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linux-next/kernel/pid.c

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/*
* Generic pidhash and scalable, time-bounded PID allocator
*
* (C) 2002-2003 Nadia Yvette Chambers, IBM
* (C) 2004 Nadia Yvette Chambers, Oracle
* (C) 2002-2004 Ingo Molnar, Red Hat
*
* pid-structures are backing objects for tasks sharing a given ID to chain
* against. There is very little to them aside from hashing them and
* parking tasks using given ID's on a list.
*
* The hash is always changed with the tasklist_lock write-acquired,
* and the hash is only accessed with the tasklist_lock at least
* read-acquired, so there's no additional SMP locking needed here.
*
* We have a list of bitmap pages, which bitmaps represent the PID space.
* Allocating and freeing PIDs is completely lockless. The worst-case
* allocation scenario when all but one out of 1 million PIDs possible are
* allocated already: the scanning of 32 list entries and at most PAGE_SIZE
* bytes. The typical fastpath is a single successful setbit. Freeing is O(1).
*
* Pid namespaces:
* (C) 2007 Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>, OpenVZ, SWsoft Inc.
* (C) 2007 Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@us.ibm.com>, IBM
* Many thanks to Oleg Nesterov for comments and help
*
*/
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/rculist.h>
#include <linux/bootmem.h>
#include <linux/hash.h>
#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
#include <linux/init_task.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/proc_ns.h>
#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
#include <linux/sched/task.h>
#define pid_hashfn(nr, ns) \
hash_long((unsigned long)nr + (unsigned long)ns, pidhash_shift)
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
static struct hlist_head *pid_hash;
static unsigned int pidhash_shift = 4;
struct pid init_struct_pid = INIT_STRUCT_PID;
int pid_max = PID_MAX_DEFAULT;
#define RESERVED_PIDS 300
int pid_max_min = RESERVED_PIDS + 1;
int pid_max_max = PID_MAX_LIMIT;
static inline int mk_pid(struct pid_namespace *pid_ns,
struct pidmap *map, int off)
{
return (map - pid_ns->pidmap)*BITS_PER_PAGE + off;
}
#define find_next_offset(map, off) \
find_next_zero_bit((map)->page, BITS_PER_PAGE, off)
/*
* PID-map pages start out as NULL, they get allocated upon
* first use and are never deallocated. This way a low pid_max
* value does not cause lots of bitmaps to be allocated, but
* the scheme scales to up to 4 million PIDs, runtime.
*/
struct pid_namespace init_pid_ns = {
.kref = KREF_INIT(2),
.pidmap = {
[ 0 ... PIDMAP_ENTRIES-1] = { ATOMIC_INIT(BITS_PER_PAGE), NULL }
},
.last_pid = 0,
.nr_hashed = PIDNS_HASH_ADDING,
.level = 0,
.child_reaper = &init_task,
.user_ns = &init_user_ns,
.ns.inum = PROC_PID_INIT_INO,
#ifdef CONFIG_PID_NS
.ns.ops = &pidns_operations,
#endif
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(init_pid_ns);
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
/*
* Note: disable interrupts while the pidmap_lock is held as an
* interrupt might come in and do read_lock(&tasklist_lock).
*
* If we don't disable interrupts there is a nasty deadlock between
* detach_pid()->free_pid() and another cpu that does
* spin_lock(&pidmap_lock) followed by an interrupt routine that does
* read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
*
* After we clean up the tasklist_lock and know there are no
* irq handlers that take it we can leave the interrupts enabled.
* For now it is easier to be safe than to prove it can't happen.
*/
static __cacheline_aligned_in_smp DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pidmap_lock);
static void free_pidmap(struct upid *upid)
{
int nr = upid->nr;
struct pidmap *map = upid->ns->pidmap + nr / BITS_PER_PAGE;
int offset = nr & BITS_PER_PAGE_MASK;
clear_bit(offset, map->page);
atomic_inc(&map->nr_free);
}
pids: fix a race in pid generation that causes pids to be reused immediately A program that repeatedly forks and waits is susceptible to having the same pid repeated, especially when it competes with another instance of the same program. This is really bad for bash implementation. Furthermore, many shell scripts assume that pid numbers will not be used for some length of time. Race Description: A B // pid == offset == n // pid == offset == n + 1 test_and_set_bit(offset, map->page) test_and_set_bit(offset, map->page); pid_ns->last_pid = pid; pid_ns->last_pid = pid; // pid == n + 1 is freed (wait()) // Next fork()... last = pid_ns->last_pid; // == n pid = last + 1; Code to reproduce it (Running multiple instances is more effective): #include <errno.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> // The distance mod 32768 between two pids, where the first pid is expected // to be smaller than the second. int PidDistance(pid_t first, pid_t second) { return (second + 32768 - first) % 32768; } int main(int argc, char* argv[]) { int failed = 0; pid_t last_pid = 0; int i; printf("%d\n", sizeof(pid_t)); for (i = 0; i < 10000000; ++i) { if (i % 32786 == 0) printf("Iter: %d\n", i/32768); int child_exit_code = i % 256; pid_t pid = fork(); if (pid == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "fork failed, iteration %d, errno=%d", i, errno); exit(1); } if (pid == 0) { // Child exit(child_exit_code); } else { // Parent if (i > 0) { int distance = PidDistance(last_pid, pid); if (distance == 0 || distance > 30000) { fprintf(stderr, "Unexpected pid sequence: previous fork: pid=%d, " "current fork: pid=%d for iteration=%d.\n", last_pid, pid, i); failed = 1; } } last_pid = pid; int status; int reaped = wait(&status); if (reaped != pid) { fprintf(stderr, "Wait return value: expected pid=%d, " "got %d, iteration %d\n", pid, reaped, i); failed = 1; } else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != child_exit_code) { fprintf(stderr, "Unexpected exit status %x, iteration %d\n", WEXITSTATUS(status), i); failed = 1; } } } exit(failed); } Thanks to Ted Tso for the key ideas of this implementation. Signed-off-by: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@us.ibm.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-08-11 09:03:16 +08:00
/*
* If we started walking pids at 'base', is 'a' seen before 'b'?
*/
static int pid_before(int base, int a, int b)
{
/*
* This is the same as saying
*
* (a - base + MAXUINT) % MAXUINT < (b - base + MAXUINT) % MAXUINT
* and that mapping orders 'a' and 'b' with respect to 'base'.
*/
return (unsigned)(a - base) < (unsigned)(b - base);
}
/*
* We might be racing with someone else trying to set pid_ns->last_pid
* at the pid allocation time (there's also a sysctl for this, but racing
* with this one is OK, see comment in kernel/pid_namespace.c about it).
pids: fix a race in pid generation that causes pids to be reused immediately A program that repeatedly forks and waits is susceptible to having the same pid repeated, especially when it competes with another instance of the same program. This is really bad for bash implementation. Furthermore, many shell scripts assume that pid numbers will not be used for some length of time. Race Description: A B // pid == offset == n // pid == offset == n + 1 test_and_set_bit(offset, map->page) test_and_set_bit(offset, map->page); pid_ns->last_pid = pid; pid_ns->last_pid = pid; // pid == n + 1 is freed (wait()) // Next fork()... last = pid_ns->last_pid; // == n pid = last + 1; Code to reproduce it (Running multiple instances is more effective): #include <errno.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> // The distance mod 32768 between two pids, where the first pid is expected // to be smaller than the second. int PidDistance(pid_t first, pid_t second) { return (second + 32768 - first) % 32768; } int main(int argc, char* argv[]) { int failed = 0; pid_t last_pid = 0; int i; printf("%d\n", sizeof(pid_t)); for (i = 0; i < 10000000; ++i) { if (i % 32786 == 0) printf("Iter: %d\n", i/32768); int child_exit_code = i % 256; pid_t pid = fork(); if (pid == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "fork failed, iteration %d, errno=%d", i, errno); exit(1); } if (pid == 0) { // Child exit(child_exit_code); } else { // Parent if (i > 0) { int distance = PidDistance(last_pid, pid); if (distance == 0 || distance > 30000) { fprintf(stderr, "Unexpected pid sequence: previous fork: pid=%d, " "current fork: pid=%d for iteration=%d.\n", last_pid, pid, i); failed = 1; } } last_pid = pid; int status; int reaped = wait(&status); if (reaped != pid) { fprintf(stderr, "Wait return value: expected pid=%d, " "got %d, iteration %d\n", pid, reaped, i); failed = 1; } else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != child_exit_code) { fprintf(stderr, "Unexpected exit status %x, iteration %d\n", WEXITSTATUS(status), i); failed = 1; } } } exit(failed); } Thanks to Ted Tso for the key ideas of this implementation. Signed-off-by: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@us.ibm.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-08-11 09:03:16 +08:00
* We want the winner to have the "later" value, because if the
* "earlier" value prevails, then a pid may get reused immediately.
