randomize instances of the struct in question. Follow-on patches enable the auto-detection logic for selecting structures for randomization that contain only function pointers. It is disabled here to assist with bisection. Since any randomized structs must be initialized using designated initializers, __randomize_layout includes the __designated_init annotation even when the plugin is disabled so that all builds will require the needed initialization. (With the plugin enabled, annotations for automatically chosen structures are marked as well.) The main differences between this implemenation and grsecurity are: - disable automatic struct selection (to be enabled in follow-up patch) - add designated_init attribute at runtime and for manual marking - clarify debugging output to differentiate bad cast warnings - add whitelisting infrastructure - support gcc 7's DECL_ALIGN and DECL_MODE changes (Laura Abbott) - raise minimum required GCC version to 4.7 Earlier versions of this patch series were ported by Michael Leibowitz. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-05-06 14:37:45 +08:00
if (!is_fptr(fieldtype))
gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct plugin This randstruct plugin is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. The randstruct GCC plugin randomizes the layout of selected structures at compile time, as a probabilistic defense against attacks that need to know the layout of structures within the kernel. This is most useful for "in-house" kernel builds where neither the randomization seed nor other build artifacts are made available to an attacker. While less useful for distribution kernels (where the randomization seed must be exposed for third party kernel module builds), it still has some value there since now all kernel builds would need to be tracked by an attacker. In more performance sensitive scenarios, GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE can be selected to make a best effort to restrict randomization to cacheline-sized groups of elements, and will not randomize bitfields. This comes at the cost of reduced randomization. Two annotations are defined,__randomize_layout and __no_randomize_layout, which respectively tell the plugin to either randomize or not to randomize instances of the struct in question. Follow-on patches enable the auto-detection logic for selecting structures for randomization that contain only function pointers. It is disabled here to assist with bisection. Since any randomized structs must be initialized using designated initializers, __randomize_layout includes the __designated_init annotation even when the plugin is disabled so that all builds will require the needed initialization. (With the plugin enabled, annotations for automatically chosen structures are marked as well.) The main differences between this implemenation and grsecurity are: - disable automatic struct selection (to be enabled in follow-up patch) - add designated_init attribute at runtime and for manual marking - clarify debugging output to differentiate bad cast warnings - add whitelisting infrastructure - support gcc 7's DECL_ALIGN and DECL_MODE changes (Laura Abbott) - raise minimum required GCC version to 4.7 Earlier versions of this patch series were ported by Michael Leibowitz. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-05-06 14:37:45 +08:00
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static void randomize_type(tree type)
{
tree variant;
gcc_assert(TREE_CODE(type) == RECORD_TYPE);
if (lookup_attribute("randomize_considered", TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(type)))
return;
if (lookup_attribute("randomize_layout", TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(TYPE_MAIN_VARIANT(type))) || is_pure_ops_struct(type))
relayout_struct(type);
for (variant = TYPE_MAIN_VARIANT(type); variant; variant = TYPE_NEXT_VARIANT(variant)) {
TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(type) = copy_list(TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(type));
TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(type) = tree_cons(get_identifier("randomize_considered"), NULL_TREE, TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(type));
}
#ifdef __DEBUG_PLUGIN
fprintf(stderr, "Marking randomize_considered on struct %s\n", ORIG_TYPE_NAME(type));
#ifdef __DEBUG_VERBOSE
debug_tree(type);
#endif
#endif
}
