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linux-next/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c

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/*
* Kexec bzImage loader
*
* Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat Inc.
* Authors:
* Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
*
* This source code is licensed under the GNU General Public License,
* Version 2. See the file COPYING for more details.
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "kexec-bzImage64: " fmt
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/printk.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/kexec.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/efi.h>
#include <linux/verification.h>
#include <asm/bootparam.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
#include <asm/crash.h>
#include <asm/efi.h>
#include <asm/e820/api.h>
#include <asm/kexec-bzimage64.h>
#define MAX_ELFCOREHDR_STR_LEN 30 /* elfcorehdr=0x<64bit-value> */
/*
* Defines lowest physical address for various segments. Not sure where
* exactly these limits came from. Current bzimage64 loader in kexec-tools
* uses these so I am retaining it. It can be changed over time as we gain
* more insight.
*/
#define MIN_PURGATORY_ADDR 0x3000
#define MIN_BOOTPARAM_ADDR 0x3000
#define MIN_KERNEL_LOAD_ADDR 0x100000
#define MIN_INITRD_LOAD_ADDR 0x1000000
/*
* This is a place holder for all boot loader specific data structure which
* gets allocated in one call but gets freed much later during cleanup
* time. Right now there is only one field but it can grow as need be.
*/
struct bzimage64_data {
/*
* Temporary buffer to hold bootparams buffer. This should be
* freed once the bootparam segment has been loaded.
*/
void *bootparams_buf;
};
static int setup_initrd(struct boot_params *params,
unsigned long initrd_load_addr, unsigned long initrd_len)
{
params->hdr.ramdisk_image = initrd_load_addr & 0xffffffffUL;
params->hdr.ramdisk_size = initrd_len & 0xffffffffUL;
params->ext_ramdisk_image = initrd_load_addr >> 32;
params->ext_ramdisk_size = initrd_len >> 32;
return 0;
}
static int setup_cmdline(struct kimage *image, struct boot_params *params,
unsigned long bootparams_load_addr,
unsigned long cmdline_offset, char *cmdline,
unsigned long cmdline_len)
{
char *cmdline_ptr = ((char *)params) + cmdline_offset;
unsigned long cmdline_ptr_phys, len = 0;
uint32_t cmdline_low_32, cmdline_ext_32;
if (image->type == KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH) {
len = sprintf(cmdline_ptr,
"elfcorehdr=0x%lx ", image->arch.elf_load_addr);
}
memcpy(cmdline_ptr + len, cmdline, cmdline_len);
cmdline_len += len;
cmdline_ptr[cmdline_len - 1] = '\0';
pr_debug("Final command line is: %s\n", cmdline_ptr);
cmdline_ptr_phys = bootparams_load_addr + cmdline_offset;
cmdline_low_32 = cmdline_ptr_phys & 0xffffffffUL;
cmdline_ext_32 = cmdline_ptr_phys >> 32;
params->hdr.cmd_line_ptr = cmdline_low_32;
if (cmdline_ext_32)
params->ext_cmd_line_ptr = cmdline_ext_32;
return 0;
}
static int setup_e820_entries(struct boot_params *params)
{
unsigned int nr_e820_entries;
nr_e820_entries = e820_table_kexec->nr_entries;
/* TODO: Pass entries more than E820_MAX_ENTRIES_ZEROPAGE in bootparams setup data */
if (nr_e820_entries > E820_MAX_ENTRIES_ZEROPAGE)