*
* Since pids rollover, it is not sufficient to just pick the bigger
* value. We have to consider where we started counting from.
*
* 'base' is the value of pid_ns->last_pid that we observed when
* we started looking for a pid.
*
* 'pid' is the pid that we eventually found.
*/
static void set_last_pid(struct pid_namespace *pid_ns, int base, int pid)
{
int prev;
int last_write = base;
do {
prev = last_write;
last_write = cmpxchg(&pid_ns->last_pid, prev, pid);
} while ((prev != last_write) && (pid_before(base, last_write, pid)));
}
static int alloc_pidmap(struct pid_namespace *pid_ns)
{
int i, offset, max_scan, pid, last = pid_ns->last_pid;
struct pidmap *map;
pid = last + 1;
if (pid >= pid_max)
pid = RESERVED_PIDS;
offset = pid & BITS_PER_PAGE_MASK;
map = &pid_ns->pidmap[pid/BITS_PER_PAGE];
/*
* If last_pid points into the middle of the map->page we
* want to scan this bitmap block twice, the second time
* we start with offset == 0 (or RESERVED_PIDS).
*/
max_scan = DIV_ROUND_UP(pid_max, BITS_PER_PAGE) - !offset;
for (i = 0; i <= max_scan; ++i) {
if (unlikely(!map->page)) {
void *page = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
/*
* Free the page if someone raced with us
* installing it:
*/
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
spin_lock_irq(&pidmap_lock);
if (!map->page) {
map->page = page;
page = NULL;
}
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
spin_unlock_irq(&pidmap_lock);
kfree(page);
if (unlikely(!map->page))
fork: report pid reservation failure properly copy_process will report any failure in alloc_pid as ENOMEM currently which is misleading because the pid allocation might fail not only when the memory is short but also when the pid space is consumed already. The current man page even mentions this case: : EAGAIN : : A system-imposed limit on the number of threads was encountered. : There are a number of limits that may trigger this error: the : RLIMIT_NPROC soft resource limit (set via setrlimit(2)), which : limits the number of processes and threads for a real user ID, was : reached; the kernel's system-wide limit on the number of processes : and threads, /proc/sys/kernel/threads-max, was reached (see : proc(5)); or the maximum number of PIDs, /proc/sys/kernel/pid_max, : was reached (see proc(5)). so the current behavior is also incorrect wrt. documentation. POSIX man page also suggest returing EAGAIN when the process count limit is reached. This patch simply propagates error code from alloc_pid and makes sure we return -EAGAIN due to reservation failure. This will make behavior of fork closer to both our documentation and POSIX. alloc_pid might alsoo fail when the reaper in the pid namespace is dead (the namespace basically disallows all new processes) and there is no good error code which would match documented ones. We have traditionally returned ENOMEM for this case which is misleading as well but as per Eric W. Biederman this behavior is documented in man pid_namespaces(7) : If the "init" process of a PID namespace terminates, the kernel : terminates all of the processes in the namespace via a SIGKILL signal. : This behavior reflects the fact that the "init" process is essential for : the correct operation of a PID namespace. In this case, a subsequent : fork(2) into this PID namespace will fail with the error ENOMEM; it is : not possible to create a new processes in a PID namespace whose "init" : process has terminated. and introducing a new error code would be too risky so let's stick to ENOMEM for this case. Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-17 03:47:38 +08:00
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (likely(atomic_read(&map->nr_free))) {
for ( ; ; ) {
if (!test_and_set_bit(offset, map->page)) {
atomic_dec(&map->nr_free);
pids: fix a race in pid generation that causes pids to be reused immediately A program that repeatedly forks and waits is susceptible to having the same pid repeated, especially when it competes with another instance of the same program. This is really bad for bash implementation. Furthermore, many shell scripts assume that pid numbers will not be used for some length of time. Race Description: A B // pid == offset == n // pid == offset == n + 1 test_and_set_bit(offset, map->page) test_and_set_bit(offset, map->page); pid_ns->last_pid = pid; pid_ns->last_pid = pid; // pid == n + 1 is freed (wait()) // Next fork()... last = pid_ns->last_pid; // == n pid = last + 1; Code to reproduce it (Running multiple instances is more effective): #include <errno.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> // The distance mod 32768 between two pids, where the first pid is expected // to be smaller than the second. int PidDistance(pid_t first, pid_t second) { return (second + 32768 - first) % 32768; } int main(int argc, char* argv[]) { int failed = 0; pid_t last_pid = 0; int i; printf("%d\n", sizeof(pid_t)); for (i = 0; i < 10000000; ++i) { if (i % 32786 == 0) printf("Iter: %d\n", i/32768); int child_exit_code = i % 256; pid_t pid = fork(); if (pid == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "fork failed, iteration %d, errno=%d", i, errno); exit(1); } if (pid == 0) { // Child exit(child_exit_code); } else { // Parent if (i > 0) { int distance = PidDistance(last_pid, pid); if (distance == 0 || distance > 30000) { fprintf(stderr, "Unexpected pid sequence: previous fork: pid=%d, " "current fork: pid=%d for iteration=%d.\n", last_pid, pid, i); failed = 1; } } last_pid = pid; int status; int reaped = wait(&status); if (reaped != pid) { fprintf(stderr, "Wait return value: expected pid=%d, " "got %d, iteration %d\n", pid, reaped, i); failed = 1; } else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != child_exit_code) { fprintf(stderr, "Unexpected exit status %x, iteration %d\n", WEXITSTATUS(status), i); failed = 1; } } } exit(failed); } Thanks to Ted Tso for the key ideas of this implementation. Signed-off-by: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@us.ibm.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-08-11 09:03:16 +08:00
set_last_pid(pid_ns, last, pid);
return pid;
}
offset = find_next_offset(map, offset);
if (offset >= BITS_PER_PAGE)
break;
pid = mk_pid(pid_ns, map, offset);
if (pid >= pid_max)
break;
}
}
if (map < &pid_ns->pidmap[(pid_max-1)/BITS_PER_PAGE]) {
++map;
offset = 0;
} else {
map = &pid_ns->pidmap[0];
offset = RESERVED_PIDS;
if (unlikely(last == offset))
break;
}
pid = mk_pid(pid_ns, map, offset);
}
fork: report pid reservation failure properly copy_process will report any failure in alloc_pid as ENOMEM currently which is misleading because the pid allocation might fail not only when the memory is short but also when the pid space is consumed already. The current man page even mentions this case: : EAGAIN : : A system-imposed limit on the number of threads was encountered. : There are a number of limits that may trigger this error: the : RLIMIT_NPROC soft resource limit (set via setrlimit(2)), which : limits the number of processes and threads for a real user ID, was : reached; the kernel's system-wide limit on the number of processes : and threads, /proc/sys/kernel/threads-max, was reached (see : proc(5)); or the maximum number of PIDs, /proc/sys/kernel/pid_max, : was reached (see proc(5)). so the current behavior is also incorrect wrt. documentation. POSIX man page also suggest returing EAGAIN when the process count limit is reached. This patch simply propagates error code from alloc_pid and makes sure we return -EAGAIN due to reservation failure. This will make behavior of fork closer to both our documentation and POSIX. alloc_pid might alsoo fail when the reaper in the pid namespace is dead (the namespace basically disallows all new processes) and there is no good error code which would match documented ones. We have traditionally returned ENOMEM for this case which is misleading as well but as per Eric W. Biederman this behavior is documented in man pid_namespaces(7) : If the "init" process of a PID namespace terminates, the kernel : terminates all of the processes in the namespace via a SIGKILL signal. : This behavior reflects the fact that the "init" process is essential for : the correct operation of a PID namespace. In this case, a subsequent : fork(2) into this PID namespace will fail with the error ENOMEM; it is : not possible to create a new processes in a PID namespace whose "init" : process has terminated. and introducing a new error code would be too risky so let's stick to ENOMEM for this case. Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-17 03:47:38 +08:00
return -EAGAIN;
}
int next_pidmap(struct pid_namespace *pid_ns, unsigned int last)
[PATCH] proc: readdir race fix (take 3) The problem: An opendir, readdir, closedir sequence can fail to report process ids that are continually in use throughout the sequence of system calls. For this race to trigger the process that proc_pid_readdir stops at must exit before readdir is called again. This can cause ps to fail to report processes, and it is in violation of posix guarantees and normal application expectations with respect to readdir. Currently there is no way to work around this problem in user space short of providing a gargantuan buffer to user space so the directory read all happens in on system call. This patch implements the normal directory semantics for proc, that guarantee that a directory entry that is neither created nor destroyed while reading the directory entry will be returned. For directory that are either created or destroyed during the readdir you may or may not see them. Furthermore you may seek to a directory offset you have previously seen. These are the guarantee that ext[23] provides and that posix requires, and more importantly that user space expects. Plus it is a simple semantic to implement reliable service. It is just a matter of calling readdir a second time if you are wondering if something new has show up. These better semantics are implemented by scanning through the pids in numerical order and by making the file offset a pid plus a fixed offset. The pid scan happens on the pid bitmap, which when you look at it is remarkably efficient for a brute force algorithm. Given that a typical cache line is 64 bytes and thus covers space for 64*8 == 200 pids. There are only 40 cache lines for the entire 32K pid space. A typical system will have 100 pids or more so this is actually fewer cache lines we have to look at to scan a linked list, and the worst case of having to scan the entire pid bitmap is pretty reasonable. If we need something more efficient we can go to a more efficient data structure for indexing the pids, but for now what we have should be sufficient. In addition this takes no additional locks and is actually less code than what we are doing now. Also another very subtle bug in this area has been fixed. It is possible to catch a task in the middle of de_thread where a thread is assuming the thread of it's thread group leader. This patch carefully handles that case so if we hit it we don't fail to return the pid, that is undergoing the de_thread dance. Thanks to KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> for providing the first fix, pointing this out and working on it. [oleg@tv-sign.ru: fix it] Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-02 17:17:04 +08:00