static void update_decl_size(tree decl)
{
tree lastval, lastidx, field, init, type, flexsize;
unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT len;
type = TREE_TYPE(decl);
if (!lookup_attribute("has_flexarray", TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(type)))
return;
init = DECL_INITIAL(decl);
if (init == NULL_TREE || init == error_mark_node)
return;
if (TREE_CODE(init) != CONSTRUCTOR)
return;
len = CONSTRUCTOR_NELTS(init);
if (!len)
return;
lastval = CONSTRUCTOR_ELT(init, CONSTRUCTOR_NELTS(init) - 1)->value;
lastidx = CONSTRUCTOR_ELT(init, CONSTRUCTOR_NELTS(init) - 1)->index;
for (field = TYPE_FIELDS(TREE_TYPE(decl)); TREE_CHAIN(field); field = TREE_CHAIN(field))
;
if (lastidx != field)
return;
if (TREE_CODE(lastval) != STRING_CST) {
error("Only string constants are supported as initializers "
"for randomized structures with flexible arrays");
return;
}
flexsize = bitsize_int(TREE_STRING_LENGTH(lastval) *
tree_to_uhwi(TYPE_SIZE(TREE_TYPE(TREE_TYPE(lastval)))));
DECL_SIZE(decl) = size_binop(PLUS_EXPR, TYPE_SIZE(type), flexsize);
return;
}
static void randomize_layout_finish_decl(void *event_data, void *data)
{
tree decl = (tree)event_data;
tree type;
if (decl == NULL_TREE || decl == error_mark_node)
return;
type = TREE_TYPE(decl);
if (TREE_CODE(decl) != VAR_DECL)
return;
if (TREE_CODE(type) != RECORD_TYPE && TREE_CODE(type) != UNION_TYPE)
return;
if (!lookup_attribute("randomize_performed", TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(type)))
return;
DECL_SIZE(decl) = 0;
DECL_SIZE_UNIT(decl) = 0;
SET_DECL_ALIGN(decl, 0);
SET_DECL_MODE (decl, VOIDmode);
SET_DECL_RTL(decl, 0);
update_decl_size(decl);
layout_decl(decl, 0);
}
static void finish_type(void *event_data, void *data)
{
tree type = (tree)event_data;
if (type == NULL_TREE || type == error_mark_node)
return;
if (TREE_CODE(type) != RECORD_TYPE)
return;
if (TYPE_FIELDS(type) == NULL_TREE)
return;
if (lookup_attribute("randomize_considered", TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(type)))
return;
#ifdef __DEBUG_PLUGIN
fprintf(stderr, "Calling randomize_type on %s\n", ORIG_TYPE_NAME(type));
#endif
#ifdef __DEBUG_VERBOSE
debug_tree(type);
#endif
randomize_type(type);
return;
}
static struct attribute_spec randomize_layout_attr = { };
static struct attribute_spec no_randomize_layout_attr = { };
static struct attribute_spec randomize_considered_attr = { };
static struct attribute_spec randomize_performed_attr = { };
gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct plugin This randstruct plugin is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. The randstruct GCC plugin randomizes the layout of selected structures at compile time, as a probabilistic defense against attacks that need to know the layout of structures within the kernel. This is most useful for "in-house" kernel builds where neither the randomization seed nor other build artifacts are made available to an attacker. While less useful for distribution kernels (where the randomization seed must be exposed for third party kernel module builds), it still has some value there since now all kernel builds would need to be tracked by an attacker. In more performance sensitive scenarios, GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE can be selected to make a best effort to restrict randomization to cacheline-sized groups of elements, and will not randomize bitfields. This comes at the cost of reduced randomization. Two annotations are defined,__randomize_layout and __no_randomize_layout, which respectively tell the plugin to either randomize or not to randomize instances of the struct in question. Follow-on patches enable the auto-detection logic for selecting structures for randomization that contain only function pointers. It is disabled here to assist with bisection. Since any randomized structs must be initialized using designated initializers, __randomize_layout includes the __designated_init annotation even when the plugin is disabled so that all builds will require the needed initialization. (With the plugin enabled, annotations for automatically chosen structures are marked as well.) The main differences between this implemenation and grsecurity are: - disable automatic struct selection (to be enabled in follow-up patch) - add designated_init attribute at runtime and for manual marking - clarify debugging output to differentiate bad cast warnings - add whitelisting infrastructure - support gcc 7's DECL_ALIGN and DECL_MODE changes (Laura Abbott) - raise minimum required GCC version to 4.7 Earlier versions of this patch series were ported by Michael Leibowitz. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-05-06 14:37:45 +08:00