nr_e820_entries = E820_MAX_ENTRIES_ZEROPAGE;
params->e820_entries = nr_e820_entries;
memcpy(&params->e820_table, &e820_table_kexec->entries, nr_e820_entries*sizeof(struct e820_entry));
return 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
static int setup_efi_info_memmap(struct boot_params *params,
unsigned long params_load_addr,
unsigned int efi_map_offset,
unsigned int efi_map_sz)
{
void *efi_map = (void *)params + efi_map_offset;
unsigned long efi_map_phys_addr = params_load_addr + efi_map_offset;
struct efi_info *ei = &params->efi_info;
if (!efi_map_sz)
return 0;
efi_runtime_map_copy(efi_map, efi_map_sz);
ei->efi_memmap = efi_map_phys_addr & 0xffffffff;
ei->efi_memmap_hi = efi_map_phys_addr >> 32;
ei->efi_memmap_size = efi_map_sz;
return 0;
}
static int
prepare_add_efi_setup_data(struct boot_params *params,
unsigned long params_load_addr,
unsigned int efi_setup_data_offset)
{
unsigned long setup_data_phys;
struct setup_data *sd = (void *)params + efi_setup_data_offset;
struct efi_setup_data *esd = (void *)sd + sizeof(struct setup_data);
esd->fw_vendor = efi.fw_vendor;
esd->runtime = efi.runtime;
esd->tables = efi.config_table;
esd->smbios = efi.smbios;
sd->type = SETUP_EFI;
sd->len = sizeof(struct efi_setup_data);
/* Add setup data */
setup_data_phys = params_load_addr + efi_setup_data_offset;
sd->next = params->hdr.setup_data;
params->hdr.setup_data = setup_data_phys;
return 0;
}
static int
setup_efi_state(struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr,
unsigned int efi_map_offset, unsigned int efi_map_sz,
unsigned int efi_setup_data_offset)
{
struct efi_info *current_ei = &boot_params.efi_info;
struct efi_info *ei = &params->efi_info;
x86/kexec: Don't setup EFI info if EFI runtime is not enabled Kexec-ing a kernel with "efi=noruntime" on the first kernel's command line causes the following null pointer dereference: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000 #PF error: [normal kernel read fault] Call Trace: efi_runtime_map_copy+0x28/0x30 bzImage64_load+0x688/0x872 arch_kexec_kernel_image_load+0x6d/0x70 kimage_file_alloc_init+0x13e/0x220 __x64_sys_kexec_file_load+0x144/0x290 do_syscall_64+0x55/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Just skip the EFI info setup if EFI runtime services are not enabled. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Suggested-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: bhe@redhat.com Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: erik.schmauss@intel.com Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: lenb@kernel.org Cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org Cc: Philipp Rudo <prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com Cc: robert.moore@intel.com Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Cc: Yannik Sembritzki <yannik@sembritzki.me> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190118111310.29589-2-kasong@redhat.com
2019-01-18 19:13:08 +08:00
if (!efi_enabled(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES))
return 0;
if (!current_ei->efi_memmap_size)
return 0;
/*
* If 1:1 mapping is not enabled, second kernel can not setup EFI
* and use EFI run time services. User space will have to pass
* acpi_rsdp=<addr> on kernel command line to make second kernel boot
* without efi.
