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linux-next/fs/xfs/xfs_super.h

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000-2005 Silicon Graphics, Inc.
* All Rights Reserved.
*/
#ifndef __XFS_SUPER_H__
#define __XFS_SUPER_H__
#include <linux/exportfs.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_XFS_QUOTA
extern int xfs_qm_init(void);
extern void xfs_qm_exit(void);
# define XFS_QUOTA_STRING "quota, "
#else
# define xfs_qm_init() (0)
# define xfs_qm_exit() do { } while (0)
# define XFS_QUOTA_STRING
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_XFS_POSIX_ACL
# define XFS_ACL_STRING "ACLs, "
Rename superblock flags (MS_xyz -> SB_xyz) This is a pure automated search-and-replace of the internal kernel superblock flags. The s_flags are now called SB_*, with the names and the values for the moment mirroring the MS_* flags that they're equivalent to. Note how the MS_xyz flags are the ones passed to the mount system call, while the SB_xyz flags are what we then use in sb->s_flags. The script to do this was: # places to look in; re security/*: it generally should *not* be # touched (that stuff parses mount(2) arguments directly), but # there are two places where we really deal with superblock flags. FILES="drivers/mtd drivers/staging/lustre fs ipc mm \ include/linux/fs.h include/uapi/linux/bfs_fs.h \ security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c security/apparmor/include/lib.h" # the list of MS_... constants SYMS="RDONLY NOSUID NODEV NOEXEC SYNCHRONOUS REMOUNT MANDLOCK \ DIRSYNC NOATIME NODIRATIME BIND MOVE REC VERBOSE SILENT \ POSIXACL UNBINDABLE PRIVATE SLAVE SHARED RELATIME KERNMOUNT \ I_VERSION STRICTATIME LAZYTIME SUBMOUNT NOREMOTELOCK NOSEC BORN \ ACTIVE NOUSER" SED_PROG= for i in $SYMS; do SED_PROG="$SED_PROG -e s/MS_$i/SB_$i/g"; done # we want files that contain at least one of MS_..., # with fs/namespace.c and fs/pnode.c excluded. L=$(for i in $SYMS; do git grep -w -l MS_$i $FILES; done| sort|uniq|grep -v '^fs/namespace.c'|grep -v '^fs/pnode.c') for f in $L; do sed -i $f $SED_PROG; done Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-11-28 05:05:09 +08:00
# define set_posix_acl_flag(sb) ((sb)->s_flags |= SB_POSIXACL)
#else
# define XFS_ACL_STRING
# define set_posix_acl_flag(sb) do { } while (0)
#endif
#define XFS_SECURITY_STRING "security attributes, "
#ifdef CONFIG_XFS_RT
# define XFS_REALTIME_STRING "realtime, "
#else
# define XFS_REALTIME_STRING
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_XFS_ONLINE_SCRUB
# define XFS_SCRUB_STRING "scrub, "
#else
# define XFS_SCRUB_STRING
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_XFS_ONLINE_REPAIR
# define XFS_REPAIR_STRING "repair, "
#else
# define XFS_REPAIR_STRING
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_XFS_WARN
# define XFS_WARN_STRING "verbose warnings, "
#else
# define XFS_WARN_STRING
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_XFS_ASSERT_FATAL
# define XFS_ASSERT_FATAL_STRING "fatal assert, "
#else
# define XFS_ASSERT_FATAL_STRING
#endif
#ifdef DEBUG
# define XFS_DBG_STRING "debug"
#else
# define XFS_DBG_STRING "no debug"
#endif
#define XFS_VERSION_STRING "SGI XFS"
#define XFS_BUILD_OPTIONS XFS_ACL_STRING \
XFS_SECURITY_STRING \
XFS_REALTIME_STRING \
XFS_SCRUB_STRING \
XFS_REPAIR_STRING \
XFS_WARN_STRING \
XFS_QUOTA_STRING \
XFS_ASSERT_FATAL_STRING \
XFS_DBG_STRING /* DBG must be last */
struct xfs_inode;
struct xfs_mount;
struct xfs_buftarg;
struct block_device;