static void register_attributes(void *event_data, void *data)
{
randomize_layout_attr.name = "randomize_layout";
randomize_layout_attr.type_required = true;
randomize_layout_attr.handler = handle_randomize_layout_attr;
gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct plugin This randstruct plugin is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. The randstruct GCC plugin randomizes the layout of selected structures at compile time, as a probabilistic defense against attacks that need to know the layout of structures within the kernel. This is most useful for "in-house" kernel builds where neither the randomization seed nor other build artifacts are made available to an attacker. While less useful for distribution kernels (where the randomization seed must be exposed for third party kernel module builds), it still has some value there since now all kernel builds would need to be tracked by an attacker. In more performance sensitive scenarios, GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE can be selected to make a best effort to restrict randomization to cacheline-sized groups of elements, and will not randomize bitfields. This comes at the cost of reduced randomization. Two annotations are defined,__randomize_layout and __no_randomize_layout, which respectively tell the plugin to either randomize or not to randomize instances of the struct in question. Follow-on patches enable the auto-detection logic for selecting structures for randomization that contain only function pointers. It is disabled here to assist with bisection. Since any randomized structs must be initialized using designated initializers, __randomize_layout includes the __designated_init annotation even when the plugin is disabled so that all builds will require the needed initialization. (With the plugin enabled, annotations for automatically chosen structures are marked as well.) The main differences between this implemenation and grsecurity are: - disable automatic struct selection (to be enabled in follow-up patch) - add designated_init attribute at runtime and for manual marking - clarify debugging output to differentiate bad cast warnings - add whitelisting infrastructure - support gcc 7's DECL_ALIGN and DECL_MODE changes (Laura Abbott) - raise minimum required GCC version to 4.7 Earlier versions of this patch series were ported by Michael Leibowitz. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-05-06 14:37:45 +08:00
#if BUILDING_GCC_VERSION >= 4007
randomize_layout_attr.affects_type_identity = true;
gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct plugin This randstruct plugin is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. The randstruct GCC plugin randomizes the layout of selected structures at compile time, as a probabilistic defense against attacks that need to know the layout of structures within the kernel. This is most useful for "in-house" kernel builds where neither the randomization seed nor other build artifacts are made available to an attacker. While less useful for distribution kernels (where the randomization seed must be exposed for third party kernel module builds), it still has some value there since now all kernel builds would need to be tracked by an attacker. In more performance sensitive scenarios, GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE can be selected to make a best effort to restrict randomization to cacheline-sized groups of elements, and will not randomize bitfields. This comes at the cost of reduced randomization. Two annotations are defined,__randomize_layout and __no_randomize_layout, which respectively tell the plugin to either randomize or not to randomize instances of the struct in question. Follow-on patches enable the auto-detection logic for selecting structures for randomization that contain only function pointers. It is disabled here to assist with bisection. Since any randomized structs must be initialized using designated initializers, __randomize_layout includes the __designated_init annotation even when the plugin is disabled so that all builds will require the needed initialization. (With the plugin enabled, annotations for automatically chosen structures are marked as well.) The main differences between this implemenation and grsecurity are: - disable automatic struct selection (to be enabled in follow-up patch) - add designated_init attribute at runtime and for manual marking - clarify debugging output to differentiate bad cast warnings - add whitelisting infrastructure - support gcc 7's DECL_ALIGN and DECL_MODE changes (Laura Abbott) - raise minimum required GCC version to 4.7 Earlier versions of this patch series were ported by Michael Leibowitz. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-05-06 14:37:45 +08:00
