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linux-next/kernel/bpf/verifier.c

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bpf: verifier (add docs) this patch adds all of eBPF verfier documentation and empty bpf_check() The end goal for the verifier is to statically check safety of the program. Verifier will catch: - loops - out of range jumps - unreachable instructions - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:02 +08:00
/* Copyright (c) 2011-2014 PLUMgrid, http://plumgrid.com
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
* Copyright (c) 2016 Facebook
bpf: verifier (add docs) this patch adds all of eBPF verfier documentation and empty bpf_check() The end goal for the verifier is to statically check safety of the program. Verifier will catch: - loops - out of range jumps - unreachable instructions - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:02 +08:00
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public
* License as published by the Free Software Foundation.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/bpf.h>
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
#include <linux/bpf_verifier.h>
bpf: verifier (add docs) this patch adds all of eBPF verfier documentation and empty bpf_check() The end goal for the verifier is to statically check safety of the program. Verifier will catch: - loops - out of range jumps - unreachable instructions - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:02 +08:00
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <net/netlink.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
bpf: Print function name in addition to function id The verifier currently prints raw function ids when printing CALL instructions or when complaining: 5: (85) call 23 unknown func 23 print a meaningful function name instead: 5: (85) call bpf_redirect#23 unknown func bpf_redirect#23 Moves the function documentation to a single comment and renames all helpers names in the list to conform to the bpf_ prefix notation so they can be greped in the kernel source. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-27 17:23:51 +08:00
#include <linux/stringify.h>
bpf: verifier (add docs) this patch adds all of eBPF verfier documentation and empty bpf_check() The end goal for the verifier is to statically check safety of the program. Verifier will catch: - loops - out of range jumps - unreachable instructions - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:02 +08:00
/* bpf_check() is a static code analyzer that walks eBPF program
* instruction by instruction and updates register/stack state.
* All paths of conditional branches are analyzed until 'bpf_exit' insn.
*
* The first pass is depth-first-search to check that the program is a DAG.
* It rejects the following programs:
* - larger than BPF_MAXINSNS insns
* - if loop is present (detected via back-edge)
* - unreachable insns exist (shouldn't be a forest. program = one function)
* - out of bounds or malformed jumps
* The second pass is all possible path descent from the 1st insn.
* Since it's analyzing all pathes through the program, the length of the
bpf: update the comment about the length of analysis Commit 07016151a446 ("bpf, verifier: further improve search pruning") increased the limit of processed instructions from 32k to 64k, but the comment still mentioned the 32k limit. This commit updates the comment to reflect the change. Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-01 16:25:51 +08:00
* analysis is limited to 64k insn, which may be hit even if total number of
bpf: verifier (add docs) this patch adds all of eBPF verfier documentation and empty bpf_check() The end goal for the verifier is to statically check safety of the program. Verifier will catch: - loops - out of range jumps - unreachable instructions - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:02 +08:00
* insn is less then 4K, but there are too many branches that change stack/regs.
* Number of 'branches to be analyzed' is limited to 1k
*
* On entry to each instruction, each register has a type, and the instruction
* changes the types of the registers depending on instruction semantics.
* If instruction is BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_5), then type of R5 is
* copied to R1.
*
* All registers are 64-bit.
* R0 - return register
* R1-R5 argument passing registers
* R6-R9 callee saved registers
* R10 - frame pointer read-only
*
* At the start of BPF program the register R1 contains a pointer to bpf_context
* and has type PTR_TO_CTX.
*
* Verifier tracks arithmetic operations on pointers in case:
* BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
* BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -20),
* 1st insn copies R10 (which has FRAME_PTR) type into R1
* and 2nd arithmetic instruction is pattern matched to recognize
* that it wants to construct a pointer to some element within stack.
* So after 2nd insn, the register R1 has type PTR_TO_STACK
* (and -20 constant is saved for further stack bounds checking).
* Meaning that this reg is a pointer to stack plus known immediate constant.
*
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
* Most of the time the registers have SCALAR_VALUE type, which
bpf: verifier (add docs) this patch adds all of eBPF verfier documentation and empty bpf_check() The end goal for the verifier is to statically check safety of the program. Verifier will catch: - loops - out of range jumps - unreachable instructions - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:02 +08:00
* means the register has some value, but it's not a valid pointer.
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
* (like pointer plus pointer becomes SCALAR_VALUE type)
bpf: verifier (add docs) this patch adds all of eBPF verfier documentation and empty bpf_check() The end goal for the verifier is to statically check safety of the program. Verifier will catch: - loops - out of range jumps - unreachable instructions - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:02 +08:00
*
* When verifier sees load or store instructions the type of base register
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
* can be: PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, PTR_TO_CTX, PTR_TO_STACK. These are three pointer
bpf: verifier (add docs) this patch adds all of eBPF verfier documentation and empty bpf_check() The end goal for the verifier is to statically check safety of the program. Verifier will catch: - loops - out of range jumps - unreachable instructions - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:02 +08:00
* types recognized by check_mem_access() function.
*
* PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE means that this register is pointing to 'map element value'
* and the range of [ptr, ptr + map's value_size) is accessible.
*
* registers used to pass values to function calls are checked against
* function argument constraints.
*
* ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY is one of such argument constraints.
* It means that the register type passed to this function must be
* PTR_TO_STACK and it will be used inside the function as
* 'pointer to map element key'
*
* For example the argument constraints for bpf_map_lookup_elem():
* .ret_type = RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL,
* .arg1_type = ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR,
* .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY,
*
* ret_type says that this function returns 'pointer to map elem value or null'
* function expects 1st argument to be a const pointer to 'struct bpf_map' and
* 2nd argument should be a pointer to stack, which will be used inside
* the helper function as a pointer to map element key.
*
* On the kernel side the helper function looks like:
* u64 bpf_map_lookup_elem(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5)
* {
* struct bpf_map *map = (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) r1;
* void *key = (void *) (unsigned long) r2;
* void *value;
*
* here kernel can access 'key' and 'map' pointers safely, knowing that
* [key, key + map->key_size) bytes are valid and were initialized on
* the stack of eBPF program.
* }
*
* Corresponding eBPF program may look like:
* BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), // after this insn R2 type is FRAME_PTR
* BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4), // after this insn R2 type is PTR_TO_STACK
* BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, map_fd), // after this insn R1 type is CONST_PTR_TO_MAP
* BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
* here verifier looks at prototype of map_lookup_elem() and sees:
* .arg1_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR and R1->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP, which is ok,
* Now verifier knows that this map has key of R1->map_ptr->key_size bytes
*
* Then .arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY and R2->type == PTR_TO_STACK, ok so far,
* Now verifier checks that [R2, R2 + map's key_size) are within stack limits
* and were initialized prior to this call.
* If it's ok, then verifier allows this BPF_CALL insn and looks at
* .ret_type which is RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, so it sets
* R0->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL which means bpf_map_lookup_elem() function
* returns ether pointer to map value or NULL.
*
* When type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL passes through 'if (reg != 0) goto +off'
* insn, the register holding that pointer in the true branch changes state to
* PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE and the same register changes state to CONST_IMM in the false
* branch. See check_cond_jmp_op().
*
* After the call R0 is set to return type of the function and registers R1-R5
* are set to NOT_INIT to indicate that they are no longer readable.
*/
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
/* verifier_state + insn_idx are pushed to stack when branch is encountered */
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem {
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
/* verifer state is 'st'
* before processing instruction 'insn_idx'
* and after processing instruction 'prev_insn_idx'
*/
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
struct bpf_verifier_state st;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
int insn_idx;
int prev_insn_idx;
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *next;
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
};
bpf/verifier: increase complexity limit to 128k The more detailed value tracking can reduce the effectiveness of pruning for some programs. So, to avoid rejecting previously valid programs, up the limit to 128kinsns. Hopefully we will be able to bring this back down later by improving pruning performance. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:30:30 +08:00
#define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS 131072
bpf, verifier: further improve search pruning The verifier needs to go through every path of the program in order to check that it terminates safely, which can be quite a lot of instructions that need to be processed f.e. in cases with more branchy programs. With search pruning from f1bca824dabb ("bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier") the search space can already be reduced significantly when the verifier detects that a previously walked path with same register and stack contents terminated already (see verifier's states_equal()), so the search can skip walking those states. When working with larger programs of > ~2000 (out of max 4096) insns, we found that the current limit of 32k instructions is easily hit. For example, a case we ran into is that the search space cannot be pruned due to branches at the beginning of the program that make use of certain stack space slots (STACK_MISC), which are never used in the remaining program (STACK_INVALID). Therefore, the verifier needs to walk paths for the slots in STACK_INVALID state, but also all remaining paths with a stack structure, where the slots are in STACK_MISC, which can nearly double the search space needed. After various experiments, we find that a limit of 64k processed insns is a more reasonable choice when dealing with larger programs in practice. This still allows to reject extreme crafted cases that can have a much higher complexity (f.e. > ~300k) within the 4096 insns limit due to search pruning not being able to take effect. Furthermore, we found that a lot of states can be pruned after a call instruction, f.e. we were able to reduce the search state by ~35% in some cases with this heuristic, trade-off is to keep a bit more states in env->explored_states. Usually, call instructions have a number of preceding register assignments and/or stack stores, where search pruning has a better chance to suceed in states_equal() test. The current code marks the branch targets with STATE_LIST_MARK in case of conditional jumps, and the next (t + 1) instruction in case of unconditional jump so that f.e. a backjump will walk it. We also did experiments with using t + insns[t].off + 1 as a marker in the unconditionally jump case instead of t + 1 with the rationale that these two branches of execution that converge after the label might have more potential of pruning. We found that it was a bit better, but not necessarily significantly better than the current state, perhaps also due to clang not generating back jumps often. Hence, we left that as is for now. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-06 04:33:17 +08:00
#define BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STACK 1024
bpf: Fix and simplifications on inline map lookup Fix in verifier: For the same bpf_map_lookup_elem() instruction (i.e. "call 1"), a broken case is "a different type of map could be used for the same lookup instruction". For example, an array in one case and a hashmap in another. We have to resort to the old dynamic call behavior in this case. The fix is to check for collision on insn_aux->map_ptr. If there is collision, don't inline the map lookup. Please see the "do_reg_lookup()" in test_map_in_map_kern.c in the later patch for how-to trigger the above case. Simplifications on array_map_gen_lookup(): 1. Calculate elem_size from map->value_size. It removes the need for 'struct bpf_array' which makes the later map-in-map implementation easier. 2. Remove the 'elem_size == 1' test Fixes: 81ed18ab3098 ("bpf: add helper inlining infra and optimize map_array lookup") Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-23 01:00:32 +08:00
#define BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON ((void *)0xeB9F + POISON_POINTER_DELTA)
bpf, verifier: add bpf_call_arg_meta for passing meta data Currently, when the verifier checks calls in check_call() function, we call check_func_arg() for all 5 arguments e.g. to make sure expected types are correct. In some cases, we collect meta data (here: map pointer) to perform additional checks such as checking stack boundary on key/value sizes for subsequent arguments. As we're going to extend the meta data, add a generic struct bpf_call_arg_meta that we can use for passing into check_func_arg(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-13 06:10:50 +08:00
struct bpf_call_arg_meta {
struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
bpf, verifier: add ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK type When passing buffers from eBPF stack space into a helper function, we have ARG_PTR_TO_STACK argument type for helpers available. The verifier makes sure that such buffers are initialized, within boundaries, etc. However, the downside with this is that we have a couple of helper functions such as bpf_skb_load_bytes() that fill out the passed buffer in the expected success case anyway, so zero initializing them prior to the helper call is unneeded/wasted instructions in the eBPF program that can be avoided. Therefore, add a new helper function argument type called ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK. The idea is to skip the STACK_MISC check in check_stack_boundary() and color the related stack slots as STACK_MISC after we checked all call arguments. Helper functions using ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK must make sure that every path of the helper function will fill the provided buffer area, so that we cannot leak any uninitialized stack memory. This f.e. means that error paths need to memset() the buffers, but the expected fast-path doesn't have to do this anymore. Since there's no such helper needing more than at most one ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK argument, we can keep it simple and don't need to check for multiple areas. Should in future such a use-case really appear, we have check_raw_mode() that will make sure we implement support for it first. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-13 06:10:51 +08:00
bool raw_mode;
bpf: direct packet write and access for helpers for clsact progs This work implements direct packet access for helpers and direct packet write in a similar fashion as already available for XDP types via commits 4acf6c0b84c9 ("bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs") and 6841de8b0d03 ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly"), and as a complementary feature to the already available direct packet read for tc (cls/act) programs. For enabling this, we need to introduce two helpers, bpf_skb_pull_data() and bpf_csum_update(). The first is generally needed for both, read and write, because they would otherwise only be limited to the current linear skb head. Usually, when the data_end test fails, programs just bail out, or, in the direct read case, use bpf_skb_load_bytes() as an alternative to overcome this limitation. If such data sits in non-linear parts, we can just pull them in once with the new helper, retest and eventually access them. At the same time, this also makes sure the skb is uncloned, which is, of course, a necessary condition for direct write. As this needs to be an invariant for the write part only, the verifier detects writes and adds a prologue that is calling bpf_skb_pull_data() to effectively unclone the skb from the very beginning in case it is indeed cloned. The heuristic makes use of a similar trick that was done in 233577a22089 ("net: filter: constify detection of pkt_type_offset"). This comes at zero cost for other programs that do not use the direct write feature. Should a program use this feature only sparsely and has read access for the most parts with, for example, drop return codes, then such write action can be delegated to a tail called program for mitigating this cost of potential uncloning to a late point in time where it would have been paid similarly with the bpf_skb_store_bytes() as well. Advantage of direct write is that the writes are inlined whereas the helper cannot make any length assumptions and thus needs to generate a call to memcpy() also for small sizes, as well as cost of helper call itself with sanity checks are avoided. Plus, when direct read is already used, we don't need to cache or perform rechecks on the data boundaries (due to verifier invalidating previous checks for helpers that change skb->data), so more complex programs using rewrites can benefit from switching to direct read plus write. For direct packet access to helpers, we save the otherwise needed copy into a temp struct sitting on stack memory when use-case allows. Both facilities are enabled via may_access_direct_pkt_data() in verifier. For now, we limit this to map helpers and csum_diff, and can successively enable other helpers where we find it makes sense. Helpers that definitely cannot be allowed for this are those part of bpf_helper_changes_skb_data() since they can change underlying data, and those that write into memory as this could happen for packet typed args when still cloned. bpf_csum_update() helper accommodates for the fact that we need to fixup checksum_complete when using direct write instead of bpf_skb_store_bytes(), meaning the programs can use available helpers like bpf_csum_diff(), and implement csum_add(), csum_sub(), csum_block_add(), csum_block_sub() equivalents in eBPF together with the new helper. A usage example will be provided for iproute2's examples/bpf/ directory. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-20 06:26:13 +08:00
bool pkt_access;
bpf, verifier: add ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK type When passing buffers from eBPF stack space into a helper function, we have ARG_PTR_TO_STACK argument type for helpers available. The verifier makes sure that such buffers are initialized, within boundaries, etc. However, the downside with this is that we have a couple of helper functions such as bpf_skb_load_bytes() that fill out the passed buffer in the expected success case anyway, so zero initializing them prior to the helper call is unneeded/wasted instructions in the eBPF program that can be avoided. Therefore, add a new helper function argument type called ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK. The idea is to skip the STACK_MISC check in check_stack_boundary() and color the related stack slots as STACK_MISC after we checked all call arguments. Helper functions using ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK must make sure that every path of the helper function will fill the provided buffer area, so that we cannot leak any uninitialized stack memory. This f.e. means that error paths need to memset() the buffers, but the expected fast-path doesn't have to do this anymore. Since there's no such helper needing more than at most one ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK argument, we can keep it simple and don't need to check for multiple areas. Should in future such a use-case really appear, we have check_raw_mode() that will make sure we implement support for it first. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-13 06:10:51 +08:00
int regno;
int access_size;
bpf, verifier: add bpf_call_arg_meta for passing meta data Currently, when the verifier checks calls in check_call() function, we call check_func_arg() for all 5 arguments e.g. to make sure expected types are correct. In some cases, we collect meta data (here: map pointer) to perform additional checks such as checking stack boundary on key/value sizes for subsequent arguments. As we're going to extend the meta data, add a generic struct bpf_call_arg_meta that we can use for passing into check_func_arg(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-13 06:10:50 +08:00
};
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_verifier_lock);
/* log_level controls verbosity level of eBPF verifier.
* verbose() is used to dump the verification trace to the log, so the user
* can figure out what's wrong with the program
*/
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
static __printf(2, 3) void verbose(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const char *fmt, ...)
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
{
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
struct bpf_verifer_log *log = &env->log;
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
va_list args;
bpf: encapsulate verifier log state into a structure Put the loose log_* variables into a structure. This will make it simpler to remove the global verifier state in following patches. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:10 +08:00
if (!log->level || bpf_verifier_log_full(log))
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
return;
va_start(args, fmt);
bpf: encapsulate verifier log state into a structure Put the loose log_* variables into a structure. This will make it simpler to remove the global verifier state in following patches. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:10 +08:00
log->len_used += vscnprintf(log->kbuf + log->len_used,
log->len_total - log->len_used, fmt, args);
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
va_end(args);
}
bpf: add meta pointer for direct access This work enables generic transfer of metadata from XDP into skb. The basic idea is that we can make use of the fact that the resulting skb must be linear and already comes with a larger headroom for supporting bpf_xdp_adjust_head(), which mangles xdp->data. Here, we base our work on a similar principle and introduce a small helper bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() for adjusting a new pointer called xdp->data_meta. Thus, the packet has a flexible and programmable room for meta data, followed by the actual packet data. struct xdp_buff is therefore laid out that we first point to data_hard_start, then data_meta directly prepended to data followed by data_end marking the end of packet. bpf_xdp_adjust_head() takes into account whether we have meta data already prepended and if so, memmove()s this along with the given offset provided there's enough room. xdp->data_meta is optional and programs are not required to use it. The rationale is that when we process the packet in XDP (e.g. as DoS filter), we can push further meta data along with it for the XDP_PASS case, and give the guarantee that a clsact ingress BPF program on the same device can pick this up for further post-processing. Since we work with skb there, we can also set skb->mark, skb->priority or other skb meta data out of BPF, thus having this scratch space generic and programmable allows for more flexibility than defining a direct 1:1 transfer of potentially new XDP members into skb (it's also more efficient as we don't need to initialize/handle each of such new members). The facility also works together with GRO aggregation. The scratch space at the head of the packet can be multiple of 4 byte up to 32 byte large. Drivers not yet supporting xdp->data_meta can simply be set up with xdp->data_meta as xdp->data + 1 as bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() will detect this and bail out, such that the subsequent match against xdp->data for later access is guaranteed to fail. The verifier treats xdp->data_meta/xdp->data the same way as we treat xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons. The requirement for doing the compare against xdp->data is that it hasn't been modified from it's original address we got from ctx access. It may have a range marking already from prior successful xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons though. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-25 08:25:51 +08:00
static bool type_is_pkt_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type)
{
return type == PTR_TO_PACKET ||
type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META;
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
/* string representation of 'enum bpf_reg_type' */
static const char * const reg_type_str[] = {
[NOT_INIT] = "?",
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
[SCALAR_VALUE] = "inv",
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
[PTR_TO_CTX] = "ctx",
[CONST_PTR_TO_MAP] = "map_ptr",
[PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE] = "map_value",
[PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL] = "map_value_or_null",
[PTR_TO_STACK] = "fp",
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
[PTR_TO_PACKET] = "pkt",
bpf: add meta pointer for direct access This work enables generic transfer of metadata from XDP into skb. The basic idea is that we can make use of the fact that the resulting skb must be linear and already comes with a larger headroom for supporting bpf_xdp_adjust_head(), which mangles xdp->data. Here, we base our work on a similar principle and introduce a small helper bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() for adjusting a new pointer called xdp->data_meta. Thus, the packet has a flexible and programmable room for meta data, followed by the actual packet data. struct xdp_buff is therefore laid out that we first point to data_hard_start, then data_meta directly prepended to data followed by data_end marking the end of packet. bpf_xdp_adjust_head() takes into account whether we have meta data already prepended and if so, memmove()s this along with the given offset provided there's enough room. xdp->data_meta is optional and programs are not required to use it. The rationale is that when we process the packet in XDP (e.g. as DoS filter), we can push further meta data along with it for the XDP_PASS case, and give the guarantee that a clsact ingress BPF program on the same device can pick this up for further post-processing. Since we work with skb there, we can also set skb->mark, skb->priority or other skb meta data out of BPF, thus having this scratch space generic and programmable allows for more flexibility than defining a direct 1:1 transfer of potentially new XDP members into skb (it's also more efficient as we don't need to initialize/handle each of such new members). The facility also works together with GRO aggregation. The scratch space at the head of the packet can be multiple of 4 byte up to 32 byte large. Drivers not yet supporting xdp->data_meta can simply be set up with xdp->data_meta as xdp->data + 1 as bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() will detect this and bail out, such that the subsequent match against xdp->data for later access is guaranteed to fail. The verifier treats xdp->data_meta/xdp->data the same way as we treat xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons. The requirement for doing the compare against xdp->data is that it hasn't been modified from it's original address we got from ctx access. It may have a range marking already from prior successful xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons though. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-25 08:25:51 +08:00
[PTR_TO_PACKET_META] = "pkt_meta",
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
[PTR_TO_PACKET_END] = "pkt_end",
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
};
bpf: Print function name in addition to function id The verifier currently prints raw function ids when printing CALL instructions or when complaining: 5: (85) call 23 unknown func 23 print a meaningful function name instead: 5: (85) call bpf_redirect#23 unknown func bpf_redirect#23 Moves the function documentation to a single comment and renames all helpers names in the list to conform to the bpf_ prefix notation so they can be greped in the kernel source. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-27 17:23:51 +08:00
#define __BPF_FUNC_STR_FN(x) [BPF_FUNC_ ## x] = __stringify(bpf_ ## x)
static const char * const func_id_str[] = {
__BPF_FUNC_MAPPER(__BPF_FUNC_STR_FN)
};
#undef __BPF_FUNC_STR_FN
static const char *func_id_name(int id)
{
BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(func_id_str) != __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID);
if (id >= 0 && id < __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID && func_id_str[id])
return func_id_str[id];
else
return "unknown";
}
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_verifier_state *state)
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
enum bpf_reg_type t;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
bpf: cleanup verifier code cleanup verifier code and prepare it for addition of "pointer to packet" logic Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:09 +08:00
reg = &state->regs[i];
t = reg->type;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (t == NOT_INIT)
continue;
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, " R%d=%s", i, reg_type_str[t]);
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
if ((t == SCALAR_VALUE || t == PTR_TO_STACK) &&
tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
/* reg->off should be 0 for SCALAR_VALUE */
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "%lld", reg->var_off.value + reg->off);
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
} else {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "(id=%d", reg->id);
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
if (t != SCALAR_VALUE)
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, ",off=%d", reg->off);
bpf: add meta pointer for direct access This work enables generic transfer of metadata from XDP into skb. The basic idea is that we can make use of the fact that the resulting skb must be linear and already comes with a larger headroom for supporting bpf_xdp_adjust_head(), which mangles xdp->data. Here, we base our work on a similar principle and introduce a small helper bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() for adjusting a new pointer called xdp->data_meta. Thus, the packet has a flexible and programmable room for meta data, followed by the actual packet data. struct xdp_buff is therefore laid out that we first point to data_hard_start, then data_meta directly prepended to data followed by data_end marking the end of packet. bpf_xdp_adjust_head() takes into account whether we have meta data already prepended and if so, memmove()s this along with the given offset provided there's enough room. xdp->data_meta is optional and programs are not required to use it. The rationale is that when we process the packet in XDP (e.g. as DoS filter), we can push further meta data along with it for the XDP_PASS case, and give the guarantee that a clsact ingress BPF program on the same device can pick this up for further post-processing. Since we work with skb there, we can also set skb->mark, skb->priority or other skb meta data out of BPF, thus having this scratch space generic and programmable allows for more flexibility than defining a direct 1:1 transfer of potentially new XDP members into skb (it's also more efficient as we don't need to initialize/handle each of such new members). The facility also works together with GRO aggregation. The scratch space at the head of the packet can be multiple of 4 byte up to 32 byte large. Drivers not yet supporting xdp->data_meta can simply be set up with xdp->data_meta as xdp->data + 1 as bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() will detect this and bail out, such that the subsequent match against xdp->data for later access is guaranteed to fail. The verifier treats xdp->data_meta/xdp->data the same way as we treat xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons. The requirement for doing the compare against xdp->data is that it hasn't been modified from it's original address we got from ctx access. It may have a range marking already from prior successful xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons though. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-25 08:25:51 +08:00
if (type_is_pkt_pointer(t))
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, ",r=%d", reg->range);
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
else if (t == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP ||
t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE ||
t == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL)
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, ",ks=%d,vs=%d",
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
reg->map_ptr->key_size,
reg->map_ptr->value_size);
bpf/verifier: more concise register state logs for constant var_off Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:56 +08:00
if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
/* Typically an immediate SCALAR_VALUE, but
* could be a pointer whose offset is too big
* for reg->off
*/
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, ",imm=%llx", reg->var_off.value);
bpf/verifier: more concise register state logs for constant var_off Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:56 +08:00
} else {
if (reg->smin_value != reg->umin_value &&
reg->smin_value != S64_MIN)
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, ",smin_value=%lld",
bpf/verifier: more concise register state logs for constant var_off Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:56 +08:00
(long long)reg->smin_value);
if (reg->smax_value != reg->umax_value &&
reg->smax_value != S64_MAX)
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, ",smax_value=%lld",
bpf/verifier: more concise register state logs for constant var_off Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:56 +08:00
(long long)reg->smax_value);
if (reg->umin_value != 0)
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, ",umin_value=%llu",
bpf/verifier: more concise register state logs for constant var_off Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:56 +08:00
(unsigned long long)reg->umin_value);
if (reg->umax_value != U64_MAX)
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, ",umax_value=%llu",
bpf/verifier: more concise register state logs for constant var_off Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:56 +08:00
(unsigned long long)reg->umax_value);
if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) {
char tn_buf[48];
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
bpf/verifier: more concise register state logs for constant var_off Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:56 +08:00
tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, ",var_off=%s", tn_buf);
bpf/verifier: more concise register state logs for constant var_off Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:56 +08:00
}
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
}
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, ")");
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
}
bpf: reduce verifier memory consumption verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack. registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track spilled register state. Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage. This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state) from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit. Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program, 1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn (since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers cleanup and rejects the program. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-29 06:11:41 +08:00
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) {
bpf: cleanup verifier code cleanup verifier code and prepare it for addition of "pointer to packet" logic Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:09 +08:00
if (state->stack_slot_type[i] == STACK_SPILL)
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, " fp%d=%s", -MAX_BPF_STACK + i,
bpf: cleanup verifier code cleanup verifier code and prepare it for addition of "pointer to packet" logic Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:09 +08:00
reg_type_str[state->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE].type]);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
}
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "\n");
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
}
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
static const char *const bpf_class_string[] = {
[BPF_LD] = "ld",
[BPF_LDX] = "ldx",
[BPF_ST] = "st",
[BPF_STX] = "stx",
[BPF_ALU] = "alu",
[BPF_JMP] = "jmp",
[BPF_RET] = "BUG",
[BPF_ALU64] = "alu64",
};
bpf: fix out of bounds access in verifier log when the verifier log is enabled the print_bpf_insn() is doing bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4] and bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4] where BPF_OP is a 4-bit instruction opcode. Malformed insns can cause out of bounds access. Fix it by sizing arrays appropriately. The bug was found by clang address sanitizer with libfuzzer. Reported-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-09-09 04:40:01 +08:00
static const char *const bpf_alu_string[16] = {
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
[BPF_ADD >> 4] = "+=",
[BPF_SUB >> 4] = "-=",
[BPF_MUL >> 4] = "*=",
[BPF_DIV >> 4] = "/=",
[BPF_OR >> 4] = "|=",
[BPF_AND >> 4] = "&=",
[BPF_LSH >> 4] = "<<=",
[BPF_RSH >> 4] = ">>=",
[BPF_NEG >> 4] = "neg",
[BPF_MOD >> 4] = "%=",
[BPF_XOR >> 4] = "^=",
[BPF_MOV >> 4] = "=",
[BPF_ARSH >> 4] = "s>>=",
[BPF_END >> 4] = "endian",
};
static const char *const bpf_ldst_string[] = {
[BPF_W >> 3] = "u32",
[BPF_H >> 3] = "u16",
[BPF_B >> 3] = "u8",
[BPF_DW >> 3] = "u64",
};
bpf: fix out of bounds access in verifier log when the verifier log is enabled the print_bpf_insn() is doing bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4] and bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4] where BPF_OP is a 4-bit instruction opcode. Malformed insns can cause out of bounds access. Fix it by sizing arrays appropriately. The bug was found by clang address sanitizer with libfuzzer. Reported-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-09-09 04:40:01 +08:00
static const char *const bpf_jmp_string[16] = {
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
[BPF_JA >> 4] = "jmp",
[BPF_JEQ >> 4] = "==",
[BPF_JGT >> 4] = ">",
bpf: enable BPF_J{LT, LE, SLT, SLE} opcodes in verifier Enable the newly added jump opcodes, main parts are in two different areas, namely direct packet access and dynamic map value access. For the direct packet access, we now allow for the following two new patterns to match in order to trigger markings with find_good_pkt_pointers(): Variant 1 (access ok when taking the branch): 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (bf) r0 = r2 3: (07) r0 += 8 4: (ad) if r0 < r3 goto pc+2 R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 5: (b7) r0 = 0 6: (95) exit from 4 to 7: R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=8) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=8) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 7: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) 8: (05) goto pc-4 5: (b7) r0 = 0 6: (95) exit processed 11 insns, stack depth 0 Variant 2 (access ok on fall-through): 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (bf) r0 = r2 3: (07) r0 += 8 4: (bd) if r3 <= r0 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=8) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=8) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 5: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) 6: (b7) r0 = 1 7: (95) exit from 4 to 6: R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 6: (b7) r0 = 1 7: (95) exit processed 10 insns, stack depth 0 The above two basically just swap the branches where we need to handle an exception and allow packet access compared to the two already existing variants for find_good_pkt_pointers(). For the dynamic map value access, we add the new instructions to reg_set_min_max() and reg_set_min_max_inv() in order to learn bounds. Verifier test cases for both are added in a follow-up patch. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-10 07:40:02 +08:00
[BPF_JLT >> 4] = "<",
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
[BPF_JGE >> 4] = ">=",
bpf: enable BPF_J{LT, LE, SLT, SLE} opcodes in verifier Enable the newly added jump opcodes, main parts are in two different areas, namely direct packet access and dynamic map value access. For the direct packet access, we now allow for the following two new patterns to match in order to trigger markings with find_good_pkt_pointers(): Variant 1 (access ok when taking the branch): 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (bf) r0 = r2 3: (07) r0 += 8 4: (ad) if r0 < r3 goto pc+2 R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 5: (b7) r0 = 0 6: (95) exit from 4 to 7: R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=8) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=8) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 7: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) 8: (05) goto pc-4 5: (b7) r0 = 0 6: (95) exit processed 11 insns, stack depth 0 Variant 2 (access ok on fall-through): 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (bf) r0 = r2 3: (07) r0 += 8 4: (bd) if r3 <= r0 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=8) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=8) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 5: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) 6: (b7) r0 = 1 7: (95) exit from 4 to 6: R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 6: (b7) r0 = 1 7: (95) exit processed 10 insns, stack depth 0 The above two basically just swap the branches where we need to handle an exception and allow packet access compared to the two already existing variants for find_good_pkt_pointers(). For the dynamic map value access, we add the new instructions to reg_set_min_max() and reg_set_min_max_inv() in order to learn bounds. Verifier test cases for both are added in a follow-up patch. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-10 07:40:02 +08:00
[BPF_JLE >> 4] = "<=",
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
[BPF_JSET >> 4] = "&",
[BPF_JNE >> 4] = "!=",
[BPF_JSGT >> 4] = "s>",
bpf: enable BPF_J{LT, LE, SLT, SLE} opcodes in verifier Enable the newly added jump opcodes, main parts are in two different areas, namely direct packet access and dynamic map value access. For the direct packet access, we now allow for the following two new patterns to match in order to trigger markings with find_good_pkt_pointers(): Variant 1 (access ok when taking the branch): 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (bf) r0 = r2 3: (07) r0 += 8 4: (ad) if r0 < r3 goto pc+2 R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 5: (b7) r0 = 0 6: (95) exit from 4 to 7: R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=8) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=8) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 7: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) 8: (05) goto pc-4 5: (b7) r0 = 0 6: (95) exit processed 11 insns, stack depth 0 Variant 2 (access ok on fall-through): 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (bf) r0 = r2 3: (07) r0 += 8 4: (bd) if r3 <= r0 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=8) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=8) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 5: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) 6: (b7) r0 = 1 7: (95) exit from 4 to 6: R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 6: (b7) r0 = 1 7: (95) exit processed 10 insns, stack depth 0 The above two basically just swap the branches where we need to handle an exception and allow packet access compared to the two already existing variants for find_good_pkt_pointers(). For the dynamic map value access, we add the new instructions to reg_set_min_max() and reg_set_min_max_inv() in order to learn bounds. Verifier test cases for both are added in a follow-up patch. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-10 07:40:02 +08:00
[BPF_JSLT >> 4] = "s<",
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
[BPF_JSGE >> 4] = "s>=",
bpf: enable BPF_J{LT, LE, SLT, SLE} opcodes in verifier Enable the newly added jump opcodes, main parts are in two different areas, namely direct packet access and dynamic map value access. For the direct packet access, we now allow for the following two new patterns to match in order to trigger markings with find_good_pkt_pointers(): Variant 1 (access ok when taking the branch): 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (bf) r0 = r2 3: (07) r0 += 8 4: (ad) if r0 < r3 goto pc+2 R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 5: (b7) r0 = 0 6: (95) exit from 4 to 7: R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=8) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=8) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 7: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) 8: (05) goto pc-4 5: (b7) r0 = 0 6: (95) exit processed 11 insns, stack depth 0 Variant 2 (access ok on fall-through): 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (bf) r0 = r2 3: (07) r0 += 8 4: (bd) if r3 <= r0 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=8) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=8) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 5: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) 6: (b7) r0 = 1 7: (95) exit from 4 to 6: R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 6: (b7) r0 = 1 7: (95) exit processed 10 insns, stack depth 0 The above two basically just swap the branches where we need to handle an exception and allow packet access compared to the two already existing variants for find_good_pkt_pointers(). For the dynamic map value access, we add the new instructions to reg_set_min_max() and reg_set_min_max_inv() in order to learn bounds. Verifier test cases for both are added in a follow-up patch. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-10 07:40:02 +08:00
[BPF_JSLE >> 4] = "s<=",
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
[BPF_CALL >> 4] = "call",
[BPF_EXIT >> 4] = "exit",
};
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
static void print_bpf_end_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
bpf/verifier: improve disassembly of BPF_END instructions print_bpf_insn() was treating all BPF_ALU[64] the same, but BPF_END has a different structure: it has a size in insn->imm (even if it's BPF_X) and uses the BPF_SRC (X or K) to indicate which endianness to use. So it needs different code to print it. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-26 23:35:13 +08:00
const struct bpf_insn *insn)
{
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "(%02x) r%d = %s%d r%d\n", insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
bpf/verifier: improve disassembly of BPF_END instructions print_bpf_insn() was treating all BPF_ALU[64] the same, but BPF_END has a different structure: it has a size in insn->imm (even if it's BPF_X) and uses the BPF_SRC (X or K) to indicate which endianness to use. So it needs different code to print it. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-26 23:35:13 +08:00
BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_TO_BE ? "be" : "le",
insn->imm, insn->dst_reg);
}
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
static void print_bpf_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
bpf: don't let ldimm64 leak map addresses on unprivileged The patch fixes two things at once: 1) It checks the env->allow_ptr_leaks and only prints the map address to the log if we have the privileges to do so, otherwise it just dumps 0 as we would when kptr_restrict is enabled on %pK. Given the latter is off by default and not every distro sets it, I don't want to rely on this, hence the 0 by default for unprivileged. 2) Printing of ldimm64 in the verifier log is currently broken in that we don't print the full immediate, but only the 32 bit part of the first insn part for ldimm64. Thus, fix this up as well; it's okay to access, since we verified all ldimm64 earlier already (including just constants) through replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(). Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs") Fixes: cbd357008604 ("bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log)") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-08 06:04:09 +08:00
const struct bpf_insn *insn)
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
{
u8 class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
bpf/verifier: improve disassembly of BPF_END instructions print_bpf_insn() was treating all BPF_ALU[64] the same, but BPF_END has a different structure: it has a size in insn->imm (even if it's BPF_X) and uses the BPF_SRC (X or K) to indicate which endianness to use. So it needs different code to print it. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-26 23:35:13 +08:00
if (BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_END) {
if (class == BPF_ALU64)
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "BUG_alu64_%02x\n", insn->code);
bpf/verifier: improve disassembly of BPF_END instructions print_bpf_insn() was treating all BPF_ALU[64] the same, but BPF_END has a different structure: it has a size in insn->imm (even if it's BPF_X) and uses the BPF_SRC (X or K) to indicate which endianness to use. So it needs different code to print it. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-26 23:35:13 +08:00
else
print_bpf_end_insn(env, insn);
bpf/verifier: improve disassembly of BPF_NEG instructions BPF_NEG takes only one operand, unlike the bulk of BPF_ALU[64] which are compound-assignments. So give it its own format in print_bpf_insn(). Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-26 23:35:29 +08:00
} else if (BPF_OP(insn->code) == BPF_NEG) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "(%02x) r%d = %s-r%d\n",
bpf/verifier: improve disassembly of BPF_NEG instructions BPF_NEG takes only one operand, unlike the bulk of BPF_ALU[64] which are compound-assignments. So give it its own format in print_bpf_insn(). Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-26 23:35:29 +08:00
insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->dst_reg);
bpf/verifier: improve disassembly of BPF_END instructions print_bpf_insn() was treating all BPF_ALU[64] the same, but BPF_END has a different structure: it has a size in insn->imm (even if it's BPF_X) and uses the BPF_SRC (X or K) to indicate which endianness to use. So it needs different code to print it. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-26 23:35:13 +08:00
} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "(%02x) %sr%d %s %sr%d\n",
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->dst_reg,
bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->src_reg);
bpf/verifier: improve disassembly of BPF_END instructions print_bpf_insn() was treating all BPF_ALU[64] the same, but BPF_END has a different structure: it has a size in insn->imm (even if it's BPF_X) and uses the BPF_SRC (X or K) to indicate which endianness to use. So it needs different code to print it. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-26 23:35:13 +08:00
} else {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "(%02x) %sr%d %s %s%d\n",
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
insn->code, class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->dst_reg,
bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
class == BPF_ALU ? "(u32) " : "",
insn->imm);
bpf/verifier: improve disassembly of BPF_END instructions print_bpf_insn() was treating all BPF_ALU[64] the same, but BPF_END has a different structure: it has a size in insn->imm (even if it's BPF_X) and uses the BPF_SRC (X or K) to indicate which endianness to use. So it needs different code to print it. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-26 23:35:13 +08:00
}
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
} else if (class == BPF_STX) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM)
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = r%d\n",
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->dst_reg,
insn->off, insn->src_reg);
else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD)
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "(%02x) lock *(%s *)(r%d %+d) += r%d\n",
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
insn->src_reg);
else
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "BUG_%02x\n", insn->code);
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
} else if (class == BPF_ST) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "BUG_st_%02x\n", insn->code);
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
return;
}
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = %d\n",
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->dst_reg,
insn->off, insn->imm);
} else if (class == BPF_LDX) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "BUG_ldx_%02x\n", insn->code);
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
return;
}
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "(%02x) r%d = *(%s *)(r%d %+d)\n",
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->src_reg, insn->off);
} else if (class == BPF_LD) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[%d]\n",
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->imm);
} else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "(%02x) r0 = *(%s *)skb[r%d + %d]\n",
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
insn->code,
bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
insn->src_reg, insn->imm);
bpf: don't let ldimm64 leak map addresses on unprivileged The patch fixes two things at once: 1) It checks the env->allow_ptr_leaks and only prints the map address to the log if we have the privileges to do so, otherwise it just dumps 0 as we would when kptr_restrict is enabled on %pK. Given the latter is off by default and not every distro sets it, I don't want to rely on this, hence the 0 by default for unprivileged. 2) Printing of ldimm64 in the verifier log is currently broken in that we don't print the full immediate, but only the 32 bit part of the first insn part for ldimm64. Thus, fix this up as well; it's okay to access, since we verified all ldimm64 earlier already (including just constants) through replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(). Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs") Fixes: cbd357008604 ("bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log)") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-08 06:04:09 +08:00
} else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IMM &&
BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW) {
/* At this point, we already made sure that the second
* part of the ldimm64 insn is accessible.
*/
u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm;
bool map_ptr = insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD;
if (map_ptr && !env->allow_ptr_leaks)
imm = 0;
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "(%02x) r%d = 0x%llx\n", insn->code,
bpf: don't let ldimm64 leak map addresses on unprivileged The patch fixes two things at once: 1) It checks the env->allow_ptr_leaks and only prints the map address to the log if we have the privileges to do so, otherwise it just dumps 0 as we would when kptr_restrict is enabled on %pK. Given the latter is off by default and not every distro sets it, I don't want to rely on this, hence the 0 by default for unprivileged. 2) Printing of ldimm64 in the verifier log is currently broken in that we don't print the full immediate, but only the 32 bit part of the first insn part for ldimm64. Thus, fix this up as well; it's okay to access, since we verified all ldimm64 earlier already (including just constants) through replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(). Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs") Fixes: cbd357008604 ("bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log)") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-08 06:04:09 +08:00
insn->dst_reg, (unsigned long long)imm);
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
} else {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "BUG_ld_%02x\n", insn->code);
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
return;
}
} else if (class == BPF_JMP) {
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "(%02x) call %s#%d\n", insn->code,
bpf: Print function name in addition to function id The verifier currently prints raw function ids when printing CALL instructions or when complaining: 5: (85) call 23 unknown func 23 print a meaningful function name instead: 5: (85) call bpf_redirect#23 unknown func bpf_redirect#23 Moves the function documentation to a single comment and renames all helpers names in the list to conform to the bpf_ prefix notation so they can be greped in the kernel source. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-27 17:23:51 +08:00
func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm);
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
} else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "(%02x) goto pc%+d\n",
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
insn->code, insn->off);
} else if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT)) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "(%02x) exit\n", insn->code);
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "(%02x) if r%d %s r%d goto pc%+d\n",
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
insn->src_reg, insn->off);
} else {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "(%02x) if r%d %s 0x%x goto pc%+d\n",
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
insn->code, insn->dst_reg,
bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4],
insn->imm, insn->off);
}
} else {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "(%02x) %s\n",
insn->code, bpf_class_string[class]);
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
}
}
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
static int pop_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *prev_insn_idx)
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
int insn_idx;
if (env->head == NULL)
return -1;
memcpy(&env->cur_state, &env->head->st, sizeof(env->cur_state));
insn_idx = env->head->insn_idx;
if (prev_insn_idx)
*prev_insn_idx = env->head->prev_insn_idx;
elem = env->head->next;
kfree(env->head);
env->head = elem;
env->stack_size--;
return insn_idx;
}
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx)
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
elem = kmalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem), GFP_KERNEL);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (!elem)
goto err;
memcpy(&elem->st, &env->cur_state, sizeof(env->cur_state));
elem->insn_idx = insn_idx;
elem->prev_insn_idx = prev_insn_idx;
elem->next = env->head;
env->head = elem;
env->stack_size++;
bpf, verifier: further improve search pruning The verifier needs to go through every path of the program in order to check that it terminates safely, which can be quite a lot of instructions that need to be processed f.e. in cases with more branchy programs. With search pruning from f1bca824dabb ("bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier") the search space can already be reduced significantly when the verifier detects that a previously walked path with same register and stack contents terminated already (see verifier's states_equal()), so the search can skip walking those states. When working with larger programs of > ~2000 (out of max 4096) insns, we found that the current limit of 32k instructions is easily hit. For example, a case we ran into is that the search space cannot be pruned due to branches at the beginning of the program that make use of certain stack space slots (STACK_MISC), which are never used in the remaining program (STACK_INVALID). Therefore, the verifier needs to walk paths for the slots in STACK_INVALID state, but also all remaining paths with a stack structure, where the slots are in STACK_MISC, which can nearly double the search space needed. After various experiments, we find that a limit of 64k processed insns is a more reasonable choice when dealing with larger programs in practice. This still allows to reject extreme crafted cases that can have a much higher complexity (f.e. > ~300k) within the 4096 insns limit due to search pruning not being able to take effect. Furthermore, we found that a lot of states can be pruned after a call instruction, f.e. we were able to reduce the search state by ~35% in some cases with this heuristic, trade-off is to keep a bit more states in env->explored_states. Usually, call instructions have a number of preceding register assignments and/or stack stores, where search pruning has a better chance to suceed in states_equal() test. The current code marks the branch targets with STATE_LIST_MARK in case of conditional jumps, and the next (t + 1) instruction in case of unconditional jump so that f.e. a backjump will walk it. We also did experiments with using t + insns[t].off + 1 as a marker in the unconditionally jump case instead of t + 1 with the rationale that these two branches of execution that converge after the label might have more potential of pruning. We found that it was a bit better, but not necessarily significantly better than the current state, perhaps also due to clang not generating back jumps often. Hence, we left that as is for now. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-06 04:33:17 +08:00
if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STACK) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "BPF program is too complex\n");
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
goto err;
}
return &elem->st;
err:
/* pop all elements and return */
while (pop_stack(env, NULL) >= 0);
return NULL;
}
#define CALLER_SAVED_REGS 6
static const int caller_saved[CALLER_SAVED_REGS] = {
BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_5
};
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
static void __mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_reg_state *reg);
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
/* Mark the unknown part of a register (variable offset or scalar value) as
* known to have the value @imm.
*/
static void __mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm)
{
reg->id = 0;
reg->var_off = tnum_const(imm);
reg->smin_value = (s64)imm;
reg->smax_value = (s64)imm;
reg->umin_value = imm;
reg->umax_value = imm;
}
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
/* Mark the 'variable offset' part of a register as zero. This should be
* used only on registers holding a pointer type.
*/
static void __mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
bpf: properly reset caller saved regs after helper call and ld_abs/ind Currently, after performing helper calls, we clear all caller saved registers, that is r0 - r5 and fill r0 depending on struct bpf_func_proto specification. The way we reset these regs can affect pruning decisions in later paths, since we only reset register's imm to 0 and type to NOT_INIT. However, we leave out clearing of other variables such as id, min_value, max_value, etc, which can later on lead to pruning mismatches due to stale data. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-25 07:05:06 +08:00
{
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
__mark_reg_known(reg, 0);
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
}
bpf: properly reset caller saved regs after helper call and ld_abs/ind Currently, after performing helper calls, we clear all caller saved registers, that is r0 - r5 and fill r0 depending on struct bpf_func_proto specification. The way we reset these regs can affect pruning decisions in later paths, since we only reset register's imm to 0 and type to NOT_INIT. However, we leave out clearing of other variables such as id, min_value, max_value, etc, which can later on lead to pruning mismatches due to stale data. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-25 07:05:06 +08:00
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
static void mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
{
if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "mark_reg_known_zero(regs, %u)\n", regno);
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
/* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */
for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++)
__mark_reg_not_init(regs + regno);
return;
}
__mark_reg_known_zero(regs + regno);
}
bpf: add meta pointer for direct access This work enables generic transfer of metadata from XDP into skb. The basic idea is that we can make use of the fact that the resulting skb must be linear and already comes with a larger headroom for supporting bpf_xdp_adjust_head(), which mangles xdp->data. Here, we base our work on a similar principle and introduce a small helper bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() for adjusting a new pointer called xdp->data_meta. Thus, the packet has a flexible and programmable room for meta data, followed by the actual packet data. struct xdp_buff is therefore laid out that we first point to data_hard_start, then data_meta directly prepended to data followed by data_end marking the end of packet. bpf_xdp_adjust_head() takes into account whether we have meta data already prepended and if so, memmove()s this along with the given offset provided there's enough room. xdp->data_meta is optional and programs are not required to use it. The rationale is that when we process the packet in XDP (e.g. as DoS filter), we can push further meta data along with it for the XDP_PASS case, and give the guarantee that a clsact ingress BPF program on the same device can pick this up for further post-processing. Since we work with skb there, we can also set skb->mark, skb->priority or other skb meta data out of BPF, thus having this scratch space generic and programmable allows for more flexibility than defining a direct 1:1 transfer of potentially new XDP members into skb (it's also more efficient as we don't need to initialize/handle each of such new members). The facility also works together with GRO aggregation. The scratch space at the head of the packet can be multiple of 4 byte up to 32 byte large. Drivers not yet supporting xdp->data_meta can simply be set up with xdp->data_meta as xdp->data + 1 as bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() will detect this and bail out, such that the subsequent match against xdp->data for later access is guaranteed to fail. The verifier treats xdp->data_meta/xdp->data the same way as we treat xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons. The requirement for doing the compare against xdp->data is that it hasn't been modified from it's original address we got from ctx access. It may have a range marking already from prior successful xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons though. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-25 08:25:51 +08:00
static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
{
return type_is_pkt_pointer(reg->type);
}
static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
{
return reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg) ||
reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END;
}
/* Unmodified PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END] register from ctx access. */
static bool reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
enum bpf_reg_type which)
{
/* The register can already have a range from prior markings.
* This is fine as long as it hasn't been advanced from its
* origin.
*/
return reg->type == which &&
reg->id == 0 &&
reg->off == 0 &&
tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0);
}
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
/* Attempts to improve min/max values based on var_off information */
static void __update_reg_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
{
/* min signed is max(sign bit) | min(other bits) */
reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, reg->smin_value,
reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MIN));
/* max signed is min(sign bit) | max(other bits) */
reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, reg->smax_value,
reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask & S64_MAX));
reg->umin_value = max(reg->umin_value, reg->var_off.value);
reg->umax_value = min(reg->umax_value,
reg->var_off.value | reg->var_off.mask);
}
/* Uses signed min/max values to inform unsigned, and vice-versa */
static void __reg_deduce_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
{
/* Learn sign from signed bounds.
* If we cannot cross the sign boundary, then signed and unsigned bounds
* are the same, so combine. This works even in the negative case, e.g.
* -3 s<= x s<= -1 implies 0xf...fd u<= x u<= 0xf...ff.
*/
if (reg->smin_value >= 0 || reg->smax_value < 0) {
reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value,
reg->umin_value);
reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value,
reg->umax_value);
return;
}
/* Learn sign from unsigned bounds. Signed bounds cross the sign
* boundary, so we must be careful.
*/
if ((s64)reg->umax_value >= 0) {
/* Positive. We can't learn anything from the smin, but smax
* is positive, hence safe.
*/
reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value;
reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value = min_t(u64, reg->smax_value,
reg->umax_value);
} else if ((s64)reg->umin_value < 0) {
/* Negative. We can't learn anything from the smax, but smin
* is negative, hence safe.
*/
reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value = max_t(u64, reg->smin_value,
reg->umin_value);
reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value;
}
}
/* Attempts to improve var_off based on unsigned min/max information */
static void __reg_bound_offset(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
{
reg->var_off = tnum_intersect(reg->var_off,
tnum_range(reg->umin_value,
reg->umax_value));
}
/* Reset the min/max bounds of a register */
static void __mark_reg_unbounded(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
{
reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
reg->umin_value = 0;
reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
}
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
/* Mark a register as having a completely unknown (scalar) value. */
static void __mark_reg_unknown(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
{
reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE;
reg->id = 0;
reg->off = 0;
reg->var_off = tnum_unknown;
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
__mark_reg_unbounded(reg);
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
}
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
static void mark_reg_unknown(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
{
if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "mark_reg_unknown(regs, %u)\n", regno);
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
/* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */
for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++)
__mark_reg_not_init(regs + regno);
return;
}
__mark_reg_unknown(regs + regno);
}
static void __mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
{
__mark_reg_unknown(reg);
reg->type = NOT_INIT;
}
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
static void mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
{
if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "mark_reg_not_init(regs, %u)\n", regno);
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
/* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */
for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++)
__mark_reg_not_init(regs + regno);
return;
}
__mark_reg_not_init(regs + regno);
bpf: properly reset caller saved regs after helper call and ld_abs/ind Currently, after performing helper calls, we clear all caller saved registers, that is r0 - r5 and fill r0 depending on struct bpf_func_proto specification. The way we reset these regs can affect pruning decisions in later paths, since we only reset register's imm to 0 and type to NOT_INIT. However, we leave out clearing of other variables such as id, min_value, max_value, etc, which can later on lead to pruning mismatches due to stale data. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-25 07:05:06 +08:00
}
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
static void init_reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_reg_state *regs)
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
{
int i;
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, i);
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE;
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
/* frame pointer */
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
regs[BPF_REG_FP].type = PTR_TO_STACK;
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_FP);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
/* 1st arg to a function */
regs[BPF_REG_1].type = PTR_TO_CTX;
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_1);
bpf: fix mark_reg_unknown_value for spilled regs on map value marking Martin reported a verifier issue that hit the BUG_ON() for his test case in the mark_reg_unknown_value() function: [ 202.861380] kernel BUG at kernel/bpf/verifier.c:467! [...] [ 203.291109] Call Trace: [ 203.296501] [<ffffffff811364d5>] mark_map_reg+0x45/0x50 [ 203.308225] [<ffffffff81136558>] mark_map_regs+0x78/0x90 [ 203.320140] [<ffffffff8113938d>] do_check+0x226d/0x2c90 [ 203.331865] [<ffffffff8113a6ab>] bpf_check+0x48b/0x780 [ 203.343403] [<ffffffff81134c8e>] bpf_prog_load+0x27e/0x440 [ 203.355705] [<ffffffff8118a38f>] ? handle_mm_fault+0x11af/0x1230 [ 203.369158] [<ffffffff812d8188>] ? security_capable+0x48/0x60 [ 203.382035] [<ffffffff811351a4>] SyS_bpf+0x124/0x960 [ 203.393185] [<ffffffff810515f6>] ? __do_page_fault+0x276/0x490 [ 203.406258] [<ffffffff816db320>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x94 This issue got uncovered after the fix in a08dd0da5307 ("bpf: fix regression on verifier pruning wrt map lookups"). The reason why it wasn't noticed before was, because as mentioned in a08dd0da5307, mark_map_regs() was doing the id matching incorrectly based on the uncached regs[regno].id. So, in the first loop, we walked all regs and as soon as we found regno == i, then this reg's id was cleared when calling mark_reg_unknown_value() thus that every subsequent register was probed against id of 0 (which, in combination with the PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL type is an invalid condition that no other register state can hold), and therefore wasn't type transitioned such as in the spilled register case for the second loop. Now since that got fixed, it turned out that 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers") used mark_reg_unknown_value() incorrectly for the spilled regs, and thus hitting the BUG_ON() in some cases due to regno >= MAX_BPF_REG. Although spilled regs have the same type as the non-spilled regs for the verifier state, that is, struct bpf_reg_state, they are semantically different from the non-spilled regs. In other words, there can be up to 64 (MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE) spilled regs in the stack, for example, register R<x> could have been spilled by the program to stack location X, Y, Z, and in mark_map_regs() we need to scan these stack slots of type STACK_SPILL for potential registers that we have to transition from PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL. Therefore, depending on the location, the spilled_regs regno can be a lot higher than just MAX_BPF_REG's value since we operate on stack instead. The reset in mark_reg_unknown_value() itself is just fine, only that the BUG_ON() was inappropriate for this. Fix it by making a __mark_reg_unknown_value() version that can be called from mark_map_reg() generically; we know for the non-spilled case that the regno is always < MAX_BPF_REG anyway. Fixes: 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers") Reported-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-18 08:52:59 +08:00
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
enum reg_arg_type {
SRC_OP, /* register is used as source operand */
DST_OP, /* register is used as destination operand */
DST_OP_NO_MARK /* same as above, check only, don't mark */
};
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
static void mark_reg_read(const struct bpf_verifier_state *state, u32 regno)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *parent = state->parent;
bpf: fix liveness marking while processing Rx = Ry instruction the verifier does regs[insn->dst_reg] = regs[insn->src_reg] which often clears write mark (when Ry doesn't have it) that was just set by check_reg_arg(Rx) prior to the assignment. That causes mark_reg_read() to keep marking Rx in this block as REG_LIVE_READ (since the logic incorrectly misses that it's screened by the write) and in many of its parents (until lucky write into the same Rx or beginning of the program). That causes is_state_visited() logic to miss many pruning opportunities. Furthermore mark_reg_read() logic propagates the read mark for BPF_REG_FP as well (though it's readonly) which causes harmless but unnecssary work during is_state_visited(). Note that do_propagate_liveness() skips FP correctly, so do the same in mark_reg_read() as well. It saves 0.2 seconds for the test below program before after bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o 2604 2304 bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o 11159 3723 bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o 1116 1110 bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o 34566 28004 bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o 53267 39026 bpf_netdev.o 17843 16943 bpf_overlay.o 8672 7929 time ~11 sec ~4 sec Fixes: dc503a8ad984 ("bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning") Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-06 07:20:56 +08:00
if (regno == BPF_REG_FP)
/* We don't need to worry about FP liveness because it's read-only */
return;
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
while (parent) {
/* if read wasn't screened by an earlier write ... */
if (state->regs[regno].live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN)
break;
/* ... then we depend on parent's value */
parent->regs[regno].live |= REG_LIVE_READ;
state = parent;
parent = state->parent;
}
}
static int check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
enum reg_arg_type t)
{
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (regno >= MAX_BPF_REG) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "R%d is invalid\n", regno);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
if (t == SRC_OP) {
/* check whether register used as source operand can be read */
if (regs[regno].type == NOT_INIT) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "R%d !read_ok\n", regno);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EACCES;
}
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
mark_reg_read(&env->cur_state, regno);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
} else {
/* check whether register used as dest operand can be written to */
if (regno == BPF_REG_FP) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "frame pointer is read only\n");
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EACCES;
}
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
regs[regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (t == DST_OP)
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, regno);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
}
return 0;
}
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:21 +08:00
static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type)
{
switch (type) {
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL:
case PTR_TO_STACK:
case PTR_TO_CTX:
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
case PTR_TO_PACKET:
bpf: add meta pointer for direct access This work enables generic transfer of metadata from XDP into skb. The basic idea is that we can make use of the fact that the resulting skb must be linear and already comes with a larger headroom for supporting bpf_xdp_adjust_head(), which mangles xdp->data. Here, we base our work on a similar principle and introduce a small helper bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() for adjusting a new pointer called xdp->data_meta. Thus, the packet has a flexible and programmable room for meta data, followed by the actual packet data. struct xdp_buff is therefore laid out that we first point to data_hard_start, then data_meta directly prepended to data followed by data_end marking the end of packet. bpf_xdp_adjust_head() takes into account whether we have meta data already prepended and if so, memmove()s this along with the given offset provided there's enough room. xdp->data_meta is optional and programs are not required to use it. The rationale is that when we process the packet in XDP (e.g. as DoS filter), we can push further meta data along with it for the XDP_PASS case, and give the guarantee that a clsact ingress BPF program on the same device can pick this up for further post-processing. Since we work with skb there, we can also set skb->mark, skb->priority or other skb meta data out of BPF, thus having this scratch space generic and programmable allows for more flexibility than defining a direct 1:1 transfer of potentially new XDP members into skb (it's also more efficient as we don't need to initialize/handle each of such new members). The facility also works together with GRO aggregation. The scratch space at the head of the packet can be multiple of 4 byte up to 32 byte large. Drivers not yet supporting xdp->data_meta can simply be set up with xdp->data_meta as xdp->data + 1 as bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() will detect this and bail out, such that the subsequent match against xdp->data for later access is guaranteed to fail. The verifier treats xdp->data_meta/xdp->data the same way as we treat xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons. The requirement for doing the compare against xdp->data is that it hasn't been modified from it's original address we got from ctx access. It may have a range marking already from prior successful xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons though. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-25 08:25:51 +08:00
case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
case PTR_TO_PACKET_END:
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:21 +08:00
case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP:
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
/* check_stack_read/write functions track spill/fill of registers,
* stack boundary and alignment are checked in check_mem_access()
*/
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int off,
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
int size, int value_regno)
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
{
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
int i, spi = (MAX_BPF_STACK + off) / BPF_REG_SIZE;
bpf: reduce verifier memory consumption verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack. registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track spilled register state. Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage. This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state) from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit. Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program, 1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn (since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers cleanup and rejects the program. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-29 06:11:41 +08:00
/* caller checked that off % size == 0 and -MAX_BPF_STACK <= off < 0,
* so it's aligned access and [off, off + size) are within stack limits
*/
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (value_regno >= 0 &&
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:21 +08:00
is_spillable_regtype(state->regs[value_regno].type)) {
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
/* register containing pointer is being spilled into stack */
bpf: reduce verifier memory consumption verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack. registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track spilled register state. Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage. This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state) from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit. Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program, 1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn (since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers cleanup and rejects the program. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-29 06:11:41 +08:00
if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "invalid size of register spill\n");
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EACCES;
}
/* save register state */
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
state->spilled_regs[spi] = state->regs[value_regno];
state->spilled_regs[spi].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
bpf: reduce verifier memory consumption verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack. registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track spilled register state. Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage. This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state) from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit. Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program, 1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn (since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers cleanup and rejects the program. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-29 06:11:41 +08:00
for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++)
state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i] = STACK_SPILL;
} else {
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
/* regular write of data into stack */
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
state->spilled_regs[spi] = (struct bpf_reg_state) {};
bpf: reduce verifier memory consumption verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack. registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track spilled register state. Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage. This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state) from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit. Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program, 1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn (since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers cleanup and rejects the program. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-29 06:11:41 +08:00
for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i] = STACK_MISC;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
}
return 0;
}
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
static void mark_stack_slot_read(const struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int slot)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *parent = state->parent;
while (parent) {
/* if read wasn't screened by an earlier write ... */
if (state->spilled_regs[slot].live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN)
break;
/* ... then we depend on parent's value */
parent->spilled_regs[slot].live |= REG_LIVE_READ;
state = parent;
parent = state->parent;
}
}
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int off, int size,
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
int value_regno)
{
bpf: reduce verifier memory consumption verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack. registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track spilled register state. Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage. This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state) from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit. Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program, 1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn (since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers cleanup and rejects the program. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-29 06:11:41 +08:00
u8 *slot_type;
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
int i, spi;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
bpf: reduce verifier memory consumption verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack. registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track spilled register state. Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage. This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state) from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit. Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program, 1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn (since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers cleanup and rejects the program. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-29 06:11:41 +08:00
slot_type = &state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off];
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
bpf: reduce verifier memory consumption verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack. registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track spilled register state. Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage. This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state) from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit. Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program, 1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn (since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers cleanup and rejects the program. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-29 06:11:41 +08:00
if (slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL) {
if (size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "invalid size of register spill\n");
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: reduce verifier memory consumption verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack. registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track spilled register state. Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage. This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state) from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit. Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program, 1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn (since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers cleanup and rejects the program. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-29 06:11:41 +08:00
for (i = 1; i < BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
if (slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "corrupted spill memory\n");
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EACCES;
}
}
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
spi = (MAX_BPF_STACK + off) / BPF_REG_SIZE;
if (value_regno >= 0) {
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
/* restore register state from stack */
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
state->regs[value_regno] = state->spilled_regs[spi];
mark_stack_slot_read(state, spi);
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return 0;
} else {
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
bpf: reduce verifier memory consumption verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack. registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track spilled register state. Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage. This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state) from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit. Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program, 1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn (since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers cleanup and rejects the program. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-29 06:11:41 +08:00
if (slot_type[i] != STACK_MISC) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "invalid read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
off, i, size);
return -EACCES;
}
}
if (value_regno >= 0)
/* have read misc data from the stack */
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, value_regno);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return 0;
}
}
/* check read/write into map element returned by bpf_map_lookup_elem() */
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
static int __check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
int size)
{
struct bpf_map *map = env->cur_state.regs[regno].map_ptr;
bpf: allow helpers access to map element values Enable helpers to directly access a map element value by passing a register type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE (or PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ) to helper arguments ARG_PTR_TO_STACK or ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK. This enables several use cases. For example, a typical tracing program might want to capture pathnames passed to sys_open() with: struct trace_data { char pathname[PATHLEN]; }; SEC("kprobe/sys_open") void bpf_sys_open(struct pt_regs *ctx) { struct trace_data data; bpf_probe_read(data.pathname, sizeof(data.pathname), ctx->di); /* consume data.pathname, for example via * bpf_trace_printk() or bpf_perf_event_output() */ } Such a program could easily hit the stack limit in case PATHLEN needs to be large or more local variables need to exist, both of which are quite common scenarios. Allowing direct helper access to map element values, one could do: struct bpf_map_def SEC("maps") scratch_map = { .type = BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY, .key_size = sizeof(u32), .value_size = sizeof(struct trace_data), .max_entries = 1, }; SEC("kprobe/sys_open") int bpf_sys_open(struct pt_regs *ctx) { int id = 0; struct trace_data *p = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&scratch_map, &id); if (!p) return; bpf_probe_read(p->pathname, sizeof(p->pathname), ctx->di); /* consume p->pathname, for example via * bpf_trace_printk() or bpf_perf_event_output() */ } And wouldn't risk exhausting the stack. Code changes are loosely modeled after commit 6841de8b0d03 ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly"). Unlike with PTR_TO_PACKET, these changes just work with ARG_PTR_TO_STACK and ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK (not ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, ...): adding those would be trivial, but since there is not currently a use case for that, it's reasonable to limit the set of changes. Also, add new tests to make sure accesses to map element values from helpers never go out of boundary, even when adjusted. Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-10 02:19:47 +08:00
if (off < 0 || size <= 0 || off + size > map->value_size) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "invalid access to map value, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n",
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
map->value_size, off, size);
return -EACCES;
}
return 0;
}
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
/* check read/write into a map element with possible variable offset */
static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
bpf: split check_mem_access logic for map values Move the logic to check memory accesses to a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ from check_mem_access() to a separate helper check_map_access_adj(). This enables to use those checks in other parts of the verifier as well, where boundaries on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ might need to be checked, for example when checking helper function arguments. The same thing is already happening for other types such as PTR_TO_PACKET and its check_packet_access() helper. The code has been copied verbatim, with the only difference of removing the "off += reg->max_value" statement and moving the sum into the call statement to check_map_access(), as that was only needed due to the earlier common check_map_access() call. Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-10 02:19:46 +08:00
int off, int size)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno];
int err;
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
/* We may have adjusted the register to this map value, so we
* need to try adding each of min_value and max_value to off
* to make sure our theoretical access will be safe.
bpf: split check_mem_access logic for map values Move the logic to check memory accesses to a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ from check_mem_access() to a separate helper check_map_access_adj(). This enables to use those checks in other parts of the verifier as well, where boundaries on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ might need to be checked, for example when checking helper function arguments. The same thing is already happening for other types such as PTR_TO_PACKET and its check_packet_access() helper. The code has been copied verbatim, with the only difference of removing the "off += reg->max_value" statement and moving the sum into the call statement to check_map_access(), as that was only needed due to the earlier common check_map_access() call. Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-10 02:19:46 +08:00
*/
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
if (env->log.level)
print_verifier_state(env, state);
bpf: split check_mem_access logic for map values Move the logic to check memory accesses to a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ from check_mem_access() to a separate helper check_map_access_adj(). This enables to use those checks in other parts of the verifier as well, where boundaries on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ might need to be checked, for example when checking helper function arguments. The same thing is already happening for other types such as PTR_TO_PACKET and its check_packet_access() helper. The code has been copied verbatim, with the only difference of removing the "off += reg->max_value" statement and moving the sum into the call statement to check_map_access(), as that was only needed due to the earlier common check_map_access() call. Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-10 02:19:46 +08:00
/* The minimum value is only important with signed
* comparisons where we can't assume the floor of a
* value is 0. If we are using signed variables for our
* index'es we need to make sure that whatever we use
* will have a set floor within our range.
