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linux-next/arch/arm/boot/compressed/misc.c

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/*
* misc.c
*
* This is a collection of several routines from gzip-1.0.3
* adapted for Linux.
*
* malloc by Hannu Savolainen 1993 and Matthias Urlichs 1994
*
* Modified for ARM Linux by Russell King
*
* Nicolas Pitre <nico@visuaide.com> 1999/04/14 :
* For this code to run directly from Flash, all constant variables must
* be marked with 'const' and all other variables initialized at run-time
* only. This way all non constant variables will end up in the bss segment,
* which should point to addresses in RAM and cleared to 0 on start.
* This allows for a much quicker boot time.
*/
unsigned int __machine_arch_type;
#include <linux/compiler.h> /* for inline */
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/linkage.h>
static void putstr(const char *ptr);
extern void error(char *x);
#include CONFIG_UNCOMPRESS_INCLUDE
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ICEDCC
#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_V6) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_V6K) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_V7)
static void icedcc_putc(int ch)
{
int status, i = 0x4000000;
do {
if (--i < 0)
return;
asm volatile ("mrc p14, 0, %0, c0, c1, 0" : "=r" (status));
} while (status & (1 << 29));
asm("mcr p14, 0, %0, c0, c5, 0" : : "r" (ch));
}
#elif defined(CONFIG_CPU_XSCALE)
static void icedcc_putc(int ch)
{
int status, i = 0x4000000;
do {
if (--i < 0)
return;
asm volatile ("mrc p14, 0, %0, c14, c0, 0" : "=r" (status));
} while (status & (1 << 28));
asm("mcr p14, 0, %0, c8, c0, 0" : : "r" (ch));
}
#else
static void icedcc_putc(int ch)
{
int status, i = 0x4000000;
do {
if (--i < 0)
return;
asm volatile ("mrc p14, 0, %0, c0, c0, 0" : "=r" (status));
} while (status & 2);
asm("mcr p14, 0, %0, c1, c0, 0" : : "r" (ch));
}
#endif
#define putc(ch) icedcc_putc(ch)
#endif
static void putstr(const char *ptr)
{
char c;
while ((c = *ptr++) != '\0') {
if (c == '\n')
putc('\r');
putc(c);
}
flush();
}
/*
* gzip declarations
*/
extern char input_data[];
extern char input_data_end[];
unsigned char *output_data;
unsigned long free_mem_ptr;
unsigned long free_mem_end_ptr;
#ifndef arch_error
#define arch_error(x)
#endif
void error(char *x)
{
arch_error(x);
putstr("\n\n");
putstr(x);
putstr("\n\n -- System halted");
while(1); /* Halt */
}
asmlinkage void __div0(void)
{
error("Attempting division by 0!");
}
stackprotector: Introduce CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG This changes the stack protector config option into a choice of "None", "Regular", and "Strong": CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG "Regular" means the old CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y option. "Strong" is a new mode introduced by this patch. With "Strong" the kernel is built with -fstack-protector-strong (available in gcc 4.9 and later). This option increases the coverage of the stack protector without the heavy performance hit of -fstack-protector-all. For reference, the stack protector options available in gcc are: -fstack-protector-all: Adds the stack-canary saving prefix and stack-canary checking suffix to _all_ function entry and exit. Results in substantial use of stack space for saving the canary for deep stack users (e.g. historically xfs), and measurable (though shockingly still low) performance hit due to all the saving/checking. Really not suitable for sane systems, and was entirely removed as an option from the kernel many years ago. -fstack-protector: Adds the canary save/check to functions that define an 8 (--param=ssp-buffer-size=N, N=8 by default) or more byte local char array. Traditionally, stack overflows happened with string-based manipulations, so this was a way to find those functions. Very few total functions actually get the canary; no measurable performance or size overhead. -fstack-protector-strong Adds the canary for a wider set of functions, since it's not just those with strings that have ultimately been vulnerable to stack-busting. With this superset, more functions end up with a canary, but it still remains small compared to all functions with only a small change in performance. Based on the original design document, a function gets the canary when it contains any of: - local variable's address used as part of the right hand side of an assignment or function argument - local variable is an array (or union containing an array), regardless of array type or length - uses register local variables https://docs.google.com/a/google.com/document/d/1xXBH6rRZue4f296vGt9YQcuLVQHeE516stHwt8M9xyU Find below a comparison of "size" and "objdump" output when built with gcc-4.9 in three configurations: - defconfig 11430641 kernel text size 36110 function bodies - defconfig + CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR 11468490 kernel text size (+0.33%) 1015 of 36110 functions are stack-protected (2.81%) - defconfig + CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG via this patch 11692790 kernel text size (+2.24%) 7401 of 36110 functions are stack-protected (20.5%) With -strong, ARM's compressed boot code now triggers stack protection, so a static guard was added. Since this is only used during decompression and was never used before, the exposure here is very small. Once it switches to the full kernel, the stack guard is back to normal. Chrome OS has been using -fstack-protector-strong for its kernel builds for the last 8 months with no problems. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Shawn Guo <shawn.guo@linaro.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1387481759-14535-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org [ Improved the changelog and descriptions some more. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2013-12-20 03:35:59 +08:00
unsigned long __stack_chk_guard;
void __stack_chk_guard_setup(void)