xfs: quiesce the filesystem after recovery on readonly mount Recently we've had a number of reports where log recovery on a v5 filesystem has reported corruptions that looked to be caused by recovery being re-run over the top of an already-recovered metadata. This has uncovered a bug in recovery (fixed elsewhere) but the vector that caused this was largely unknown. A kdump test started tripping over this problem - the system would be crashed, the kdump kernel and environment would boot and dump the kernel core image, and then the system would reboot. After reboot, the root filesystem was triggering log recovery and corruptions were being detected. The metadumps indicated the above log recovery issue. What is happening is that the kdump kernel and environment is mounting the root device read-only to find the binaries needed to do it's work. The result of this is that it is running log recovery. However, because there were unlinked files and EFIs to be processed by recovery, the completion of phase 1 of log recovery could not mark the log clean. And because it's a read-only mount, the unmount process does not write records to the log to mark it clean, either. Hence on the next mount of the filesystem, log recovery was run again across all the metadata that had already been recovered and this is what triggered corruption warnings. To avoid this problem, we need to ensure that a read-only mount always updates the log when it completes the second phase of recovery. We already handle this sort of issue with rw->ro remount transitions, so the solution is as simple as quiescing the filesystem at the appropriate time during the mount process. This results in the log being marked clean so the mount behaviour recorded in the logs on repeated RO mounts will change (i.e. log recovery will no longer be run on every mount until a RW mount is done). This is a user visible change in behaviour, but it is harmless. Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
2016-09-26 06:21:44 +08:00
extern void xfs_quiesce_attr(struct xfs_mount *mp);
xfs: xfs_sync_data is redundant. We don't do any data writeback from XFS any more - the VFS is completely responsible for that, including for freeze. We can replace the remaining caller with a VFS level function that achieves the same thing, but without conflicting with current writeback work. This means we can remove the flush_work and xfs_flush_inodes() - the VFS functionality completely replaces the internal flush queue for doing this writeback work in a separate context to avoid stack overruns. This does have one complication - it cannot be called with page locks held. Hence move the flushing of delalloc space when ENOSPC occurs back up into xfs_file_aio_buffered_write when we don't hold any locks that will stall writeback. Unfortunately, writeback_inodes_sb_if_idle() is not sufficient to trigger delalloc conversion fast enough to prevent spurious ENOSPC whent here are hundreds of writers, thousands of small files and GBs of free RAM. Hence we need to use sync_sb_inodes() to block callers while we wait for writeback like the previous xfs_flush_inodes implementation did. That means we have to hold the s_umount lock here, but because this call can nest inside i_mutex (the parent directory in the create case, held by the VFS), we have to use down_read_trylock() to avoid potential deadlocks. In practice, this trylock will succeed on almost every attempt as unmount/remount type operations are exceedingly rare. Note: we always need to pass a count of zero to generic_file_buffered_write() as the previously written byte count. We only do this by accident before this patch by the virtue of ret always being zero when there are no errors. Make this explicit rather than needing to specifically zero ret in the ENOSPC retry case. Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Tested-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
2012-10-08 18:56:04 +08:00
extern void xfs_flush_inodes(struct xfs_mount *mp);
extern void xfs_blkdev_issue_flush(struct xfs_buftarg *);
extern xfs_agnumber_t xfs_set_inode_alloc(struct xfs_mount *,
xfs_agnumber_t agcount);
extern const struct export_operations xfs_export_operations;
extern const struct xattr_handler *xfs_xattr_handlers[];
extern const struct quotactl_ops xfs_quotactl_operations;
extern void xfs_reinit_percpu_counters(struct xfs_mount *mp);
extern struct workqueue_struct *xfs_discard_wq;
#define XFS_M(sb) ((struct xfs_mount *)((sb)->s_fs_info))
#endif /* __XFS_SUPER_H__ */