#endif
no_randomize_layout_attr.name = "no_randomize_layout";
no_randomize_layout_attr.type_required = true;
no_randomize_layout_attr.handler = handle_randomize_layout_attr;
gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct plugin This randstruct plugin is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. The randstruct GCC plugin randomizes the layout of selected structures at compile time, as a probabilistic defense against attacks that need to know the layout of structures within the kernel. This is most useful for "in-house" kernel builds where neither the randomization seed nor other build artifacts are made available to an attacker. While less useful for distribution kernels (where the randomization seed must be exposed for third party kernel module builds), it still has some value there since now all kernel builds would need to be tracked by an attacker. In more performance sensitive scenarios, GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE can be selected to make a best effort to restrict randomization to cacheline-sized groups of elements, and will not randomize bitfields. This comes at the cost of reduced randomization. Two annotations are defined,__randomize_layout and __no_randomize_layout, which respectively tell the plugin to either randomize or not to randomize instances of the struct in question. Follow-on patches enable the auto-detection logic for selecting structures for randomization that contain only function pointers. It is disabled here to assist with bisection. Since any randomized structs must be initialized using designated initializers, __randomize_layout includes the __designated_init annotation even when the plugin is disabled so that all builds will require the needed initialization. (With the plugin enabled, annotations for automatically chosen structures are marked as well.) The main differences between this implemenation and grsecurity are: - disable automatic struct selection (to be enabled in follow-up patch) - add designated_init attribute at runtime and for manual marking - clarify debugging output to differentiate bad cast warnings - add whitelisting infrastructure - support gcc 7's DECL_ALIGN and DECL_MODE changes (Laura Abbott) - raise minimum required GCC version to 4.7 Earlier versions of this patch series were ported by Michael Leibowitz. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-05-06 14:37:45 +08:00
#if BUILDING_GCC_VERSION >= 4007
no_randomize_layout_attr.affects_type_identity = true;
gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct plugin This randstruct plugin is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. The randstruct GCC plugin randomizes the layout of selected structures at compile time, as a probabilistic defense against attacks that need to know the layout of structures within the kernel. This is most useful for "in-house" kernel builds where neither the randomization seed nor other build artifacts are made available to an attacker. While less useful for distribution kernels (where the randomization seed must be exposed for third party kernel module builds), it still has some value there since now all kernel builds would need to be tracked by an attacker. In more performance sensitive scenarios, GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE can be selected to make a best effort to restrict randomization to cacheline-sized groups of elements, and will not randomize bitfields. This comes at the cost of reduced randomization. Two annotations are defined,__randomize_layout and __no_randomize_layout, which respectively tell the plugin to either randomize or not to randomize instances of the struct in question. Follow-on patches enable the auto-detection logic for selecting structures for randomization