{
int offset;
struct pidmap *map, *end;
[PATCH] proc: readdir race fix (take 3) The problem: An opendir, readdir, closedir sequence can fail to report process ids that are continually in use throughout the sequence of system calls. For this race to trigger the process that proc_pid_readdir stops at must exit before readdir is called again. This can cause ps to fail to report processes, and it is in violation of posix guarantees and normal application expectations with respect to readdir. Currently there is no way to work around this problem in user space short of providing a gargantuan buffer to user space so the directory read all happens in on system call. This patch implements the normal directory semantics for proc, that guarantee that a directory entry that is neither created nor destroyed while reading the directory entry will be returned. For directory that are either created or destroyed during the readdir you may or may not see them. Furthermore you may seek to a directory offset you have previously seen. These are the guarantee that ext[23] provides and that posix requires, and more importantly that user space expects. Plus it is a simple semantic to implement reliable service. It is just a matter of calling readdir a second time if you are wondering if something new has show up. These better semantics are implemented by scanning through the pids in numerical order and by making the file offset a pid plus a fixed offset. The pid scan happens on the pid bitmap, which when you look at it is remarkably efficient for a brute force algorithm. Given that a typical cache line is 64 bytes and thus covers space for 64*8 == 200 pids. There are only 40 cache lines for the entire 32K pid space. A typical system will have 100 pids or more so this is actually fewer cache lines we have to look at to scan a linked list, and the worst case of having to scan the entire pid bitmap is pretty reasonable. If we need something more efficient we can go to a more efficient data structure for indexing the pids, but for now what we have should be sufficient. In addition this takes no additional locks and is actually less code than what we are doing now. Also another very subtle bug in this area has been fixed. It is possible to catch a task in the middle of de_thread where a thread is assuming the thread of it's thread group leader. This patch carefully handles that case so if we hit it we don't fail to return the pid, that is undergoing the de_thread dance. Thanks to KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> for providing the first fix, pointing this out and working on it. [oleg@tv-sign.ru: fix it] Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-02 17:17:04 +08:00
if (last >= PID_MAX_LIMIT)
return -1;
[PATCH] proc: readdir race fix (take 3) The problem: An opendir, readdir, closedir sequence can fail to report process ids that are continually in use throughout the sequence of system calls. For this race to trigger the process that proc_pid_readdir stops at must exit before readdir is called again. This can cause ps to fail to report processes, and it is in violation of posix guarantees and normal application expectations with respect to readdir. Currently there is no way to work around this problem in user space short of providing a gargantuan buffer to user space so the directory read all happens in on system call. This patch implements the normal directory semantics for proc, that guarantee that a directory entry that is neither created nor destroyed while reading the directory entry will be returned. For directory that are either created or destroyed during the readdir you may or may not see them. Furthermore you may seek to a directory offset you have previously seen. These are the guarantee that ext[23] provides and that posix requires, and more importantly that user space expects. Plus it is a simple semantic to implement reliable service. It is just a matter of calling readdir a second time if you are wondering if something new has show up. These better semantics are implemented by scanning through the pids in numerical order and by making the file offset a pid plus a fixed offset. The pid scan happens on the pid bitmap, which when you look at it is remarkably efficient for a brute force algorithm. Given that a typical cache line is 64 bytes and thus covers space for 64*8 == 200 pids. There are only 40 cache lines for the entire 32K pid space. A typical system will have 100 pids or more so this is actually fewer cache lines we have to look at to scan a linked list, and the worst case of having to scan the entire pid bitmap is pretty reasonable. If we need something more efficient we can go to a more efficient data structure for indexing the pids, but for now what we have should be sufficient. In addition this takes no additional locks and is actually less code than what we are doing now. Also another very subtle bug in this area has been fixed. It is possible to catch a task in the middle of de_thread where a thread is assuming the thread of it's thread group leader. This patch carefully handles that case so if we hit it we don't fail to return the pid, that is undergoing the de_thread dance. Thanks to KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> for providing the first fix, pointing this out and working on it. [oleg@tv-sign.ru: fix it] Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-02 17:17:04 +08:00
offset = (last + 1) & BITS_PER_PAGE_MASK;
map = &pid_ns->pidmap[(last + 1)/BITS_PER_PAGE];
end = &pid_ns->pidmap[PIDMAP_ENTRIES];
for (; map < end; map++, offset = 0) {
[PATCH] proc: readdir race fix (take 3) The problem: An opendir, readdir, closedir sequence can fail to report process ids that are continually in use throughout the sequence of system calls. For this race to trigger the process that proc_pid_readdir stops at must exit before readdir is called again. This can cause ps to fail to report processes, and it is in violation of posix guarantees and normal application expectations with respect to readdir. Currently there is no way to work around this problem in user space short of providing a gargantuan buffer to user space so the directory read all happens in on system call. This patch implements the normal directory semantics for proc, that guarantee that a directory entry that is neither created nor destroyed while reading the directory entry will be returned. For directory that are either created or destroyed during the readdir you may or may not see them. Furthermore you may seek to a directory offset you have previously seen. These are the guarantee that ext[23] provides and that posix requires, and more importantly that user space expects. Plus it is a simple semantic to implement reliable service. It is just a matter of calling readdir a second time if you are wondering if something new has show up. These better semantics are implemented by scanning through the pids in numerical order and by making the file offset a pid plus a fixed offset. The pid scan happens on the pid bitmap, which when you look at it is remarkably efficient for a brute force algorithm. Given that a typical cache line is 64 bytes and thus covers space for 64*8 == 200 pids. There are only 40 cache lines for the entire 32K pid space. A typical system will have 100 pids or more so this is actually fewer cache lines we have to look at to scan a linked list, and the worst case of having to scan the entire pid bitmap is pretty reasonable. If we need something more efficient we can go to a more efficient data structure for indexing the pids, but for now what we have should be sufficient. In addition this takes no additional locks and is actually less code than what we are doing now. Also another very subtle bug in this area has been fixed. It is possible to catch a task in the middle of de_thread where a thread is assuming the thread of it's thread group leader. This patch carefully handles that case so if we hit it we don't fail to return the pid, that is undergoing the de_thread dance. Thanks to KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> for providing the first fix, pointing this out and working on it. [oleg@tv-sign.ru: fix it] Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-02 17:17:04 +08:00
if (unlikely(!map->page))
continue;
offset = find_next_bit((map)->page, BITS_PER_PAGE, offset);
if (offset < BITS_PER_PAGE)
return mk_pid(pid_ns, map, offset);