*/
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
if (reg->smin_value < 0) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n",
bpf: split check_mem_access logic for map values Move the logic to check memory accesses to a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ from check_mem_access() to a separate helper check_map_access_adj(). This enables to use those checks in other parts of the verifier as well, where boundaries on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ might need to be checked, for example when checking helper function arguments. The same thing is already happening for other types such as PTR_TO_PACKET and its check_packet_access() helper. The code has been copied verbatim, with the only difference of removing the "off += reg->max_value" statement and moving the sum into the call statement to check_map_access(), as that was only needed due to the earlier common check_map_access() call. Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-10 02:19:46 +08:00
regno);
return -EACCES;
}
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
err = __check_map_access(env, regno, reg->smin_value + off, size);
bpf: split check_mem_access logic for map values Move the logic to check memory accesses to a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ from check_mem_access() to a separate helper check_map_access_adj(). This enables to use those checks in other parts of the verifier as well, where boundaries on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ might need to be checked, for example when checking helper function arguments. The same thing is already happening for other types such as PTR_TO_PACKET and its check_packet_access() helper. The code has been copied verbatim, with the only difference of removing the "off += reg->max_value" statement and moving the sum into the call statement to check_map_access(), as that was only needed due to the earlier common check_map_access() call. Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-10 02:19:46 +08:00
if (err) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "R%d min value is outside of the array range\n",
regno);
bpf: split check_mem_access logic for map values Move the logic to check memory accesses to a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ from check_mem_access() to a separate helper check_map_access_adj(). This enables to use those checks in other parts of the verifier as well, where boundaries on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ might need to be checked, for example when checking helper function arguments. The same thing is already happening for other types such as PTR_TO_PACKET and its check_packet_access() helper. The code has been copied verbatim, with the only difference of removing the "off += reg->max_value" statement and moving the sum into the call statement to check_map_access(), as that was only needed due to the earlier common check_map_access() call. Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-10 02:19:46 +08:00
return err;
}
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
/* If we haven't set a max value then we need to bail since we can't be
* sure we won't do bad things.
* If reg->umax_value + off could overflow, treat that as unbounded too.
bpf: split check_mem_access logic for map values Move the logic to check memory accesses to a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ from check_mem_access() to a separate helper check_map_access_adj(). This enables to use those checks in other parts of the verifier as well, where boundaries on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ might need to be checked, for example when checking helper function arguments. The same thing is already happening for other types such as PTR_TO_PACKET and its check_packet_access() helper. The code has been copied verbatim, with the only difference of removing the "off += reg->max_value" statement and moving the sum into the call statement to check_map_access(), as that was only needed due to the earlier common check_map_access() call. Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-10 02:19:46 +08:00
*/
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, make sure to bounds check any array access into a map\n",
bpf: split check_mem_access logic for map values Move the logic to check memory accesses to a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ from check_mem_access() to a separate helper check_map_access_adj(). This enables to use those checks in other parts of the verifier as well, where boundaries on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ might need to be checked, for example when checking helper function arguments. The same thing is already happening for other types such as PTR_TO_PACKET and its check_packet_access() helper. The code has been copied verbatim, with the only difference of removing the "off += reg->max_value" statement and moving the sum into the call statement to check_map_access(), as that was only needed due to the earlier common check_map_access() call. Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-10 02:19:46 +08:00
regno);
return -EACCES;
}
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
err = __check_map_access(env, regno, reg->umax_value + off, size);
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
if (err)
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "R%d max value is outside of the array range\n",
regno);
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
return err;
bpf: split check_mem_access logic for map values Move the logic to check memory accesses to a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ from check_mem_access() to a separate helper check_map_access_adj(). This enables to use those checks in other parts of the verifier as well, where boundaries on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ might need to be checked, for example when checking helper function arguments. The same thing is already happening for other types such as PTR_TO_PACKET and its check_packet_access() helper. The code has been copied verbatim, with the only difference of removing the "off += reg->max_value" statement and moving the sum into the call statement to check_map_access(), as that was only needed due to the earlier common check_map_access() call. Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-10 02:19:46 +08:00
}
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
#define MAX_PACKET_OFF 0xffff
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
static bool may_access_direct_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
bpf: BPF for lightweight tunnel infrastructure Registers new BPF program types which correspond to the LWT hooks: - BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN => dst_input() - BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT => dst_output() - BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT => lwtunnel_xmit() The separate program types are required to differentiate between the capabilities each LWT hook allows: * Programs attached to dst_input() or dst_output() are restricted and may only read the data of an skb. This prevent modification and possible invalidation of already validated packet headers on receive and the construction of illegal headers while the IP headers are still being assembled. * Programs attached to lwtunnel_xmit() are allowed to modify packet content as well as prepending an L2 header via a newly introduced helper bpf_skb_change_head(). This is safe as lwtunnel_xmit() is invoked after the IP header has been assembled completely. All BPF programs receive an skb with L3 headers attached and may return one of the following error codes: BPF_OK - Continue routing as per nexthop BPF_DROP - Drop skb and return EPERM BPF_REDIRECT - Redirect skb to device as per redirect() helper. (Only valid in lwtunnel_xmit() context) The return codes are binary compatible with their TC_ACT_ relatives to ease compatibility. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-01 00:10:10 +08:00
const struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
enum bpf_access_type t)
bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs For forwarding to be effective, XDP programs should be allowed to rewrite packet data. This requires that the drivers supporting XDP must all map the packet memory as TODEVICE or BIDIRECTIONAL before invoking the program. Signed-off-by: Brenden Blanco <bblanco@plumgrid.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-07-20 03:16:56 +08:00
{
bpf: direct packet write and access for helpers for clsact progs This work implements direct packet access for helpers and direct packet write in a similar fashion as already available for XDP types via commits 4acf6c0b84c9 ("bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs") and 6841de8b0d03 ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly"), and as a complementary feature to the already available direct packet read for tc (cls/act) programs. For enabling this, we need to introduce two helpers, bpf_skb_pull_data() and bpf_csum_update(). The first is generally needed for both, read and write, because they would otherwise only be limited to the current linear skb head. Usually, when the data_end test fails, programs just bail out, or, in the direct read case, use bpf_skb_load_bytes() as an alternative to overcome this limitation. If such data sits in non-linear parts, we can just pull them in once with the new helper, retest and eventually access them. At the same time, this also makes sure the skb is uncloned, which is, of course, a necessary condition for direct write. As this needs to be an invariant for the write part only, the verifier detects writes and adds a prologue that is calling bpf_skb_pull_data() to effectively unclone the skb from the very beginning in case it is indeed cloned. The heuristic makes use of a similar trick that was done in 233577a22089 ("net: filter: constify detection of pkt_type_offset"). This comes at zero cost for other programs that do not use the direct write feature. Should a program use this feature only sparsely and has read access for the most parts with, for example, drop return codes, then such write action can be delegated to a tail called program for mitigating this cost of potential uncloning to a late point in time where it would have been paid similarly with the bpf_skb_store_bytes() as well. Advantage of direct write is that the writes are inlined whereas the helper cannot make any length assumptions and thus needs to generate a call to memcpy() also for small sizes, as well as cost of helper call itself with sanity checks are avoided. Plus, when direct read is already used, we don't need to cache or perform rechecks on the data boundaries (due to verifier invalidating previous checks for helpers that change skb->data), so more complex programs using rewrites can benefit from switching to direct read plus write. For direct packet access to helpers, we save the otherwise needed copy into a temp struct sitting on stack memory when use-case allows. Both facilities are enabled via may_access_direct_pkt_data() in verifier. For now, we limit this to map helpers and csum_diff, and can successively enable other helpers where we find it makes sense. Helpers that definitely cannot be allowed for this are those part of bpf_helper_changes_skb_data() since they can change underlying data, and those that write into memory as this could happen for packet typed args when still cloned. bpf_csum_update() helper accommodates for the fact that we need to fixup checksum_complete when using direct write instead of bpf_skb_store_bytes(), meaning the programs can use available helpers like bpf_csum_diff(), and implement csum_add(), csum_sub(), csum_block_add(), csum_block_sub() equivalents in eBPF together with the new helper. A usage example will be provided for iproute2's examples/bpf/ directory. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-20 06:26:13 +08:00
switch (env->prog->type) {
bpf: BPF for lightweight tunnel infrastructure Registers new BPF program types which correspond to the LWT hooks: - BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN => dst_input() - BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT => dst_output() - BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT => lwtunnel_xmit() The separate program types are required to differentiate between the capabilities each LWT hook allows: * Programs attached to dst_input() or dst_output() are restricted and may only read the data of an skb. This prevent modification and possible invalidation of already validated packet headers on receive and the construction of illegal headers while the IP headers are still being assembled. * Programs attached to lwtunnel_xmit() are allowed to modify packet content as well as prepending an L2 header via a newly introduced helper bpf_skb_change_head(). This is safe as lwtunnel_xmit() is invoked after the IP header has been assembled completely. All BPF programs receive an skb with L3 headers attached and may return one of the following error codes: BPF_OK - Continue routing as per nexthop BPF_DROP - Drop skb and return EPERM BPF_REDIRECT - Redirect skb to device as per redirect() helper. (Only valid in lwtunnel_xmit() context) The return codes are binary compatible with their TC_ACT_ relatives to ease compatibility. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-01 00:10:10 +08:00
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN:
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT:
/* dst_input() and dst_output() can't write for now */
if (t == BPF_WRITE)
return false;
bpf: reduce compiler warnings by adding fallthrough comments Fixes the following warnings: kernel/bpf/verifier.c: In function ‘may_access_direct_pkt_data’: kernel/bpf/verifier.c:702:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] if (t == BPF_WRITE) ^ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:704:2: note: here case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: ^~~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c: In function ‘reg_set_min_max_inv’: kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2057:23: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] true_reg->min_value = 0; ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2058:2: note: here case BPF_JSGT: ^~~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2068:23: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] true_reg->min_value = 0; ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2069:2: note: here case BPF_JSGE: ^~~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c: In function ‘reg_set_min_max’: kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2009:24: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] false_reg->min_value = 0; ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2010:2: note: here case BPF_JSGT: ^~~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2019:24: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] false_reg->min_value = 0; ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~ kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2020:2: note: here case BPF_JSGE: ^~~~ Reported-by: David Binderman <dcb314@hotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Alemayhu <alexander@alemayhu.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-02-14 07:02:35 +08:00
/* fallthrough */
bpf: direct packet write and access for helpers for clsact progs This work implements direct packet access for helpers and direct packet write in a similar fashion as already available for XDP types via commits 4acf6c0b84c9 ("bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs") and 6841de8b0d03 ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly"), and as a complementary feature to the already available direct packet read for tc (cls/act) programs. For enabling this, we need to introduce two helpers, bpf_skb_pull_data() and bpf_csum_update(). The first is generally needed for both, read and write, because they would otherwise only be limited to the current linear skb head. Usually, when the data_end test fails, programs just bail out, or, in the direct read case, use bpf_skb_load_bytes() as an alternative to overcome this limitation. If such data sits in non-linear parts, we can just pull them in once with the new helper, retest and eventually access them. At the same time, this also makes sure the skb is uncloned, which is, of course, a necessary condition for direct write. As this needs to be an invariant for the write part only, the verifier detects writes and adds a prologue that is calling bpf_skb_pull_data() to effectively unclone the skb from the very beginning in case it is indeed cloned. The heuristic makes use of a similar trick that was done in 233577a22089 ("net: filter: constify detection of pkt_type_offset"). This comes at zero cost for other programs that do not use the direct write feature. Should a program use this feature only sparsely and has read access for the most parts with, for example, drop return codes, then such write action can be delegated to a tail called program for mitigating this cost of potential uncloning to a late point in time where it would have been paid similarly with the bpf_skb_store_bytes() as well. Advantage of direct write is that the writes are inlined whereas the helper cannot make any length assumptions and thus needs to generate a call to memcpy() also for small sizes, as well as cost of helper call itself with sanity checks are avoided. Plus, when direct read is already used, we don't need to cache or perform rechecks on the data boundaries (due to verifier invalidating previous checks for helpers that change skb->data), so more complex programs using rewrites can benefit from switching to direct read plus write. For direct packet access to helpers, we save the otherwise needed copy into a temp struct sitting on stack memory when use-case allows. Both facilities are enabled via may_access_direct_pkt_data() in verifier. For now, we limit this to map helpers and csum_diff, and can successively enable other helpers where we find it makes sense. Helpers that definitely cannot be allowed for this are those part of bpf_helper_changes_skb_data() since they can change underlying data, and those that write into memory as this could happen for packet typed args when still cloned. bpf_csum_update() helper accommodates for the fact that we need to fixup checksum_complete when using direct write instead of bpf_skb_store_bytes(), meaning the programs can use available helpers like bpf_csum_diff(), and implement csum_add(), csum_sub(), csum_block_add(), csum_block_sub() equivalents in eBPF together with the new helper. A usage example will be provided for iproute2's examples/bpf/ directory. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-20 06:26:13 +08:00
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS:
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT:
bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs For forwarding to be effective, XDP programs should be allowed to rewrite packet data. This requires that the drivers supporting XDP must all map the packet memory as TODEVICE or BIDIRECTIONAL before invoking the program. Signed-off-by: Brenden Blanco <bblanco@plumgrid.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-07-20 03:16:56 +08:00
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP:
bpf: BPF for lightweight tunnel infrastructure Registers new BPF program types which correspond to the LWT hooks: - BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN => dst_input() - BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT => dst_output() - BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT => lwtunnel_xmit() The separate program types are required to differentiate between the capabilities each LWT hook allows: * Programs attached to dst_input() or dst_output() are restricted and may only read the data of an skb. This prevent modification and possible invalidation of already validated packet headers on receive and the construction of illegal headers while the IP headers are still being assembled. * Programs attached to lwtunnel_xmit() are allowed to modify packet content as well as prepending an L2 header via a newly introduced helper bpf_skb_change_head(). This is safe as lwtunnel_xmit() is invoked after the IP header has been assembled completely. All BPF programs receive an skb with L3 headers attached and may return one of the following error codes: BPF_OK - Continue routing as per nexthop BPF_DROP - Drop skb and return EPERM BPF_REDIRECT - Redirect skb to device as per redirect() helper. (Only valid in lwtunnel_xmit() context) The return codes are binary compatible with their TC_ACT_ relatives to ease compatibility. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-01 00:10:10 +08:00
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT:
bpf: add access to sock fields and pkt data from sk_skb programs Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 13:33:09 +08:00
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_SKB:
bpf: direct packet write and access for helpers for clsact progs This work implements direct packet access for helpers and direct packet write in a similar fashion as already available for XDP types via commits 4acf6c0b84c9 ("bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs") and 6841de8b0d03 ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly"), and as a complementary feature to the already available direct packet read for tc (cls/act) programs. For enabling this, we need to introduce two helpers, bpf_skb_pull_data() and bpf_csum_update(). The first is generally needed for both, read and write, because they would otherwise only be limited to the current linear skb head. Usually, when the data_end test fails, programs just bail out, or, in the direct read case, use bpf_skb_load_bytes() as an alternative to overcome this limitation. If such data sits in non-linear parts, we can just pull them in once with the new helper, retest and eventually access them. At the same time, this also makes sure the skb is uncloned, which is, of course, a necessary condition for direct write. As this needs to be an invariant for the write part only, the verifier detects writes and adds a prologue that is calling bpf_skb_pull_data() to effectively unclone the skb from the very beginning in case it is indeed cloned. The heuristic makes use of a similar trick that was done in 233577a22089 ("net: filter: constify detection of pkt_type_offset"). This comes at zero cost for other programs that do not use the direct write feature. Should a program use this feature only sparsely and has read access for the most parts with, for example, drop return codes, then such write action can be delegated to a tail called program for mitigating this cost of potential uncloning to a late point in time where it would have been paid similarly with the bpf_skb_store_bytes() as well. Advantage of direct write is that the writes are inlined whereas the helper cannot make any length assumptions and thus needs to generate a call to memcpy() also for small sizes, as well as cost of helper call itself with sanity checks are avoided. Plus, when direct read is already used, we don't need to cache or perform rechecks on the data boundaries (due to verifier invalidating previous checks for helpers that change skb->data), so more complex programs using rewrites can benefit from switching to direct read plus write. For direct packet access to helpers, we save the otherwise needed copy into a temp struct sitting on stack memory when use-case allows. Both facilities are enabled via may_access_direct_pkt_data() in verifier. For now, we limit this to map helpers and csum_diff, and can successively enable other helpers where we find it makes sense. Helpers that definitely cannot be allowed for this are those part of bpf_helper_changes_skb_data() since they can change underlying data, and those that write into memory as this could happen for packet typed args when still cloned. bpf_csum_update() helper accommodates for the fact that we need to fixup checksum_complete when using direct write instead of bpf_skb_store_bytes(), meaning the programs can use available helpers like bpf_csum_diff(), and implement csum_add(), csum_sub(), csum_block_add(), csum_block_sub() equivalents in eBPF together with the new helper. A usage example will be provided for iproute2's examples/bpf/ directory. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-20 06:26:13 +08:00
if (meta)
return meta->pkt_access;
env->seen_direct_write = true;
bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs For forwarding to be effective, XDP programs should be allowed to rewrite packet data. This requires that the drivers supporting XDP must all map the packet memory as TODEVICE or BIDIRECTIONAL before invoking the program. Signed-off-by: Brenden Blanco <bblanco@plumgrid.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-07-20 03:16:56 +08:00
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
static int __check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
int off, int size)
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &regs[regno];
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
if (off < 0 || size <= 0 || (u64)off + size > reg->range) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "invalid access to packet, off=%d size=%d, R%d(id=%d,off=%d,r=%d)\n",
bpf: support decreasing order in direct packet access when packet headers are accessed in 'decreasing' order (like TCP port may be fetched before the program reads IP src) the llvm may generate the following code: [...] // R7=pkt(id=0,off=22,r=70) r2 = *(u32 *)(r7 +0) // good access [...] r7 += 40 // R7=pkt(id=0,off=62,r=70) r8 = *(u32 *)(r7 +0) // good access [...] r1 = *(u32 *)(r7 -20) // this one will fail though it's within a safe range // it's doing *(u32*)(skb->data + 42) Fix verifier to recognize such code pattern Alos turned out that 'off > range' condition is not a verifier bug. It's a buggy program that may do something like: if (ptr + 50 > data_end) return 0; ptr += 60; *(u32*)ptr; in such case emit "invalid access to packet, off=0 size=4, R1(id=0,off=60,r=50)" error message, so all information is available for the program author to fix the program. Fixes: 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf: direct packet access") Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-20 09:17:13 +08:00
off, size, regno, reg->id, reg->off, reg->range);
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
return -EACCES;
}
return 0;
}
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
static int check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
int size)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &regs[regno];
int err;
/* We may have added a variable offset to the packet pointer; but any
* reg->range we have comes after that. We are only checking the fixed
* offset.
*/
/* We don't allow negative numbers, because we aren't tracking enough
* detail to prove they're safe.
*/
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
if (reg->smin_value < 0) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n",
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
regno);
return -EACCES;
}
err = __check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size);
if (err) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "R%d offset is outside of the packet\n", regno);
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
return err;
}
return err;
}
/* check access to 'struct bpf_context' fields. Supports fixed offsets only */
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-14 06:52:13 +08:00
static int check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, int off, int size,
bpf: fix matching of data/data_end in verifier The ctx structure passed into bpf programs is different depending on bpf program type. The verifier incorrectly marked ctx->data and ctx->data_end access based on ctx offset only. That caused loads in tracing programs int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { .. ctx->ax .. } to be incorrectly marked as PTR_TO_PACKET which later caused verifier to reject the program that was actually valid in tracing context. Fix this by doing program type specific matching of ctx offsets. Fixes: 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf: direct packet access") Reported-by: Sasha Goldshtein <goldshtn@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-06-16 09:25:38 +08:00
enum bpf_access_type t, enum bpf_reg_type *reg_type)
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
{
bpf: simplify narrower ctx access This work tries to make the semantics and code around the narrower ctx access a bit easier to follow. Right now everything is done inside the .is_valid_access(). Offset matching is done differently for read/write types, meaning writes don't support narrower access and thus matching only on offsetof(struct foo, bar) is enough whereas for read case that supports narrower access we must check for offsetof(struct foo, bar) + offsetof(struct foo, bar) + sizeof(<bar>) - 1 for each of the cases. For read cases of individual members that don't support narrower access (like packet pointers or skb->cb[] case which has its own narrow access logic), we check as usual only offsetof(struct foo, bar) like in write case. Then, for the case where narrower access is allowed, we also need to set the aux info for the access. Meaning, ctx_field_size and converted_op_size have to be set. First is the original field size e.g. sizeof(<bar>) as in above example from the user facing ctx, and latter one is the target size after actual rewrite happened, thus for the kernel facing ctx. Also here we need the range match and we need to keep track changing convert_ctx_access() and converted_op_size from is_valid_access() as both are not at the same location. We can simplify the code a bit: check_ctx_access() becomes simpler in that we only store ctx_field_size as a meta data and later in convert_ctx_accesses() we fetch the target_size right from the location where we do convert. Should the verifier be misconfigured we do reject for BPF_WRITE cases or target_size that are not provided. For the subsystems, we always work on ranges in is_valid_access() and add small helpers for ranges and narrow access, convert_ctx_accesses() sets target_size for the relevant instruction. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-02 08:13:27 +08:00
struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = {
.reg_type = *reg_type,
};
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-14 06:52:13 +08:00
bpf: enable non-core use of the verfier Advanced JIT compilers and translators may want to use eBPF verifier as a base for parsers or to perform custom checks and validations. Add ability for external users to invoke the verifier and provide callbacks to be invoked for every intruction checked. For now only add most basic callback for per-instruction pre-interpretation checks is added. More advanced users may also like to have per-instruction post callback and state comparison callback. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:58 +08:00
/* for analyzer ctx accesses are already validated and converted */
if (env->analyzer_ops)
return 0;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (env->prog->aux->ops->is_valid_access &&
bpf: possibly avoid extra masking for narrower load in verifier Commit 31fd85816dbe ("bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields") permits narrower load for certain ctx fields. The commit however will already generate a masking even if the prog-specific ctx conversion produces the result with narrower size. For example, for __sk_buff->protocol, the ctx conversion loads the data into register with 2-byte load. A narrower 2-byte load should not generate masking. For __sk_buff->vlan_present, the conversion function set the result as either 0 or 1, essentially a byte. The narrower 2-byte or 1-byte load should not generate masking. To avoid unnecessary masking, prog-specific *_is_valid_access now passes converted_op_size back to verifier, which indicates the valid data width after perceived future conversion. Based on this information, verifier is able to avoid unnecessary marking. Since we want more information back from prog-specific *_is_valid_access checking, all of them are packed into one data structure for more clarity. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-23 06:07:39 +08:00
env->prog->aux->ops->is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info)) {
bpf: simplify narrower ctx access This work tries to make the semantics and code around the narrower ctx access a bit easier to follow. Right now everything is done inside the .is_valid_access(). Offset matching is done differently for read/write types, meaning writes don't support narrower access and thus matching only on offsetof(struct foo, bar) is enough whereas for read case that supports narrower access we must check for offsetof(struct foo, bar) + offsetof(struct foo, bar) + sizeof(<bar>) - 1 for each of the cases. For read cases of individual members that don't support narrower access (like packet pointers or skb->cb[] case which has its own narrow access logic), we check as usual only offsetof(struct foo, bar) like in write case. Then, for the case where narrower access is allowed, we also need to set the aux info for the access. Meaning, ctx_field_size and converted_op_size have to be set. First is the original field size e.g. sizeof(<bar>) as in above example from the user facing ctx, and latter one is the target size after actual rewrite happened, thus for the kernel facing ctx. Also here we need the range match and we need to keep track changing convert_ctx_access() and converted_op_size from is_valid_access() as both are not at the same location. We can simplify the code a bit: check_ctx_access() becomes simpler in that we only store ctx_field_size as a meta data and later in convert_ctx_accesses() we fetch the target_size right from the location where we do convert. Should the verifier be misconfigured we do reject for BPF_WRITE cases or target_size that are not provided. For the subsystems, we always work on ranges in is_valid_access() and add small helpers for ranges and narrow access, convert_ctx_accesses() sets target_size for the relevant instruction. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-02 08:13:27 +08:00
/* A non zero info.ctx_field_size indicates that this field is a
* candidate for later verifier transformation to load the whole
* field and then apply a mask when accessed with a narrower
* access than actual ctx access size. A zero info.ctx_field_size
* will only allow for whole field access and rejects any other
* type of narrower access.
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-14 06:52:13 +08:00
*/
bpf: simplify narrower ctx access This work tries to make the semantics and code around the narrower ctx access a bit easier to follow. Right now everything is done inside the .is_valid_access(). Offset matching is done differently for read/write types, meaning writes don't support narrower access and thus matching only on offsetof(struct foo, bar) is enough whereas for read case that supports narrower access we must check for offsetof(struct foo, bar) + offsetof(struct foo, bar) + sizeof(<bar>) - 1 for each of the cases. For read cases of individual members that don't support narrower access (like packet pointers or skb->cb[] case which has its own narrow access logic), we check as usual only offsetof(struct foo, bar) like in write case. Then, for the case where narrower access is allowed, we also need to set the aux info for the access. Meaning, ctx_field_size and converted_op_size have to be set. First is the original field size e.g. sizeof(<bar>) as in above example from the user facing ctx, and latter one is the target size after actual rewrite happened, thus for the kernel facing ctx. Also here we need the range match and we need to keep track changing convert_ctx_access() and converted_op_size from is_valid_access() as both are not at the same location. We can simplify the code a bit: check_ctx_access() becomes simpler in that we only store ctx_field_size as a meta data and later in convert_ctx_accesses() we fetch the target_size right from the location where we do convert. Should the verifier be misconfigured we do reject for BPF_WRITE cases or target_size that are not provided. For the subsystems, we always work on ranges in is_valid_access() and add small helpers for ranges and narrow access, convert_ctx_accesses() sets target_size for the relevant instruction. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-02 08:13:27 +08:00
env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ctx_field_size = info.ctx_field_size;
bpf: possibly avoid extra masking for narrower load in verifier Commit 31fd85816dbe ("bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields") permits narrower load for certain ctx fields. The commit however will already generate a masking even if the prog-specific ctx conversion produces the result with narrower size. For example, for __sk_buff->protocol, the ctx conversion loads the data into register with 2-byte load. A narrower 2-byte load should not generate masking. For __sk_buff->vlan_present, the conversion function set the result as either 0 or 1, essentially a byte. The narrower 2-byte or 1-byte load should not generate masking. To avoid unnecessary masking, prog-specific *_is_valid_access now passes converted_op_size back to verifier, which indicates the valid data width after perceived future conversion. Based on this information, verifier is able to avoid unnecessary marking. Since we want more information back from prog-specific *_is_valid_access checking, all of them are packed into one data structure for more clarity. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-23 06:07:39 +08:00
*reg_type = info.reg_type;
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-14 06:52:13 +08:00
bpf: sanitize bpf tracepoint access during bpf program loading remember the last byte of ctx access and at the time of attaching the program to tracepoint check that the program doesn't access bytes beyond defined in tracepoint fields This also disallows access to __dynamic_array fields, but can be relaxed in the future. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-07 09:43:28 +08:00
/* remember the offset of last byte accessed in ctx */
if (env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset < off + size)
env->prog->aux->max_ctx_offset = off + size;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return 0;
bpf: sanitize bpf tracepoint access during bpf program loading remember the last byte of ctx access and at the time of attaching the program to tracepoint check that the program doesn't access bytes beyond defined in tracepoint fields This also disallows access to __dynamic_array fields, but can be relaxed in the future. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-07 09:43:28 +08:00
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "invalid bpf_context access off=%d size=%d\n", off, size);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: fix mixed signed/unsigned derived min/max value bounds Edward reported that there's an issue in min/max value bounds tracking when signed and unsigned compares both provide hints on limits when having unknown variables. E.g. a program such as the following should have been rejected: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (18) r1 = 0xffff8a94cda93400 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+7 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = -8 8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 9: (b7) r2 = -1 10: (2d) if r1 > r2 goto pc+3 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0 R2=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp 11: (65) if r1 s> 0x1 goto pc+2 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R2=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp 12: (0f) r0 += r1 13: (72) *(u8 *)(r0 +0) = 0 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=1 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R2=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp 14: (b7) r0 = 0 15: (95) exit What happens is that in the first part ... 8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 9: (b7) r2 = -1 10: (2d) if r1 > r2 goto pc+3 ... r1 carries an unsigned value, and is compared as unsigned against a register carrying an immediate. Verifier deduces in reg_set_min_max() that since the compare is unsigned and operation is greater than (>), that in the fall-through/false case, r1's minimum bound must be 0 and maximum bound must be r2. Latter is larger than the bound and thus max value is reset back to being 'invalid' aka BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE. Thus, r1 state is now 'R1=inv,min_value=0'. The subsequent test ... 11: (65) if r1 s> 0x1 goto pc+2 ... is a signed compare of r1 with immediate value 1. Here, verifier deduces in reg_set_min_max() that since the compare is signed this time and operation is greater than (>), that in the fall-through/false case, we can deduce that r1's maximum bound must be 1, meaning with prior test, we result in r1 having the following state: R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1. Given that the actual value this holds is -8, the bounds are wrongly deduced. When this is being added to r0 which holds the map_value(_adj) type, then subsequent store access in above case will go through check_mem_access() which invokes check_map_access_adj(), that will then probe whether the map memory is in bounds based on the min_value and max_value as well as access size since the actual unknown value is min_value <= x <= max_value; commit fce366a9dd0d ("bpf, verifier: fix alu ops against map_value{, _adj} register types") provides some more explanation on the semantics. It's worth to note in this context that in the current code, min_value and max_value tracking are used for two things, i) dynamic map value access via check_map_access_adj() and since commit 06c1c049721a ("bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory") ii) also enforced at check_helper_mem_access() when passing a memory address (pointer to packet, map value, stack) and length pair to a helper and the length in this case is an unknown value defining an access range through min_value/max_value in that case. The min_value/max_value tracking is /not/ used in the direct packet access case to track ranges. However, the issue also affects case ii), for example, the following crafted program based on the same principle must be rejected as well: 0: (b7) r2 = 0 1: (bf) r3 = r10 2: (07) r3 += -512 3: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = -8 4: (79) r4 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 5: (b7) r6 = -1 6: (2d) if r4 > r6 goto pc+5 R1=ctx R2=imm0,min_value=0,max_value=0,min_align=2147483648 R3=fp-512 R4=inv,min_value=0 R6=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp 7: (65) if r4 s> 0x1 goto pc+4 R1=ctx R2=imm0,min_value=0,max_value=0,min_align=2147483648 R3=fp-512 R4=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R6=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp 8: (07) r4 += 1 9: (b7) r5 = 0 10: (6a) *(u16 *)(r10 -512) = 0 11: (85) call bpf_skb_load_bytes#26 12: (b7) r0 = 0 13: (95) exit Meaning, while we initialize the max_value stack slot that the verifier thinks we access in the [1,2] range, in reality we pass -7 as length which is interpreted as u32 in the helper. Thus, this issue is relevant also for the case of helper ranges. Resetting both bounds in check_reg_overflow() in case only one of them exceeds limits is also not enough as similar test can be created that uses values which are within range, thus also here learned min value in r1 is incorrect when mixed with later signed test to create a range: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (18) r1 = 0xffff880ad081fa00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+7 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = -8 8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 9: (b7) r2 = 2 10: (3d) if r2 >= r1 goto pc+3 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R10=fp 11: (65) if r1 s> 0x4 goto pc+2 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3,max_value=4 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R10=fp 12: (0f) r0 += r1 13: (72) *(u8 *)(r0 +0) = 0 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=4 R1=inv,min_value=3,max_value=4 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R10=fp 14: (b7) r0 = 0 15: (95) exit This leaves us with two options for fixing this: i) to invalidate all prior learned information once we switch signed context, ii) to track min/max signed and unsigned boundaries separately as done in [0]. (Given latter introduces major changes throughout the whole verifier, it's rather net-next material, thus this patch follows option i), meaning we can derive bounds either from only signed tests or only unsigned tests.) There is still the case of adjust_reg_min_max_vals(), where we adjust bounds on ALU operations, meaning programs like the following where boundaries on the reg get mixed in context later on when bounds are merged on the dst reg must get rejected, too: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (18) r1 = 0xffff89b2bf87ce00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+6 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = -8 8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 9: (b7) r2 = 2 10: (3d) if r2 >= r1 goto pc+2 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R10=fp 11: (b7) r7 = 1 12: (65) if r7 s> 0x0 goto pc+2 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R7=imm1,max_value=0 R10=fp 13: (b7) r0 = 0 14: (95) exit from 12 to 15: R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R7=imm1,min_value=1 R10=fp 15: (0f) r7 += r1 16: (65) if r7 s> 0x4 goto pc+2 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R7=inv,min_value=4,max_value=4 R10=fp 17: (0f) r0 += r7 18: (72) *(u8 *)(r0 +0) = 0 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=4,max_value=4 R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R7=inv,min_value=4,max_value=4 R10=fp 19: (b7) r0 = 0 20: (95) exit Meaning, in adjust_reg_min_max_vals() we must also reset range values on the dst when src/dst registers have mixed signed/ unsigned derived min/max value bounds with one unbounded value as otherwise they can be added together deducing false boundaries. Once both boundaries are established from either ALU ops or compare operations w/o mixing signed/unsigned insns, then they can safely be added to other regs also having both boundaries established. Adding regs with one unbounded side to a map value where the bounded side has been learned w/o mixing ops is possible, but the resulting map value won't recover from that, meaning such op is considered invalid on the time of actual access. Invalid bounds are set on the dst reg in case i) src reg, or ii) in case dst reg already had them. The only way to recover would be to perform i) ALU ops but only 'add' is allowed on map value types or ii) comparisons, but these are disallowed on pointers in case they span a range. This is fine as only BPF_JEQ and BPF_JNE may be performed on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers which potentially turn them into PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE type depending on the branch, so only here min/max value cannot be invalidated for them. In terms of state pruning, value_from_signed is considered as well in states_equal() when dealing with adjusted map values. With regards to breaking existing programs, there is a small risk, but use-cases are rather quite narrow where this could occur and mixing compares probably unlikely. Joint work with Josef and Edward. [0] https://lists.iovisor.org/pipermail/iovisor-dev/2017-June/000822.html Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") Reported-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-21 06:00:21 +08:00
static bool __is_pointer_value(bool allow_ptr_leaks,
const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:21 +08:00
{
bpf: fix mixed signed/unsigned derived min/max value bounds Edward reported that there's an issue in min/max value bounds tracking when signed and unsigned compares both provide hints on limits when having unknown variables. E.g. a program such as the following should have been rejected: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (18) r1 = 0xffff8a94cda93400 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+7 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = -8 8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 9: (b7) r2 = -1 10: (2d) if r1 > r2 goto pc+3 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0 R2=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp 11: (65) if r1 s> 0x1 goto pc+2 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R2=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp 12: (0f) r0 += r1 13: (72) *(u8 *)(r0 +0) = 0 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=1 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R2=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp 14: (b7) r0 = 0 15: (95) exit What happens is that in the first part ... 8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 9: (b7) r2 = -1 10: (2d) if r1 > r2 goto pc+3 ... r1 carries an unsigned value, and is compared as unsigned against a register carrying an immediate. Verifier deduces in reg_set_min_max() that since the compare is unsigned and operation is greater than (>), that in the fall-through/false case, r1's minimum bound must be 0 and maximum bound must be r2. Latter is larger than the bound and thus max value is reset back to being 'invalid' aka BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE. Thus, r1 state is now 'R1=inv,min_value=0'. The subsequent test ... 11: (65) if r1 s> 0x1 goto pc+2 ... is a signed compare of r1 with immediate value 1. Here, verifier deduces in reg_set_min_max() that since the compare is signed this time and operation is greater than (>), that in the fall-through/false case, we can deduce that r1's maximum bound must be 1, meaning with prior test, we result in r1 having the following state: R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1. Given that the actual value this holds is -8, the bounds are wrongly deduced. When this is being added to r0 which holds the map_value(_adj) type, then subsequent store access in above case will go through check_mem_access() which invokes check_map_access_adj(), that will then probe whether the map memory is in bounds based on the min_value and max_value as well as access size since the actual unknown value is min_value <= x <= max_value; commit fce366a9dd0d ("bpf, verifier: fix alu ops against map_value{, _adj} register types") provides some more explanation on the semantics. It's worth to note in this context that in the current code, min_value and max_value tracking are used for two things, i) dynamic map value access via check_map_access_adj() and since commit 06c1c049721a ("bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory") ii) also enforced at check_helper_mem_access() when passing a memory address (pointer to packet, map value, stack) and length pair to a helper and the length in this case is an unknown value defining an access range through min_value/max_value in that case. The min_value/max_value tracking is /not/ used in the direct packet access case to track ranges. However, the issue also affects case ii), for example, the following crafted program based on the same principle must be rejected as well: 0: (b7) r2 = 0 1: (bf) r3 = r10 2: (07) r3 += -512 3: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = -8 4: (79) r4 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 5: (b7) r6 = -1 6: (2d) if r4 > r6 goto pc+5 R1=ctx R2=imm0,min_value=0,max_value=0,min_align=2147483648 R3=fp-512 R4=inv,min_value=0 R6=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp 7: (65) if r4 s> 0x1 goto pc+4 R1=ctx R2=imm0,min_value=0,max_value=0,min_align=2147483648 R3=fp-512 R4=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R6=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp 8: (07) r4 += 1 9: (b7) r5 = 0 10: (6a) *(u16 *)(r10 -512) = 0 11: (85) call bpf_skb_load_bytes#26 12: (b7) r0 = 0 13: (95) exit Meaning, while we initialize the max_value stack slot that the verifier thinks we access in the [1,2] range, in reality we pass -7 as length which is interpreted as u32 in the helper. Thus, this issue is relevant also for the case of helper ranges. Resetting both bounds in check_reg_overflow() in case only one of them exceeds limits is also not enough as similar test can be created that uses values which are within range, thus also here learned min value in r1 is incorrect when mixed with later signed test to create a range: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (18) r1 = 0xffff880ad081fa00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+7 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = -8 8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 9: (b7) r2 = 2 10: (3d) if r2 >= r1 goto pc+3 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R10=fp 11: (65) if r1 s> 0x4 goto pc+2 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3,max_value=4 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R10=fp 12: (0f) r0 += r1 13: (72) *(u8 *)(r0 +0) = 0 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=4 R1=inv,min_value=3,max_value=4 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R10=fp 14: (b7) r0 = 0 15: (95) exit This leaves us with two options for fixing this: i) to invalidate all prior learned information once we switch signed context, ii) to track min/max signed and unsigned boundaries separately as done in [0]. (Given latter introduces major changes throughout the whole verifier, it's rather net-next material, thus this patch follows option i), meaning we can derive bounds either from only signed tests or only unsigned tests.) There is still the case of adjust_reg_min_max_vals(), where we adjust bounds on ALU operations, meaning programs like the following where boundaries on the reg get mixed in context later on when bounds are merged on the dst reg must get rejected, too: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (18) r1 = 0xffff89b2bf87ce00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+6 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = -8 8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 9: (b7) r2 = 2 10: (3d) if r2 >= r1 goto pc+2 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R10=fp 11: (b7) r7 = 1 12: (65) if r7 s> 0x0 goto pc+2 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R7=imm1,max_value=0 R10=fp 13: (b7) r0 = 0 14: (95) exit from 12 to 15: R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R7=imm1,min_value=1 R10=fp 15: (0f) r7 += r1 16: (65) if r7 s> 0x4 goto pc+2 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R7=inv,min_value=4,max_value=4 R10=fp 17: (0f) r0 += r7 18: (72) *(u8 *)(r0 +0) = 0 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=4,max_value=4 R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R7=inv,min_value=4,max_value=4 R10=fp 19: (b7) r0 = 0 20: (95) exit Meaning, in adjust_reg_min_max_vals() we must also reset range values on the dst when src/dst registers have mixed signed/ unsigned derived min/max value bounds with one unbounded value as otherwise they can be added together deducing false boundaries. Once both boundaries are established from either ALU ops or compare operations w/o mixing signed/unsigned insns, then they can safely be added to other regs also having both boundaries established. Adding regs with one unbounded side to a map value where the bounded side has been learned w/o mixing ops is possible, but the resulting map value won't recover from that, meaning such op is considered invalid on the time of actual access. Invalid bounds are set on the dst reg in case i) src reg, or ii) in case dst reg already had them. The only way to recover would be to perform i) ALU ops but only 'add' is allowed on map value types or ii) comparisons, but these are disallowed on pointers in case they span a range. This is fine as only BPF_JEQ and BPF_JNE may be performed on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers which potentially turn them into PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE type depending on the branch, so only here min/max value cannot be invalidated for them. In terms of state pruning, value_from_signed is considered as well in states_equal() when dealing with adjusted map values. With regards to breaking existing programs, there is a small risk, but use-cases are rather quite narrow where this could occur and mixing compares probably unlikely. Joint work with Josef and Edward. [0] https://lists.iovisor.org/pipermail/iovisor-dev/2017-June/000822.html Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") Reported-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-21 06:00:21 +08:00
if (allow_ptr_leaks)
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:21 +08:00
return false;
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
return reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE;
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:21 +08:00
}
bpf: fix mixed signed/unsigned derived min/max value bounds Edward reported that there's an issue in min/max value bounds tracking when signed and unsigned compares both provide hints on limits when having unknown variables. E.g. a program such as the following should have been rejected: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (18) r1 = 0xffff8a94cda93400 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+7 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = -8 8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 9: (b7) r2 = -1 10: (2d) if r1 > r2 goto pc+3 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0 R2=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp 11: (65) if r1 s> 0x1 goto pc+2 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R2=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp 12: (0f) r0 += r1 13: (72) *(u8 *)(r0 +0) = 0 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=1 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R2=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp 14: (b7) r0 = 0 15: (95) exit What happens is that in the first part ... 8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 9: (b7) r2 = -1 10: (2d) if r1 > r2 goto pc+3 ... r1 carries an unsigned value, and is compared as unsigned against a register carrying an immediate. Verifier deduces in reg_set_min_max() that since the compare is unsigned and operation is greater than (>), that in the fall-through/false case, r1's minimum bound must be 0 and maximum bound must be r2. Latter is larger than the bound and thus max value is reset back to being 'invalid' aka BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE. Thus, r1 state is now 'R1=inv,min_value=0'. The subsequent test ... 11: (65) if r1 s> 0x1 goto pc+2 ... is a signed compare of r1 with immediate value 1. Here, verifier deduces in reg_set_min_max() that since the compare is signed this time and operation is greater than (>), that in the fall-through/false case, we can deduce that r1's maximum bound must be 1, meaning with prior test, we result in r1 having the following state: R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1. Given that the actual value this holds is -8, the bounds are wrongly deduced. When this is being added to r0 which holds the map_value(_adj) type, then subsequent store access in above case will go through check_mem_access() which invokes check_map_access_adj(), that will then probe whether the map memory is in bounds based on the min_value and max_value as well as access size since the actual unknown value is min_value <= x <= max_value; commit fce366a9dd0d ("bpf, verifier: fix alu ops against map_value{, _adj} register types") provides some more explanation on the semantics. It's worth to note in this context that in the current code, min_value and max_value tracking are used for two things, i) dynamic map value access via check_map_access_adj() and since commit 06c1c049721a ("bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory") ii) also enforced at check_helper_mem_access() when passing a memory address (pointer to packet, map value, stack) and length pair to a helper and the length in this case is an unknown value defining an access range through min_value/max_value in that case. The min_value/max_value tracking is /not/ used in the direct packet access case to track ranges. However, the issue also affects case ii), for example, the following crafted program based on the same principle must be rejected as well: 0: (b7) r2 = 0 1: (bf) r3 = r10 2: (07) r3 += -512 3: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = -8 4: (79) r4 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 5: (b7) r6 = -1 6: (2d) if r4 > r6 goto pc+5 R1=ctx R2=imm0,min_value=0,max_value=0,min_align=2147483648 R3=fp-512 R4=inv,min_value=0 R6=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp 7: (65) if r4 s> 0x1 goto pc+4 R1=ctx R2=imm0,min_value=0,max_value=0,min_align=2147483648 R3=fp-512 R4=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R6=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp 8: (07) r4 += 1 9: (b7) r5 = 0 10: (6a) *(u16 *)(r10 -512) = 0 11: (85) call bpf_skb_load_bytes#26 12: (b7) r0 = 0 13: (95) exit Meaning, while we initialize the max_value stack slot that the verifier thinks we access in the [1,2] range, in reality we pass -7 as length which is interpreted as u32 in the helper. Thus, this issue is relevant also for the case of helper ranges. Resetting both bounds in check_reg_overflow() in case only one of them exceeds limits is also not enough as similar test can be created that uses values which are within range, thus also here learned min value in r1 is incorrect when mixed with later signed test to create a range: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (18) r1 = 0xffff880ad081fa00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+7 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = -8 8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 9: (b7) r2 = 2 10: (3d) if r2 >= r1 goto pc+3 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R10=fp 11: (65) if r1 s> 0x4 goto pc+2 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3,max_value=4 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R10=fp 12: (0f) r0 += r1 13: (72) *(u8 *)(r0 +0) = 0 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=4 R1=inv,min_value=3,max_value=4 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R10=fp 14: (b7) r0 = 0 15: (95) exit This leaves us with two options for fixing this: i) to invalidate all prior learned information once we switch signed context, ii) to track min/max signed and unsigned boundaries separately as done in [0]. (Given latter introduces major changes throughout the whole verifier, it's rather net-next material, thus this patch follows option i), meaning we can derive bounds either from only signed tests or only unsigned tests.) There is still the case of adjust_reg_min_max_vals(), where we adjust bounds on ALU operations, meaning programs like the following where boundaries on the reg get mixed in context later on when bounds are merged on the dst reg must get rejected, too: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (18) r1 = 0xffff89b2bf87ce00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+6 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = -8 8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 9: (b7) r2 = 2 10: (3d) if r2 >= r1 goto pc+2 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R10=fp 11: (b7) r7 = 1 12: (65) if r7 s> 0x0 goto pc+2 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R7=imm1,max_value=0 R10=fp 13: (b7) r0 = 0 14: (95) exit from 12 to 15: R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R7=imm1,min_value=1 R10=fp 15: (0f) r7 += r1 16: (65) if r7 s> 0x4 goto pc+2 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R7=inv,min_value=4,max_value=4 R10=fp 17: (0f) r0 += r7 18: (72) *(u8 *)(r0 +0) = 0 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=4,max_value=4 R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R7=inv,min_value=4,max_value=4 R10=fp 19: (b7) r0 = 0 20: (95) exit Meaning, in adjust_reg_min_max_vals() we must also reset range values on the dst when src/dst registers have mixed signed/ unsigned derived min/max value bounds with one unbounded value as otherwise they can be added together deducing false boundaries. Once both boundaries are established from either ALU ops or compare operations w/o mixing signed/unsigned insns, then they can safely be added to other regs also having both boundaries established. Adding regs with one unbounded side to a map value where the bounded side has been learned w/o mixing ops is possible, but the resulting map value won't recover from that, meaning such op is considered invalid on the time of actual access. Invalid bounds are set on the dst reg in case i) src reg, or ii) in case dst reg already had them. The only way to recover would be to perform i) ALU ops but only 'add' is allowed on map value types or ii) comparisons, but these are disallowed on pointers in case they span a range. This is fine as only BPF_JEQ and BPF_JNE may be performed on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers which potentially turn them into PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE type depending on the branch, so only here min/max value cannot be invalidated for them. In terms of state pruning, value_from_signed is considered as well in states_equal() when dealing with adjusted map values. With regards to breaking existing programs, there is a small risk, but use-cases are rather quite narrow where this could occur and mixing compares probably unlikely. Joint work with Josef and Edward. [0] https://lists.iovisor.org/pipermail/iovisor-dev/2017-June/000822.html Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") Reported-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-21 06:00:21 +08:00
static bool is_pointer_value(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
{
return __is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, &env->cur_state.regs[regno]);
}
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-11 02:22:52 +08:00
int off, int size, bool strict)
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
{
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
struct tnum reg_off;
bpf: Add strict alignment flag for BPF_PROG_LOAD. Add a new field, "prog_flags", and an initial flag value BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT. When set, the verifier will enforce strict pointer alignment regardless of the setting of CONFIG_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS. The verifier, in this mode, will also use a fixed value of "2" in place of NET_IP_ALIGN. This facilitates test cases that will exercise and validate this part of the verifier even when run on architectures where alignment doesn't matter. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-11 02:38:07 +08:00
int ip_align;
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-11 02:22:52 +08:00
/* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */
if (!strict || size == 1)
return 0;
net: Make IP alignment calulations clearer. The assignmnet: ip_align = strict ? 2 : NET_IP_ALIGN; in compare_pkt_ptr_alignment() trips up Coverity because we can only get to this code when strict is true, therefore ip_align will always be 2 regardless of NET_IP_ALIGN's value. So just assign directly to '2' and explain the situation in the comment above. Reported-by: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <garsilva@embeddedor.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-23 00:27:07 +08:00
/* For platforms that do not have a Kconfig enabling
* CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS the value of
* NET_IP_ALIGN is universally set to '2'. And on platforms
* that do set CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS, we get
* to this code only in strict mode where we want to emulate
* the NET_IP_ALIGN==2 checking. Therefore use an
* unconditional IP align value of '2'.
bpf: Add strict alignment flag for BPF_PROG_LOAD. Add a new field, "prog_flags", and an initial flag value BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT. When set, the verifier will enforce strict pointer alignment regardless of the setting of CONFIG_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS. The verifier, in this mode, will also use a fixed value of "2" in place of NET_IP_ALIGN. This facilitates test cases that will exercise and validate this part of the verifier even when run on architectures where alignment doesn't matter. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-11 02:38:07 +08:00
*/
net: Make IP alignment calulations clearer. The assignmnet: ip_align = strict ? 2 : NET_IP_ALIGN; in compare_pkt_ptr_alignment() trips up Coverity because we can only get to this code when strict is true, therefore ip_align will always be 2 regardless of NET_IP_ALIGN's value. So just assign directly to '2' and explain the situation in the comment above. Reported-by: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <garsilva@embeddedor.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-23 00:27:07 +08:00
ip_align = 2;
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(ip_align + reg->off + off));
if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) {
char tn_buf[48];
tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env,
"misaligned packet access off %d+%s+%d+%d size %d\n",
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
ip_align, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size);
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
return -EACCES;
}
bpf, verifier: fix rejection of unaligned access checks for map_value_adj Currently, the verifier doesn't reject unaligned access for map_value_adj register types. Commit 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") added logic to check_ptr_alignment() extending it from PTR_TO_PACKET to also PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ, but for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ no enforcement is in place, because reg->id for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ reg types is never non-zero, meaning, we can cause BPF_H/_W/_DW-based unaligned access for architectures not supporting efficient unaligned access, and thus worst case could raise exceptions on some archs that are unable to correct the unaligned access or perform a different memory access to the actual requested one and such. i) Unaligned load with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0x42533a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+11 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (61) r1 = *(u32 *)(r0 +0) 8: (35) if r1 >= 0xb goto pc+9 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp 9: (07) r0 += 3 10: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp 11: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +2) R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R7=inv R10=fp [...] ii) Unaligned store with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0x4df16a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+19 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (07) r0 += 3 8: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = 42 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +2) = 43 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp 10: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 -2) = 44 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp [...] For the PTR_TO_PACKET type, reg->id is initially zero when skb->data was fetched, it later receives a reg->id from env->id_gen generator once another register with UNKNOWN_VALUE type was added to it via check_packet_ptr_add(). The purpose of this reg->id is twofold: i) it is used in find_good_pkt_pointers() for setting the allowed access range for regs with PTR_TO_PACKET of same id once verifier matched on data/data_end tests, and ii) for check_ptr_alignment() to determine that when not having efficient unaligned access and register with UNKNOWN_VALUE was added to PTR_TO_PACKET, that we're only allowed to access the content bytewise due to unknown unalignment. reg->id was never intended for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE{,_ADJ} types and thus is always zero, the only marking is in PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL that was added after 484611357c19 via 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers"). Above tests will fail for non-root environment due to prohibited pointer arithmetic. The fix splits register-type specific checks into their own helper instead of keeping them combined, so we don't run into a similar issue in future once we extend check_ptr_alignment() further and forget to add reg->type checks for some of the checks. Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-31 08:24:03 +08:00
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
return 0;
}
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
static int check_generic_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
const char *pointer_desc,
int off, int size, bool strict)
bpf, verifier: fix rejection of unaligned access checks for map_value_adj Currently, the verifier doesn't reject unaligned access for map_value_adj register types. Commit 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") added logic to check_ptr_alignment() extending it from PTR_TO_PACKET to also PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ, but for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ no enforcement is in place, because reg->id for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ reg types is never non-zero, meaning, we can cause BPF_H/_W/_DW-based unaligned access for architectures not supporting efficient unaligned access, and thus worst case could raise exceptions on some archs that are unable to correct the unaligned access or perform a different memory access to the actual requested one and such. i) Unaligned load with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0x42533a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+11 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (61) r1 = *(u32 *)(r0 +0) 8: (35) if r1 >= 0xb goto pc+9 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp 9: (07) r0 += 3 10: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp 11: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +2) R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R7=inv R10=fp [...] ii) Unaligned store with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0x4df16a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+19 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (07) r0 += 3 8: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = 42 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +2) = 43 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp 10: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 -2) = 44 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp [...] For the PTR_TO_PACKET type, reg->id is initially zero when skb->data was fetched, it later receives a reg->id from env->id_gen generator once another register with UNKNOWN_VALUE type was added to it via check_packet_ptr_add(). The purpose of this reg->id is twofold: i) it is used in find_good_pkt_pointers() for setting the allowed access range for regs with PTR_TO_PACKET of same id once verifier matched on data/data_end tests, and ii) for check_ptr_alignment() to determine that when not having efficient unaligned access and register with UNKNOWN_VALUE was added to PTR_TO_PACKET, that we're only allowed to access the content bytewise due to unknown unalignment. reg->id was never intended for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE{,_ADJ} types and thus is always zero, the only marking is in PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL that was added after 484611357c19 via 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers"). Above tests will fail for non-root environment due to prohibited pointer arithmetic. The fix splits register-type specific checks into their own helper instead of keeping them combined, so we don't run into a similar issue in future once we extend check_ptr_alignment() further and forget to add reg->type checks for some of the checks. Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-31 08:24:03 +08:00
{
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
struct tnum reg_off;
/* Byte size accesses are always allowed. */
if (!strict || size == 1)
return 0;
reg_off = tnum_add(reg->var_off, tnum_const(reg->off + off));
if (!tnum_is_aligned(reg_off, size)) {
char tn_buf[48];
tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "misaligned %saccess off %s+%d+%d size %d\n",
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
pointer_desc, tn_buf, reg->off, off, size);
bpf, verifier: fix rejection of unaligned access checks for map_value_adj Currently, the verifier doesn't reject unaligned access for map_value_adj register types. Commit 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") added logic to check_ptr_alignment() extending it from PTR_TO_PACKET to also PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ, but for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ no enforcement is in place, because reg->id for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ reg types is never non-zero, meaning, we can cause BPF_H/_W/_DW-based unaligned access for architectures not supporting efficient unaligned access, and thus worst case could raise exceptions on some archs that are unable to correct the unaligned access or perform a different memory access to the actual requested one and such. i) Unaligned load with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0x42533a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+11 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (61) r1 = *(u32 *)(r0 +0) 8: (35) if r1 >= 0xb goto pc+9 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp 9: (07) r0 += 3 10: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp 11: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +2) R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R7=inv R10=fp [...] ii) Unaligned store with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0x4df16a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+19 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (07) r0 += 3 8: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = 42 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +2) = 43 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp 10: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 -2) = 44 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp [...] For the PTR_TO_PACKET type, reg->id is initially zero when skb->data was fetched, it later receives a reg->id from env->id_gen generator once another register with UNKNOWN_VALUE type was added to it via check_packet_ptr_add(). The purpose of this reg->id is twofold: i) it is used in find_good_pkt_pointers() for setting the allowed access range for regs with PTR_TO_PACKET of same id once verifier matched on data/data_end tests, and ii) for check_ptr_alignment() to determine that when not having efficient unaligned access and register with UNKNOWN_VALUE was added to PTR_TO_PACKET, that we're only allowed to access the content bytewise due to unknown unalignment. reg->id was never intended for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE{,_ADJ} types and thus is always zero, the only marking is in PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL that was added after 484611357c19 via 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers"). Above tests will fail for non-root environment due to prohibited pointer arithmetic. The fix splits register-type specific checks into their own helper instead of keeping them combined, so we don't run into a similar issue in future once we extend check_ptr_alignment() further and forget to add reg->type checks for some of the checks. Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-31 08:24:03 +08:00
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
return 0;
}
bpf: Add strict alignment flag for BPF_PROG_LOAD. Add a new field, "prog_flags", and an initial flag value BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT. When set, the verifier will enforce strict pointer alignment regardless of the setting of CONFIG_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS. The verifier, in this mode, will also use a fixed value of "2" in place of NET_IP_ALIGN. This facilitates test cases that will exercise and validate this part of the verifier even when run on architectures where alignment doesn't matter. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-11 02:38:07 +08:00
static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
bpf, verifier: fix rejection of unaligned access checks for map_value_adj Currently, the verifier doesn't reject unaligned access for map_value_adj register types. Commit 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") added logic to check_ptr_alignment() extending it from PTR_TO_PACKET to also PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ, but for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ no enforcement is in place, because reg->id for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ reg types is never non-zero, meaning, we can cause BPF_H/_W/_DW-based unaligned access for architectures not supporting efficient unaligned access, and thus worst case could raise exceptions on some archs that are unable to correct the unaligned access or perform a different memory access to the actual requested one and such. i) Unaligned load with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0x42533a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+11 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (61) r1 = *(u32 *)(r0 +0) 8: (35) if r1 >= 0xb goto pc+9 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp 9: (07) r0 += 3 10: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp 11: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +2) R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R7=inv R10=fp [...] ii) Unaligned store with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0x4df16a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+19 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (07) r0 += 3 8: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = 42 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +2) = 43 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp 10: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 -2) = 44 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp [...] For the PTR_TO_PACKET type, reg->id is initially zero when skb->data was fetched, it later receives a reg->id from env->id_gen generator once another register with UNKNOWN_VALUE type was added to it via check_packet_ptr_add(). The purpose of this reg->id is twofold: i) it is used in find_good_pkt_pointers() for setting the allowed access range for regs with PTR_TO_PACKET of same id once verifier matched on data/data_end tests, and ii) for check_ptr_alignment() to determine that when not having efficient unaligned access and register with UNKNOWN_VALUE was added to PTR_TO_PACKET, that we're only allowed to access the content bytewise due to unknown unalignment. reg->id was never intended for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE{,_ADJ} types and thus is always zero, the only marking is in PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL that was added after 484611357c19 via 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers"). Above tests will fail for non-root environment due to prohibited pointer arithmetic. The fix splits register-type specific checks into their own helper instead of keeping them combined, so we don't run into a similar issue in future once we extend check_ptr_alignment() further and forget to add reg->type checks for some of the checks. Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-31 08:24:03 +08:00
int off, int size)
{
bpf: Add strict alignment flag for BPF_PROG_LOAD. Add a new field, "prog_flags", and an initial flag value BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT. When set, the verifier will enforce strict pointer alignment regardless of the setting of CONFIG_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS. The verifier, in this mode, will also use a fixed value of "2" in place of NET_IP_ALIGN. This facilitates test cases that will exercise and validate this part of the verifier even when run on architectures where alignment doesn't matter. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-11 02:38:07 +08:00
bool strict = env->strict_alignment;
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
const char *pointer_desc = "";
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-11 02:22:52 +08:00
bpf, verifier: fix rejection of unaligned access checks for map_value_adj Currently, the verifier doesn't reject unaligned access for map_value_adj register types. Commit 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") added logic to check_ptr_alignment() extending it from PTR_TO_PACKET to also PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ, but for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ no enforcement is in place, because reg->id for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ reg types is never non-zero, meaning, we can cause BPF_H/_W/_DW-based unaligned access for architectures not supporting efficient unaligned access, and thus worst case could raise exceptions on some archs that are unable to correct the unaligned access or perform a different memory access to the actual requested one and such. i) Unaligned load with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0x42533a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+11 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (61) r1 = *(u32 *)(r0 +0) 8: (35) if r1 >= 0xb goto pc+9 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp 9: (07) r0 += 3 10: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp 11: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +2) R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R7=inv R10=fp [...] ii) Unaligned store with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0x4df16a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+19 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (07) r0 += 3 8: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = 42 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +2) = 43 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp 10: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 -2) = 44 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp [...] For the PTR_TO_PACKET type, reg->id is initially zero when skb->data was fetched, it later receives a reg->id from env->id_gen generator once another register with UNKNOWN_VALUE type was added to it via check_packet_ptr_add(). The purpose of this reg->id is twofold: i) it is used in find_good_pkt_pointers() for setting the allowed access range for regs with PTR_TO_PACKET of same id once verifier matched on data/data_end tests, and ii) for check_ptr_alignment() to determine that when not having efficient unaligned access and register with UNKNOWN_VALUE was added to PTR_TO_PACKET, that we're only allowed to access the content bytewise due to unknown unalignment. reg->id was never intended for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE{,_ADJ} types and thus is always zero, the only marking is in PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL that was added after 484611357c19 via 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers"). Above tests will fail for non-root environment due to prohibited pointer arithmetic. The fix splits register-type specific checks into their own helper instead of keeping them combined, so we don't run into a similar issue in future once we extend check_ptr_alignment() further and forget to add reg->type checks for some of the checks. Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-31 08:24:03 +08:00
switch (reg->type) {
case PTR_TO_PACKET:
bpf: add meta pointer for direct access This work enables generic transfer of metadata from XDP into skb. The basic idea is that we can make use of the fact that the resulting skb must be linear and already comes with a larger headroom for supporting bpf_xdp_adjust_head(), which mangles xdp->data. Here, we base our work on a similar principle and introduce a small helper bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() for adjusting a new pointer called xdp->data_meta. Thus, the packet has a flexible and programmable room for meta data, followed by the actual packet data. struct xdp_buff is therefore laid out that we first point to data_hard_start, then data_meta directly prepended to data followed by data_end marking the end of packet. bpf_xdp_adjust_head() takes into account whether we have meta data already prepended and if so, memmove()s this along with the given offset provided there's enough room. xdp->data_meta is optional and programs are not required to use it. The rationale is that when we process the packet in XDP (e.g. as DoS filter), we can push further meta data along with it for the XDP_PASS case, and give the guarantee that a clsact ingress BPF program on the same device can pick this up for further post-processing. Since we work with skb there, we can also set skb->mark, skb->priority or other skb meta data out of BPF, thus having this scratch space generic and programmable allows for more flexibility than defining a direct 1:1 transfer of potentially new XDP members into skb (it's also more efficient as we don't need to initialize/handle each of such new members). The facility also works together with GRO aggregation. The scratch space at the head of the packet can be multiple of 4 byte up to 32 byte large. Drivers not yet supporting xdp->data_meta can simply be set up with xdp->data_meta as xdp->data + 1 as bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() will detect this and bail out, such that the subsequent match against xdp->data for later access is guaranteed to fail. The verifier treats xdp->data_meta/xdp->data the same way as we treat xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons. The requirement for doing the compare against xdp->data is that it hasn't been modified from it's original address we got from ctx access. It may have a range marking already from prior successful xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons though. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-25 08:25:51 +08:00
case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
/* Special case, because of NET_IP_ALIGN. Given metadata sits
* right in front, treat it the very same way.
*/
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
return check_pkt_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size, strict);
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
pointer_desc = "value ";
break;
case PTR_TO_CTX:
pointer_desc = "context ";
break;
case PTR_TO_STACK:
pointer_desc = "stack ";
break;
bpf, verifier: fix rejection of unaligned access checks for map_value_adj Currently, the verifier doesn't reject unaligned access for map_value_adj register types. Commit 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") added logic to check_ptr_alignment() extending it from PTR_TO_PACKET to also PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ, but for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ no enforcement is in place, because reg->id for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ reg types is never non-zero, meaning, we can cause BPF_H/_W/_DW-based unaligned access for architectures not supporting efficient unaligned access, and thus worst case could raise exceptions on some archs that are unable to correct the unaligned access or perform a different memory access to the actual requested one and such. i) Unaligned load with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0x42533a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+11 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (61) r1 = *(u32 *)(r0 +0) 8: (35) if r1 >= 0xb goto pc+9 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp 9: (07) r0 += 3 10: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp 11: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +2) R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R7=inv R10=fp [...] ii) Unaligned store with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0x4df16a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+19 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (07) r0 += 3 8: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = 42 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +2) = 43 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp 10: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 -2) = 44 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp [...] For the PTR_TO_PACKET type, reg->id is initially zero when skb->data was fetched, it later receives a reg->id from env->id_gen generator once another register with UNKNOWN_VALUE type was added to it via check_packet_ptr_add(). The purpose of this reg->id is twofold: i) it is used in find_good_pkt_pointers() for setting the allowed access range for regs with PTR_TO_PACKET of same id once verifier matched on data/data_end tests, and ii) for check_ptr_alignment() to determine that when not having efficient unaligned access and register with UNKNOWN_VALUE was added to PTR_TO_PACKET, that we're only allowed to access the content bytewise due to unknown unalignment. reg->id was never intended for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE{,_ADJ} types and thus is always zero, the only marking is in PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL that was added after 484611357c19 via 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers"). Above tests will fail for non-root environment due to prohibited pointer arithmetic. The fix splits register-type specific checks into their own helper instead of keeping them combined, so we don't run into a similar issue in future once we extend check_ptr_alignment() further and forget to add reg->type checks for some of the checks. Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-31 08:24:03 +08:00
default:
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
break;
bpf, verifier: fix rejection of unaligned access checks for map_value_adj Currently, the verifier doesn't reject unaligned access for map_value_adj register types. Commit 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") added logic to check_ptr_alignment() extending it from PTR_TO_PACKET to also PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ, but for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ no enforcement is in place, because reg->id for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ reg types is never non-zero, meaning, we can cause BPF_H/_W/_DW-based unaligned access for architectures not supporting efficient unaligned access, and thus worst case could raise exceptions on some archs that are unable to correct the unaligned access or perform a different memory access to the actual requested one and such. i) Unaligned load with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0x42533a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+11 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (61) r1 = *(u32 *)(r0 +0) 8: (35) if r1 >= 0xb goto pc+9 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp 9: (07) r0 += 3 10: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp 11: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +2) R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R7=inv R10=fp [...] ii) Unaligned store with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0x4df16a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+19 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (07) r0 += 3 8: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = 42 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +2) = 43 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp 10: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 -2) = 44 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp [...] For the PTR_TO_PACKET type, reg->id is initially zero when skb->data was fetched, it later receives a reg->id from env->id_gen generator once another register with UNKNOWN_VALUE type was added to it via check_packet_ptr_add(). The purpose of this reg->id is twofold: i) it is used in find_good_pkt_pointers() for setting the allowed access range for regs with PTR_TO_PACKET of same id once verifier matched on data/data_end tests, and ii) for check_ptr_alignment() to determine that when not having efficient unaligned access and register with UNKNOWN_VALUE was added to PTR_TO_PACKET, that we're only allowed to access the content bytewise due to unknown unalignment. reg->id was never intended for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE{,_ADJ} types and thus is always zero, the only marking is in PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL that was added after 484611357c19 via 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers"). Above tests will fail for non-root environment due to prohibited pointer arithmetic. The fix splits register-type specific checks into their own helper instead of keeping them combined, so we don't run into a similar issue in future once we extend check_ptr_alignment() further and forget to add reg->type checks for some of the checks. Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-31 08:24:03 +08:00
}
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
return check_generic_ptr_alignment(env, reg, pointer_desc, off, size,
strict);
bpf, verifier: fix rejection of unaligned access checks for map_value_adj Currently, the verifier doesn't reject unaligned access for map_value_adj register types. Commit 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") added logic to check_ptr_alignment() extending it from PTR_TO_PACKET to also PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ, but for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ no enforcement is in place, because reg->id for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ reg types is never non-zero, meaning, we can cause BPF_H/_W/_DW-based unaligned access for architectures not supporting efficient unaligned access, and thus worst case could raise exceptions on some archs that are unable to correct the unaligned access or perform a different memory access to the actual requested one and such. i) Unaligned load with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0x42533a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+11 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (61) r1 = *(u32 *)(r0 +0) 8: (35) if r1 >= 0xb goto pc+9 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp 9: (07) r0 += 3 10: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0) R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp 11: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +2) R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R7=inv R10=fp [...] ii) Unaligned store with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS on r0 (map_value_adj): 0: (bf) r2 = r10 1: (07) r2 += -8 2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0 3: (18) r1 = 0x4df16a00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+19 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (07) r0 += 3 8: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = 42 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +2) = 43 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp 10: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 -2) = 44 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp [...] For the PTR_TO_PACKET type, reg->id is initially zero when skb->data was fetched, it later receives a reg->id from env->id_gen generator once another register with UNKNOWN_VALUE type was added to it via check_packet_ptr_add(). The purpose of this reg->id is twofold: i) it is used in find_good_pkt_pointers() for setting the allowed access range for regs with PTR_TO_PACKET of same id once verifier matched on data/data_end tests, and ii) for check_ptr_alignment() to determine that when not having efficient unaligned access and register with UNKNOWN_VALUE was added to PTR_TO_PACKET, that we're only allowed to access the content bytewise due to unknown unalignment. reg->id was never intended for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE{,_ADJ} types and thus is always zero, the only marking is in PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL that was added after 484611357c19 via 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers"). Above tests will fail for non-root environment due to prohibited pointer arithmetic. The fix splits register-type specific checks into their own helper instead of keeping them combined, so we don't run into a similar issue in future once we extend check_ptr_alignment() further and forget to add reg->type checks for some of the checks. Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-31 08:24:03 +08:00
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
/* check whether memory at (regno + off) is accessible for t = (read | write)
* if t==write, value_regno is a register which value is stored into memory
* if t==read, value_regno is a register which will receive the value from memory
* if t==write && value_regno==-1, some unknown value is stored into memory
* if t==read && value_regno==-1, don't care what we read from memory
*/
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-14 06:52:13 +08:00
static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regno, int off,
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
int bpf_size, enum bpf_access_type t,
int value_regno)
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno];
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
int size, err = 0;
size = bpf_size_to_bytes(bpf_size);
if (size < 0)
return size;
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
/* alignment checks will add in reg->off themselves */
bpf: Add strict alignment flag for BPF_PROG_LOAD. Add a new field, "prog_flags", and an initial flag value BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT. When set, the verifier will enforce strict pointer alignment regardless of the setting of CONFIG_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS. The verifier, in this mode, will also use a fixed value of "2" in place of NET_IP_ALIGN. This facilitates test cases that will exercise and validate this part of the verifier even when run on architectures where alignment doesn't matter. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-11 02:38:07 +08:00
err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size);
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
if (err)
return err;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
/* for access checks, reg->off is just part of off */
off += reg->off;
if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:21 +08:00
if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into map\n", value_regno);
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:21 +08:00
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
err = check_map_access(env, regno, off, size);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, value_regno);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
bpf: cleanup verifier code cleanup verifier code and prepare it for addition of "pointer to packet" logic Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:09 +08:00
} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX) {
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
enum bpf_reg_type reg_type = SCALAR_VALUE;
bpf: fix matching of data/data_end in verifier The ctx structure passed into bpf programs is different depending on bpf program type. The verifier incorrectly marked ctx->data and ctx->data_end access based on ctx offset only. That caused loads in tracing programs int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { .. ctx->ax .. } to be incorrectly marked as PTR_TO_PACKET which later caused verifier to reject the program that was actually valid in tracing context. Fix this by doing program type specific matching of ctx offsets. Fixes: 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf: direct packet access") Reported-by: Sasha Goldshtein <goldshtn@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-06-16 09:25:38 +08:00
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:21 +08:00
if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into ctx\n", value_regno);
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:21 +08:00
return -EACCES;
}
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
/* ctx accesses must be at a fixed offset, so that we can
* determine what type of data were returned.