that contain only function pointers. It is disabled here to assist with bisection. Since any randomized structs must be initialized using designated initializers, __randomize_layout includes the __designated_init annotation even when the plugin is disabled so that all builds will require the needed initialization. (With the plugin enabled, annotations for automatically chosen structures are marked as well.) The main differences between this implemenation and grsecurity are: - disable automatic struct selection (to be enabled in follow-up patch) - add designated_init attribute at runtime and for manual marking - clarify debugging output to differentiate bad cast warnings - add whitelisting infrastructure - support gcc 7's DECL_ALIGN and DECL_MODE changes (Laura Abbott) - raise minimum required GCC version to 4.7 Earlier versions of this patch series were ported by Michael Leibowitz. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-05-06 14:37:45 +08:00
#endif
randomize_considered_attr.name = "randomize_considered";
randomize_considered_attr.type_required = true;
randomize_considered_attr.handler = handle_randomize_considered_attr;
randomize_performed_attr.name = "randomize_performed";
randomize_performed_attr.type_required = true;
randomize_performed_attr.handler = handle_randomize_performed_attr;
gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct plugin This randstruct plugin is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. The randstruct GCC plugin randomizes the layout of selected structures at compile time, as a probabilistic defense against attacks that need to know the layout of structures within the kernel. This is most useful for "in-house" kernel builds where neither the randomization seed nor other build artifacts are made available to an attacker. While less useful for distribution kernels (where the randomization seed must be exposed for third party kernel module builds), it still has some value there since now all kernel builds would need to be tracked by an attacker. In more performance sensitive scenarios, GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE can be selected to make a best effort to restrict randomization to cacheline-sized groups of elements, and will not randomize bitfields. This comes at the cost of reduced randomization. Two annotations are defined,__randomize_layout and __no_randomize_layout, which respectively tell the plugin to either randomize or not to randomize instances of the struct in question. Follow-on patches enable the auto-detection logic for selecting structures for randomization that contain only function pointers. It is disabled here to assist with bisection. Since any randomized structs must be initialized using designated initializers, __randomize_layout includes the __designated_init annotation even when the plugin is disabled so that all builds will require the needed initialization. (With the plugin enabled, annotations for automatically chosen structures are marked as well.) The main differences between this implemenation and grsecurity are: - disable automatic struct selection (to be enabled in follow-up patch) - add designated_init attribute at runtime and for manual marking - clarify debugging output to differentiate bad cast warnings - add whitelisting infrastructure - support gcc 7's DECL_ALIGN and DECL_MODE changes (Laura Abbott) - raise minimum required GCC version to 4.7 Earlier versions of this patch series were ported by Michael Leibowitz. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-05-06 14:37:45 +08:00
register_attribute(&randomize_layout_attr);
register_attribute(&no_randomize_layout_attr);
register_attribute(&randomize_considered_attr);
register_attribute(&randomize_performed_attr);
}
static void check_bad_casts_in_constructor(tree var, tree init)
{
unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT idx;
tree field, val;
tree field_type, val_type;
FOR_EACH_CONSTRUCTOR_ELT(CONSTRUCTOR_ELTS(init), idx, field, val) {
if (TREE_CODE(val) == CONSTRUCTOR) {
check_bad_casts_in_constructor(var, val);
continue;
}
/* pipacs' plugin creates franken-arrays that differ from those produced by
normal code which all have valid 'field' trees. work around this */
if (field == NULL_TREE)
continue;
field_type = TREE_TYPE(field);
val_type = TREE_TYPE(val);
if (TREE_CODE(field_type) != POINTER_TYPE || TREE_CODE(val_type) != POINTER_TYPE)
continue;