[PATCH] proc: readdir race fix (take 3) The problem: An opendir, readdir, closedir sequence can fail to report process ids that are continually in use throughout the sequence of system calls. For this race to trigger the process that proc_pid_readdir stops at must exit before readdir is called again. This can cause ps to fail to report processes, and it is in violation of posix guarantees and normal application expectations with respect to readdir. Currently there is no way to work around this problem in user space short of providing a gargantuan buffer to user space so the directory read all happens in on system call. This patch implements the normal directory semantics for proc, that guarantee that a directory entry that is neither created nor destroyed while reading the directory entry will be returned. For directory that are either created or destroyed during the readdir you may or may not see them. Furthermore you may seek to a directory offset you have previously seen. These are the guarantee that ext[23] provides and that posix requires, and more importantly that user space expects. Plus it is a simple semantic to implement reliable service. It is just a matter of calling readdir a second time if you are wondering if something new has show up. These better semantics are implemented by scanning through the pids in numerical order and by making the file offset a pid plus a fixed offset. The pid scan happens on the pid bitmap, which when you look at it is remarkably efficient for a brute force algorithm. Given that a typical cache line is 64 bytes and thus covers space for 64*8 == 200 pids. There are only 40 cache lines for the entire 32K pid space. A typical system will have 100 pids or more so this is actually fewer cache lines we have to look at to scan a linked list, and the worst case of having to scan the entire pid bitmap is pretty reasonable. If we need something more efficient we can go to a more efficient data structure for indexing the pids, but for now what we have should be sufficient. In addition this takes no additional locks and is actually less code than what we are doing now. Also another very subtle bug in this area has been fixed. It is possible to catch a task in the middle of de_thread where a thread is assuming the thread of it's thread group leader. This patch carefully handles that case so if we hit it we don't fail to return the pid, that is undergoing the de_thread dance. Thanks to KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> for providing the first fix, pointing this out and working on it. [oleg@tv-sign.ru: fix it] Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-02 17:17:04 +08:00
}
return -1;
}
void put_pid(struct pid *pid)
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
{
struct pid_namespace *ns;
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
if (!pid)
return;
ns = pid->numbers[pid->level].ns;
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
if ((atomic_read(&pid->count) == 1) ||
atomic_dec_and_test(&pid->count)) {
kmem_cache_free(ns->pid_cachep, pid);
put_pid_ns(ns);
}
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(put_pid);
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
static void delayed_put_pid(struct rcu_head *rhp)
{
struct pid *pid = container_of(rhp, struct pid, rcu);
put_pid(pid);
}
void free_pid(struct pid *pid)
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
{
/* We can be called with write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock) held */
int i;
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&pidmap_lock, flags);
for (i = 0; i <= pid->level; i++) {
struct upid *upid = pid->numbers + i;
struct pid_namespace *ns = upid->ns;
hlist_del_rcu(&upid->pid_chain);
switch(--ns->nr_hashed) {
pidns: Fix hang in zap_pid_ns_processes by sending a potentially extra wakeup Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> writes: > Since commit af4b8a83add95ef40716401395b44a1b579965f4 it's been > possible to get into a situation where a pidns reaper is > <defunct>, reparented to host pid 1, but never reaped. How to > reproduce this is documented at > > https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxc/+bug/1168526 > (and see > https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxc/+bug/1168526/comments/13) > In short, run repeated starts of a container whose init is > > Process.exit(0); > > sysrq-t when such a task is playing zombie shows: > > [ 131.132978] init x ffff88011fc14580 0 2084 2039 0x00000000 > [ 131.132978] ffff880116e89ea8 0000000000000002 ffff880116e89fd8 0000000000014580 > [ 131.132978] ffff880116e89fd8 0000000000014580 ffff8801172a0000 ffff8801172a0000 > [ 131.132978] ffff8801172a0630 ffff88011729fff0 ffff880116e14650 ffff88011729fff0 > [ 131.132978] Call Trace: > [ 131.132978] [<ffffffff816f6159>] schedule+0x29/0x70 > [ 131.132978] [<ffffffff81064591>] do_exit+0x6e1/0xa40 > [ 131.132978] [<ffffffff81071eae>] ? signal_wake_up_state+0x1e/0x30 > [ 131.132978] [<ffffffff8106496f>] do_group_exit+0x3f/0xa0 > [ 131.132978] [<ffffffff810649e4>] SyS_exit_group+0x14/0x20 > [ 131.132978] [<ffffffff8170102f>] tracesys+0xe1/0xe6 > > Further debugging showed that every time this happened, zap_pid_ns_processes() > started with nr_hashed being 3, while we were expecting it to drop to 2. > Any time it didn't happen, nr_hashed was 1 or 2. So the reaper was > waiting for nr_hashed to become 2, but free_pid() only wakes the reaper > if nr_hashed hits 1. The issue is that when the task group leader of an init process exits before other tasks of the init process when the init process finally exits it will be a secondary task sleeping in zap_pid_ns_processes and waiting to wake up when the number of hashed pids drops to two. This case waits forever as free_pid only sends a wake up when the number of hashed pids drops to 1. To correct this the simple strategy of sending a possibly unncessary wake up when the number of hashed pids drops to 2 is adopted. Sending one extraneous wake up is relatively harmless, at worst we waste a little cpu time in the rare case when a pid namespace appropaches exiting. We can detect the case when the pid namespace drops to just two pids hashed race free in free_pid. Dereferencing pid_ns->child_reaper with the pidmap_lock held is safe without out the tasklist_lock because it is guaranteed that the detach_pid will be called on the child_reaper before it is freed and detach_pid calls __change_pid which calls free_pid which takes the pidmap_lock. __change_pid only calls free_pid if this is the last use of the pid. For a thread that is not the thread group leader the threads pid will only ever have one user because a threads pid is not allowed to be the pid of a process, of a process group or a session. For a thread that is a thread group leader all of the other threads of that process will be reaped before it is allowed for the thread group leader to be reaped ensuring there will only be one user of the threads pid as a process pid. Furthermore because the thread is the init process of a pid namespace all of the other processes in the pid namespace will have also been already freed leading to the fact that the pid will not be used as a session pid or a process group pid for any other running process. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Tested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Reported-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2013-08-30 04:56:50 +08:00
case 2:
case 1:
/* When all that is left in the pid namespace
* is the reaper wake up the reaper. The reaper
* may be sleeping in zap_pid_ns_processes().
*/
wake_up_process(ns->child_reaper);
break;
case PIDNS_HASH_ADDING:
/* Handle a fork failure of the first process */
WARN_ON(ns->child_reaper);
ns->nr_hashed = 0;
/* fall through */
case 0:
schedule_work(&ns->proc_work);
break;
}
}
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pidmap_lock, flags);
for (i = 0; i <= pid->level; i++)
free_pidmap(pid->numbers + i);
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
call_rcu(&pid->rcu, delayed_put_pid);
}
struct pid *alloc_pid(struct pid_namespace *ns)
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
{
struct pid *pid;
enum pid_type type;
int i, nr;
struct pid_namespace *tmp;
struct upid *upid;
fork: report pid reservation failure properly copy_process will report any failure in alloc_pid as ENOMEM currently which is misleading because the pid allocation might fail not only when the memory is short but also when the pid space is consumed already. The current man page even mentions this case: : EAGAIN : : A system-imposed limit on the number of threads was encountered. : There are a number of limits that may trigger this error: the : RLIMIT_NPROC soft resource limit (set via setrlimit(2)), which : limits the number of processes and threads for a real user ID, was : reached; the kernel's system-wide limit on the number of processes : and threads, /proc/sys/kernel/threads-max, was reached (see : proc(5)); or the maximum number of PIDs, /proc/sys/kernel/pid_max, : was reached (see proc(5)). so the current behavior is also incorrect wrt. documentation. POSIX man page also suggest returing EAGAIN when the process count limit is reached. This patch simply propagates error code from alloc_pid and makes sure we return -EAGAIN due to reservation failure. This will make behavior of fork closer to both our documentation and POSIX. alloc_pid might alsoo fail when the reaper in the pid namespace is dead (the namespace basically disallows all new processes) and there is no good error code which would match documented ones. We have traditionally returned ENOMEM for this case which is misleading as well but as per Eric W. Biederman this behavior is documented in man pid_namespaces(7) : If the "init" process of a PID namespace terminates, the kernel : terminates all of the processes in the namespace via a SIGKILL signal. : This behavior reflects the fact that the "init" process is essential for : the correct operation of a PID namespace. In this case, a subsequent : fork(2) into this PID namespace will fail with the error ENOMEM; it is : not possible to create a new processes in a PID namespace whose "init" : process has terminated. and introducing a new error code would be too risky so let's stick to ENOMEM for this case. Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-17 03:47:38 +08:00
int retval = -ENOMEM;
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
pid = kmem_cache_alloc(ns->pid_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
if (!pid)