*/
if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP))
return 0;
ei->efi_loader_signature = current_ei->efi_loader_signature;
ei->efi_systab = current_ei->efi_systab;
ei->efi_systab_hi = current_ei->efi_systab_hi;
ei->efi_memdesc_version = current_ei->efi_memdesc_version;
ei->efi_memdesc_size = efi_get_runtime_map_desc_size();
setup_efi_info_memmap(params, params_load_addr, efi_map_offset,
efi_map_sz);
prepare_add_efi_setup_data(params, params_load_addr,
efi_setup_data_offset);
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_EFI */
static int
setup_boot_parameters(struct kimage *image, struct boot_params *params,
unsigned long params_load_addr,
unsigned int efi_map_offset, unsigned int efi_map_sz,
unsigned int efi_setup_data_offset)
{
unsigned int nr_e820_entries;
unsigned long long mem_k, start, end;
int i, ret = 0;
/* Get subarch from existing bootparams */
params->hdr.hardware_subarch = boot_params.hdr.hardware_subarch;
/* Copying screen_info will do? */
memcpy(&params->screen_info, &boot_params.screen_info,
sizeof(struct screen_info));
/* Fill in memsize later */
params->screen_info.ext_mem_k = 0;
params->alt_mem_k = 0;
2019-02-05 01:38:52 +08:00
/* Always fill in RSDP: it is either 0 or a valid value */
params->acpi_rsdp_addr = boot_params.acpi_rsdp_addr;
/* Default APM info */
memset(&params->apm_bios_info, 0, sizeof(params->apm_bios_info));
/* Default drive info */
memset(&params->hd0_info, 0, sizeof(params->hd0_info));
memset(&params->hd1_info, 0, sizeof(params->hd1_info));
if (image->type == KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH) {
ret = crash_setup_memmap_entries(image, params);
if (ret)
return ret;
} else
setup_e820_entries(params);
nr_e820_entries = params->e820_entries;
for (i = 0; i < nr_e820_entries; i++) {
if (params->e820_table[i].type != E820_TYPE_RAM)
continue;
start = params->e820_table[i].addr;
end = params->e820_table[i].addr + params->e820_table[i].size - 1;
if ((start <= 0x100000) && end > 0x100000) {
mem_k = (end >> 10) - (0x100000 >> 10);
params->screen_info.ext_mem_k = mem_k;
params->alt_mem_k = mem_k;
if (mem_k > 0xfc00)
params->screen_info.ext_mem_k = 0xfc00; /* 64M*/
if (mem_k > 0xffffffff)
params->alt_mem_k = 0xffffffff;
}
}
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
/* Setup EFI state */
setup_efi_state(params, params_load_addr, efi_map_offset, efi_map_sz,
efi_setup_data_offset);
#endif
/* Setup EDD info */
memcpy(params->eddbuf, boot_params.eddbuf,
EDDMAXNR * sizeof(struct edd_info));
params->eddbuf_entries = boot_params.eddbuf_entries;
memcpy(params->edd_mbr_sig_buffer, boot_params.edd_mbr_sig_buffer,
EDD_MBR_SIG_MAX * sizeof(unsigned int));
return ret;
}
static int bzImage64_probe(const char *buf, unsigned long len)
{
int ret = -ENOEXEC;
struct setup_header *header;
/* kernel should be at least two sectors long */
if (len < 2 * 512) {
pr_err("File is too short to be a bzImage\n");
return ret;
}
header = (struct setup_header *)(buf + offsetof(struct boot_params, hdr));
if (memcmp((char *)&header->header, "HdrS", 4) != 0) {
pr_err("Not a bzImage\n");
return ret;
}
if (header->boot_flag != 0xAA55) {
pr_err("No x86 boot sector present\n");
return ret;
}
if (header->version < 0x020C) {
pr_err("Must be at least protocol version 2.12\n");
return ret;
}
if (!(header->loadflags & LOADED_HIGH)) {
pr_err("zImage not a bzImage\n");
return ret;
}
if (!(header->xloadflags & XLF_KERNEL_64)) {
pr_err("Not a bzImage64. XLF_KERNEL_64 is not set.\n");
return ret;
}
if (!(header->xloadflags & XLF_CAN_BE_LOADED_ABOVE_4G)) {
pr_err("XLF_CAN_BE_LOADED_ABOVE_4G is not set.\n");
return ret;
}
/*
* Can't handle 32bit EFI as it does not allow loading kernel
* above 4G. This should be handled by 32bit bzImage loader
*/
if (efi_enabled(EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES) && !efi_enabled(EFI_64BIT)) {
pr_debug("EFI is 32 bit. Can't load kernel above 4G.\n");
return ret;
}
/* I've got a bzImage */
pr_debug("It's a relocatable bzImage64\n");
ret = 0;
return ret;
}
static void *bzImage64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel,
unsigned long kernel_len, char *initrd,
unsigned long initrd_len, char *cmdline,
unsigned long cmdline_len)
{
struct setup_header *header;
int setup_sects, kern16_size, ret = 0;
unsigned long setup_header_size, params_cmdline_sz;
struct boot_params *params;
unsigned long bootparam_load_addr, kernel_load_addr, initrd_load_addr;
struct bzimage64_data *ldata;
struct kexec_entry64_regs regs64;
void *stack;
unsigned int setup_hdr_offset = offsetof(struct boot_params, hdr);
unsigned int efi_map_offset, efi_map_sz, efi_setup_data_offset;