*/
if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
char tn_buf[48];
tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env,
"variable ctx access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d",
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
tn_buf, off, size);
return -EACCES;
}
off += reg->var_off.value;
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-14 06:52:13 +08:00
err = check_ctx_access(env, insn_idx, off, size, t, &reg_type);
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) {
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
/* ctx access returns either a scalar, or a
bpf: add meta pointer for direct access This work enables generic transfer of metadata from XDP into skb. The basic idea is that we can make use of the fact that the resulting skb must be linear and already comes with a larger headroom for supporting bpf_xdp_adjust_head(), which mangles xdp->data. Here, we base our work on a similar principle and introduce a small helper bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() for adjusting a new pointer called xdp->data_meta. Thus, the packet has a flexible and programmable room for meta data, followed by the actual packet data. struct xdp_buff is therefore laid out that we first point to data_hard_start, then data_meta directly prepended to data followed by data_end marking the end of packet. bpf_xdp_adjust_head() takes into account whether we have meta data already prepended and if so, memmove()s this along with the given offset provided there's enough room. xdp->data_meta is optional and programs are not required to use it. The rationale is that when we process the packet in XDP (e.g. as DoS filter), we can push further meta data along with it for the XDP_PASS case, and give the guarantee that a clsact ingress BPF program on the same device can pick this up for further post-processing. Since we work with skb there, we can also set skb->mark, skb->priority or other skb meta data out of BPF, thus having this scratch space generic and programmable allows for more flexibility than defining a direct 1:1 transfer of potentially new XDP members into skb (it's also more efficient as we don't need to initialize/handle each of such new members). The facility also works together with GRO aggregation. The scratch space at the head of the packet can be multiple of 4 byte up to 32 byte large. Drivers not yet supporting xdp->data_meta can simply be set up with xdp->data_meta as xdp->data + 1 as bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() will detect this and bail out, such that the subsequent match against xdp->data for later access is guaranteed to fail. The verifier treats xdp->data_meta/xdp->data the same way as we treat xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons. The requirement for doing the compare against xdp->data is that it hasn't been modified from it's original address we got from ctx access. It may have a range marking already from prior successful xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons though. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-25 08:25:51 +08:00
* PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END]. In the latter
* case, we know the offset is zero.
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
*/
if (reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE)
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, value_regno);
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
else
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
mark_reg_known_zero(env, state->regs,
value_regno);
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
state->regs[value_regno].id = 0;
state->regs[value_regno].off = 0;
state->regs[value_regno].range = 0;
bpf: Set register type according to is_valid_access() This prevent future potential pointer leaks when an unprivileged eBPF program will read a pointer value from its context. Even if is_valid_access() returns a pointer type, the eBPF verifier replace it with UNKNOWN_VALUE. The register value that contains a kernel address is then allowed to leak. Moreover, this fix allows unprivileged eBPF programs to use functions with (legitimate) pointer arguments. Not an issue currently since reg_type is only set for PTR_TO_PACKET or PTR_TO_PACKET_END in XDP and TC programs that can only be loaded as privileged. For now, the only unprivileged eBPF program allowed is for socket filtering and all the types from its context are UNKNOWN_VALUE. However, this fix is important for future unprivileged eBPF programs which could use pointers in their context. Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-25 02:01:50 +08:00
state->regs[value_regno].type = reg_type;
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
/* stack accesses must be at a fixed offset, so that we can
* determine what type of data were returned.
* See check_stack_read().
*/
if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
char tn_buf[48];
tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "variable stack access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d",
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
tn_buf, off, size);
return -EACCES;
}
off += reg->var_off.value;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "invalid stack off=%d size=%d\n", off,
size);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: teach verifier to track stack depth teach verifier to track bpf program stack depth Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-31 04:31:29 +08:00
if (env->prog->aux->stack_depth < -off)
env->prog->aux->stack_depth = -off;
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:21 +08:00
if (t == BPF_WRITE) {
if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks &&
state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off] == STACK_SPILL &&
size != BPF_REG_SIZE) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "attempt to corrupt spilled pointer on stack\n");
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:21 +08:00
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
err = check_stack_write(env, state, off, size,
value_regno);
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:21 +08:00
} else {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
err = check_stack_read(env, state, off, size,
value_regno);
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:21 +08:00
}
bpf: add meta pointer for direct access This work enables generic transfer of metadata from XDP into skb. The basic idea is that we can make use of the fact that the resulting skb must be linear and already comes with a larger headroom for supporting bpf_xdp_adjust_head(), which mangles xdp->data. Here, we base our work on a similar principle and introduce a small helper bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() for adjusting a new pointer called xdp->data_meta. Thus, the packet has a flexible and programmable room for meta data, followed by the actual packet data. struct xdp_buff is therefore laid out that we first point to data_hard_start, then data_meta directly prepended to data followed by data_end marking the end of packet. bpf_xdp_adjust_head() takes into account whether we have meta data already prepended and if so, memmove()s this along with the given offset provided there's enough room. xdp->data_meta is optional and programs are not required to use it. The rationale is that when we process the packet in XDP (e.g. as DoS filter), we can push further meta data along with it for the XDP_PASS case, and give the guarantee that a clsact ingress BPF program on the same device can pick this up for further post-processing. Since we work with skb there, we can also set skb->mark, skb->priority or other skb meta data out of BPF, thus having this scratch space generic and programmable allows for more flexibility than defining a direct 1:1 transfer of potentially new XDP members into skb (it's also more efficient as we don't need to initialize/handle each of such new members). The facility also works together with GRO aggregation. The scratch space at the head of the packet can be multiple of 4 byte up to 32 byte large. Drivers not yet supporting xdp->data_meta can simply be set up with xdp->data_meta as xdp->data + 1 as bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() will detect this and bail out, such that the subsequent match against xdp->data for later access is guaranteed to fail. The verifier treats xdp->data_meta/xdp->data the same way as we treat xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons. The requirement for doing the compare against xdp->data is that it hasn't been modified from it's original address we got from ctx access. It may have a range marking already from prior successful xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons though. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-25 08:25:51 +08:00
} else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg)) {
bpf: BPF for lightweight tunnel infrastructure Registers new BPF program types which correspond to the LWT hooks: - BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN => dst_input() - BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT => dst_output() - BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT => lwtunnel_xmit() The separate program types are required to differentiate between the capabilities each LWT hook allows: * Programs attached to dst_input() or dst_output() are restricted and may only read the data of an skb. This prevent modification and possible invalidation of already validated packet headers on receive and the construction of illegal headers while the IP headers are still being assembled. * Programs attached to lwtunnel_xmit() are allowed to modify packet content as well as prepending an L2 header via a newly introduced helper bpf_skb_change_head(). This is safe as lwtunnel_xmit() is invoked after the IP header has been assembled completely. All BPF programs receive an skb with L3 headers attached and may return one of the following error codes: BPF_OK - Continue routing as per nexthop BPF_DROP - Drop skb and return EPERM BPF_REDIRECT - Redirect skb to device as per redirect() helper. (Only valid in lwtunnel_xmit() context) The return codes are binary compatible with their TC_ACT_ relatives to ease compatibility. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-01 00:10:10 +08:00
if (t == BPF_WRITE && !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, t)) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "cannot write into packet\n");
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs For forwarding to be effective, XDP programs should be allowed to rewrite packet data. This requires that the drivers supporting XDP must all map the packet memory as TODEVICE or BIDIRECTIONAL before invoking the program. Signed-off-by: Brenden Blanco <bblanco@plumgrid.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-07-20 03:16:56 +08:00
if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into packet\n",
value_regno);
bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs For forwarding to be effective, XDP programs should be allowed to rewrite packet data. This requires that the drivers supporting XDP must all map the packet memory as TODEVICE or BIDIRECTIONAL before invoking the program. Signed-off-by: Brenden Blanco <bblanco@plumgrid.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-07-20 03:16:56 +08:00
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
err = check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size);
if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
mark_reg_unknown(env, state->regs, value_regno);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
} else {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n", regno,
reg_type_str[reg->type]);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
if (!err && size < BPF_REG_SIZE && value_regno >= 0 && t == BPF_READ &&
state->regs[value_regno].type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
/* b/h/w load zero-extends, mark upper bits as known 0 */
state->regs[value_regno].var_off = tnum_cast(
state->regs[value_regno].var_off, size);
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
__update_reg_bounds(&state->regs[value_regno]);
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return err;
}
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-14 06:52:13 +08:00
static int check_xadd(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_insn *insn)
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
{
int err;
if ((BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W && BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) ||
insn->imm != 0) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "BPF_XADD uses reserved fields\n");
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check src1 operand */
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (err)
return err;
/* check src2 operand */
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (err)
return err;
bpf: prevent leaking pointer via xadd on unpriviledged Leaking kernel addresses on unpriviledged is generally disallowed, for example, verifier rejects the following: 0: (b7) r0 = 0 1: (18) r2 = 0xffff897e82304400 3: (7b) *(u64 *)(r1 +48) = r2 R2 leaks addr into ctx Doing pointer arithmetic on them is also forbidden, so that they don't turn into unknown value and then get leaked out. However, there's xadd as a special case, where we don't check the src reg for being a pointer register, e.g. the following will pass: 0: (b7) r0 = 0 1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r1 +48) = r0 2: (18) r2 = 0xffff897e82304400 ; map 4: (db) lock *(u64 *)(r1 +48) += r2 5: (95) exit We could store the pointer into skb->cb, loose the type context, and then read it out from there again to leak it eventually out of a map value. Or more easily in a different variant, too: 0: (bf) r6 = r1 1: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 2: (bf) r2 = r10 3: (07) r2 += -8 4: (18) r1 = 0x0 6: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 7: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+3 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R6=ctx R10=fp 8: (b7) r3 = 0 9: (7b) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = r3 10: (db) lock *(u64 *)(r0 +0) += r6 11: (b7) r0 = 0 12: (95) exit from 7 to 11: R0=inv,min_value=0,max_value=0 R6=ctx R10=fp 11: (b7) r0 = 0 12: (95) exit Prevent this by checking xadd src reg for pointer types. Also add a couple of test cases related to this. Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs") Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-29 09:04:59 +08:00
if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", insn->src_reg);
bpf: prevent leaking pointer via xadd on unpriviledged Leaking kernel addresses on unpriviledged is generally disallowed, for example, verifier rejects the following: 0: (b7) r0 = 0 1: (18) r2 = 0xffff897e82304400 3: (7b) *(u64 *)(r1 +48) = r2 R2 leaks addr into ctx Doing pointer arithmetic on them is also forbidden, so that they don't turn into unknown value and then get leaked out. However, there's xadd as a special case, where we don't check the src reg for being a pointer register, e.g. the following will pass: 0: (b7) r0 = 0 1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r1 +48) = r0 2: (18) r2 = 0xffff897e82304400 ; map 4: (db) lock *(u64 *)(r1 +48) += r2 5: (95) exit We could store the pointer into skb->cb, loose the type context, and then read it out from there again to leak it eventually out of a map value. Or more easily in a different variant, too: 0: (bf) r6 = r1 1: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 2: (bf) r2 = r10 3: (07) r2 += -8 4: (18) r1 = 0x0 6: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 7: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+3 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R6=ctx R10=fp 8: (b7) r3 = 0 9: (7b) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = r3 10: (db) lock *(u64 *)(r0 +0) += r6 11: (b7) r0 = 0 12: (95) exit from 7 to 11: R0=inv,min_value=0,max_value=0 R6=ctx R10=fp 11: (b7) r0 = 0 12: (95) exit Prevent this by checking xadd src reg for pointer types. Also add a couple of test cases related to this. Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs") Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-29 09:04:59 +08:00
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
/* check whether atomic_add can read the memory */
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-14 06:52:13 +08:00
err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, -1);
if (err)
return err;
/* check whether atomic_add can write into the same memory */
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-14 06:52:13 +08:00
return check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1);
}
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
/* Does this register contain a constant zero? */
static bool register_is_null(struct bpf_reg_state reg)
{
return reg.type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_equals_const(reg.var_off, 0);
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
/* when register 'regno' is passed into function that will read 'access_size'
* bytes from that pointer, make sure that it's within stack boundary
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
* and all elements of stack are initialized.
* Unlike most pointer bounds-checking functions, this one doesn't take an
* 'off' argument, so it has to add in reg->off itself.
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
*/
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
bpf, verifier: add ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK type When passing buffers from eBPF stack space into a helper function, we have ARG_PTR_TO_STACK argument type for helpers available. The verifier makes sure that such buffers are initialized, within boundaries, etc. However, the downside with this is that we have a couple of helper functions such as bpf_skb_load_bytes() that fill out the passed buffer in the expected success case anyway, so zero initializing them prior to the helper call is unneeded/wasted instructions in the eBPF program that can be avoided. Therefore, add a new helper function argument type called ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK. The idea is to skip the STACK_MISC check in check_stack_boundary() and color the related stack slots as STACK_MISC after we checked all call arguments. Helper functions using ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK must make sure that every path of the helper function will fill the provided buffer area, so that we cannot leak any uninitialized stack memory. This f.e. means that error paths need to memset() the buffers, but the expected fast-path doesn't have to do this anymore. Since there's no such helper needing more than at most one ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK argument, we can keep it simple and don't need to check for multiple areas. Should in future such a use-case really appear, we have check_raw_mode() that will make sure we implement support for it first. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-13 06:10:51 +08:00
int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,
struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
int off, i;
bpf: add new arg_type that allows for 0 sized stack buffer Currently, when we pass a buffer from the eBPF stack into a helper function, the function proto indicates argument types as ARG_PTR_TO_STACK and ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE pair. If R<X> contains the former, then R<X+1> must be of the latter type. Then, verifier checks whether the buffer points into eBPF stack, is initialized, etc. The verifier also guarantees that the constant value passed in R<X+1> is greater than 0, so helper functions don't need to test for it and can always assume a non-NULL initialized buffer as well as non-0 buffer size. This patch adds a new argument types ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO that allows to also pass NULL as R<X> and 0 as R<X+1> into the helper function. Such helper functions, of course, need to be able to handle these cases internally then. Verifier guarantees that either R<X> == NULL && R<X+1> == 0 or R<X> != NULL && R<X+1> != 0 (like the case of ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE), any other combinations are not possible to load. I went through various options of extending the verifier, and introducing the type ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO seems to have most minimal changes needed to the verifier. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-02-20 06:05:22 +08:00
if (regs[regno].type != PTR_TO_STACK) {
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
/* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */
bpf: add new arg_type that allows for 0 sized stack buffer Currently, when we pass a buffer from the eBPF stack into a helper function, the function proto indicates argument types as ARG_PTR_TO_STACK and ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE pair. If R<X> contains the former, then R<X+1> must be of the latter type. Then, verifier checks whether the buffer points into eBPF stack, is initialized, etc. The verifier also guarantees that the constant value passed in R<X+1> is greater than 0, so helper functions don't need to test for it and can always assume a non-NULL initialized buffer as well as non-0 buffer size. This patch adds a new argument types ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO that allows to also pass NULL as R<X> and 0 as R<X+1> into the helper function. Such helper functions, of course, need to be able to handle these cases internally then. Verifier guarantees that either R<X> == NULL && R<X+1> == 0 or R<X> != NULL && R<X+1> != 0 (like the case of ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE), any other combinations are not possible to load. I went through various options of extending the verifier, and introducing the type ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO seems to have most minimal changes needed to the verifier. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-02-20 06:05:22 +08:00
if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 &&
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
register_is_null(regs[regno]))
bpf: add new arg_type that allows for 0 sized stack buffer Currently, when we pass a buffer from the eBPF stack into a helper function, the function proto indicates argument types as ARG_PTR_TO_STACK and ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE pair. If R<X> contains the former, then R<X+1> must be of the latter type. Then, verifier checks whether the buffer points into eBPF stack, is initialized, etc. The verifier also guarantees that the constant value passed in R<X+1> is greater than 0, so helper functions don't need to test for it and can always assume a non-NULL initialized buffer as well as non-0 buffer size. This patch adds a new argument types ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO that allows to also pass NULL as R<X> and 0 as R<X+1> into the helper function. Such helper functions, of course, need to be able to handle these cases internally then. Verifier guarantees that either R<X> == NULL && R<X+1> == 0 or R<X> != NULL && R<X+1> != 0 (like the case of ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE), any other combinations are not possible to load. I went through various options of extending the verifier, and introducing the type ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO seems to have most minimal changes needed to the verifier. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-02-20 06:05:22 +08:00
return 0;
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno,
bpf: add new arg_type that allows for 0 sized stack buffer Currently, when we pass a buffer from the eBPF stack into a helper function, the function proto indicates argument types as ARG_PTR_TO_STACK and ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE pair. If R<X> contains the former, then R<X+1> must be of the latter type. Then, verifier checks whether the buffer points into eBPF stack, is initialized, etc. The verifier also guarantees that the constant value passed in R<X+1> is greater than 0, so helper functions don't need to test for it and can always assume a non-NULL initialized buffer as well as non-0 buffer size. This patch adds a new argument types ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO that allows to also pass NULL as R<X> and 0 as R<X+1> into the helper function. Such helper functions, of course, need to be able to handle these cases internally then. Verifier guarantees that either R<X> == NULL && R<X+1> == 0 or R<X> != NULL && R<X+1> != 0 (like the case of ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE), any other combinations are not possible to load. I went through various options of extending the verifier, and introducing the type ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO seems to have most minimal changes needed to the verifier. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-02-20 06:05:22 +08:00
reg_type_str[regs[regno].type],
reg_type_str[PTR_TO_STACK]);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EACCES;
bpf: add new arg_type that allows for 0 sized stack buffer Currently, when we pass a buffer from the eBPF stack into a helper function, the function proto indicates argument types as ARG_PTR_TO_STACK and ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE pair. If R<X> contains the former, then R<X+1> must be of the latter type. Then, verifier checks whether the buffer points into eBPF stack, is initialized, etc. The verifier also guarantees that the constant value passed in R<X+1> is greater than 0, so helper functions don't need to test for it and can always assume a non-NULL initialized buffer as well as non-0 buffer size. This patch adds a new argument types ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO that allows to also pass NULL as R<X> and 0 as R<X+1> into the helper function. Such helper functions, of course, need to be able to handle these cases internally then. Verifier guarantees that either R<X> == NULL && R<X+1> == 0 or R<X> != NULL && R<X+1> != 0 (like the case of ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE), any other combinations are not possible to load. I went through various options of extending the verifier, and introducing the type ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO seems to have most minimal changes needed to the verifier. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-02-20 06:05:22 +08:00
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
/* Only allow fixed-offset stack reads */
if (!tnum_is_const(regs[regno].var_off)) {
char tn_buf[48];
tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), regs[regno].var_off);
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "invalid variable stack read R%d var_off=%s\n",
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
regno, tn_buf);
}
off = regs[regno].off + regs[regno].var_off.value;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 ||
access_size <= 0) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n",
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
regno, off, access_size);
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: teach verifier to track stack depth teach verifier to track bpf program stack depth Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-31 04:31:29 +08:00
if (env->prog->aux->stack_depth < -off)
env->prog->aux->stack_depth = -off;
bpf, verifier: add ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK type When passing buffers from eBPF stack space into a helper function, we have ARG_PTR_TO_STACK argument type for helpers available. The verifier makes sure that such buffers are initialized, within boundaries, etc. However, the downside with this is that we have a couple of helper functions such as bpf_skb_load_bytes() that fill out the passed buffer in the expected success case anyway, so zero initializing them prior to the helper call is unneeded/wasted instructions in the eBPF program that can be avoided. Therefore, add a new helper function argument type called ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK. The idea is to skip the STACK_MISC check in check_stack_boundary() and color the related stack slots as STACK_MISC after we checked all call arguments. Helper functions using ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK must make sure that every path of the helper function will fill the provided buffer area, so that we cannot leak any uninitialized stack memory. This f.e. means that error paths need to memset() the buffers, but the expected fast-path doesn't have to do this anymore. Since there's no such helper needing more than at most one ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK argument, we can keep it simple and don't need to check for multiple areas. Should in future such a use-case really appear, we have check_raw_mode() that will make sure we implement support for it first. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-13 06:10:51 +08:00
if (meta && meta->raw_mode) {
meta->access_size = access_size;
meta->regno = regno;
return 0;
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
for (i = 0; i < access_size; i++) {
bpf: reduce verifier memory consumption verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack. registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track spilled register state. Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage. This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state) from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit. Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program, 1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn (since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers cleanup and rejects the program. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-29 06:11:41 +08:00
if (state->stack_slot_type[MAX_BPF_STACK + off + i] != STACK_MISC) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
off, i, access_size);
return -EACCES;
}
}
return 0;
}
bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory Currently, helpers that read and write from/to the stack can do so using a pair of arguments of type ARG_PTR_TO_STACK and ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE. ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE accepts a constant register of type CONST_IMM, so that the verifier can safely check the memory access. However, requiring the argument to be a constant can be limiting in some circumstances. Since the current logic keeps track of the minimum and maximum value of a register throughout the simulated execution, ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE can be changed to also accept an UNKNOWN_VALUE register in case its boundaries have been set and the range doesn't cause invalid memory accesses. One common situation when this is useful: int len; char buf[BUFSIZE]; /* BUFSIZE is 128 */ if (some_condition) len = 42; else len = 84; some_helper(..., buf, len & (BUFSIZE - 1)); The compiler can often decide to assign the constant values 42 or 48 into a variable on the stack, instead of keeping it in a register. When the variable is then read back from stack into the register in order to be passed to the helper, the verifier will not be able to recognize the register as constant (the verifier is not currently tracking all constant writes into memory), and the program won't be valid. However, by allowing the helper to accept an UNKNOWN_VALUE register, this program will work because the bitwise AND operation will set the range of possible values for the UNKNOWN_VALUE register to [0, BUFSIZE), so the verifier can guarantee the helper call will be safe (assuming the argument is of type ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO, otherwise one more check against 0 would be needed). Custom ranges can be set not only with ALU operations, but also by explicitly comparing the UNKNOWN_VALUE register with constants. Another very common example happens when intercepting system call arguments and accessing user-provided data of variable size using bpf_probe_read(). One can load at runtime the user-provided length in an UNKNOWN_VALUE register, and then read that exact amount of data up to a compile-time determined limit in order to fit into the proper local storage allocated on the stack, without having to guess a suboptimal access size at compile time. Also, in case the helpers accepting the UNKNOWN_VALUE register operate in raw mode, disable the raw mode so that the program is required to initialize all memory, since there is no guarantee the helper will fill it completely, leaving possibilities for data leak (just relevant when the memory used by the helper is the stack, not when using a pointer to map element value or packet). In other words, ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK will be treated as ARG_PTR_TO_STACK. Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-10 02:19:49 +08:00
static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,
struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
{
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs, *reg = &regs[regno];
bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory Currently, helpers that read and write from/to the stack can do so using a pair of arguments of type ARG_PTR_TO_STACK and ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE. ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE accepts a constant register of type CONST_IMM, so that the verifier can safely check the memory access. However, requiring the argument to be a constant can be limiting in some circumstances. Since the current logic keeps track of the minimum and maximum value of a register throughout the simulated execution, ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE can be changed to also accept an UNKNOWN_VALUE register in case its boundaries have been set and the range doesn't cause invalid memory accesses. One common situation when this is useful: int len; char buf[BUFSIZE]; /* BUFSIZE is 128 */ if (some_condition) len = 42; else len = 84; some_helper(..., buf, len & (BUFSIZE - 1)); The compiler can often decide to assign the constant values 42 or 48 into a variable on the stack, instead of keeping it in a register. When the variable is then read back from stack into the register in order to be passed to the helper, the verifier will not be able to recognize the register as constant (the verifier is not currently tracking all constant writes into memory), and the program won't be valid. However, by allowing the helper to accept an UNKNOWN_VALUE register, this program will work because the bitwise AND operation will set the range of possible values for the UNKNOWN_VALUE register to [0, BUFSIZE), so the verifier can guarantee the helper call will be safe (assuming the argument is of type ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO, otherwise one more check against 0 would be needed). Custom ranges can be set not only with ALU operations, but also by explicitly comparing the UNKNOWN_VALUE register with constants. Another very common example happens when intercepting system call arguments and accessing user-provided data of variable size using bpf_probe_read(). One can load at runtime the user-provided length in an UNKNOWN_VALUE register, and then read that exact amount of data up to a compile-time determined limit in order to fit into the proper local storage allocated on the stack, without having to guess a suboptimal access size at compile time. Also, in case the helpers accepting the UNKNOWN_VALUE register operate in raw mode, disable the raw mode so that the program is required to initialize all memory, since there is no guarantee the helper will fill it completely, leaving possibilities for data leak (just relevant when the memory used by the helper is the stack, not when using a pointer to map element value or packet). In other words, ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK will be treated as ARG_PTR_TO_STACK. Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-10 02:19:49 +08:00
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
switch (reg->type) {
bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory Currently, helpers that read and write from/to the stack can do so using a pair of arguments of type ARG_PTR_TO_STACK and ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE. ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE accepts a constant register of type CONST_IMM, so that the verifier can safely check the memory access. However, requiring the argument to be a constant can be limiting in some circumstances. Since the current logic keeps track of the minimum and maximum value of a register throughout the simulated execution, ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE can be changed to also accept an UNKNOWN_VALUE register in case its boundaries have been set and the range doesn't cause invalid memory accesses. One common situation when this is useful: int len; char buf[BUFSIZE]; /* BUFSIZE is 128 */ if (some_condition) len = 42; else len = 84; some_helper(..., buf, len & (BUFSIZE - 1)); The compiler can often decide to assign the constant values 42 or 48 into a variable on the stack, instead of keeping it in a register. When the variable is then read back from stack into the register in order to be passed to the helper, the verifier will not be able to recognize the register as constant (the verifier is not currently tracking all constant writes into memory), and the program won't be valid. However, by allowing the helper to accept an UNKNOWN_VALUE register, this program will work because the bitwise AND operation will set the range of possible values for the UNKNOWN_VALUE register to [0, BUFSIZE), so the verifier can guarantee the helper call will be safe (assuming the argument is of type ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO, otherwise one more check against 0 would be needed). Custom ranges can be set not only with ALU operations, but also by explicitly comparing the UNKNOWN_VALUE register with constants. Another very common example happens when intercepting system call arguments and accessing user-provided data of variable size using bpf_probe_read(). One can load at runtime the user-provided length in an UNKNOWN_VALUE register, and then read that exact amount of data up to a compile-time determined limit in order to fit into the proper local storage allocated on the stack, without having to guess a suboptimal access size at compile time. Also, in case the helpers accepting the UNKNOWN_VALUE register operate in raw mode, disable the raw mode so that the program is required to initialize all memory, since there is no guarantee the helper will fill it completely, leaving possibilities for data leak (just relevant when the memory used by the helper is the stack, not when using a pointer to map element value or packet). In other words, ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK will be treated as ARG_PTR_TO_STACK. Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-10 02:19:49 +08:00
case PTR_TO_PACKET:
bpf: add meta pointer for direct access This work enables generic transfer of metadata from XDP into skb. The basic idea is that we can make use of the fact that the resulting skb must be linear and already comes with a larger headroom for supporting bpf_xdp_adjust_head(), which mangles xdp->data. Here, we base our work on a similar principle and introduce a small helper bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() for adjusting a new pointer called xdp->data_meta. Thus, the packet has a flexible and programmable room for meta data, followed by the actual packet data. struct xdp_buff is therefore laid out that we first point to data_hard_start, then data_meta directly prepended to data followed by data_end marking the end of packet. bpf_xdp_adjust_head() takes into account whether we have meta data already prepended and if so, memmove()s this along with the given offset provided there's enough room. xdp->data_meta is optional and programs are not required to use it. The rationale is that when we process the packet in XDP (e.g. as DoS filter), we can push further meta data along with it for the XDP_PASS case, and give the guarantee that a clsact ingress BPF program on the same device can pick this up for further post-processing. Since we work with skb there, we can also set skb->mark, skb->priority or other skb meta data out of BPF, thus having this scratch space generic and programmable allows for more flexibility than defining a direct 1:1 transfer of potentially new XDP members into skb (it's also more efficient as we don't need to initialize/handle each of such new members). The facility also works together with GRO aggregation. The scratch space at the head of the packet can be multiple of 4 byte up to 32 byte large. Drivers not yet supporting xdp->data_meta can simply be set up with xdp->data_meta as xdp->data + 1 as bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() will detect this and bail out, such that the subsequent match against xdp->data for later access is guaranteed to fail. The verifier treats xdp->data_meta/xdp->data the same way as we treat xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons. The requirement for doing the compare against xdp->data is that it hasn't been modified from it's original address we got from ctx access. It may have a range marking already from prior successful xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons though. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-25 08:25:51 +08:00
case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
return check_packet_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size);
bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory Currently, helpers that read and write from/to the stack can do so using a pair of arguments of type ARG_PTR_TO_STACK and ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE. ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE accepts a constant register of type CONST_IMM, so that the verifier can safely check the memory access. However, requiring the argument to be a constant can be limiting in some circumstances. Since the current logic keeps track of the minimum and maximum value of a register throughout the simulated execution, ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE can be changed to also accept an UNKNOWN_VALUE register in case its boundaries have been set and the range doesn't cause invalid memory accesses. One common situation when this is useful: int len; char buf[BUFSIZE]; /* BUFSIZE is 128 */ if (some_condition) len = 42; else len = 84; some_helper(..., buf, len & (BUFSIZE - 1)); The compiler can often decide to assign the constant values 42 or 48 into a variable on the stack, instead of keeping it in a register. When the variable is then read back from stack into the register in order to be passed to the helper, the verifier will not be able to recognize the register as constant (the verifier is not currently tracking all constant writes into memory), and the program won't be valid. However, by allowing the helper to accept an UNKNOWN_VALUE register, this program will work because the bitwise AND operation will set the range of possible values for the UNKNOWN_VALUE register to [0, BUFSIZE), so the verifier can guarantee the helper call will be safe (assuming the argument is of type ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO, otherwise one more check against 0 would be needed). Custom ranges can be set not only with ALU operations, but also by explicitly comparing the UNKNOWN_VALUE register with constants. Another very common example happens when intercepting system call arguments and accessing user-provided data of variable size using bpf_probe_read(). One can load at runtime the user-provided length in an UNKNOWN_VALUE register, and then read that exact amount of data up to a compile-time determined limit in order to fit into the proper local storage allocated on the stack, without having to guess a suboptimal access size at compile time. Also, in case the helpers accepting the UNKNOWN_VALUE register operate in raw mode, disable the raw mode so that the program is required to initialize all memory, since there is no guarantee the helper will fill it completely, leaving possibilities for data leak (just relevant when the memory used by the helper is the stack, not when using a pointer to map element value or packet). In other words, ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK will be treated as ARG_PTR_TO_STACK. Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-10 02:19:49 +08:00
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
return check_map_access(env, regno, reg->off, access_size);
default: /* scalar_value|ptr_to_stack or invalid ptr */
bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory Currently, helpers that read and write from/to the stack can do so using a pair of arguments of type ARG_PTR_TO_STACK and ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE. ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE accepts a constant register of type CONST_IMM, so that the verifier can safely check the memory access. However, requiring the argument to be a constant can be limiting in some circumstances. Since the current logic keeps track of the minimum and maximum value of a register throughout the simulated execution, ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE can be changed to also accept an UNKNOWN_VALUE register in case its boundaries have been set and the range doesn't cause invalid memory accesses. One common situation when this is useful: int len; char buf[BUFSIZE]; /* BUFSIZE is 128 */ if (some_condition) len = 42; else len = 84; some_helper(..., buf, len & (BUFSIZE - 1)); The compiler can often decide to assign the constant values 42 or 48 into a variable on the stack, instead of keeping it in a register. When the variable is then read back from stack into the register in order to be passed to the helper, the verifier will not be able to recognize the register as constant (the verifier is not currently tracking all constant writes into memory), and the program won't be valid. However, by allowing the helper to accept an UNKNOWN_VALUE register, this program will work because the bitwise AND operation will set the range of possible values for the UNKNOWN_VALUE register to [0, BUFSIZE), so the verifier can guarantee the helper call will be safe (assuming the argument is of type ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO, otherwise one more check against 0 would be needed). Custom ranges can be set not only with ALU operations, but also by explicitly comparing the UNKNOWN_VALUE register with constants. Another very common example happens when intercepting system call arguments and accessing user-provided data of variable size using bpf_probe_read(). One can load at runtime the user-provided length in an UNKNOWN_VALUE register, and then read that exact amount of data up to a compile-time determined limit in order to fit into the proper local storage allocated on the stack, without having to guess a suboptimal access size at compile time. Also, in case the helpers accepting the UNKNOWN_VALUE register operate in raw mode, disable the raw mode so that the program is required to initialize all memory, since there is no guarantee the helper will fill it completely, leaving possibilities for data leak (just relevant when the memory used by the helper is the stack, not when using a pointer to map element value or packet). In other words, ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK will be treated as ARG_PTR_TO_STACK. Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-10 02:19:49 +08:00
return check_stack_boundary(env, regno, access_size,
zero_size_allowed, meta);
}
}
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
bpf, verifier: add bpf_call_arg_meta for passing meta data Currently, when the verifier checks calls in check_call() function, we call check_func_arg() for all 5 arguments e.g. to make sure expected types are correct. In some cases, we collect meta data (here: map pointer) to perform additional checks such as checking stack boundary on key/value sizes for subsequent arguments. As we're going to extend the meta data, add a generic struct bpf_call_arg_meta that we can use for passing into check_func_arg(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-13 06:10:50 +08:00
enum bpf_arg_type arg_type,
struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs, *reg = &regs[regno];
bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly The helper functions like bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, key) were only allowing 'key' to point to the initialized stack area. That is causing performance degradation when programs need to process millions of packets per second and need to copy contents of the packet into the stack just to pass the stack pointer into the lookup() function. Allow such helpers read from the packet directly. All helpers that expect ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, ARG_PTR_TO_STACK assume byte aligned pointer, so no alignment concerns, only need to check that helper will not be accessing beyond the packet range verified by the prior 'if (ptr < data_end)' condition. For now allow this feature for XDP programs only. Later it can be relaxed for the clsact programs as well. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-08-12 09:17:16 +08:00
enum bpf_reg_type expected_type, type = reg->type;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
int err = 0;
ebpf: verifier: check that call reg with ARG_ANYTHING is initialized I noticed that a helper function with argument type ARG_ANYTHING does not need to have an initialized value (register). This can worst case lead to unintented stack memory leakage in future helper functions if they are not carefully designed, or unintended application behaviour in case the application developer was not careful enough to match a correct helper function signature in the API. The underlying issue is that ARG_ANYTHING should actually be split into two different semantics: 1) ARG_DONTCARE for function arguments that the helper function does not care about (in other words: the default for unused function arguments), and 2) ARG_ANYTHING that is an argument actually being used by a helper function and *guaranteed* to be an initialized register. The current risk is low: ARG_ANYTHING is only used for the 'flags' argument (r4) in bpf_map_update_elem() that internally does strict checking. Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-13 00:21:42 +08:00
if (arg_type == ARG_DONTCARE)
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return 0;
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
err = check_reg_arg(env, regno, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:21 +08:00
if (arg_type == ARG_ANYTHING) {
if (is_pointer_value(env, regno)) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into helper function\n",
regno);
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:21 +08:00
return -EACCES;
}
ebpf: verifier: check that call reg with ARG_ANYTHING is initialized I noticed that a helper function with argument type ARG_ANYTHING does not need to have an initialized value (register). This can worst case lead to unintented stack memory leakage in future helper functions if they are not carefully designed, or unintended application behaviour in case the application developer was not careful enough to match a correct helper function signature in the API. The underlying issue is that ARG_ANYTHING should actually be split into two different semantics: 1) ARG_DONTCARE for function arguments that the helper function does not care about (in other words: the default for unused function arguments), and 2) ARG_ANYTHING that is an argument actually being used by a helper function and *guaranteed* to be an initialized register. The current risk is low: ARG_ANYTHING is only used for the 'flags' argument (r4) in bpf_map_update_elem() that internally does strict checking. Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-13 00:21:42 +08:00
return 0;
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:21 +08:00
}
ebpf: verifier: check that call reg with ARG_ANYTHING is initialized I noticed that a helper function with argument type ARG_ANYTHING does not need to have an initialized value (register). This can worst case lead to unintented stack memory leakage in future helper functions if they are not carefully designed, or unintended application behaviour in case the application developer was not careful enough to match a correct helper function signature in the API. The underlying issue is that ARG_ANYTHING should actually be split into two different semantics: 1) ARG_DONTCARE for function arguments that the helper function does not care about (in other words: the default for unused function arguments), and 2) ARG_ANYTHING that is an argument actually being used by a helper function and *guaranteed* to be an initialized register. The current risk is low: ARG_ANYTHING is only used for the 'flags' argument (r4) in bpf_map_update_elem() that internally does strict checking. Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-13 00:21:42 +08:00
bpf: add meta pointer for direct access This work enables generic transfer of metadata from XDP into skb. The basic idea is that we can make use of the fact that the resulting skb must be linear and already comes with a larger headroom for supporting bpf_xdp_adjust_head(), which mangles xdp->data. Here, we base our work on a similar principle and introduce a small helper bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() for adjusting a new pointer called xdp->data_meta. Thus, the packet has a flexible and programmable room for meta data, followed by the actual packet data. struct xdp_buff is therefore laid out that we first point to data_hard_start, then data_meta directly prepended to data followed by data_end marking the end of packet. bpf_xdp_adjust_head() takes into account whether we have meta data already prepended and if so, memmove()s this along with the given offset provided there's enough room. xdp->data_meta is optional and programs are not required to use it. The rationale is that when we process the packet in XDP (e.g. as DoS filter), we can push further meta data along with it for the XDP_PASS case, and give the guarantee that a clsact ingress BPF program on the same device can pick this up for further post-processing. Since we work with skb there, we can also set skb->mark, skb->priority or other skb meta data out of BPF, thus having this scratch space generic and programmable allows for more flexibility than defining a direct 1:1 transfer of potentially new XDP members into skb (it's also more efficient as we don't need to initialize/handle each of such new members). The facility also works together with GRO aggregation. The scratch space at the head of the packet can be multiple of 4 byte up to 32 byte large. Drivers not yet supporting xdp->data_meta can simply be set up with xdp->data_meta as xdp->data + 1 as bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() will detect this and bail out, such that the subsequent match against xdp->data for later access is guaranteed to fail. The verifier treats xdp->data_meta/xdp->data the same way as we treat xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons. The requirement for doing the compare against xdp->data is that it hasn't been modified from it's original address we got from ctx access. It may have a range marking already from prior successful xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons though. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-25 08:25:51 +08:00
if (type_is_pkt_pointer(type) &&
bpf: BPF for lightweight tunnel infrastructure Registers new BPF program types which correspond to the LWT hooks: - BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN => dst_input() - BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT => dst_output() - BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT => lwtunnel_xmit() The separate program types are required to differentiate between the capabilities each LWT hook allows: * Programs attached to dst_input() or dst_output() are restricted and may only read the data of an skb. This prevent modification and possible invalidation of already validated packet headers on receive and the construction of illegal headers while the IP headers are still being assembled. * Programs attached to lwtunnel_xmit() are allowed to modify packet content as well as prepending an L2 header via a newly introduced helper bpf_skb_change_head(). This is safe as lwtunnel_xmit() is invoked after the IP header has been assembled completely. All BPF programs receive an skb with L3 headers attached and may return one of the following error codes: BPF_OK - Continue routing as per nexthop BPF_DROP - Drop skb and return EPERM BPF_REDIRECT - Redirect skb to device as per redirect() helper. (Only valid in lwtunnel_xmit() context) The return codes are binary compatible with their TC_ACT_ relatives to ease compatibility. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-01 00:10:10 +08:00
!may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, meta, BPF_READ)) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "helper access to the packet is not allowed\n");
bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly The helper functions like bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, key) were only allowing 'key' to point to the initialized stack area. That is causing performance degradation when programs need to process millions of packets per second and need to copy contents of the packet into the stack just to pass the stack pointer into the lookup() function. Allow such helpers read from the packet directly. All helpers that expect ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, ARG_PTR_TO_STACK assume byte aligned pointer, so no alignment concerns, only need to check that helper will not be accessing beyond the packet range verified by the prior 'if (ptr < data_end)' condition. For now allow this feature for XDP programs only. Later it can be relaxed for the clsact programs as well. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-08-12 09:17:16 +08:00
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: add new arg_type that allows for 0 sized stack buffer Currently, when we pass a buffer from the eBPF stack into a helper function, the function proto indicates argument types as ARG_PTR_TO_STACK and ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE pair. If R<X> contains the former, then R<X+1> must be of the latter type. Then, verifier checks whether the buffer points into eBPF stack, is initialized, etc. The verifier also guarantees that the constant value passed in R<X+1> is greater than 0, so helper functions don't need to test for it and can always assume a non-NULL initialized buffer as well as non-0 buffer size. This patch adds a new argument types ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO that allows to also pass NULL as R<X> and 0 as R<X+1> into the helper function. Such helper functions, of course, need to be able to handle these cases internally then. Verifier guarantees that either R<X> == NULL && R<X+1> == 0 or R<X> != NULL && R<X+1> != 0 (like the case of ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE), any other combinations are not possible to load. I went through various options of extending the verifier, and introducing the type ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO seems to have most minimal changes needed to the verifier. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-02-20 06:05:22 +08:00
if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY ||
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
expected_type = PTR_TO_STACK;
bpf: add meta pointer for direct access This work enables generic transfer of metadata from XDP into skb. The basic idea is that we can make use of the fact that the resulting skb must be linear and already comes with a larger headroom for supporting bpf_xdp_adjust_head(), which mangles xdp->data. Here, we base our work on a similar principle and introduce a small helper bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() for adjusting a new pointer called xdp->data_meta. Thus, the packet has a flexible and programmable room for meta data, followed by the actual packet data. struct xdp_buff is therefore laid out that we first point to data_hard_start, then data_meta directly prepended to data followed by data_end marking the end of packet. bpf_xdp_adjust_head() takes into account whether we have meta data already prepended and if so, memmove()s this along with the given offset provided there's enough room. xdp->data_meta is optional and programs are not required to use it. The rationale is that when we process the packet in XDP (e.g. as DoS filter), we can push further meta data along with it for the XDP_PASS case, and give the guarantee that a clsact ingress BPF program on the same device can pick this up for further post-processing. Since we work with skb there, we can also set skb->mark, skb->priority or other skb meta data out of BPF, thus having this scratch space generic and programmable allows for more flexibility than defining a direct 1:1 transfer of potentially new XDP members into skb (it's also more efficient as we don't need to initialize/handle each of such new members). The facility also works together with GRO aggregation. The scratch space at the head of the packet can be multiple of 4 byte up to 32 byte large. Drivers not yet supporting xdp->data_meta can simply be set up with xdp->data_meta as xdp->data + 1 as bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() will detect this and bail out, such that the subsequent match against xdp->data for later access is guaranteed to fail. The verifier treats xdp->data_meta/xdp->data the same way as we treat xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons. The requirement for doing the compare against xdp->data is that it hasn't been modified from it's original address we got from ctx access. It may have a range marking already from prior successful xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons though. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-25 08:25:51 +08:00
if (!type_is_pkt_pointer(type) &&
type != expected_type)
bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly The helper functions like bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, key) were only allowing 'key' to point to the initialized stack area. That is causing performance degradation when programs need to process millions of packets per second and need to copy contents of the packet into the stack just to pass the stack pointer into the lookup() function. Allow such helpers read from the packet directly. All helpers that expect ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, ARG_PTR_TO_STACK assume byte aligned pointer, so no alignment concerns, only need to check that helper will not be accessing beyond the packet range verified by the prior 'if (ptr < data_end)' condition. For now allow this feature for XDP programs only. Later it can be relaxed for the clsact programs as well. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-08-12 09:17:16 +08:00
goto err_type;
bpf: rename ARG_PTR_TO_STACK since ARG_PTR_TO_STACK is no longer just pointer to stack rename it to ARG_PTR_TO_MEM and adjust comment. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-10 02:19:50 +08:00
} else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE ||
arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO) {
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
expected_type = SCALAR_VALUE;
if (type != expected_type)
bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly The helper functions like bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, key) were only allowing 'key' to point to the initialized stack area. That is causing performance degradation when programs need to process millions of packets per second and need to copy contents of the packet into the stack just to pass the stack pointer into the lookup() function. Allow such helpers read from the packet directly. All helpers that expect ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, ARG_PTR_TO_STACK assume byte aligned pointer, so no alignment concerns, only need to check that helper will not be accessing beyond the packet range verified by the prior 'if (ptr < data_end)' condition. For now allow this feature for XDP programs only. Later it can be relaxed for the clsact programs as well. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-08-12 09:17:16 +08:00
goto err_type;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
} else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR) {
expected_type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly The helper functions like bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, key) were only allowing 'key' to point to the initialized stack area. That is causing performance degradation when programs need to process millions of packets per second and need to copy contents of the packet into the stack just to pass the stack pointer into the lookup() function. Allow such helpers read from the packet directly. All helpers that expect ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, ARG_PTR_TO_STACK assume byte aligned pointer, so no alignment concerns, only need to check that helper will not be accessing beyond the packet range verified by the prior 'if (ptr < data_end)' condition. For now allow this feature for XDP programs only. Later it can be relaxed for the clsact programs as well. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-08-12 09:17:16 +08:00
if (type != expected_type)
goto err_type;
tc: bpf: generalize pedit action existing TC action 'pedit' can munge any bits of the packet. Generalize it for use in bpf programs attached as cls_bpf and act_bpf via bpf_skb_store_bytes() helper function. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-27 10:53:57 +08:00
} else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) {
expected_type = PTR_TO_CTX;
bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly The helper functions like bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, key) were only allowing 'key' to point to the initialized stack area. That is causing performance degradation when programs need to process millions of packets per second and need to copy contents of the packet into the stack just to pass the stack pointer into the lookup() function. Allow such helpers read from the packet directly. All helpers that expect ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, ARG_PTR_TO_STACK assume byte aligned pointer, so no alignment concerns, only need to check that helper will not be accessing beyond the packet range verified by the prior 'if (ptr < data_end)' condition. For now allow this feature for XDP programs only. Later it can be relaxed for the clsact programs as well. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-08-12 09:17:16 +08:00
if (type != expected_type)
goto err_type;
bpf: rename ARG_PTR_TO_STACK since ARG_PTR_TO_STACK is no longer just pointer to stack rename it to ARG_PTR_TO_MEM and adjust comment. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-10 02:19:50 +08:00
} else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM ||
arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) {
bpf: add new arg_type that allows for 0 sized stack buffer Currently, when we pass a buffer from the eBPF stack into a helper function, the function proto indicates argument types as ARG_PTR_TO_STACK and ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE pair. If R<X> contains the former, then R<X+1> must be of the latter type. Then, verifier checks whether the buffer points into eBPF stack, is initialized, etc. The verifier also guarantees that the constant value passed in R<X+1> is greater than 0, so helper functions don't need to test for it and can always assume a non-NULL initialized buffer as well as non-0 buffer size. This patch adds a new argument types ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO that allows to also pass NULL as R<X> and 0 as R<X+1> into the helper function. Such helper functions, of course, need to be able to handle these cases internally then. Verifier guarantees that either R<X> == NULL && R<X+1> == 0 or R<X> != NULL && R<X+1> != 0 (like the case of ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE), any other combinations are not possible to load. I went through various options of extending the verifier, and introducing the type ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO seems to have most minimal changes needed to the verifier. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-02-20 06:05:22 +08:00
expected_type = PTR_TO_STACK;
/* One exception here. In case function allows for NULL to be
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
* passed in as argument, it's a SCALAR_VALUE type. Final test
bpf: add new arg_type that allows for 0 sized stack buffer Currently, when we pass a buffer from the eBPF stack into a helper function, the function proto indicates argument types as ARG_PTR_TO_STACK and ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE pair. If R<X> contains the former, then R<X+1> must be of the latter type. Then, verifier checks whether the buffer points into eBPF stack, is initialized, etc. The verifier also guarantees that the constant value passed in R<X+1> is greater than 0, so helper functions don't need to test for it and can always assume a non-NULL initialized buffer as well as non-0 buffer size. This patch adds a new argument types ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO that allows to also pass NULL as R<X> and 0 as R<X+1> into the helper function. Such helper functions, of course, need to be able to handle these cases internally then. Verifier guarantees that either R<X> == NULL && R<X+1> == 0 or R<X> != NULL && R<X+1> != 0 (like the case of ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE), any other combinations are not possible to load. I went through various options of extending the verifier, and introducing the type ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO seems to have most minimal changes needed to the verifier. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-02-20 06:05:22 +08:00
* happens during stack boundary checking.
*/
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
if (register_is_null(*reg))
bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly The helper functions like bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, key) were only allowing 'key' to point to the initialized stack area. That is causing performance degradation when programs need to process millions of packets per second and need to copy contents of the packet into the stack just to pass the stack pointer into the lookup() function. Allow such helpers read from the packet directly. All helpers that expect ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, ARG_PTR_TO_STACK assume byte aligned pointer, so no alignment concerns, only need to check that helper will not be accessing beyond the packet range verified by the prior 'if (ptr < data_end)' condition. For now allow this feature for XDP programs only. Later it can be relaxed for the clsact programs as well. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-08-12 09:17:16 +08:00
/* final test in check_stack_boundary() */;
bpf: add meta pointer for direct access This work enables generic transfer of metadata from XDP into skb. The basic idea is that we can make use of the fact that the resulting skb must be linear and already comes with a larger headroom for supporting bpf_xdp_adjust_head(), which mangles xdp->data. Here, we base our work on a similar principle and introduce a small helper bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() for adjusting a new pointer called xdp->data_meta. Thus, the packet has a flexible and programmable room for meta data, followed by the actual packet data. struct xdp_buff is therefore laid out that we first point to data_hard_start, then data_meta directly prepended to data followed by data_end marking the end of packet. bpf_xdp_adjust_head() takes into account whether we have meta data already prepended and if so, memmove()s this along with the given offset provided there's enough room. xdp->data_meta is optional and programs are not required to use it. The rationale is that when we process the packet in XDP (e.g. as DoS filter), we can push further meta data along with it for the XDP_PASS case, and give the guarantee that a clsact ingress BPF program on the same device can pick this up for further post-processing. Since we work with skb there, we can also set skb->mark, skb->priority or other skb meta data out of BPF, thus having this scratch space generic and programmable allows for more flexibility than defining a direct 1:1 transfer of potentially new XDP members into skb (it's also more efficient as we don't need to initialize/handle each of such new members). The facility also works together with GRO aggregation. The scratch space at the head of the packet can be multiple of 4 byte up to 32 byte large. Drivers not yet supporting xdp->data_meta can simply be set up with xdp->data_meta as xdp->data + 1 as bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() will detect this and bail out, such that the subsequent match against xdp->data for later access is guaranteed to fail. The verifier treats xdp->data_meta/xdp->data the same way as we treat xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons. The requirement for doing the compare against xdp->data is that it hasn't been modified from it's original address we got from ctx access. It may have a range marking already from prior successful xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons though. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-25 08:25:51 +08:00
else if (!type_is_pkt_pointer(type) &&
type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE &&
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
type != expected_type)
bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly The helper functions like bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, key) were only allowing 'key' to point to the initialized stack area. That is causing performance degradation when programs need to process millions of packets per second and need to copy contents of the packet into the stack just to pass the stack pointer into the lookup() function. Allow such helpers read from the packet directly. All helpers that expect ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, ARG_PTR_TO_STACK assume byte aligned pointer, so no alignment concerns, only need to check that helper will not be accessing beyond the packet range verified by the prior 'if (ptr < data_end)' condition. For now allow this feature for XDP programs only. Later it can be relaxed for the clsact programs as well. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-08-12 09:17:16 +08:00
goto err_type;
bpf: rename ARG_PTR_TO_STACK since ARG_PTR_TO_STACK is no longer just pointer to stack rename it to ARG_PTR_TO_MEM and adjust comment. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-10 02:19:50 +08:00
meta->raw_mode = arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
} else {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "unsupported arg_type %d\n", arg_type);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EFAULT;
}
if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR) {
/* bpf_map_xxx(map_ptr) call: remember that map_ptr */
bpf, verifier: add bpf_call_arg_meta for passing meta data Currently, when the verifier checks calls in check_call() function, we call check_func_arg() for all 5 arguments e.g. to make sure expected types are correct. In some cases, we collect meta data (here: map pointer) to perform additional checks such as checking stack boundary on key/value sizes for subsequent arguments. As we're going to extend the meta data, add a generic struct bpf_call_arg_meta that we can use for passing into check_func_arg(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-13 06:10:50 +08:00
meta->map_ptr = reg->map_ptr;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
} else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY) {
/* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., key) call:
* check that [key, key + map->key_size) are within
* stack limits and initialized
*/
bpf, verifier: add bpf_call_arg_meta for passing meta data Currently, when the verifier checks calls in check_call() function, we call check_func_arg() for all 5 arguments e.g. to make sure expected types are correct. In some cases, we collect meta data (here: map pointer) to perform additional checks such as checking stack boundary on key/value sizes for subsequent arguments. As we're going to extend the meta data, add a generic struct bpf_call_arg_meta that we can use for passing into check_func_arg(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-13 06:10:50 +08:00
if (!meta->map_ptr) {
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
/* in function declaration map_ptr must come before
* map_key, so that it's verified and known before
* we have to check map_key here. Otherwise it means
* that kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier
*/
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->key\n");
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: add meta pointer for direct access This work enables generic transfer of metadata from XDP into skb. The basic idea is that we can make use of the fact that the resulting skb must be linear and already comes with a larger headroom for supporting bpf_xdp_adjust_head(), which mangles xdp->data. Here, we base our work on a similar principle and introduce a small helper bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() for adjusting a new pointer called xdp->data_meta. Thus, the packet has a flexible and programmable room for meta data, followed by the actual packet data. struct xdp_buff is therefore laid out that we first point to data_hard_start, then data_meta directly prepended to data followed by data_end marking the end of packet. bpf_xdp_adjust_head() takes into account whether we have meta data already prepended and if so, memmove()s this along with the given offset provided there's enough room. xdp->data_meta is optional and programs are not required to use it. The rationale is that when we process the packet in XDP (e.g. as DoS filter), we can push further meta data along with it for the XDP_PASS case, and give the guarantee that a clsact ingress BPF program on the same device can pick this up for further post-processing. Since we work with skb there, we can also set skb->mark, skb->priority or other skb meta data out of BPF, thus having this scratch space generic and programmable allows for more flexibility than defining a direct 1:1 transfer of potentially new XDP members into skb (it's also more efficient as we don't need to initialize/handle each of such new members). The facility also works together with GRO aggregation. The scratch space at the head of the packet can be multiple of 4 byte up to 32 byte large. Drivers not yet supporting xdp->data_meta can simply be set up with xdp->data_meta as xdp->data + 1 as bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() will detect this and bail out, such that the subsequent match against xdp->data for later access is guaranteed to fail. The verifier treats xdp->data_meta/xdp->data the same way as we treat xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons. The requirement for doing the compare against xdp->data is that it hasn't been modified from it's original address we got from ctx access. It may have a range marking already from prior successful xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons though. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-25 08:25:51 +08:00
if (type_is_pkt_pointer(type))
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
err = check_packet_access(env, regno, reg->off,
bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly The helper functions like bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, key) were only allowing 'key' to point to the initialized stack area. That is causing performance degradation when programs need to process millions of packets per second and need to copy contents of the packet into the stack just to pass the stack pointer into the lookup() function. Allow such helpers read from the packet directly. All helpers that expect ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, ARG_PTR_TO_STACK assume byte aligned pointer, so no alignment concerns, only need to check that helper will not be accessing beyond the packet range verified by the prior 'if (ptr < data_end)' condition. For now allow this feature for XDP programs only. Later it can be relaxed for the clsact programs as well. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-08-12 09:17:16 +08:00
meta->map_ptr->key_size);
else
err = check_stack_boundary(env, regno,
meta->map_ptr->key_size,
false, NULL);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
} else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
/* bpf_map_xxx(..., map_ptr, ..., value) call:
* check [value, value + map->value_size) validity
*/
bpf, verifier: add bpf_call_arg_meta for passing meta data Currently, when the verifier checks calls in check_call() function, we call check_func_arg() for all 5 arguments e.g. to make sure expected types are correct. In some cases, we collect meta data (here: map pointer) to perform additional checks such as checking stack boundary on key/value sizes for subsequent arguments. As we're going to extend the meta data, add a generic struct bpf_call_arg_meta that we can use for passing into check_func_arg(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-13 06:10:50 +08:00
if (!meta->map_ptr) {
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
/* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->value\n");
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: add meta pointer for direct access This work enables generic transfer of metadata from XDP into skb. The basic idea is that we can make use of the fact that the resulting skb must be linear and already comes with a larger headroom for supporting bpf_xdp_adjust_head(), which mangles xdp->data. Here, we base our work on a similar principle and introduce a small helper bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() for adjusting a new pointer called xdp->data_meta. Thus, the packet has a flexible and programmable room for meta data, followed by the actual packet data. struct xdp_buff is therefore laid out that we first point to data_hard_start, then data_meta directly prepended to data followed by data_end marking the end of packet. bpf_xdp_adjust_head() takes into account whether we have meta data already prepended and if so, memmove()s this along with the given offset provided there's enough room. xdp->data_meta is optional and programs are not required to use it. The rationale is that when we process the packet in XDP (e.g. as DoS filter), we can push further meta data along with it for the XDP_PASS case, and give the guarantee that a clsact ingress BPF program on the same device can pick this up for further post-processing. Since we work with skb there, we can also set skb->mark, skb->priority or other skb meta data out of BPF, thus having this scratch space generic and programmable allows for more flexibility than defining a direct 1:1 transfer of potentially new XDP members into skb (it's also more efficient as we don't need to initialize/handle each of such new members). The facility also works together with GRO aggregation. The scratch space at the head of the packet can be multiple of 4 byte up to 32 byte large. Drivers not yet supporting xdp->data_meta can simply be set up with xdp->data_meta as xdp->data + 1 as bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() will detect this and bail out, such that the subsequent match against xdp->data for later access is guaranteed to fail. The verifier treats xdp->data_meta/xdp->data the same way as we treat xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons. The requirement for doing the compare against xdp->data is that it hasn't been modified from it's original address we got from ctx access. It may have a range marking already from prior successful xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons though. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-25 08:25:51 +08:00
if (type_is_pkt_pointer(type))
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
err = check_packet_access(env, regno, reg->off,
bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly The helper functions like bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, key) were only allowing 'key' to point to the initialized stack area. That is causing performance degradation when programs need to process millions of packets per second and need to copy contents of the packet into the stack just to pass the stack pointer into the lookup() function. Allow such helpers read from the packet directly. All helpers that expect ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, ARG_PTR_TO_STACK assume byte aligned pointer, so no alignment concerns, only need to check that helper will not be accessing beyond the packet range verified by the prior 'if (ptr < data_end)' condition. For now allow this feature for XDP programs only. Later it can be relaxed for the clsact programs as well. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-08-12 09:17:16 +08:00
meta->map_ptr->value_size);
else
err = check_stack_boundary(env, regno,
meta->map_ptr->value_size,
false, NULL);
bpf: rename ARG_PTR_TO_STACK since ARG_PTR_TO_STACK is no longer just pointer to stack rename it to ARG_PTR_TO_MEM and adjust comment. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-10 02:19:50 +08:00
} else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE ||
arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO) {
bool zero_size_allowed = (arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
/* bpf_xxx(..., buf, len) call will access 'len' bytes
* from stack pointer 'buf'. Check it
* note: regno == len, regno - 1 == buf
*/
if (regno == 0) {
/* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env,
"ARG_CONST_SIZE cannot be first argument\n");
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory Currently, helpers that read and write from/to the stack can do so using a pair of arguments of type ARG_PTR_TO_STACK and ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE. ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE accepts a constant register of type CONST_IMM, so that the verifier can safely check the memory access. However, requiring the argument to be a constant can be limiting in some circumstances. Since the current logic keeps track of the minimum and maximum value of a register throughout the simulated execution, ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE can be changed to also accept an UNKNOWN_VALUE register in case its boundaries have been set and the range doesn't cause invalid memory accesses. One common situation when this is useful: int len; char buf[BUFSIZE]; /* BUFSIZE is 128 */ if (some_condition) len = 42; else len = 84; some_helper(..., buf, len & (BUFSIZE - 1)); The compiler can often decide to assign the constant values 42 or 48 into a variable on the stack, instead of keeping it in a register. When the variable is then read back from stack into the register in order to be passed to the helper, the verifier will not be able to recognize the register as constant (the verifier is not currently tracking all constant writes into memory), and the program won't be valid. However, by allowing the helper to accept an UNKNOWN_VALUE register, this program will work because the bitwise AND operation will set the range of possible values for the UNKNOWN_VALUE register to [0, BUFSIZE), so the verifier can guarantee the helper call will be safe (assuming the argument is of type ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO, otherwise one more check against 0 would be needed). Custom ranges can be set not only with ALU operations, but also by explicitly comparing the UNKNOWN_VALUE register with constants. Another very common example happens when intercepting system call arguments and accessing user-provided data of variable size using bpf_probe_read(). One can load at runtime the user-provided length in an UNKNOWN_VALUE register, and then read that exact amount of data up to a compile-time determined limit in order to fit into the proper local storage allocated on the stack, without having to guess a suboptimal access size at compile time. Also, in case the helpers accepting the UNKNOWN_VALUE register operate in raw mode, disable the raw mode so that the program is required to initialize all memory, since there is no guarantee the helper will fill it completely, leaving possibilities for data leak (just relevant when the memory used by the helper is the stack, not when using a pointer to map element value or packet). In other words, ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK will be treated as ARG_PTR_TO_STACK. Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-10 02:19:49 +08:00
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
/* The register is SCALAR_VALUE; the access check
* happens using its boundaries.
bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory Currently, helpers that read and write from/to the stack can do so using a pair of arguments of type ARG_PTR_TO_STACK and ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE. ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE accepts a constant register of type CONST_IMM, so that the verifier can safely check the memory access. However, requiring the argument to be a constant can be limiting in some circumstances. Since the current logic keeps track of the minimum and maximum value of a register throughout the simulated execution, ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE can be changed to also accept an UNKNOWN_VALUE register in case its boundaries have been set and the range doesn't cause invalid memory accesses. One common situation when this is useful: int len; char buf[BUFSIZE]; /* BUFSIZE is 128 */ if (some_condition) len = 42; else len = 84; some_helper(..., buf, len & (BUFSIZE - 1)); The compiler can often decide to assign the constant values 42 or 48 into a variable on the stack, instead of keeping it in a register. When the variable is then read back from stack into the register in order to be passed to the helper, the verifier will not be able to recognize the register as constant (the verifier is not currently tracking all constant writes into memory), and the program won't be valid. However, by allowing the helper to accept an UNKNOWN_VALUE register, this program will work because the bitwise AND operation will set the range of possible values for the UNKNOWN_VALUE register to [0, BUFSIZE), so the verifier can guarantee the helper call will be safe (assuming the argument is of type ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO, otherwise one more check against 0 would be needed). Custom ranges can be set not only with ALU operations, but also by explicitly comparing the UNKNOWN_VALUE register with constants. Another very common example happens when intercepting system call arguments and accessing user-provided data of variable size using bpf_probe_read(). One can load at runtime the user-provided length in an UNKNOWN_VALUE register, and then read that exact amount of data up to a compile-time determined limit in order to fit into the proper local storage allocated on the stack, without having to guess a suboptimal access size at compile time. Also, in case the helpers accepting the UNKNOWN_VALUE register operate in raw mode, disable the raw mode so that the program is required to initialize all memory, since there is no guarantee the helper will fill it completely, leaving possibilities for data leak (just relevant when the memory used by the helper is the stack, not when using a pointer to map element value or packet). In other words, ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK will be treated as ARG_PTR_TO_STACK. Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-10 02:19:49 +08:00
*/
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off))
bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory Currently, helpers that read and write from/to the stack can do so using a pair of arguments of type ARG_PTR_TO_STACK and ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE. ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE accepts a constant register of type CONST_IMM, so that the verifier can safely check the memory access. However, requiring the argument to be a constant can be limiting in some circumstances. Since the current logic keeps track of the minimum and maximum value of a register throughout the simulated execution, ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE can be changed to also accept an UNKNOWN_VALUE register in case its boundaries have been set and the range doesn't cause invalid memory accesses. One common situation when this is useful: int len; char buf[BUFSIZE]; /* BUFSIZE is 128 */ if (some_condition) len = 42; else len = 84; some_helper(..., buf, len & (BUFSIZE - 1)); The compiler can often decide to assign the constant values 42 or 48 into a variable on the stack, instead of keeping it in a register. When the variable is then read back from stack into the register in order to be passed to the helper, the verifier will not be able to recognize the register as constant (the verifier is not currently tracking all constant writes into memory), and the program won't be valid. However, by allowing the helper to accept an UNKNOWN_VALUE register, this program will work because the bitwise AND operation will set the range of possible values for the UNKNOWN_VALUE register to [0, BUFSIZE), so the verifier can guarantee the helper call will be safe (assuming the argument is of type ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO, otherwise one more check against 0 would be needed). Custom ranges can be set not only with ALU operations, but also by explicitly comparing the UNKNOWN_VALUE register with constants. Another very common example happens when intercepting system call arguments and accessing user-provided data of variable size using bpf_probe_read(). One can load at runtime the user-provided length in an UNKNOWN_VALUE register, and then read that exact amount of data up to a compile-time determined limit in order to fit into the proper local storage allocated on the stack, without having to guess a suboptimal access size at compile time. Also, in case the helpers accepting the UNKNOWN_VALUE register operate in raw mode, disable the raw mode so that the program is required to initialize all memory, since there is no guarantee the helper will fill it completely, leaving possibilities for data leak (just relevant when the memory used by the helper is the stack, not when using a pointer to map element value or packet). In other words, ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK will be treated as ARG_PTR_TO_STACK. Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-10 02:19:49 +08:00
/* For unprivileged variable accesses, disable raw
* mode so that the program is required to
* initialize all the memory that the helper could
* just partially fill up.
