License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 22:07:57 +08:00
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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
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2009-02-09 21:17:40 +08:00
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/*
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* GCC stack protector support.
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*
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* Stack protector works by putting predefined pattern at the start of
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* the stack frame and verifying that it hasn't been overwritten when
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* returning from the function. The pattern is called stack canary
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* and unfortunately gcc requires it to be at a fixed offset from %gs.
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* On x86_64, the offset is 40 bytes and on x86_32 20 bytes. x86_64
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* and x86_32 use segment registers differently and thus handles this
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* requirement differently.
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*
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* On x86_64, %gs is shared by percpu area and stack canary. All
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* percpu symbols are zero based and %gs points to the base of percpu
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* area. The first occupant of the percpu area is always
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2019-04-15 00:00:06 +08:00
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* fixed_percpu_data which contains stack_canary at offset 40. Userland
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2009-02-09 21:17:40 +08:00
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* %gs is always saved and restored on kernel entry and exit using
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* swapgs, so stack protector doesn't add any complexity there.
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*
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* On x86_32, it's slightly more complicated. As in x86_64, %gs is
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* used for userland TLS. Unfortunately, some processors are much
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* slower at loading segment registers with different value when
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* entering and leaving the kernel, so the kernel uses %fs for percpu
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* area and manages %gs lazily so that %gs is switched only when
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* necessary, usually during task switch.
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*
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* As gcc requires the stack canary at %gs:20, %gs can't be managed
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* lazily if stack protector is enabled, so the kernel saves and
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* restores userland %gs on kernel entry and exit. This behavior is
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* controlled by CONFIG_X86_32_LAZY_GS and accessors are defined in
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* system.h to hide the details.
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*/
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2008-02-14 16:41:09 +08:00
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#ifndef _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H
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#define _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H 1
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Kbuild: rename CC_STACKPROTECTOR[_STRONG] config variables
The changes to automatically test for working stack protector compiler
support in the Kconfig files removed the special STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO
option that picked the strongest stack protector that the compiler
supported.
That was all a nice cleanup - it makes no sense to have the AUTO case
now that the Kconfig phase can just determine the compiler support
directly.
HOWEVER.
It also meant that doing "make oldconfig" would now _disable_ the strong
stackprotector if you had AUTO enabled, because in a legacy config file,
the sane stack protector configuration would look like
CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE is not set
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR is not set
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set
CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO=y
and when you ran this through "make oldconfig" with the Kbuild changes,
it would ask you about the regular CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR (that had
been renamed from CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR to just
CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR), but it would think that the STRONG version
used to be disabled (because it was really enabled by AUTO), and would
disable it in the new config, resulting in:
CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y
CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set
CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y
That's dangerously subtle - people could suddenly find themselves with
the weaker stack protector setup without even realizing.
The solution here is to just rename not just the old RECULAR stack
protector option, but also the strong one. This does that by just
removing the CC_ prefix entirely for the user choices, because it really
is not about the compiler support (the compiler support now instead
automatially impacts _visibility_ of the options to users).
This results in "make oldconfig" actually asking the user for their
choice, so that we don't have any silent subtle security model changes.
The end result would generally look like this:
CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y
CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR=y
CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG=y
CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y
where the "CC_" versions really are about internal compiler
infrastructure, not the user selections.
Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-06-14 11:21:18 +08:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR
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2009-02-09 21:17:39 +08:00
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2008-02-14 16:56:04 +08:00
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#include <asm/tsc.h>
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2009-01-19 11:21:28 +08:00
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#include <asm/processor.h>
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2009-02-09 21:17:39 +08:00
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#include <asm/percpu.h>
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2009-02-09 21:17:40 +08:00
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#include <asm/desc.h>
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2015-04-26 22:56:05 +08:00
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2009-02-09 21:17:39 +08:00
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#include <linux/random.h>
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2015-04-26 22:56:05 +08:00
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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2008-02-14 16:56:04 +08:00
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2009-02-09 21:17:40 +08:00
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/*
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* 24 byte read-only segment initializer for stack canary. Linker
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* can't handle the address bit shifting. Address will be set in
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* head_32 for boot CPU and setup_per_cpu_areas() for others.
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*/
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#define GDT_STACK_CANARY_INIT \
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2009-07-18 23:12:20 +08:00
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[GDT_ENTRY_STACK_CANARY] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x4090, 0, 0x18),
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2009-02-09 21:17:40 +08:00
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2008-02-14 16:42:02 +08:00
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/*
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* Initialize the stackprotector canary value.
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*
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x86: Fix early boot crash on gcc-10, third try
... or the odyssey of trying to disable the stack protector for the
function which generates the stack canary value.