if (field_type == val_type)
continue;
field_type = TYPE_MAIN_VARIANT(strip_array_types(TYPE_MAIN_VARIANT(TREE_TYPE(field_type))));
val_type = TYPE_MAIN_VARIANT(strip_array_types(TYPE_MAIN_VARIANT(TREE_TYPE(val_type))));
if (field_type == void_type_node)
continue;
if (field_type == val_type)
continue;
if (TREE_CODE(val_type) != RECORD_TYPE)
continue;
if (!lookup_attribute("randomize_performed", TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(val_type)))
continue;
MISMATCH(DECL_SOURCE_LOCATION(var), "constructor\n", TYPE_MAIN_VARIANT(field_type), TYPE_MAIN_VARIANT(val_type));
}
}
/* derived from the constify plugin */
static void check_global_variables(void *event_data, void *data)
{
struct varpool_node *node;
tree init;
FOR_EACH_VARIABLE(node) {
tree var = NODE_DECL(node);
init = DECL_INITIAL(var);
if (init == NULL_TREE)
continue;
if (TREE_CODE(init) != CONSTRUCTOR)
continue;
check_bad_casts_in_constructor(var, init);
}
}
static bool dominated_by_is_err(const_tree rhs, basic_block bb)
{
basic_block dom;
gimple dom_stmt;
gimple call_stmt;
const_tree dom_lhs;
const_tree poss_is_err_cond;
const_tree poss_is_err_func;
const_tree is_err_arg;
dom = get_immediate_dominator(CDI_DOMINATORS, bb);
if (!dom)
return false;
dom_stmt = last_stmt(dom);
if (!dom_stmt)
return false;
if (gimple_code(dom_stmt) != GIMPLE_COND)
return false;
if (gimple_cond_code(dom_stmt) != NE_EXPR)
return false;
if (!integer_zerop(gimple_cond_rhs(dom_stmt)))
return false;
poss_is_err_cond = gimple_cond_lhs(dom_stmt);
if (TREE_CODE(poss_is_err_cond) != SSA_NAME)
return false;
call_stmt = SSA_NAME_DEF_STMT(poss_is_err_cond);
if (gimple_code(call_stmt) != GIMPLE_CALL)
return false;
dom_lhs = gimple_get_lhs(call_stmt);
poss_is_err_func = gimple_call_fndecl(call_stmt);
if (!poss_is_err_func)
return false;
if (dom_lhs != poss_is_err_cond)
return false;
if (strcmp(DECL_NAME_POINTER(poss_is_err_func), "IS_ERR"))
return false;
is_err_arg = gimple_call_arg(call_stmt, 0);
if (!is_err_arg)
return false;
if (is_err_arg != rhs)
return false;
return true;
}
static void handle_local_var_initializers(void)
{
tree var;
unsigned int i;
FOR_EACH_LOCAL_DECL(cfun, i, var) {
tree init = DECL_INITIAL(var);
if (!init)
continue;
if (TREE_CODE(init) != CONSTRUCTOR)
continue;
check_bad_casts_in_constructor(var, init);
}
}
static bool type_name_eq(gimple stmt, const_tree type_tree, const char *wanted_name)
{
const char *type_name;
if (type_tree == NULL_TREE)
return false;
switch (TREE_CODE(type_tree)) {
case RECORD_TYPE:
type_name = TYPE_NAME_POINTER(type_tree);
break;
case INTEGER_TYPE:
if (TYPE_PRECISION(type_tree) == CHAR_TYPE_SIZE)
type_name = "char";
else {
INFORM(gimple_location(stmt), "found non-char INTEGER_TYPE cast comparison: %qT\n", type_tree);
debug_tree(type_tree);
return false;
}
break;
case POINTER_TYPE:
if (TREE_CODE(TREE_TYPE(type_tree)) == VOID_TYPE) {
type_name = "void *";
break;
} else {
INFORM(gimple_location(stmt), "found non-void POINTER_TYPE cast comparison %qT\n", type_tree);
debug_tree(type_tree);
return false;
}
default:
INFORM(gimple_location(stmt), "unhandled cast comparison: %qT\n", type_tree);
debug_tree(type_tree);
return false;
}
return strcmp(type_name, wanted_name) == 0;
}
static bool whitelisted_cast(gimple stmt, const_tree lhs_tree, const_tree rhs_tree)
{
const struct whitelist_entry *entry;
expanded_location xloc = expand_location(gimple_location(stmt));
for (entry = whitelist; entry->pathname; entry++) {
if (!strstr(xloc.file, entry->pathname))
continue;
if (type_name_eq(stmt, lhs_tree, entry->lhs) && type_name_eq(stmt, rhs_tree, entry->rhs))
return true;
}
return false;
}
/*
* iterate over all statements to find "bad" casts:
* those where the address of the start of a structure is cast
* to a pointer of a structure of a different type, or a
* structure pointer type is cast to a different structure pointer type
*/
static unsigned int find_bad_casts_execute(void)
{
basic_block bb;
handle_local_var_initializers();
FOR_EACH_BB_FN(bb, cfun) {
gimple_stmt_iterator gsi;
for (gsi = gsi_start_bb(bb); !gsi_end_p(gsi); gsi_next(&gsi)) {
gimple stmt;
const_tree lhs;
const_tree lhs_type;
const_tree rhs1;
const_tree rhs_type;
const_tree ptr_lhs_type;
const_tree ptr_rhs_type;
const_tree op0;
const_tree op0_type;
enum tree_code rhs_code;
stmt = gsi_stmt(gsi);
#ifdef __DEBUG_PLUGIN
#ifdef __DEBUG_VERBOSE
debug_gimple_stmt(stmt);
debug_tree(gimple_get_lhs(stmt));
#endif