*/
meta = NULL;
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
if (reg->smin_value < 0) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned or 'var &= const'\n",
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
regno);
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory Currently, helpers that read and write from/to the stack can do so using a pair of arguments of type ARG_PTR_TO_STACK and ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE. ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE accepts a constant register of type CONST_IMM, so that the verifier can safely check the memory access. However, requiring the argument to be a constant can be limiting in some circumstances. Since the current logic keeps track of the minimum and maximum value of a register throughout the simulated execution, ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE can be changed to also accept an UNKNOWN_VALUE register in case its boundaries have been set and the range doesn't cause invalid memory accesses. One common situation when this is useful: int len; char buf[BUFSIZE]; /* BUFSIZE is 128 */ if (some_condition) len = 42; else len = 84; some_helper(..., buf, len & (BUFSIZE - 1)); The compiler can often decide to assign the constant values 42 or 48 into a variable on the stack, instead of keeping it in a register. When the variable is then read back from stack into the register in order to be passed to the helper, the verifier will not be able to recognize the register as constant (the verifier is not currently tracking all constant writes into memory), and the program won't be valid. However, by allowing the helper to accept an UNKNOWN_VALUE register, this program will work because the bitwise AND operation will set the range of possible values for the UNKNOWN_VALUE register to [0, BUFSIZE), so the verifier can guarantee the helper call will be safe (assuming the argument is of type ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO, otherwise one more check against 0 would be needed). Custom ranges can be set not only with ALU operations, but also by explicitly comparing the UNKNOWN_VALUE register with constants. Another very common example happens when intercepting system call arguments and accessing user-provided data of variable size using bpf_probe_read(). One can load at runtime the user-provided length in an UNKNOWN_VALUE register, and then read that exact amount of data up to a compile-time determined limit in order to fit into the proper local storage allocated on the stack, without having to guess a suboptimal access size at compile time. Also, in case the helpers accepting the UNKNOWN_VALUE register operate in raw mode, disable the raw mode so that the program is required to initialize all memory, since there is no guarantee the helper will fill it completely, leaving possibilities for data leak (just relevant when the memory used by the helper is the stack, not when using a pointer to map element value or packet). In other words, ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK will be treated as ARG_PTR_TO_STACK. Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-10 02:19:49 +08:00
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
if (reg->umin_value == 0) {
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, 0,
zero_size_allowed,
meta);
bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory Currently, helpers that read and write from/to the stack can do so using a pair of arguments of type ARG_PTR_TO_STACK and ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE. ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE accepts a constant register of type CONST_IMM, so that the verifier can safely check the memory access. However, requiring the argument to be a constant can be limiting in some circumstances. Since the current logic keeps track of the minimum and maximum value of a register throughout the simulated execution, ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE can be changed to also accept an UNKNOWN_VALUE register in case its boundaries have been set and the range doesn't cause invalid memory accesses. One common situation when this is useful: int len; char buf[BUFSIZE]; /* BUFSIZE is 128 */ if (some_condition) len = 42; else len = 84; some_helper(..., buf, len & (BUFSIZE - 1)); The compiler can often decide to assign the constant values 42 or 48 into a variable on the stack, instead of keeping it in a register. When the variable is then read back from stack into the register in order to be passed to the helper, the verifier will not be able to recognize the register as constant (the verifier is not currently tracking all constant writes into memory), and the program won't be valid. However, by allowing the helper to accept an UNKNOWN_VALUE register, this program will work because the bitwise AND operation will set the range of possible values for the UNKNOWN_VALUE register to [0, BUFSIZE), so the verifier can guarantee the helper call will be safe (assuming the argument is of type ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO, otherwise one more check against 0 would be needed). Custom ranges can be set not only with ALU operations, but also by explicitly comparing the UNKNOWN_VALUE register with constants. Another very common example happens when intercepting system call arguments and accessing user-provided data of variable size using bpf_probe_read(). One can load at runtime the user-provided length in an UNKNOWN_VALUE register, and then read that exact amount of data up to a compile-time determined limit in order to fit into the proper local storage allocated on the stack, without having to guess a suboptimal access size at compile time. Also, in case the helpers accepting the UNKNOWN_VALUE register operate in raw mode, disable the raw mode so that the program is required to initialize all memory, since there is no guarantee the helper will fill it completely, leaving possibilities for data leak (just relevant when the memory used by the helper is the stack, not when using a pointer to map element value or packet). In other words, ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK will be treated as ARG_PTR_TO_STACK. Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-10 02:19:49 +08:00
if (err)
return err;
}
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, use 'var &= const' or 'if (var < const)'\n",
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
regno);
return -EACCES;
}
err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1,
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
reg->umax_value,
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
zero_size_allowed, meta);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
}
return err;
bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly The helper functions like bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, key) were only allowing 'key' to point to the initialized stack area. That is causing performance degradation when programs need to process millions of packets per second and need to copy contents of the packet into the stack just to pass the stack pointer into the lookup() function. Allow such helpers read from the packet directly. All helpers that expect ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, ARG_PTR_TO_STACK assume byte aligned pointer, so no alignment concerns, only need to check that helper will not be accessing beyond the packet range verified by the prior 'if (ptr < data_end)' condition. For now allow this feature for XDP programs only. Later it can be relaxed for the clsact programs as well. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-08-12 09:17:16 +08:00
err_type:
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno,
bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly The helper functions like bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, key) were only allowing 'key' to point to the initialized stack area. That is causing performance degradation when programs need to process millions of packets per second and need to copy contents of the packet into the stack just to pass the stack pointer into the lookup() function. Allow such helpers read from the packet directly. All helpers that expect ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, ARG_PTR_TO_STACK assume byte aligned pointer, so no alignment concerns, only need to check that helper will not be accessing beyond the packet range verified by the prior 'if (ptr < data_end)' condition. For now allow this feature for XDP programs only. Later it can be relaxed for the clsact programs as well. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-08-12 09:17:16 +08:00
reg_type_str[type], reg_type_str[expected_type]);
return -EACCES;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
}
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_map *map, int func_id)
bpf: Implement function bpf_perf_event_read() that get the selected hardware PMU conuter According to the perf_event_map_fd and index, the function bpf_perf_event_read() can convert the corresponding map value to the pointer to struct perf_event and return the Hardware PMU counter value. Signed-off-by: Kaixu Xia <xiakaixu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-08-06 15:02:35 +08:00
{
if (!map)
return 0;
bpf: fix check_map_func_compatibility logic The commit 35578d798400 ("bpf: Implement function bpf_perf_event_read() that get the selected hardware PMU conuter") introduced clever way to check bpf_helper<->map_type compatibility. Later on commit a43eec304259 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper") adjusted the logic and inadvertently broke it. Get rid of the clever bool compare and go back to two-way check from map and from helper perspective. Fixes: a43eec304259 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-28 09:56:21 +08:00
/* We need a two way check, first is from map perspective ... */
switch (map->map_type) {
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY:
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY:
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read &&
bpf: add helper bpf_perf_event_read_value for perf event array map Hardware pmu counters are limited resources. When there are more pmu based perf events opened than available counters, kernel will multiplex these events so each event gets certain percentage (but not 100%) of the pmu time. In case that multiplexing happens, the number of samples or counter value will not reflect the case compared to no multiplexing. This makes comparison between different runs difficult. Typically, the number of samples or counter value should be normalized before comparing to other experiments. The typical normalization is done like: normalized_num_samples = num_samples * time_enabled / time_running normalized_counter_value = counter_value * time_enabled / time_running where time_enabled is the time enabled for event and time_running is the time running for event since last normalization. This patch adds helper bpf_perf_event_read_value for kprobed based perf event array map, to read perf counter and enabled/running time. The enabled/running time is accumulated since the perf event open. To achieve scaling factor between two bpf invocations, users can can use cpu_id as the key (which is typical for perf array usage model) to remember the previous value and do the calculation inside the bpf program. Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@fb.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-06 00:19:20 +08:00
func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output &&
func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value)
bpf: fix check_map_func_compatibility logic The commit 35578d798400 ("bpf: Implement function bpf_perf_event_read() that get the selected hardware PMU conuter") introduced clever way to check bpf_helper<->map_type compatibility. Later on commit a43eec304259 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper") adjusted the logic and inadvertently broke it. Get rid of the clever bool compare and go back to two-way check from map and from helper perspective. Fixes: a43eec304259 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-28 09:56:21 +08:00
goto error;
break;
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE:
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stackid)
goto error;
break;
cgroup: bpf: Add BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY Add a BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY and its bpf_map_ops's implementations. To update an element, the caller is expected to obtain a cgroup2 backed fd by open(cgroup2_dir) and then update the array with that fd. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@fb.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-07-01 01:28:43 +08:00
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY:
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net Minor overlapping changes for both merge conflicts. Resolution work done by Stephen Rothwell was used as a reference. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-08-18 13:17:32 +08:00
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup &&
bpf: Add bpf_current_task_under_cgroup helper This adds a bpf helper that's similar to the skb_in_cgroup helper to check whether the probe is currently executing in the context of a specific subset of the cgroupsv2 hierarchy. It does this based on membership test for a cgroup arraymap. It is invalid to call this in an interrupt, and it'll return an error. The helper is primarily to be used in debugging activities for containers, where you may have multiple programs running in a given top-level "container". Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-08-12 23:56:52 +08:00
func_id != BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup)
cgroup: bpf: Add bpf_skb_in_cgroup_proto Adds a bpf helper, bpf_skb_in_cgroup, to decide if a skb->sk belongs to a descendant of a cgroup2. It is similar to the feature added in netfilter: commit c38c4597e4bf ("netfilter: implement xt_cgroup cgroup2 path match") The user is expected to populate a BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY which will be used by the bpf_skb_in_cgroup. Modifications to the bpf verifier is to ensure BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY and bpf_skb_in_cgroup() are always used together. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@fb.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-07-01 01:28:44 +08:00
goto error;
break;
bpf: add devmap, a map for storing net device references Device map (devmap) is a BPF map, primarily useful for networking applications, that uses a key to lookup a reference to a netdevice. The map provides a clean way for BPF programs to build virtual port to physical port maps. Additionally, it provides a scoping function for the redirect action itself allowing multiple optimizations. Future patches will leverage the map to provide batching at the XDP layer. Another optimization/feature, that is not yet implemented, would be to support multiple netdevices per key to support efficient multicast and broadcast support. Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-18 00:28:56 +08:00
/* devmap returns a pointer to a live net_device ifindex that we cannot
* allow to be modified from bpf side. So do not allow lookup elements
* for now.
*/
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP:
net: add notifier hooks for devmap bpf map The BPF map devmap holds a refcnt on the net_device structure when it is in the map. We need to do this to ensure on driver unload we don't lose a dev reference. However, its not very convenient to have to manually unload the map when destroying a net device so add notifier handlers to do the cleanup automatically. But this creates a race between update/destroy BPF syscall and programs and the unregister netdev hook. Unfortunately, the best I could come up with is either to live with requiring manual removal of net devices from the map before removing the net device OR to add a mutex in devmap to ensure the map is not modified while we are removing a device. The fallout also requires that BPF programs no longer update/delete the map from the BPF program side because the mutex may sleep and this can not be done from inside an rcu critical section. This is not a real problem though because I have not come up with any use cases where this is actually useful in practice. If/when we come up with a compelling user for this we may need to revisit this. Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-18 00:30:02 +08:00
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map)
bpf: add devmap, a map for storing net device references Device map (devmap) is a BPF map, primarily useful for networking applications, that uses a key to lookup a reference to a netdevice. The map provides a clean way for BPF programs to build virtual port to physical port maps. Additionally, it provides a scoping function for the redirect action itself allowing multiple optimizations. Future patches will leverage the map to provide batching at the XDP layer. Another optimization/feature, that is not yet implemented, would be to support multiple netdevices per key to support efficient multicast and broadcast support. Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-18 00:28:56 +08:00
goto error;
break;
bpf: Add array of maps support This patch adds a few helper funcs to enable map-in-map support (i.e. outer_map->inner_map). The first outer_map type BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS is also added in this patch. The next patch will introduce a hash of maps type. Any bpf map type can be acted as an inner_map. The exception is BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY because the extra level of indirection makes it harder to verify the owner_prog_type and owner_jited. Multi-level map-in-map is not supported (i.e. map->map is ok but not map->map->map). When adding an inner_map to an outer_map, it currently checks the map_type, key_size, value_size, map_flags, max_entries and ops. The verifier also uses those map's properties to do static analysis. map_flags is needed because we need to ensure BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT is using a preallocated hashtab for the inner_hash also. ops and max_entries are needed to generate inlined map-lookup instructions. For simplicity reason, a simple '==' test is used for both map_flags and max_entries. The equality of ops is implied by the equality of map_type. During outer_map creation time, an inner_map_fd is needed to create an outer_map. However, the inner_map_fd's life time does not depend on the outer_map. The inner_map_fd is merely used to initialize the inner_map_meta of the outer_map. Also, for the outer_map: * It allows element update and delete from syscall * It allows element lookup from bpf_prog The above is similar to the current fd_array pattern. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-23 01:00:33 +08:00
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS:
bpf: Add hash of maps support This patch adds hash of maps support (hashmap->bpf_map). BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS is added. A map-in-map contains a pointer to another map and lets call this pointer 'inner_map_ptr'. Notes on deleting inner_map_ptr from a hash map: 1. For BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC map-in-map, when deleting an inner_map_ptr, the htab_elem itself will go through a rcu grace period and the inner_map_ptr resides in the htab_elem. 2. For pre-allocated htab_elem (!BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC), when deleting an inner_map_ptr, the htab_elem may get reused immediately. This situation is similar to the existing prealloc-ated use cases. However, the bpf_map_fd_put_ptr() calls bpf_map_put() which calls inner_map->ops->map_free(inner_map) which will go through a rcu grace period (i.e. all bpf_map's map_free currently goes through a rcu grace period). Hence, the inner_map_ptr is still safe for the rcu reader side. This patch also includes BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS to the check_map_prealloc() in the verifier. preallocation is a must for BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT. Hence, even we don't expect heavy updates to map-in-map, enforcing BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC for map-in-map is impossible without disallowing BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT from using map-in-map first. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-23 01:00:34 +08:00
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS:
bpf: Add array of maps support This patch adds a few helper funcs to enable map-in-map support (i.e. outer_map->inner_map). The first outer_map type BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS is also added in this patch. The next patch will introduce a hash of maps type. Any bpf map type can be acted as an inner_map. The exception is BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY because the extra level of indirection makes it harder to verify the owner_prog_type and owner_jited. Multi-level map-in-map is not supported (i.e. map->map is ok but not map->map->map). When adding an inner_map to an outer_map, it currently checks the map_type, key_size, value_size, map_flags, max_entries and ops. The verifier also uses those map's properties to do static analysis. map_flags is needed because we need to ensure BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT is using a preallocated hashtab for the inner_hash also. ops and max_entries are needed to generate inlined map-lookup instructions. For simplicity reason, a simple '==' test is used for both map_flags and max_entries. The equality of ops is implied by the equality of map_type. During outer_map creation time, an inner_map_fd is needed to create an outer_map. However, the inner_map_fd's life time does not depend on the outer_map. The inner_map_fd is merely used to initialize the inner_map_meta of the outer_map. Also, for the outer_map: * It allows element update and delete from syscall * It allows element lookup from bpf_prog The above is similar to the current fd_array pattern. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-23 01:00:33 +08:00
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
goto error;
bpf: Fix map-in-map checking in the verifier In check_map_func_compatibility(), a 'break' has been accidentally removed for the BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS and BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS cases. This patch adds it back. Fixes: 174a79ff9515 ("bpf: sockmap with sk redirect support") Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-18 09:14:43 +08:00
break;
bpf: sockmap with sk redirect support Recently we added a new map type called dev map used to forward XDP packets between ports (6093ec2dc313). This patches introduces a similar notion for sockets. A sockmap allows users to add participating sockets to a map. When sockets are added to the map enough context is stored with the map entry to use the entry with a new helper bpf_sk_redirect_map(map, key, flags) This helper (analogous to bpf_redirect_map in XDP) is given the map and an entry in the map. When called from a sockmap program, discussed below, the skb will be sent on the socket using skb_send_sock(). With the above we need a bpf program to call the helper from that will then implement the send logic. The initial site implemented in this series is the recv_sock hook. For this to work we implemented a map attach command to add attributes to a map. In sockmap we add two programs a parse program and a verdict program. The parse program uses strparser to build messages and pass them to the verdict program. The parse programs use the normal strparser semantics. The verdict program is of type SK_SKB. The verdict program returns a verdict SK_DROP, or SK_REDIRECT for now. Additional actions may be added later. When SK_REDIRECT is returned, expected when bpf program uses bpf_sk_redirect_map(), the sockmap logic will consult per cpu variables set by the helper routine and pull the sock entry out of the sock map. This pattern follows the existing redirect logic in cls and xdp programs. This gives the flow, recv_sock -> str_parser (parse_prog) -> verdict_prog -> skb_send_sock \ -> kfree_skb As an example use case a message based load balancer may use specific logic in the verdict program to select the sock to send on. Sample programs are provided in future patches that hopefully illustrate the user interfaces. Also selftests are in follow-on patches. Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 13:32:47 +08:00
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP:
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map &&
func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update &&
func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem)
goto error;
break;
bpf: fix check_map_func_compatibility logic The commit 35578d798400 ("bpf: Implement function bpf_perf_event_read() that get the selected hardware PMU conuter") introduced clever way to check bpf_helper<->map_type compatibility. Later on commit a43eec304259 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper") adjusted the logic and inadvertently broke it. Get rid of the clever bool compare and go back to two-way check from map and from helper perspective. Fixes: a43eec304259 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-28 09:56:21 +08:00
default:
break;
}
/* ... and second from the function itself. */
switch (func_id) {
case BPF_FUNC_tail_call:
if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read:
case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output:
bpf: add helper bpf_perf_event_read_value for perf event array map Hardware pmu counters are limited resources. When there are more pmu based perf events opened than available counters, kernel will multiplex these events so each event gets certain percentage (but not 100%) of the pmu time. In case that multiplexing happens, the number of samples or counter value will not reflect the case compared to no multiplexing. This makes comparison between different runs difficult. Typically, the number of samples or counter value should be normalized before comparing to other experiments. The typical normalization is done like: normalized_num_samples = num_samples * time_enabled / time_running normalized_counter_value = counter_value * time_enabled / time_running where time_enabled is the time enabled for event and time_running is the time running for event since last normalization. This patch adds helper bpf_perf_event_read_value for kprobed based perf event array map, to read perf counter and enabled/running time. The enabled/running time is accumulated since the perf event open. To achieve scaling factor between two bpf invocations, users can can use cpu_id as the key (which is typical for perf array usage model) to remember the previous value and do the calculation inside the bpf program. Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@fb.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-06 00:19:20 +08:00
case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value:
bpf: fix check_map_func_compatibility logic The commit 35578d798400 ("bpf: Implement function bpf_perf_event_read() that get the selected hardware PMU conuter") introduced clever way to check bpf_helper<->map_type compatibility. Later on commit a43eec304259 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper") adjusted the logic and inadvertently broke it. Get rid of the clever bool compare and go back to two-way check from map and from helper perspective. Fixes: a43eec304259 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-28 09:56:21 +08:00
if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_FUNC_get_stackid:
if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE)
goto error;
break;
bpf: Add bpf_current_task_under_cgroup helper This adds a bpf helper that's similar to the skb_in_cgroup helper to check whether the probe is currently executing in the context of a specific subset of the cgroupsv2 hierarchy. It does this based on membership test for a cgroup arraymap. It is invalid to call this in an interrupt, and it'll return an error. The helper is primarily to be used in debugging activities for containers, where you may have multiple programs running in a given top-level "container". Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-08-12 23:56:52 +08:00
case BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup:
bpf: fix bpf_skb_in_cgroup helper naming While hashing out BPF's current_task_under_cgroup helper bits, it came to discussion that the skb_in_cgroup helper name was suboptimally chosen. Tejun says: So, I think in_cgroup should mean that the object is in that particular cgroup while under_cgroup in the subhierarchy of that cgroup. Let's rename the other subhierarchy test to under too. I think that'd be a lot less confusing going forward. [...] It's more intuitive and gives us the room to implement the real "in" test if ever necessary in the future. Since this touches uapi bits, we need to change this as long as v4.8 is not yet officially released. Thus, change the helper enum and rename related bits. Fixes: 4a482f34afcc ("cgroup: bpf: Add bpf_skb_in_cgroup_proto") Reference: http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/658500/ Suggested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me> Suggested-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2016-08-13 04:17:17 +08:00
case BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup:
cgroup: bpf: Add bpf_skb_in_cgroup_proto Adds a bpf helper, bpf_skb_in_cgroup, to decide if a skb->sk belongs to a descendant of a cgroup2. It is similar to the feature added in netfilter: commit c38c4597e4bf ("netfilter: implement xt_cgroup cgroup2 path match") The user is expected to populate a BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY which will be used by the bpf_skb_in_cgroup. Modifications to the bpf verifier is to ensure BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY and bpf_skb_in_cgroup() are always used together. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@fb.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-07-01 01:28:44 +08:00
if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY)
goto error;
break;
bpf: add bpf_redirect_map helper routine BPF programs can use the devmap with a bpf_redirect_map() helper routine to forward packets to netdevice in map. Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-18 00:29:18 +08:00
case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map:
if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP)
goto error;
break;
bpf: sockmap with sk redirect support Recently we added a new map type called dev map used to forward XDP packets between ports (6093ec2dc313). This patches introduces a similar notion for sockets. A sockmap allows users to add participating sockets to a map. When sockets are added to the map enough context is stored with the map entry to use the entry with a new helper bpf_sk_redirect_map(map, key, flags) This helper (analogous to bpf_redirect_map in XDP) is given the map and an entry in the map. When called from a sockmap program, discussed below, the skb will be sent on the socket using skb_send_sock(). With the above we need a bpf program to call the helper from that will then implement the send logic. The initial site implemented in this series is the recv_sock hook. For this to work we implemented a map attach command to add attributes to a map. In sockmap we add two programs a parse program and a verdict program. The parse program uses strparser to build messages and pass them to the verdict program. The parse programs use the normal strparser semantics. The verdict program is of type SK_SKB. The verdict program returns a verdict SK_DROP, or SK_REDIRECT for now. Additional actions may be added later. When SK_REDIRECT is returned, expected when bpf program uses bpf_sk_redirect_map(), the sockmap logic will consult per cpu variables set by the helper routine and pull the sock entry out of the sock map. This pattern follows the existing redirect logic in cls and xdp programs. This gives the flow, recv_sock -> str_parser (parse_prog) -> verdict_prog -> skb_send_sock \ -> kfree_skb As an example use case a message based load balancer may use specific logic in the verdict program to select the sock to send on. Sample programs are provided in future patches that hopefully illustrate the user interfaces. Also selftests are in follow-on patches. Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 13:32:47 +08:00
case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map:
if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update:
if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP)
goto error;
break;
bpf: fix check_map_func_compatibility logic The commit 35578d798400 ("bpf: Implement function bpf_perf_event_read() that get the selected hardware PMU conuter") introduced clever way to check bpf_helper<->map_type compatibility. Later on commit a43eec304259 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper") adjusted the logic and inadvertently broke it. Get rid of the clever bool compare and go back to two-way check from map and from helper perspective. Fixes: a43eec304259 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-28 09:56:21 +08:00
default:
break;
bpf: Implement function bpf_perf_event_read() that get the selected hardware PMU conuter According to the perf_event_map_fd and index, the function bpf_perf_event_read() can convert the corresponding map value to the pointer to struct perf_event and return the Hardware PMU counter value. Signed-off-by: Kaixu Xia <xiakaixu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-08-06 15:02:35 +08:00
}
return 0;
bpf: fix check_map_func_compatibility logic The commit 35578d798400 ("bpf: Implement function bpf_perf_event_read() that get the selected hardware PMU conuter") introduced clever way to check bpf_helper<->map_type compatibility. Later on commit a43eec304259 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper") adjusted the logic and inadvertently broke it. Get rid of the clever bool compare and go back to two-way check from map and from helper perspective. Fixes: a43eec304259 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-28 09:56:21 +08:00
error:
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "cannot pass map_type %d into func %s#%d\n",
bpf: Print function name in addition to function id The verifier currently prints raw function ids when printing CALL instructions or when complaining: 5: (85) call 23 unknown func 23 print a meaningful function name instead: 5: (85) call bpf_redirect#23 unknown func bpf_redirect#23 Moves the function documentation to a single comment and renames all helpers names in the list to conform to the bpf_ prefix notation so they can be greped in the kernel source. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-27 17:23:51 +08:00
map->map_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
bpf: fix check_map_func_compatibility logic The commit 35578d798400 ("bpf: Implement function bpf_perf_event_read() that get the selected hardware PMU conuter") introduced clever way to check bpf_helper<->map_type compatibility. Later on commit a43eec304259 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper") adjusted the logic and inadvertently broke it. Get rid of the clever bool compare and go back to two-way check from map and from helper perspective. Fixes: a43eec304259 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-28 09:56:21 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
bpf: Implement function bpf_perf_event_read() that get the selected hardware PMU conuter According to the perf_event_map_fd and index, the function bpf_perf_event_read() can convert the corresponding map value to the pointer to struct perf_event and return the Hardware PMU counter value. Signed-off-by: Kaixu Xia <xiakaixu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-08-06 15:02:35 +08:00
}
bpf, verifier: add ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK type When passing buffers from eBPF stack space into a helper function, we have ARG_PTR_TO_STACK argument type for helpers available. The verifier makes sure that such buffers are initialized, within boundaries, etc. However, the downside with this is that we have a couple of helper functions such as bpf_skb_load_bytes() that fill out the passed buffer in the expected success case anyway, so zero initializing them prior to the helper call is unneeded/wasted instructions in the eBPF program that can be avoided. Therefore, add a new helper function argument type called ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK. The idea is to skip the STACK_MISC check in check_stack_boundary() and color the related stack slots as STACK_MISC after we checked all call arguments. Helper functions using ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK must make sure that every path of the helper function will fill the provided buffer area, so that we cannot leak any uninitialized stack memory. This f.e. means that error paths need to memset() the buffers, but the expected fast-path doesn't have to do this anymore. Since there's no such helper needing more than at most one ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK argument, we can keep it simple and don't need to check for multiple areas. Should in future such a use-case really appear, we have check_raw_mode() that will make sure we implement support for it first. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-13 06:10:51 +08:00
static int check_raw_mode(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn)
{
int count = 0;
bpf: rename ARG_PTR_TO_STACK since ARG_PTR_TO_STACK is no longer just pointer to stack rename it to ARG_PTR_TO_MEM and adjust comment. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-10 02:19:50 +08:00
if (fn->arg1_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
bpf, verifier: add ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK type When passing buffers from eBPF stack space into a helper function, we have ARG_PTR_TO_STACK argument type for helpers available. The verifier makes sure that such buffers are initialized, within boundaries, etc. However, the downside with this is that we have a couple of helper functions such as bpf_skb_load_bytes() that fill out the passed buffer in the expected success case anyway, so zero initializing them prior to the helper call is unneeded/wasted instructions in the eBPF program that can be avoided. Therefore, add a new helper function argument type called ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK. The idea is to skip the STACK_MISC check in check_stack_boundary() and color the related stack slots as STACK_MISC after we checked all call arguments. Helper functions using ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK must make sure that every path of the helper function will fill the provided buffer area, so that we cannot leak any uninitialized stack memory. This f.e. means that error paths need to memset() the buffers, but the expected fast-path doesn't have to do this anymore. Since there's no such helper needing more than at most one ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK argument, we can keep it simple and don't need to check for multiple areas. Should in future such a use-case really appear, we have check_raw_mode() that will make sure we implement support for it first. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-13 06:10:51 +08:00
count++;
bpf: rename ARG_PTR_TO_STACK since ARG_PTR_TO_STACK is no longer just pointer to stack rename it to ARG_PTR_TO_MEM and adjust comment. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-10 02:19:50 +08:00
if (fn->arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
bpf, verifier: add ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK type When passing buffers from eBPF stack space into a helper function, we have ARG_PTR_TO_STACK argument type for helpers available. The verifier makes sure that such buffers are initialized, within boundaries, etc. However, the downside with this is that we have a couple of helper functions such as bpf_skb_load_bytes() that fill out the passed buffer in the expected success case anyway, so zero initializing them prior to the helper call is unneeded/wasted instructions in the eBPF program that can be avoided. Therefore, add a new helper function argument type called ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK. The idea is to skip the STACK_MISC check in check_stack_boundary() and color the related stack slots as STACK_MISC after we checked all call arguments. Helper functions using ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK must make sure that every path of the helper function will fill the provided buffer area, so that we cannot leak any uninitialized stack memory. This f.e. means that error paths need to memset() the buffers, but the expected fast-path doesn't have to do this anymore. Since there's no such helper needing more than at most one ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK argument, we can keep it simple and don't need to check for multiple areas. Should in future such a use-case really appear, we have check_raw_mode() that will make sure we implement support for it first. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-13 06:10:51 +08:00
count++;
bpf: rename ARG_PTR_TO_STACK since ARG_PTR_TO_STACK is no longer just pointer to stack rename it to ARG_PTR_TO_MEM and adjust comment. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-10 02:19:50 +08:00
if (fn->arg3_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
bpf, verifier: add ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK type When passing buffers from eBPF stack space into a helper function, we have ARG_PTR_TO_STACK argument type for helpers available. The verifier makes sure that such buffers are initialized, within boundaries, etc. However, the downside with this is that we have a couple of helper functions such as bpf_skb_load_bytes() that fill out the passed buffer in the expected success case anyway, so zero initializing them prior to the helper call is unneeded/wasted instructions in the eBPF program that can be avoided. Therefore, add a new helper function argument type called ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK. The idea is to skip the STACK_MISC check in check_stack_boundary() and color the related stack slots as STACK_MISC after we checked all call arguments. Helper functions using ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK must make sure that every path of the helper function will fill the provided buffer area, so that we cannot leak any uninitialized stack memory. This f.e. means that error paths need to memset() the buffers, but the expected fast-path doesn't have to do this anymore. Since there's no such helper needing more than at most one ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK argument, we can keep it simple and don't need to check for multiple areas. Should in future such a use-case really appear, we have check_raw_mode() that will make sure we implement support for it first. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-13 06:10:51 +08:00
count++;
bpf: rename ARG_PTR_TO_STACK since ARG_PTR_TO_STACK is no longer just pointer to stack rename it to ARG_PTR_TO_MEM and adjust comment. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-10 02:19:50 +08:00
if (fn->arg4_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
bpf, verifier: add ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK type When passing buffers from eBPF stack space into a helper function, we have ARG_PTR_TO_STACK argument type for helpers available. The verifier makes sure that such buffers are initialized, within boundaries, etc. However, the downside with this is that we have a couple of helper functions such as bpf_skb_load_bytes() that fill out the passed buffer in the expected success case anyway, so zero initializing them prior to the helper call is unneeded/wasted instructions in the eBPF program that can be avoided. Therefore, add a new helper function argument type called ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK. The idea is to skip the STACK_MISC check in check_stack_boundary() and color the related stack slots as STACK_MISC after we checked all call arguments. Helper functions using ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK must make sure that every path of the helper function will fill the provided buffer area, so that we cannot leak any uninitialized stack memory. This f.e. means that error paths need to memset() the buffers, but the expected fast-path doesn't have to do this anymore. Since there's no such helper needing more than at most one ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK argument, we can keep it simple and don't need to check for multiple areas. Should in future such a use-case really appear, we have check_raw_mode() that will make sure we implement support for it first. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-13 06:10:51 +08:00
count++;
bpf: rename ARG_PTR_TO_STACK since ARG_PTR_TO_STACK is no longer just pointer to stack rename it to ARG_PTR_TO_MEM and adjust comment. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-10 02:19:50 +08:00
if (fn->arg5_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
bpf, verifier: add ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK type When passing buffers from eBPF stack space into a helper function, we have ARG_PTR_TO_STACK argument type for helpers available. The verifier makes sure that such buffers are initialized, within boundaries, etc. However, the downside with this is that we have a couple of helper functions such as bpf_skb_load_bytes() that fill out the passed buffer in the expected success case anyway, so zero initializing them prior to the helper call is unneeded/wasted instructions in the eBPF program that can be avoided. Therefore, add a new helper function argument type called ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK. The idea is to skip the STACK_MISC check in check_stack_boundary() and color the related stack slots as STACK_MISC after we checked all call arguments. Helper functions using ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK must make sure that every path of the helper function will fill the provided buffer area, so that we cannot leak any uninitialized stack memory. This f.e. means that error paths need to memset() the buffers, but the expected fast-path doesn't have to do this anymore. Since there's no such helper needing more than at most one ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK argument, we can keep it simple and don't need to check for multiple areas. Should in future such a use-case really appear, we have check_raw_mode() that will make sure we implement support for it first. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-13 06:10:51 +08:00
count++;
return count > 1 ? -EINVAL : 0;
}
bpf: add meta pointer for direct access This work enables generic transfer of metadata from XDP into skb. The basic idea is that we can make use of the fact that the resulting skb must be linear and already comes with a larger headroom for supporting bpf_xdp_adjust_head(), which mangles xdp->data. Here, we base our work on a similar principle and introduce a small helper bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() for adjusting a new pointer called xdp->data_meta. Thus, the packet has a flexible and programmable room for meta data, followed by the actual packet data. struct xdp_buff is therefore laid out that we first point to data_hard_start, then data_meta directly prepended to data followed by data_end marking the end of packet. bpf_xdp_adjust_head() takes into account whether we have meta data already prepended and if so, memmove()s this along with the given offset provided there's enough room. xdp->data_meta is optional and programs are not required to use it. The rationale is that when we process the packet in XDP (e.g. as DoS filter), we can push further meta data along with it for the XDP_PASS case, and give the guarantee that a clsact ingress BPF program on the same device can pick this up for further post-processing. Since we work with skb there, we can also set skb->mark, skb->priority or other skb meta data out of BPF, thus having this scratch space generic and programmable allows for more flexibility than defining a direct 1:1 transfer of potentially new XDP members into skb (it's also more efficient as we don't need to initialize/handle each of such new members). The facility also works together with GRO aggregation. The scratch space at the head of the packet can be multiple of 4 byte up to 32 byte large. Drivers not yet supporting xdp->data_meta can simply be set up with xdp->data_meta as xdp->data + 1 as bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() will detect this and bail out, such that the subsequent match against xdp->data for later access is guaranteed to fail. The verifier treats xdp->data_meta/xdp->data the same way as we treat xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons. The requirement for doing the compare against xdp->data is that it hasn't been modified from it's original address we got from ctx access. It may have a range marking already from prior successful xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons though. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-25 08:25:51 +08:00
/* Packet data might have moved, any old PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END]
* are now invalid, so turn them into unknown SCALAR_VALUE.
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
*/
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
static void clear_all_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg;
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
bpf: add meta pointer for direct access This work enables generic transfer of metadata from XDP into skb. The basic idea is that we can make use of the fact that the resulting skb must be linear and already comes with a larger headroom for supporting bpf_xdp_adjust_head(), which mangles xdp->data. Here, we base our work on a similar principle and introduce a small helper bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() for adjusting a new pointer called xdp->data_meta. Thus, the packet has a flexible and programmable room for meta data, followed by the actual packet data. struct xdp_buff is therefore laid out that we first point to data_hard_start, then data_meta directly prepended to data followed by data_end marking the end of packet. bpf_xdp_adjust_head() takes into account whether we have meta data already prepended and if so, memmove()s this along with the given offset provided there's enough room. xdp->data_meta is optional and programs are not required to use it. The rationale is that when we process the packet in XDP (e.g. as DoS filter), we can push further meta data along with it for the XDP_PASS case, and give the guarantee that a clsact ingress BPF program on the same device can pick this up for further post-processing. Since we work with skb there, we can also set skb->mark, skb->priority or other skb meta data out of BPF, thus having this scratch space generic and programmable allows for more flexibility than defining a direct 1:1 transfer of potentially new XDP members into skb (it's also more efficient as we don't need to initialize/handle each of such new members). The facility also works together with GRO aggregation. The scratch space at the head of the packet can be multiple of 4 byte up to 32 byte large. Drivers not yet supporting xdp->data_meta can simply be set up with xdp->data_meta as xdp->data + 1 as bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() will detect this and bail out, such that the subsequent match against xdp->data for later access is guaranteed to fail. The verifier treats xdp->data_meta/xdp->data the same way as we treat xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons. The requirement for doing the compare against xdp->data is that it hasn't been modified from it's original address we got from ctx access. It may have a range marking already from prior successful xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons though. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-25 08:25:51 +08:00
if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(&regs[i]))
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i);
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) {
if (state->stack_slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL)
continue;
reg = &state->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE];
bpf: add meta pointer for direct access This work enables generic transfer of metadata from XDP into skb. The basic idea is that we can make use of the fact that the resulting skb must be linear and already comes with a larger headroom for supporting bpf_xdp_adjust_head(), which mangles xdp->data. Here, we base our work on a similar principle and introduce a small helper bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() for adjusting a new pointer called xdp->data_meta. Thus, the packet has a flexible and programmable room for meta data, followed by the actual packet data. struct xdp_buff is therefore laid out that we first point to data_hard_start, then data_meta directly prepended to data followed by data_end marking the end of packet. bpf_xdp_adjust_head() takes into account whether we have meta data already prepended and if so, memmove()s this along with the given offset provided there's enough room. xdp->data_meta is optional and programs are not required to use it. The rationale is that when we process the packet in XDP (e.g. as DoS filter), we can push further meta data along with it for the XDP_PASS case, and give the guarantee that a clsact ingress BPF program on the same device can pick this up for further post-processing. Since we work with skb there, we can also set skb->mark, skb->priority or other skb meta data out of BPF, thus having this scratch space generic and programmable allows for more flexibility than defining a direct 1:1 transfer of potentially new XDP members into skb (it's also more efficient as we don't need to initialize/handle each of such new members). The facility also works together with GRO aggregation. The scratch space at the head of the packet can be multiple of 4 byte up to 32 byte large. Drivers not yet supporting xdp->data_meta can simply be set up with xdp->data_meta as xdp->data + 1 as bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() will detect this and bail out, such that the subsequent match against xdp->data for later access is guaranteed to fail. The verifier treats xdp->data_meta/xdp->data the same way as we treat xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons. The requirement for doing the compare against xdp->data is that it hasn't been modified from it's original address we got from ctx access. It may have a range marking already from prior successful xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons though. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-25 08:25:51 +08:00
if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(reg))
__mark_reg_unknown(reg);
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
}
}
bpf: add helper inlining infra and optimize map_array lookup Optimize bpf_call -> bpf_map_lookup_elem() -> array_map_lookup_elem() into a sequence of bpf instructions. When JIT is on the sequence of bpf instructions is the sequence of native cpu instructions with significantly faster performance than indirect call and two function's prologue/epilogue. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:42 +08:00
static int check_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn_idx)
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
const struct bpf_func_proto *fn = NULL;
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
bpf, verifier: add bpf_call_arg_meta for passing meta data Currently, when the verifier checks calls in check_call() function, we call check_func_arg() for all 5 arguments e.g. to make sure expected types are correct. In some cases, we collect meta data (here: map pointer) to perform additional checks such as checking stack boundary on key/value sizes for subsequent arguments. As we're going to extend the meta data, add a generic struct bpf_call_arg_meta that we can use for passing into check_func_arg(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-13 06:10:50 +08:00
struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta;
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
bool changes_data;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
int i, err;
/* find function prototype */
if (func_id < 0 || func_id >= __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "invalid func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id),
func_id);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
if (env->prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto)
fn = env->prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(func_id);
if (!fn) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "unknown func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id),
func_id);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
/* eBPF programs must be GPL compatible to use GPL-ed functions */
ebpf: move read-only fields to bpf_prog and shrink bpf_prog_aux is_gpl_compatible and prog_type should be moved directly into bpf_prog as they stay immutable during bpf_prog's lifetime, are core attributes and they can be locked as read-only later on via bpf_prog_select_runtime(). With a bit of rearranging, this also allows us to shrink bpf_prog_aux to exactly 1 cacheline. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-01 19:31:47 +08:00
if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && fn->gpl_only) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "cannot call GPL only function from proprietary program\n");
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
bpf: xdp: Allow head adjustment in XDP prog This patch allows XDP prog to extend/remove the packet data at the head (like adding or removing header). It is done by adding a new XDP helper bpf_xdp_adjust_head(). It also renames bpf_helper_changes_skb_data() to bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data() to better reflect that XDP prog does not work on skb. This patch adds one "xdp_adjust_head" bit to bpf_prog for the XDP-capable driver to check if the XDP prog requires bpf_xdp_adjust_head() support. The driver can then decide to error out during XDP_SETUP_PROG. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.r.fastabend@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-08 07:53:11 +08:00
changes_data = bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(fn->func);
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
bpf, verifier: add bpf_call_arg_meta for passing meta data Currently, when the verifier checks calls in check_call() function, we call check_func_arg() for all 5 arguments e.g. to make sure expected types are correct. In some cases, we collect meta data (here: map pointer) to perform additional checks such as checking stack boundary on key/value sizes for subsequent arguments. As we're going to extend the meta data, add a generic struct bpf_call_arg_meta that we can use for passing into check_func_arg(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-13 06:10:50 +08:00
memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta));
bpf: direct packet write and access for helpers for clsact progs This work implements direct packet access for helpers and direct packet write in a similar fashion as already available for XDP types via commits 4acf6c0b84c9 ("bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs") and 6841de8b0d03 ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly"), and as a complementary feature to the already available direct packet read for tc (cls/act) programs. For enabling this, we need to introduce two helpers, bpf_skb_pull_data() and bpf_csum_update(). The first is generally needed for both, read and write, because they would otherwise only be limited to the current linear skb head. Usually, when the data_end test fails, programs just bail out, or, in the direct read case, use bpf_skb_load_bytes() as an alternative to overcome this limitation. If such data sits in non-linear parts, we can just pull them in once with the new helper, retest and eventually access them. At the same time, this also makes sure the skb is uncloned, which is, of course, a necessary condition for direct write. As this needs to be an invariant for the write part only, the verifier detects writes and adds a prologue that is calling bpf_skb_pull_data() to effectively unclone the skb from the very beginning in case it is indeed cloned. The heuristic makes use of a similar trick that was done in 233577a22089 ("net: filter: constify detection of pkt_type_offset"). This comes at zero cost for other programs that do not use the direct write feature. Should a program use this feature only sparsely and has read access for the most parts with, for example, drop return codes, then such write action can be delegated to a tail called program for mitigating this cost of potential uncloning to a late point in time where it would have been paid similarly with the bpf_skb_store_bytes() as well. Advantage of direct write is that the writes are inlined whereas the helper cannot make any length assumptions and thus needs to generate a call to memcpy() also for small sizes, as well as cost of helper call itself with sanity checks are avoided. Plus, when direct read is already used, we don't need to cache or perform rechecks on the data boundaries (due to verifier invalidating previous checks for helpers that change skb->data), so more complex programs using rewrites can benefit from switching to direct read plus write. For direct packet access to helpers, we save the otherwise needed copy into a temp struct sitting on stack memory when use-case allows. Both facilities are enabled via may_access_direct_pkt_data() in verifier. For now, we limit this to map helpers and csum_diff, and can successively enable other helpers where we find it makes sense. Helpers that definitely cannot be allowed for this are those part of bpf_helper_changes_skb_data() since they can change underlying data, and those that write into memory as this could happen for packet typed args when still cloned. bpf_csum_update() helper accommodates for the fact that we need to fixup checksum_complete when using direct write instead of bpf_skb_store_bytes(), meaning the programs can use available helpers like bpf_csum_diff(), and implement csum_add(), csum_sub(), csum_block_add(), csum_block_sub() equivalents in eBPF together with the new helper. A usage example will be provided for iproute2's examples/bpf/ directory. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-20 06:26:13 +08:00
meta.pkt_access = fn->pkt_access;
bpf, verifier: add bpf_call_arg_meta for passing meta data Currently, when the verifier checks calls in check_call() function, we call check_func_arg() for all 5 arguments e.g. to make sure expected types are correct. In some cases, we collect meta data (here: map pointer) to perform additional checks such as checking stack boundary on key/value sizes for subsequent arguments. As we're going to extend the meta data, add a generic struct bpf_call_arg_meta that we can use for passing into check_func_arg(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-13 06:10:50 +08:00
bpf, verifier: add ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK type When passing buffers from eBPF stack space into a helper function, we have ARG_PTR_TO_STACK argument type for helpers available. The verifier makes sure that such buffers are initialized, within boundaries, etc. However, the downside with this is that we have a couple of helper functions such as bpf_skb_load_bytes() that fill out the passed buffer in the expected success case anyway, so zero initializing them prior to the helper call is unneeded/wasted instructions in the eBPF program that can be avoided. Therefore, add a new helper function argument type called ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK. The idea is to skip the STACK_MISC check in check_stack_boundary() and color the related stack slots as STACK_MISC after we checked all call arguments. Helper functions using ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK must make sure that every path of the helper function will fill the provided buffer area, so that we cannot leak any uninitialized stack memory. This f.e. means that error paths need to memset() the buffers, but the expected fast-path doesn't have to do this anymore. Since there's no such helper needing more than at most one ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK argument, we can keep it simple and don't need to check for multiple areas. Should in future such a use-case really appear, we have check_raw_mode() that will make sure we implement support for it first. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-13 06:10:51 +08:00
/* We only support one arg being in raw mode at the moment, which
* is sufficient for the helper functions we have right now.
*/
err = check_raw_mode(fn);
if (err) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n",
bpf: Print function name in addition to function id The verifier currently prints raw function ids when printing CALL instructions or when complaining: 5: (85) call 23 unknown func 23 print a meaningful function name instead: 5: (85) call bpf_redirect#23 unknown func bpf_redirect#23 Moves the function documentation to a single comment and renames all helpers names in the list to conform to the bpf_ prefix notation so they can be greped in the kernel source. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-27 17:23:51 +08:00
func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
bpf, verifier: add ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK type When passing buffers from eBPF stack space into a helper function, we have ARG_PTR_TO_STACK argument type for helpers available. The verifier makes sure that such buffers are initialized, within boundaries, etc. However, the downside with this is that we have a couple of helper functions such as bpf_skb_load_bytes() that fill out the passed buffer in the expected success case anyway, so zero initializing them prior to the helper call is unneeded/wasted instructions in the eBPF program that can be avoided. Therefore, add a new helper function argument type called ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK. The idea is to skip the STACK_MISC check in check_stack_boundary() and color the related stack slots as STACK_MISC after we checked all call arguments. Helper functions using ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK must make sure that every path of the helper function will fill the provided buffer area, so that we cannot leak any uninitialized stack memory. This f.e. means that error paths need to memset() the buffers, but the expected fast-path doesn't have to do this anymore. Since there's no such helper needing more than at most one ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK argument, we can keep it simple and don't need to check for multiple areas. Should in future such a use-case really appear, we have check_raw_mode() that will make sure we implement support for it first. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-13 06:10:51 +08:00
return err;
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
/* check args */
bpf, verifier: add bpf_call_arg_meta for passing meta data Currently, when the verifier checks calls in check_call() function, we call check_func_arg() for all 5 arguments e.g. to make sure expected types are correct. In some cases, we collect meta data (here: map pointer) to perform additional checks such as checking stack boundary on key/value sizes for subsequent arguments. As we're going to extend the meta data, add a generic struct bpf_call_arg_meta that we can use for passing into check_func_arg(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-13 06:10:50 +08:00
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_1, fn->arg1_type, &meta);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (err)
return err;
bpf, verifier: add bpf_call_arg_meta for passing meta data Currently, when the verifier checks calls in check_call() function, we call check_func_arg() for all 5 arguments e.g. to make sure expected types are correct. In some cases, we collect meta data (here: map pointer) to perform additional checks such as checking stack boundary on key/value sizes for subsequent arguments. As we're going to extend the meta data, add a generic struct bpf_call_arg_meta that we can use for passing into check_func_arg(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-13 06:10:50 +08:00
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_2, fn->arg2_type, &meta);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (err)
return err;
bpf, verifier: add bpf_call_arg_meta for passing meta data Currently, when the verifier checks calls in check_call() function, we call check_func_arg() for all 5 arguments e.g. to make sure expected types are correct. In some cases, we collect meta data (here: map pointer) to perform additional checks such as checking stack boundary on key/value sizes for subsequent arguments. As we're going to extend the meta data, add a generic struct bpf_call_arg_meta that we can use for passing into check_func_arg(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-13 06:10:50 +08:00
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_3, fn->arg3_type, &meta);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (err)
return err;
bpf, verifier: add bpf_call_arg_meta for passing meta data Currently, when the verifier checks calls in check_call() function, we call check_func_arg() for all 5 arguments e.g. to make sure expected types are correct. In some cases, we collect meta data (here: map pointer) to perform additional checks such as checking stack boundary on key/value sizes for subsequent arguments. As we're going to extend the meta data, add a generic struct bpf_call_arg_meta that we can use for passing into check_func_arg(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-13 06:10:50 +08:00
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_4, fn->arg4_type, &meta);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (err)
return err;
bpf, verifier: add bpf_call_arg_meta for passing meta data Currently, when the verifier checks calls in check_call() function, we call check_func_arg() for all 5 arguments e.g. to make sure expected types are correct. In some cases, we collect meta data (here: map pointer) to perform additional checks such as checking stack boundary on key/value sizes for subsequent arguments. As we're going to extend the meta data, add a generic struct bpf_call_arg_meta that we can use for passing into check_func_arg(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-13 06:10:50 +08:00
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_5, fn->arg5_type, &meta);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (err)
return err;
bpf, verifier: add ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK type When passing buffers from eBPF stack space into a helper function, we have ARG_PTR_TO_STACK argument type for helpers available. The verifier makes sure that such buffers are initialized, within boundaries, etc. However, the downside with this is that we have a couple of helper functions such as bpf_skb_load_bytes() that fill out the passed buffer in the expected success case anyway, so zero initializing them prior to the helper call is unneeded/wasted instructions in the eBPF program that can be avoided. Therefore, add a new helper function argument type called ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK. The idea is to skip the STACK_MISC check in check_stack_boundary() and color the related stack slots as STACK_MISC after we checked all call arguments. Helper functions using ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK must make sure that every path of the helper function will fill the provided buffer area, so that we cannot leak any uninitialized stack memory. This f.e. means that error paths need to memset() the buffers, but the expected fast-path doesn't have to do this anymore. Since there's no such helper needing more than at most one ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK argument, we can keep it simple and don't need to check for multiple areas. Should in future such a use-case really appear, we have check_raw_mode() that will make sure we implement support for it first. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-13 06:10:51 +08:00
/* Mark slots with STACK_MISC in case of raw mode, stack offset
* is inferred from register state.
*/
for (i = 0; i < meta.access_size; i++) {
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-14 06:52:13 +08:00
err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.regno, i, BPF_B, BPF_WRITE, -1);
bpf, verifier: add ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK type When passing buffers from eBPF stack space into a helper function, we have ARG_PTR_TO_STACK argument type for helpers available. The verifier makes sure that such buffers are initialized, within boundaries, etc. However, the downside with this is that we have a couple of helper functions such as bpf_skb_load_bytes() that fill out the passed buffer in the expected success case anyway, so zero initializing them prior to the helper call is unneeded/wasted instructions in the eBPF program that can be avoided. Therefore, add a new helper function argument type called ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK. The idea is to skip the STACK_MISC check in check_stack_boundary() and color the related stack slots as STACK_MISC after we checked all call arguments. Helper functions using ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK must make sure that every path of the helper function will fill the provided buffer area, so that we cannot leak any uninitialized stack memory. This f.e. means that error paths need to memset() the buffers, but the expected fast-path doesn't have to do this anymore. Since there's no such helper needing more than at most one ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK argument, we can keep it simple and don't need to check for multiple areas. Should in future such a use-case really appear, we have check_raw_mode() that will make sure we implement support for it first. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-13 06:10:51 +08:00
if (err)
return err;
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
/* reset caller saved regs */
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]);
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK);
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
/* update return register (already marked as written above) */
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (fn->ret_type == RET_INTEGER) {
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
/* sets type to SCALAR_VALUE */
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
} else if (fn->ret_type == RET_VOID) {
regs[BPF_REG_0].type = NOT_INIT;
} else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) {
bpf: Fix and simplifications on inline map lookup Fix in verifier: For the same bpf_map_lookup_elem() instruction (i.e. "call 1"), a broken case is "a different type of map could be used for the same lookup instruction". For example, an array in one case and a hashmap in another. We have to resort to the old dynamic call behavior in this case. The fix is to check for collision on insn_aux->map_ptr. If there is collision, don't inline the map lookup. Please see the "do_reg_lookup()" in test_map_in_map_kern.c in the later patch for how-to trigger the above case. Simplifications on array_map_gen_lookup(): 1. Calculate elem_size from map->value_size. It removes the need for 'struct bpf_array' which makes the later map-in-map implementation easier. 2. Remove the 'elem_size == 1' test Fixes: 81ed18ab3098 ("bpf: add helper inlining infra and optimize map_array lookup") Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-23 01:00:32 +08:00
struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL;
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
/* There is no offset yet applied, variable or fixed */
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
regs[BPF_REG_0].off = 0;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
/* remember map_ptr, so that check_map_access()
* can check 'value_size' boundary of memory access
* to map element returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem()
*/
bpf, verifier: add bpf_call_arg_meta for passing meta data Currently, when the verifier checks calls in check_call() function, we call check_func_arg() for all 5 arguments e.g. to make sure expected types are correct. In some cases, we collect meta data (here: map pointer) to perform additional checks such as checking stack boundary on key/value sizes for subsequent arguments. As we're going to extend the meta data, add a generic struct bpf_call_arg_meta that we can use for passing into check_func_arg(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-13 06:10:50 +08:00
if (meta.map_ptr == NULL) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env,
"kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n");
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
bpf, verifier: add bpf_call_arg_meta for passing meta data Currently, when the verifier checks calls in check_call() function, we call check_func_arg() for all 5 arguments e.g. to make sure expected types are correct. In some cases, we collect meta data (here: map pointer) to perform additional checks such as checking stack boundary on key/value sizes for subsequent arguments. As we're going to extend the meta data, add a generic struct bpf_call_arg_meta that we can use for passing into check_func_arg(). Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-13 06:10:50 +08:00
regs[BPF_REG_0].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr;
bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers A BPF program is required to check the return register of a map_elem_lookup() call before accessing memory. The verifier keeps track of this by converting the type of the result register from PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE after a conditional jump ensures safety. This check is currently exclusively performed for the result register 0. In the event the compiler reorders instructions, BPF_MOV64_REG instructions may be moved before the conditional jump which causes them to keep their type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to which the verifier objects when the register is accessed: 0: (b7) r1 = 10 1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1 2: (bf) r2 = r10 3: (07) r2 += -8 4: (18) r1 = 0x59c00000 6: (85) call 1 7: (bf) r4 = r0 8: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8) R4=map_value_or_null(ks=8,vs=8) R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r4 +0) = 0 R4 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null' This commit extends the verifier to keep track of all identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers after a map_elem_lookup() by assigning them an ID and then marking them all when the conditional jump is observed. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-19 01:51:19 +08:00
regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen;
bpf: Fix and simplifications on inline map lookup Fix in verifier: For the same bpf_map_lookup_elem() instruction (i.e. "call 1"), a broken case is "a different type of map could be used for the same lookup instruction". For example, an array in one case and a hashmap in another. We have to resort to the old dynamic call behavior in this case. The fix is to check for collision on insn_aux->map_ptr. If there is collision, don't inline the map lookup. Please see the "do_reg_lookup()" in test_map_in_map_kern.c in the later patch for how-to trigger the above case. Simplifications on array_map_gen_lookup(): 1. Calculate elem_size from map->value_size. It removes the need for 'struct bpf_array' which makes the later map-in-map implementation easier. 2. Remove the 'elem_size == 1' test Fixes: 81ed18ab3098 ("bpf: add helper inlining infra and optimize map_array lookup") Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-23 01:00:32 +08:00
insn_aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx];
if (!insn_aux->map_ptr)
insn_aux->map_ptr = meta.map_ptr;
else if (insn_aux->map_ptr != meta.map_ptr)
insn_aux->map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
} else {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "unknown return type %d of func %s#%d\n",
bpf: Print function name in addition to function id The verifier currently prints raw function ids when printing CALL instructions or when complaining: 5: (85) call 23 unknown func 23 print a meaningful function name instead: 5: (85) call bpf_redirect#23 unknown func bpf_redirect#23 Moves the function documentation to a single comment and renames all helpers names in the list to conform to the bpf_ prefix notation so they can be greped in the kernel source. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-27 17:23:51 +08:00
fn->ret_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
bpf: allow bpf programs to tail-call other bpf programs introduce bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index) helper function which can be used from BPF programs like: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index); ... } that is roughly equivalent to: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... if (jmp_table[index]) return (*jmp_table[index])(ctx); ... } The important detail that it's not a normal call, but a tail call. The kernel stack is precious, so this helper reuses the current stack frame and jumps into another BPF program without adding extra call frame. It's trivially done in interpreter and a bit trickier in JITs. In case of x64 JIT the bigger part of generated assembler prologue is common for all programs, so it is simply skipped while jumping. Other JITs can do similar prologue-skipping optimization or do stack unwind before jumping into the next program. bpf_tail_call() arguments: ctx - context pointer jmp_table - one of BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY maps used as the jump table index - index in the jump table Since all BPF programs are idenitified by file descriptor, user space need to populate the jmp_table with FDs of other BPF programs. If jmp_table[index] is empty the bpf_tail_call() doesn't jump anywhere and program execution continues as normal. New BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY map type is introduced so that user space can populate this jmp_table array with FDs of other bpf programs. Programs can share the same jmp_table array or use multiple jmp_tables. The chain of tail calls can form unpredictable dynamic loops therefore tail_call_cnt is used to limit the number of calls and currently is set to 32. Use cases: Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> ========== - simplify complex programs by splitting them into a sequence of small programs - dispatch routine For tracing and future seccomp the program may be triggered on all system calls, but processing of syscall arguments will be different. It's more efficient to implement them as: int syscall_entry(struct seccomp_data *ctx) { bpf_tail_call(ctx, &syscall_jmp_table, ctx->nr /* syscall number */); ... default: process unknown syscall ... } int sys_write_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} int sys_read_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} syscall_jmp_table[__NR_write] = sys_write_event; syscall_jmp_table[__NR_read] = sys_read_event; For networking the program may call into different parsers depending on packet format, like: int packet_parser(struct __sk_buff *skb) { ... parse L2, L3 here ... __u8 ipproto = load_byte(skb, ... offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); bpf_tail_call(skb, &ipproto_jmp_table, ipproto); ... default: process unknown protocol ... } int parse_tcp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} int parse_udp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_TCP] = parse_tcp; ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_UDP] = parse_udp; - for TC use case, bpf_tail_call() allows to implement reclassify-like logic - bpf_map_update_elem/delete calls into BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY jump table are atomic, so user space can build chains of BPF programs on the fly Implementation details: ======================= - high performance of bpf_tail_call() is the goal. It could have been implemented without JIT changes as a wrapper on top of BPF_PROG_RUN() macro, but with two downsides: . all programs would have to pay performance penalty for this feature and tail call itself would be slower, since mandatory stack unwind, return, stack allocate would be done for every tailcall. . tailcall would be limited to programs running preempt_disabled, since generic 'void *ctx' doesn't have room for 'tail_call_cnt' and it would need to be either global per_cpu variable accessed by helper and by wrapper or global variable protected by locks. In this implementation x64 JIT bypasses stack unwind and jumps into the callee program after prologue. - bpf_prog_array_compatible() ensures that prog_type of callee and caller are the same and JITed/non-JITed flag is the same, since calling JITed program from non-JITed is invalid, since stack frames are different. Similarly calling kprobe type program from socket type program is invalid. - jump table is implemented as BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY to reuse 'map' abstraction, its user space API and all of verifier logic. It's in the existing arraymap.c file, since several functions are shared with regular array map. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-05-20 07:59:03 +08:00
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
err = check_map_func_compatibility(env, meta.map_ptr, func_id);
bpf: Implement function bpf_perf_event_read() that get the selected hardware PMU conuter According to the perf_event_map_fd and index, the function bpf_perf_event_read() can convert the corresponding map value to the pointer to struct perf_event and return the Hardware PMU counter value. Signed-off-by: Kaixu Xia <xiakaixu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-08-06 15:02:35 +08:00
if (err)
return err;
bpf: allow bpf programs to tail-call other bpf programs introduce bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index) helper function which can be used from BPF programs like: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index); ... } that is roughly equivalent to: int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { ... if (jmp_table[index]) return (*jmp_table[index])(ctx); ... } The important detail that it's not a normal call, but a tail call. The kernel stack is precious, so this helper reuses the current stack frame and jumps into another BPF program without adding extra call frame. It's trivially done in interpreter and a bit trickier in JITs. In case of x64 JIT the bigger part of generated assembler prologue is common for all programs, so it is simply skipped while jumping. Other JITs can do similar prologue-skipping optimization or do stack unwind before jumping into the next program. bpf_tail_call() arguments: ctx - context pointer jmp_table - one of BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY maps used as the jump table index - index in the jump table Since all BPF programs are idenitified by file descriptor, user space need to populate the jmp_table with FDs of other BPF programs. If jmp_table[index] is empty the bpf_tail_call() doesn't jump anywhere and program execution continues as normal. New BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY map type is introduced so that user space can populate this jmp_table array with FDs of other bpf programs. Programs can share the same jmp_table array or use multiple jmp_tables. The chain of tail calls can form unpredictable dynamic loops therefore tail_call_cnt is used to limit the number of calls and currently is set to 32. Use cases: Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> ========== - simplify complex programs by splitting them into a sequence of small programs - dispatch routine For tracing and future seccomp the program may be triggered on all system calls, but processing of syscall arguments will be different. It's more efficient to implement them as: int syscall_entry(struct seccomp_data *ctx) { bpf_tail_call(ctx, &syscall_jmp_table, ctx->nr /* syscall number */); ... default: process unknown syscall ... } int sys_write_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} int sys_read_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...} syscall_jmp_table[__NR_write] = sys_write_event; syscall_jmp_table[__NR_read] = sys_read_event; For networking the program may call into different parsers depending on packet format, like: int packet_parser(struct __sk_buff *skb) { ... parse L2, L3 here ... __u8 ipproto = load_byte(skb, ... offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); bpf_tail_call(skb, &ipproto_jmp_table, ipproto); ... default: process unknown protocol ... } int parse_tcp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} int parse_udp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...} ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_TCP] = parse_tcp; ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_UDP] = parse_udp; - for TC use case, bpf_tail_call() allows to implement reclassify-like logic - bpf_map_update_elem/delete calls into BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY jump table are atomic, so user space can build chains of BPF programs on the fly Implementation details: ======================= - high performance of bpf_tail_call() is the goal. It could have been implemented without JIT changes as a wrapper on top of BPF_PROG_RUN() macro, but with two downsides: . all programs would have to pay performance penalty for this feature and tail call itself would be slower, since mandatory stack unwind, return, stack allocate would be done for every tailcall. . tailcall would be limited to programs running preempt_disabled, since generic 'void *ctx' doesn't have room for 'tail_call_cnt' and it would need to be either global per_cpu variable accessed by helper and by wrapper or global variable protected by locks. In this implementation x64 JIT bypasses stack unwind and jumps into the callee program after prologue. - bpf_prog_array_compatible() ensures that prog_type of callee and caller are the same and JITed/non-JITed flag is the same, since calling JITed program from non-JITed is invalid, since stack frames are different. Similarly calling kprobe type program from socket type program is invalid. - jump table is implemented as BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY to reuse 'map' abstraction, its user space API and all of verifier logic. It's in the existing arraymap.c file, since several functions are shared with regular array map. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-05-20 07:59:03 +08:00
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
if (changes_data)
clear_all_pkt_pointers(env);
return 0;
}
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
static void coerce_reg_to_32(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
{
/* clear high 32 bits */
reg->var_off = tnum_cast(reg->var_off, 4);
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
/* Update bounds */
__update_reg_bounds(reg);
}
static bool signed_add_overflows(s64 a, s64 b)
{
/* Do the add in u64, where overflow is well-defined */
s64 res = (s64)((u64)a + (u64)b);
if (b < 0)
return res > a;
return res < a;
}
static bool signed_sub_overflows(s64 a, s64 b)
{
/* Do the sub in u64, where overflow is well-defined */
s64 res = (s64)((u64)a - (u64)b);
if (b < 0)
return res < a;
return res > a;
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
}
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
/* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and var_off.
* Caller should also handle BPF_MOV case separately.
* If we return -EACCES, caller may want to try again treating pointer as a
* scalar. So we only emit a diagnostic if !env->allow_ptr_leaks.
*/
static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn,
const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg)
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
{
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs, *dst_reg;
bool known = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off);
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
s64 smin_val = off_reg->smin_value, smax_val = off_reg->smax_value,
smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value;
u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value,
umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value;
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
dst_reg = &regs[dst];
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(known && (smin_val != smax_val))) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
print_verifier_state(env, &env->cur_state);
verbose(env,
"verifier internal error: known but bad sbounds\n");
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(known && (umin_val != umax_val))) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
print_verifier_state(env, &env->cur_state);
verbose(env,
"verifier internal error: known but bad ubounds\n");
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) {
/* 32-bit ALU ops on pointers produce (meaningless) scalars */
if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env,
"R%d 32-bit pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
dst);
return -EACCES;
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
}
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) {
if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL prohibited, null-check it first\n",
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
dst);
return -EACCES;
}
if (ptr_reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP) {
if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on CONST_PTR_TO_MAP prohibited\n",
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
dst);
return -EACCES;
}
if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) {
if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_PACKET_END prohibited\n",
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
dst);
return -EACCES;
}
/* In case of 'scalar += pointer', dst_reg inherits pointer type and id.
* The id may be overwritten later if we create a new variable offset.
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
*/
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
dst_reg->type = ptr_reg->type;
dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id;
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
switch (opcode) {
case BPF_ADD:
/* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow
* the s32 'off' field
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
*/
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
if (known && (ptr_reg->off + smin_val ==
(s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off + smin_val))) {
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
/* pointer += K. Accumulate it into fixed offset */
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr;
dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr;
dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr;
dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr;
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off;
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off + smin_val;
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
dst_reg->range = ptr_reg->range;
break;
}
/* A new variable offset is created. Note that off_reg->off
* == 0, since it's a scalar.
* dst_reg gets the pointer type and since some positive
* integer value was added to the pointer, give it a new 'id'
* if it's a PTR_TO_PACKET.
* this creates a new 'base' pointer, off_reg (variable) gets
* added into the variable offset, and we copy the fixed offset
* from ptr_reg.
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
*/
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
if (signed_add_overflows(smin_ptr, smin_val) ||
signed_add_overflows(smax_ptr, smax_val)) {
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr + smin_val;
dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr + smax_val;
}
if (umin_ptr + umin_val < umin_ptr ||
umax_ptr + umax_val < umax_ptr) {
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr + umin_val;
dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr + umax_val;
}
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off);
dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off;
bpf: add meta pointer for direct access This work enables generic transfer of metadata from XDP into skb. The basic idea is that we can make use of the fact that the resulting skb must be linear and already comes with a larger headroom for supporting bpf_xdp_adjust_head(), which mangles xdp->data. Here, we base our work on a similar principle and introduce a small helper bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() for adjusting a new pointer called xdp->data_meta. Thus, the packet has a flexible and programmable room for meta data, followed by the actual packet data. struct xdp_buff is therefore laid out that we first point to data_hard_start, then data_meta directly prepended to data followed by data_end marking the end of packet. bpf_xdp_adjust_head() takes into account whether we have meta data already prepended and if so, memmove()s this along with the given offset provided there's enough room. xdp->data_meta is optional and programs are not required to use it. The rationale is that when we process the packet in XDP (e.g. as DoS filter), we can push further meta data along with it for the XDP_PASS case, and give the guarantee that a clsact ingress BPF program on the same device can pick this up for further post-processing. Since we work with skb there, we can also set skb->mark, skb->priority or other skb meta data out of BPF, thus having this scratch space generic and programmable allows for more flexibility than defining a direct 1:1 transfer of potentially new XDP members into skb (it's also more efficient as we don't need to initialize/handle each of such new members). The facility also works together with GRO aggregation. The scratch space at the head of the packet can be multiple of 4 byte up to 32 byte large. Drivers not yet supporting xdp->data_meta can simply be set up with xdp->data_meta as xdp->data + 1 as bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() will detect this and bail out, such that the subsequent match against xdp->data for later access is guaranteed to fail. The verifier treats xdp->data_meta/xdp->data the same way as we treat xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons. The requirement for doing the compare against xdp->data is that it hasn't been modified from it's original address we got from ctx access. It may have a range marking already from prior successful xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons though. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-25 08:25:51 +08:00
if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) {
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
/* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */
dst_reg->range = 0;
}
break;
case BPF_SUB:
if (dst_reg == off_reg) {
/* scalar -= pointer. Creates an unknown scalar */
if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n",
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
dst);
return -EACCES;
}
/* We don't allow subtraction from FP, because (according to
* test_verifier.c test "invalid fp arithmetic", JITs might not
* be able to deal with it.
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
*/
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "R%d subtraction from stack pointer prohibited\n",
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
dst);
return -EACCES;
}
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
if (known && (ptr_reg->off - smin_val ==
(s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off - smin_val))) {
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
/* pointer -= K. Subtract it from fixed offset */
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr;
dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr;
dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr;
dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr;
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off;
dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id;
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off - smin_val;
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
dst_reg->range = ptr_reg->range;
break;
}
/* A new variable offset is created. If the subtrahend is known
* nonnegative, then any reg->range we had before is still good.