The whole story started with Sergei reporting a boot crash with a kernel
built with gcc-10:
Kernel panic — not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: start_secondary
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc5—00235—gfffb08b37df9 #139
Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. To be filled by O.E.M./H77M—D3H, BIOS F12 11/14/2013
Call Trace:
dump_stack
panic
? start_secondary
__stack_chk_fail
start_secondary
secondary_startup_64
-—-[ end Kernel panic — not syncing: stack—protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: start_secondary
This happens because gcc-10 tail-call optimizes the last function call
in start_secondary() - cpu_startup_entry() - and thus emits a stack
canary check which fails because the canary value changes after the
boot_init_stack_canary() call.
To fix that, the initial attempt was to mark the one function which
generates the stack canary with:
__attribute__((optimize("-fno-stack-protector"))) ... start_secondary(void *unused)
however, using the optimize attribute doesn't work cumulatively
as the attribute does not add to but rather replaces previously
supplied optimization options - roughly all -fxxx options.
The key one among them being -fno-omit-frame-pointer and thus leading to
not present frame pointer - frame pointer which the kernel needs.
The next attempt to prevent compilers from tail-call optimizing
the last function call cpu_startup_entry(), shy of carving out
start_secondary() into a separate compilation unit and building it with
-fno-stack-protector, was to add an empty asm("").
This current solution was short and sweet, and reportedly, is supported
by both compilers but we didn't get very far this time: future (LTO?)
optimization passes could potentially eliminate this, which leads us
to the third attempt: having an actual memory barrier there which the
compiler cannot ignore or move around etc.
That should hold for a long time, but hey we said that about the other
two solutions too so...
Reported-by: Sergei Trofimovich <slyfox@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200314164451.346497-1-slyfox@gentoo.org
2020-04-23 00:11:30 +08:00
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* NOTE: this must only be called from functions that never return
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2008-02-14 16:42:02 +08:00
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* and it must always be inlined.
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x86: Fix early boot crash on gcc-10, third try
... or the odyssey of trying to disable the stack protector for the
function which generates the stack canary value.
The whole story started with Sergei reporting a boot crash with a kernel
built with gcc-10:
Kernel panic — not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: start_secondary
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc5—00235—gfffb08b37df9 #139
Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. To be filled by O.E.M./H77M—D3H, BIOS F12 11/14/2013
Call Trace:
dump_stack
panic
? start_secondary
__stack_chk_fail
start_secondary
secondary_startup_64
-—-[ end Kernel panic — not syncing: stack—protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: start_secondary
This happens because gcc-10 tail-call optimizes the last function call
in start_secondary() - cpu_startup_entry() - and thus emits a stack
canary check which fails because the canary value changes after the
boot_init_stack_canary() call.
To fix that, the initial attempt was to mark the one function which
generates the stack canary with:
__attribute__((optimize("-fno-stack-protector"))) ... start_secondary(void *unused)
however, using the optimize attribute doesn't work cumulatively
as the attribute does not add to but rather replaces previously
supplied optimization options - roughly all -fxxx options.
The key one among them being -fno-omit-frame-pointer and thus leading to
not present frame pointer - frame pointer which the kernel needs.
The next attempt to prevent compilers from tail-call optimizing
the last function call cpu_startup_entry(), shy of carving out
start_secondary() into a separate compilation unit and building it with
-fno-stack-protector, was to add an empty asm("").
This current solution was short and sweet, and reportedly, is supported
by both compilers but we didn't get very far this time: future (LTO?)
optimization passes could potentially eliminate this, which leads us
to the third attempt: having an actual memory barrier there which the
compiler cannot ignore or move around etc.
That should hold for a long time, but hey we said that about the other
two solutions too so...
Reported-by: Sergei Trofimovich <slyfox@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200314164451.346497-1-slyfox@gentoo.org
2020-04-23 00:11:30 +08:00
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*
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* In addition, it should be called from a compilation unit for which
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* stack protector is disabled. Alternatively, the caller should not end
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* with a function call which gets tail-call optimized as that would
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* lead to checking a modified canary value.
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2008-02-14 16:42:02 +08:00
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*/
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static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void)
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{
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2008-02-14 16:56:04 +08:00
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u64 canary;
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u64 tsc;
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2009-02-09 21:17:40 +08:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
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2019-04-15 00:00:06 +08:00
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BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct fixed_percpu_data, stack_canary) != 40);
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2009-02-09 21:17:40 +08:00
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#endif
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2009-01-20 11:29:19 +08:00
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/*
|
2008-02-14 16:56:04 +08:00
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* We both use the random pool and the current TSC as a source
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* of randomness. The TSC only matters for very early init,
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* there it already has some randomness on most systems. Later
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* on during the bootup the random pool has true entropy too.