struct kexec_buf kbuf = { .image = image, .buf_max = ULONG_MAX,
.top_down = true };
kernel/kexec_file.c: allow archs to set purgatory load address For s390 new kernels are loaded to fixed addresses in memory before they are booted. With the current code this is a problem as it assumes the kernel will be loaded to an 'arbitrary' address. In particular, kexec_locate_mem_hole searches for a large enough memory region and sets the load address (kexec_bufer->mem) to it. Luckily there is a simple workaround for this problem. By returning 1 in arch_kexec_walk_mem, kexec_locate_mem_hole is turned off. This allows the architecture to set kbuf->mem by hand. While the trick works fine for the kernel it does not for the purgatory as here the architectures don't have access to its kexec_buffer. Give architectures access to the purgatories kexec_buffer by changing kexec_load_purgatory to take a pointer to it. With this change architectures have access to the buffer and can edit it as they need. A nice side effect of this change is that we can get rid of the purgatory_info->purgatory_load_address field. As now the information stored there can directly be accessed from kbuf->mem. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180321112751.22196-11-prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Philipp Rudo <prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-14 06:36:43 +08:00
struct kexec_buf pbuf = { .image = image, .buf_min = MIN_PURGATORY_ADDR,
.buf_max = ULONG_MAX, .top_down = true };
header = (struct setup_header *)(kernel + setup_hdr_offset);
setup_sects = header->setup_sects;
if (setup_sects == 0)
setup_sects = 4;
kern16_size = (setup_sects + 1) * 512;
if (kernel_len < kern16_size) {
pr_err("bzImage truncated\n");
return ERR_PTR(-ENOEXEC);
}
if (cmdline_len > header->cmdline_size) {
pr_err("Kernel command line too long\n");
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
/*
* In case of crash dump, we will append elfcorehdr=<addr> to
* command line. Make sure it does not overflow
*/
if (cmdline_len + MAX_ELFCOREHDR_STR_LEN > header->cmdline_size) {
pr_debug("Appending elfcorehdr=<addr> to command line exceeds maximum allowed length\n");
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
/* Allocate and load backup region */
if (image->type == KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH) {
ret = crash_load_segments(image);
if (ret)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
/*
* Load purgatory. For 64bit entry point, purgatory code can be
* anywhere.
*/
kernel/kexec_file.c: allow archs to set purgatory load address For s390 new kernels are loaded to fixed addresses in memory before they are booted. With the current code this is a problem as it assumes the kernel will be loaded to an 'arbitrary' address. In particular, kexec_locate_mem_hole searches for a large enough memory region and sets the load address (kexec_bufer->mem) to it. Luckily there is a simple workaround for this problem. By returning 1 in arch_kexec_walk_mem, kexec_locate_mem_hole is turned off. This allows the architecture to set kbuf->mem by hand. While the trick works fine for the kernel it does not for the purgatory as here the architectures don't have access to its kexec_buffer. Give architectures access to the purgatories kexec_buffer by changing kexec_load_purgatory to take a pointer to it. With this change architectures have access to the buffer and can edit it as they need. A nice side effect of this change is that we can get rid of the purgatory_info->purgatory_load_address field. As now the information stored there can directly be accessed from kbuf->mem. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180321112751.22196-11-prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Philipp Rudo <prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-14 06:36:43 +08:00
ret = kexec_load_purgatory(image, &pbuf);
if (ret) {
pr_err("Loading purgatory failed\n");
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