fork: report pid reservation failure properly copy_process will report any failure in alloc_pid as ENOMEM currently which is misleading because the pid allocation might fail not only when the memory is short but also when the pid space is consumed already. The current man page even mentions this case: : EAGAIN : : A system-imposed limit on the number of threads was encountered. : There are a number of limits that may trigger this error: the : RLIMIT_NPROC soft resource limit (set via setrlimit(2)), which : limits the number of processes and threads for a real user ID, was : reached; the kernel's system-wide limit on the number of processes : and threads, /proc/sys/kernel/threads-max, was reached (see : proc(5)); or the maximum number of PIDs, /proc/sys/kernel/pid_max, : was reached (see proc(5)). so the current behavior is also incorrect wrt. documentation. POSIX man page also suggest returing EAGAIN when the process count limit is reached. This patch simply propagates error code from alloc_pid and makes sure we return -EAGAIN due to reservation failure. This will make behavior of fork closer to both our documentation and POSIX. alloc_pid might alsoo fail when the reaper in the pid namespace is dead (the namespace basically disallows all new processes) and there is no good error code which would match documented ones. We have traditionally returned ENOMEM for this case which is misleading as well but as per Eric W. Biederman this behavior is documented in man pid_namespaces(7) : If the "init" process of a PID namespace terminates, the kernel : terminates all of the processes in the namespace via a SIGKILL signal. : This behavior reflects the fact that the "init" process is essential for : the correct operation of a PID namespace. In this case, a subsequent : fork(2) into this PID namespace will fail with the error ENOMEM; it is : not possible to create a new processes in a PID namespace whose "init" : process has terminated. and introducing a new error code would be too risky so let's stick to ENOMEM for this case. Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-17 03:47:38 +08:00
return ERR_PTR(retval);
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
tmp = ns;
pid->level = ns->level;
for (i = ns->level; i >= 0; i--) {
nr = alloc_pidmap(tmp);
remove lots of IS_ERR_VALUE abuses Most users of IS_ERR_VALUE() in the kernel are wrong, as they pass an 'int' into a function that takes an 'unsigned long' argument. This happens to work because the type is sign-extended on 64-bit architectures before it gets converted into an unsigned type. However, anything that passes an 'unsigned short' or 'unsigned int' argument into IS_ERR_VALUE() is guaranteed to be broken, as are 8-bit integers and types that are wider than 'unsigned long'. Andrzej Hajda has already fixed a lot of the worst abusers that were causing actual bugs, but it would be nice to prevent any users that are not passing 'unsigned long' arguments. This patch changes all users of IS_ERR_VALUE() that I could find on 32-bit ARM randconfig builds and x86 allmodconfig. For the moment, this doesn't change the definition of IS_ERR_VALUE() because there are probably still architecture specific users elsewhere. Almost all the warnings I got are for files that are better off using 'if (err)' or 'if (err < 0)'. The only legitimate user I could find that we get a warning for is the (32-bit only) freescale fman driver, so I did not remove the IS_ERR_VALUE() there but changed the type to 'unsigned long'. For 9pfs, I just worked around one user whose calling conventions are so obscure that I did not dare change the behavior. I was using this definition for testing: #define IS_ERR_VALUE(x) ((unsigned long*)NULL == (typeof (x)*)NULL && \ unlikely((unsigned long long)(x) >= (unsigned long long)(typeof(x))-MAX_ERRNO)) which ends up making all 16-bit or wider types work correctly with the most plausible interpretation of what IS_ERR_VALUE() was supposed to return according to its users, but also causes a compile-time warning for any users that do not pass an 'unsigned long' argument. I suggested this approach earlier this year, but back then we ended up deciding to just fix the users that are obviously broken. After the initial warning that caused me to get involved in the discussion (fs/gfs2/dir.c) showed up again in the mainline kernel, Linus asked me to send the whole thing again. [ Updated the 9p parts as per Al Viro - Linus ] Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Andrzej Hajda <a.hajda@samsung.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Link: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/1/7/363 Link: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/5/27/486 Acked-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org> # For nvmem part Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-05-28 05:23:25 +08:00
if (nr < 0) {
fork: report pid reservation failure properly copy_process will report any failure in alloc_pid as ENOMEM currently which is misleading because the pid allocation might fail not only when the memory is short but also when the pid space is consumed already. The current man page even mentions this case: : EAGAIN : : A system-imposed limit on the number of threads was encountered. : There are a number of limits that may trigger this error: the : RLIMIT_NPROC soft resource limit (set via setrlimit(2)), which : limits the number of processes and threads for a real user ID, was : reached; the kernel's system-wide limit on the number of processes : and threads, /proc/sys/kernel/threads-max, was reached (see : proc(5)); or the maximum number of PIDs, /proc/sys/kernel/pid_max, : was reached (see proc(5)). so the current behavior is also incorrect wrt. documentation. POSIX man page also suggest returing EAGAIN when the process count limit is reached. This patch simply propagates error code from alloc_pid and makes sure we return -EAGAIN due to reservation failure. This will make behavior of fork closer to both our documentation and POSIX. alloc_pid might alsoo fail when the reaper in the pid namespace is dead (the namespace basically disallows all new processes) and there is no good error code which would match documented ones. We have traditionally returned ENOMEM for this case which is misleading as well but as per Eric W. Biederman this behavior is documented in man pid_namespaces(7) : If the "init" process of a PID namespace terminates, the kernel : terminates all of the processes in the namespace via a SIGKILL signal. : This behavior reflects the fact that the "init" process is essential for : the correct operation of a PID namespace. In this case, a subsequent : fork(2) into this PID namespace will fail with the error ENOMEM; it is : not possible to create a new processes in a PID namespace whose "init" : process has terminated. and introducing a new error code would be too risky so let's stick to ENOMEM for this case. Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-17 03:47:38 +08:00
retval = nr;
goto out_free;
fork: report pid reservation failure properly copy_process will report any failure in alloc_pid as ENOMEM currently which is misleading because the pid allocation might fail not only when the memory is short but also when the pid space is consumed already. The current man page even mentions this case: : EAGAIN : : A system-imposed limit on the number of threads was encountered. : There are a number of limits that may trigger this error: the : RLIMIT_NPROC soft resource limit (set via setrlimit(2)), which : limits the number of processes and threads for a real user ID, was : reached; the kernel's system-wide limit on the number of processes : and threads, /proc/sys/kernel/threads-max, was reached (see : proc(5)); or the maximum number of PIDs, /proc/sys/kernel/pid_max, : was reached (see proc(5)). so the current behavior is also incorrect wrt. documentation. POSIX man page also suggest returing EAGAIN when the process count limit is reached. This patch simply propagates error code from alloc_pid and makes sure we return -EAGAIN due to reservation failure. This will make behavior of fork closer to both our documentation and POSIX. alloc_pid might alsoo fail when the reaper in the pid namespace is dead (the namespace basically disallows all new processes) and there is no good error code which would match documented ones. We have traditionally returned ENOMEM for this case which is misleading as well but as per Eric W. Biederman this behavior is documented in man pid_namespaces(7) : If the "init" process of a PID namespace terminates, the kernel : terminates all of the processes in the namespace via a SIGKILL signal. : This behavior reflects the fact that the "init" process is essential for : the correct operation of a PID namespace. In this case, a subsequent : fork(2) into this PID namespace will fail with the error ENOMEM; it is : not possible to create a new processes in a PID namespace whose "init" : process has terminated. and introducing a new error code would be too risky so let's stick to ENOMEM for this case. Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-17 03:47:38 +08:00
}
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
pid->numbers[i].nr = nr;
pid->numbers[i].ns = tmp;
tmp = tmp->parent;
}
if (unlikely(is_child_reaper(pid))) {
pidns: disable pid allocation if pid_ns_prepare_proc() is failed in alloc_pid() alloc_pidmap() advances pid_namespace::last_pid. When first pid allocation fails, then next created process will have pid 2 and pid_ns_prepare_proc() won't be called. So, pid_namespace::proc_mnt will never be initialized (not to mention that there won't be a child reaper). I saw crash stack of such case on kernel 3.10: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) IP: proc_flush_task+0x8f/0x1b0 Call Trace: release_task+0x3f/0x490 wait_consider_task.part.10+0x7ff/0xb00 do_wait+0x11f/0x280 SyS_wait4+0x7d/0x110 We may fix this by restore of last_pid in 0 or by prohibiting of futher allocations. Since there was a similar issue in Oleg Nesterov's commit 314a8ad0f18a ("pidns: fix free_pid() to handle the first fork failure"). and it was fixed via prohibiting allocation, let's follow this way, and do the same. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/149201021004.4863.6762095011554287922.stgit@localhost.localdomain Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@googlemail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-05-09 06:56:34 +08:00