{
__stack_chk_guard = 0x000a0dff;
}
void __stack_chk_fail(void)
{
error("stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted\n");
}
extern int do_decompress(u8 *input, int len, u8 *output, void (*error)(char *x));
void
decompress_kernel(unsigned long output_start, unsigned long free_mem_ptr_p,
unsigned long free_mem_ptr_end_p,
int arch_id)
{
int ret;
stackprotector: Introduce CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG This changes the stack protector config option into a choice of "None", "Regular", and "Strong": CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG "Regular" means the old CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y option. "Strong" is a new mode introduced by this patch. With "Strong" the kernel is built with -fstack-protector-strong (available in gcc 4.9 and later). This option increases the coverage of the stack protector without the heavy performance hit of -fstack-protector-all. For reference, the stack protector options available in gcc are: -fstack-protector-all: Adds the stack-canary saving prefix and stack-canary checking suffix to _all_ function entry and exit. Results in substantial use of stack space for saving the canary for deep stack users (e.g. historically xfs), and measurable (though shockingly still low) performance hit due to all the saving/checking. Really not suitable for sane systems, and was entirely removed as an option from the kernel many years ago. -fstack-protector: Adds the canary save/check to functions that define an 8 (--param=ssp-buffer-size=N, N=8 by default) or more byte local char array. Traditionally, stack overflows happened with string-based manipulations, so this was a way to find those functions. Very few total functions actually get the canary; no measurable performance or size overhead. -fstack-protector-strong Adds the canary for a wider set of functions, since it's not just those with strings that have ultimately been vulnerable to stack-busting. With this superset, more functions end up with a canary, but it still remains small compared to all functions with only a small change in performance. Based on the original design document, a function gets the canary when it contains any of: - local variable's address used as part of the right hand side of an assignment or function argument - local variable is an array (or union containing an array), regardless of array type or length - uses register local variables https://docs.google.com/a/google.com/document/d/1xXBH6rRZue4f296vGt9YQcuLVQHeE516stHwt8M9xyU Find below a comparison of "size" and "objdump" output when built with gcc-4.9 in three configurations: - defconfig 11430641 kernel text size 36110 function bodies - defconfig + CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR 11468490 kernel text size (+0.33%) 1015 of 36110 functions are stack-protected (2.81%) - defconfig + CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG via this patch 11692790 kernel text size (+2.24%) 7401 of 36110 functions are stack-protected (20.5%) With -strong, ARM's compressed boot code now triggers stack protection, so a static guard was added. Since this is only used during decompression and was never used before, the exposure here is very small. Once it switches to the full kernel, the stack guard is back to normal. Chrome OS has been using -fstack-protector-strong for its kernel builds for the last 8 months with no problems. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Shawn Guo <shawn.guo@linaro.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1387481759-14535-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org [ Improved the changelog and descriptions some more. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2013-12-20 03:35:59 +08:00
__stack_chk_guard_setup();
output_data = (unsigned char *)output_start;
free_mem_ptr = free_mem_ptr_p;
inflate: refactor inflate malloc code Inflate requires some dynamic memory allocation very early in the boot process and this is provided with a set of four functions: malloc/free/gzip_mark/gzip_release. The old inflate code used a mark/release strategy rather than implement free. This new version instead keeps a count on the number of outstanding allocations and when it hits zero, it resets the malloc arena. This allows removing all the mark and release implementations and unifying all the malloc/free implementations. The architecture-dependent code must define two addresses: - free_mem_ptr, the address of the beginning of the area in which allocations should be made - free_mem_end_ptr, the address of the end of the area in which allocations should be made. If set to 0, then no check is made on the number of allocations, it just grows as much as needed The architecture-dependent code can also provide an arch_decomp_wdog() function call. This function will be called several times during the decompression process, and allow to notify the watchdog that the system is still running. If an architecture provides such a call, then it must define ARCH_HAS_DECOMP_WDOG so that the generic inflate code calls arch_decomp_wdog(). Work initially done by Matt Mackall, updated to a recent version of the kernel and improved by me. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com> Cc: Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru> Cc: Mikael Starvik <mikael.starvik@axis.com> Cc: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com> Cc: Haavard Skinnemoen <hskinnemoen@atmel.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Acked-by: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Acked-by: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-25 16:45:44 +08:00
free_mem_end_ptr = free_mem_ptr_end_p;
__machine_arch_type = arch_id;
arch_decomp_setup();
putstr("Uncompressing Linux...");
ret = do_decompress(input_data, input_data_end - input_data,
output_data, error);
if (ret)
error("decompressor returned an error");
else
putstr(" done, booting the kernel.\n");
}