kernel/kexec_file.c: allow archs to set purgatory load address For s390 new kernels are loaded to fixed addresses in memory before they are booted. With the current code this is a problem as it assumes the kernel will be loaded to an 'arbitrary' address. In particular, kexec_locate_mem_hole searches for a large enough memory region and sets the load address (kexec_bufer->mem) to it. Luckily there is a simple workaround for this problem. By returning 1 in arch_kexec_walk_mem, kexec_locate_mem_hole is turned off. This allows the architecture to set kbuf->mem by hand. While the trick works fine for the kernel it does not for the purgatory as here the architectures don't have access to its kexec_buffer. Give architectures access to the purgatories kexec_buffer by changing kexec_load_purgatory to take a pointer to it. With this change architectures have access to the buffer and can edit it as they need. A nice side effect of this change is that we can get rid of the purgatory_info->purgatory_load_address field. As now the information stored there can directly be accessed from kbuf->mem. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180321112751.22196-11-prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Philipp Rudo <prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Acked-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-14 06:36:43 +08:00
pr_debug("Loaded purgatory at 0x%lx\n", pbuf.mem);
/*
* Load Bootparams and cmdline and space for efi stuff.
*
* Allocate memory together for multiple data structures so
* that they all can go in single area/segment and we don't
* have to create separate segment for each. Keeps things
* little bit simple
*/
efi_map_sz = efi_get_runtime_map_size();
params_cmdline_sz = sizeof(struct boot_params) + cmdline_len +
MAX_ELFCOREHDR_STR_LEN;
params_cmdline_sz = ALIGN(params_cmdline_sz, 16);
kbuf.bufsz = params_cmdline_sz + ALIGN(efi_map_sz, 16) +
sizeof(struct setup_data) +
sizeof(struct efi_setup_data);
params = kzalloc(kbuf.bufsz, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!params)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
efi_map_offset = params_cmdline_sz;
efi_setup_data_offset = efi_map_offset + ALIGN(efi_map_sz, 16);
/* Copy setup header onto bootparams. Documentation/x86/boot.txt */
setup_header_size = 0x0202 + kernel[0x0201] - setup_hdr_offset;
/* Is there a limit on setup header size? */
memcpy(&params->hdr, (kernel + setup_hdr_offset), setup_header_size);
kbuf.buffer = params;
kbuf.memsz = kbuf.bufsz;
kbuf.buf_align = 16;
kbuf.buf_min = MIN_BOOTPARAM_ADDR;
ret = kexec_add_buffer(&kbuf);
if (ret)
goto out_free_params;
bootparam_load_addr = kbuf.mem;
pr_debug("Loaded boot_param, command line and misc at 0x%lx bufsz=0x%lx memsz=0x%lx\n",
bootparam_load_addr, kbuf.bufsz, kbuf.bufsz);
/* Load kernel */
kbuf.buffer = kernel + kern16_size;
kbuf.bufsz = kernel_len - kern16_size;
kbuf.memsz = PAGE_ALIGN(header->init_size);
kbuf.buf_align = header->kernel_alignment;
kbuf.buf_min = MIN_KERNEL_LOAD_ADDR;
kbuf.mem = KEXEC_BUF_MEM_UNKNOWN;
ret = kexec_add_buffer(&kbuf);
if (ret)
goto out_free_params;
kernel_load_addr = kbuf.mem;
pr_debug("Loaded 64bit kernel at 0x%lx bufsz=0x%lx memsz=0x%lx\n",
kernel_load_addr, kbuf.bufsz, kbuf.memsz);
/* Load initrd high */
if (initrd) {
kbuf.buffer = initrd;
kbuf.bufsz = kbuf.memsz = initrd_len;
kbuf.buf_align = PAGE_SIZE;
kbuf.buf_min = MIN_INITRD_LOAD_ADDR;
kbuf.mem = KEXEC_BUF_MEM_UNKNOWN;
ret = kexec_add_buffer(&kbuf);
if (ret)
goto out_free_params;
initrd_load_addr = kbuf.mem;
pr_debug("Loaded initrd at 0x%lx bufsz=0x%lx memsz=0x%lx\n",
initrd_load_addr, initrd_len, initrd_len);
setup_initrd(params, initrd_load_addr, initrd_len);
}
setup_cmdline(image, params, bootparam_load_addr,
sizeof(struct boot_params), cmdline, cmdline_len);
/* bootloader info. Do we need a separate ID for kexec kernel loader? */
params->hdr.type_of_loader = 0x0D << 4;
params->hdr.loadflags = 0;
/* Setup purgatory regs for entry */
ret = kexec_purgatory_get_set_symbol(image, "entry64_regs", &regs64,
sizeof(regs64), 1);
if (ret)
goto out_free_params;
regs64.rbx = 0; /* Bootstrap Processor */
regs64.rsi = bootparam_load_addr;
regs64.rip = kernel_load_addr + 0x200;
stack = kexec_purgatory_get_symbol_addr(image, "stack_end");
if (IS_ERR(stack)) {
pr_err("Could not find address of symbol stack_end\n");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_free_params;
}
regs64.rsp = (unsigned long)stack;
ret = kexec_purgatory_get_set_symbol(image, "entry64_regs", &regs64,
sizeof(regs64), 0);
if (ret)
goto out_free_params;
ret = setup_boot_parameters(image, params, bootparam_load_addr,
efi_map_offset, efi_map_sz,
efi_setup_data_offset);
if (ret)
goto out_free_params;
/* Allocate loader specific data */
ldata = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bzimage64_data), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ldata) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free_params;
}
/*
* Store pointer to params so that it could be freed after loading
* params segment has been loaded and contents have been copied
* somewhere else.
*/
ldata->bootparams_buf = params;
return ldata;
out_free_params:
kfree(params);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