if (pid_ns_prepare_proc(ns)) {
disable_pid_allocation(ns);
goto out_free;
pidns: disable pid allocation if pid_ns_prepare_proc() is failed in alloc_pid() alloc_pidmap() advances pid_namespace::last_pid. When first pid allocation fails, then next created process will have pid 2 and pid_ns_prepare_proc() won't be called. So, pid_namespace::proc_mnt will never be initialized (not to mention that there won't be a child reaper). I saw crash stack of such case on kernel 3.10: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) IP: proc_flush_task+0x8f/0x1b0 Call Trace: release_task+0x3f/0x490 wait_consider_task.part.10+0x7ff/0xb00 do_wait+0x11f/0x280 SyS_wait4+0x7d/0x110 We may fix this by restore of last_pid in 0 or by prohibiting of futher allocations. Since there was a similar issue in Oleg Nesterov's commit 314a8ad0f18a ("pidns: fix free_pid() to handle the first fork failure"). and it was fixed via prohibiting allocation, let's follow this way, and do the same. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/149201021004.4863.6762095011554287922.stgit@localhost.localdomain Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@googlemail.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-05-09 06:56:34 +08:00
}
}
get_pid_ns(ns);
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
atomic_set(&pid->count, 1);
for (type = 0; type < PIDTYPE_MAX; ++type)
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&pid->tasks[type]);
upid = pid->numbers + ns->level;
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
spin_lock_irq(&pidmap_lock);
if (!(ns->nr_hashed & PIDNS_HASH_ADDING))
goto out_unlock;
for ( ; upid >= pid->numbers; --upid) {
hlist_add_head_rcu(&upid->pid_chain,
&pid_hash[pid_hashfn(upid->nr, upid->ns)]);
upid->ns->nr_hashed++;
}
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
spin_unlock_irq(&pidmap_lock);
return pid;
out_unlock:
spin_unlock_irq(&pidmap_lock);
put_pid_ns(ns);
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
out_free:
while (++i <= ns->level)
free_pidmap(pid->numbers + i);
kmem_cache_free(ns->pid_cachep, pid);
fork: report pid reservation failure properly copy_process will report any failure in alloc_pid as ENOMEM currently which is misleading because the pid allocation might fail not only when the memory is short but also when the pid space is consumed already. The current man page even mentions this case: : EAGAIN : : A system-imposed limit on the number of threads was encountered. : There are a number of limits that may trigger this error: the : RLIMIT_NPROC soft resource limit (set via setrlimit(2)), which : limits the number of processes and threads for a real user ID, was : reached; the kernel's system-wide limit on the number of processes : and threads, /proc/sys/kernel/threads-max, was reached (see : proc(5)); or the maximum number of PIDs, /proc/sys/kernel/pid_max, : was reached (see proc(5)). so the current behavior is also incorrect wrt. documentation. POSIX man page also suggest returing EAGAIN when the process count limit is reached. This patch simply propagates error code from alloc_pid and makes sure we return -EAGAIN due to reservation failure. This will make behavior of fork closer to both our documentation and POSIX. alloc_pid might alsoo fail when the reaper in the pid namespace is dead (the namespace basically disallows all new processes) and there is no good error code which would match documented ones. We have traditionally returned ENOMEM for this case which is misleading as well but as per Eric W. Biederman this behavior is documented in man pid_namespaces(7) : If the "init" process of a PID namespace terminates, the kernel : terminates all of the processes in the namespace via a SIGKILL signal. : This behavior reflects the fact that the "init" process is essential for : the correct operation of a PID namespace. In this case, a subsequent : fork(2) into this PID namespace will fail with the error ENOMEM; it is : not possible to create a new processes in a PID namespace whose "init" : process has terminated. and introducing a new error code would be too risky so let's stick to ENOMEM for this case. Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-17 03:47:38 +08:00
return ERR_PTR(retval);
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
}
void disable_pid_allocation(struct pid_namespace *ns)
{
spin_lock_irq(&pidmap_lock);
ns->nr_hashed &= ~PIDNS_HASH_ADDING;
spin_unlock_irq(&pidmap_lock);
}
struct pid *find_pid_ns(int nr, struct pid_namespace *ns)
{
struct upid *pnr;
hlist: drop the node parameter from iterators I'm not sure why, but the hlist for each entry iterators were conceived list_for_each_entry(pos, head, member) The hlist ones were greedy and wanted an extra parameter: hlist_for_each_entry(tpos, pos, head, member) Why did they need an extra pos parameter? I'm not quite sure. Not only they don't really need it, it also prevents the iterator from looking exactly like the list iterator, which is unfortunate. Besides the semantic patch, there was some manual work required: - Fix up the actual hlist iterators in linux/list.h - Fix up the declaration of other iterators based on the hlist ones. - A very small amount of places were using the 'node' parameter, this was modified to use 'obj->member' instead. - Coccinelle didn't handle the hlist_for_each_entry_safe iterator properly, so those had to be fixed up manually. The semantic patch which is mostly the work of Peter Senna Tschudin is here: @@ iterator name hlist_for_each_entry, hlist_for_each_entry_continue, hlist_for_each_entry_from, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh, for_each_busy_worker, ax25_uid_for_each, ax25_for_each, inet_bind_bucket_for_each, sctp_for_each_hentry, sk_for_each, sk_for_each_rcu, sk_for_each_from, sk_for_each_safe, sk_for_each_bound, hlist_for_each_entry_safe, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu, nr_neigh_for_each, nr_neigh_for_each_safe, nr_node_for_each, nr_node_for_each_safe, for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp, for_each_gfn_sp, for_each_host; type T; expression a,c,d,e; identifier b; statement S; @@ -T b; <+... when != b ( hlist_for_each_entry(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_from(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh(a, - b, c) S | for_each_busy_worker(a, c, - b, d) S | ax25_uid_for_each(a, - b, c) S | ax25_for_each(a, - b, c) S | inet_bind_bucket_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sctp_for_each_hentry(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_rcu(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_from -(a, b) +(a) S + sk_for_each_from(a) S | sk_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | sk_for_each_bound(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_safe(a, - b, c, d, e) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | nr_node_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_node_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d) S | for_each_host(a, - b, c) S | for_each_host_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | for_each_mesh_entry(a, - b, c, d) S ) ...+> [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus change from net/ipv4/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus hunk from net/ipv6/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warnings] [akpm@linux-foudnation.org: redo intrusive kvm changes] Tested-by: Peter Senna Tschudin <peter.senna@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-02-28 09:06:00 +08:00
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(pnr,
&pid_hash[pid_hashfn(nr, ns)], pid_chain)
if (pnr->nr == nr && pnr->ns == ns)
return container_of(pnr, struct pid,
numbers[ns->level]);
return NULL;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(find_pid_ns);
struct pid *find_vpid(int nr)
{
return find_pid_ns(nr, task_active_pid_ns(current));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(find_vpid);
/*
* attach_pid() must be called with the tasklist_lock write-held.
*/
void attach_pid(struct task_struct *task, enum pid_type type)
{
struct pid_link *link = &task->pids[type];
hlist_add_head_rcu(&link->node, &link->pid->tasks[type]);
}
static void __change_pid(struct task_struct *task, enum pid_type type,
struct pid *new)
{
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
struct pid_link *link;
struct pid *pid;
int tmp;
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
link = &task->pids[type];
pid = link->pid;
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
hlist_del_rcu(&link->node);
link->pid = new;
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
for (tmp = PIDTYPE_MAX; --tmp >= 0; )
if (!hlist_empty(&pid->tasks[tmp]))
return;
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
free_pid(pid);
}
void detach_pid(struct task_struct *task, enum pid_type type)
{
__change_pid(task, type, NULL);
}
void change_pid(struct task_struct *task, enum pid_type type,
struct pid *pid)
{
__change_pid(task, type, pid);
attach_pid(task, type);
}
/* transfer_pid is an optimization of attach_pid(new), detach_pid(old) */
void transfer_pid(struct task_struct *old, struct task_struct *new,
enum pid_type type)
{
new->pids[type].pid = old->pids[type].pid;
hlist_replace_rcu(&old->pids[type].node, &new->pids[type].node);
}
struct task_struct *pid_task(struct pid *pid, enum pid_type type)
{
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
struct task_struct *result = NULL;
if (pid) {
struct hlist_node *first;
first = rcu_dereference_check(hlist_first_rcu(&pid->tasks[type]),
lockdep_tasklist_lock_is_held());
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
if (first)
result = hlist_entry(first, struct task_struct, pids[(type)].node);
}
return result;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(pid_task);
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
/*
* Must be called under rcu_read_lock().