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
*/
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
if (signed_sub_overflows(smin_ptr, smax_val) ||
signed_sub_overflows(smax_ptr, smin_val)) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr - smax_val;
dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr - smin_val;
}
if (umin_ptr < umax_val) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
} else {
/* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */
dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr - umax_val;
dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr - umin_val;
}
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off);
dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off;
bpf: add meta pointer for direct access This work enables generic transfer of metadata from XDP into skb. The basic idea is that we can make use of the fact that the resulting skb must be linear and already comes with a larger headroom for supporting bpf_xdp_adjust_head(), which mangles xdp->data. Here, we base our work on a similar principle and introduce a small helper bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() for adjusting a new pointer called xdp->data_meta. Thus, the packet has a flexible and programmable room for meta data, followed by the actual packet data. struct xdp_buff is therefore laid out that we first point to data_hard_start, then data_meta directly prepended to data followed by data_end marking the end of packet. bpf_xdp_adjust_head() takes into account whether we have meta data already prepended and if so, memmove()s this along with the given offset provided there's enough room. xdp->data_meta is optional and programs are not required to use it. The rationale is that when we process the packet in XDP (e.g. as DoS filter), we can push further meta data along with it for the XDP_PASS case, and give the guarantee that a clsact ingress BPF program on the same device can pick this up for further post-processing. Since we work with skb there, we can also set skb->mark, skb->priority or other skb meta data out of BPF, thus having this scratch space generic and programmable allows for more flexibility than defining a direct 1:1 transfer of potentially new XDP members into skb (it's also more efficient as we don't need to initialize/handle each of such new members). The facility also works together with GRO aggregation. The scratch space at the head of the packet can be multiple of 4 byte up to 32 byte large. Drivers not yet supporting xdp->data_meta can simply be set up with xdp->data_meta as xdp->data + 1 as bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() will detect this and bail out, such that the subsequent match against xdp->data for later access is guaranteed to fail. The verifier treats xdp->data_meta/xdp->data the same way as we treat xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons. The requirement for doing the compare against xdp->data is that it hasn't been modified from it's original address we got from ctx access. It may have a range marking already from prior successful xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons though. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-25 08:25:51 +08:00
if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) {
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
/* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
if (smin_val < 0)
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
dst_reg->range = 0;
bpf, verifier: add additional patterns to evaluate_reg_imm_alu Currently the verifier does not track imm across alu operations when the source register is of unknown type. This adds additional pattern matching to catch this and track imm. We've seen LLVM generating this pattern while working on cilium. Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-02 08:13:30 +08:00
}
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
break;
case BPF_AND:
case BPF_OR:
case BPF_XOR:
/* bitwise ops on pointers are troublesome, prohibit for now.
* (However, in principle we could allow some cases, e.g.
* ptr &= ~3 which would reduce min_value by 3.)
*/
if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "R%d bitwise operator %s on pointer prohibited\n",
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
return -EACCES;
default:
/* other operators (e.g. MUL,LSH) produce non-pointer results */
if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic with %s operator prohibited\n",
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
return -EACCES;
bpf, verifier: add additional patterns to evaluate_reg_imm_alu Currently the verifier does not track imm across alu operations when the source register is of unknown type. This adds additional pattern matching to catch this and track imm. We've seen LLVM generating this pattern while working on cilium. Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-02 08:13:30 +08:00
}
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
__reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
__reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
bpf, verifier: add additional patterns to evaluate_reg_imm_alu Currently the verifier does not track imm across alu operations when the source register is of unknown type. This adds additional pattern matching to catch this and track imm. We've seen LLVM generating this pattern while working on cilium. Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-02 08:13:30 +08:00
return 0;
}
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn,
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
struct bpf_reg_state src_reg)
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
bool src_known, dst_known;
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
s64 smin_val, smax_val;
u64 umin_val, umax_val;
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) {
/* 32-bit ALU ops are (32,32)->64 */
coerce_reg_to_32(dst_reg);
coerce_reg_to_32(&src_reg);
bpf/verifier: fix min/max handling in BPF_SUB We have to subtract the src max from the dst min, and vice-versa, since (e.g.) the smallest result comes from the largest subtrahend. Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-21 21:37:34 +08:00
}
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
smin_val = src_reg.smin_value;
smax_val = src_reg.smax_value;
umin_val = src_reg.umin_value;
umax_val = src_reg.umax_value;
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg.var_off);
dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off);
bpf: fix range arithmetic for bpf map access I made some invalid assumptions with BPF_AND and BPF_MOD that could result in invalid accesses to bpf map entries. Fix this up by doing a few things 1) Kill BPF_MOD support. This doesn't actually get used by the compiler in real life and just adds extra complexity. 2) Fix the logic for BPF_AND, don't allow AND of negative numbers and set the minimum value to 0 for positive AND's. 3) Don't do operations on the ranges if they are set to the limits, as they are by definition undefined, and allowing arithmetic operations on those values could make them appear valid when they really aren't. This fixes the testcase provided by Jann as well as a few other theoretical problems. Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-11-15 04:45:36 +08:00
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
switch (opcode) {
case BPF_ADD:
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
if (signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smin_val) ||
signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smax_val)) {
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->smin_value += smin_val;
dst_reg->smax_value += smax_val;
}
if (dst_reg->umin_value + umin_val < umin_val ||
dst_reg->umax_value + umax_val < umax_val) {
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->umin_value += umin_val;
dst_reg->umax_value += umax_val;
}
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
break;
case BPF_SUB:
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
if (signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smax_val) ||
signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smin_val)) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->smin_value -= smax_val;
dst_reg->smax_value -= smin_val;
}
if (dst_reg->umin_value < umax_val) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
} else {
/* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */
dst_reg->umin_value -= umax_val;
dst_reg->umax_value -= umin_val;
}
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
break;
case BPF_MUL:
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_mul(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->smin_value < 0) {
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
/* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
__mark_reg_unbounded(dst_reg);
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
break;
}
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
/* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and
* copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S64_MAX).
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
*/
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
if (umax_val > U32_MAX || dst_reg->umax_value > U32_MAX) {
/* Potential overflow, we know nothing */
__mark_reg_unbounded(dst_reg);
/* (except what we can learn from the var_off) */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
}
dst_reg->umin_value *= umin_val;
dst_reg->umax_value *= umax_val;
if (dst_reg->umax_value > S64_MAX) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
}
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
break;
case BPF_AND:
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
if (src_known && dst_known) {
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
__mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value &
src_reg.var_off.value);
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
break;
}
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
/* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently
* bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima.
bpf: fix range arithmetic for bpf map access I made some invalid assumptions with BPF_AND and BPF_MOD that could result in invalid accesses to bpf map entries. Fix this up by doing a few things 1) Kill BPF_MOD support. This doesn't actually get used by the compiler in real life and just adds extra complexity. 2) Fix the logic for BPF_AND, don't allow AND of negative numbers and set the minimum value to 0 for positive AND's. 3) Don't do operations on the ranges if they are set to the limits, as they are by definition undefined, and allowing arithmetic operations on those values could make them appear valid when they really aren't. This fixes the testcase provided by Jann as well as a few other theoretical problems. Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-11-15 04:45:36 +08:00
*/
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_and(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value;
dst_reg->umax_value = min(dst_reg->umax_value, umax_val);
if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) {
/* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers,
* ain't nobody got time for that.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
/* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to
* cast result into s64.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
}
/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
break;
case BPF_OR:
if (src_known && dst_known) {
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
__mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value |
src_reg.var_off.value);
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
break;
}
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
/* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the
* maximum of the operands' minima
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
*/
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_or(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
dst_reg->umin_value = max(dst_reg->umin_value, umin_val);
dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value |
dst_reg->var_off.mask;
if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) {
/* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers,
* ain't nobody got time for that.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
} else {
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
/* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to
* cast result into s64.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
}
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
break;
case BPF_LSH:
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
if (umax_val > 63) {
/* Shifts greater than 63 are undefined. This includes
* shifts by a negative number.
*/
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
break;
}
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
/* We lose all sign bit information (except what we can pick
* up from var_off)
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
*/
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
/* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */
if (dst_reg->umax_value > 1ULL << (63 - umax_val)) {
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-11 02:22:52 +08:00
} else {
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
dst_reg->umin_value <<= umin_val;
dst_reg->umax_value <<= umax_val;
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-11 02:22:52 +08:00
}
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
if (src_known)
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val);
else
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(tnum_unknown, umin_val);
/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
break;
case BPF_RSH:
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
if (umax_val > 63) {
/* Shifts greater than 63 are undefined. This includes
* shifts by a negative number.
*/
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
break;
}
/* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift, so make the appropriate casts */
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0) {
if (umin_val) {
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
/* Sign bit will be cleared */
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
dst_reg->smin_value = 0;
} else {
/* Lost sign bit information */
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
}
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-11 02:22:52 +08:00
} else {
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
dst_reg->smin_value =
(u64)(dst_reg->smin_value) >> umax_val;
bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier. Currently if we add only constant values to pointers we can fully validate the alignment, and properly check if we need to reject the program on !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS architectures. However, once an unknown value is introduced we only allow byte sized memory accesses which is too restrictive. Add logic to track the known minimum alignment of register values, and propagate this state into registers containing pointers. The most common paradigm that makes use of this new logic is computing the transport header using the IP header length field. For example: struct ethhdr *ep = skb->data; struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *) (ep + 1); struct tcphdr *th; ... n = iph->ihl; th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); port = th->dest; The existing code will reject the load of th->dest because it cannot validate that the alignment is at least 2 once "n * 4" is added the the packet pointer. In the new code, the register holding "n * 4" will have a reg->min_align value of 4, because any value multiplied by 4 will be at least 4 byte aligned. (actually, the eBPF code emitted by the compiler in this case is most likely to use a shift left by 2, but the end result is identical) At the critical addition: th = ((void *)iph + (n * 4)); The register holding 'th' will start with reg->off value of 14. The pointer addition will transform that reg into something that looks like: reg->aux_off = 14 reg->aux_off_align = 4 Next, the verifier will look at the th->dest load, and it will see a load offset of 2, and first check: if (reg->aux_off_align % size) which will pass because aux_off_align is 4. reg_off will be computed: reg_off = reg->off; ... reg_off += reg->aux_off; plus we have off==2, and it will thus check: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg_off + off) % size != 0) which evaluates to: if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + 14 + 2) % size != 0) On strict alignment architectures, NET_IP_ALIGN is 2, thus: if ((2 + 14 + 2) % size != 0) which passes. These pointer transformations and checks work regardless of whether the constant offset or the variable with known alignment is added first to the pointer register. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-11 02:22:52 +08:00
}
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
if (src_known)
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(dst_reg->var_off,
umin_val);
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
else
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(tnum_unknown, umin_val);
dst_reg->umin_value >>= umax_val;
dst_reg->umax_value >>= umin_val;
/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
break;
default:
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
break;
}
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
__reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
__reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
return 0;
}
/* Handles ALU ops other than BPF_END, BPF_NEG and BPF_MOV: computes new min/max
* and var_off.
*/
static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs, *dst_reg, *src_reg;
struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, off_reg = {0};
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
int rc;
dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
src_reg = NULL;
if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE)
ptr_reg = dst_reg;
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
src_reg = &regs[insn->src_reg];
if (src_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
/* Combining two pointers by any ALU op yields
* an arbitrary scalar.
*/
if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "R%d pointer %s pointer prohibited\n",
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
insn->dst_reg,
bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
return 0;
} else {
/* scalar += pointer
* This is legal, but we have to reverse our
* src/dest handling in computing the range
*/
rc = adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
src_reg, dst_reg);
if (rc == -EACCES && env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
/* scalar += unknown scalar */
__mark_reg_unknown(&off_reg);
return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(
env, insn,
dst_reg, off_reg);
}
return rc;
}
} else if (ptr_reg) {
/* pointer += scalar */
rc = adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
dst_reg, src_reg);
if (rc == -EACCES && env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
/* unknown scalar += scalar */
__mark_reg_unknown(dst_reg);
return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(
env, insn, dst_reg, *src_reg);
}
return rc;
}
} else {
/* Pretend the src is a reg with a known value, since we only
* need to be able to read from this state.
*/
off_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE;
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
__mark_reg_known(&off_reg, insn->imm);
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
src_reg = &off_reg;
if (ptr_reg) { /* pointer += K */
rc = adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
ptr_reg, src_reg);
if (rc == -EACCES && env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
/* unknown scalar += K */
__mark_reg_unknown(dst_reg);
return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(
env, insn, dst_reg, off_reg);
}
return rc;
}
}
/* Got here implies adding two SCALAR_VALUEs */
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ptr_reg)) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
print_verifier_state(env, &env->cur_state);
verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected ptr_reg\n");
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
if (WARN_ON(!src_reg)) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
print_verifier_state(env, &env->cur_state);
verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no src_reg\n");
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(env, insn, dst_reg, *src_reg);
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
/* check validity of 32-bit and 64-bit arithmetic operations */
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
{
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
int err;
if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) {
if (opcode == BPF_NEG) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != 0 ||
insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
insn->off != 0 || insn->imm != 0) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "BPF_NEG uses reserved fields\n");
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 ||
bpf/verifier: reject BPF_ALU64|BPF_END Neither ___bpf_prog_run nor the JITs accept it. Also adds a new test case. Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)") Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-15 21:37:38 +08:00
(insn->imm != 16 && insn->imm != 32 && insn->imm != 64) ||
BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "BPF_END uses reserved fields\n");
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check src operand */
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (err)
return err;
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:21 +08:00
if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:21 +08:00
insn->dst_reg);
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
/* check dest operand */
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (err)
return err;
} else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check src operand */
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (err)
return err;
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check dest operand */
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (err)
return err;
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
/* case: R1 = R2
* copy register state to dest reg
*/
regs[insn->dst_reg] = regs[insn->src_reg];
bpf: fix liveness marking while processing Rx = Ry instruction the verifier does regs[insn->dst_reg] = regs[insn->src_reg] which often clears write mark (when Ry doesn't have it) that was just set by check_reg_arg(Rx) prior to the assignment. That causes mark_reg_read() to keep marking Rx in this block as REG_LIVE_READ (since the logic incorrectly misses that it's screened by the write) and in many of its parents (until lucky write into the same Rx or beginning of the program). That causes is_state_visited() logic to miss many pruning opportunities. Furthermore mark_reg_read() logic propagates the read mark for BPF_REG_FP as well (though it's readonly) which causes harmless but unnecssary work during is_state_visited(). Note that do_propagate_liveness() skips FP correctly, so do the same in mark_reg_read() as well. It saves 0.2 seconds for the test below program before after bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o 2604 2304 bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o 11159 3723 bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o 1116 1110 bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o 34566 28004 bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o 53267 39026 bpf_netdev.o 17843 16943 bpf_overlay.o 8672 7929 time ~11 sec ~4 sec Fixes: dc503a8ad984 ("bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning") Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-06 07:20:56 +08:00
regs[insn->dst_reg].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
} else {
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
/* R1 = (u32) R2 */
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:21 +08:00
if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env,
"R%d partial copy of pointer\n",
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:21 +08:00
insn->src_reg);
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
/* high 32 bits are known zero. */
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
regs[insn->dst_reg].var_off = tnum_cast(
regs[insn->dst_reg].var_off, 4);
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
__update_reg_bounds(&regs[insn->dst_reg]);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
}
} else {
/* case: R = imm
* remember the value we stored into this reg
*/
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
regs[insn->dst_reg].type = SCALAR_VALUE;
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
__mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg, insn->imm);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
}
} else if (opcode > BPF_END) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "invalid BPF_ALU opcode %x\n", opcode);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
} else { /* all other ALU ops: and, sub, xor, add, ... */
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check src1 operand */
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (err)
return err;
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check src2 operand */
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (err)
return err;
if ((opcode == BPF_MOD || opcode == BPF_DIV) &&
BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && insn->imm == 0) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "div by zero\n");
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
net: bpf: reject invalid shifts On ARM64, a BUG() is triggered in the eBPF JIT if a filter with a constant shift that can't be encoded in the immediate field of the UBFM/SBFM instructions is passed to the JIT. Since these shifts amounts, which are negative or >= regsize, are invalid, reject them in the eBPF verifier and the classic BPF filter checker, for all architectures. Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabin@rab.in> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-01-13 03:17:08 +08:00
if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH ||
opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32;
if (insn->imm < 0 || insn->imm >= size) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm);
net: bpf: reject invalid shifts On ARM64, a BUG() is triggered in the eBPF JIT if a filter with a constant shift that can't be encoded in the immediate field of the UBFM/SBFM instructions is passed to the JIT. Since these shifts amounts, which are negative or >= regsize, are invalid, reject them in the eBPF verifier and the classic BPF filter checker, for all architectures. Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabin@rab.in> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-01-13 03:17:08 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
}
bpf: cleanup verifier code cleanup verifier code and prepare it for addition of "pointer to packet" logic Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:09 +08:00
/* check dest operand */
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK);
bpf: cleanup verifier code cleanup verifier code and prepare it for addition of "pointer to packet" logic Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:09 +08:00
if (err)
return err;
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
return adjust_reg_min_max_vals(env, insn);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
}
return 0;
}
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
static void find_good_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_state *state,
bpf: add meta pointer for direct access This work enables generic transfer of metadata from XDP into skb. The basic idea is that we can make use of the fact that the resulting skb must be linear and already comes with a larger headroom for supporting bpf_xdp_adjust_head(), which mangles xdp->data. Here, we base our work on a similar principle and introduce a small helper bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() for adjusting a new pointer called xdp->data_meta. Thus, the packet has a flexible and programmable room for meta data, followed by the actual packet data. struct xdp_buff is therefore laid out that we first point to data_hard_start, then data_meta directly prepended to data followed by data_end marking the end of packet. bpf_xdp_adjust_head() takes into account whether we have meta data already prepended and if so, memmove()s this along with the given offset provided there's enough room. xdp->data_meta is optional and programs are not required to use it. The rationale is that when we process the packet in XDP (e.g. as DoS filter), we can push further meta data along with it for the XDP_PASS case, and give the guarantee that a clsact ingress BPF program on the same device can pick this up for further post-processing. Since we work with skb there, we can also set skb->mark, skb->priority or other skb meta data out of BPF, thus having this scratch space generic and programmable allows for more flexibility than defining a direct 1:1 transfer of potentially new XDP members into skb (it's also more efficient as we don't need to initialize/handle each of such new members). The facility also works together with GRO aggregation. The scratch space at the head of the packet can be multiple of 4 byte up to 32 byte large. Drivers not yet supporting xdp->data_meta can simply be set up with xdp->data_meta as xdp->data + 1 as bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() will detect this and bail out, such that the subsequent match against xdp->data for later access is guaranteed to fail. The verifier treats xdp->data_meta/xdp->data the same way as we treat xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons. The requirement for doing the compare against xdp->data is that it hasn't been modified from it's original address we got from ctx access. It may have a range marking already from prior successful xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons though. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-25 08:25:51 +08:00
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
enum bpf_reg_type type)
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg;
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
int i;
bpf: fix range propagation on direct packet access LLVM can generate code that tests for direct packet access via skb->data/data_end in a way that currently gets rejected by the verifier, example: [...] 7: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80) 8: (61) r9 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76) 9: (bf) r2 = r9 10: (07) r2 += 54 11: (3d) if r3 >= r2 goto pc+12 R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 12: (18) r4 = 0xffffff7a 14: (05) goto pc+430 [...] from 11 to 24: R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 24: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -40) = r1 25: (b7) r1 = 0 26: (63) *(u32 *)(r6 +56) = r1 27: (b7) r2 = 40 28: (71) r8 = *(u8 *)(r9 +20) invalid access to packet, off=20 size=1, R9(id=0,off=0,r=0) The reason why this gets rejected despite a proper test is that we currently call find_good_pkt_pointers() only in case where we detect tests like rX > pkt_end, where rX is of type pkt(id=Y,off=Z,r=0) and derived, for example, from a register of type pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=0) pointing to skb->data. find_good_pkt_pointers() then fills the range in the current branch to pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=Z) on success. For above case, we need to extend that to recognize pkt_end >= rX pattern and mark the other branch that is taken on success with the appropriate pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=Z) type via find_good_pkt_pointers(). Since eBPF operates on BPF_JGT (>) and BPF_JGE (>=), these are the only two practical options to test for from what LLVM could have generated, since there's no such thing as BPF_JLT (<) or BPF_JLE (<=) that we would need to take into account as well. After the fix: [...] 7: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80) 8: (61) r9 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76) 9: (bf) r2 = r9 10: (07) r2 += 54 11: (3d) if r3 >= r2 goto pc+12 R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 12: (18) r4 = 0xffffff7a 14: (05) goto pc+430 [...] from 11 to 24: R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=54) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=54) R10=fp 24: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -40) = r1 25: (b7) r1 = 0 26: (63) *(u32 *)(r6 +56) = r1 27: (b7) r2 = 40 28: (71) r8 = *(u8 *)(r9 +20) 29: (bf) r1 = r8 30: (25) if r8 > 0x3c goto pc+47 R1=inv56 R2=imm40 R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R8=inv56 R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=54) R10=fp 31: (b7) r1 = 1 [...] Verifier test cases are also added in this work, one that demonstrates the mentioned example here and one that tries a bad packet access for the current/fall-through branch (the one with types pkt(id=X,off=Y,r=0), pkt(id=X,off=0,r=0)), then a case with good and bad accesses, and two with both test variants (>, >=). Fixes: 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf: direct packet access") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-08 07:03:42 +08:00
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
if (dst_reg->off < 0)
/* This doesn't give us any range */
return;
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
if (dst_reg->umax_value > MAX_PACKET_OFF ||
dst_reg->umax_value + dst_reg->off > MAX_PACKET_OFF)
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
/* Risk of overflow. For instance, ptr + (1<<63) may be less
* than pkt_end, but that's because it's also less than pkt.
*/
return;
bpf: enable BPF_J{LT, LE, SLT, SLE} opcodes in verifier Enable the newly added jump opcodes, main parts are in two different areas, namely direct packet access and dynamic map value access. For the direct packet access, we now allow for the following two new patterns to match in order to trigger markings with find_good_pkt_pointers(): Variant 1 (access ok when taking the branch): 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (bf) r0 = r2 3: (07) r0 += 8 4: (ad) if r0 < r3 goto pc+2 R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 5: (b7) r0 = 0 6: (95) exit from 4 to 7: R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=8) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=8) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 7: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) 8: (05) goto pc-4 5: (b7) r0 = 0 6: (95) exit processed 11 insns, stack depth 0 Variant 2 (access ok on fall-through): 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (bf) r0 = r2 3: (07) r0 += 8 4: (bd) if r3 <= r0 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=8) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=8) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 5: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) 6: (b7) r0 = 1 7: (95) exit from 4 to 6: R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 6: (b7) r0 = 1 7: (95) exit processed 10 insns, stack depth 0 The above two basically just swap the branches where we need to handle an exception and allow packet access compared to the two already existing variants for find_good_pkt_pointers(). For the dynamic map value access, we add the new instructions to reg_set_min_max() and reg_set_min_max_inv() in order to learn bounds. Verifier test cases for both are added in a follow-up patch. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-10 07:40:02 +08:00
/* LLVM can generate four kind of checks:
bpf: fix range propagation on direct packet access LLVM can generate code that tests for direct packet access via skb->data/data_end in a way that currently gets rejected by the verifier, example: [...] 7: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80) 8: (61) r9 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76) 9: (bf) r2 = r9 10: (07) r2 += 54 11: (3d) if r3 >= r2 goto pc+12 R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 12: (18) r4 = 0xffffff7a 14: (05) goto pc+430 [...] from 11 to 24: R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 24: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -40) = r1 25: (b7) r1 = 0 26: (63) *(u32 *)(r6 +56) = r1 27: (b7) r2 = 40 28: (71) r8 = *(u8 *)(r9 +20) invalid access to packet, off=20 size=1, R9(id=0,off=0,r=0) The reason why this gets rejected despite a proper test is that we currently call find_good_pkt_pointers() only in case where we detect tests like rX > pkt_end, where rX is of type pkt(id=Y,off=Z,r=0) and derived, for example, from a register of type pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=0) pointing to skb->data. find_good_pkt_pointers() then fills the range in the current branch to pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=Z) on success. For above case, we need to extend that to recognize pkt_end >= rX pattern and mark the other branch that is taken on success with the appropriate pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=Z) type via find_good_pkt_pointers(). Since eBPF operates on BPF_JGT (>) and BPF_JGE (>=), these are the only two practical options to test for from what LLVM could have generated, since there's no such thing as BPF_JLT (<) or BPF_JLE (<=) that we would need to take into account as well. After the fix: [...] 7: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80) 8: (61) r9 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76) 9: (bf) r2 = r9 10: (07) r2 += 54 11: (3d) if r3 >= r2 goto pc+12 R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 12: (18) r4 = 0xffffff7a 14: (05) goto pc+430 [...] from 11 to 24: R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=54) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=54) R10=fp 24: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -40) = r1 25: (b7) r1 = 0 26: (63) *(u32 *)(r6 +56) = r1 27: (b7) r2 = 40 28: (71) r8 = *(u8 *)(r9 +20) 29: (bf) r1 = r8 30: (25) if r8 > 0x3c goto pc+47 R1=inv56 R2=imm40 R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R8=inv56 R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=54) R10=fp 31: (b7) r1 = 1 [...] Verifier test cases are also added in this work, one that demonstrates the mentioned example here and one that tries a bad packet access for the current/fall-through branch (the one with types pkt(id=X,off=Y,r=0), pkt(id=X,off=0,r=0)), then a case with good and bad accesses, and two with both test variants (>, >=). Fixes: 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf: direct packet access") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-08 07:03:42 +08:00
*
bpf: enable BPF_J{LT, LE, SLT, SLE} opcodes in verifier Enable the newly added jump opcodes, main parts are in two different areas, namely direct packet access and dynamic map value access. For the direct packet access, we now allow for the following two new patterns to match in order to trigger markings with find_good_pkt_pointers(): Variant 1 (access ok when taking the branch): 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (bf) r0 = r2 3: (07) r0 += 8 4: (ad) if r0 < r3 goto pc+2 R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 5: (b7) r0 = 0 6: (95) exit from 4 to 7: R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=8) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=8) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 7: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) 8: (05) goto pc-4 5: (b7) r0 = 0 6: (95) exit processed 11 insns, stack depth 0 Variant 2 (access ok on fall-through): 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (bf) r0 = r2 3: (07) r0 += 8 4: (bd) if r3 <= r0 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=8) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=8) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 5: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) 6: (b7) r0 = 1 7: (95) exit from 4 to 6: R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 6: (b7) r0 = 1 7: (95) exit processed 10 insns, stack depth 0 The above two basically just swap the branches where we need to handle an exception and allow packet access compared to the two already existing variants for find_good_pkt_pointers(). For the dynamic map value access, we add the new instructions to reg_set_min_max() and reg_set_min_max_inv() in order to learn bounds. Verifier test cases for both are added in a follow-up patch. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-10 07:40:02 +08:00
* Type 1/2:
bpf: fix range propagation on direct packet access LLVM can generate code that tests for direct packet access via skb->data/data_end in a way that currently gets rejected by the verifier, example: [...] 7: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80) 8: (61) r9 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76) 9: (bf) r2 = r9 10: (07) r2 += 54 11: (3d) if r3 >= r2 goto pc+12 R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 12: (18) r4 = 0xffffff7a 14: (05) goto pc+430 [...] from 11 to 24: R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 24: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -40) = r1 25: (b7) r1 = 0 26: (63) *(u32 *)(r6 +56) = r1 27: (b7) r2 = 40 28: (71) r8 = *(u8 *)(r9 +20) invalid access to packet, off=20 size=1, R9(id=0,off=0,r=0) The reason why this gets rejected despite a proper test is that we currently call find_good_pkt_pointers() only in case where we detect tests like rX > pkt_end, where rX is of type pkt(id=Y,off=Z,r=0) and derived, for example, from a register of type pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=0) pointing to skb->data. find_good_pkt_pointers() then fills the range in the current branch to pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=Z) on success. For above case, we need to extend that to recognize pkt_end >= rX pattern and mark the other branch that is taken on success with the appropriate pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=Z) type via find_good_pkt_pointers(). Since eBPF operates on BPF_JGT (>) and BPF_JGE (>=), these are the only two practical options to test for from what LLVM could have generated, since there's no such thing as BPF_JLT (<) or BPF_JLE (<=) that we would need to take into account as well. After the fix: [...] 7: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80) 8: (61) r9 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76) 9: (bf) r2 = r9 10: (07) r2 += 54 11: (3d) if r3 >= r2 goto pc+12 R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 12: (18) r4 = 0xffffff7a 14: (05) goto pc+430 [...] from 11 to 24: R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=54) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=54) R10=fp 24: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -40) = r1 25: (b7) r1 = 0 26: (63) *(u32 *)(r6 +56) = r1 27: (b7) r2 = 40 28: (71) r8 = *(u8 *)(r9 +20) 29: (bf) r1 = r8 30: (25) if r8 > 0x3c goto pc+47 R1=inv56 R2=imm40 R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R8=inv56 R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=54) R10=fp 31: (b7) r1 = 1 [...] Verifier test cases are also added in this work, one that demonstrates the mentioned example here and one that tries a bad packet access for the current/fall-through branch (the one with types pkt(id=X,off=Y,r=0), pkt(id=X,off=0,r=0)), then a case with good and bad accesses, and two with both test variants (>, >=). Fixes: 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf: direct packet access") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-08 07:03:42 +08:00
*
* r2 = r3;
* r2 += 8;
* if (r2 > pkt_end) goto <handle exception>
* <access okay>
*
bpf: enable BPF_J{LT, LE, SLT, SLE} opcodes in verifier Enable the newly added jump opcodes, main parts are in two different areas, namely direct packet access and dynamic map value access. For the direct packet access, we now allow for the following two new patterns to match in order to trigger markings with find_good_pkt_pointers(): Variant 1 (access ok when taking the branch): 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (bf) r0 = r2 3: (07) r0 += 8 4: (ad) if r0 < r3 goto pc+2 R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 5: (b7) r0 = 0 6: (95) exit from 4 to 7: R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=8) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=8) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 7: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) 8: (05) goto pc-4 5: (b7) r0 = 0 6: (95) exit processed 11 insns, stack depth 0 Variant 2 (access ok on fall-through): 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (bf) r0 = r2 3: (07) r0 += 8 4: (bd) if r3 <= r0 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=8) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=8) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 5: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) 6: (b7) r0 = 1 7: (95) exit from 4 to 6: R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 6: (b7) r0 = 1 7: (95) exit processed 10 insns, stack depth 0 The above two basically just swap the branches where we need to handle an exception and allow packet access compared to the two already existing variants for find_good_pkt_pointers(). For the dynamic map value access, we add the new instructions to reg_set_min_max() and reg_set_min_max_inv() in order to learn bounds. Verifier test cases for both are added in a follow-up patch. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-10 07:40:02 +08:00
* r2 = r3;
* r2 += 8;
* if (r2 < pkt_end) goto <access okay>
* <handle exception>
*
bpf: fix range propagation on direct packet access LLVM can generate code that tests for direct packet access via skb->data/data_end in a way that currently gets rejected by the verifier, example: [...] 7: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80) 8: (61) r9 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76) 9: (bf) r2 = r9 10: (07) r2 += 54 11: (3d) if r3 >= r2 goto pc+12 R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 12: (18) r4 = 0xffffff7a 14: (05) goto pc+430 [...] from 11 to 24: R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 24: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -40) = r1 25: (b7) r1 = 0 26: (63) *(u32 *)(r6 +56) = r1 27: (b7) r2 = 40 28: (71) r8 = *(u8 *)(r9 +20) invalid access to packet, off=20 size=1, R9(id=0,off=0,r=0) The reason why this gets rejected despite a proper test is that we currently call find_good_pkt_pointers() only in case where we detect tests like rX > pkt_end, where rX is of type pkt(id=Y,off=Z,r=0) and derived, for example, from a register of type pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=0) pointing to skb->data. find_good_pkt_pointers() then fills the range in the current branch to pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=Z) on success. For above case, we need to extend that to recognize pkt_end >= rX pattern and mark the other branch that is taken on success with the appropriate pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=Z) type via find_good_pkt_pointers(). Since eBPF operates on BPF_JGT (>) and BPF_JGE (>=), these are the only two practical options to test for from what LLVM could have generated, since there's no such thing as BPF_JLT (<) or BPF_JLE (<=) that we would need to take into account as well. After the fix: [...] 7: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80) 8: (61) r9 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76) 9: (bf) r2 = r9 10: (07) r2 += 54 11: (3d) if r3 >= r2 goto pc+12 R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 12: (18) r4 = 0xffffff7a 14: (05) goto pc+430 [...] from 11 to 24: R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=54) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=54) R10=fp 24: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -40) = r1 25: (b7) r1 = 0 26: (63) *(u32 *)(r6 +56) = r1 27: (b7) r2 = 40 28: (71) r8 = *(u8 *)(r9 +20) 29: (bf) r1 = r8 30: (25) if r8 > 0x3c goto pc+47 R1=inv56 R2=imm40 R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R8=inv56 R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=54) R10=fp 31: (b7) r1 = 1 [...] Verifier test cases are also added in this work, one that demonstrates the mentioned example here and one that tries a bad packet access for the current/fall-through branch (the one with types pkt(id=X,off=Y,r=0), pkt(id=X,off=0,r=0)), then a case with good and bad accesses, and two with both test variants (>, >=). Fixes: 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf: direct packet access") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-08 07:03:42 +08:00
* Where:
* r2 == dst_reg, pkt_end == src_reg
* r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0)
* r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0)
*
bpf: enable BPF_J{LT, LE, SLT, SLE} opcodes in verifier Enable the newly added jump opcodes, main parts are in two different areas, namely direct packet access and dynamic map value access. For the direct packet access, we now allow for the following two new patterns to match in order to trigger markings with find_good_pkt_pointers(): Variant 1 (access ok when taking the branch): 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (bf) r0 = r2 3: (07) r0 += 8 4: (ad) if r0 < r3 goto pc+2 R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 5: (b7) r0 = 0 6: (95) exit from 4 to 7: R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=8) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=8) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 7: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) 8: (05) goto pc-4 5: (b7) r0 = 0 6: (95) exit processed 11 insns, stack depth 0 Variant 2 (access ok on fall-through): 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (bf) r0 = r2 3: (07) r0 += 8 4: (bd) if r3 <= r0 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=8) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=8) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 5: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) 6: (b7) r0 = 1 7: (95) exit from 4 to 6: R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 6: (b7) r0 = 1 7: (95) exit processed 10 insns, stack depth 0 The above two basically just swap the branches where we need to handle an exception and allow packet access compared to the two already existing variants for find_good_pkt_pointers(). For the dynamic map value access, we add the new instructions to reg_set_min_max() and reg_set_min_max_inv() in order to learn bounds. Verifier test cases for both are added in a follow-up patch. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-10 07:40:02 +08:00
* Type 3/4:
bpf: fix range propagation on direct packet access LLVM can generate code that tests for direct packet access via skb->data/data_end in a way that currently gets rejected by the verifier, example: [...] 7: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80) 8: (61) r9 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76) 9: (bf) r2 = r9 10: (07) r2 += 54 11: (3d) if r3 >= r2 goto pc+12 R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 12: (18) r4 = 0xffffff7a 14: (05) goto pc+430 [...] from 11 to 24: R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 24: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -40) = r1 25: (b7) r1 = 0 26: (63) *(u32 *)(r6 +56) = r1 27: (b7) r2 = 40 28: (71) r8 = *(u8 *)(r9 +20) invalid access to packet, off=20 size=1, R9(id=0,off=0,r=0) The reason why this gets rejected despite a proper test is that we currently call find_good_pkt_pointers() only in case where we detect tests like rX > pkt_end, where rX is of type pkt(id=Y,off=Z,r=0) and derived, for example, from a register of type pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=0) pointing to skb->data. find_good_pkt_pointers() then fills the range in the current branch to pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=Z) on success. For above case, we need to extend that to recognize pkt_end >= rX pattern and mark the other branch that is taken on success with the appropriate pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=Z) type via find_good_pkt_pointers(). Since eBPF operates on BPF_JGT (>) and BPF_JGE (>=), these are the only two practical options to test for from what LLVM could have generated, since there's no such thing as BPF_JLT (<) or BPF_JLE (<=) that we would need to take into account as well. After the fix: [...] 7: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80) 8: (61) r9 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76) 9: (bf) r2 = r9 10: (07) r2 += 54 11: (3d) if r3 >= r2 goto pc+12 R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 12: (18) r4 = 0xffffff7a 14: (05) goto pc+430 [...] from 11 to 24: R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=54) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=54) R10=fp 24: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -40) = r1 25: (b7) r1 = 0 26: (63) *(u32 *)(r6 +56) = r1 27: (b7) r2 = 40 28: (71) r8 = *(u8 *)(r9 +20) 29: (bf) r1 = r8 30: (25) if r8 > 0x3c goto pc+47 R1=inv56 R2=imm40 R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R8=inv56 R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=54) R10=fp 31: (b7) r1 = 1 [...] Verifier test cases are also added in this work, one that demonstrates the mentioned example here and one that tries a bad packet access for the current/fall-through branch (the one with types pkt(id=X,off=Y,r=0), pkt(id=X,off=0,r=0)), then a case with good and bad accesses, and two with both test variants (>, >=). Fixes: 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf: direct packet access") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-08 07:03:42 +08:00
*
* r2 = r3;
* r2 += 8;
* if (pkt_end >= r2) goto <access okay>
* <handle exception>
*
bpf: enable BPF_J{LT, LE, SLT, SLE} opcodes in verifier Enable the newly added jump opcodes, main parts are in two different areas, namely direct packet access and dynamic map value access. For the direct packet access, we now allow for the following two new patterns to match in order to trigger markings with find_good_pkt_pointers(): Variant 1 (access ok when taking the branch): 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (bf) r0 = r2 3: (07) r0 += 8 4: (ad) if r0 < r3 goto pc+2 R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 5: (b7) r0 = 0 6: (95) exit from 4 to 7: R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=8) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=8) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 7: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) 8: (05) goto pc-4 5: (b7) r0 = 0 6: (95) exit processed 11 insns, stack depth 0 Variant 2 (access ok on fall-through): 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (bf) r0 = r2 3: (07) r0 += 8 4: (bd) if r3 <= r0 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=8) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=8) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 5: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) 6: (b7) r0 = 1 7: (95) exit from 4 to 6: R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 6: (b7) r0 = 1 7: (95) exit processed 10 insns, stack depth 0 The above two basically just swap the branches where we need to handle an exception and allow packet access compared to the two already existing variants for find_good_pkt_pointers(). For the dynamic map value access, we add the new instructions to reg_set_min_max() and reg_set_min_max_inv() in order to learn bounds. Verifier test cases for both are added in a follow-up patch. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-10 07:40:02 +08:00
* r2 = r3;
* r2 += 8;
* if (pkt_end <= r2) goto <handle exception>
* <access okay>
*
bpf: fix range propagation on direct packet access LLVM can generate code that tests for direct packet access via skb->data/data_end in a way that currently gets rejected by the verifier, example: [...] 7: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80) 8: (61) r9 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76) 9: (bf) r2 = r9 10: (07) r2 += 54 11: (3d) if r3 >= r2 goto pc+12 R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 12: (18) r4 = 0xffffff7a 14: (05) goto pc+430 [...] from 11 to 24: R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 24: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -40) = r1 25: (b7) r1 = 0 26: (63) *(u32 *)(r6 +56) = r1 27: (b7) r2 = 40 28: (71) r8 = *(u8 *)(r9 +20) invalid access to packet, off=20 size=1, R9(id=0,off=0,r=0) The reason why this gets rejected despite a proper test is that we currently call find_good_pkt_pointers() only in case where we detect tests like rX > pkt_end, where rX is of type pkt(id=Y,off=Z,r=0) and derived, for example, from a register of type pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=0) pointing to skb->data. find_good_pkt_pointers() then fills the range in the current branch to pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=Z) on success. For above case, we need to extend that to recognize pkt_end >= rX pattern and mark the other branch that is taken on success with the appropriate pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=Z) type via find_good_pkt_pointers(). Since eBPF operates on BPF_JGT (>) and BPF_JGE (>=), these are the only two practical options to test for from what LLVM could have generated, since there's no such thing as BPF_JLT (<) or BPF_JLE (<=) that we would need to take into account as well. After the fix: [...] 7: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80) 8: (61) r9 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76) 9: (bf) r2 = r9 10: (07) r2 += 54 11: (3d) if r3 >= r2 goto pc+12 R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 12: (18) r4 = 0xffffff7a 14: (05) goto pc+430 [...] from 11 to 24: R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=54) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=54) R10=fp 24: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -40) = r1 25: (b7) r1 = 0 26: (63) *(u32 *)(r6 +56) = r1 27: (b7) r2 = 40 28: (71) r8 = *(u8 *)(r9 +20) 29: (bf) r1 = r8 30: (25) if r8 > 0x3c goto pc+47 R1=inv56 R2=imm40 R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R8=inv56 R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=54) R10=fp 31: (b7) r1 = 1 [...] Verifier test cases are also added in this work, one that demonstrates the mentioned example here and one that tries a bad packet access for the current/fall-through branch (the one with types pkt(id=X,off=Y,r=0), pkt(id=X,off=0,r=0)), then a case with good and bad accesses, and two with both test variants (>, >=). Fixes: 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf: direct packet access") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-08 07:03:42 +08:00
* Where:
* pkt_end == dst_reg, r2 == src_reg
* r2=pkt(id=n,off=8,r=0)
* r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=0)
*
* Find register r3 and mark its range as r3=pkt(id=n,off=0,r=8)
* so that range of bytes [r3, r3 + 8) is safe to access.
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
*/
bpf: fix range propagation on direct packet access LLVM can generate code that tests for direct packet access via skb->data/data_end in a way that currently gets rejected by the verifier, example: [...] 7: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80) 8: (61) r9 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76) 9: (bf) r2 = r9 10: (07) r2 += 54 11: (3d) if r3 >= r2 goto pc+12 R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 12: (18) r4 = 0xffffff7a 14: (05) goto pc+430 [...] from 11 to 24: R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 24: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -40) = r1 25: (b7) r1 = 0 26: (63) *(u32 *)(r6 +56) = r1 27: (b7) r2 = 40 28: (71) r8 = *(u8 *)(r9 +20) invalid access to packet, off=20 size=1, R9(id=0,off=0,r=0) The reason why this gets rejected despite a proper test is that we currently call find_good_pkt_pointers() only in case where we detect tests like rX > pkt_end, where rX is of type pkt(id=Y,off=Z,r=0) and derived, for example, from a register of type pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=0) pointing to skb->data. find_good_pkt_pointers() then fills the range in the current branch to pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=Z) on success. For above case, we need to extend that to recognize pkt_end >= rX pattern and mark the other branch that is taken on success with the appropriate pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=Z) type via find_good_pkt_pointers(). Since eBPF operates on BPF_JGT (>) and BPF_JGE (>=), these are the only two practical options to test for from what LLVM could have generated, since there's no such thing as BPF_JLT (<) or BPF_JLE (<=) that we would need to take into account as well. After the fix: [...] 7: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80) 8: (61) r9 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76) 9: (bf) r2 = r9 10: (07) r2 += 54 11: (3d) if r3 >= r2 goto pc+12 R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 12: (18) r4 = 0xffffff7a 14: (05) goto pc+430 [...] from 11 to 24: R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=54) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=54) R10=fp 24: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -40) = r1 25: (b7) r1 = 0 26: (63) *(u32 *)(r6 +56) = r1 27: (b7) r2 = 40 28: (71) r8 = *(u8 *)(r9 +20) 29: (bf) r1 = r8 30: (25) if r8 > 0x3c goto pc+47 R1=inv56 R2=imm40 R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R8=inv56 R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=54) R10=fp 31: (b7) r1 = 1 [...] Verifier test cases are also added in this work, one that demonstrates the mentioned example here and one that tries a bad packet access for the current/fall-through branch (the one with types pkt(id=X,off=Y,r=0), pkt(id=X,off=0,r=0)), then a case with good and bad accesses, and two with both test variants (>, >=). Fixes: 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf: direct packet access") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-08 07:03:42 +08:00
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
/* If our ids match, then we must have the same max_value. And we
* don't care about the other reg's fixed offset, since if it's too big
* the range won't allow anything.
* dst_reg->off is known < MAX_PACKET_OFF, therefore it fits in a u16.
*/
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
bpf: add meta pointer for direct access This work enables generic transfer of metadata from XDP into skb. The basic idea is that we can make use of the fact that the resulting skb must be linear and already comes with a larger headroom for supporting bpf_xdp_adjust_head(), which mangles xdp->data. Here, we base our work on a similar principle and introduce a small helper bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() for adjusting a new pointer called xdp->data_meta. Thus, the packet has a flexible and programmable room for meta data, followed by the actual packet data. struct xdp_buff is therefore laid out that we first point to data_hard_start, then data_meta directly prepended to data followed by data_end marking the end of packet. bpf_xdp_adjust_head() takes into account whether we have meta data already prepended and if so, memmove()s this along with the given offset provided there's enough room. xdp->data_meta is optional and programs are not required to use it. The rationale is that when we process the packet in XDP (e.g. as DoS filter), we can push further meta data along with it for the XDP_PASS case, and give the guarantee that a clsact ingress BPF program on the same device can pick this up for further post-processing. Since we work with skb there, we can also set skb->mark, skb->priority or other skb meta data out of BPF, thus having this scratch space generic and programmable allows for more flexibility than defining a direct 1:1 transfer of potentially new XDP members into skb (it's also more efficient as we don't need to initialize/handle each of such new members). The facility also works together with GRO aggregation. The scratch space at the head of the packet can be multiple of 4 byte up to 32 byte large. Drivers not yet supporting xdp->data_meta can simply be set up with xdp->data_meta as xdp->data + 1 as bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() will detect this and bail out, such that the subsequent match against xdp->data for later access is guaranteed to fail. The verifier treats xdp->data_meta/xdp->data the same way as we treat xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons. The requirement for doing the compare against xdp->data is that it hasn't been modified from it's original address we got from ctx access. It may have a range marking already from prior successful xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons though. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-25 08:25:51 +08:00
if (regs[i].type == type && regs[i].id == dst_reg->id)
bpf: improve verifier packet range checks llvm can optimize the 'if (ptr > data_end)' checks to be in the order slightly different than the original C code which will confuse verifier. Like: if (ptr + 16 > data_end) return TC_ACT_SHOT; // may be followed by if (ptr + 14 > data_end) return TC_ACT_SHOT; while llvm can see that 'ptr' is valid for all 16 bytes, the verifier could not. Fix verifier logic to account for such case and add a test. Reported-by: Huapeng Zhou <hzhou@fb.com> Fixes: 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf: direct packet access") Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-25 06:57:33 +08:00
/* keep the maximum range already checked */
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
regs[i].range = max_t(u16, regs[i].range, dst_reg->off);
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) {
if (state->stack_slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL)
continue;
reg = &state->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE];
bpf: add meta pointer for direct access This work enables generic transfer of metadata from XDP into skb. The basic idea is that we can make use of the fact that the resulting skb must be linear and already comes with a larger headroom for supporting bpf_xdp_adjust_head(), which mangles xdp->data. Here, we base our work on a similar principle and introduce a small helper bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() for adjusting a new pointer called xdp->data_meta. Thus, the packet has a flexible and programmable room for meta data, followed by the actual packet data. struct xdp_buff is therefore laid out that we first point to data_hard_start, then data_meta directly prepended to data followed by data_end marking the end of packet. bpf_xdp_adjust_head() takes into account whether we have meta data already prepended and if so, memmove()s this along with the given offset provided there's enough room. xdp->data_meta is optional and programs are not required to use it. The rationale is that when we process the packet in XDP (e.g. as DoS filter), we can push further meta data along with it for the XDP_PASS case, and give the guarantee that a clsact ingress BPF program on the same device can pick this up for further post-processing. Since we work with skb there, we can also set skb->mark, skb->priority or other skb meta data out of BPF, thus having this scratch space generic and programmable allows for more flexibility than defining a direct 1:1 transfer of potentially new XDP members into skb (it's also more efficient as we don't need to initialize/handle each of such new members). The facility also works together with GRO aggregation. The scratch space at the head of the packet can be multiple of 4 byte up to 32 byte large. Drivers not yet supporting xdp->data_meta can simply be set up with xdp->data_meta as xdp->data + 1 as bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() will detect this and bail out, such that the subsequent match against xdp->data for later access is guaranteed to fail. The verifier treats xdp->data_meta/xdp->data the same way as we treat xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons. The requirement for doing the compare against xdp->data is that it hasn't been modified from it's original address we got from ctx access. It may have a range marking already from prior successful xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons though. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-25 08:25:51 +08:00
if (reg->type == type && reg->id == dst_reg->id)
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
reg->range = max_t(u16, reg->range, dst_reg->off);
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
}
}
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
/* Adjusts the register min/max values in the case that the dst_reg is the
* variable register that we are working on, and src_reg is a constant or we're
* simply doing a BPF_K check.
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
* In JEQ/JNE cases we also adjust the var_off values.
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
*/
static void reg_set_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg,
struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg, u64 val,
u8 opcode)
{
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
/* If the dst_reg is a pointer, we can't learn anything about its
* variable offset from the compare (unless src_reg were a pointer into
* the same object, but we don't bother with that.
* Since false_reg and true_reg have the same type by construction, we
* only need to check one of them for pointerness.
*/
if (__is_pointer_value(false, false_reg))
return;
bpf: fix mixed signed/unsigned derived min/max value bounds Edward reported that there's an issue in min/max value bounds tracking when signed and unsigned compares both provide hints on limits when having unknown variables. E.g. a program such as the following should have been rejected: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (18) r1 = 0xffff8a94cda93400 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+7 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = -8 8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 9: (b7) r2 = -1 10: (2d) if r1 > r2 goto pc+3 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0 R2=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp 11: (65) if r1 s> 0x1 goto pc+2 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R2=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp 12: (0f) r0 += r1 13: (72) *(u8 *)(r0 +0) = 0 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=1 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R2=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp 14: (b7) r0 = 0 15: (95) exit What happens is that in the first part ... 8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 9: (b7) r2 = -1 10: (2d) if r1 > r2 goto pc+3 ... r1 carries an unsigned value, and is compared as unsigned against a register carrying an immediate. Verifier deduces in reg_set_min_max() that since the compare is unsigned and operation is greater than (>), that in the fall-through/false case, r1's minimum bound must be 0 and maximum bound must be r2. Latter is larger than the bound and thus max value is reset back to being 'invalid' aka BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE. Thus, r1 state is now 'R1=inv,min_value=0'. The subsequent test ... 11: (65) if r1 s> 0x1 goto pc+2 ... is a signed compare of r1 with immediate value 1. Here, verifier deduces in reg_set_min_max() that since the compare is signed this time and operation is greater than (>), that in the fall-through/false case, we can deduce that r1's maximum bound must be 1, meaning with prior test, we result in r1 having the following state: R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1. Given that the actual value this holds is -8, the bounds are wrongly deduced. When this is being added to r0 which holds the map_value(_adj) type, then subsequent store access in above case will go through check_mem_access() which invokes check_map_access_adj(), that will then probe whether the map memory is in bounds based on the min_value and max_value as well as access size since the actual unknown value is min_value <= x <= max_value; commit fce366a9dd0d ("bpf, verifier: fix alu ops against map_value{, _adj} register types") provides some more explanation on the semantics. It's worth to note in this context that in the current code, min_value and max_value tracking are used for two things, i) dynamic map value access via check_map_access_adj() and since commit 06c1c049721a ("bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory") ii) also enforced at check_helper_mem_access() when passing a memory address (pointer to packet, map value, stack) and length pair to a helper and the length in this case is an unknown value defining an access range through min_value/max_value in that case. The min_value/max_value tracking is /not/ used in the direct packet access case to track ranges. However, the issue also affects case ii), for example, the following crafted program based on the same principle must be rejected as well: 0: (b7) r2 = 0 1: (bf) r3 = r10 2: (07) r3 += -512 3: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = -8 4: (79) r4 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 5: (b7) r6 = -1 6: (2d) if r4 > r6 goto pc+5 R1=ctx R2=imm0,min_value=0,max_value=0,min_align=2147483648 R3=fp-512 R4=inv,min_value=0 R6=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp 7: (65) if r4 s> 0x1 goto pc+4 R1=ctx R2=imm0,min_value=0,max_value=0,min_align=2147483648 R3=fp-512 R4=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R6=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp 8: (07) r4 += 1 9: (b7) r5 = 0 10: (6a) *(u16 *)(r10 -512) = 0 11: (85) call bpf_skb_load_bytes#26 12: (b7) r0 = 0 13: (95) exit Meaning, while we initialize the max_value stack slot that the verifier thinks we access in the [1,2] range, in reality we pass -7 as length which is interpreted as u32 in the helper. Thus, this issue is relevant also for the case of helper ranges. Resetting both bounds in check_reg_overflow() in case only one of them exceeds limits is also not enough as similar test can be created that uses values which are within range, thus also here learned min value in r1 is incorrect when mixed with later signed test to create a range: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (18) r1 = 0xffff880ad081fa00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+7 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = -8 8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 9: (b7) r2 = 2 10: (3d) if r2 >= r1 goto pc+3 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R10=fp 11: (65) if r1 s> 0x4 goto pc+2 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3,max_value=4 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R10=fp 12: (0f) r0 += r1 13: (72) *(u8 *)(r0 +0) = 0 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=4 R1=inv,min_value=3,max_value=4 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R10=fp 14: (b7) r0 = 0 15: (95) exit This leaves us with two options for fixing this: i) to invalidate all prior learned information once we switch signed context, ii) to track min/max signed and unsigned boundaries separately as done in [0]. (Given latter introduces major changes throughout the whole verifier, it's rather net-next material, thus this patch follows option i), meaning we can derive bounds either from only signed tests or only unsigned tests.) There is still the case of adjust_reg_min_max_vals(), where we adjust bounds on ALU operations, meaning programs like the following where boundaries on the reg get mixed in context later on when bounds are merged on the dst reg must get rejected, too: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (18) r1 = 0xffff89b2bf87ce00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+6 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = -8 8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 9: (b7) r2 = 2 10: (3d) if r2 >= r1 goto pc+2 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R10=fp 11: (b7) r7 = 1 12: (65) if r7 s> 0x0 goto pc+2 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R7=imm1,max_value=0 R10=fp 13: (b7) r0 = 0 14: (95) exit from 12 to 15: R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R7=imm1,min_value=1 R10=fp 15: (0f) r7 += r1 16: (65) if r7 s> 0x4 goto pc+2 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R7=inv,min_value=4,max_value=4 R10=fp 17: (0f) r0 += r7 18: (72) *(u8 *)(r0 +0) = 0 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=4,max_value=4 R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R7=inv,min_value=4,max_value=4 R10=fp 19: (b7) r0 = 0 20: (95) exit Meaning, in adjust_reg_min_max_vals() we must also reset range values on the dst when src/dst registers have mixed signed/ unsigned derived min/max value bounds with one unbounded value as otherwise they can be added together deducing false boundaries. Once both boundaries are established from either ALU ops or compare operations w/o mixing signed/unsigned insns, then they can safely be added to other regs also having both boundaries established. Adding regs with one unbounded side to a map value where the bounded side has been learned w/o mixing ops is possible, but the resulting map value won't recover from that, meaning such op is considered invalid on the time of actual access. Invalid bounds are set on the dst reg in case i) src reg, or ii) in case dst reg already had them. The only way to recover would be to perform i) ALU ops but only 'add' is allowed on map value types or ii) comparisons, but these are disallowed on pointers in case they span a range. This is fine as only BPF_JEQ and BPF_JNE may be performed on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers which potentially turn them into PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE type depending on the branch, so only here min/max value cannot be invalidated for them. In terms of state pruning, value_from_signed is considered as well in states_equal() when dealing with adjusted map values. With regards to breaking existing programs, there is a small risk, but use-cases are rather quite narrow where this could occur and mixing compares probably unlikely. Joint work with Josef and Edward. [0] https://lists.iovisor.org/pipermail/iovisor-dev/2017-June/000822.html Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") Reported-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-21 06:00:21 +08:00
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
switch (opcode) {
case BPF_JEQ:
/* If this is false then we know nothing Jon Snow, but if it is
* true then we know for sure.
*/
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
__mark_reg_known(true_reg, val);
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
break;
case BPF_JNE:
/* If this is true we know nothing Jon Snow, but if it is false
* we know the value for sure;
*/
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
__mark_reg_known(false_reg, val);
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
break;
case BPF_JGT:
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
false_reg->umax_value = min(false_reg->umax_value, val);
true_reg->umin_value = max(true_reg->umin_value, val + 1);
break;
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
case BPF_JSGT:
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
false_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, false_reg->smax_value, val);
true_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, true_reg->smin_value, val + 1);
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
break;
bpf: enable BPF_J{LT, LE, SLT, SLE} opcodes in verifier Enable the newly added jump opcodes, main parts are in two different areas, namely direct packet access and dynamic map value access. For the direct packet access, we now allow for the following two new patterns to match in order to trigger markings with find_good_pkt_pointers(): Variant 1 (access ok when taking the branch): 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (bf) r0 = r2 3: (07) r0 += 8 4: (ad) if r0 < r3 goto pc+2 R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 5: (b7) r0 = 0 6: (95) exit from 4 to 7: R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=8) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=8) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 7: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) 8: (05) goto pc-4 5: (b7) r0 = 0 6: (95) exit processed 11 insns, stack depth 0 Variant 2 (access ok on fall-through): 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (bf) r0 = r2 3: (07) r0 += 8 4: (bd) if r3 <= r0 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=8) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=8) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 5: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) 6: (b7) r0 = 1 7: (95) exit from 4 to 6: R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 6: (b7) r0 = 1 7: (95) exit processed 10 insns, stack depth 0 The above two basically just swap the branches where we need to handle an exception and allow packet access compared to the two already existing variants for find_good_pkt_pointers(). For the dynamic map value access, we add the new instructions to reg_set_min_max() and reg_set_min_max_inv() in order to learn bounds. Verifier test cases for both are added in a follow-up patch. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-10 07:40:02 +08:00
case BPF_JLT:
false_reg->umin_value = max(false_reg->umin_value, val);
true_reg->umax_value = min(true_reg->umax_value, val - 1);
break;
case BPF_JSLT:
false_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, false_reg->smin_value, val);
true_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, true_reg->smax_value, val - 1);
break;
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
case BPF_JGE:
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
false_reg->umax_value = min(false_reg->umax_value, val - 1);
true_reg->umin_value = max(true_reg->umin_value, val);
break;
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
case BPF_JSGE:
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
false_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, false_reg->smax_value, val - 1);
true_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, true_reg->smin_value, val);
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
break;
bpf: enable BPF_J{LT, LE, SLT, SLE} opcodes in verifier Enable the newly added jump opcodes, main parts are in two different areas, namely direct packet access and dynamic map value access. For the direct packet access, we now allow for the following two new patterns to match in order to trigger markings with find_good_pkt_pointers(): Variant 1 (access ok when taking the branch): 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (bf) r0 = r2 3: (07) r0 += 8 4: (ad) if r0 < r3 goto pc+2 R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 5: (b7) r0 = 0 6: (95) exit from 4 to 7: R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=8) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=8) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 7: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) 8: (05) goto pc-4 5: (b7) r0 = 0 6: (95) exit processed 11 insns, stack depth 0 Variant 2 (access ok on fall-through): 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (bf) r0 = r2 3: (07) r0 += 8 4: (bd) if r3 <= r0 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=8) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=8) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 5: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) 6: (b7) r0 = 1 7: (95) exit from 4 to 6: R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 6: (b7) r0 = 1 7: (95) exit processed 10 insns, stack depth 0 The above two basically just swap the branches where we need to handle an exception and allow packet access compared to the two already existing variants for find_good_pkt_pointers(). For the dynamic map value access, we add the new instructions to reg_set_min_max() and reg_set_min_max_inv() in order to learn bounds. Verifier test cases for both are added in a follow-up patch. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-10 07:40:02 +08:00
case BPF_JLE:
false_reg->umin_value = max(false_reg->umin_value, val + 1);
true_reg->umax_value = min(true_reg->umax_value, val);
break;
case BPF_JSLE:
false_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, false_reg->smin_value, val + 1);
true_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, true_reg->smax_value, val);
break;
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
default:
break;
}
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
__reg_deduce_bounds(false_reg);
__reg_deduce_bounds(true_reg);
/* We might have learned some bits from the bounds. */
__reg_bound_offset(false_reg);
__reg_bound_offset(true_reg);
/* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds
* slightly. e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc),
* then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax.
*/
__update_reg_bounds(false_reg);
__update_reg_bounds(true_reg);
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
}
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
/* Same as above, but for the case that dst_reg holds a constant and src_reg is
* the variable reg.
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
*/
static void reg_set_min_max_inv(struct bpf_reg_state *true_reg,
struct bpf_reg_state *false_reg, u64 val,
u8 opcode)
{
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
if (__is_pointer_value(false, false_reg))
return;
bpf: fix mixed signed/unsigned derived min/max value bounds Edward reported that there's an issue in min/max value bounds tracking when signed and unsigned compares both provide hints on limits when having unknown variables. E.g. a program such as the following should have been rejected: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (18) r1 = 0xffff8a94cda93400 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+7 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = -8 8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 9: (b7) r2 = -1 10: (2d) if r1 > r2 goto pc+3 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0 R2=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp 11: (65) if r1 s> 0x1 goto pc+2 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R2=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp 12: (0f) r0 += r1 13: (72) *(u8 *)(r0 +0) = 0 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=1 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R2=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp 14: (b7) r0 = 0 15: (95) exit What happens is that in the first part ... 8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 9: (b7) r2 = -1 10: (2d) if r1 > r2 goto pc+3 ... r1 carries an unsigned value, and is compared as unsigned against a register carrying an immediate. Verifier deduces in reg_set_min_max() that since the compare is unsigned and operation is greater than (>), that in the fall-through/false case, r1's minimum bound must be 0 and maximum bound must be r2. Latter is larger than the bound and thus max value is reset back to being 'invalid' aka BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE. Thus, r1 state is now 'R1=inv,min_value=0'. The subsequent test ... 11: (65) if r1 s> 0x1 goto pc+2 ... is a signed compare of r1 with immediate value 1. Here, verifier deduces in reg_set_min_max() that since the compare is signed this time and operation is greater than (>), that in the fall-through/false case, we can deduce that r1's maximum bound must be 1, meaning with prior test, we result in r1 having the following state: R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1. Given that the actual value this holds is -8, the bounds are wrongly deduced. When this is being added to r0 which holds the map_value(_adj) type, then subsequent store access in above case will go through check_mem_access() which invokes check_map_access_adj(), that will then probe whether the map memory is in bounds based on the min_value and max_value as well as access size since the actual unknown value is min_value <= x <= max_value; commit fce366a9dd0d ("bpf, verifier: fix alu ops against map_value{, _adj} register types") provides some more explanation on the semantics. It's worth to note in this context that in the current code, min_value and max_value tracking are used for two things, i) dynamic map value access via check_map_access_adj() and since commit 06c1c049721a ("bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory") ii) also enforced at check_helper_mem_access() when passing a memory address (pointer to packet, map value, stack) and length pair to a helper and the length in this case is an unknown value defining an access range through min_value/max_value in that case. The min_value/max_value tracking is /not/ used in the direct packet access case to track ranges. However, the issue also affects case ii), for example, the following crafted program based on the same principle must be rejected as well: 0: (b7) r2 = 0 1: (bf) r3 = r10 2: (07) r3 += -512 3: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = -8 4: (79) r4 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 5: (b7) r6 = -1 6: (2d) if r4 > r6 goto pc+5 R1=ctx R2=imm0,min_value=0,max_value=0,min_align=2147483648 R3=fp-512 R4=inv,min_value=0 R6=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp 7: (65) if r4 s> 0x1 goto pc+4 R1=ctx R2=imm0,min_value=0,max_value=0,min_align=2147483648 R3=fp-512 R4=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R6=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp 8: (07) r4 += 1 9: (b7) r5 = 0 10: (6a) *(u16 *)(r10 -512) = 0 11: (85) call bpf_skb_load_bytes#26 12: (b7) r0 = 0 13: (95) exit Meaning, while we initialize the max_value stack slot that the verifier thinks we access in the [1,2] range, in reality we pass -7 as length which is interpreted as u32 in the helper. Thus, this issue is relevant also for the case of helper ranges. Resetting both bounds in check_reg_overflow() in case only one of them exceeds limits is also not enough as similar test can be created that uses values which are within range, thus also here learned min value in r1 is incorrect when mixed with later signed test to create a range: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (18) r1 = 0xffff880ad081fa00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+7 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = -8 8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 9: (b7) r2 = 2 10: (3d) if r2 >= r1 goto pc+3 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R10=fp 11: (65) if r1 s> 0x4 goto pc+2 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3,max_value=4 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R10=fp 12: (0f) r0 += r1 13: (72) *(u8 *)(r0 +0) = 0 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=4 R1=inv,min_value=3,max_value=4 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R10=fp 14: (b7) r0 = 0 15: (95) exit This leaves us with two options for fixing this: i) to invalidate all prior learned information once we switch signed context, ii) to track min/max signed and unsigned boundaries separately as done in [0]. (Given latter introduces major changes throughout the whole verifier, it's rather net-next material, thus this patch follows option i), meaning we can derive bounds either from only signed tests or only unsigned tests.) There is still the case of adjust_reg_min_max_vals(), where we adjust bounds on ALU operations, meaning programs like the following where boundaries on the reg get mixed in context later on when bounds are merged on the dst reg must get rejected, too: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (18) r1 = 0xffff89b2bf87ce00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+6 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = -8 8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 9: (b7) r2 = 2 10: (3d) if r2 >= r1 goto pc+2 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R10=fp 11: (b7) r7 = 1 12: (65) if r7 s> 0x0 goto pc+2 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R7=imm1,max_value=0 R10=fp 13: (b7) r0 = 0 14: (95) exit from 12 to 15: R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R7=imm1,min_value=1 R10=fp 15: (0f) r7 += r1 16: (65) if r7 s> 0x4 goto pc+2 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R7=inv,min_value=4,max_value=4 R10=fp 17: (0f) r0 += r7 18: (72) *(u8 *)(r0 +0) = 0 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=4,max_value=4 R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R7=inv,min_value=4,max_value=4 R10=fp 19: (b7) r0 = 0 20: (95) exit Meaning, in adjust_reg_min_max_vals() we must also reset range values on the dst when src/dst registers have mixed signed/ unsigned derived min/max value bounds with one unbounded value as otherwise they can be added together deducing false boundaries. Once both boundaries are established from either ALU ops or compare operations w/o mixing signed/unsigned insns, then they can safely be added to other regs also having both boundaries established. Adding regs with one unbounded side to a map value where the bounded side has been learned w/o mixing ops is possible, but the resulting map value won't recover from that, meaning such op is considered invalid on the time of actual access. Invalid bounds are set on the dst reg in case i) src reg, or ii) in case dst reg already had them. The only way to recover would be to perform i) ALU ops but only 'add' is allowed on map value types or ii) comparisons, but these are disallowed on pointers in case they span a range. This is fine as only BPF_JEQ and BPF_JNE may be performed on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers which potentially turn them into PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE type depending on the branch, so only here min/max value cannot be invalidated for them. In terms of state pruning, value_from_signed is considered as well in states_equal() when dealing with adjusted map values. With regards to breaking existing programs, there is a small risk, but use-cases are rather quite narrow where this could occur and mixing compares probably unlikely. Joint work with Josef and Edward. [0] https://lists.iovisor.org/pipermail/iovisor-dev/2017-June/000822.html Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") Reported-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-21 06:00:21 +08:00
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
switch (opcode) {
case BPF_JEQ:
/* If this is false then we know nothing Jon Snow, but if it is
* true then we know for sure.