/* This cleanup function is called after various segments have been loaded */
static int bzImage64_cleanup(void *loader_data)
{
struct bzimage64_data *ldata = loader_data;
if (!ldata)
return 0;
kfree(ldata->bootparams_buf);
ldata->bootparams_buf = NULL;
return 0;
}
kexec: verify the signature of signed PE bzImage This is the final piece of the puzzle of verifying kernel image signature during kexec_file_load() syscall. This patch calls into PE file routines to verify signature of bzImage. If signature are valid, kexec_file_load() succeeds otherwise it fails. Two new config options have been introduced. First one is CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. This option enforces that kernel has to be validly signed otherwise kernel load will fail. If this option is not set, no signature verification will be done. Only exception will be when secureboot is enabled. In that case signature verification should be automatically enforced when secureboot is enabled. But that will happen when secureboot patches are merged. Second config option is CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG. This option enables signature verification support on bzImage. If this option is not set and previous one is set, kernel image loading will fail because kernel does not have support to verify signature of bzImage. I tested these patches with both "pesign" and "sbsign" signed bzImages. I used signing_key.priv key and signing_key.x509 cert for signing as generated during kernel build process (if module signing is enabled). Used following method to sign bzImage. pesign ====== - Convert DER format cert to PEM format cert openssl x509 -in signing_key.x509 -inform DER -out signing_key.x509.PEM -outform PEM - Generate a .p12 file from existing cert and private key file openssl pkcs12 -export -out kernel-key.p12 -inkey signing_key.priv -in signing_key.x509.PEM - Import .p12 file into pesign db pk12util -i /tmp/kernel-key.p12 -d /etc/pki/pesign - Sign bzImage pesign -i /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+ -o /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+.signed.pesign -c "Glacier signing key - Magrathea" -s sbsign ====== sbsign --key signing_key.priv --cert signing_key.x509.PEM --output /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+.signed.sbsign /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+ Patch details: Well all the hard work is done in previous patches. Now bzImage loader has just call into that code and verify whether bzImage signature are valid or not. Also create two config options. First one is CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. This option enforces that kernel has to be validly signed otherwise kernel load will fail. If this option is not set, no signature verification will be done. Only exception will be when secureboot is enabled. In that case signature verification should be automatically enforced when secureboot is enabled. But that will happen when secureboot patches are merged. Second config option is CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG. This option enables signature verification support on bzImage. If this option is not set and previous one is set, kernel image loading will fail because kernel does not have support to verify signature of bzImage. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: WANG Chao <chaowang@redhat.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@console-pimps.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-08-09 05:26:13 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
static int bzImage64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
kexec: verify the signature of signed PE bzImage This is the final piece of the puzzle of verifying kernel image signature during kexec_file_load() syscall. This patch calls into PE file routines to verify signature of bzImage. If signature are valid, kexec_file_load() succeeds otherwise it fails. Two new config options have been introduced. First one is CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. This option enforces that kernel has to be validly signed otherwise kernel load will fail. If this option is not set, no signature verification will be done. Only exception will be when secureboot is enabled. In that case signature verification should be automatically enforced when secureboot is enabled. But that will happen when secureboot patches are merged. Second config option is CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG. This option enables signature verification support on bzImage. If this option is not set and previous one is set, kernel image