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
*/
struct task_struct *find_task_by_pid_ns(pid_t nr, struct pid_namespace *ns)
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
{
RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN(!rcu_read_lock_held(),
"find_task_by_pid_ns() needs rcu_read_lock() protection");
return pid_task(find_pid_ns(nr, ns), PIDTYPE_PID);
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
}
struct task_struct *find_task_by_vpid(pid_t vnr)
{
return find_task_by_pid_ns(vnr, task_active_pid_ns(current));
}
struct pid *get_task_pid(struct task_struct *task, enum pid_type type)
{
struct pid *pid;
rcu_read_lock();
if (type != PIDTYPE_PID)
task = task->group_leader;
pid = get_pid(rcu_dereference(task->pids[type].pid));
rcu_read_unlock();
return pid;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(get_task_pid);
struct task_struct *get_pid_task(struct pid *pid, enum pid_type type)
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
{
struct task_struct *result;
rcu_read_lock();
result = pid_task(pid, type);
if (result)
get_task_struct(result);
rcu_read_unlock();
return result;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(get_pid_task);
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
struct pid *find_get_pid(pid_t nr)
{
struct pid *pid;
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
rcu_read_lock();
pid = get_pid(find_vpid(nr));
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
rcu_read_unlock();
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
return pid;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(find_get_pid);
pid_t pid_nr_ns(struct pid *pid, struct pid_namespace *ns)
{
struct upid *upid;
pid_t nr = 0;
if (pid && ns->level <= pid->level) {
upid = &pid->numbers[ns->level];
if (upid->ns == ns)
nr = upid->nr;
}
return nr;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pid_nr_ns);
pid_t pid_vnr(struct pid *pid)
{
return pid_nr_ns(pid, task_active_pid_ns(current));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pid_vnr);
pid_t __task_pid_nr_ns(struct task_struct *task, enum pid_type type,
struct pid_namespace *ns)
{
pid_t nr = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
if (!ns)
ns = task_active_pid_ns(current);
if (likely(pid_alive(task))) {
if (type != PIDTYPE_PID)
task = task->group_leader;
nr = pid_nr_ns(rcu_dereference(task->pids[type].pid), ns);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return nr;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__task_pid_nr_ns);
pid_t task_tgid_nr_ns(struct task_struct *tsk, struct pid_namespace *ns)
{
return pid_nr_ns(task_tgid(tsk), ns);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(task_tgid_nr_ns);
struct pid_namespace *task_active_pid_ns(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
return ns_of_pid(task_pid(tsk));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(task_active_pid_ns);
[PATCH] proc: readdir race fix (take 3) The problem: An opendir, readdir, closedir sequence can fail to report process ids that are continually in use throughout the sequence of system calls. For this race to trigger the process that proc_pid_readdir stops at must exit before readdir is called again. This can cause ps to fail to report processes, and it is in violation of posix guarantees and normal application expectations with respect to readdir. Currently there is no way to work around this problem in user space short of providing a gargantuan buffer to user space so the directory read all happens in on system call. This patch implements the normal directory semantics for proc, that guarantee that a directory entry that is neither created nor destroyed while reading the directory entry will be returned. For directory that are either created or destroyed during the readdir you may or may not see them. Furthermore you may seek to a directory offset you have previously seen. These are the guarantee that ext[23] provides and that posix requires, and more importantly that user space expects. Plus it is a simple semantic to implement reliable service. It is just a matter of calling readdir a second time if you are wondering if something new has show up. These better semantics are implemented by scanning through the pids in numerical order and by making the file offset a pid plus a fixed offset. The pid scan happens on the pid bitmap, which when you look at it is remarkably efficient for a brute force algorithm. Given that a typical cache line is 64 bytes and thus covers space for 64*8 == 200 pids. There are only 40 cache lines for the entire 32K pid space. A typical system will have 100 pids or more so this is actually fewer cache lines we have to look at to scan a linked list, and the worst case of having to scan the entire pid bitmap is pretty reasonable. If we need something more efficient we can go to a more efficient data structure for indexing the pids, but for now what we have should be sufficient. In addition this takes no additional locks and is actually less code than what we are doing now. Also another very subtle bug in this area has been fixed. It is possible to catch a task in the middle of de_thread where a thread is assuming the thread of it's thread group leader. This patch carefully handles that case so if we hit it we don't fail to return the pid, that is undergoing the de_thread dance. Thanks to KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> for providing the first fix, pointing this out and working on it. [oleg@tv-sign.ru: fix it] Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-02 17:17:04 +08:00
/*
* Used by proc to find the first pid that is greater than or equal to nr.
[PATCH] proc: readdir race fix (take 3) The problem: An opendir, readdir, closedir sequence can fail to report process ids that are continually in use throughout the sequence of system calls. For this race to trigger the process that proc_pid_readdir stops at must exit before readdir is called again. This can cause ps to fail to report processes, and it is in violation of posix guarantees and normal application expectations with respect to readdir. Currently there is no way to work around this problem in user space short of providing a gargantuan buffer to user space so the directory read all happens in on system call. This patch implements the normal directory semantics for proc, that guarantee that a directory entry that is neither created nor destroyed while reading the directory entry will be returned. For directory that are either created or destroyed during the readdir you may or may not see them. Furthermore you may seek to a directory offset you have previously seen. These are the guarantee that ext[23] provides and that posix requires, and more importantly that user space expects. Plus it is a simple semantic to implement reliable service. It is just a matter of calling readdir a second time if you are wondering if something new has show up. These better semantics are implemented by scanning through the pids in numerical order and by making the file offset a pid plus a fixed offset. The pid scan happens on the pid bitmap, which when you look at it is remarkably efficient for a brute force algorithm. Given that a typical cache line is 64 bytes and thus covers space for 64*8 == 200 pids. There are only 40 cache lines for the entire 32K pid space. A typical system will have 100 pids or more so this is actually fewer cache lines we have to look at to scan a linked list, and the worst case of having to scan the entire pid bitmap is pretty reasonable. If we need something more efficient we can go to a more efficient data structure for indexing the pids, but for now what we have should be sufficient. In addition this takes no additional locks and is actually less code than what we are doing now. Also another very subtle bug in this area has been fixed. It is possible to catch a task in the middle of de_thread where a thread is assuming the thread of it's thread group leader. This patch carefully handles that case so if we hit it we don't fail to return the pid, that is undergoing the de_thread dance. Thanks to KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> for providing the first fix, pointing this out and working on it. [oleg@tv-sign.ru: fix it] Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-02 17:17:04 +08:00
*
* If there is a pid at nr this function is exactly the same as find_pid_ns.
[PATCH] proc: readdir race fix (take 3) The problem: An opendir, readdir, closedir sequence can fail to report process ids that are continually in use throughout the sequence of system calls. For this race to trigger the process that proc_pid_readdir stops at must exit before readdir is called again. This can cause ps to fail to report processes, and it is in violation of posix guarantees and normal application expectations with respect to readdir. Currently there is no way to work around this problem in user space short of providing a gargantuan buffer to user space so the directory read all happens in on system call. This patch implements the normal directory semantics for proc, that guarantee that a directory entry that is neither created nor destroyed while reading the directory entry will be returned. For directory that are either created or destroyed during the readdir you may or may not see them. Furthermore you may seek to a directory offset you have previously seen. These are the guarantee that ext[23] provides and that posix requires, and more importantly that user space expects. Plus it is a simple semantic to implement reliable service. It is just a matter of calling readdir a second time if you are wondering if something new has show up. These better semantics are implemented by scanning through the pids in numerical order and by making the file offset a pid plus a fixed offset. The pid scan happens on the pid bitmap, which when you look at it is remarkably efficient for a brute force algorithm. Given that a typical cache line is 64 bytes and thus covers space for 64*8 == 200 pids. There are only 40 cache lines for the entire 32K pid space. A typical system will have 100 pids or more so this is actually fewer cache lines we have to look at to scan a linked list, and the worst case of having to scan the entire pid bitmap is pretty reasonable. If we need something more efficient we can go to a more efficient data structure for indexing the pids, but for now what we have should be sufficient. In addition this takes no additional locks and is actually less code than what we are doing now. Also another very subtle bug in this area has been fixed. It is possible to catch a task in the middle of de_thread where a thread is assuming the thread of it's thread group leader. This patch carefully handles that case so if we hit it we don't fail to return the pid, that is undergoing the de_thread dance. Thanks to KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> for providing the first fix, pointing this out and working on it. [oleg@tv-sign.ru: fix it] Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-02 17:17:04 +08:00
*/
struct pid *find_ge_pid(int nr, struct pid_namespace *ns)