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2008-02-14 16:42:02 +08:00
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*/
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2008-02-14 16:56:04 +08:00
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get_random_bytes(&canary, sizeof(canary));
|
2015-06-26 00:44:07 +08:00
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tsc = rdtsc();
|
2008-02-14 16:56:04 +08:00
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canary += tsc + (tsc << 32UL);
|
2017-07-13 05:36:23 +08:00
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canary &= CANARY_MASK;
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2008-02-14 16:56:04 +08:00
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current->stack_canary = canary;
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2009-02-09 21:17:40 +08:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
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2019-04-15 00:00:06 +08:00
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this_cpu_write(fixed_percpu_data.stack_canary, canary);
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2009-02-09 21:17:40 +08:00
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#else
|
2012-05-11 15:35:27 +08:00
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this_cpu_write(stack_canary.canary, canary);
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2009-02-09 21:17:40 +08:00
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#endif
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}
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static inline void setup_stack_canary_segment(int cpu)
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{
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
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2009-09-04 03:27:15 +08:00
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unsigned long canary = (unsigned long)&per_cpu(stack_canary, cpu);
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2017-03-15 01:05:07 +08:00
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struct desc_struct *gdt_table = get_cpu_gdt_rw(cpu);
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2009-02-09 21:17:40 +08:00
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struct desc_struct desc;
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desc = gdt_table[GDT_ENTRY_STACK_CANARY];
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2009-07-18 23:11:06 +08:00
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set_desc_base(&desc, canary);
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2009-02-09 21:17:40 +08:00
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write_gdt_entry(gdt_table, GDT_ENTRY_STACK_CANARY, &desc, DESCTYPE_S);
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#endif
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}
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static inline void load_stack_canary_segment(void)
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{
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
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asm("mov %0, %%gs" : : "r" (__KERNEL_STACK_CANARY) : "memory");
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#endif
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}
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Kbuild: rename CC_STACKPROTECTOR[_STRONG] config variables
The changes to automatically test for working stack protector compiler
support in the Kconfig files removed the special STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO
option that picked the strongest stack protector that the compiler
supported.
That was all a nice cleanup - it makes no sense to have the AUTO case
now that the Kconfig phase can just determine the compiler support
directly.
HOWEVER.
It also meant that doing "make oldconfig" would now _disable_ the strong
stackprotector if you had AUTO enabled, because in a legacy config file,
the sane stack protector configuration would look like
CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE is not set
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR is not set
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set
CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO=y
and when you ran this through "make oldconfig" with the Kbuild changes,
it would ask you about the regular CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR (that had
been renamed from CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR to just
CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR), but it would think that the STRONG version
used to be disabled (because it was really enabled by AUTO), and would
disable it in the new config, resulting in:
CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y
CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set
CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y
That's dangerously subtle - people could suddenly find themselves with
the weaker stack protector setup without even realizing.
The solution here is to just rename not just the old RECULAR stack
protector option, but also the strong one. This does that by just
removing the CC_ prefix entirely for the user choices, because it really
is not about the compiler support (the compiler support now instead
automatially impacts _visibility_ of the options to users).
This results in "make oldconfig" actually asking the user for their
choice, so that we don't have any silent subtle security model changes.
The end result would generally look like this:
CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y
CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR=y
CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG=y
CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y
where the "CC_" versions really are about internal compiler
infrastructure, not the user selections.
Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-06-14 11:21:18 +08:00
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#else /* STACKPROTECTOR */
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2009-02-09 21:17:40 +08:00
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#define GDT_STACK_CANARY_INIT
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/* dummy boot_init_stack_canary() is defined in linux/stackprotector.h */
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static inline void setup_stack_canary_segment(int cpu)
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{ }
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static inline void load_stack_canary_segment(void)
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{
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
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asm volatile ("mov %0, %%gs" : : "r" (0));
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#endif
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2008-02-14 16:42:02 +08:00
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}
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Kbuild: rename CC_STACKPROTECTOR[_STRONG] config variables
The changes to automatically test for working stack protector compiler
support in the Kconfig files removed the special STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO
option that picked the strongest stack protector that the compiler
supported.
That was all a nice cleanup - it makes no sense to have the AUTO case
now that the Kconfig phase can just determine the compiler support
directly.
HOWEVER.
It also meant that doing "make oldconfig" would now _disable_ the strong
stackprotector if you had AUTO enabled, because in a legacy config file,
the sane stack protector configuration would look like
CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE is not set
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR is not set
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set
CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO=y
and when you ran this through "make oldconfig" with the Kbuild changes,
it would ask you about the regular CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR (that had
been renamed from CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR to just
CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR), but it would think that the STRONG version
used to be disabled (because it was really enabled by AUTO), and would
disable it in the new config, resulting in:
CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y
CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set
CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y
That's dangerously subtle - people could suddenly find themselves with
the weaker stack protector setup without even realizing.
The solution here is to just rename not just the old RECULAR stack
protector option, but also the strong one. This does that by just
removing the CC_ prefix entirely for the user choices, because it really
is not about the compiler support (the compiler support now instead
automatially impacts _visibility_ of the options to users).
This results in "make oldconfig" actually asking the user for their
choice, so that we don't have any silent subtle security model changes.
The end result would generally look like this:
CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y
CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR=y
CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG=y
CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y
where the "CC_" versions really are about internal compiler
infrastructure, not the user selections.
Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-06-14 11:21:18 +08:00
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#endif /* STACKPROTECTOR */
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2009-02-09 21:17:39 +08:00
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#endif /* _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H */
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