loading will fail because kernel does not have support to verify signature of bzImage. I tested these patches with both "pesign" and "sbsign" signed bzImages. I used signing_key.priv key and signing_key.x509 cert for signing as generated during kernel build process (if module signing is enabled). Used following method to sign bzImage. pesign ====== - Convert DER format cert to PEM format cert openssl x509 -in signing_key.x509 -inform DER -out signing_key.x509.PEM -outform PEM - Generate a .p12 file from existing cert and private key file openssl pkcs12 -export -out kernel-key.p12 -inkey signing_key.priv -in signing_key.x509.PEM - Import .p12 file into pesign db pk12util -i /tmp/kernel-key.p12 -d /etc/pki/pesign - Sign bzImage pesign -i /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+ -o /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+.signed.pesign -c "Glacier signing key - Magrathea" -s sbsign ====== sbsign --key signing_key.priv --cert signing_key.x509.PEM --output /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+.signed.sbsign /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+ Patch details: Well all the hard work is done in previous patches. Now bzImage loader has just call into that code and verify whether bzImage signature are valid or not. Also create two config options. First one is CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. This option enforces that kernel has to be validly signed otherwise kernel load will fail. If this option is not set, no signature verification will be done. Only exception will be when secureboot is enabled. In that case signature verification should be automatically enforced when secureboot is enabled. But that will happen when secureboot patches are merged. Second config option is CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG. This option enables signature verification support on bzImage. If this option is not set and previous one is set, kernel image loading will fail because kernel does not have support to verify signature of bzImage. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: WANG Chao <chaowang@redhat.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@console-pimps.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-08-09 05:26:13 +08:00
{
int ret;
ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
if (ret == -ENOKEY && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING)) {
ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE);
}
return ret;
kexec: verify the signature of signed PE bzImage This is the final piece of the puzzle of verifying kernel image signature during kexec_file_load() syscall. This patch calls into PE file routines to verify signature of bzImage. If signature are valid, kexec_file_load() succeeds otherwise it fails. Two new config options have been introduced. First one is CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. This option enforces that kernel has to be validly signed otherwise kernel load will fail. If this option is not set, no signature verification will be done. Only exception will be when secureboot is enabled. In that case signature verification should be automatically enforced when secureboot is enabled. But that will happen when secureboot patches are merged. Second config option is CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG. This option enables signature verification support on bzImage. If this option is not set and previous one is set, kernel image loading will fail because kernel does not have support to verify signature of bzImage. I tested these patches with both "pesign" and "sbsign" signed bzImages. I used signing_key.priv key and signing_key.x509 cert for signing as generated during kernel build process (if module signing is enabled). Used following method to sign bzImage. pesign ====== - Convert DER format cert to PEM format cert openssl x509 -in signing_key.x509 -inform DER -out signing_key.x509.PEM -outform PEM - Generate a .p12 file from existing cert and private key file openssl pkcs12 -export -out kernel-key.p12 -inkey signing_key.priv -in signing_key.x509.PEM - Import .p12 file into pesign db pk12util -i /tmp/kernel-key.p12 -d /etc/pki/pesign - Sign bzImage pesign -i /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+ -o /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+.signed.pesign -c "Glacier signing key - Magrathea" -s sbsign ====== sbsign --key signing_key.priv --cert signing_key.x509.PEM --output /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+.signed.sbsign /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+ Patch details: Well all