*/
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
__mark_reg_known(true_reg, val);
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
break;
case BPF_JNE:
/* If this is true we know nothing Jon Snow, but if it is false
* we know the value for sure;
*/
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
__mark_reg_known(false_reg, val);
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
break;
case BPF_JGT:
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
true_reg->umax_value = min(true_reg->umax_value, val - 1);
false_reg->umin_value = max(false_reg->umin_value, val);
break;
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
case BPF_JSGT:
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
true_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, true_reg->smax_value, val - 1);
false_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, false_reg->smin_value, val);
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
break;
bpf: enable BPF_J{LT, LE, SLT, SLE} opcodes in verifier Enable the newly added jump opcodes, main parts are in two different areas, namely direct packet access and dynamic map value access. For the direct packet access, we now allow for the following two new patterns to match in order to trigger markings with find_good_pkt_pointers(): Variant 1 (access ok when taking the branch): 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (bf) r0 = r2 3: (07) r0 += 8 4: (ad) if r0 < r3 goto pc+2 R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 5: (b7) r0 = 0 6: (95) exit from 4 to 7: R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=8) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=8) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 7: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) 8: (05) goto pc-4 5: (b7) r0 = 0 6: (95) exit processed 11 insns, stack depth 0 Variant 2 (access ok on fall-through): 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (bf) r0 = r2 3: (07) r0 += 8 4: (bd) if r3 <= r0 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=8) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=8) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 5: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) 6: (b7) r0 = 1 7: (95) exit from 4 to 6: R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 6: (b7) r0 = 1 7: (95) exit processed 10 insns, stack depth 0 The above two basically just swap the branches where we need to handle an exception and allow packet access compared to the two already existing variants for find_good_pkt_pointers(). For the dynamic map value access, we add the new instructions to reg_set_min_max() and reg_set_min_max_inv() in order to learn bounds. Verifier test cases for both are added in a follow-up patch. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-10 07:40:02 +08:00
case BPF_JLT:
true_reg->umin_value = max(true_reg->umin_value, val + 1);
false_reg->umax_value = min(false_reg->umax_value, val);
break;
case BPF_JSLT:
true_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, true_reg->smin_value, val + 1);
false_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, false_reg->smax_value, val);
break;
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
case BPF_JGE:
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
true_reg->umax_value = min(true_reg->umax_value, val);
false_reg->umin_value = max(false_reg->umin_value, val + 1);
break;
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
case BPF_JSGE:
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
true_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, true_reg->smax_value, val);
false_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, false_reg->smin_value, val + 1);
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
break;
bpf: enable BPF_J{LT, LE, SLT, SLE} opcodes in verifier Enable the newly added jump opcodes, main parts are in two different areas, namely direct packet access and dynamic map value access. For the direct packet access, we now allow for the following two new patterns to match in order to trigger markings with find_good_pkt_pointers(): Variant 1 (access ok when taking the branch): 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (bf) r0 = r2 3: (07) r0 += 8 4: (ad) if r0 < r3 goto pc+2 R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 5: (b7) r0 = 0 6: (95) exit from 4 to 7: R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=8) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=8) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 7: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) 8: (05) goto pc-4 5: (b7) r0 = 0 6: (95) exit processed 11 insns, stack depth 0 Variant 2 (access ok on fall-through): 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (bf) r0 = r2 3: (07) r0 += 8 4: (bd) if r3 <= r0 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=8) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=8) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 5: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) 6: (b7) r0 = 1 7: (95) exit from 4 to 6: R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 6: (b7) r0 = 1 7: (95) exit processed 10 insns, stack depth 0 The above two basically just swap the branches where we need to handle an exception and allow packet access compared to the two already existing variants for find_good_pkt_pointers(). For the dynamic map value access, we add the new instructions to reg_set_min_max() and reg_set_min_max_inv() in order to learn bounds. Verifier test cases for both are added in a follow-up patch. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-10 07:40:02 +08:00
case BPF_JLE:
true_reg->umin_value = max(true_reg->umin_value, val);
false_reg->umax_value = min(false_reg->umax_value, val - 1);
break;
case BPF_JSLE:
true_reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, true_reg->smin_value, val);
false_reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, false_reg->smax_value, val - 1);
break;
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
default:
break;
}
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
__reg_deduce_bounds(false_reg);
__reg_deduce_bounds(true_reg);
/* We might have learned some bits from the bounds. */
__reg_bound_offset(false_reg);
__reg_bound_offset(true_reg);
/* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds
* slightly. e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc),
* then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax.
*/
__update_reg_bounds(false_reg);
__update_reg_bounds(true_reg);
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
}
/* Regs are known to be equal, so intersect their min/max/var_off */
static void __reg_combine_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg,
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
{
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
src_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->umin_value = max(src_reg->umin_value,
dst_reg->umin_value);
src_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->umax_value = min(src_reg->umax_value,
dst_reg->umax_value);
src_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->smin_value = max(src_reg->smin_value,
dst_reg->smin_value);
src_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->smax_value = min(src_reg->smax_value,
dst_reg->smax_value);
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
src_reg->var_off = dst_reg->var_off = tnum_intersect(src_reg->var_off,
dst_reg->var_off);
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
/* We might have learned new bounds from the var_off. */
__update_reg_bounds(src_reg);
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
/* We might have learned something about the sign bit. */
__reg_deduce_bounds(src_reg);
__reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
/* We might have learned some bits from the bounds. */
__reg_bound_offset(src_reg);
__reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
/* Intersecting with the old var_off might have improved our bounds
* slightly. e.g. if umax was 0x7f...f and var_off was (0; 0xf...fc),
* then new var_off is (0; 0x7f...fc) which improves our umax.
*/
__update_reg_bounds(src_reg);
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
}
static void reg_combine_min_max(struct bpf_reg_state *true_src,
struct bpf_reg_state *true_dst,
struct bpf_reg_state *false_src,
struct bpf_reg_state *false_dst,
u8 opcode)
{
switch (opcode) {
case BPF_JEQ:
__reg_combine_min_max(true_src, true_dst);
break;
case BPF_JNE:
__reg_combine_min_max(false_src, false_dst);
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
break;
bpf: fix mixed signed/unsigned derived min/max value bounds Edward reported that there's an issue in min/max value bounds tracking when signed and unsigned compares both provide hints on limits when having unknown variables. E.g. a program such as the following should have been rejected: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (18) r1 = 0xffff8a94cda93400 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+7 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = -8 8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 9: (b7) r2 = -1 10: (2d) if r1 > r2 goto pc+3 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0 R2=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp 11: (65) if r1 s> 0x1 goto pc+2 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R2=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp 12: (0f) r0 += r1 13: (72) *(u8 *)(r0 +0) = 0 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=1 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R2=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp 14: (b7) r0 = 0 15: (95) exit What happens is that in the first part ... 8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 9: (b7) r2 = -1 10: (2d) if r1 > r2 goto pc+3 ... r1 carries an unsigned value, and is compared as unsigned against a register carrying an immediate. Verifier deduces in reg_set_min_max() that since the compare is unsigned and operation is greater than (>), that in the fall-through/false case, r1's minimum bound must be 0 and maximum bound must be r2. Latter is larger than the bound and thus max value is reset back to being 'invalid' aka BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE. Thus, r1 state is now 'R1=inv,min_value=0'. The subsequent test ... 11: (65) if r1 s> 0x1 goto pc+2 ... is a signed compare of r1 with immediate value 1. Here, verifier deduces in reg_set_min_max() that since the compare is signed this time and operation is greater than (>), that in the fall-through/false case, we can deduce that r1's maximum bound must be 1, meaning with prior test, we result in r1 having the following state: R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1. Given that the actual value this holds is -8, the bounds are wrongly deduced. When this is being added to r0 which holds the map_value(_adj) type, then subsequent store access in above case will go through check_mem_access() which invokes check_map_access_adj(), that will then probe whether the map memory is in bounds based on the min_value and max_value as well as access size since the actual unknown value is min_value <= x <= max_value; commit fce366a9dd0d ("bpf, verifier: fix alu ops against map_value{, _adj} register types") provides some more explanation on the semantics. It's worth to note in this context that in the current code, min_value and max_value tracking are used for two things, i) dynamic map value access via check_map_access_adj() and since commit 06c1c049721a ("bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory") ii) also enforced at check_helper_mem_access() when passing a memory address (pointer to packet, map value, stack) and length pair to a helper and the length in this case is an unknown value defining an access range through min_value/max_value in that case. The min_value/max_value tracking is /not/ used in the direct packet access case to track ranges. However, the issue also affects case ii), for example, the following crafted program based on the same principle must be rejected as well: 0: (b7) r2 = 0 1: (bf) r3 = r10 2: (07) r3 += -512 3: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = -8 4: (79) r4 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 5: (b7) r6 = -1 6: (2d) if r4 > r6 goto pc+5 R1=ctx R2=imm0,min_value=0,max_value=0,min_align=2147483648 R3=fp-512 R4=inv,min_value=0 R6=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp 7: (65) if r4 s> 0x1 goto pc+4 R1=ctx R2=imm0,min_value=0,max_value=0,min_align=2147483648 R3=fp-512 R4=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R6=imm-1,max_value=18446744073709551615,min_align=1 R10=fp 8: (07) r4 += 1 9: (b7) r5 = 0 10: (6a) *(u16 *)(r10 -512) = 0 11: (85) call bpf_skb_load_bytes#26 12: (b7) r0 = 0 13: (95) exit Meaning, while we initialize the max_value stack slot that the verifier thinks we access in the [1,2] range, in reality we pass -7 as length which is interpreted as u32 in the helper. Thus, this issue is relevant also for the case of helper ranges. Resetting both bounds in check_reg_overflow() in case only one of them exceeds limits is also not enough as similar test can be created that uses values which are within range, thus also here learned min value in r1 is incorrect when mixed with later signed test to create a range: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (18) r1 = 0xffff880ad081fa00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+7 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = -8 8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 9: (b7) r2 = 2 10: (3d) if r2 >= r1 goto pc+3 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R10=fp 11: (65) if r1 s> 0x4 goto pc+2 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3,max_value=4 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R10=fp 12: (0f) r0 += r1 13: (72) *(u8 *)(r0 +0) = 0 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=4 R1=inv,min_value=3,max_value=4 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R10=fp 14: (b7) r0 = 0 15: (95) exit This leaves us with two options for fixing this: i) to invalidate all prior learned information once we switch signed context, ii) to track min/max signed and unsigned boundaries separately as done in [0]. (Given latter introduces major changes throughout the whole verifier, it's rather net-next material, thus this patch follows option i), meaning we can derive bounds either from only signed tests or only unsigned tests.) There is still the case of adjust_reg_min_max_vals(), where we adjust bounds on ALU operations, meaning programs like the following where boundaries on the reg get mixed in context later on when bounds are merged on the dst reg must get rejected, too: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (18) r1 = 0xffff89b2bf87ce00 5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+6 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp 7: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = -8 8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16) 9: (b7) r2 = 2 10: (3d) if r2 >= r1 goto pc+2 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R10=fp 11: (b7) r7 = 1 12: (65) if r7 s> 0x0 goto pc+2 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R7=imm1,max_value=0 R10=fp 13: (b7) r0 = 0 14: (95) exit from 12 to 15: R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R7=imm1,min_value=1 R10=fp 15: (0f) r7 += r1 16: (65) if r7 s> 0x4 goto pc+2 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R7=inv,min_value=4,max_value=4 R10=fp 17: (0f) r0 += r7 18: (72) *(u8 *)(r0 +0) = 0 R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=4,max_value=4 R1=inv,min_value=3 R2=imm2,min_value=2,max_value=2,min_align=2 R7=inv,min_value=4,max_value=4 R10=fp 19: (b7) r0 = 0 20: (95) exit Meaning, in adjust_reg_min_max_vals() we must also reset range values on the dst when src/dst registers have mixed signed/ unsigned derived min/max value bounds with one unbounded value as otherwise they can be added together deducing false boundaries. Once both boundaries are established from either ALU ops or compare operations w/o mixing signed/unsigned insns, then they can safely be added to other regs also having both boundaries established. Adding regs with one unbounded side to a map value where the bounded side has been learned w/o mixing ops is possible, but the resulting map value won't recover from that, meaning such op is considered invalid on the time of actual access. Invalid bounds are set on the dst reg in case i) src reg, or ii) in case dst reg already had them. The only way to recover would be to perform i) ALU ops but only 'add' is allowed on map value types or ii) comparisons, but these are disallowed on pointers in case they span a range. This is fine as only BPF_JEQ and BPF_JNE may be performed on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers which potentially turn them into PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE type depending on the branch, so only here min/max value cannot be invalidated for them. In terms of state pruning, value_from_signed is considered as well in states_equal() when dealing with adjusted map values. With regards to breaking existing programs, there is a small risk, but use-cases are rather quite narrow where this could occur and mixing compares probably unlikely. Joint work with Josef and Edward. [0] https://lists.iovisor.org/pipermail/iovisor-dev/2017-June/000822.html Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays") Reported-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-21 06:00:21 +08:00
}
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
}
bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers A BPF program is required to check the return register of a map_elem_lookup() call before accessing memory. The verifier keeps track of this by converting the type of the result register from PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE after a conditional jump ensures safety. This check is currently exclusively performed for the result register 0. In the event the compiler reorders instructions, BPF_MOV64_REG instructions may be moved before the conditional jump which causes them to keep their type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to which the verifier objects when the register is accessed: 0: (b7) r1 = 10 1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1 2: (bf) r2 = r10 3: (07) r2 += -8 4: (18) r1 = 0x59c00000 6: (85) call 1 7: (bf) r4 = r0 8: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8) R4=map_value_or_null(ks=8,vs=8) R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r4 +0) = 0 R4 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null' This commit extends the verifier to keep track of all identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers after a map_elem_lookup() by assigning them an ID and then marking them all when the conditional jump is observed. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-19 01:51:19 +08:00
static void mark_map_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno, u32 id,
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
bool is_null)
bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers A BPF program is required to check the return register of a map_elem_lookup() call before accessing memory. The verifier keeps track of this by converting the type of the result register from PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE after a conditional jump ensures safety. This check is currently exclusively performed for the result register 0. In the event the compiler reorders instructions, BPF_MOV64_REG instructions may be moved before the conditional jump which causes them to keep their type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to which the verifier objects when the register is accessed: 0: (b7) r1 = 10 1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1 2: (bf) r2 = r10 3: (07) r2 += -8 4: (18) r1 = 0x59c00000 6: (85) call 1 7: (bf) r4 = r0 8: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8) R4=map_value_or_null(ks=8,vs=8) R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r4 +0) = 0 R4 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null' This commit extends the verifier to keep track of all identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers after a map_elem_lookup() by assigning them an ID and then marking them all when the conditional jump is observed. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-19 01:51:19 +08:00
{
struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &regs[regno];
if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL && reg->id == id) {
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
/* Old offset (both fixed and variable parts) should
* have been known-zero, because we don't allow pointer
* arithmetic on pointers that might be NULL.
*/
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(reg->smin_value || reg->smax_value ||
!tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0) ||
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
reg->off)) {
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
__mark_reg_known_zero(reg);
reg->off = 0;
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
}
if (is_null) {
reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE;
bpf: Add array of maps support This patch adds a few helper funcs to enable map-in-map support (i.e. outer_map->inner_map). The first outer_map type BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS is also added in this patch. The next patch will introduce a hash of maps type. Any bpf map type can be acted as an inner_map. The exception is BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY because the extra level of indirection makes it harder to verify the owner_prog_type and owner_jited. Multi-level map-in-map is not supported (i.e. map->map is ok but not map->map->map). When adding an inner_map to an outer_map, it currently checks the map_type, key_size, value_size, map_flags, max_entries and ops. The verifier also uses those map's properties to do static analysis. map_flags is needed because we need to ensure BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT is using a preallocated hashtab for the inner_hash also. ops and max_entries are needed to generate inlined map-lookup instructions. For simplicity reason, a simple '==' test is used for both map_flags and max_entries. The equality of ops is implied by the equality of map_type. During outer_map creation time, an inner_map_fd is needed to create an outer_map. However, the inner_map_fd's life time does not depend on the outer_map. The inner_map_fd is merely used to initialize the inner_map_meta of the outer_map. Also, for the outer_map: * It allows element update and delete from syscall * It allows element lookup from bpf_prog The above is similar to the current fd_array pattern. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-23 01:00:33 +08:00
} else if (reg->map_ptr->inner_map_meta) {
reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
reg->map_ptr = reg->map_ptr->inner_map_meta;
} else {
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE;
bpf: Add array of maps support This patch adds a few helper funcs to enable map-in-map support (i.e. outer_map->inner_map). The first outer_map type BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS is also added in this patch. The next patch will introduce a hash of maps type. Any bpf map type can be acted as an inner_map. The exception is BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY because the extra level of indirection makes it harder to verify the owner_prog_type and owner_jited. Multi-level map-in-map is not supported (i.e. map->map is ok but not map->map->map). When adding an inner_map to an outer_map, it currently checks the map_type, key_size, value_size, map_flags, max_entries and ops. The verifier also uses those map's properties to do static analysis. map_flags is needed because we need to ensure BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT is using a preallocated hashtab for the inner_hash also. ops and max_entries are needed to generate inlined map-lookup instructions. For simplicity reason, a simple '==' test is used for both map_flags and max_entries. The equality of ops is implied by the equality of map_type. During outer_map creation time, an inner_map_fd is needed to create an outer_map. However, the inner_map_fd's life time does not depend on the outer_map. The inner_map_fd is merely used to initialize the inner_map_meta of the outer_map. Also, for the outer_map: * It allows element update and delete from syscall * It allows element lookup from bpf_prog The above is similar to the current fd_array pattern. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-23 01:00:33 +08:00
}
bpf: fix regression on verifier pruning wrt map lookups Commit 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers") introduced a regression where existing programs stopped loading due to reaching the verifier's maximum complexity limit, whereas prior to this commit they were loading just fine; the affected program has roughly 2k instructions. What was found is that state pruning couldn't be performed effectively anymore due to mismatches of the verifier's register state, in particular in the id tracking. It doesn't mean that 57a09bf0a416 is incorrect per se, but rather that verifier needs to perform a lot more work for the same program with regards to involved map lookups. Since commit 57a09bf0a416 is only about tracking registers with type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, the id is only needed to follow registers until they are promoted through pattern matching with a NULL check to either PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE or UNKNOWN_VALUE type. After that point, the id becomes irrelevant for the transitioned types. For UNKNOWN_VALUE, id is already reset to 0 via mark_reg_unknown_value(), but not so for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE where id is becoming stale. It's even transferred further into other types that don't make use of it. Among others, one example is where UNKNOWN_VALUE is set on function call return with RET_INTEGER return type. states_equal() will then fall through the memcmp() on register state; note that the second memcmp() uses offsetofend(), so the id is part of that since d2a4dd37f6b4 ("bpf: fix state equivalence"). But the bisect pointed already to 57a09bf0a416, where we really reach beyond complexity limit. What I found was that states_equal() often failed in this case due to id mismatches in spilled regs with registers in type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE. Unlike non-spilled regs, spilled regs just perform a memcmp() on their reg state and don't have any other optimizations in place, therefore also id was relevant in this case for making a pruning decision. We can safely reset id to 0 as well when converting to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE. For the affected program, it resulted in a ~17 fold reduction of complexity and let the program load fine again. Selftest suite also runs fine. The only other place where env->id_gen is used currently is through direct packet access, but for these cases id is long living, thus a different scenario. Also, the current logic in mark_map_regs() is not fully correct when marking NULL branch with UNKNOWN_VALUE. We need to cache the destination reg's id in any case. Otherwise, once we marked that reg as UNKNOWN_VALUE, it's id is reset and any subsequent registers that hold the original id and are of type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL won't be marked UNKNOWN_VALUE anymore, since mark_map_reg() reuses the uncached regs[regno].id that was just overridden. Note, we don't need to cache it outside of mark_map_regs(), since it's called once on this_branch and the other time on other_branch, which are both two independent verifier states. A test case for this is added here, too. Fixes: 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-15 08:30:06 +08:00
/* We don't need id from this point onwards anymore, thus we
* should better reset it, so that state pruning has chances
* to take effect.
*/
reg->id = 0;
bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers A BPF program is required to check the return register of a map_elem_lookup() call before accessing memory. The verifier keeps track of this by converting the type of the result register from PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE after a conditional jump ensures safety. This check is currently exclusively performed for the result register 0. In the event the compiler reorders instructions, BPF_MOV64_REG instructions may be moved before the conditional jump which causes them to keep their type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to which the verifier objects when the register is accessed: 0: (b7) r1 = 10 1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1 2: (bf) r2 = r10 3: (07) r2 += -8 4: (18) r1 = 0x59c00000 6: (85) call 1 7: (bf) r4 = r0 8: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8) R4=map_value_or_null(ks=8,vs=8) R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r4 +0) = 0 R4 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null' This commit extends the verifier to keep track of all identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers after a map_elem_lookup() by assigning them an ID and then marking them all when the conditional jump is observed. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-19 01:51:19 +08:00
}
}
/* The logic is similar to find_good_pkt_pointers(), both could eventually
* be folded together at some point.
*/
static void mark_map_regs(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, u32 regno,
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
bool is_null)
bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers A BPF program is required to check the return register of a map_elem_lookup() call before accessing memory. The verifier keeps track of this by converting the type of the result register from PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE after a conditional jump ensures safety. This check is currently exclusively performed for the result register 0. In the event the compiler reorders instructions, BPF_MOV64_REG instructions may be moved before the conditional jump which causes them to keep their type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to which the verifier objects when the register is accessed: 0: (b7) r1 = 10 1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1 2: (bf) r2 = r10 3: (07) r2 += -8 4: (18) r1 = 0x59c00000 6: (85) call 1 7: (bf) r4 = r0 8: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8) R4=map_value_or_null(ks=8,vs=8) R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r4 +0) = 0 R4 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null' This commit extends the verifier to keep track of all identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers after a map_elem_lookup() by assigning them an ID and then marking them all when the conditional jump is observed. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-19 01:51:19 +08:00
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
bpf: fix regression on verifier pruning wrt map lookups Commit 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers") introduced a regression where existing programs stopped loading due to reaching the verifier's maximum complexity limit, whereas prior to this commit they were loading just fine; the affected program has roughly 2k instructions. What was found is that state pruning couldn't be performed effectively anymore due to mismatches of the verifier's register state, in particular in the id tracking. It doesn't mean that 57a09bf0a416 is incorrect per se, but rather that verifier needs to perform a lot more work for the same program with regards to involved map lookups. Since commit 57a09bf0a416 is only about tracking registers with type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, the id is only needed to follow registers until they are promoted through pattern matching with a NULL check to either PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE or UNKNOWN_VALUE type. After that point, the id becomes irrelevant for the transitioned types. For UNKNOWN_VALUE, id is already reset to 0 via mark_reg_unknown_value(), but not so for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE where id is becoming stale. It's even transferred further into other types that don't make use of it. Among others, one example is where UNKNOWN_VALUE is set on function call return with RET_INTEGER return type. states_equal() will then fall through the memcmp() on register state; note that the second memcmp() uses offsetofend(), so the id is part of that since d2a4dd37f6b4 ("bpf: fix state equivalence"). But the bisect pointed already to 57a09bf0a416, where we really reach beyond complexity limit. What I found was that states_equal() often failed in this case due to id mismatches in spilled regs with registers in type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE. Unlike non-spilled regs, spilled regs just perform a memcmp() on their reg state and don't have any other optimizations in place, therefore also id was relevant in this case for making a pruning decision. We can safely reset id to 0 as well when converting to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE. For the affected program, it resulted in a ~17 fold reduction of complexity and let the program load fine again. Selftest suite also runs fine. The only other place where env->id_gen is used currently is through direct packet access, but for these cases id is long living, thus a different scenario. Also, the current logic in mark_map_regs() is not fully correct when marking NULL branch with UNKNOWN_VALUE. We need to cache the destination reg's id in any case. Otherwise, once we marked that reg as UNKNOWN_VALUE, it's id is reset and any subsequent registers that hold the original id and are of type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL won't be marked UNKNOWN_VALUE anymore, since mark_map_reg() reuses the uncached regs[regno].id that was just overridden. Note, we don't need to cache it outside of mark_map_regs(), since it's called once on this_branch and the other time on other_branch, which are both two independent verifier states. A test case for this is added here, too. Fixes: 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-15 08:30:06 +08:00
u32 id = regs[regno].id;
bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers A BPF program is required to check the return register of a map_elem_lookup() call before accessing memory. The verifier keeps track of this by converting the type of the result register from PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE after a conditional jump ensures safety. This check is currently exclusively performed for the result register 0. In the event the compiler reorders instructions, BPF_MOV64_REG instructions may be moved before the conditional jump which causes them to keep their type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to which the verifier objects when the register is accessed: 0: (b7) r1 = 10 1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1 2: (bf) r2 = r10 3: (07) r2 += -8 4: (18) r1 = 0x59c00000 6: (85) call 1 7: (bf) r4 = r0 8: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8) R4=map_value_or_null(ks=8,vs=8) R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r4 +0) = 0 R4 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null' This commit extends the verifier to keep track of all identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers after a map_elem_lookup() by assigning them an ID and then marking them all when the conditional jump is observed. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-19 01:51:19 +08:00
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
mark_map_reg(regs, i, id, is_null);
bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers A BPF program is required to check the return register of a map_elem_lookup() call before accessing memory. The verifier keeps track of this by converting the type of the result register from PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE after a conditional jump ensures safety. This check is currently exclusively performed for the result register 0. In the event the compiler reorders instructions, BPF_MOV64_REG instructions may be moved before the conditional jump which causes them to keep their type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to which the verifier objects when the register is accessed: 0: (b7) r1 = 10 1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1 2: (bf) r2 = r10 3: (07) r2 += -8 4: (18) r1 = 0x59c00000 6: (85) call 1 7: (bf) r4 = r0 8: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8) R4=map_value_or_null(ks=8,vs=8) R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r4 +0) = 0 R4 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null' This commit extends the verifier to keep track of all identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers after a map_elem_lookup() by assigning them an ID and then marking them all when the conditional jump is observed. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-19 01:51:19 +08:00
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) {
if (state->stack_slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL)
continue;
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
mark_map_reg(state->spilled_regs, i / BPF_REG_SIZE, id, is_null);
bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers A BPF program is required to check the return register of a map_elem_lookup() call before accessing memory. The verifier keeps track of this by converting the type of the result register from PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE after a conditional jump ensures safety. This check is currently exclusively performed for the result register 0. In the event the compiler reorders instructions, BPF_MOV64_REG instructions may be moved before the conditional jump which causes them to keep their type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to which the verifier objects when the register is accessed: 0: (b7) r1 = 10 1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1 2: (bf) r2 = r10 3: (07) r2 += -8 4: (18) r1 = 0x59c00000 6: (85) call 1 7: (bf) r4 = r0 8: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8) R4=map_value_or_null(ks=8,vs=8) R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r4 +0) = 0 R4 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null' This commit extends the verifier to keep track of all identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers after a map_elem_lookup() by assigning them an ID and then marking them all when the conditional jump is observed. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-19 01:51:19 +08:00
}
}
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
struct bpf_insn *insn, int *insn_idx)
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch, *this_branch = &env->cur_state;
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = this_branch->regs, *dst_reg;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
int err;
bpf: enable BPF_J{LT, LE, SLT, SLE} opcodes in verifier Enable the newly added jump opcodes, main parts are in two different areas, namely direct packet access and dynamic map value access. For the direct packet access, we now allow for the following two new patterns to match in order to trigger markings with find_good_pkt_pointers(): Variant 1 (access ok when taking the branch): 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (bf) r0 = r2 3: (07) r0 += 8 4: (ad) if r0 < r3 goto pc+2 R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 5: (b7) r0 = 0 6: (95) exit from 4 to 7: R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=8) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=8) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 7: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) 8: (05) goto pc-4 5: (b7) r0 = 0 6: (95) exit processed 11 insns, stack depth 0 Variant 2 (access ok on fall-through): 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (bf) r0 = r2 3: (07) r0 += 8 4: (bd) if r3 <= r0 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=8) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=8) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 5: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) 6: (b7) r0 = 1 7: (95) exit from 4 to 6: R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 6: (b7) r0 = 1 7: (95) exit processed 10 insns, stack depth 0 The above two basically just swap the branches where we need to handle an exception and allow packet access compared to the two already existing variants for find_good_pkt_pointers(). For the dynamic map value access, we add the new instructions to reg_set_min_max() and reg_set_min_max_inv() in order to learn bounds. Verifier test cases for both are added in a follow-up patch. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-10 07:40:02 +08:00
if (opcode > BPF_JSLE) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "invalid BPF_JMP opcode %x\n", opcode);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (insn->imm != 0) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "BPF_JMP uses reserved fields\n");
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check src1 operand */
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (err)
return err;
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:21 +08:00
if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n",
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:21 +08:00
insn->src_reg);
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "BPF_JMP uses reserved fields\n");
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check src2 operand */
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (err)
return err;
bpf: cleanup verifier code cleanup verifier code and prepare it for addition of "pointer to packet" logic Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:09 +08:00
dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
/* detect if R == 0 where R was initialized to zero earlier */
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K &&
(opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) &&
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE &&
tnum_equals_const(dst_reg->var_off, insn->imm)) {
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (opcode == BPF_JEQ) {
/* if (imm == imm) goto pc+off;
* only follow the goto, ignore fall-through
*/
*insn_idx += insn->off;
return 0;
} else {
/* if (imm != imm) goto pc+off;
* only follow fall-through branch, since
* that's where the program will go
*/
return 0;
}
}
other_branch = push_stack(env, *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, *insn_idx);
if (!other_branch)
return -EFAULT;
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
/* detect if we are comparing against a constant value so we can adjust
* our min/max values for our dst register.
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
* this is only legit if both are scalars (or pointers to the same
* object, I suppose, but we don't support that right now), because
* otherwise the different base pointers mean the offsets aren't
* comparable.
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
*/
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE &&
regs[insn->src_reg].type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
if (tnum_is_const(regs[insn->src_reg].var_off))
reg_set_min_max(&other_branch->regs[insn->dst_reg],
dst_reg, regs[insn->src_reg].var_off.value,
opcode);
else if (tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off))
reg_set_min_max_inv(&other_branch->regs[insn->src_reg],
&regs[insn->src_reg],
dst_reg->var_off.value, opcode);
else if (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE)
/* Comparing for equality, we can combine knowledge */
reg_combine_min_max(&other_branch->regs[insn->src_reg],
&other_branch->regs[insn->dst_reg],
&regs[insn->src_reg],
&regs[insn->dst_reg], opcode);
}
} else if (dst_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
reg_set_min_max(&other_branch->regs[insn->dst_reg],
dst_reg, insn->imm, opcode);
}
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
/* detect if R == 0 where R is returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem() */
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K &&
bpf: cleanup verifier code cleanup verifier code and prepare it for addition of "pointer to packet" logic Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:09 +08:00
insn->imm == 0 && (opcode == BPF_JEQ || opcode == BPF_JNE) &&
dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) {
bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers A BPF program is required to check the return register of a map_elem_lookup() call before accessing memory. The verifier keeps track of this by converting the type of the result register from PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE after a conditional jump ensures safety. This check is currently exclusively performed for the result register 0. In the event the compiler reorders instructions, BPF_MOV64_REG instructions may be moved before the conditional jump which causes them to keep their type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to which the verifier objects when the register is accessed: 0: (b7) r1 = 10 1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1 2: (bf) r2 = r10 3: (07) r2 += -8 4: (18) r1 = 0x59c00000 6: (85) call 1 7: (bf) r4 = r0 8: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8) R4=map_value_or_null(ks=8,vs=8) R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r4 +0) = 0 R4 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null' This commit extends the verifier to keep track of all identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers after a map_elem_lookup() by assigning them an ID and then marking them all when the conditional jump is observed. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-19 01:51:19 +08:00
/* Mark all identical map registers in each branch as either
* safe or unknown depending R == 0 or R != 0 conditional.
*/
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
mark_map_regs(this_branch, insn->dst_reg, opcode == BPF_JNE);
mark_map_regs(other_branch, insn->dst_reg, opcode == BPF_JEQ);
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JGT &&
dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) {
bpf: add meta pointer for direct access This work enables generic transfer of metadata from XDP into skb. The basic idea is that we can make use of the fact that the resulting skb must be linear and already comes with a larger headroom for supporting bpf_xdp_adjust_head(), which mangles xdp->data. Here, we base our work on a similar principle and introduce a small helper bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() for adjusting a new pointer called xdp->data_meta. Thus, the packet has a flexible and programmable room for meta data, followed by the actual packet data. struct xdp_buff is therefore laid out that we first point to data_hard_start, then data_meta directly prepended to data followed by data_end marking the end of packet. bpf_xdp_adjust_head() takes into account whether we have meta data already prepended and if so, memmove()s this along with the given offset provided there's enough room. xdp->data_meta is optional and programs are not required to use it. The rationale is that when we process the packet in XDP (e.g. as DoS filter), we can push further meta data along with it for the XDP_PASS case, and give the guarantee that a clsact ingress BPF program on the same device can pick this up for further post-processing. Since we work with skb there, we can also set skb->mark, skb->priority or other skb meta data out of BPF, thus having this scratch space generic and programmable allows for more flexibility than defining a direct 1:1 transfer of potentially new XDP members into skb (it's also more efficient as we don't need to initialize/handle each of such new members). The facility also works together with GRO aggregation. The scratch space at the head of the packet can be multiple of 4 byte up to 32 byte large. Drivers not yet supporting xdp->data_meta can simply be set up with xdp->data_meta as xdp->data + 1 as bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() will detect this and bail out, such that the subsequent match against xdp->data for later access is guaranteed to fail. The verifier treats xdp->data_meta/xdp->data the same way as we treat xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons. The requirement for doing the compare against xdp->data is that it hasn't been modified from it's original address we got from ctx access. It may have a range marking already from prior successful xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons though. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-25 08:25:51 +08:00
find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET);
bpf: enable BPF_J{LT, LE, SLT, SLE} opcodes in verifier Enable the newly added jump opcodes, main parts are in two different areas, namely direct packet access and dynamic map value access. For the direct packet access, we now allow for the following two new patterns to match in order to trigger markings with find_good_pkt_pointers(): Variant 1 (access ok when taking the branch): 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (bf) r0 = r2 3: (07) r0 += 8 4: (ad) if r0 < r3 goto pc+2 R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 5: (b7) r0 = 0 6: (95) exit from 4 to 7: R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=8) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=8) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 7: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) 8: (05) goto pc-4 5: (b7) r0 = 0 6: (95) exit processed 11 insns, stack depth 0 Variant 2 (access ok on fall-through): 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (bf) r0 = r2 3: (07) r0 += 8 4: (bd) if r3 <= r0 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=8) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=8) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 5: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) 6: (b7) r0 = 1 7: (95) exit from 4 to 6: R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 6: (b7) r0 = 1 7: (95) exit processed 10 insns, stack depth 0 The above two basically just swap the branches where we need to handle an exception and allow packet access compared to the two already existing variants for find_good_pkt_pointers(). For the dynamic map value access, we add the new instructions to reg_set_min_max() and reg_set_min_max_inv() in order to learn bounds. Verifier test cases for both are added in a follow-up patch. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-10 07:40:02 +08:00
} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JLT &&
dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) {
bpf: add meta pointer for direct access This work enables generic transfer of metadata from XDP into skb. The basic idea is that we can make use of the fact that the resulting skb must be linear and already comes with a larger headroom for supporting bpf_xdp_adjust_head(), which mangles xdp->data. Here, we base our work on a similar principle and introduce a small helper bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() for adjusting a new pointer called xdp->data_meta. Thus, the packet has a flexible and programmable room for meta data, followed by the actual packet data. struct xdp_buff is therefore laid out that we first point to data_hard_start, then data_meta directly prepended to data followed by data_end marking the end of packet. bpf_xdp_adjust_head() takes into account whether we have meta data already prepended and if so, memmove()s this along with the given offset provided there's enough room. xdp->data_meta is optional and programs are not required to use it. The rationale is that when we process the packet in XDP (e.g. as DoS filter), we can push further meta data along with it for the XDP_PASS case, and give the guarantee that a clsact ingress BPF program on the same device can pick this up for further post-processing. Since we work with skb there, we can also set skb->mark, skb->priority or other skb meta data out of BPF, thus having this scratch space generic and programmable allows for more flexibility than defining a direct 1:1 transfer of potentially new XDP members into skb (it's also more efficient as we don't need to initialize/handle each of such new members). The facility also works together with GRO aggregation. The scratch space at the head of the packet can be multiple of 4 byte up to 32 byte large. Drivers not yet supporting xdp->data_meta can simply be set up with xdp->data_meta as xdp->data + 1 as bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() will detect this and bail out, such that the subsequent match against xdp->data for later access is guaranteed to fail. The verifier treats xdp->data_meta/xdp->data the same way as we treat xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons. The requirement for doing the compare against xdp->data is that it hasn't been modified from it's original address we got from ctx access. It may have a range marking already from prior successful xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons though. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-25 08:25:51 +08:00
find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET);
bpf: fix range propagation on direct packet access LLVM can generate code that tests for direct packet access via skb->data/data_end in a way that currently gets rejected by the verifier, example: [...] 7: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80) 8: (61) r9 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76) 9: (bf) r2 = r9 10: (07) r2 += 54 11: (3d) if r3 >= r2 goto pc+12 R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 12: (18) r4 = 0xffffff7a 14: (05) goto pc+430 [...] from 11 to 24: R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 24: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -40) = r1 25: (b7) r1 = 0 26: (63) *(u32 *)(r6 +56) = r1 27: (b7) r2 = 40 28: (71) r8 = *(u8 *)(r9 +20) invalid access to packet, off=20 size=1, R9(id=0,off=0,r=0) The reason why this gets rejected despite a proper test is that we currently call find_good_pkt_pointers() only in case where we detect tests like rX > pkt_end, where rX is of type pkt(id=Y,off=Z,r=0) and derived, for example, from a register of type pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=0) pointing to skb->data. find_good_pkt_pointers() then fills the range in the current branch to pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=Z) on success. For above case, we need to extend that to recognize pkt_end >= rX pattern and mark the other branch that is taken on success with the appropriate pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=Z) type via find_good_pkt_pointers(). Since eBPF operates on BPF_JGT (>) and BPF_JGE (>=), these are the only two practical options to test for from what LLVM could have generated, since there's no such thing as BPF_JLT (<) or BPF_JLE (<=) that we would need to take into account as well. After the fix: [...] 7: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80) 8: (61) r9 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76) 9: (bf) r2 = r9 10: (07) r2 += 54 11: (3d) if r3 >= r2 goto pc+12 R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp 12: (18) r4 = 0xffffff7a 14: (05) goto pc+430 [...] from 11 to 24: R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=54) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=54) R10=fp 24: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -40) = r1 25: (b7) r1 = 0 26: (63) *(u32 *)(r6 +56) = r1 27: (b7) r2 = 40 28: (71) r8 = *(u8 *)(r9 +20) 29: (bf) r1 = r8 30: (25) if r8 > 0x3c goto pc+47 R1=inv56 R2=imm40 R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R8=inv56 R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=54) R10=fp 31: (b7) r1 = 1 [...] Verifier test cases are also added in this work, one that demonstrates the mentioned example here and one that tries a bad packet access for the current/fall-through branch (the one with types pkt(id=X,off=Y,r=0), pkt(id=X,off=0,r=0)), then a case with good and bad accesses, and two with both test variants (>, >=). Fixes: 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf: direct packet access") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-08 07:03:42 +08:00
} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JGE &&
dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET) {
bpf: add meta pointer for direct access This work enables generic transfer of metadata from XDP into skb. The basic idea is that we can make use of the fact that the resulting skb must be linear and already comes with a larger headroom for supporting bpf_xdp_adjust_head(), which mangles xdp->data. Here, we base our work on a similar principle and introduce a small helper bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() for adjusting a new pointer called xdp->data_meta. Thus, the packet has a flexible and programmable room for meta data, followed by the actual packet data. struct xdp_buff is therefore laid out that we first point to data_hard_start, then data_meta directly prepended to data followed by data_end marking the end of packet. bpf_xdp_adjust_head() takes into account whether we have meta data already prepended and if so, memmove()s this along with the given offset provided there's enough room. xdp->data_meta is optional and programs are not required to use it. The rationale is that when we process the packet in XDP (e.g. as DoS filter), we can push further meta data along with it for the XDP_PASS case, and give the guarantee that a clsact ingress BPF program on the same device can pick this up for further post-processing. Since we work with skb there, we can also set skb->mark, skb->priority or other skb meta data out of BPF, thus having this scratch space generic and programmable allows for more flexibility than defining a direct 1:1 transfer of potentially new XDP members into skb (it's also more efficient as we don't need to initialize/handle each of such new members). The facility also works together with GRO aggregation. The scratch space at the head of the packet can be multiple of 4 byte up to 32 byte large. Drivers not yet supporting xdp->data_meta can simply be set up with xdp->data_meta as xdp->data + 1 as bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() will detect this and bail out, such that the subsequent match against xdp->data for later access is guaranteed to fail. The verifier treats xdp->data_meta/xdp->data the same way as we treat xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons. The requirement for doing the compare against xdp->data is that it hasn't been modified from it's original address we got from ctx access. It may have a range marking already from prior successful xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons though. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-25 08:25:51 +08:00
find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, &regs[insn->src_reg],
PTR_TO_PACKET);
bpf: enable BPF_J{LT, LE, SLT, SLE} opcodes in verifier Enable the newly added jump opcodes, main parts are in two different areas, namely direct packet access and dynamic map value access. For the direct packet access, we now allow for the following two new patterns to match in order to trigger markings with find_good_pkt_pointers(): Variant 1 (access ok when taking the branch): 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (bf) r0 = r2 3: (07) r0 += 8 4: (ad) if r0 < r3 goto pc+2 R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 5: (b7) r0 = 0 6: (95) exit from 4 to 7: R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=8) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=8) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 7: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) 8: (05) goto pc-4 5: (b7) r0 = 0 6: (95) exit processed 11 insns, stack depth 0 Variant 2 (access ok on fall-through): 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (bf) r0 = r2 3: (07) r0 += 8 4: (bd) if r3 <= r0 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=8) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=8) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 5: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0) 6: (b7) r0 = 1 7: (95) exit from 4 to 6: R0=pkt(id=0,off=8,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R10=fp 6: (b7) r0 = 1 7: (95) exit processed 10 insns, stack depth 0 The above two basically just swap the branches where we need to handle an exception and allow packet access compared to the two already existing variants for find_good_pkt_pointers(). For the dynamic map value access, we add the new instructions to reg_set_min_max() and reg_set_min_max_inv() in order to learn bounds. Verifier test cases for both are added in a follow-up patch. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-10 07:40:02 +08:00
} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JLE &&
dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END &&
regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET) {
bpf: add meta pointer for direct access This work enables generic transfer of metadata from XDP into skb. The basic idea is that we can make use of the fact that the resulting skb must be linear and already comes with a larger headroom for supporting bpf_xdp_adjust_head(), which mangles xdp->data. Here, we base our work on a similar principle and introduce a small helper bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() for adjusting a new pointer called xdp->data_meta. Thus, the packet has a flexible and programmable room for meta data, followed by the actual packet data. struct xdp_buff is therefore laid out that we first point to data_hard_start, then data_meta directly prepended to data followed by data_end marking the end of packet. bpf_xdp_adjust_head() takes into account whether we have meta data already prepended and if so, memmove()s this along with the given offset provided there's enough room. xdp->data_meta is optional and programs are not required to use it. The rationale is that when we process the packet in XDP (e.g. as DoS filter), we can push further meta data along with it for the XDP_PASS case, and give the guarantee that a clsact ingress BPF program on the same device can pick this up for further post-processing. Since we work with skb there, we can also set skb->mark, skb->priority or other skb meta data out of BPF, thus having this scratch space generic and programmable allows for more flexibility than defining a direct 1:1 transfer of potentially new XDP members into skb (it's also more efficient as we don't need to initialize/handle each of such new members). The facility also works together with GRO aggregation. The scratch space at the head of the packet can be multiple of 4 byte up to 32 byte large. Drivers not yet supporting xdp->data_meta can simply be set up with xdp->data_meta as xdp->data + 1 as bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() will detect this and bail out, such that the subsequent match against xdp->data for later access is guaranteed to fail. The verifier treats xdp->data_meta/xdp->data the same way as we treat xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons. The requirement for doing the compare against xdp->data is that it hasn't been modified from it's original address we got from ctx access. It may have a range marking already from prior successful xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons though. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-25 08:25:51 +08:00
find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, &regs[insn->src_reg],
PTR_TO_PACKET);
} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JGT &&
dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META &&
reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(&regs[insn->src_reg], PTR_TO_PACKET)) {
find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET_META);
} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JLT &&
dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META &&
reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(&regs[insn->src_reg], PTR_TO_PACKET)) {
find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET_META);
} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JGE &&
reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) &&
regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META) {
find_good_pkt_pointers(other_branch, &regs[insn->src_reg],
PTR_TO_PACKET_META);
} else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && opcode == BPF_JLE &&
reg_is_init_pkt_pointer(dst_reg, PTR_TO_PACKET) &&
regs[insn->src_reg].type == PTR_TO_PACKET_META) {
find_good_pkt_pointers(this_branch, &regs[insn->src_reg],
PTR_TO_PACKET_META);
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:21 +08:00
} else if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n",
insn->dst_reg);
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:21 +08:00
return -EACCES;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
}
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
if (env->log.level)
print_verifier_state(env, this_branch);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return 0;
}
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:04 +08:00
/* return the map pointer stored inside BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */
static struct bpf_map *ld_imm64_to_map_ptr(struct bpf_insn *insn)
{
u64 imm64 = ((u64) (u32) insn[0].imm) | ((u64) (u32) insn[1].imm) << 32;
return (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) imm64;
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
/* verify BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
int err;
if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD_IMM insn\n");
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
if (insn->off != 0) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "BPF_LD_IMM64 uses reserved fields\n");
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (err)
return err;
bpf: recognize 64bit immediate loads as consts When running as parser interpret BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW instructions as loading CONST_IMM with the value stored in imm. The verifier will continue not recognizing those due to concerns about search space/program complexity increase. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:59 +08:00
if (insn->src_reg == 0) {
u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm;
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
regs[insn->dst_reg].type = SCALAR_VALUE;
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
__mark_reg_known(&regs[insn->dst_reg], imm);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return 0;
bpf: recognize 64bit immediate loads as consts When running as parser interpret BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW instructions as loading CONST_IMM with the value stored in imm. The verifier will continue not recognizing those due to concerns about search space/program complexity increase. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:59 +08:00
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
/* replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr() should have caught bad ld_imm64 */
BUG_ON(insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD);
regs[insn->dst_reg].type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
regs[insn->dst_reg].map_ptr = ld_imm64_to_map_ptr(insn);
return 0;
}
ebpf: add sched_cls_type and map it to sk_filter's verifier ops As discussed recently and at netconf/netdev01, we want to prevent making bpf_verifier_ops registration available for modules, but have them at a controlled place inside the kernel instead. The reason for this is, that out-of-tree modules can go crazy and define and register any verfifier ops they want, doing all sorts of crap, even bypassing available GPLed eBPF helper functions. We don't want to offer such a shiny playground, of course, but keep strict control to ourselves inside the core kernel. This also encourages us to design eBPF user helpers carefully and generically, so they can be shared among various subsystems using eBPF. For the eBPF traffic classifier (cls_bpf), it's a good start to share the same helper facilities as we currently do in eBPF for socket filters. That way, we have BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS look like it's own type, thus one day if there's a good reason to diverge the set of helper functions from the set available to socket filters, we keep ABI compatibility. In future, we could place all bpf_prog_type_list at a central place, perhaps. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-01 19:31:46 +08:00
static bool may_access_skb(enum bpf_prog_type type)
{
switch (type) {
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER:
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS:
ebpf: add sched_act_type and map it to sk_filter's verifier ops In order to prepare eBPF support for tc action, we need to add sched_act_type, so that the eBPF verifier is aware of what helper function act_bpf may use, that it can load skb data and read out currently available skb fields. This is bascially analogous to 96be4325f443 ("ebpf: add sched_cls_type and map it to sk_filter's verifier ops"). BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS and BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT need to be separate since both will have a different set of functionality in future (classifier vs action), thus we won't run into ABI troubles when the point in time comes to diverge functionality from the classifier. The future plan for act_bpf would be that it will be able to write into skb->data and alter selected fields mirrored in struct __sk_buff. For an initial support, it's sufficient to map it to sk_filter_ops. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-20 22:11:11 +08:00
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT:
ebpf: add sched_cls_type and map it to sk_filter's verifier ops As discussed recently and at netconf/netdev01, we want to prevent making bpf_verifier_ops registration available for modules, but have them at a controlled place inside the kernel instead. The reason for this is, that out-of-tree modules can go crazy and define and register any verfifier ops they want, doing all sorts of crap, even bypassing available GPLed eBPF helper functions. We don't want to offer such a shiny playground, of course, but keep strict control to ourselves inside the core kernel. This also encourages us to design eBPF user helpers carefully and generically, so they can be shared among various subsystems using eBPF. For the eBPF traffic classifier (cls_bpf), it's a good start to share the same helper facilities as we currently do in eBPF for socket filters. That way, we have BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS look like it's own type, thus one day if there's a good reason to diverge the set of helper functions from the set available to socket filters, we keep ABI compatibility. In future, we could place all bpf_prog_type_list at a central place, perhaps. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-01 19:31:46 +08:00
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
bpf: verifier: add checks for BPF_ABS | BPF_IND instructions introduce program type BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER that is used for attaching programs to sockets where ctx == skb. add verifier checks for ABS/IND instructions which can only be seen in socket filters, therefore the check: if (env->prog->aux->prog_type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) verbose("BPF_LD_ABS|IND instructions are only allowed in socket filters\n"); Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-12-02 07:06:34 +08:00
/* verify safety of LD_ABS|LD_IND instructions:
* - they can only appear in the programs where ctx == skb
* - since they are wrappers of function calls, they scratch R1-R5 registers,
* preserve R6-R9, and store return value into R0
*
* Implicit input:
* ctx == skb == R6 == CTX
*
* Explicit input:
* SRC == any register
* IMM == 32-bit immediate
*
* Output:
* R0 - 8/16/32-bit skb data converted to cpu endianness
*/
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
bpf: verifier: add checks for BPF_ABS | BPF_IND instructions introduce program type BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER that is used for attaching programs to sockets where ctx == skb. add verifier checks for ABS/IND instructions which can only be seen in socket filters, therefore the check: if (env->prog->aux->prog_type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) verbose("BPF_LD_ABS|IND instructions are only allowed in socket filters\n"); Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-12-02 07:06:34 +08:00
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
bpf: verifier: add checks for BPF_ABS | BPF_IND instructions introduce program type BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER that is used for attaching programs to sockets where ctx == skb. add verifier checks for ABS/IND instructions which can only be seen in socket filters, therefore the check: if (env->prog->aux->prog_type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) verbose("BPF_LD_ABS|IND instructions are only allowed in socket filters\n"); Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-12-02 07:06:34 +08:00
u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code);
int i, err;
ebpf: move read-only fields to bpf_prog and shrink bpf_prog_aux is_gpl_compatible and prog_type should be moved directly into bpf_prog as they stay immutable during bpf_prog's lifetime, are core attributes and they can be locked as read-only later on via bpf_prog_select_runtime(). With a bit of rearranging, this also allows us to shrink bpf_prog_aux to exactly 1 cacheline. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-01 19:31:47 +08:00
if (!may_access_skb(env->prog->type)) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] instructions not allowed for this program type\n");
bpf: verifier: add checks for BPF_ABS | BPF_IND instructions introduce program type BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER that is used for attaching programs to sockets where ctx == skb. add verifier checks for ABS/IND instructions which can only be seen in socket filters, therefore the check: if (env->prog->aux->prog_type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) verbose("BPF_LD_ABS|IND instructions are only allowed in socket filters\n"); Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-12-02 07:06:34 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 ||
bpf/verifier: reject invalid LD_ABS | BPF_DW instruction verifier must check for reserved size bits in instruction opcode and reject BPF_LD | BPF_ABS | BPF_DW and BPF_LD | BPF_IND | BPF_DW instructions, otherwise interpreter will WARN_RATELIMIT on them during execution. Fixes: ddd872bc3098 ("bpf: verifier: add checks for BPF_ABS | BPF_IND instructions") Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-13 01:26:19 +08:00
BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW ||
bpf: verifier: add checks for BPF_ABS | BPF_IND instructions introduce program type BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER that is used for attaching programs to sockets where ctx == skb. add verifier checks for ABS/IND instructions which can only be seen in socket filters, therefore the check: if (env->prog->aux->prog_type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) verbose("BPF_LD_ABS|IND instructions are only allowed in socket filters\n"); Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-12-02 07:06:34 +08:00
(mode == BPF_ABS && insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0)) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] uses reserved fields\n");
bpf: verifier: add checks for BPF_ABS | BPF_IND instructions introduce program type BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER that is used for attaching programs to sockets where ctx == skb. add verifier checks for ABS/IND instructions which can only be seen in socket filters, therefore the check: if (env->prog->aux->prog_type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) verbose("BPF_LD_ABS|IND instructions are only allowed in socket filters\n"); Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-12-02 07:06:34 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check whether implicit source operand (register R6) is readable */
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
err = check_reg_arg(env, BPF_REG_6, SRC_OP);
bpf: verifier: add checks for BPF_ABS | BPF_IND instructions introduce program type BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER that is used for attaching programs to sockets where ctx == skb. add verifier checks for ABS/IND instructions which can only be seen in socket filters, therefore the check: if (env->prog->aux->prog_type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) verbose("BPF_LD_ABS|IND instructions are only allowed in socket filters\n"); Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-12-02 07:06:34 +08:00
if (err)
return err;
if (regs[BPF_REG_6].type != PTR_TO_CTX) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env,
"at the time of BPF_LD_ABS|IND R6 != pointer to skb\n");
bpf: verifier: add checks for BPF_ABS | BPF_IND instructions introduce program type BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER that is used for attaching programs to sockets where ctx == skb. add verifier checks for ABS/IND instructions which can only be seen in socket filters, therefore the check: if (env->prog->aux->prog_type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) verbose("BPF_LD_ABS|IND instructions are only allowed in socket filters\n"); Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-12-02 07:06:34 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
if (mode == BPF_IND) {
/* check explicit source operand */
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
bpf: verifier: add checks for BPF_ABS | BPF_IND instructions introduce program type BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER that is used for attaching programs to sockets where ctx == skb. add verifier checks for ABS/IND instructions which can only be seen in socket filters, therefore the check: if (env->prog->aux->prog_type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) verbose("BPF_LD_ABS|IND instructions are only allowed in socket filters\n"); Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-12-02 07:06:34 +08:00
if (err)
return err;
}
/* reset caller saved regs to unreadable */
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]);
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK);
}
bpf: verifier: add checks for BPF_ABS | BPF_IND instructions introduce program type BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER that is used for attaching programs to sockets where ctx == skb. add verifier checks for ABS/IND instructions which can only be seen in socket filters, therefore the check: if (env->prog->aux->prog_type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) verbose("BPF_LD_ABS|IND instructions are only allowed in socket filters\n"); Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-12-02 07:06:34 +08:00
/* mark destination R0 register as readable, since it contains
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
* the value fetched from the packet.
* Already marked as written above.
bpf: verifier: add checks for BPF_ABS | BPF_IND instructions introduce program type BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER that is used for attaching programs to sockets where ctx == skb. add verifier checks for ABS/IND instructions which can only be seen in socket filters, therefore the check: if (env->prog->aux->prog_type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) verbose("BPF_LD_ABS|IND instructions are only allowed in socket filters\n"); Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-12-02 07:06:34 +08:00
*/
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
bpf: verifier: add checks for BPF_ABS | BPF_IND instructions introduce program type BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER that is used for attaching programs to sockets where ctx == skb. add verifier checks for ABS/IND instructions which can only be seen in socket filters, therefore the check: if (env->prog->aux->prog_type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) verbose("BPF_LD_ABS|IND instructions are only allowed in socket filters\n"); Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-12-02 07:06:34 +08:00
return 0;
}
bpf: enforce return code for cgroup-bpf programs with addition of tnum logic the verifier got smart enough and we can enforce return codes at program load time. For now do so for cgroup-bpf program types. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-03 13:50:23 +08:00
static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
struct tnum range = tnum_range(0, 1);
switch (env->prog->type) {
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB:
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK:
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS:
break;
default:
return 0;
}
reg = &env->cur_state.regs[BPF_REG_0];
if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "At program exit the register R0 is not a known value (%s)\n",
bpf: enforce return code for cgroup-bpf programs with addition of tnum logic the verifier got smart enough and we can enforce return codes at program load time. For now do so for cgroup-bpf program types. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-03 13:50:23 +08:00
reg_type_str[reg->type]);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!tnum_in(range, reg->var_off)) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "At program exit the register R0 ");
bpf: enforce return code for cgroup-bpf programs with addition of tnum logic the verifier got smart enough and we can enforce return codes at program load time. For now do so for cgroup-bpf program types. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-03 13:50:23 +08:00
if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) {
char tn_buf[48];
tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "has value %s", tn_buf);
bpf: enforce return code for cgroup-bpf programs with addition of tnum logic the verifier got smart enough and we can enforce return codes at program load time. For now do so for cgroup-bpf program types. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-03 13:50:23 +08:00
} else {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "has unknown scalar value");
bpf: enforce return code for cgroup-bpf programs with addition of tnum logic the verifier got smart enough and we can enforce return codes at program load time. For now do so for cgroup-bpf program types. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-03 13:50:23 +08:00
}
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, " should have been 0 or 1\n");
bpf: enforce return code for cgroup-bpf programs with addition of tnum logic the verifier got smart enough and we can enforce return codes at program load time. For now do so for cgroup-bpf program types. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-03 13:50:23 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
bpf: verifier (add branch/goto checks) check that control flow graph of eBPF program is a directed acyclic graph check_cfg() does: - detect loops - detect unreachable instructions - check that program terminates with BPF_EXIT insn - check that all branches are within program boundary Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:05 +08:00
/* non-recursive DFS pseudo code
* 1 procedure DFS-iterative(G,v):
* 2 label v as discovered
* 3 let S be a stack
* 4 S.push(v)
* 5 while S is not empty
* 6 t <- S.pop()
* 7 if t is what we're looking for:
* 8 return t
* 9 for all edges e in G.adjacentEdges(t) do
* 10 if edge e is already labelled
* 11 continue with the next edge
* 12 w <- G.adjacentVertex(t,e)
* 13 if vertex w is not discovered and not explored
* 14 label e as tree-edge
* 15 label w as discovered
* 16 S.push(w)
* 17 continue at 5
* 18 else if vertex w is discovered
* 19 label e as back-edge
* 20 else
* 21 // vertex w is explored
* 22 label e as forward- or cross-edge
* 23 label t as explored
* 24 S.pop()
*
* convention:
* 0x10 - discovered
* 0x11 - discovered and fall-through edge labelled
* 0x12 - discovered and fall-through and branch edges labelled
* 0x20 - explored
*/
enum {
DISCOVERED = 0x10,
EXPLORED = 0x20,
FALLTHROUGH = 1,
BRANCH = 2,
};
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
#define STATE_LIST_MARK ((struct bpf_verifier_state_list *) -1L)
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 09:50:01 +08:00
bpf: verifier (add branch/goto checks) check that control flow graph of eBPF program is a directed acyclic graph check_cfg() does: - detect loops - detect unreachable instructions - check that program terminates with BPF_EXIT insn - check that all branches are within program boundary Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:05 +08:00
static int *insn_stack; /* stack of insns to process */
static int cur_stack; /* current stack index */
static int *insn_state;
/* t, w, e - match pseudo-code above:
* t - index of current instruction
* w - next instruction
* e - edge
*/
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
bpf: verifier (add branch/goto checks) check that control flow graph of eBPF program is a directed acyclic graph check_cfg() does: - detect loops - detect unreachable instructions - check that program terminates with BPF_EXIT insn - check that all branches are within program boundary Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:05 +08:00
{
if (e == FALLTHROUGH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | FALLTHROUGH))
return 0;
if (e == BRANCH && insn_state[t] >= (DISCOVERED | BRANCH))
return 0;
if (w < 0 || w >= env->prog->len) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", t, w);
bpf: verifier (add branch/goto checks) check that control flow graph of eBPF program is a directed acyclic graph check_cfg() does: - detect loops - detect unreachable instructions - check that program terminates with BPF_EXIT insn - check that all branches are within program boundary Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:05 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 09:50:01 +08:00
if (e == BRANCH)
/* mark branch target for state pruning */
env->explored_states[w] = STATE_LIST_MARK;
bpf: verifier (add branch/goto checks) check that control flow graph of eBPF program is a directed acyclic graph check_cfg() does: - detect loops - detect unreachable instructions - check that program terminates with BPF_EXIT insn - check that all branches are within program boundary Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:05 +08:00
if (insn_state[w] == 0) {
/* tree-edge */
insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e;
insn_state[w] = DISCOVERED;
if (cur_stack >= env->prog->len)
return -E2BIG;
insn_stack[cur_stack++] = w;
return 1;
} else if ((insn_state[w] & 0xF0) == DISCOVERED) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "back-edge from insn %d to %d\n", t, w);
bpf: verifier (add branch/goto checks) check that control flow graph of eBPF program is a directed acyclic graph check_cfg() does: - detect loops - detect unreachable instructions - check that program terminates with BPF_EXIT insn - check that all branches are within program boundary Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:05 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
} else if (insn_state[w] == EXPLORED) {
/* forward- or cross-edge */
insn_state[t] = DISCOVERED | e;
} else {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "insn state internal bug\n");
bpf: verifier (add branch/goto checks) check that control flow graph of eBPF program is a directed acyclic graph check_cfg() does: - detect loops - detect unreachable instructions - check that program terminates with BPF_EXIT insn - check that all branches are within program boundary Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:05 +08:00
return -EFAULT;
}
return 0;
}
/* non-recursive depth-first-search to detect loops in BPF program
* loop == back-edge in directed graph
*/
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
bpf: verifier (add branch/goto checks) check that control flow graph of eBPF program is a directed acyclic graph check_cfg() does: - detect loops - detect unreachable instructions - check that program terminates with BPF_EXIT insn - check that all branches are within program boundary Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:05 +08:00
{
struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
int ret = 0;
int i, t;
insn_state = kcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!insn_state)
return -ENOMEM;
insn_stack = kcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!insn_stack) {
kfree(insn_state);
return -ENOMEM;
}
insn_state[0] = DISCOVERED; /* mark 1st insn as discovered */
insn_stack[0] = 0; /* 0 is the first instruction */
cur_stack = 1;
peek_stack:
if (cur_stack == 0)
goto check_state;
t = insn_stack[cur_stack - 1];
if (BPF_CLASS(insns[t].code) == BPF_JMP) {
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insns[t].code);
if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) {
goto mark_explored;
} else if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env);
if (ret == 1)
goto peek_stack;
else if (ret < 0)
goto err_free;
bpf, verifier: further improve search pruning The verifier needs to go through every path of the program in order to check that it terminates safely, which can be quite a lot of instructions that need to be processed f.e. in cases with more branchy programs. With search pruning from f1bca824dabb ("bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier") the search space can already be reduced significantly when the verifier detects that a previously walked path with same register and stack contents terminated already (see verifier's states_equal()), so the search can skip walking those states. When working with larger programs of > ~2000 (out of max 4096) insns, we found that the current limit of 32k instructions is easily hit. For example, a case we ran into is that the search space cannot be pruned due to branches at the beginning of the program that make use of certain stack space slots (STACK_MISC), which are never used in the remaining program (STACK_INVALID). Therefore, the verifier needs to walk paths for the slots in STACK_INVALID state, but also all remaining paths with a stack structure, where the slots are in STACK_MISC, which can nearly double the search space needed. After various experiments, we find that a limit of 64k processed insns is a more reasonable choice when dealing with larger programs in practice. This still allows to reject extreme crafted cases that can have a much higher complexity (f.e. > ~300k) within the 4096 insns limit due to search pruning not being able to take effect. Furthermore, we found that a lot of states can be pruned after a call instruction, f.e. we were able to reduce the search state by ~35% in some cases with this heuristic, trade-off is to keep a bit more states in env->explored_states. Usually, call instructions have a number of preceding register assignments and/or stack stores, where search pruning has a better chance to suceed in states_equal() test. The current code marks the branch targets with STATE_LIST_MARK in case of conditional jumps, and the next (t + 1) instruction in case of unconditional jump so that f.e. a backjump will walk it. We also did experiments with using t + insns[t].off + 1 as a marker in the unconditionally jump case instead of t + 1 with the rationale that these two branches of execution that converge after the label might have more potential of pruning. We found that it was a bit better, but not necessarily significantly better than the current state, perhaps also due to clang not generating back jumps often. Hence, we left that as is for now. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-06 04:33:17 +08:00
if (t + 1 < insn_cnt)
env->explored_states[t + 1] = STATE_LIST_MARK;
bpf: verifier (add branch/goto checks) check that control flow graph of eBPF program is a directed acyclic graph check_cfg() does: - detect loops - detect unreachable instructions - check that program terminates with BPF_EXIT insn - check that all branches are within program boundary Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:05 +08:00
} else if (opcode == BPF_JA) {
if (BPF_SRC(insns[t].code) != BPF_K) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err_free;
}
/* unconditional jump with single edge */
ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1,
FALLTHROUGH, env);
if (ret == 1)
goto peek_stack;
else if (ret < 0)
goto err_free;
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 09:50:01 +08:00
/* tell verifier to check for equivalent states
* after every call and jump
*/
bpf: fix verifier memory corruption Due to missing bounds check the DAG pass of the BPF verifier can corrupt the memory which can cause random crashes during program loading: [8.449451] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffffffffff [8.451293] IP: [<ffffffff811de33d>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x8d/0x2f0 [8.452329] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [8.452329] Call Trace: [8.452329] [<ffffffff8116cc82>] bpf_check+0x852/0x2000 [8.452329] [<ffffffff8116b7e4>] bpf_prog_load+0x1e4/0x310 [8.452329] [<ffffffff811b190f>] ? might_fault+0x5f/0xb0 [8.452329] [<ffffffff8116c206>] SyS_bpf+0x806/0xa30 Fixes: f1bca824dabb ("bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier") Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-04-15 06:57:13 +08:00
if (t + 1 < insn_cnt)
env->explored_states[t + 1] = STATE_LIST_MARK;
bpf: verifier (add branch/goto checks) check that control flow graph of eBPF program is a directed acyclic graph check_cfg() does: - detect loops - detect unreachable instructions - check that program terminates with BPF_EXIT insn - check that all branches are within program boundary Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:05 +08:00
} else {
/* conditional jump with two edges */
bpf: adjust verifier heuristics Current limits with regards to processing program paths do not really reflect today's needs anymore due to programs becoming more complex and verifier smarter, keeping track of more data such as const ALU operations, alignment tracking, spilling of PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ registers, and other features allowing for smarter matching of what LLVM generates. This also comes with the side-effect that we result in fewer opportunities to prune search states and thus often need to do more work to prove safety than in the past due to different register states and stack layout where we mismatch. Generally, it's quite hard to determine what caused a sudden increase in complexity, it could be caused by something as trivial as a single branch somewhere at the beginning of the program where LLVM assigned a stack slot that is marked differently throughout other branches and thus causing a mismatch, where verifier then needs to prove safety for the whole rest of the program. Subsequently, programs with even less than half the insn size limit can get rejected. We noticed that while some programs load fine under pre 4.11, they get rejected due to hitting limits on more recent kernels. We saw that in the vast majority of cases (90+%) pruning failed due to register mismatches. In case of stack mismatches, majority of cases failed due to different stack slot types (invalid, spill, misc) rather than differences in spilled registers. This patch makes pruning more aggressive by also adding markers that sit at conditional jumps as well. Currently, we only mark jump targets for pruning. For example in direct packet access, these are usually error paths where we bail out. We found that adding these markers, it can reduce number of processed insns by up to 30%. Another option is to ignore reg->id in probing PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers, which can help pruning slightly as well by up to 7% observed complexity reduction as stand-alone. Meaning, if a previous path with register type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL for map X was found to be safe, then in the current state a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL register for the same map X must be safe as well. Last but not least the patch also adds a scheduling point and bumps the current limit for instructions to be processed to a more adequate value. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-18 09:00:06 +08:00
env->explored_states[t] = STATE_LIST_MARK;
bpf: verifier (add branch/goto checks) check that control flow graph of eBPF program is a directed acyclic graph check_cfg() does: - detect loops - detect unreachable instructions - check that program terminates with BPF_EXIT insn - check that all branches are within program boundary Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:05 +08:00
ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env);
if (ret == 1)
goto peek_stack;
else if (ret < 0)
goto err_free;
ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, BRANCH, env);
if (ret == 1)
goto peek_stack;
else if (ret < 0)
goto err_free;
}
} else {
/* all other non-branch instructions with single
* fall-through edge
*/
ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env);
if (ret == 1)
goto peek_stack;
else if (ret < 0)
goto err_free;
}
mark_explored:
insn_state[t] = EXPLORED;
if (cur_stack-- <= 0) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "pop stack internal bug\n");
bpf: verifier (add branch/goto checks) check that control flow graph of eBPF program is a directed acyclic graph check_cfg() does: - detect loops - detect unreachable instructions - check that program terminates with BPF_EXIT insn - check that all branches are within program boundary Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:05 +08:00
ret = -EFAULT;
goto err_free;
}
goto peek_stack;
check_state:
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
if (insn_state[i] != EXPLORED) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "unreachable insn %d\n", i);
bpf: verifier (add branch/goto checks) check that control flow graph of eBPF program is a directed acyclic graph check_cfg() does: - detect loops - detect unreachable instructions - check that program terminates with BPF_EXIT insn - check that all branches are within program boundary Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:05 +08:00
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err_free;
}
}
ret = 0; /* cfg looks good */
err_free:
kfree(insn_state);
kfree(insn_stack);
return ret;
}
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
/* check %cur's range satisfies %old's */
static bool range_within(struct bpf_reg_state *old,
struct bpf_reg_state *cur)
{
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
return old->umin_value <= cur->umin_value &&
old->umax_value >= cur->umax_value &&
old->smin_value <= cur->smin_value &&
old->smax_value >= cur->smax_value;
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
}
/* Maximum number of register states that can exist at once */
#define ID_MAP_SIZE (MAX_BPF_REG + MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE)
struct idpair {
u32 old;
u32 cur;
};
/* If in the old state two registers had the same id, then they need to have
* the same id in the new state as well. But that id could be different from
* the old state, so we need to track the mapping from old to new ids.