#endif
if (gimple_code(stmt) != GIMPLE_ASSIGN)
continue;
#ifdef __DEBUG_PLUGIN
#ifdef __DEBUG_VERBOSE
debug_tree(gimple_assign_rhs1(stmt));
#endif
#endif
rhs_code = gimple_assign_rhs_code(stmt);
if (rhs_code != ADDR_EXPR && rhs_code != SSA_NAME)
continue;
lhs = gimple_get_lhs(stmt);
lhs_type = TREE_TYPE(lhs);
rhs1 = gimple_assign_rhs1(stmt);
rhs_type = TREE_TYPE(rhs1);
if (TREE_CODE(rhs_type) != POINTER_TYPE ||
TREE_CODE(lhs_type) != POINTER_TYPE)
continue;
ptr_lhs_type = TYPE_MAIN_VARIANT(strip_array_types(TYPE_MAIN_VARIANT(TREE_TYPE(lhs_type))));
ptr_rhs_type = TYPE_MAIN_VARIANT(strip_array_types(TYPE_MAIN_VARIANT(TREE_TYPE(rhs_type))));
if (ptr_rhs_type == void_type_node)
continue;
if (ptr_lhs_type == void_type_node)
continue;
if (dominated_by_is_err(rhs1, bb))
continue;
if (TREE_CODE(ptr_rhs_type) != RECORD_TYPE) {
#ifndef __DEBUG_PLUGIN
if (lookup_attribute("randomize_performed", TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(ptr_lhs_type)))
#endif
{
if (!whitelisted_cast(stmt, ptr_lhs_type, ptr_rhs_type))
MISMATCH(gimple_location(stmt), "rhs", ptr_lhs_type, ptr_rhs_type);
}
continue;
}
if (rhs_code == SSA_NAME && ptr_lhs_type == ptr_rhs_type)
continue;
if (rhs_code == ADDR_EXPR) {
op0 = TREE_OPERAND(rhs1, 0);
if (op0 == NULL_TREE)
continue;
if (TREE_CODE(op0) != VAR_DECL)
continue;
op0_type = TYPE_MAIN_VARIANT(strip_array_types(TYPE_MAIN_VARIANT(TREE_TYPE(op0))));
if (op0_type == ptr_lhs_type)
continue;
#ifndef __DEBUG_PLUGIN
if (lookup_attribute("randomize_performed", TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(op0_type)))
#endif
{
if (!whitelisted_cast(stmt, ptr_lhs_type, op0_type))
MISMATCH(gimple_location(stmt), "op0", ptr_lhs_type, op0_type);
}
} else {
const_tree ssa_name_var = SSA_NAME_VAR(rhs1);
/* skip bogus type casts introduced by container_of */
if (ssa_name_var != NULL_TREE && DECL_NAME(ssa_name_var) &&
!strcmp((const char *)DECL_NAME_POINTER(ssa_name_var), "__mptr"))
continue;
#ifndef __DEBUG_PLUGIN
if (lookup_attribute("randomize_performed", TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(ptr_rhs_type)))
#endif
{
if (!whitelisted_cast(stmt, ptr_lhs_type, ptr_rhs_type))
MISMATCH(gimple_location(stmt), "ssa", ptr_lhs_type, ptr_rhs_type);
}
}
}
}
return 0;
}
#define PASS_NAME find_bad_casts
#define NO_GATE
#define TODO_FLAGS_FINISH TODO_dump_func
#include "gcc-generate-gimple-pass.h"
__visible int plugin_init(struct plugin_name_args *plugin_info, struct plugin_gcc_version *version)
{
int i;
const char * const plugin_name = plugin_info->base_name;
const int argc = plugin_info->argc;
const struct plugin_argument * const argv = plugin_info->argv;
bool enable = true;
int obtained_seed = 0;
struct register_pass_info find_bad_casts_pass_info;
find_bad_casts_pass_info.pass = make_find_bad_casts_pass();
find_bad_casts_pass_info.reference_pass_name = "ssa";
find_bad_casts_pass_info.ref_pass_instance_number = 1;
find_bad_casts_pass_info.pos_op = PASS_POS_INSERT_AFTER;
if (!plugin_default_version_check(version, &gcc_version)) {
error(G_("incompatible gcc/plugin versions"));
return 1;
}
if (strncmp(lang_hooks.name, "GNU C", 5) && !strncmp(lang_hooks.name, "GNU C+", 6)) {
inform(UNKNOWN_LOCATION, G_("%s supports C only, not %s"), plugin_name, lang_hooks.name);
enable = false;
}
for (i = 0; i < argc; ++i) {
if (!strcmp(argv[i].key, "disable")) {
enable = false;
continue;
}
if (!strcmp(argv[i].key, "performance-mode")) {
performance_mode = 1;
continue;
}
error(G_("unknown option '-fplugin-arg-%s-%s'"), plugin_name, argv[i].key);
}
if (strlen(randstruct_seed) != 64) {
error(G_("invalid seed value supplied for %s plugin"), plugin_name);
return 1;
}
obtained_seed = sscanf(randstruct_seed, "%016llx%016llx%016llx%016llx",
&shuffle_seed[0], &shuffle_seed[1], &shuffle_seed[2], &shuffle_seed[3]);
if (obtained_seed != 4) {
error(G_("Invalid seed supplied for %s plugin"), plugin_name);
return 1;
}
register_callback(plugin_name, PLUGIN_INFO, NULL, &randomize_layout_plugin_info);
if (enable) {
register_callback(plugin_name, PLUGIN_ALL_IPA_PASSES_START, check_global_variables, NULL);
register_callback(plugin_name, PLUGIN_PASS_MANAGER_SETUP, NULL, &find_bad_casts_pass_info);
register_callback(plugin_name, PLUGIN_FINISH_TYPE, finish_type, NULL);
register_callback(plugin_name, PLUGIN_FINISH_DECL, randomize_layout_finish_decl, NULL);
}
register_callback(plugin_name, PLUGIN_ATTRIBUTES, register_attributes, NULL);
return 0;
}