[PATCH] proc: readdir race fix (take 3) The problem: An opendir, readdir, closedir sequence can fail to report process ids that are continually in use throughout the sequence of system calls. For this race to trigger the process that proc_pid_readdir stops at must exit before readdir is called again. This can cause ps to fail to report processes, and it is in violation of posix guarantees and normal application expectations with respect to readdir. Currently there is no way to work around this problem in user space short of providing a gargantuan buffer to user space so the directory read all happens in on system call. This patch implements the normal directory semantics for proc, that guarantee that a directory entry that is neither created nor destroyed while reading the directory entry will be returned. For directory that are either created or destroyed during the readdir you may or may not see them. Furthermore you may seek to a directory offset you have previously seen. These are the guarantee that ext[23] provides and that posix requires, and more importantly that user space expects. Plus it is a simple semantic to implement reliable service. It is just a matter of calling readdir a second time if you are wondering if something new has show up. These better semantics are implemented by scanning through the pids in numerical order and by making the file offset a pid plus a fixed offset. The pid scan happens on the pid bitmap, which when you look at it is remarkably efficient for a brute force algorithm. Given that a typical cache line is 64 bytes and thus covers space for 64*8 == 200 pids. There are only 40 cache lines for the entire 32K pid space. A typical system will have 100 pids or more so this is actually fewer cache lines we have to look at to scan a linked list, and the worst case of having to scan the entire pid bitmap is pretty reasonable. If we need something more efficient we can go to a more efficient data structure for indexing the pids, but for now what we have should be sufficient. In addition this takes no additional locks and is actually less code than what we are doing now. Also another very subtle bug in this area has been fixed. It is possible to catch a task in the middle of de_thread where a thread is assuming the thread of it's thread group leader. This patch carefully handles that case so if we hit it we don't fail to return the pid, that is undergoing the de_thread dance. Thanks to KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> for providing the first fix, pointing this out and working on it. [oleg@tv-sign.ru: fix it] Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-02 17:17:04 +08:00
{
struct pid *pid;
do {
pid = find_pid_ns(nr, ns);
[PATCH] proc: readdir race fix (take 3) The problem: An opendir, readdir, closedir sequence can fail to report process ids that are continually in use throughout the sequence of system calls. For this race to trigger the process that proc_pid_readdir stops at must exit before readdir is called again. This can cause ps to fail to report processes, and it is in violation of posix guarantees and normal application expectations with respect to readdir. Currently there is no way to work around this problem in user space short of providing a gargantuan buffer to user space so the directory read all happens in on system call. This patch implements the normal directory semantics for proc, that guarantee that a directory entry that is neither created nor destroyed while reading the directory entry will be returned. For directory that are either created or destroyed during the readdir you may or may not see them. Furthermore you may seek to a directory offset you have previously seen. These are the guarantee that ext[23] provides and that posix requires, and more importantly that user space expects. Plus it is a simple semantic to implement reliable service. It is just a matter of calling readdir a second time if you are wondering if something new has show up. These better semantics are implemented by scanning through the pids in numerical order and by making the file offset a pid plus a fixed offset. The pid scan happens on the pid bitmap, which when you look at it is remarkably efficient for a brute force algorithm. Given that a typical cache line is 64 bytes and thus covers space for 64*8 == 200 pids. There are only 40 cache lines for the entire 32K pid space. A typical system will have 100 pids or more so this is actually fewer cache lines we have to look at to scan a linked list, and the worst case of having to scan the entire pid bitmap is pretty reasonable. If we need something more efficient we can go to a more efficient data structure for indexing the pids, but for now what we have should be sufficient. In addition this takes no additional locks and is actually less code than what we are doing now. Also another very subtle bug in this area has been fixed. It is possible to catch a task in the middle of de_thread where a thread is assuming the thread of it's thread group leader. This patch carefully handles that case so if we hit it we don't fail to return the pid, that is undergoing the de_thread dance. Thanks to KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> for providing the first fix, pointing this out and working on it. [oleg@tv-sign.ru: fix it] Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-02 17:17:04 +08:00
if (pid)
break;
nr = next_pidmap(ns, nr);
[PATCH] proc: readdir race fix (take 3) The problem: An opendir, readdir, closedir sequence can fail to report process ids that are continually in use throughout the sequence of system calls. For this race to trigger the process that proc_pid_readdir stops at must exit before readdir is called again. This can cause ps to fail to report processes, and it is in violation of posix guarantees and normal application expectations with respect to readdir. Currently there is no way to work around this problem in user space short of providing a gargantuan buffer to user space so the directory read all happens in on system call. This patch implements the normal directory semantics for proc, that guarantee that a directory entry that is neither created nor destroyed while reading the directory entry will be returned. For directory that are either created or destroyed during the readdir you may or may not see them. Furthermore you may seek to a directory offset you have previously seen. These are the guarantee that ext[23] provides and that posix requires, and more importantly that user space expects. Plus it is a simple semantic to implement reliable service. It is just a matter of calling readdir a second time if you are wondering if something new has show up. These better semantics are implemented by scanning through the pids in numerical order and by making the file offset a pid plus a fixed offset. The pid scan happens on the pid bitmap, which when you look at it is remarkably efficient for a brute force algorithm. Given that a typical cache line is 64 bytes and thus covers space for 64*8 == 200 pids. There are only 40 cache lines for the entire 32K pid space. A typical system will have 100 pids or more so this is actually fewer cache lines we have to look at to scan a linked list, and the worst case of having to scan the entire pid bitmap is pretty reasonable. If we need something more efficient we can go to a more efficient data structure for indexing the pids, but for now what we have should be sufficient. In addition this takes no additional locks and is actually less code than what we are doing now. Also another very subtle bug in this area has been fixed. It is possible to catch a task in the middle of de_thread where a thread is assuming the thread of it's thread group leader. This patch carefully handles that case so if we hit it we don't fail to return the pid, that is undergoing the de_thread dance. Thanks to KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> for providing the first fix, pointing this out and working on it. [oleg@tv-sign.ru: fix it] Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-10-02 17:17:04 +08:00
} while (nr > 0);
return pid;
}
/*
* The pid hash table is scaled according to the amount of memory in the
* machine. From a minimum of 16 slots up to 4096 slots at one gigabyte or
* more.
*/
void __init pidhash_init(void)
{
unsigned int i, pidhash_size;
pid_hash = alloc_large_system_hash("PID", sizeof(*pid_hash), 0, 18,
HASH_EARLY | HASH_SMALL,
&pidhash_shift, NULL,
0, 4096);
pidhash_size = 1U << pidhash_shift;
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
for (i = 0; i < pidhash_size; i++)
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&pid_hash[i]);
}
void __init pidmap_init(void)
{
/* Verify no one has done anything silly: */
BUILD_BUG_ON(PID_MAX_LIMIT >= PIDNS_HASH_ADDING);
/* bump default and minimum pid_max based on number of cpus */
pid_max = min(pid_max_max, max_t(int, pid_max,
PIDS_PER_CPU_DEFAULT * num_possible_cpus()));
pid_max_min = max_t(int, pid_max_min,
PIDS_PER_CPU_MIN * num_possible_cpus());
pr_info("pid_max: default: %u minimum: %u\n", pid_max, pid_max_min);
init_pid_ns.pidmap[0].page = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
/* Reserve PID 0. We never call free_pidmap(0) */
set_bit(0, init_pid_ns.pidmap[0].page);
atomic_dec(&init_pid_ns.pidmap[0].nr_free);
[PATCH] pidhash: Refactor the pid hash table Simplifies the code, reduces the need for 4 pid hash tables, and makes the code more capable. In the discussions I had with Oleg it was felt that to a large extent the cleanup itself justified the work. With struct pid being dynamically allocated meant we could create the hash table entry when the pid was allocated and free the hash table entry when the pid was freed. Instead of playing with the hash lists when ever a process would attach or detach to a process. For myself the fact that it gave what my previous task_ref patch gave for free with simpler code was a big win. The problem is that if you hold a reference to struct task_struct you lock in 10K of low memory. If you do that in a user controllable way like /proc does, with an unprivileged but hostile user space application with typical resource limits of 1000 fds and 100 processes I can trigger the OOM killer by consuming all of low memory with task structs, on a machine wight 1GB of low memory. If I instead hold a reference to struct pid which holds a pointer to my task_struct, I don't suffer from that problem because struct pid is 2 orders of magnitude smaller. In fact struct pid is small enough that most other kernel data structures dwarf it, so simply limiting the number of referring data structures is enough to prevent exhaustion of low memory. This splits the current struct pid into two structures, struct pid and struct pid_link, and reduces our number of hash tables from PIDTYPE_MAX to just one. struct pid_link is the per process linkage into the hash tables and lives in struct task_struct. struct pid is given an indepedent lifetime, and holds pointers to each of the pid types. The independent life of struct pid simplifies attach_pid, and detach_pid, because we are always manipulating the list of pids and not the hash table. In addition in giving struct pid an indpendent life it makes the concept much more powerful. Kernel data structures can now embed a struct pid * instead of a pid_t and not suffer from pid wrap around problems or from keeping unnecessarily large amounts of memory allocated. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-31 18:31:42 +08:00
init_pid_ns.pid_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(pid,
2016-01-15 07:18:21 +08:00
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_PANIC | SLAB_ACCOUNT);
}