* Once we have seen that, say, a reg with old id 5 had new id 9, any subsequent
* regs with old id 5 must also have new id 9 for the new state to be safe. But
* regs with a different old id could still have new id 9, we don't care about
* that.
* So we look through our idmap to see if this old id has been seen before. If
* so, we require the new id to match; otherwise, we add the id pair to the map.
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
*/
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
static bool check_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cur_id, struct idpair *idmap)
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
{
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
unsigned int i;
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
for (i = 0; i < ID_MAP_SIZE; i++) {
if (!idmap[i].old) {
/* Reached an empty slot; haven't seen this id before */
idmap[i].old = old_id;
idmap[i].cur = cur_id;
return true;
}
if (idmap[i].old == old_id)
return idmap[i].cur == cur_id;
}
/* We ran out of idmap slots, which should be impossible */
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
return false;
}
/* Returns true if (rold safe implies rcur safe) */
bpf/verifier: remove varlen_map_value_access flag The optimisation it does is broken when the 'new' register value has a variable offset and the 'old' was constant. I broke it with my pointer types unification (see Fixes tag below), before which the 'new' value would have type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ and would thus not compare equal; other changes in that patch mean that its original behaviour (ignore min/max values) cannot be restored. Tests on a sample set of cilium programs show no change in count of processed instructions. Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking") Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-23 22:10:50 +08:00
static bool regsafe(struct bpf_reg_state *rold, struct bpf_reg_state *rcur,
struct idpair *idmap)
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
{
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
if (!(rold->live & REG_LIVE_READ))
/* explored state didn't use this */
return true;
if (memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, live)) == 0)
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
return true;
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
if (rold->type == NOT_INIT)
/* explored state can't have used this */
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
return true;
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
if (rcur->type == NOT_INIT)
return false;
switch (rold->type) {
case SCALAR_VALUE:
if (rcur->type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
/* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */
return range_within(rold, rcur) &&
tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off);
} else {
/* if we knew anything about the old value, we're not
* equal, because we can't know anything about the
* scalar value of the pointer in the new value.
*/
bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one bound and an unsigned check of the other. We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as unknown. While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:36 +08:00
return rold->umin_value == 0 &&
rold->umax_value == U64_MAX &&
rold->smin_value == S64_MIN &&
rold->smax_value == S64_MAX &&
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
tnum_is_unknown(rold->var_off);
}
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
bpf/verifier: remove varlen_map_value_access flag The optimisation it does is broken when the 'new' register value has a variable offset and the 'old' was constant. I broke it with my pointer types unification (see Fixes tag below), before which the 'new' value would have type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ and would thus not compare equal; other changes in that patch mean that its original behaviour (ignore min/max values) cannot be restored. Tests on a sample set of cilium programs show no change in count of processed instructions. Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking") Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-23 22:10:50 +08:00
/* If the new min/max/var_off satisfy the old ones and
* everything else matches, we are OK.
* We don't care about the 'id' value, because nothing
* uses it for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE (only for ..._OR_NULL)
*/
return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 &&
range_within(rold, rcur) &&
tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off);
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL:
/* a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE could be safe to use as a
* PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL into the same map.
* However, if the old PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL then got NULL-
* checked, doing so could have affected others with the same
* id, and we can't check for that because we lost the id when
* we converted to a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE.
*/
if (rcur->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL)
return false;
if (memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)))
return false;
/* Check our ids match any regs they're supposed to */
return check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap);
bpf: add meta pointer for direct access This work enables generic transfer of metadata from XDP into skb. The basic idea is that we can make use of the fact that the resulting skb must be linear and already comes with a larger headroom for supporting bpf_xdp_adjust_head(), which mangles xdp->data. Here, we base our work on a similar principle and introduce a small helper bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() for adjusting a new pointer called xdp->data_meta. Thus, the packet has a flexible and programmable room for meta data, followed by the actual packet data. struct xdp_buff is therefore laid out that we first point to data_hard_start, then data_meta directly prepended to data followed by data_end marking the end of packet. bpf_xdp_adjust_head() takes into account whether we have meta data already prepended and if so, memmove()s this along with the given offset provided there's enough room. xdp->data_meta is optional and programs are not required to use it. The rationale is that when we process the packet in XDP (e.g. as DoS filter), we can push further meta data along with it for the XDP_PASS case, and give the guarantee that a clsact ingress BPF program on the same device can pick this up for further post-processing. Since we work with skb there, we can also set skb->mark, skb->priority or other skb meta data out of BPF, thus having this scratch space generic and programmable allows for more flexibility than defining a direct 1:1 transfer of potentially new XDP members into skb (it's also more efficient as we don't need to initialize/handle each of such new members). The facility also works together with GRO aggregation. The scratch space at the head of the packet can be multiple of 4 byte up to 32 byte large. Drivers not yet supporting xdp->data_meta can simply be set up with xdp->data_meta as xdp->data + 1 as bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() will detect this and bail out, such that the subsequent match against xdp->data for later access is guaranteed to fail. The verifier treats xdp->data_meta/xdp->data the same way as we treat xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons. The requirement for doing the compare against xdp->data is that it hasn't been modified from it's original address we got from ctx access. It may have a range marking already from prior successful xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons though. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-25 08:25:51 +08:00
case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
case PTR_TO_PACKET:
bpf: add meta pointer for direct access This work enables generic transfer of metadata from XDP into skb. The basic idea is that we can make use of the fact that the resulting skb must be linear and already comes with a larger headroom for supporting bpf_xdp_adjust_head(), which mangles xdp->data. Here, we base our work on a similar principle and introduce a small helper bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() for adjusting a new pointer called xdp->data_meta. Thus, the packet has a flexible and programmable room for meta data, followed by the actual packet data. struct xdp_buff is therefore laid out that we first point to data_hard_start, then data_meta directly prepended to data followed by data_end marking the end of packet. bpf_xdp_adjust_head() takes into account whether we have meta data already prepended and if so, memmove()s this along with the given offset provided there's enough room. xdp->data_meta is optional and programs are not required to use it. The rationale is that when we process the packet in XDP (e.g. as DoS filter), we can push further meta data along with it for the XDP_PASS case, and give the guarantee that a clsact ingress BPF program on the same device can pick this up for further post-processing. Since we work with skb there, we can also set skb->mark, skb->priority or other skb meta data out of BPF, thus having this scratch space generic and programmable allows for more flexibility than defining a direct 1:1 transfer of potentially new XDP members into skb (it's also more efficient as we don't need to initialize/handle each of such new members). The facility also works together with GRO aggregation. The scratch space at the head of the packet can be multiple of 4 byte up to 32 byte large. Drivers not yet supporting xdp->data_meta can simply be set up with xdp->data_meta as xdp->data + 1 as bpf_xdp_adjust_meta() will detect this and bail out, such that the subsequent match against xdp->data for later access is guaranteed to fail. The verifier treats xdp->data_meta/xdp->data the same way as we treat xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons. The requirement for doing the compare against xdp->data is that it hasn't been modified from it's original address we got from ctx access. It may have a range marking already from prior successful xdp->data/xdp->data_end pointer comparisons though. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-25 08:25:51 +08:00
if (rcur->type != rold->type)
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
return false;
/* We must have at least as much range as the old ptr
* did, so that any accesses which were safe before are
* still safe. This is true even if old range < old off,
* since someone could have accessed through (ptr - k), or
* even done ptr -= k in a register, to get a safe access.
*/
if (rold->range > rcur->range)
return false;
/* If the offsets don't match, we can't trust our alignment;
* nor can we be sure that we won't fall out of range.
*/
if (rold->off != rcur->off)
return false;
/* id relations must be preserved */
if (rold->id && !check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap))
return false;
/* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */
return range_within(rold, rcur) &&
tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off);
case PTR_TO_CTX:
case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP:
case PTR_TO_STACK:
case PTR_TO_PACKET_END:
/* Only valid matches are exact, which memcmp() above
* would have accepted
*/
default:
/* Don't know what's going on, just say it's not safe */
return false;
}
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
/* Shouldn't get here; if we do, say it's not safe */
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
bpf: direct packet access Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs, but due to their design they have to do length check for every access. When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses. One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW with similar usage as skb_header_pointer(). The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient. Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { struct iphdr *ip; if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end) /* packet too small */ return 0; ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN; /* access IP header fields with direct loads */ if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001) return 1; [...] } This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard to prove safety of the above program. For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well. The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:10 +08:00
return false;
}
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 09:50:01 +08:00
/* compare two verifier states
*
* all states stored in state_list are known to be valid, since
* verifier reached 'bpf_exit' instruction through them
*
* this function is called when verifier exploring different branches of
* execution popped from the state stack. If it sees an old state that has
* more strict register state and more strict stack state then this execution
* branch doesn't need to be explored further, since verifier already
* concluded that more strict state leads to valid finish.
*
* Therefore two states are equivalent if register state is more conservative
* and explored stack state is more conservative than the current one.
* Example:
* explored current
* (slot1=INV slot2=MISC) == (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC)
* (slot1=MISC slot2=MISC) != (slot1=INV slot2=MISC)
*
* In other words if current stack state (one being explored) has more
* valid slots than old one that already passed validation, it means
* the verifier can stop exploring and conclude that current state is valid too
*
* Similarly with registers. If explored state has register type as invalid
* whereas register type in current state is meaningful, it means that
* the current state will reach 'bpf_exit' instruction safely
*/
bpf: allow access into map value arrays Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this struct foo { unsigned iter; int array[SOME_CONSTANT]; }; You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as this unsigned index = 0; if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT) foo->iter = index; else index = foo->iter++; foo->array[index] = bar; would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %= SOME_CONSTANT. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-28 22:54:32 +08:00
static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_verifier_state *old,
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
struct bpf_verifier_state *cur)
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 09:50:01 +08:00
{
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
struct idpair *idmap;
bool ret = false;
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 09:50:01 +08:00
int i;
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
idmap = kcalloc(ID_MAP_SIZE, sizeof(struct idpair), GFP_KERNEL);
/* If we failed to allocate the idmap, just say it's not safe */
if (!idmap)
bpf: cleanup verifier code cleanup verifier code and prepare it for addition of "pointer to packet" logic Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-05-06 10:49:09 +08:00
return false;
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
bpf/verifier: remove varlen_map_value_access flag The optimisation it does is broken when the 'new' register value has a variable offset and the 'old' was constant. I broke it with my pointer types unification (see Fixes tag below), before which the 'new' value would have type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ and would thus not compare equal; other changes in that patch mean that its original behaviour (ignore min/max values) cannot be restored. Tests on a sample set of cilium programs show no change in count of processed instructions. Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking") Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-23 22:10:50 +08:00
if (!regsafe(&old->regs[i], &cur->regs[i], idmap))
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
goto out_free;
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 09:50:01 +08:00
}
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i++) {
bpf: reduce verifier memory consumption verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack. registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track spilled register state. Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage. This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state) from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit. Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program, 1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn (since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers cleanup and rejects the program. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-29 06:11:41 +08:00
if (old->stack_slot_type[i] == STACK_INVALID)
continue;
if (old->stack_slot_type[i] != cur->stack_slot_type[i])
/* Ex: old explored (safe) state has STACK_SPILL in
* this stack slot, but current has has STACK_MISC ->
* this verifier states are not equivalent,
* return false to continue verification of this path
*/
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
goto out_free;
bpf: reduce verifier memory consumption verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack. registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track spilled register state. Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage. This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state) from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit. Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program, 1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn (since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers cleanup and rejects the program. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-29 06:11:41 +08:00
if (i % BPF_REG_SIZE)
continue;
bpf: don't check spilled reg state for non-STACK_SPILLed type slots spilled_regs[] state is only used for stack slots of type STACK_SPILL, never for STACK_MISC. Right now, in states_equal(), even if we have old and current stack state of type STACK_MISC, we compare spilled_regs[] for that particular offset. Just skip these like we do everywhere else. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-11 06:50:41 +08:00
if (old->stack_slot_type[i] != STACK_SPILL)
continue;
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
if (!regsafe(&old->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE],
&cur->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE],
bpf/verifier: remove varlen_map_value_access flag The optimisation it does is broken when the 'new' register value has a variable offset and the 'old' was constant. I broke it with my pointer types unification (see Fixes tag below), before which the 'new' value would have type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ and would thus not compare equal; other changes in that patch mean that its original behaviour (ignore min/max values) cannot be restored. Tests on a sample set of cilium programs show no change in count of processed instructions. Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking") Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-23 22:10:50 +08:00
idmap))
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
/* when explored and current stack slot are both storing
* spilled registers, check that stored pointers types
bpf: reduce verifier memory consumption verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack. registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track spilled register state. Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage. This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state) from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit. Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program, 1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn (since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers cleanup and rejects the program. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-29 06:11:41 +08:00
* are the same as well.
* Ex: explored safe path could have stored
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
* (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -8}
bpf: reduce verifier memory consumption verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack. registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track spilled register state. Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage. This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state) from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit. Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program, 1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn (since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers cleanup and rejects the program. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-29 06:11:41 +08:00
* but current path has stored:
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
* (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .off = -16}
bpf: reduce verifier memory consumption verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack. registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track spilled register state. Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage. This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state) from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit. Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program, 1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn (since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers cleanup and rejects the program. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-29 06:11:41 +08:00
* such verifier states are not equivalent.
* return false to continue verification of this path
*/
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
goto out_free;
bpf: reduce verifier memory consumption verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack. registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track spilled register state. Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage. This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state) from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit. Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program, 1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn (since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers cleanup and rejects the program. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-29 06:11:41 +08:00
else
continue;
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 09:50:01 +08:00
}
bpf/verifier: rework value tracking Unifies adjusted and unadjusted register value types (e.g. FRAME_POINTER is now just a PTR_TO_STACK with zero offset). Tracks value alignment by means of tracking known & unknown bits. This also replaces the 'reg->imm' (leading zero bits) calculations for (what were) UNKNOWN_VALUEs. If pointer leaks are allowed, and adjust_ptr_min_max_vals returns -EACCES, treat the pointer as an unknown scalar and try again, because we might be able to conclude something about the result (e.g. pointer & 0x40 is either 0 or 0x40). Verifier hooks in the netronome/nfp driver were changed to match the new data structures. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-07 22:26:19 +08:00
ret = true;
out_free:
kfree(idmap);
return ret;
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 09:50:01 +08:00
}
bpf/verifier: document liveness analysis The liveness tracking algorithm is quite subtle; add comments to explain it. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-23 22:11:21 +08:00
/* A write screens off any subsequent reads; but write marks come from the
* straight-line code between a state and its parent. When we arrive at a
* jump target (in the first iteration of the propagate_liveness() loop),
* we didn't arrive by the straight-line code, so read marks in state must
* propagate to parent regardless of state's write marks.
*/
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
static bool do_propagate_liveness(const struct bpf_verifier_state *state,
struct bpf_verifier_state *parent)
{
bpf/verifier: when pruning a branch, ignore its write marks The fact that writes occurred in reaching the continuation state does not screen off its reads from us, because we're not really its parent. So detect 'not really the parent' in do_propagate_liveness, and ignore write marks in that case. Fixes: dc503a8ad984 ("bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning") Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-23 22:10:03 +08:00
bool writes = parent == state->parent; /* Observe write marks */
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
bool touched = false; /* any changes made? */
int i;
if (!parent)
return touched;
/* Propagate read liveness of registers... */
BUILD_BUG_ON(BPF_REG_FP + 1 != MAX_BPF_REG);
/* We don't need to worry about FP liveness because it's read-only */
for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++) {
if (parent->regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_READ)
continue;
bpf/verifier: when pruning a branch, ignore its write marks The fact that writes occurred in reaching the continuation state does not screen off its reads from us, because we're not really its parent. So detect 'not really the parent' in do_propagate_liveness, and ignore write marks in that case. Fixes: dc503a8ad984 ("bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning") Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-23 22:10:03 +08:00
if (writes && (state->regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN))
continue;
if (state->regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_READ) {
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
parent->regs[i].live |= REG_LIVE_READ;
touched = true;
}
}
/* ... and stack slots */
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
if (parent->stack_slot_type[i * BPF_REG_SIZE] != STACK_SPILL)
continue;
if (state->stack_slot_type[i * BPF_REG_SIZE] != STACK_SPILL)
continue;
if (parent->spilled_regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_READ)
continue;
bpf/verifier: when pruning a branch, ignore its write marks The fact that writes occurred in reaching the continuation state does not screen off its reads from us, because we're not really its parent. So detect 'not really the parent' in do_propagate_liveness, and ignore write marks in that case. Fixes: dc503a8ad984 ("bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning") Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-23 22:10:03 +08:00
if (writes && (state->spilled_regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_WRITTEN))
continue;
if (state->spilled_regs[i].live & REG_LIVE_READ) {
bpf: fix liveness propagation to parent in spilled stack slots Using parent->regs[] when propagating REG_LIVE_READ for spilled regs doesn't work since parent->regs[] denote the set of normal registers but not spilled ones. Propagate to the correct regs. Fixes: dc503a8ad984 ("bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning") Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-17 20:59:40 +08:00
parent->spilled_regs[i].live |= REG_LIVE_READ;
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
touched = true;
}
}
return touched;
}
bpf/verifier: document liveness analysis The liveness tracking algorithm is quite subtle; add comments to explain it. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-23 22:11:21 +08:00
/* "parent" is "a state from which we reach the current state", but initially
* it is not the state->parent (i.e. "the state whose straight-line code leads
* to the current state"), instead it is the state that happened to arrive at
* a (prunable) equivalent of the current state. See comment above
* do_propagate_liveness() for consequences of this.
* This function is just a more efficient way of calling mark_reg_read() or
* mark_stack_slot_read() on each reg in "parent" that is read in "state",
* though it requires that parent != state->parent in the call arguments.
*/
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
static void propagate_liveness(const struct bpf_verifier_state *state,
struct bpf_verifier_state *parent)
{
while (do_propagate_liveness(state, parent)) {
/* Something changed, so we need to feed those changes onward */
state = parent;
parent = state->parent;
}
}
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 09:50:01 +08:00
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
struct bpf_verifier_state_list *new_sl;
struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl;
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
int i;
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 09:50:01 +08:00
sl = env->explored_states[insn_idx];
if (!sl)
/* this 'insn_idx' instruction wasn't marked, so we will not
* be doing state search here
*/
return 0;
while (sl != STATE_LIST_MARK) {
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, &env->cur_state)) {
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 09:50:01 +08:00
/* reached equivalent register/stack state,
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
* prune the search.
* Registers read by the continuation are read by us.
bpf/verifier: document liveness analysis The liveness tracking algorithm is quite subtle; add comments to explain it. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-23 22:11:21 +08:00
* If we have any write marks in env->cur_state, they
* will prevent corresponding reads in the continuation
* from reaching our parent (an explored_state). Our
* own state will get the read marks recorded, but
* they'll be immediately forgotten as we're pruning
* this state and will pop a new one.
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 09:50:01 +08:00
*/
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
propagate_liveness(&sl->state, &env->cur_state);
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 09:50:01 +08:00
return 1;
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
}
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 09:50:01 +08:00
sl = sl->next;
}
/* there were no equivalent states, remember current one.
* technically the current state is not proven to be safe yet,
* but it will either reach bpf_exit (which means it's safe) or
* it will be rejected. Since there are no loops, we won't be
* seeing this 'insn_idx' instruction again on the way to bpf_exit
*/
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
new_sl = kmalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list), GFP_USER);
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 09:50:01 +08:00
if (!new_sl)
return -ENOMEM;
/* add new state to the head of linked list */
memcpy(&new_sl->state, &env->cur_state, sizeof(env->cur_state));
new_sl->next = env->explored_states[insn_idx];
env->explored_states[insn_idx] = new_sl;
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
/* connect new state to parentage chain */
env->cur_state.parent = &new_sl->state;
bpf/verifier: document liveness analysis The liveness tracking algorithm is quite subtle; add comments to explain it. Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-23 22:11:21 +08:00
/* clear write marks in current state: the writes we did are not writes
* our child did, so they don't screen off its reads from us.
* (There are no read marks in current state, because reads always mark
* their parent and current state never has children yet. Only
* explored_states can get read marks.)
*/
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
for (i = 0; i < BPF_REG_FP; i++)
env->cur_state.regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++)
if (env->cur_state.stack_slot_type[i * BPF_REG_SIZE] == STACK_SPILL)
env->cur_state.spilled_regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE;
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 09:50:01 +08:00
return 0;
}
bpf: enable non-core use of the verfier Advanced JIT compilers and translators may want to use eBPF verifier as a base for parsers or to perform custom checks and validations. Add ability for external users to invoke the verifier and provide callbacks to be invoked for every intruction checked. For now only add most basic callback for per-instruction pre-interpretation checks is added. More advanced users may also like to have per-instruction post callback and state comparison callback. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:58 +08:00
static int ext_analyzer_insn_hook(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx)
{
if (!env->analyzer_ops || !env->analyzer_ops->insn_hook)
return 0;
return env->analyzer_ops->insn_hook(env, insn_idx, prev_insn_idx);
}
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
int insn_idx, prev_insn_idx = 0;
int insn_processed = 0;
bool do_print_state = false;
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
init_reg_state(env, regs);
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
state->parent = NULL;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
insn_idx = 0;
for (;;) {
struct bpf_insn *insn;
u8 class;
int err;
if (insn_idx >= insn_cnt) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "invalid insn idx %d insn_cnt %d\n",
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
insn_idx, insn_cnt);
return -EFAULT;
}
insn = &insns[insn_idx];
class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
bpf, verifier: further improve search pruning The verifier needs to go through every path of the program in order to check that it terminates safely, which can be quite a lot of instructions that need to be processed f.e. in cases with more branchy programs. With search pruning from f1bca824dabb ("bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier") the search space can already be reduced significantly when the verifier detects that a previously walked path with same register and stack contents terminated already (see verifier's states_equal()), so the search can skip walking those states. When working with larger programs of > ~2000 (out of max 4096) insns, we found that the current limit of 32k instructions is easily hit. For example, a case we ran into is that the search space cannot be pruned due to branches at the beginning of the program that make use of certain stack space slots (STACK_MISC), which are never used in the remaining program (STACK_INVALID). Therefore, the verifier needs to walk paths for the slots in STACK_INVALID state, but also all remaining paths with a stack structure, where the slots are in STACK_MISC, which can nearly double the search space needed. After various experiments, we find that a limit of 64k processed insns is a more reasonable choice when dealing with larger programs in practice. This still allows to reject extreme crafted cases that can have a much higher complexity (f.e. > ~300k) within the 4096 insns limit due to search pruning not being able to take effect. Furthermore, we found that a lot of states can be pruned after a call instruction, f.e. we were able to reduce the search state by ~35% in some cases with this heuristic, trade-off is to keep a bit more states in env->explored_states. Usually, call instructions have a number of preceding register assignments and/or stack stores, where search pruning has a better chance to suceed in states_equal() test. The current code marks the branch targets with STATE_LIST_MARK in case of conditional jumps, and the next (t + 1) instruction in case of unconditional jump so that f.e. a backjump will walk it. We also did experiments with using t + insns[t].off + 1 as a marker in the unconditionally jump case instead of t + 1 with the rationale that these two branches of execution that converge after the label might have more potential of pruning. We found that it was a bit better, but not necessarily significantly better than the current state, perhaps also due to clang not generating back jumps often. Hence, we left that as is for now. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-06 04:33:17 +08:00
if (++insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env,
"BPF program is too large. Processed %d insn\n",
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
insn_processed);
return -E2BIG;
}
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 09:50:01 +08:00
err = is_state_visited(env, insn_idx);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (err == 1) {
/* found equivalent state, can prune the search */
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
if (env->log.level) {
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 09:50:01 +08:00
if (do_print_state)
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d: safe\n",
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 09:50:01 +08:00
prev_insn_idx, insn_idx);
else
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "%d: safe\n", insn_idx);
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 09:50:01 +08:00
}
goto process_bpf_exit;
}
bpf: adjust verifier heuristics Current limits with regards to processing program paths do not really reflect today's needs anymore due to programs becoming more complex and verifier smarter, keeping track of more data such as const ALU operations, alignment tracking, spilling of PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ registers, and other features allowing for smarter matching of what LLVM generates. This also comes with the side-effect that we result in fewer opportunities to prune search states and thus often need to do more work to prove safety than in the past due to different register states and stack layout where we mismatch. Generally, it's quite hard to determine what caused a sudden increase in complexity, it could be caused by something as trivial as a single branch somewhere at the beginning of the program where LLVM assigned a stack slot that is marked differently throughout other branches and thus causing a mismatch, where verifier then needs to prove safety for the whole rest of the program. Subsequently, programs with even less than half the insn size limit can get rejected. We noticed that while some programs load fine under pre 4.11, they get rejected due to hitting limits on more recent kernels. We saw that in the vast majority of cases (90+%) pruning failed due to register mismatches. In case of stack mismatches, majority of cases failed due to different stack slot types (invalid, spill, misc) rather than differences in spilled registers. This patch makes pruning more aggressive by also adding markers that sit at conditional jumps as well. Currently, we only mark jump targets for pruning. For example in direct packet access, these are usually error paths where we bail out. We found that adding these markers, it can reduce number of processed insns by up to 30%. Another option is to ignore reg->id in probing PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers, which can help pruning slightly as well by up to 7% observed complexity reduction as stand-alone. Meaning, if a previous path with register type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL for map X was found to be safe, then in the current state a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL register for the same map X must be safe as well. Last but not least the patch also adds a scheduling point and bumps the current limit for instructions to be processed to a more adequate value. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-18 09:00:06 +08:00
if (need_resched())
cond_resched();
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
if (env->log.level > 1 || (env->log.level && do_print_state)) {
if (env->log.level > 1)
verbose(env, "%d:", insn_idx);
bpf: Do per-instruction state dumping in verifier when log_level > 1. If log_level > 1, do a state dump every instruction and emit it in a more compact way (without a leading newline). This will facilitate more sophisticated test cases which inspect the verifier log for register state. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-11 02:25:17 +08:00
else
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d:",
bpf: Do per-instruction state dumping in verifier when log_level > 1. If log_level > 1, do a state dump every instruction and emit it in a more compact way (without a leading newline). This will facilitate more sophisticated test cases which inspect the verifier log for register state. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-11 02:25:17 +08:00
prev_insn_idx, insn_idx);
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
print_verifier_state(env, &env->cur_state);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
do_print_state = false;
}
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
if (env->log.level) {
verbose(env, "%d: ", insn_idx);
bpf: don't let ldimm64 leak map addresses on unprivileged The patch fixes two things at once: 1) It checks the env->allow_ptr_leaks and only prints the map address to the log if we have the privileges to do so, otherwise it just dumps 0 as we would when kptr_restrict is enabled on %pK. Given the latter is off by default and not every distro sets it, I don't want to rely on this, hence the 0 by default for unprivileged. 2) Printing of ldimm64 in the verifier log is currently broken in that we don't print the full immediate, but only the 32 bit part of the first insn part for ldimm64. Thus, fix this up as well; it's okay to access, since we verified all ldimm64 earlier already (including just constants) through replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(). Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs") Fixes: cbd357008604 ("bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log)") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-08 06:04:09 +08:00
print_bpf_insn(env, insn);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
}
bpf: enable non-core use of the verfier Advanced JIT compilers and translators may want to use eBPF verifier as a base for parsers or to perform custom checks and validations. Add ability for external users to invoke the verifier and provide callbacks to be invoked for every intruction checked. For now only add most basic callback for per-instruction pre-interpretation checks is added. More advanced users may also like to have per-instruction post callback and state comparison callback. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:58 +08:00
err = ext_analyzer_insn_hook(env, insn_idx, prev_insn_idx);
if (err)
return err;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:21 +08:00
err = check_alu_op(env, insn);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (err)
return err;
} else if (class == BPF_LDX) {
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:56 +08:00
enum bpf_reg_type *prev_src_type, src_reg_type;
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-14 02:57:42 +08:00
/* check for reserved fields is already done */
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
/* check src operand */
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (err)
return err;
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (err)
return err;
bpf: fix two bugs in verification logic when accessing 'ctx' pointer 1. first bug is a silly mistake. It broke tracing examples and prevented simple bpf programs from loading. In the following code: if (insn->imm == 0 && BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_W) { } else if (...) { // this part should have been executed when // insn->code == BPF_W and insn->imm != 0 } Obviously it's not doing that. So simple instructions like: r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 8) will be rejected. Note the comments in the code around these branches were and still valid and indicate the true intent. Replace it with: if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W) continue; if (insn->imm == 0) { } else if (...) { // now this code will be executed when // insn->code == BPF_W and insn->imm != 0 } 2. second bug is more subtle. If malicious code is using the same dest register as source register, the checks designed to prevent the same instruction to be used with different pointer types will fail to trigger, since we were assigning src_reg_type when it was already overwritten by check_mem_access(). The fix is trivial. Just move line: src_reg_type = regs[insn->src_reg].type; before check_mem_access(). Add new 'access skb fields bad4' test to check this case. Fixes: 9bac3d6d548e ("bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields") Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-04-16 07:19:33 +08:00
src_reg_type = regs[insn->src_reg].type;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
/* check that memory (src_reg + off) is readable,
* the state of dst_reg will be updated by this func
*/
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-14 06:52:13 +08:00
err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->src_reg, insn->off,
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ,
insn->dst_reg);
if (err)
return err;
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:56 +08:00
prev_src_type = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ptr_type;
if (*prev_src_type == NOT_INIT) {
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-14 02:57:42 +08:00
/* saw a valid insn
* dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + off)
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:56 +08:00
* save type to validate intersecting paths
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-14 02:57:42 +08:00
*/
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:56 +08:00
*prev_src_type = src_reg_type;
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-14 02:57:42 +08:00
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:56 +08:00
} else if (src_reg_type != *prev_src_type &&
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-14 02:57:42 +08:00
(src_reg_type == PTR_TO_CTX ||
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:56 +08:00
*prev_src_type == PTR_TO_CTX)) {
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-14 02:57:42 +08:00
/* ABuser program is trying to use the same insn
* dst_reg = *(u32*) (src_reg + off)
* with different pointer types:
* src_reg == ctx in one branch and
* src_reg == stack|map in some other branch.
* Reject it.
*/
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n");
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-14 02:57:42 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
} else if (class == BPF_STX) {
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:56 +08:00
enum bpf_reg_type *prev_dst_type, dst_reg_type;
bpf: allow programs to write to certain skb fields allow programs read/write skb->mark, tc_index fields and ((struct qdisc_skb_cb *)cb)->data. mark and tc_index are generically useful in TC. cb[0]-cb[4] are primarily used to pass arguments from one program to another called via bpf_tail_call() which can be seen in sockex3_kern.c example. All fields of 'struct __sk_buff' are readable to socket and tc_cls_act progs. mark, tc_index are writeable from tc_cls_act only. cb[0]-cb[4] are writeable by both sockets and tc_cls_act. Add verifier tests and improve sample code. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-06-05 01:11:54 +08:00
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD) {
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-14 06:52:13 +08:00
err = check_xadd(env, insn_idx, insn);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (err)
return err;
insn_idx++;
continue;
}
/* check src1 operand */
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (err)
return err;
/* check src2 operand */
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (err)
return err;
bpf: allow programs to write to certain skb fields allow programs read/write skb->mark, tc_index fields and ((struct qdisc_skb_cb *)cb)->data. mark and tc_index are generically useful in TC. cb[0]-cb[4] are primarily used to pass arguments from one program to another called via bpf_tail_call() which can be seen in sockex3_kern.c example. All fields of 'struct __sk_buff' are readable to socket and tc_cls_act progs. mark, tc_index are writeable from tc_cls_act only. cb[0]-cb[4] are writeable by both sockets and tc_cls_act. Add verifier tests and improve sample code. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-06-05 01:11:54 +08:00
dst_reg_type = regs[insn->dst_reg].type;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
/* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-14 06:52:13 +08:00
err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE,
insn->src_reg);
if (err)
return err;
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:56 +08:00
prev_dst_type = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ptr_type;
if (*prev_dst_type == NOT_INIT) {
*prev_dst_type = dst_reg_type;
} else if (dst_reg_type != *prev_dst_type &&
bpf: allow programs to write to certain skb fields allow programs read/write skb->mark, tc_index fields and ((struct qdisc_skb_cb *)cb)->data. mark and tc_index are generically useful in TC. cb[0]-cb[4] are primarily used to pass arguments from one program to another called via bpf_tail_call() which can be seen in sockex3_kern.c example. All fields of 'struct __sk_buff' are readable to socket and tc_cls_act progs. mark, tc_index are writeable from tc_cls_act only. cb[0]-cb[4] are writeable by both sockets and tc_cls_act. Add verifier tests and improve sample code. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-06-05 01:11:54 +08:00
(dst_reg_type == PTR_TO_CTX ||
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:56 +08:00
*prev_dst_type == PTR_TO_CTX)) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "same insn cannot be used with different pointers\n");
bpf: allow programs to write to certain skb fields allow programs read/write skb->mark, tc_index fields and ((struct qdisc_skb_cb *)cb)->data. mark and tc_index are generically useful in TC. cb[0]-cb[4] are primarily used to pass arguments from one program to another called via bpf_tail_call() which can be seen in sockex3_kern.c example. All fields of 'struct __sk_buff' are readable to socket and tc_cls_act progs. mark, tc_index are writeable from tc_cls_act only. cb[0]-cb[4] are writeable by both sockets and tc_cls_act. Add verifier tests and improve sample code. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-06-05 01:11:54 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
} else if (class == BPF_ST) {
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM ||
insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "BPF_ST uses reserved fields\n");
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check src operand */
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (err)
return err;
/* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-14 06:52:13 +08:00
err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE,
-1);
if (err)
return err;
} else if (class == BPF_JMP) {
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
insn->off != 0 ||
insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "BPF_CALL uses reserved fields\n");
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
bpf: add helper inlining infra and optimize map_array lookup Optimize bpf_call -> bpf_map_lookup_elem() -> array_map_lookup_elem() into a sequence of bpf instructions. When JIT is on the sequence of bpf instructions is the sequence of native cpu instructions with significantly faster performance than indirect call and two function's prologue/epilogue. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:42 +08:00
err = check_call(env, insn->imm, insn_idx);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (err)
return err;
} else if (opcode == BPF_JA) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
insn->imm != 0 ||
insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "BPF_JA uses reserved fields\n");
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
insn_idx += insn->off + 1;
continue;
} else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
insn->imm != 0 ||
insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "BPF_EXIT uses reserved fields\n");
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
/* eBPF calling convetion is such that R0 is used
* to return the value from eBPF program.
* Make sure that it's readable at this time
* of bpf_exit, which means that program wrote
* something into it earlier
*/
bpf/verifier: track liveness for pruning State of a register doesn't matter if it wasn't read in reaching an exit; a write screens off all reads downstream of it from all explored_states upstream of it. This allows us to prune many more branches; here are some processed insn counts for some Cilium programs: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 6515 3361 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 8976 5176 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 2960 1137 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 95412 48537 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 141706 78718 bpf_netdev.o 24251 17995 bpf_overlay.o 10999 9385 The runtime is also improved; here are 'time' results in ms: Program before after bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L3.o 24 6 bpf_lb_opt_-DLB_L4.o 26 11 bpf_lb_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 11 2 bpf_lxc_opt_-DDROP_ALL.o 1288 139 bpf_lxc_opt_-DUNKNOWN.o 1768 234 bpf_netdev.o 62 31 bpf_overlay.o 15 13 Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-16 03:34:35 +08:00
err = check_reg_arg(env, BPF_REG_0, SRC_OP);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
if (err)
return err;
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:21 +08:00
if (is_pointer_value(env, BPF_REG_0)) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "R0 leaks addr as return value\n");
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:21 +08:00
return -EACCES;
}
bpf: enforce return code for cgroup-bpf programs with addition of tnum logic the verifier got smart enough and we can enforce return codes at program load time. For now do so for cgroup-bpf program types. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-03 13:50:23 +08:00
err = check_return_code(env);
if (err)
return err;
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 09:50:01 +08:00
process_bpf_exit:
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
insn_idx = pop_stack(env, &prev_insn_idx);
if (insn_idx < 0) {
break;
} else {
do_print_state = true;
continue;
}
} else {
err = check_cond_jmp_op(env, insn, &insn_idx);
if (err)
return err;
}
} else if (class == BPF_LD) {
u8 mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code);
if (mode == BPF_ABS || mode == BPF_IND) {
bpf: verifier: add checks for BPF_ABS | BPF_IND instructions introduce program type BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER that is used for attaching programs to sockets where ctx == skb. add verifier checks for ABS/IND instructions which can only be seen in socket filters, therefore the check: if (env->prog->aux->prog_type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER) verbose("BPF_LD_ABS|IND instructions are only allowed in socket filters\n"); Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-12-02 07:06:34 +08:00
err = check_ld_abs(env, insn);
if (err)
return err;
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
} else if (mode == BPF_IMM) {
err = check_ld_imm(env, insn);
if (err)
return err;
insn_idx++;
} else {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD mode\n");
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
} else {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "unknown insn class %d\n", class);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
insn_idx++;
}
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "processed %d insns, stack depth %d\n", insn_processed,
env->prog->aux->stack_depth);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
return 0;
}
bpf: Add array of maps support This patch adds a few helper funcs to enable map-in-map support (i.e. outer_map->inner_map). The first outer_map type BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS is also added in this patch. The next patch will introduce a hash of maps type. Any bpf map type can be acted as an inner_map. The exception is BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY because the extra level of indirection makes it harder to verify the owner_prog_type and owner_jited. Multi-level map-in-map is not supported (i.e. map->map is ok but not map->map->map). When adding an inner_map to an outer_map, it currently checks the map_type, key_size, value_size, map_flags, max_entries and ops. The verifier also uses those map's properties to do static analysis. map_flags is needed because we need to ensure BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT is using a preallocated hashtab for the inner_hash also. ops and max_entries are needed to generate inlined map-lookup instructions. For simplicity reason, a simple '==' test is used for both map_flags and max_entries. The equality of ops is implied by the equality of map_type. During outer_map creation time, an inner_map_fd is needed to create an outer_map. However, the inner_map_fd's life time does not depend on the outer_map. The inner_map_fd is merely used to initialize the inner_map_meta of the outer_map. Also, for the outer_map: * It allows element update and delete from syscall * It allows element lookup from bpf_prog The above is similar to the current fd_array pattern. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-23 01:00:33 +08:00
static int check_map_prealloc(struct bpf_map *map)
{
return (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH &&
bpf: Add hash of maps support This patch adds hash of maps support (hashmap->bpf_map). BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS is added. A map-in-map contains a pointer to another map and lets call this pointer 'inner_map_ptr'. Notes on deleting inner_map_ptr from a hash map: 1. For BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC map-in-map, when deleting an inner_map_ptr, the htab_elem itself will go through a rcu grace period and the inner_map_ptr resides in the htab_elem. 2. For pre-allocated htab_elem (!BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC), when deleting an inner_map_ptr, the htab_elem may get reused immediately. This situation is similar to the existing prealloc-ated use cases. However, the bpf_map_fd_put_ptr() calls bpf_map_put() which calls inner_map->ops->map_free(inner_map) which will go through a rcu grace period (i.e. all bpf_map's map_free currently goes through a rcu grace period). Hence, the inner_map_ptr is still safe for the rcu reader side. This patch also includes BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS to the check_map_prealloc() in the verifier. preallocation is a must for BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT. Hence, even we don't expect heavy updates to map-in-map, enforcing BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC for map-in-map is impossible without disallowing BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT from using map-in-map first. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-23 01:00:34 +08:00
map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH &&
map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS) ||
bpf: Add array of maps support This patch adds a few helper funcs to enable map-in-map support (i.e. outer_map->inner_map). The first outer_map type BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS is also added in this patch. The next patch will introduce a hash of maps type. Any bpf map type can be acted as an inner_map. The exception is BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY because the extra level of indirection makes it harder to verify the owner_prog_type and owner_jited. Multi-level map-in-map is not supported (i.e. map->map is ok but not map->map->map). When adding an inner_map to an outer_map, it currently checks the map_type, key_size, value_size, map_flags, max_entries and ops. The verifier also uses those map's properties to do static analysis. map_flags is needed because we need to ensure BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT is using a preallocated hashtab for the inner_hash also. ops and max_entries are needed to generate inlined map-lookup instructions. For simplicity reason, a simple '==' test is used for both map_flags and max_entries. The equality of ops is implied by the equality of map_type. During outer_map creation time, an inner_map_fd is needed to create an outer_map. However, the inner_map_fd's life time does not depend on the outer_map. The inner_map_fd is merely used to initialize the inner_map_meta of the outer_map. Also, for the outer_map: * It allows element update and delete from syscall * It allows element lookup from bpf_prog The above is similar to the current fd_array pattern. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-23 01:00:33 +08:00
!(map->map_flags & BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC);
}
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_map *map,
bpf: perf_event progs should only use preallocated maps Make sure that BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT programs only use preallocated hash maps, since doing memory allocation in overflow_handler can crash depending on where nmi got triggered. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-02 09:37:23 +08:00
struct bpf_prog *prog)
{
bpf: Add array of maps support This patch adds a few helper funcs to enable map-in-map support (i.e. outer_map->inner_map). The first outer_map type BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS is also added in this patch. The next patch will introduce a hash of maps type. Any bpf map type can be acted as an inner_map. The exception is BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY because the extra level of indirection makes it harder to verify the owner_prog_type and owner_jited. Multi-level map-in-map is not supported (i.e. map->map is ok but not map->map->map). When adding an inner_map to an outer_map, it currently checks the map_type, key_size, value_size, map_flags, max_entries and ops. The verifier also uses those map's properties to do static analysis. map_flags is needed because we need to ensure BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT is using a preallocated hashtab for the inner_hash also. ops and max_entries are needed to generate inlined map-lookup instructions. For simplicity reason, a simple '==' test is used for both map_flags and max_entries. The equality of ops is implied by the equality of map_type. During outer_map creation time, an inner_map_fd is needed to create an outer_map. However, the inner_map_fd's life time does not depend on the outer_map. The inner_map_fd is merely used to initialize the inner_map_meta of the outer_map. Also, for the outer_map: * It allows element update and delete from syscall * It allows element lookup from bpf_prog The above is similar to the current fd_array pattern. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-23 01:00:33 +08:00
/* Make sure that BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT programs only use
* preallocated hash maps, since doing memory allocation
* in overflow_handler can crash depending on where nmi got
* triggered.
*/
if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT) {
if (!check_map_prealloc(map)) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "perf_event programs can only use preallocated hash map\n");
bpf: Add array of maps support This patch adds a few helper funcs to enable map-in-map support (i.e. outer_map->inner_map). The first outer_map type BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS is also added in this patch. The next patch will introduce a hash of maps type. Any bpf map type can be acted as an inner_map. The exception is BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY because the extra level of indirection makes it harder to verify the owner_prog_type and owner_jited. Multi-level map-in-map is not supported (i.e. map->map is ok but not map->map->map). When adding an inner_map to an outer_map, it currently checks the map_type, key_size, value_size, map_flags, max_entries and ops. The verifier also uses those map's properties to do static analysis. map_flags is needed because we need to ensure BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT is using a preallocated hashtab for the inner_hash also. ops and max_entries are needed to generate inlined map-lookup instructions. For simplicity reason, a simple '==' test is used for both map_flags and max_entries. The equality of ops is implied by the equality of map_type. During outer_map creation time, an inner_map_fd is needed to create an outer_map. However, the inner_map_fd's life time does not depend on the outer_map. The inner_map_fd is merely used to initialize the inner_map_meta of the outer_map. Also, for the outer_map: * It allows element update and delete from syscall * It allows element lookup from bpf_prog The above is similar to the current fd_array pattern. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-23 01:00:33 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
if (map->inner_map_meta &&
!check_map_prealloc(map->inner_map_meta)) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "perf_event programs can only use preallocated inner hash map\n");
bpf: Add array of maps support This patch adds a few helper funcs to enable map-in-map support (i.e. outer_map->inner_map). The first outer_map type BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS is also added in this patch. The next patch will introduce a hash of maps type. Any bpf map type can be acted as an inner_map. The exception is BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY because the extra level of indirection makes it harder to verify the owner_prog_type and owner_jited. Multi-level map-in-map is not supported (i.e. map->map is ok but not map->map->map). When adding an inner_map to an outer_map, it currently checks the map_type, key_size, value_size, map_flags, max_entries and ops. The verifier also uses those map's properties to do static analysis. map_flags is needed because we need to ensure BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT is using a preallocated hashtab for the inner_hash also. ops and max_entries are needed to generate inlined map-lookup instructions. For simplicity reason, a simple '==' test is used for both map_flags and max_entries. The equality of ops is implied by the equality of map_type. During outer_map creation time, an inner_map_fd is needed to create an outer_map. However, the inner_map_fd's life time does not depend on the outer_map. The inner_map_fd is merely used to initialize the inner_map_meta of the outer_map. Also, for the outer_map: * It allows element update and delete from syscall * It allows element lookup from bpf_prog The above is similar to the current fd_array pattern. Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-23 01:00:33 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
bpf: perf_event progs should only use preallocated maps Make sure that BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT programs only use preallocated hash maps, since doing memory allocation in overflow_handler can crash depending on where nmi got triggered. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-02 09:37:23 +08:00
}
return 0;
}
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:04 +08:00
/* look for pseudo eBPF instructions that access map FDs and
* replace them with actual map pointers
*/
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
static int replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:04 +08:00
{
struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
bpf: perf_event progs should only use preallocated maps Make sure that BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT programs only use preallocated hash maps, since doing memory allocation in overflow_handler can crash depending on where nmi got triggered. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-02 09:37:23 +08:00
int i, j, err;
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:04 +08:00
bpf: rework prog_digest into prog_tag Commit 7bd509e311f4 ("bpf: add prog_digest and expose it via fdinfo/netlink") was recently discussed, partially due to admittedly suboptimal name of "prog_digest" in combination with sha1 hash usage, thus inevitably and rightfully concerns about its security in terms of collision resistance were raised with regards to use-cases. The intended use cases are for debugging resp. introspection only for providing a stable "tag" over the instruction sequence that both kernel and user space can calculate independently. It's not usable at all for making a security relevant decision. So collisions where two different instruction sequences generate the same tag can happen, but ideally at a rather low rate. The "tag" will be dumped in hex and is short enough to introspect in tracepoints or kallsyms output along with other data such as stack trace, etc. Thus, this patch performs a rename into prog_tag and truncates the tag to a short output (64 bits) to make it obvious it's not collision-free. Should in future a hash or facility be needed with a security relevant focus, then we can think about requirements, constraints, etc that would fit to that situation. For now, rework the exposed parts for the current use cases as long as nothing has been released yet. Tested on x86_64 and s390x. Fixes: 7bd509e311f4 ("bpf: add prog_digest and expose it via fdinfo/netlink") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-14 06:38:15 +08:00
err = bpf_prog_calc_tag(env->prog);
bpf: dynamically allocate digest scratch buffer Geert rightfully complained that 7bd509e311f4 ("bpf: add prog_digest and expose it via fdinfo/netlink") added a too large allocation of variable 'raw' from bss section, and should instead be done dynamically: # ./scripts/bloat-o-meter kernel/bpf/core.o.1 kernel/bpf/core.o.2 add/remove: 3/0 grow/shrink: 0/0 up/down: 33291/0 (33291) function old new delta raw - 32832 +32832 [...] Since this is only relevant during program creation path, which can be considered slow-path anyway, lets allocate that dynamically and be not implicitly dependent on verifier mutex. Move bpf_prog_calc_digest() at the beginning of replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr() and also error handling stays straight forward. Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-18 08:52:57 +08:00
if (err)
return err;
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:04 +08:00
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-14 02:57:42 +08:00
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX &&
bpf: allow programs to write to certain skb fields allow programs read/write skb->mark, tc_index fields and ((struct qdisc_skb_cb *)cb)->data. mark and tc_index are generically useful in TC. cb[0]-cb[4] are primarily used to pass arguments from one program to another called via bpf_tail_call() which can be seen in sockex3_kern.c example. All fields of 'struct __sk_buff' are readable to socket and tc_cls_act progs. mark, tc_index are writeable from tc_cls_act only. cb[0]-cb[4] are writeable by both sockets and tc_cls_act. Add verifier tests and improve sample code. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-06-05 01:11:54 +08:00
(BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0)) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "BPF_LDX uses reserved fields\n");
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-14 02:57:42 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
bpf: allow programs to write to certain skb fields allow programs read/write skb->mark, tc_index fields and ((struct qdisc_skb_cb *)cb)->data. mark and tc_index are generically useful in TC. cb[0]-cb[4] are primarily used to pass arguments from one program to another called via bpf_tail_call() which can be seen in sockex3_kern.c example. All fields of 'struct __sk_buff' are readable to socket and tc_cls_act progs. mark, tc_index are writeable from tc_cls_act only. cb[0]-cb[4] are writeable by both sockets and tc_cls_act. Add verifier tests and improve sample code. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-06-05 01:11:54 +08:00
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX &&
((BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM &&
BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_XADD) || insn->imm != 0)) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n");
bpf: allow programs to write to certain skb fields allow programs read/write skb->mark, tc_index fields and ((struct qdisc_skb_cb *)cb)->data. mark and tc_index are generically useful in TC. cb[0]-cb[4] are primarily used to pass arguments from one program to another called via bpf_tail_call() which can be seen in sockex3_kern.c example. All fields of 'struct __sk_buff' are readable to socket and tc_cls_act progs. mark, tc_index are writeable from tc_cls_act only. cb[0]-cb[4] are writeable by both sockets and tc_cls_act. Add verifier tests and improve sample code. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-06-05 01:11:54 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:04 +08:00
if (insn[0].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) {
struct bpf_map *map;
struct fd f;
if (i == insn_cnt - 1 || insn[1].code != 0 ||
insn[1].dst_reg != 0 || insn[1].src_reg != 0 ||
insn[1].off != 0) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:04 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
if (insn->src_reg == 0)
/* valid generic load 64-bit imm */
goto next_insn;
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env,
"unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:04 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
f = fdget(insn->imm);
bpf: align and clean bpf_{map,prog}_get helpers Add a bpf_map_get() function that we're going to use later on and align/clean the remaining helpers a bit so that we have them a bit more consistent: - __bpf_map_get() and __bpf_prog_get() that both work on the fd struct, check whether the descriptor is eBPF and return the pointer to the map/prog stored in the private data. Also, we can return f.file->private_data directly, the function signature is enough of a documentation already. - bpf_map_get() and bpf_prog_get() that both work on u32 user fd, call their respective __bpf_map_get()/__bpf_prog_get() variants, and take a reference. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-29 21:58:07 +08:00
map = __bpf_map_get(f);
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:04 +08:00
if (IS_ERR(map)) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n",
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:04 +08:00
insn->imm);
return PTR_ERR(map);
}
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
err = check_map_prog_compatibility(env, map, env->prog);
bpf: perf_event progs should only use preallocated maps Make sure that BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT programs only use preallocated hash maps, since doing memory allocation in overflow_handler can crash depending on where nmi got triggered. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-02 09:37:23 +08:00
if (err) {
fdput(f);
return err;
}
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:04 +08:00
/* store map pointer inside BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */
insn[0].imm = (u32) (unsigned long) map;
insn[1].imm = ((u64) (unsigned long) map) >> 32;
/* check whether we recorded this map already */
for (j = 0; j < env->used_map_cnt; j++)
if (env->used_maps[j] == map) {
fdput(f);
goto next_insn;
}
if (env->used_map_cnt >= MAX_USED_MAPS) {
fdput(f);
return -E2BIG;
}
/* hold the map. If the program is rejected by verifier,
* the map will be released by release_maps() or it
* will be used by the valid program until it's unloaded
* and all maps are released in free_bpf_prog_info()
*/
bpf: fix refcnt overflow On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt. It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system. Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes. Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-28 09:56:20 +08:00
map = bpf_map_inc(map, false);
if (IS_ERR(map)) {
fdput(f);
return PTR_ERR(map);
}
env->used_maps[env->used_map_cnt++] = map;
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:04 +08:00
fdput(f);
next_insn:
insn++;
i++;
}
}
/* now all pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions load valid
* 'struct bpf_map *' into a register instead of user map_fd.
* These pointers will be used later by verifier to validate map access.
*/
return 0;
}
/* drop refcnt of maps used by the rejected program */
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
static void release_maps(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:04 +08:00
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < env->used_map_cnt; i++)
bpf_map_put(env->used_maps[i]);
}
/* convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic BPF_LD_IMM64 */
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
static void convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:04 +08:00
{
struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++)
if (insn->code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW))
insn->src_reg = 0;
}
bpf: adjust insn_aux_data when patching insns convert_ctx_accesses() replaces single bpf instruction with a set of instructions. Adjust corresponding insn_aux_data while patching. It's needed to make sure subsequent 'for(all insn)' loops have matching insn and insn_aux_data. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:41 +08:00
/* single env->prog->insni[off] instruction was replaced with the range
* insni[off, off + cnt). Adjust corresponding insn_aux_data by copying
* [0, off) and [off, end) to new locations, so the patched range stays zero
*/
static int adjust_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 prog_len,
u32 off, u32 cnt)
{
struct bpf_insn_aux_data *new_data, *old_data = env->insn_aux_data;
if (cnt == 1)
return 0;
new_data = vzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * prog_len);
if (!new_data)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(new_data, old_data, sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * off);
memcpy(new_data + off + cnt - 1, old_data + off,
sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) * (prog_len - off - cnt + 1));
env->insn_aux_data = new_data;
vfree(old_data);
return 0;
}
static struct bpf_prog *bpf_patch_insn_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off,
const struct bpf_insn *patch, u32 len)
{
struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_single(env->prog, off, patch, len);
if (!new_prog)
return NULL;
if (adjust_insn_aux_data(env, new_prog->len, off, len))
return NULL;
return new_prog;
}
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-14 02:57:42 +08:00
/* convert load instructions that access fields of 'struct __sk_buff'
* into sequence of instructions that access fields of 'struct sk_buff'
*/
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-14 02:57:42 +08:00
{
bpf: direct packet write and access for helpers for clsact progs This work implements direct packet access for helpers and direct packet write in a similar fashion as already available for XDP types via commits 4acf6c0b84c9 ("bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs") and 6841de8b0d03 ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly"), and as a complementary feature to the already available direct packet read for tc (cls/act) programs. For enabling this, we need to introduce two helpers, bpf_skb_pull_data() and bpf_csum_update(). The first is generally needed for both, read and write, because they would otherwise only be limited to the current linear skb head. Usually, when the data_end test fails, programs just bail out, or, in the direct read case, use bpf_skb_load_bytes() as an alternative to overcome this limitation. If such data sits in non-linear parts, we can just pull them in once with the new helper, retest and eventually access them. At the same time, this also makes sure the skb is uncloned, which is, of course, a necessary condition for direct write. As this needs to be an invariant for the write part only, the verifier detects writes and adds a prologue that is calling bpf_skb_pull_data() to effectively unclone the skb from the very beginning in case it is indeed cloned. The heuristic makes use of a similar trick that was done in 233577a22089 ("net: filter: constify detection of pkt_type_offset"). This comes at zero cost for other programs that do not use the direct write feature. Should a program use this feature only sparsely and has read access for the most parts with, for example, drop return codes, then such write action can be delegated to a tail called program for mitigating this cost of potential uncloning to a late point in time where it would have been paid similarly with the bpf_skb_store_bytes() as well. Advantage of direct write is that the writes are inlined whereas the helper cannot make any length assumptions and thus needs to generate a call to memcpy() also for small sizes, as well as cost of helper call itself with sanity checks are avoided. Plus, when direct read is already used, we don't need to cache or perform rechecks on the data boundaries (due to verifier invalidating previous checks for helpers that change skb->data), so more complex programs using rewrites can benefit from switching to direct read plus write. For direct packet access to helpers, we save the otherwise needed copy into a temp struct sitting on stack memory when use-case allows. Both facilities are enabled via may_access_direct_pkt_data() in verifier. For now, we limit this to map helpers and csum_diff, and can successively enable other helpers where we find it makes sense. Helpers that definitely cannot be allowed for this are those part of bpf_helper_changes_skb_data() since they can change underlying data, and those that write into memory as this could happen for packet typed args when still cloned. bpf_csum_update() helper accommodates for the fact that we need to fixup checksum_complete when using direct write instead of bpf_skb_store_bytes(), meaning the programs can use available helpers like bpf_csum_diff(), and implement csum_add(), csum_sub(), csum_block_add(), csum_block_sub() equivalents in eBPF together with the new helper. A usage example will be provided for iproute2's examples/bpf/ directory. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-20 06:26:13 +08:00
const struct bpf_verifier_ops *ops = env->prog->aux->ops;
bpf: simplify narrower ctx access This work tries to make the semantics and code around the narrower ctx access a bit easier to follow. Right now everything is done inside the .is_valid_access(). Offset matching is done differently for read/write types, meaning writes don't support narrower access and thus matching only on offsetof(struct foo, bar) is enough whereas for read case that supports narrower access we must check for offsetof(struct foo, bar) + offsetof(struct foo, bar) + sizeof(<bar>) - 1 for each of the cases. For read cases of individual members that don't support narrower access (like packet pointers or skb->cb[] case which has its own narrow access logic), we check as usual only offsetof(struct foo, bar) like in write case. Then, for the case where narrower access is allowed, we also need to set the aux info for the access. Meaning, ctx_field_size and converted_op_size have to be set. First is the original field size e.g. sizeof(<bar>) as in above example from the user facing ctx, and latter one is the target size after actual rewrite happened, thus for the kernel facing ctx. Also here we need the range match and we need to keep track changing convert_ctx_access() and converted_op_size from is_valid_access() as both are not at the same location. We can simplify the code a bit: check_ctx_access() becomes simpler in that we only store ctx_field_size as a meta data and later in convert_ctx_accesses() we fetch the target_size right from the location where we do convert. Should the verifier be misconfigured we do reject for BPF_WRITE cases or target_size that are not provided. For the subsystems, we always work on ranges in is_valid_access() and add small helpers for ranges and narrow access, convert_ctx_accesses() sets target_size for the relevant instruction. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-02 08:13:27 +08:00
int i, cnt, size, ctx_field_size, delta = 0;
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:56 +08:00
const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
bpf: direct packet write and access for helpers for clsact progs This work implements direct packet access for helpers and direct packet write in a similar fashion as already available for XDP types via commits 4acf6c0b84c9 ("bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs") and 6841de8b0d03 ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly"), and as a complementary feature to the already available direct packet read for tc (cls/act) programs. For enabling this, we need to introduce two helpers, bpf_skb_pull_data() and bpf_csum_update(). The first is generally needed for both, read and write, because they would otherwise only be limited to the current linear skb head. Usually, when the data_end test fails, programs just bail out, or, in the direct read case, use bpf_skb_load_bytes() as an alternative to overcome this limitation. If such data sits in non-linear parts, we can just pull them in once with the new helper, retest and eventually access them. At the same time, this also makes sure the skb is uncloned, which is, of course, a necessary condition for direct write. As this needs to be an invariant for the write part only, the verifier detects writes and adds a prologue that is calling bpf_skb_pull_data() to effectively unclone the skb from the very beginning in case it is indeed cloned. The heuristic makes use of a similar trick that was done in 233577a22089 ("net: filter: constify detection of pkt_type_offset"). This comes at zero cost for other programs that do not use the direct write feature. Should a program use this feature only sparsely and has read access for the most parts with, for example, drop return codes, then such write action can be delegated to a tail called program for mitigating this cost of potential uncloning to a late point in time where it would have been paid similarly with the bpf_skb_store_bytes() as well. Advantage of direct write is that the writes are inlined whereas the helper cannot make any length assumptions and thus needs to generate a call to memcpy() also for small sizes, as well as cost of helper call itself with sanity checks are avoided. Plus, when direct read is already used, we don't need to cache or perform rechecks on the data boundaries (due to verifier invalidating previous checks for helpers that change skb->data), so more complex programs using rewrites can benefit from switching to direct read plus write. For direct packet access to helpers, we save the otherwise needed copy into a temp struct sitting on stack memory when use-case allows. Both facilities are enabled via may_access_direct_pkt_data() in verifier. For now, we limit this to map helpers and csum_diff, and can successively enable other helpers where we find it makes sense. Helpers that definitely cannot be allowed for this are those part of bpf_helper_changes_skb_data() since they can change underlying data, and those that write into memory as this could happen for packet typed args when still cloned. bpf_csum_update() helper accommodates for the fact that we need to fixup checksum_complete when using direct write instead of bpf_skb_store_bytes(), meaning the programs can use available helpers like bpf_csum_diff(), and implement csum_add(), csum_sub(), csum_block_add(), csum_block_sub() equivalents in eBPF together with the new helper. A usage example will be provided for iproute2's examples/bpf/ directory. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-20 06:26:13 +08:00
struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16], *insn;
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-14 02:57:42 +08:00
struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
bpf: allow programs to write to certain skb fields allow programs read/write skb->mark, tc_index fields and ((struct qdisc_skb_cb *)cb)->data. mark and tc_index are generically useful in TC. cb[0]-cb[4] are primarily used to pass arguments from one program to another called via bpf_tail_call() which can be seen in sockex3_kern.c example. All fields of 'struct __sk_buff' are readable to socket and tc_cls_act progs. mark, tc_index are writeable from tc_cls_act only. cb[0]-cb[4] are writeable by both sockets and tc_cls_act. Add verifier tests and improve sample code. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-06-05 01:11:54 +08:00
enum bpf_access_type type;
bpf: simplify narrower ctx access This work tries to make the semantics and code around the narrower ctx access a bit easier to follow. Right now everything is done inside the .is_valid_access(). Offset matching is done differently for read/write types, meaning writes don't support narrower access and thus matching only on offsetof(struct foo, bar) is enough whereas for read case that supports narrower access we must check for offsetof(struct foo, bar) + offsetof(struct foo, bar) + sizeof(<bar>) - 1 for each of the cases. For read cases of individual members that don't support narrower access (like packet pointers or skb->cb[] case which has its own narrow access logic), we check as usual only offsetof(struct foo, bar) like in write case. Then, for the case where narrower access is allowed, we also need to set the aux info for the access. Meaning, ctx_field_size and converted_op_size have to be set. First is the original field size e.g. sizeof(<bar>) as in above example from the user facing ctx, and latter one is the target size after actual rewrite happened, thus for the kernel facing ctx. Also here we need the range match and we need to keep track changing convert_ctx_access() and converted_op_size from is_valid_access() as both are not at the same location. We can simplify the code a bit: check_ctx_access() becomes simpler in that we only store ctx_field_size as a meta data and later in convert_ctx_accesses() we fetch the target_size right from the location where we do convert. Should the verifier be misconfigured we do reject for BPF_WRITE cases or target_size that are not provided. For the subsystems, we always work on ranges in is_valid_access() and add small helpers for ranges and narrow access, convert_ctx_accesses() sets target_size for the relevant instruction. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-02 08:13:27 +08:00
bool is_narrower_load;
u32 target_size;
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-14 02:57:42 +08:00
bpf: direct packet write and access for helpers for clsact progs This work implements direct packet access for helpers and direct packet write in a similar fashion as already available for XDP types via commits 4acf6c0b84c9 ("bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs") and 6841de8b0d03 ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly"), and as a complementary feature to the already available direct packet read for tc (cls/act) programs. For enabling this, we need to introduce two helpers, bpf_skb_pull_data() and bpf_csum_update(). The first is generally needed for both, read and write, because they would otherwise only be limited to the current linear skb head. Usually, when the data_end test fails, programs just bail out, or, in the direct read case, use bpf_skb_load_bytes() as an alternative to overcome this limitation. If such data sits in non-linear parts, we can just pull them in once with the new helper, retest and eventually access them. At the same time, this also makes sure the skb is uncloned, which is, of course, a necessary condition for direct write. As this needs to be an invariant for the write part only, the verifier detects writes and adds a prologue that is calling bpf_skb_pull_data() to effectively unclone the skb from the very beginning in case it is indeed cloned. The heuristic makes use of a similar trick that was done in 233577a22089 ("net: filter: constify detection of pkt_type_offset"). This comes at zero cost for other programs that do not use the direct write feature. Should a program use this feature only sparsely and has read access for the most parts with, for example, drop return codes, then such write action can be delegated to a tail called program for mitigating this cost of potential uncloning to a late point in time where it would have been paid similarly with the bpf_skb_store_bytes() as well. Advantage of direct write is that the writes are inlined whereas the helper cannot make any length assumptions and thus needs to generate a call to memcpy() also for small sizes, as well as cost of helper call itself with sanity checks are avoided. Plus, when direct read is already used, we don't need to cache or perform rechecks on the data boundaries (due to verifier invalidating previous checks for helpers that change skb->data), so more complex programs using rewrites can benefit from switching to direct read plus write. For direct packet access to helpers, we save the otherwise needed copy into a temp struct sitting on stack memory when use-case allows. Both facilities are enabled via may_access_direct_pkt_data() in verifier. For now, we limit this to map helpers and csum_diff, and can successively enable other helpers where we find it makes sense. Helpers that definitely cannot be allowed for this are those part of bpf_helper_changes_skb_data() since they can change underlying data, and those that write into memory as this could happen for packet typed args when still cloned. bpf_csum_update() helper accommodates for the fact that we need to fixup checksum_complete when using direct write instead of bpf_skb_store_bytes(), meaning the programs can use available helpers like bpf_csum_diff(), and implement csum_add(), csum_sub(), csum_block_add(), csum_block_sub() equivalents in eBPF together with the new helper. A usage example will be provided for iproute2's examples/bpf/ directory. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-20 06:26:13 +08:00
if (ops->gen_prologue) {
cnt = ops->gen_prologue(insn_buf, env->seen_direct_write,
env->prog);
if (cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
bpf: direct packet write and access for helpers for clsact progs This work implements direct packet access for helpers and direct packet write in a similar fashion as already available for XDP types via commits 4acf6c0b84c9 ("bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs") and 6841de8b0d03 ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly"), and as a complementary feature to the already available direct packet read for tc (cls/act) programs. For enabling this, we need to introduce two helpers, bpf_skb_pull_data() and bpf_csum_update(). The first is generally needed for both, read and write, because they would otherwise only be limited to the current linear skb head. Usually, when the data_end test fails, programs just bail out, or, in the direct read case, use bpf_skb_load_bytes() as an alternative to overcome this limitation. If such data sits in non-linear parts, we can just pull them in once with the new helper, retest and eventually access them. At the same time, this also makes sure the skb is uncloned, which is, of course, a necessary condition for direct write. As this needs to be an invariant for the write part only, the verifier detects writes and adds a prologue that is calling bpf_skb_pull_data() to effectively unclone the skb from the very beginning in case it is indeed cloned. The heuristic makes use of a similar trick that was done in 233577a22089 ("net: filter: constify detection of pkt_type_offset"). This comes at zero cost for other programs that do not use the direct write feature. Should a program use this feature only sparsely and has read access for the most parts with, for example, drop return codes, then such write action can be delegated to a tail called program for mitigating this cost of potential uncloning to a late point in time where it would have been paid similarly with the bpf_skb_store_bytes() as well. Advantage of direct write is that the writes are inlined whereas the helper cannot make any length assumptions and thus needs to generate a call to memcpy() also for small sizes, as well as cost of helper call itself with sanity checks are avoided. Plus, when direct read is already used, we don't need to cache or perform rechecks on the data boundaries (due to verifier invalidating previous checks for helpers that change skb->data), so more complex programs using rewrites can benefit from switching to direct read plus write. For direct packet access to helpers, we save the otherwise needed copy into a temp struct sitting on stack memory when use-case allows. Both facilities are enabled via may_access_direct_pkt_data() in verifier. For now, we limit this to map helpers and csum_diff, and can successively enable other helpers where we find it makes sense. Helpers that definitely cannot be allowed for this are those part of bpf_helper_changes_skb_data() since they can change underlying data, and those that write into memory as this could happen for packet typed args when still cloned. bpf_csum_update() helper accommodates for the fact that we need to fixup checksum_complete when using direct write instead of bpf_skb_store_bytes(), meaning the programs can use available helpers like bpf_csum_diff(), and implement csum_add(), csum_sub(), csum_block_add(), csum_block_sub() equivalents in eBPF together with the new helper. A usage example will be provided for iproute2's examples/bpf/ directory. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-20 06:26:13 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
} else if (cnt) {
bpf: adjust insn_aux_data when patching insns convert_ctx_accesses() replaces single bpf instruction with a set of instructions. Adjust corresponding insn_aux_data while patching. It's needed to make sure subsequent 'for(all insn)' loops have matching insn and insn_aux_data. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:41 +08:00
new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, 0, insn_buf, cnt);
bpf: direct packet write and access for helpers for clsact progs This work implements direct packet access for helpers and direct packet write in a similar fashion as already available for XDP types via commits 4acf6c0b84c9 ("bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs") and 6841de8b0d03 ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly"), and as a complementary feature to the already available direct packet read for tc (cls/act) programs. For enabling this, we need to introduce two helpers, bpf_skb_pull_data() and bpf_csum_update(). The first is generally needed for both, read and write, because they would otherwise only be limited to the current linear skb head. Usually, when the data_end test fails, programs just bail out, or, in the direct read case, use bpf_skb_load_bytes() as an alternative to overcome this limitation. If such data sits in non-linear parts, we can just pull them in once with the new helper, retest and eventually access them. At the same time, this also makes sure the skb is uncloned, which is, of course, a necessary condition for direct write. As this needs to be an invariant for the write part only, the verifier detects writes and adds a prologue that is calling bpf_skb_pull_data() to effectively unclone the skb from the very beginning in case it is indeed cloned. The heuristic makes use of a similar trick that was done in 233577a22089 ("net: filter: constify detection of pkt_type_offset"). This comes at zero cost for other programs that do not use the direct write feature. Should a program use this feature only sparsely and has read access for the most parts with, for example, drop return codes, then such write action can be delegated to a tail called program for mitigating this cost of potential uncloning to a late point in time where it would have been paid similarly with the bpf_skb_store_bytes() as well. Advantage of direct write is that the writes are inlined whereas the helper cannot make any length assumptions and thus needs to generate a call to memcpy() also for small sizes, as well as cost of helper call itself with sanity checks are avoided. Plus, when direct read is already used, we don't need to cache or perform rechecks on the data boundaries (due to verifier invalidating previous checks for helpers that change skb->data), so more complex programs using rewrites can benefit from switching to direct read plus write. For direct packet access to helpers, we save the otherwise needed copy into a temp struct sitting on stack memory when use-case allows. Both facilities are enabled via may_access_direct_pkt_data() in verifier. For now, we limit this to map helpers and csum_diff, and can successively enable other helpers where we find it makes sense. Helpers that definitely cannot be allowed for this are those part of bpf_helper_changes_skb_data() since they can change underlying data, and those that write into memory as this could happen for packet typed args when still cloned. bpf_csum_update() helper accommodates for the fact that we need to fixup checksum_complete when using direct write instead of bpf_skb_store_bytes(), meaning the programs can use available helpers like bpf_csum_diff(), and implement csum_add(), csum_sub(), csum_block_add(), csum_block_sub() equivalents in eBPF together with the new helper. A usage example will be provided for iproute2's examples/bpf/ directory. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-20 06:26:13 +08:00
if (!new_prog)
return -ENOMEM;
bpf: adjust insn_aux_data when patching insns convert_ctx_accesses() replaces single bpf instruction with a set of instructions. Adjust corresponding insn_aux_data while patching. It's needed to make sure subsequent 'for(all insn)' loops have matching insn and insn_aux_data. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:41 +08:00
bpf: direct packet write and access for helpers for clsact progs This work implements direct packet access for helpers and direct packet write in a similar fashion as already available for XDP types via commits 4acf6c0b84c9 ("bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs") and 6841de8b0d03 ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly"), and as a complementary feature to the already available direct packet read for tc (cls/act) programs. For enabling this, we need to introduce two helpers, bpf_skb_pull_data() and bpf_csum_update(). The first is generally needed for both, read and write, because they would otherwise only be limited to the current linear skb head. Usually, when the data_end test fails, programs just bail out, or, in the direct read case, use bpf_skb_load_bytes() as an alternative to overcome this limitation. If such data sits in non-linear parts, we can just pull them in once with the new helper, retest and eventually access them. At the same time, this also makes sure the skb is uncloned, which is, of course, a necessary condition for direct write. As this needs to be an invariant for the write part only, the verifier detects writes and adds a prologue that is calling bpf_skb_pull_data() to effectively unclone the skb from the very beginning in case it is indeed cloned. The heuristic makes use of a similar trick that was done in 233577a22089 ("net: filter: constify detection of pkt_type_offset"). This comes at zero cost for other programs that do not use the direct write feature. Should a program use this feature only sparsely and has read access for the most parts with, for example, drop return codes, then such write action can be delegated to a tail called program for mitigating this cost of potential uncloning to a late point in time where it would have been paid similarly with the bpf_skb_store_bytes() as well. Advantage of direct write is that the writes are inlined whereas the helper cannot make any length assumptions and thus needs to generate a call to memcpy() also for small sizes, as well as cost of helper call itself with sanity checks are avoided. Plus, when direct read is already used, we don't need to cache or perform rechecks on the data boundaries (due to verifier invalidating previous checks for helpers that change skb->data), so more complex programs using rewrites can benefit from switching to direct read plus write. For direct packet access to helpers, we save the otherwise needed copy into a temp struct sitting on stack memory when use-case allows. Both facilities are enabled via may_access_direct_pkt_data() in verifier. For now, we limit this to map helpers and csum_diff, and can successively enable other helpers where we find it makes sense. Helpers that definitely cannot be allowed for this are those part of bpf_helper_changes_skb_data() since they can change underlying data, and those that write into memory as this could happen for packet typed args when still cloned. bpf_csum_update() helper accommodates for the fact that we need to fixup checksum_complete when using direct write instead of bpf_skb_store_bytes(), meaning the programs can use available helpers like bpf_csum_diff(), and implement csum_add(), csum_sub(), csum_block_add(), csum_block_sub() equivalents in eBPF together with the new helper. A usage example will be provided for iproute2's examples/bpf/ directory. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-20 06:26:13 +08:00
env->prog = new_prog;
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:56 +08:00
delta += cnt - 1;
bpf: direct packet write and access for helpers for clsact progs This work implements direct packet access for helpers and direct packet write in a similar fashion as already available for XDP types via commits 4acf6c0b84c9 ("bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs") and 6841de8b0d03 ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly"), and as a complementary feature to the already available direct packet read for tc (cls/act) programs. For enabling this, we need to introduce two helpers, bpf_skb_pull_data() and bpf_csum_update(). The first is generally needed for both, read and write, because they would otherwise only be limited to the current linear skb head. Usually, when the data_end test fails, programs just bail out, or, in the direct read case, use bpf_skb_load_bytes() as an alternative to overcome this limitation. If such data sits in non-linear parts, we can just pull them in once with the new helper, retest and eventually access them. At the same time, this also makes sure the skb is uncloned, which is, of course, a necessary condition for direct write. As this needs to be an invariant for the write part only, the verifier detects writes and adds a prologue that is calling bpf_skb_pull_data() to effectively unclone the skb from the very beginning in case it is indeed cloned. The heuristic makes use of a similar trick that was done in 233577a22089 ("net: filter: constify detection of pkt_type_offset"). This comes at zero cost for other programs that do not use the direct write feature. Should a program use this feature only sparsely and has read access for the most parts with, for example, drop return codes, then such write action can be delegated to a tail called program for mitigating this cost of potential uncloning to a late point in time where it would have been paid similarly with the bpf_skb_store_bytes() as well. Advantage of direct write is that the writes are inlined whereas the helper cannot make any length assumptions and thus needs to generate a call to memcpy() also for small sizes, as well as cost of helper call itself with sanity checks are avoided. Plus, when direct read is already used, we don't need to cache or perform rechecks on the data boundaries (due to verifier invalidating previous checks for helpers that change skb->data), so more complex programs using rewrites can benefit from switching to direct read plus write. For direct packet access to helpers, we save the otherwise needed copy into a temp struct sitting on stack memory when use-case allows. Both facilities are enabled via may_access_direct_pkt_data() in verifier. For now, we limit this to map helpers and csum_diff, and can successively enable other helpers where we find it makes sense. Helpers that definitely cannot be allowed for this are those part of bpf_helper_changes_skb_data() since they can change underlying data, and those that write into memory as this could happen for packet typed args when still cloned. bpf_csum_update() helper accommodates for the fact that we need to fixup checksum_complete when using direct write instead of bpf_skb_store_bytes(), meaning the programs can use available helpers like bpf_csum_diff(), and implement csum_add(), csum_sub(), csum_block_add(), csum_block_sub() equivalents in eBPF together with the new helper. A usage example will be provided for iproute2's examples/bpf/ directory. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-20 06:26:13 +08:00
}
}
if (!ops->convert_ctx_access)
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-14 02:57:42 +08:00
return 0;
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:56 +08:00
insn = env->prog->insnsi + delta;
bpf: direct packet write and access for helpers for clsact progs This work implements direct packet access for helpers and direct packet write in a similar fashion as already available for XDP types via commits 4acf6c0b84c9 ("bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs") and 6841de8b0d03 ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly"), and as a complementary feature to the already available direct packet read for tc (cls/act) programs. For enabling this, we need to introduce two helpers, bpf_skb_pull_data() and bpf_csum_update(). The first is generally needed for both, read and write, because they would otherwise only be limited to the current linear skb head. Usually, when the data_end test fails, programs just bail out, or, in the direct read case, use bpf_skb_load_bytes() as an alternative to overcome this limitation. If such data sits in non-linear parts, we can just pull them in once with the new helper, retest and eventually access them. At the same time, this also makes sure the skb is uncloned, which is, of course, a necessary condition for direct write. As this needs to be an invariant for the write part only, the verifier detects writes and adds a prologue that is calling bpf_skb_pull_data() to effectively unclone the skb from the very beginning in case it is indeed cloned. The heuristic makes use of a similar trick that was done in 233577a22089 ("net: filter: constify detection of pkt_type_offset"). This comes at zero cost for other programs that do not use the direct write feature. Should a program use this feature only sparsely and has read access for the most parts with, for example, drop return codes, then such write action can be delegated to a tail called program for mitigating this cost of potential uncloning to a late point in time where it would have been paid similarly with the bpf_skb_store_bytes() as well. Advantage of direct write is that the writes are inlined whereas the helper cannot make any length assumptions and thus needs to generate a call to memcpy() also for small sizes, as well as cost of helper call itself with sanity checks are avoided. Plus, when direct read is already used, we don't need to cache or perform rechecks on the data boundaries (due to verifier invalidating previous checks for helpers that change skb->data), so more complex programs using rewrites can benefit from switching to direct read plus write. For direct packet access to helpers, we save the otherwise needed copy into a temp struct sitting on stack memory when use-case allows. Both facilities are enabled via may_access_direct_pkt_data() in verifier. For now, we limit this to map helpers and csum_diff, and can successively enable other helpers where we find it makes sense. Helpers that definitely cannot be allowed for this are those part of bpf_helper_changes_skb_data() since they can change underlying data, and those that write into memory as this could happen for packet typed args when still cloned. bpf_csum_update() helper accommodates for the fact that we need to fixup checksum_complete when using direct write instead of bpf_skb_store_bytes(), meaning the programs can use available helpers like bpf_csum_diff(), and implement csum_add(), csum_sub(), csum_block_add(), csum_block_sub() equivalents in eBPF together with the new helper. A usage example will be provided for iproute2's examples/bpf/ directory. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-20 06:26:13 +08:00
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-14 02:57:42 +08:00
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
bpf: allow b/h/w/dw access for bpf's cb in ctx When structs are used to store temporary state in cb[] buffer that is used with programs and among tail calls, then the generated code will not always access the buffer in bpf_w chunks. We can ease programming of it and let this act more natural by allowing for aligned b/h/w/dw sized access for cb[] ctx member. Various test cases are attached as well for the selftest suite. Potentially, this can also be reused for other program types to pass data around. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-12 18:51:33 +08:00
if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) ||
insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) ||
insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
bpf: support 8-byte metafield access The verifier supported only 4-byte metafields in struct __sk_buff and struct xdp_md. The metafields in upcoming struct bpf_perf_event are 8-byte to match register width in struct pt_regs. Teach verifier to recognize 8-byte metafield access. The patch doesn't affect safety of sockets and xdp programs. They check for 4-byte only ctx access before these conditions are hit. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-02 09:37:21 +08:00
insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW))
bpf: allow programs to write to certain skb fields allow programs read/write skb->mark, tc_index fields and ((struct qdisc_skb_cb *)cb)->data. mark and tc_index are generically useful in TC. cb[0]-cb[4] are primarily used to pass arguments from one program to another called via bpf_tail_call() which can be seen in sockex3_kern.c example. All fields of 'struct __sk_buff' are readable to socket and tc_cls_act progs. mark, tc_index are writeable from tc_cls_act only. cb[0]-cb[4] are writeable by both sockets and tc_cls_act. Add verifier tests and improve sample code. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-06-05 01:11:54 +08:00
type = BPF_READ;
bpf: allow b/h/w/dw access for bpf's cb in ctx When structs are used to store temporary state in cb[] buffer that is used with programs and among tail calls, then the generated code will not always access the buffer in bpf_w chunks. We can ease programming of it and let this act more natural by allowing for aligned b/h/w/dw sized access for cb[] ctx member. Various test cases are attached as well for the selftest suite. Potentially, this can also be reused for other program types to pass data around. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-12 18:51:33 +08:00
else if (insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) ||
insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) ||
insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
bpf: support 8-byte metafield access The verifier supported only 4-byte metafields in struct __sk_buff and struct xdp_md. The metafields in upcoming struct bpf_perf_event are 8-byte to match register width in struct pt_regs. Teach verifier to recognize 8-byte metafield access. The patch doesn't affect safety of sockets and xdp programs. They check for 4-byte only ctx access before these conditions are hit. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-02 09:37:21 +08:00
insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW))
bpf: allow programs to write to certain skb fields allow programs read/write skb->mark, tc_index fields and ((struct qdisc_skb_cb *)cb)->data. mark and tc_index are generically useful in TC. cb[0]-cb[4] are primarily used to pass arguments from one program to another called via bpf_tail_call() which can be seen in sockex3_kern.c example. All fields of 'struct __sk_buff' are readable to socket and tc_cls_act progs. mark, tc_index are writeable from tc_cls_act only. cb[0]-cb[4] are writeable by both sockets and tc_cls_act. Add verifier tests and improve sample code. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-06-05 01:11:54 +08:00
type = BPF_WRITE;
else
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-14 02:57:42 +08:00
continue;
bpf: adjust insn_aux_data when patching insns convert_ctx_accesses() replaces single bpf instruction with a set of instructions. Adjust corresponding insn_aux_data while patching. It's needed to make sure subsequent 'for(all insn)' loops have matching insn and insn_aux_data. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:41 +08:00
if (env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type != PTR_TO_CTX)
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-14 02:57:42 +08:00
continue;
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-14 06:52:13 +08:00
ctx_field_size = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ctx_field_size;
bpf: simplify narrower ctx access This work tries to make the semantics and code around the narrower ctx access a bit easier to follow. Right now everything is done inside the .is_valid_access(). Offset matching is done differently for read/write types, meaning writes don't support narrower access and thus matching only on offsetof(struct foo, bar) is enough whereas for read case that supports narrower access we must check for offsetof(struct foo, bar) + offsetof(struct foo, bar) + sizeof(<bar>) - 1 for each of the cases. For read cases of individual members that don't support narrower access (like packet pointers or skb->cb[] case which has its own narrow access logic), we check as usual only offsetof(struct foo, bar) like in write case. Then, for the case where narrower access is allowed, we also need to set the aux info for the access. Meaning, ctx_field_size and converted_op_size have to be set. First is the original field size e.g. sizeof(<bar>) as in above example from the user facing ctx, and latter one is the target size after actual rewrite happened, thus for the kernel facing ctx. Also here we need the range match and we need to keep track changing convert_ctx_access() and converted_op_size from is_valid_access() as both are not at the same location. We can simplify the code a bit: check_ctx_access() becomes simpler in that we only store ctx_field_size as a meta data and later in convert_ctx_accesses() we fetch the target_size right from the location where we do convert. Should the verifier be misconfigured we do reject for BPF_WRITE cases or target_size that are not provided. For the subsystems, we always work on ranges in is_valid_access() and add small helpers for ranges and narrow access, convert_ctx_accesses() sets target_size for the relevant instruction. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-02 08:13:27 +08:00
size = BPF_LDST_BYTES(insn);
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-14 06:52:13 +08:00
/* If the read access is a narrower load of the field,
* convert to a 4/8-byte load, to minimum program type specific
* convert_ctx_access changes. If conversion is successful,
* we will apply proper mask to the result.