the hard work is done in previous patches. Now bzImage loader has just call into that code and verify whether bzImage signature are valid or not. Also create two config options. First one is CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. This option enforces that kernel has to be validly signed otherwise kernel load will fail. If this option is not set, no signature verification will be done. Only exception will be when secureboot is enabled. In that case signature verification should be automatically enforced when secureboot is enabled. But that will happen when secureboot patches are merged. Second config option is CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG. This option enables signature verification support on bzImage. If this option is not set and previous one is set, kernel image loading will fail because kernel does not have support to verify signature of bzImage. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: WANG Chao <chaowang@redhat.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@console-pimps.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-08-09 05:26:13 +08:00
}
#endif
const struct kexec_file_ops kexec_bzImage64_ops = {
.probe = bzImage64_probe,
.load = bzImage64_load,
.cleanup = bzImage64_cleanup,
kexec: verify the signature of signed PE bzImage This is the final piece of the puzzle of verifying kernel image signature during kexec_file_load() syscall. This patch calls into PE file routines to verify signature of bzImage. If signature are valid, kexec_file_load() succeeds otherwise it fails. Two new config options have been introduced. First one is CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. This option enforces that kernel has to be validly signed otherwise kernel load will fail. If this option is not set, no signature verification will be done. Only exception will be when secureboot is enabled. In that case signature verification should be automatically enforced when secureboot is enabled. But that will happen when secureboot patches are merged. Second config option is CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG. This option enables signature verification support on bzImage. If this option is not set and previous one is set, kernel image loading will fail because kernel does not have support to verify signature of bzImage. I tested these patches with both "pesign" and "sbsign" signed bzImages. I used signing_key.priv key and signing_key.x509 cert for signing as generated during kernel build process (if module signing is enabled). Used following method to sign bzImage. pesign ====== - Convert DER format cert to PEM format cert openssl x509 -in signing_key.x509 -inform DER -out signing_key.x509.PEM -outform PEM - Generate a .p12 file from existing cert and private key file openssl pkcs12 -export -out kernel-key.p12 -inkey signing_key.priv -in signing_key.x509.PEM - Import .p12 file into pesign db pk12util -i /tmp/kernel-key.p12 -d /etc/pki/pesign - Sign bzImage pesign -i /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+ -o /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+.signed.pesign -c "Glacier signing key - Magrathea" -s sbsign ====== sbsign --key signing_key.priv --cert signing_key.x509.PEM --output /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+.signed.sbsign /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+ Patch details: Well all the hard work is done in previous patches. Now bzImage loader has just call into that code and verify whether bzImage signature are valid or not. Also create two config options. First one is CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. This option enforces that kernel has to be validly signed otherwise kernel load will fail. If this option is not set, no signature verification will be done. Only exception will be when secureboot is enabled. In that case signature verification should be automatically enforced when secureboot is enabled. But that will happen when secureboot patches are merged. Second config option is CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG. This option enables signature verification support on bzImage. If this option is not set and previous one is set, kernel image loading will fail because kernel does not have support to verify signature of bzImage. Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: WANG Chao <chaowang@redhat.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@console-pimps.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-08-09 05:26:13 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG
.verify_sig = bzImage64_verify_sig,
#endif
};