*/
bpf: simplify narrower ctx access This work tries to make the semantics and code around the narrower ctx access a bit easier to follow. Right now everything is done inside the .is_valid_access(). Offset matching is done differently for read/write types, meaning writes don't support narrower access and thus matching only on offsetof(struct foo, bar) is enough whereas for read case that supports narrower access we must check for offsetof(struct foo, bar) + offsetof(struct foo, bar) + sizeof(<bar>) - 1 for each of the cases. For read cases of individual members that don't support narrower access (like packet pointers or skb->cb[] case which has its own narrow access logic), we check as usual only offsetof(struct foo, bar) like in write case. Then, for the case where narrower access is allowed, we also need to set the aux info for the access. Meaning, ctx_field_size and converted_op_size have to be set. First is the original field size e.g. sizeof(<bar>) as in above example from the user facing ctx, and latter one is the target size after actual rewrite happened, thus for the kernel facing ctx. Also here we need the range match and we need to keep track changing convert_ctx_access() and converted_op_size from is_valid_access() as both are not at the same location. We can simplify the code a bit: check_ctx_access() becomes simpler in that we only store ctx_field_size as a meta data and later in convert_ctx_accesses() we fetch the target_size right from the location where we do convert. Should the verifier be misconfigured we do reject for BPF_WRITE cases or target_size that are not provided. For the subsystems, we always work on ranges in is_valid_access() and add small helpers for ranges and narrow access, convert_ctx_accesses() sets target_size for the relevant instruction. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-02 08:13:27 +08:00
is_narrower_load = size < ctx_field_size;
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-14 06:52:13 +08:00
if (is_narrower_load) {
bpf: simplify narrower ctx access This work tries to make the semantics and code around the narrower ctx access a bit easier to follow. Right now everything is done inside the .is_valid_access(). Offset matching is done differently for read/write types, meaning writes don't support narrower access and thus matching only on offsetof(struct foo, bar) is enough whereas for read case that supports narrower access we must check for offsetof(struct foo, bar) + offsetof(struct foo, bar) + sizeof(<bar>) - 1 for each of the cases. For read cases of individual members that don't support narrower access (like packet pointers or skb->cb[] case which has its own narrow access logic), we check as usual only offsetof(struct foo, bar) like in write case. Then, for the case where narrower access is allowed, we also need to set the aux info for the access. Meaning, ctx_field_size and converted_op_size have to be set. First is the original field size e.g. sizeof(<bar>) as in above example from the user facing ctx, and latter one is the target size after actual rewrite happened, thus for the kernel facing ctx. Also here we need the range match and we need to keep track changing convert_ctx_access() and converted_op_size from is_valid_access() as both are not at the same location. We can simplify the code a bit: check_ctx_access() becomes simpler in that we only store ctx_field_size as a meta data and later in convert_ctx_accesses() we fetch the target_size right from the location where we do convert. Should the verifier be misconfigured we do reject for BPF_WRITE cases or target_size that are not provided. For the subsystems, we always work on ranges in is_valid_access() and add small helpers for ranges and narrow access, convert_ctx_accesses() sets target_size for the relevant instruction. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-02 08:13:27 +08:00
u32 off = insn->off;
u8 size_code;
if (type == BPF_WRITE) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "bpf verifier narrow ctx access misconfigured\n");
bpf: simplify narrower ctx access This work tries to make the semantics and code around the narrower ctx access a bit easier to follow. Right now everything is done inside the .is_valid_access(). Offset matching is done differently for read/write types, meaning writes don't support narrower access and thus matching only on offsetof(struct foo, bar) is enough whereas for read case that supports narrower access we must check for offsetof(struct foo, bar) + offsetof(struct foo, bar) + sizeof(<bar>) - 1 for each of the cases. For read cases of individual members that don't support narrower access (like packet pointers or skb->cb[] case which has its own narrow access logic), we check as usual only offsetof(struct foo, bar) like in write case. Then, for the case where narrower access is allowed, we also need to set the aux info for the access. Meaning, ctx_field_size and converted_op_size have to be set. First is the original field size e.g. sizeof(<bar>) as in above example from the user facing ctx, and latter one is the target size after actual rewrite happened, thus for the kernel facing ctx. Also here we need the range match and we need to keep track changing convert_ctx_access() and converted_op_size from is_valid_access() as both are not at the same location. We can simplify the code a bit: check_ctx_access() becomes simpler in that we only store ctx_field_size as a meta data and later in convert_ctx_accesses() we fetch the target_size right from the location where we do convert. Should the verifier be misconfigured we do reject for BPF_WRITE cases or target_size that are not provided. For the subsystems, we always work on ranges in is_valid_access() and add small helpers for ranges and narrow access, convert_ctx_accesses() sets target_size for the relevant instruction. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-02 08:13:27 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-14 06:52:13 +08:00
bpf: simplify narrower ctx access This work tries to make the semantics and code around the narrower ctx access a bit easier to follow. Right now everything is done inside the .is_valid_access(). Offset matching is done differently for read/write types, meaning writes don't support narrower access and thus matching only on offsetof(struct foo, bar) is enough whereas for read case that supports narrower access we must check for offsetof(struct foo, bar) + offsetof(struct foo, bar) + sizeof(<bar>) - 1 for each of the cases. For read cases of individual members that don't support narrower access (like packet pointers or skb->cb[] case which has its own narrow access logic), we check as usual only offsetof(struct foo, bar) like in write case. Then, for the case where narrower access is allowed, we also need to set the aux info for the access. Meaning, ctx_field_size and converted_op_size have to be set. First is the original field size e.g. sizeof(<bar>) as in above example from the user facing ctx, and latter one is the target size after actual rewrite happened, thus for the kernel facing ctx. Also here we need the range match and we need to keep track changing convert_ctx_access() and converted_op_size from is_valid_access() as both are not at the same location. We can simplify the code a bit: check_ctx_access() becomes simpler in that we only store ctx_field_size as a meta data and later in convert_ctx_accesses() we fetch the target_size right from the location where we do convert. Should the verifier be misconfigured we do reject for BPF_WRITE cases or target_size that are not provided. For the subsystems, we always work on ranges in is_valid_access() and add small helpers for ranges and narrow access, convert_ctx_accesses() sets target_size for the relevant instruction. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-02 08:13:27 +08:00
size_code = BPF_H;
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-14 06:52:13 +08:00
if (ctx_field_size == 4)
size_code = BPF_W;
else if (ctx_field_size == 8)
size_code = BPF_DW;
bpf: simplify narrower ctx access This work tries to make the semantics and code around the narrower ctx access a bit easier to follow. Right now everything is done inside the .is_valid_access(). Offset matching is done differently for read/write types, meaning writes don't support narrower access and thus matching only on offsetof(struct foo, bar) is enough whereas for read case that supports narrower access we must check for offsetof(struct foo, bar) + offsetof(struct foo, bar) + sizeof(<bar>) - 1 for each of the cases. For read cases of individual members that don't support narrower access (like packet pointers or skb->cb[] case which has its own narrow access logic), we check as usual only offsetof(struct foo, bar) like in write case. Then, for the case where narrower access is allowed, we also need to set the aux info for the access. Meaning, ctx_field_size and converted_op_size have to be set. First is the original field size e.g. sizeof(<bar>) as in above example from the user facing ctx, and latter one is the target size after actual rewrite happened, thus for the kernel facing ctx. Also here we need the range match and we need to keep track changing convert_ctx_access() and converted_op_size from is_valid_access() as both are not at the same location. We can simplify the code a bit: check_ctx_access() becomes simpler in that we only store ctx_field_size as a meta data and later in convert_ctx_accesses() we fetch the target_size right from the location where we do convert. Should the verifier be misconfigured we do reject for BPF_WRITE cases or target_size that are not provided. For the subsystems, we always work on ranges in is_valid_access() and add small helpers for ranges and narrow access, convert_ctx_accesses() sets target_size for the relevant instruction. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-02 08:13:27 +08:00
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-14 06:52:13 +08:00
insn->off = off & ~(ctx_field_size - 1);
insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | size_code;
}
bpf: simplify narrower ctx access This work tries to make the semantics and code around the narrower ctx access a bit easier to follow. Right now everything is done inside the .is_valid_access(). Offset matching is done differently for read/write types, meaning writes don't support narrower access and thus matching only on offsetof(struct foo, bar) is enough whereas for read case that supports narrower access we must check for offsetof(struct foo, bar) + offsetof(struct foo, bar) + sizeof(<bar>) - 1 for each of the cases. For read cases of individual members that don't support narrower access (like packet pointers or skb->cb[] case which has its own narrow access logic), we check as usual only offsetof(struct foo, bar) like in write case. Then, for the case where narrower access is allowed, we also need to set the aux info for the access. Meaning, ctx_field_size and converted_op_size have to be set. First is the original field size e.g. sizeof(<bar>) as in above example from the user facing ctx, and latter one is the target size after actual rewrite happened, thus for the kernel facing ctx. Also here we need the range match and we need to keep track changing convert_ctx_access() and converted_op_size from is_valid_access() as both are not at the same location. We can simplify the code a bit: check_ctx_access() becomes simpler in that we only store ctx_field_size as a meta data and later in convert_ctx_accesses() we fetch the target_size right from the location where we do convert. Should the verifier be misconfigured we do reject for BPF_WRITE cases or target_size that are not provided. For the subsystems, we always work on ranges in is_valid_access() and add small helpers for ranges and narrow access, convert_ctx_accesses() sets target_size for the relevant instruction. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-02 08:13:27 +08:00
target_size = 0;
cnt = ops->convert_ctx_access(type, insn, insn_buf, env->prog,
&target_size);
if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf) ||
(ctx_field_size && !target_size)) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-14 02:57:42 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
bpf: simplify narrower ctx access This work tries to make the semantics and code around the narrower ctx access a bit easier to follow. Right now everything is done inside the .is_valid_access(). Offset matching is done differently for read/write types, meaning writes don't support narrower access and thus matching only on offsetof(struct foo, bar) is enough whereas for read case that supports narrower access we must check for offsetof(struct foo, bar) + offsetof(struct foo, bar) + sizeof(<bar>) - 1 for each of the cases. For read cases of individual members that don't support narrower access (like packet pointers or skb->cb[] case which has its own narrow access logic), we check as usual only offsetof(struct foo, bar) like in write case. Then, for the case where narrower access is allowed, we also need to set the aux info for the access. Meaning, ctx_field_size and converted_op_size have to be set. First is the original field size e.g. sizeof(<bar>) as in above example from the user facing ctx, and latter one is the target size after actual rewrite happened, thus for the kernel facing ctx. Also here we need the range match and we need to keep track changing convert_ctx_access() and converted_op_size from is_valid_access() as both are not at the same location. We can simplify the code a bit: check_ctx_access() becomes simpler in that we only store ctx_field_size as a meta data and later in convert_ctx_accesses() we fetch the target_size right from the location where we do convert. Should the verifier be misconfigured we do reject for BPF_WRITE cases or target_size that are not provided. For the subsystems, we always work on ranges in is_valid_access() and add small helpers for ranges and narrow access, convert_ctx_accesses() sets target_size for the relevant instruction. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-02 08:13:27 +08:00
if (is_narrower_load && size < target_size) {
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-14 06:52:13 +08:00
if (ctx_field_size <= 4)
insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg,
bpf: simplify narrower ctx access This work tries to make the semantics and code around the narrower ctx access a bit easier to follow. Right now everything is done inside the .is_valid_access(). Offset matching is done differently for read/write types, meaning writes don't support narrower access and thus matching only on offsetof(struct foo, bar) is enough whereas for read case that supports narrower access we must check for offsetof(struct foo, bar) + offsetof(struct foo, bar) + sizeof(<bar>) - 1 for each of the cases. For read cases of individual members that don't support narrower access (like packet pointers or skb->cb[] case which has its own narrow access logic), we check as usual only offsetof(struct foo, bar) like in write case. Then, for the case where narrower access is allowed, we also need to set the aux info for the access. Meaning, ctx_field_size and converted_op_size have to be set. First is the original field size e.g. sizeof(<bar>) as in above example from the user facing ctx, and latter one is the target size after actual rewrite happened, thus for the kernel facing ctx. Also here we need the range match and we need to keep track changing convert_ctx_access() and converted_op_size from is_valid_access() as both are not at the same location. We can simplify the code a bit: check_ctx_access() becomes simpler in that we only store ctx_field_size as a meta data and later in convert_ctx_accesses() we fetch the target_size right from the location where we do convert. Should the verifier be misconfigured we do reject for BPF_WRITE cases or target_size that are not provided. For the subsystems, we always work on ranges in is_valid_access() and add small helpers for ranges and narrow access, convert_ctx_accesses() sets target_size for the relevant instruction. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-02 08:13:27 +08:00
(1 << size * 8) - 1);
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-14 06:52:13 +08:00
else
insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg,
bpf: simplify narrower ctx access This work tries to make the semantics and code around the narrower ctx access a bit easier to follow. Right now everything is done inside the .is_valid_access(). Offset matching is done differently for read/write types, meaning writes don't support narrower access and thus matching only on offsetof(struct foo, bar) is enough whereas for read case that supports narrower access we must check for offsetof(struct foo, bar) + offsetof(struct foo, bar) + sizeof(<bar>) - 1 for each of the cases. For read cases of individual members that don't support narrower access (like packet pointers or skb->cb[] case which has its own narrow access logic), we check as usual only offsetof(struct foo, bar) like in write case. Then, for the case where narrower access is allowed, we also need to set the aux info for the access. Meaning, ctx_field_size and converted_op_size have to be set. First is the original field size e.g. sizeof(<bar>) as in above example from the user facing ctx, and latter one is the target size after actual rewrite happened, thus for the kernel facing ctx. Also here we need the range match and we need to keep track changing convert_ctx_access() and converted_op_size from is_valid_access() as both are not at the same location. We can simplify the code a bit: check_ctx_access() becomes simpler in that we only store ctx_field_size as a meta data and later in convert_ctx_accesses() we fetch the target_size right from the location where we do convert. Should the verifier be misconfigured we do reject for BPF_WRITE cases or target_size that are not provided. For the subsystems, we always work on ranges in is_valid_access() and add small helpers for ranges and narrow access, convert_ctx_accesses() sets target_size for the relevant instruction. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-02 08:13:27 +08:00
(1 << size * 8) - 1);
bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields Currently, verifier will reject a program if it contains an narrower load from the bpf context structure. For example, __u8 h = __sk_buff->hash, or __u16 p = __sk_buff->protocol __u32 sample_period = bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period which are narrower loads of 4-byte or 8-byte field. This patch solves the issue by: . Introduce a new parameter ctx_field_size to carry the field size of narrower load from prog type specific *__is_valid_access validator back to verifier. . The non-zero ctx_field_size for a memory access indicates (1). underlying prog type specific convert_ctx_accesses supporting non-whole-field access (2). the current insn is a narrower or whole field access. . In verifier, for such loads where load memory size is less than ctx_field_size, verifier transforms it to a full field load followed by proper masking. . Currently, __sk_buff and bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period are supporting narrowing loads. . Narrower stores are still not allowed as typical ctx stores are just normal stores. Because of this change, some tests in verifier will fail and these tests are removed. As a bonus, rename some out of bound __sk_buff->cb access to proper field name and remove two redundant "skb cb oob" tests. Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-14 06:52:13 +08:00
}
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-14 02:57:42 +08:00
bpf: adjust insn_aux_data when patching insns convert_ctx_accesses() replaces single bpf instruction with a set of instructions. Adjust corresponding insn_aux_data while patching. It's needed to make sure subsequent 'for(all insn)' loops have matching insn and insn_aux_data. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:41 +08:00
new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-14 02:57:42 +08:00
if (!new_prog)
return -ENOMEM;
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:56 +08:00
delta += cnt - 1;
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-14 02:57:42 +08:00
/* keep walking new program and skip insns we just inserted */
env->prog = new_prog;
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:56 +08:00
insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-14 02:57:42 +08:00
}
return 0;
}
bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls() reduce indent and make it iterate over instructions similar to convert_ctx_accesses(). Also convert hard BUG_ON into soft verifier error. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:40 +08:00
/* fixup insn->imm field of bpf_call instructions
bpf: add helper inlining infra and optimize map_array lookup Optimize bpf_call -> bpf_map_lookup_elem() -> array_map_lookup_elem() into a sequence of bpf instructions. When JIT is on the sequence of bpf instructions is the sequence of native cpu instructions with significantly faster performance than indirect call and two function's prologue/epilogue. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:42 +08:00
* and inline eligible helpers as explicit sequence of BPF instructions
bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function no functional change. move fixup_bpf_calls() to verifier.c it's being refactored in the next patch Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:39 +08:00
*
* this function is called after eBPF program passed verification
*/
bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls() reduce indent and make it iterate over instructions similar to convert_ctx_accesses(). Also convert hard BUG_ON into soft verifier error. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:40 +08:00
static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function no functional change. move fixup_bpf_calls() to verifier.c it's being refactored in the next patch Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:39 +08:00
{
bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls() reduce indent and make it iterate over instructions similar to convert_ctx_accesses(). Also convert hard BUG_ON into soft verifier error. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:40 +08:00
struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi;
bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function no functional change. move fixup_bpf_calls() to verifier.c it's being refactored in the next patch Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:39 +08:00
const struct bpf_func_proto *fn;
bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls() reduce indent and make it iterate over instructions similar to convert_ctx_accesses(). Also convert hard BUG_ON into soft verifier error. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:40 +08:00
const int insn_cnt = prog->len;
bpf: add helper inlining infra and optimize map_array lookup Optimize bpf_call -> bpf_map_lookup_elem() -> array_map_lookup_elem() into a sequence of bpf instructions. When JIT is on the sequence of bpf instructions is the sequence of native cpu instructions with significantly faster performance than indirect call and two function's prologue/epilogue. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:42 +08:00
struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16];
struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
int i, cnt, delta = 0;
bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function no functional change. move fixup_bpf_calls() to verifier.c it's being refactored in the next patch Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:39 +08:00
bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls() reduce indent and make it iterate over instructions similar to convert_ctx_accesses(). Also convert hard BUG_ON into soft verifier error. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:40 +08:00
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL))
continue;
bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function no functional change. move fixup_bpf_calls() to verifier.c it's being refactored in the next patch Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:39 +08:00
bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls() reduce indent and make it iterate over instructions similar to convert_ctx_accesses(). Also convert hard BUG_ON into soft verifier error. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:40 +08:00
if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_route_realm)
prog->dst_needed = 1;
if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32)
bpf_user_rnd_init_once();
if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call) {
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net A function in kernel/bpf/syscall.c which got a bug fix in 'net' was moved to kernel/bpf/verifier.c in 'net-next'. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-04-20 22:35:33 +08:00
/* If we tail call into other programs, we
* cannot make any assumptions since they can
* be replaced dynamically during runtime in
* the program array.
*/
prog->cb_access = 1;
bpf: reconcile bpf_tail_call and stack_depth The next set of patches will take advantage of stack_depth tracking, so make sure that the program that does bpf_tail_call() has stack depth large enough for the callee. We could have tracked the stack depth of the prog_array owner program and only allow insertion of the programs with stack depth less than the owner, but it will break existing applications. Some of them have trivial root bpf program that only does multiple bpf_tail_calls and at init time the prog array is empty. In the future we may add a flag to do such tracking optionally, but for now play simple and safe. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-31 04:31:30 +08:00
env->prog->aux->stack_depth = MAX_BPF_STACK;
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net A function in kernel/bpf/syscall.c which got a bug fix in 'net' was moved to kernel/bpf/verifier.c in 'net-next'. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-04-20 22:35:33 +08:00
bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls() reduce indent and make it iterate over instructions similar to convert_ctx_accesses(). Also convert hard BUG_ON into soft verifier error. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:40 +08:00
/* mark bpf_tail_call as different opcode to avoid
* conditional branch in the interpeter for every normal
* call and to prevent accidental JITing by JIT compiler
* that doesn't support bpf_tail_call yet
bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function no functional change. move fixup_bpf_calls() to verifier.c it's being refactored in the next patch Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:39 +08:00
*/
bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls() reduce indent and make it iterate over instructions similar to convert_ctx_accesses(). Also convert hard BUG_ON into soft verifier error. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:40 +08:00
insn->imm = 0;
bpf: free up BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL | BPF_X opcode free up BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL | BPF_X opcode to be used by actual indirect call by register and use kernel internal opcode to mark call instruction into bpf_tail_call() helper. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-31 04:31:27 +08:00
insn->code = BPF_JMP | BPF_TAIL_CALL;
bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls() reduce indent and make it iterate over instructions similar to convert_ctx_accesses(). Also convert hard BUG_ON into soft verifier error. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:40 +08:00
continue;
}
bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function no functional change. move fixup_bpf_calls() to verifier.c it's being refactored in the next patch Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:39 +08:00
bpf: make htab inlining more robust wrt assumptions Commit 9015d2f59535 ("bpf: inline htab_map_lookup_elem()") was making the assumption that a direct call emission to the function __htab_map_lookup_elem() will always work out for JITs. This is currently true since all JITs we have are for 64 bit archs, but in case of 32 bit JITs like upcoming arm32, we get a NULL pointer dereference when executing the call to __htab_map_lookup_elem() since passed arguments are of a different size (due to pointer args) than what we do out of BPF. Guard and thus limit this for now for the current 64 bit JITs only. Reported-by: Shubham Bansal <illusionist.neo@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-19 09:12:45 +08:00
/* BPF_EMIT_CALL() assumptions in some of the map_gen_lookup
* handlers are currently limited to 64 bit only.
*/
if (ebpf_jit_enabled() && BITS_PER_LONG == 64 &&
insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) {
bpf: add helper inlining infra and optimize map_array lookup Optimize bpf_call -> bpf_map_lookup_elem() -> array_map_lookup_elem() into a sequence of bpf instructions. When JIT is on the sequence of bpf instructions is the sequence of native cpu instructions with significantly faster performance than indirect call and two function's prologue/epilogue. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:42 +08:00
map_ptr = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].map_ptr;
bpf: Fix and simplifications on inline map lookup Fix in verifier: For the same bpf_map_lookup_elem() instruction (i.e. "call 1"), a broken case is "a different type of map could be used for the same lookup instruction". For example, an array in one case and a hashmap in another. We have to resort to the old dynamic call behavior in this case. The fix is to check for collision on insn_aux->map_ptr. If there is collision, don't inline the map lookup. Please see the "do_reg_lookup()" in test_map_in_map_kern.c in the later patch for how-to trigger the above case. Simplifications on array_map_gen_lookup(): 1. Calculate elem_size from map->value_size. It removes the need for 'struct bpf_array' which makes the later map-in-map implementation easier. 2. Remove the 'elem_size == 1' test Fixes: 81ed18ab3098 ("bpf: add helper inlining infra and optimize map_array lookup") Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-23 01:00:32 +08:00
if (map_ptr == BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON ||
!map_ptr->ops->map_gen_lookup)
bpf: add helper inlining infra and optimize map_array lookup Optimize bpf_call -> bpf_map_lookup_elem() -> array_map_lookup_elem() into a sequence of bpf instructions. When JIT is on the sequence of bpf instructions is the sequence of native cpu instructions with significantly faster performance than indirect call and two function's prologue/epilogue. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:42 +08:00
goto patch_call_imm;
cnt = map_ptr->ops->map_gen_lookup(map_ptr, insn_buf);
if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
bpf: add helper inlining infra and optimize map_array lookup Optimize bpf_call -> bpf_map_lookup_elem() -> array_map_lookup_elem() into a sequence of bpf instructions. When JIT is on the sequence of bpf instructions is the sequence of native cpu instructions with significantly faster performance than indirect call and two function's prologue/epilogue. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:42 +08:00
return -EINVAL;
}
new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf,
cnt);
if (!new_prog)
return -ENOMEM;
delta += cnt - 1;
/* keep walking new program and skip insns we just inserted */
env->prog = prog = new_prog;
insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
continue;
}
bpf: don't select potentially stale ri->map from buggy xdp progs We can potentially run into a couple of issues with the XDP bpf_redirect_map() helper. The ri->map in the per CPU storage can become stale in several ways, mostly due to misuse, where we can then trigger a use after free on the map: i) prog A is calling bpf_redirect_map(), returning XDP_REDIRECT and running on a driver not supporting XDP_REDIRECT yet. The ri->map on that CPU becomes stale when the XDP program is unloaded on the driver, and a prog B loaded on a different driver which supports XDP_REDIRECT return code. prog B would have to omit calling to bpf_redirect_map() and just return XDP_REDIRECT, which would then access the freed map in xdp_do_redirect() since not cleared for that CPU. ii) prog A is calling bpf_redirect_map(), returning a code other than XDP_REDIRECT. prog A is then detached, which triggers release of the map. prog B is attached which, similarly as in i), would just return XDP_REDIRECT without having called bpf_redirect_map() and thus be accessing the freed map in xdp_do_redirect() since not cleared for that CPU. iii) prog A is attached to generic XDP, calling the bpf_redirect_map() helper and returning XDP_REDIRECT. xdp_do_generic_redirect() is currently not handling ri->map (will be fixed by Jesper), so it's not being reset. Later loading a e.g. native prog B which would, say, call bpf_xdp_redirect() and then returns XDP_REDIRECT would find in xdp_do_redirect() that a map was set and uses that causing use after free on map access. Fix thus needs to avoid accessing stale ri->map pointers, naive way would be to call a BPF function from drivers that just resets it to NULL for all XDP return codes but XDP_REDIRECT and including XDP_REDIRECT for drivers not supporting it yet (and let ri->map being handled in xdp_do_generic_redirect()). There is a less intrusive way w/o letting drivers call a reset for each BPF run. The verifier knows we're calling into bpf_xdp_redirect_map() helper, so it can do a small insn rewrite transparent to the prog itself in the sense that it fills R4 with a pointer to the own bpf_prog. We have that pointer at verification time anyway and R4 is allowed to be used as per calling convention we scratch R0 to R5 anyway, so they become inaccessible and program cannot read them prior to a write. Then, the helper would store the prog pointer in the current CPUs struct redirect_info. Later in xdp_do_*_redirect() we check whether the redirect_info's prog pointer is the same as passed xdp_prog pointer, and if that's the case then all good, since the prog holds a ref on the map anyway, so it is always valid at that point in time and must have a reference count of at least 1. If in the unlikely case they are not equal, it means we got a stale pointer, so we clear and bail out right there. Also do reset map and the owning prog in bpf_xdp_redirect(), so that bpf_xdp_redirect_map() and bpf_xdp_redirect() won't get mixed up, only the last call should take precedence. A tc bpf_redirect() doesn't use map anywhere yet, so no need to clear it there since never accessed in that layer. Note that in case the prog is released, and thus the map as well we're still under RCU read critical section at that time and have preemption disabled as well. Once we commit with the __dev_map_insert_ctx() from xdp_do_redirect_map() and set the map to ri->map_to_flush, we still wait for a xdp_do_flush_map() to finish in devmap dismantle time once flush_needed bit is set, so that is fine. Fixes: 97f91a7cf04f ("bpf: add bpf_redirect_map helper routine") Reported-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-08 06:14:51 +08:00
if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_redirect_map) {
bpf: fix ri->map_owner pointer on bpf_prog_realloc Commit 109980b894e9 ("bpf: don't select potentially stale ri->map from buggy xdp progs") passed the pointer to the prog itself to be loaded into r4 prior on bpf_redirect_map() helper call, so that we can store the owner into ri->map_owner out of the helper. Issue with that is that the actual address of the prog is still subject to change when subsequent rewrites occur that require slow path in bpf_prog_realloc() to alloc more memory, e.g. from patching inlining helper functions or constant blinding. Thus, we really need to take prog->aux as the address we're holding, which also works with prog clones as they share the same aux object. Instead of then fetching aux->prog during runtime, which could potentially incur cache misses due to false sharing, we are going to just use aux for comparison on the map owner. This will also keep the patchlet of the same size, and later check in xdp_map_invalid() only accesses read-only aux pointer from the prog, it's also in the same cacheline already from prior access when calling bpf_func. Fixes: 109980b894e9 ("bpf: don't select potentially stale ri->map from buggy xdp progs") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-20 06:44:21 +08:00
/* Note, we cannot use prog directly as imm as subsequent
* rewrites would still change the prog pointer. The only
* stable address we can use is aux, which also works with
* prog clones during blinding.
*/
u64 addr = (unsigned long)prog->aux;
bpf: don't select potentially stale ri->map from buggy xdp progs We can potentially run into a couple of issues with the XDP bpf_redirect_map() helper. The ri->map in the per CPU storage can become stale in several ways, mostly due to misuse, where we can then trigger a use after free on the map: i) prog A is calling bpf_redirect_map(), returning XDP_REDIRECT and running on a driver not supporting XDP_REDIRECT yet. The ri->map on that CPU becomes stale when the XDP program is unloaded on the driver, and a prog B loaded on a different driver which supports XDP_REDIRECT return code. prog B would have to omit calling to bpf_redirect_map() and just return XDP_REDIRECT, which would then access the freed map in xdp_do_redirect() since not cleared for that CPU. ii) prog A is calling bpf_redirect_map(), returning a code other than XDP_REDIRECT. prog A is then detached, which triggers release of the map. prog B is attached which, similarly as in i), would just return XDP_REDIRECT without having called bpf_redirect_map() and thus be accessing the freed map in xdp_do_redirect() since not cleared for that CPU. iii) prog A is attached to generic XDP, calling the bpf_redirect_map() helper and returning XDP_REDIRECT. xdp_do_generic_redirect() is currently not handling ri->map (will be fixed by Jesper), so it's not being reset. Later loading a e.g. native prog B which would, say, call bpf_xdp_redirect() and then returns XDP_REDIRECT would find in xdp_do_redirect() that a map was set and uses that causing use after free on map access. Fix thus needs to avoid accessing stale ri->map pointers, naive way would be to call a BPF function from drivers that just resets it to NULL for all XDP return codes but XDP_REDIRECT and including XDP_REDIRECT for drivers not supporting it yet (and let ri->map being handled in xdp_do_generic_redirect()). There is a less intrusive way w/o letting drivers call a reset for each BPF run. The verifier knows we're calling into bpf_xdp_redirect_map() helper, so it can do a small insn rewrite transparent to the prog itself in the sense that it fills R4 with a pointer to the own bpf_prog. We have that pointer at verification time anyway and R4 is allowed to be used as per calling convention we scratch R0 to R5 anyway, so they become inaccessible and program cannot read them prior to a write. Then, the helper would store the prog pointer in the current CPUs struct redirect_info. Later in xdp_do_*_redirect() we check whether the redirect_info's prog pointer is the same as passed xdp_prog pointer, and if that's the case then all good, since the prog holds a ref on the map anyway, so it is always valid at that point in time and must have a reference count of at least 1. If in the unlikely case they are not equal, it means we got a stale pointer, so we clear and bail out right there. Also do reset map and the owning prog in bpf_xdp_redirect(), so that bpf_xdp_redirect_map() and bpf_xdp_redirect() won't get mixed up, only the last call should take precedence. A tc bpf_redirect() doesn't use map anywhere yet, so no need to clear it there since never accessed in that layer. Note that in case the prog is released, and thus the map as well we're still under RCU read critical section at that time and have preemption disabled as well. Once we commit with the __dev_map_insert_ctx() from xdp_do_redirect_map() and set the map to ri->map_to_flush, we still wait for a xdp_do_flush_map() to finish in devmap dismantle time once flush_needed bit is set, so that is fine. Fixes: 97f91a7cf04f ("bpf: add bpf_redirect_map helper routine") Reported-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-09-08 06:14:51 +08:00
struct bpf_insn r4_ld[] = {
BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_4, addr),
*insn,
};
cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(r4_ld);
new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, r4_ld, cnt);
if (!new_prog)
return -ENOMEM;
delta += cnt - 1;
env->prog = prog = new_prog;
insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
}
bpf: add helper inlining infra and optimize map_array lookup Optimize bpf_call -> bpf_map_lookup_elem() -> array_map_lookup_elem() into a sequence of bpf instructions. When JIT is on the sequence of bpf instructions is the sequence of native cpu instructions with significantly faster performance than indirect call and two function's prologue/epilogue. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:42 +08:00
patch_call_imm:
bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls() reduce indent and make it iterate over instructions similar to convert_ctx_accesses(). Also convert hard BUG_ON into soft verifier error. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:40 +08:00
fn = prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(insn->imm);
/* all functions that have prototype and verifier allowed
* programs to call them, must be real in-kernel functions
*/
if (!fn->func) {
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
verbose(env,
"kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n",
bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls() reduce indent and make it iterate over instructions similar to convert_ctx_accesses(). Also convert hard BUG_ON into soft verifier error. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:40 +08:00
func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm);
return -EFAULT;
bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function no functional change. move fixup_bpf_calls() to verifier.c it's being refactored in the next patch Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:39 +08:00
}
bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls() reduce indent and make it iterate over instructions similar to convert_ctx_accesses(). Also convert hard BUG_ON into soft verifier error. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:40 +08:00
insn->imm = fn->func - __bpf_call_base;
bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function no functional change. move fixup_bpf_calls() to verifier.c it's being refactored in the next patch Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:39 +08:00
}
bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls() reduce indent and make it iterate over instructions similar to convert_ctx_accesses(). Also convert hard BUG_ON into soft verifier error. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:40 +08:00
return 0;
}
bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function no functional change. move fixup_bpf_calls() to verifier.c it's being refactored in the next patch Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:39 +08:00
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 09:50:01 +08:00
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, *sln;
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 09:50:01 +08:00
int i;
if (!env->explored_states)
return;
for (i = 0; i < env->prog->len; i++) {
sl = env->explored_states[i];
if (sl)
while (sl != STATE_LIST_MARK) {
sln = sl->next;
kfree(sl);
sl = sln;
}
}
kfree(env->explored_states);
}
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-14 02:57:42 +08:00
int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr)
bpf: verifier (add docs) this patch adds all of eBPF verfier documentation and empty bpf_check() The end goal for the verifier is to statically check safety of the program. Verifier will catch: - loops - out of range jumps - unreachable instructions - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:02 +08:00
{
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
struct bpf_verifier_env *env;
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
struct bpf_verifer_log *log;
bpf: verifier (add docs) this patch adds all of eBPF verfier documentation and empty bpf_check() The end goal for the verifier is to statically check safety of the program. Verifier will catch: - loops - out of range jumps - unreachable instructions - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:02 +08:00
int ret = -EINVAL;
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
/* 'struct bpf_verifier_env' can be global, but since it's not small,
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
* allocate/free it every time bpf_check() is called
*/
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
env = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL);
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
if (!env)
return -ENOMEM;
bpf: move global verifier log into verifier environment The biggest piece of global state protected by the verifier lock is the verifier_log. Move that log to struct bpf_verifier_env. struct bpf_verifier_env has to be passed now to all invocations of verbose(). Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:11 +08:00
log = &env->log;
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:56 +08:00
env->insn_aux_data = vzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) *
(*prog)->len);
ret = -ENOMEM;
if (!env->insn_aux_data)
goto err_free_env;
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-14 02:57:42 +08:00
env->prog = *prog;
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:04 +08:00
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
/* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */
mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
if (attr->log_level || attr->log_buf || attr->log_size) {
/* user requested verbose verifier output
* and supplied buffer to store the verification trace
*/
bpf: encapsulate verifier log state into a structure Put the loose log_* variables into a structure. This will make it simpler to remove the global verifier state in following patches. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:10 +08:00
log->level = attr->log_level;
log->ubuf = (char __user *) (unsigned long) attr->log_buf;
log->len_total = attr->log_size;
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
ret = -EINVAL;
bpf: encapsulate verifier log state into a structure Put the loose log_* variables into a structure. This will make it simpler to remove the global verifier state in following patches. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:10 +08:00
/* log attributes have to be sane */
if (log->len_total < 128 || log->len_total > UINT_MAX >> 8 ||
!log->level || !log->ubuf)
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:56 +08:00
goto err_unlock;
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
ret = -ENOMEM;
bpf: encapsulate verifier log state into a structure Put the loose log_* variables into a structure. This will make it simpler to remove the global verifier state in following patches. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:10 +08:00
log->kbuf = vmalloc(log->len_total);
if (!log->kbuf)
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:56 +08:00
goto err_unlock;
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
}
bpf: fix incorrect pruning decision when alignment must be tracked Currently, when we enforce alignment tracking on direct packet access, the verifier lets the following program pass despite doing a packet write with unaligned access: 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (61) r7 = *(u32 *)(r1 +8) 3: (bf) r0 = r2 4: (07) r0 += 14 5: (25) if r7 > 0x1 goto pc+4 R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R10=fp 6: (2d) if r0 > r3 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=14) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=14) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R10=fp 7: (63) *(u32 *)(r0 -4) = r0 8: (b7) r0 = 0 9: (95) exit from 6 to 8: R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R10=fp 8: (b7) r0 = 0 9: (95) exit from 5 to 10: R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=2 R10=fp 10: (07) r0 += 1 11: (05) goto pc-6 6: safe <----- here, wrongly found safe processed 15 insns However, if we enforce a pruning mismatch by adding state into r8 which is then being mismatched in states_equal(), we find that for the otherwise same program, the verifier detects a misaligned packet access when actually walking that path: 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (61) r7 = *(u32 *)(r1 +8) 3: (b7) r8 = 1 4: (bf) r0 = r2 5: (07) r0 += 14 6: (25) if r7 > 0x1 goto pc+4 R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R8=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1,min_align=1 R10=fp 7: (2d) if r0 > r3 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=14) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=14) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R8=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1,min_align=1 R10=fp 8: (63) *(u32 *)(r0 -4) = r0 9: (b7) r0 = 0 10: (95) exit from 7 to 9: R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R8=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1,min_align=1 R10=fp 9: (b7) r0 = 0 10: (95) exit from 6 to 11: R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=2 R8=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1,min_align=1 R10=fp 11: (07) r0 += 1 12: (b7) r8 = 0 13: (05) goto pc-7 <----- mismatch due to r8 7: (2d) if r0 > r3 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=15,r=15) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=15) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=2 R8=imm0,min_value=0,max_value=0,min_align=2147483648 R10=fp 8: (63) *(u32 *)(r0 -4) = r0 misaligned packet access off 2+15+-4 size 4 The reason why we fail to see it in states_equal() is that the third test in compare_ptrs_to_packet() ... if (old->off <= cur->off && old->off >= old->range && cur->off >= cur->range) return true; ... will let the above pass. The situation we run into is that old->off <= cur->off (14 <= 15), meaning that prior walked paths went with smaller offset, which was later used in the packet access after successful packet range check and found to be safe already. For example: Given is R0=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0). Adding offset 14 as in above program to it, results in R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) before the packet range test. Now, testing this against R3=pkt_end with 'if r0 > r3 goto out' will transform R0 into R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=14) for the case when we're within bounds. A write into the packet at offset *(u32 *)(r0 -4), that is, 2 + 14 -4, is valid and aligned (2 is for NET_IP_ALIGN). After processing this with all fall-through paths, we later on check paths from branches. When the above skb->mark test is true, then we jump near the end of the program, perform r0 += 1, and jump back to the 'if r0 > r3 goto out' test we've visited earlier already. This time, R0 is of type R0=pkt(id=0,off=15,r=0), and we'll prune that part because this time we'll have a larger safe packet range, and we already found that with off=14 all further insn were already safe, so it's safe as well with a larger off. However, the problem is that the subsequent write into the packet with 2 + 15 -4 is then unaligned, and not caught by the alignment tracking. Note that min_align, aux_off, and aux_off_align were all 0 in this example. Since we cannot tell at this time what kind of packet access was performed in the prior walk and what minimal requirements it has (we might do so in the future, but that requires more complexity), fix it to disable this pruning case for strict alignment for now, and let the verifier do check such paths instead. With that applied, the test cases pass and reject the program due to misalignment. Fixes: d1174416747d ("bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier.") Reference: http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/761909/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-25 07:05:05 +08:00
env->strict_alignment = !!(attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT);
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS))
bpf: Add strict alignment flag for BPF_PROG_LOAD. Add a new field, "prog_flags", and an initial flag value BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT. When set, the verifier will enforce strict pointer alignment regardless of the setting of CONFIG_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS. The verifier, in this mode, will also use a fixed value of "2" in place of NET_IP_ALIGN. This facilitates test cases that will exercise and validate this part of the verifier even when run on architectures where alignment doesn't matter. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-11 02:38:07 +08:00
env->strict_alignment = true;
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:04 +08:00
ret = replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(env);
if (ret < 0)
goto skip_full_check;
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-14 02:57:42 +08:00
env->explored_states = kcalloc(env->prog->len,
bpf: expose internal verfier structures Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external analyzers. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:57 +08:00
sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list *),
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 09:50:01 +08:00
GFP_USER);
ret = -ENOMEM;
if (!env->explored_states)
goto skip_full_check;
bpf: verifier (add branch/goto checks) check that control flow graph of eBPF program is a directed acyclic graph check_cfg() does: - detect loops - detect unreachable instructions - check that program terminates with BPF_EXIT insn - check that all branches are within program boundary Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:05 +08:00
ret = check_cfg(env);
if (ret < 0)
goto skip_full_check;
bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks. Verifier will prevent - any arithmetic on pointers (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses) - comparison of pointers (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... ) - passing pointers to helper functions - indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions - returning pointer from bpf program - storing pointers into ctx or maps Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not. Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside or obfuscate them. Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs, so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration) and future kcm can use it. tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions, since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers and tc is for root only. For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += skb->len; return 0; } but the following program is not: int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb) { u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)); u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index); if (value) *value += (u64) skb; return 0; } since it would leak the kernel address into the map. Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the following helper functions: - map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them) - get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space) - get_smp_processor_id - tail_call into another socket filter program - ktime_get_ns The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true, bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process, and the toggle cannot be set back to false. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-08 13:23:21 +08:00
env->allow_ptr_leaks = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
ret = do_check(env);
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:04 +08:00
skip_full_check:
bpf: verifier (add verifier core) This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT, it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again. For program: 1: bpf_mov r1, xxx 2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5 3: bpf_mov r0, 1 4: goto 6 5: bpf_mov r0, 2 6: bpf_exit The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6 This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for: - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention - instruction encoding is not using reserved fields Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks: - bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type); that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx' are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program) - const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id); returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:06 +08:00
while (pop_stack(env, NULL) >= 0);
bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier consider C program represented in eBPF: int filter(int arg) { int a, b, c, *ptr; if (arg == 1) ptr = &a; else if (arg == 2) ptr = &b; else ptr = &c; *ptr = 0; return 0; } eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute in all situations. It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit. Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards the end again with potentially different values in registers. When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid) programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent verifier states to prune this depth first search. Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns): 1: .. 2: if (rX == rY) goto 4 3: .. 4: .. 5: .. 6: bpf_exit In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack to come back to it later. Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state in explored_states[4] linked list. Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue. Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again, effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2 is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass. If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare this path to be safe as well. In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-30 09:50:01 +08:00
free_states(env);
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:04 +08:00
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-14 02:57:42 +08:00
if (ret == 0)
/* program is valid, convert *(u32*)(ctx + off) accesses */
ret = convert_ctx_accesses(env);
bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function no functional change. move fixup_bpf_calls() to verifier.c it's being refactored in the next patch Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:39 +08:00
if (ret == 0)
bpf: refactor fixup_bpf_calls() reduce indent and make it iterate over instructions similar to convert_ctx_accesses(). Also convert hard BUG_ON into soft verifier error. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:40 +08:00
ret = fixup_bpf_calls(env);
bpf: move fixup_bpf_calls() function no functional change. move fixup_bpf_calls() to verifier.c it's being refactored in the next patch Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-16 09:26:39 +08:00
bpf: encapsulate verifier log state into a structure Put the loose log_* variables into a structure. This will make it simpler to remove the global verifier state in following patches. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:10 +08:00
if (log->level && bpf_verifier_log_full(log)) {
BUG_ON(log->len_used >= log->len_total);
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
/* verifier log exceeded user supplied buffer */
ret = -ENOSPC;
/* fall through to return what was recorded */
}
/* copy verifier log back to user space including trailing zero */
bpf: encapsulate verifier log state into a structure Put the loose log_* variables into a structure. This will make it simpler to remove the global verifier state in following patches. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:10 +08:00
if (log->level && copy_to_user(log->ubuf, log->kbuf,
log->len_used + 1) != 0) {
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_log_buf;
}
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:04 +08:00
if (ret == 0 && env->used_map_cnt) {
/* if program passed verifier, update used_maps in bpf_prog_info */
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-14 02:57:42 +08:00
env->prog->aux->used_maps = kmalloc_array(env->used_map_cnt,
sizeof(env->used_maps[0]),
GFP_KERNEL);
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:04 +08:00
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-14 02:57:42 +08:00
if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps) {
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:04 +08:00
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto free_log_buf;
}
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-14 02:57:42 +08:00
memcpy(env->prog->aux->used_maps, env->used_maps,
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:04 +08:00
sizeof(env->used_maps[0]) * env->used_map_cnt);
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-14 02:57:42 +08:00
env->prog->aux->used_map_cnt = env->used_map_cnt;
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:04 +08:00
/* program is valid. Convert pseudo bpf_ld_imm64 into generic
* bpf_ld_imm64 instructions
*/
convert_pseudo_ld_imm64(env);
}
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
free_log_buf:
bpf: encapsulate verifier log state into a structure Put the loose log_* variables into a structure. This will make it simpler to remove the global verifier state in following patches. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-10 01:30:10 +08:00
if (log->level)
vfree(log->kbuf);
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-14 02:57:42 +08:00
if (!env->prog->aux->used_maps)
bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls. If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag. Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:04 +08:00
/* if we didn't copy map pointers into bpf_prog_info, release
* them now. Otherwise free_bpf_prog_info() will release them.
*/
release_maps(env);
bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff': struct __sk_buff { __u32 len; __u32 pkt_type; __u32 mark; __u32 queue_mapping; }; bpf programs can do: int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb) { __u32 var = skb->pkt_type; which will be compiled to bpf assembler as: dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type) bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to: dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset)) dst_reg &= 7 since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-03-14 02:57:42 +08:00
*prog = env->prog;
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:56 +08:00
err_unlock:
bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log) add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall: union bpf_attr { struct { ... __u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */ __u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */ __aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */ }; }; when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why verifier rejected given program. 'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt provides several examples of these messages, like the program: BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0), BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8), BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0), BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf: 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r2 = r10 2: (07) r2 += -8 3: (b7) r1 = 0 4: (85) call 1 5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_ptr R10=fp 6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0 misaligned access off 4 size 8 The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:03 +08:00
mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
bpf: don't (ab)use instructions to store state Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes it impossible to run verifier on programs already marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of per-instruction state instead. While touching the error path rename and move existing jump target. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:56 +08:00
vfree(env->insn_aux_data);
err_free_env:
kfree(env);
bpf: verifier (add docs) this patch adds all of eBPF verfier documentation and empty bpf_check() The end goal for the verifier is to statically check safety of the program. Verifier will catch: - loops - out of range jumps - unreachable instructions - invalid instructions - uninitialized register access - uninitialized stack access - misaligned stack access - out of range stack access - invalid calling convention More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-09-26 15:17:02 +08:00
return ret;
}
bpf: enable non-core use of the verfier Advanced JIT compilers and translators may want to use eBPF verifier as a base for parsers or to perform custom checks and validations. Add ability for external users to invoke the verifier and provide callbacks to be invoked for every intruction checked. For now only add most basic callback for per-instruction pre-interpretation checks is added. More advanced users may also like to have per-instruction post callback and state comparison callback. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:58 +08:00
int bpf_analyzer(struct bpf_prog *prog, const struct bpf_ext_analyzer_ops *ops,
void *priv)
{
struct bpf_verifier_env *env;
int ret;
env = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_env), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!env)
return -ENOMEM;
env->insn_aux_data = vzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_insn_aux_data) *
prog->len);
ret = -ENOMEM;
if (!env->insn_aux_data)
goto err_free_env;
env->prog = prog;
env->analyzer_ops = ops;
env->analyzer_priv = priv;
/* grab the mutex to protect few globals used by verifier */
mutex_lock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
bpf: Add strict alignment flag for BPF_PROG_LOAD. Add a new field, "prog_flags", and an initial flag value BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT. When set, the verifier will enforce strict pointer alignment regardless of the setting of CONFIG_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS. The verifier, in this mode, will also use a fixed value of "2" in place of NET_IP_ALIGN. This facilitates test cases that will exercise and validate this part of the verifier even when run on architectures where alignment doesn't matter. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2017-05-11 02:38:07 +08:00
env->strict_alignment = false;
bpf: fix incorrect pruning decision when alignment must be tracked Currently, when we enforce alignment tracking on direct packet access, the verifier lets the following program pass despite doing a packet write with unaligned access: 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (61) r7 = *(u32 *)(r1 +8) 3: (bf) r0 = r2 4: (07) r0 += 14 5: (25) if r7 > 0x1 goto pc+4 R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R10=fp 6: (2d) if r0 > r3 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=14) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=14) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R10=fp 7: (63) *(u32 *)(r0 -4) = r0 8: (b7) r0 = 0 9: (95) exit from 6 to 8: R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R10=fp 8: (b7) r0 = 0 9: (95) exit from 5 to 10: R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=2 R10=fp 10: (07) r0 += 1 11: (05) goto pc-6 6: safe <----- here, wrongly found safe processed 15 insns However, if we enforce a pruning mismatch by adding state into r8 which is then being mismatched in states_equal(), we find that for the otherwise same program, the verifier detects a misaligned packet access when actually walking that path: 0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +76) 1: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 +80) 2: (61) r7 = *(u32 *)(r1 +8) 3: (b7) r8 = 1 4: (bf) r0 = r2 5: (07) r0 += 14 6: (25) if r7 > 0x1 goto pc+4 R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R8=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1,min_align=1 R10=fp 7: (2d) if r0 > r3 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=14) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=14) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R8=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1,min_align=1 R10=fp 8: (63) *(u32 *)(r0 -4) = r0 9: (b7) r0 = 0 10: (95) exit from 7 to 9: R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=0,max_value=1 R8=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1,min_align=1 R10=fp 9: (b7) r0 = 0 10: (95) exit from 6 to 11: R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=2 R8=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1,min_align=1 R10=fp 11: (07) r0 += 1 12: (b7) r8 = 0 13: (05) goto pc-7 <----- mismatch due to r8 7: (2d) if r0 > r3 goto pc+1 R0=pkt(id=0,off=15,r=15) R1=ctx R2=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=15) R3=pkt_end R7=inv,min_value=2 R8=imm0,min_value=0,max_value=0,min_align=2147483648 R10=fp 8: (63) *(u32 *)(r0 -4) = r0 misaligned packet access off 2+15+-4 size 4 The reason why we fail to see it in states_equal() is that the third test in compare_ptrs_to_packet() ... if (old->off <= cur->off && old->off >= old->range && cur->off >= cur->range) return true; ... will let the above pass. The situation we run into is that old->off <= cur->off (14 <= 15), meaning that prior walked paths went with smaller offset, which was later used in the packet access after successful packet range check and found to be safe already. For example: Given is R0=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0). Adding offset 14 as in above program to it, results in R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=0) before the packet range test. Now, testing this against R3=pkt_end with 'if r0 > r3 goto out' will transform R0 into R0=pkt(id=0,off=14,r=14) for the case when we're within bounds. A write into the packet at offset *(u32 *)(r0 -4), that is, 2 + 14 -4, is valid and aligned (2 is for NET_IP_ALIGN). After processing this with all fall-through paths, we later on check paths from branches. When the above skb->mark test is true, then we jump near the end of the program, perform r0 += 1, and jump back to the 'if r0 > r3 goto out' test we've visited earlier already. This time, R0 is of type R0=pkt(id=0,off=15,r=0), and we'll prune that part because this time we'll have a larger safe packet range, and we already found that with off=14 all further insn were already safe, so it's safe as well with a larger off. However, the problem is that the subsequent write into the packet with 2 + 15 -4 is then unaligned, and not caught by the alignment tracking. Note that min_align, aux_off, and aux_off_align were all 0 in this example. Since we cannot tell at this time what kind of packet access was performed in the prior walk and what minimal requirements it has (we might do so in the future, but that requires more complexity), fix it to disable this pruning case for strict alignment for now, and let the verifier do check such paths instead. With that applied, the test cases pass and reject the program due to misalignment. Fixes: d1174416747d ("bpf: Track alignment of register values in the verifier.") Reference: http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/761909/ Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-25 07:05:05 +08:00
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS))
env->strict_alignment = true;
bpf: enable non-core use of the verfier Advanced JIT compilers and translators may want to use eBPF verifier as a base for parsers or to perform custom checks and validations. Add ability for external users to invoke the verifier and provide callbacks to be invoked for every intruction checked. For now only add most basic callback for per-instruction pre-interpretation checks is added. More advanced users may also like to have per-instruction post callback and state comparison callback. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 18:43:58 +08:00
env->explored_states = kcalloc(env->prog->len,
sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state_list *),
GFP_KERNEL);
ret = -ENOMEM;
if (!env->explored_states)
goto skip_full_check;
ret = check_cfg(env);
if (ret < 0)
goto skip_full_check;
env->allow_ptr_leaks = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
ret = do_check(env);
skip_full_check:
while (pop_stack(env, NULL) >= 0);
free_states(env);
mutex_unlock(&bpf_verifier_lock);
vfree(env->insn_aux_data);
err_free_env:
kfree(env);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bpf_analyzer);
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