2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
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/*
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* fs/cifs/sess.c
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*
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* SMB/CIFS session setup handling routines
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*
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2009-05-01 01:45:10 +08:00
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* Copyright (c) International Business Machines Corp., 2006, 2009
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2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
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* Author(s): Steve French (sfrench@us.ibm.com)
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*
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* This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published
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* by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or
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* (at your option) any later version.
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*
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* This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See
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* the GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
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* along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
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* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
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*/
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#include "cifspdu.h"
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#include "cifsglob.h"
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#include "cifsproto.h"
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#include "cifs_unicode.h"
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#include "cifs_debug.h"
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#include "ntlmssp.h"
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#include "nterr.h"
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2006-06-01 13:09:10 +08:00
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#include <linux/utsname.h>
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include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.
percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.
http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py
The script does the followings.
* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.
* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
doesn't seem to be any matching order.
* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
file.
The conversion was done in the following steps.
1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
files.
2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
inclusions to around 150 files.
3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.
4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.
5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
necessary.
6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.
7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).
* x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
* powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
* sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
* ia64 SMP allmodconfig
* s390 SMP allmodconfig
* alpha SMP allmodconfig
* um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig
8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
a separate patch and serve as bisection point.
Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 16:04:11 +08:00
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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2007-11-17 07:37:35 +08:00
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#include "cifs_spnego.h"
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2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
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2011-05-27 12:34:02 +08:00
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static __u32 cifs_ssetup_hdr(struct cifs_ses *ses, SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *pSMB)
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2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
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{
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__u32 capabilities = 0;
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/* init fields common to all four types of SessSetup */
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[CIFS] Fix multiuser mounts so server does not invalidate earlier security contexts
When two different users mount the same Windows 2003 Server share using CIFS,
the first session mounted can be invalidated. Some servers invalidate the first
smb session when a second similar user (e.g. two users who get mapped by server to "guest")
authenticates an smb session from the same client.
By making sure that we set the 2nd and subsequent vc numbers to nonzero values,
this ensures that we will not have this problem.
Fixes Samba bug 6004, problem description follows:
How to reproduce:
- configure an "open share" (full permissions to Guest user) on Windows 2003
Server (I couldn't reproduce the problem with Samba server or Windows older
than 2003)
- mount the share twice with different users who will be authenticated as guest.
noacl,noperm,user=john,dir_mode=0700,domain=DOMAIN,rw
noacl,noperm,user=jeff,dir_mode=0700,domain=DOMAIN,rw
Result:
- just the mount point mounted last is accessible:
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2009-02-20 13:43:09 +08:00
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/* Note that offsets for first seven fields in req struct are same */
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/* in CIFS Specs so does not matter which of 3 forms of struct */
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/* that we use in next few lines */
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/* Note that header is initialized to zero in header_assemble */
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2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
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pSMB->req.AndXCommand = 0xFF;
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2011-10-11 18:41:32 +08:00
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pSMB->req.MaxBufferSize = cpu_to_le16(min_t(u32,
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CIFSMaxBufSize + MAX_CIFS_HDR_SIZE - 4,
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USHRT_MAX));
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2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
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pSMB->req.MaxMpxCount = cpu_to_le16(ses->server->maxReq);
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2014-12-11 07:41:15 +08:00
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pSMB->req.VcNumber = cpu_to_le16(1);
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2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
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/* Now no need to set SMBFLG_CASELESS or obsolete CANONICAL PATH */
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2007-07-08 03:25:05 +08:00
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/* BB verify whether signing required on neg or just on auth frame
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2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
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(and NTLM case) */
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capabilities = CAP_LARGE_FILES | CAP_NT_SMBS | CAP_LEVEL_II_OPLOCKS |
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CAP_LARGE_WRITE_X | CAP_LARGE_READ_X;
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2013-05-26 19:01:00 +08:00
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if (ses->server->sign)
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2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
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pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE;
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if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNICODE) {
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pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_UNICODE;
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capabilities |= CAP_UNICODE;
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}
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if (ses->capabilities & CAP_STATUS32) {
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pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_ERR_STATUS;
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capabilities |= CAP_STATUS32;
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}
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if (ses->capabilities & CAP_DFS) {
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pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_DFS;
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capabilities |= CAP_DFS;
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}
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2007-08-31 06:09:15 +08:00
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if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNIX)
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2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
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capabilities |= CAP_UNIX;
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return capabilities;
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}
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2007-10-17 01:32:19 +08:00
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static void
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unicode_oslm_strings(char **pbcc_area, const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
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{
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char *bcc_ptr = *pbcc_area;
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int bytes_ret = 0;
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/* Copy OS version */
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2012-01-19 12:32:33 +08:00
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bytes_ret = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)bcc_ptr, "Linux version ", 32,
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nls_cp);
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2007-10-17 01:32:19 +08:00
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bcc_ptr += 2 * bytes_ret;
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2012-01-19 12:32:33 +08:00
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bytes_ret = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *) bcc_ptr, init_utsname()->release,
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32, nls_cp);
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2007-10-17 01:32:19 +08:00
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bcc_ptr += 2 * bytes_ret;
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bcc_ptr += 2; /* trailing null */
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2012-01-19 12:32:33 +08:00
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bytes_ret = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *) bcc_ptr, CIFS_NETWORK_OPSYS,
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32, nls_cp);
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2007-10-17 01:32:19 +08:00
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bcc_ptr += 2 * bytes_ret;
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bcc_ptr += 2; /* trailing null */
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*pbcc_area = bcc_ptr;
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}
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2011-05-27 12:34:02 +08:00
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static void unicode_domain_string(char **pbcc_area, struct cifs_ses *ses,
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2007-10-17 01:32:19 +08:00
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const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
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{
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char *bcc_ptr = *pbcc_area;
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int bytes_ret = 0;
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/* copy domain */
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if (ses->domainName == NULL) {
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/* Sending null domain better than using a bogus domain name (as
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we did briefly in 2.6.18) since server will use its default */
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*bcc_ptr = 0;
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*(bcc_ptr+1) = 0;
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bytes_ret = 0;
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} else
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2012-01-19 12:32:33 +08:00
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bytes_ret = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *) bcc_ptr, ses->domainName,
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2013-07-19 09:01:36 +08:00
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CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN, nls_cp);
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2007-10-17 01:32:19 +08:00
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bcc_ptr += 2 * bytes_ret;
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bcc_ptr += 2; /* account for null terminator */
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*pbcc_area = bcc_ptr;
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}
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2011-05-27 12:34:02 +08:00
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static void unicode_ssetup_strings(char **pbcc_area, struct cifs_ses *ses,
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2007-07-08 03:25:05 +08:00
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const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
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2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
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{
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2007-07-08 03:25:05 +08:00
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char *bcc_ptr = *pbcc_area;
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2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
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int bytes_ret = 0;
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/* BB FIXME add check that strings total less
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than 335 or will need to send them as arrays */
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2006-06-28 03:50:57 +08:00
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/* unicode strings, must be word aligned before the call */
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/* if ((long) bcc_ptr % 2) {
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2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
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*bcc_ptr = 0;
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bcc_ptr++;
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2006-06-28 03:50:57 +08:00
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} */
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2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
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/* copy user */
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2011-02-25 15:11:56 +08:00
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if (ses->user_name == NULL) {
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2006-11-09 07:10:46 +08:00
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/* null user mount */
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*bcc_ptr = 0;
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*(bcc_ptr+1) = 0;
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2010-02-06 15:08:53 +08:00
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} else {
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2012-01-19 12:32:33 +08:00
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bytes_ret = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *) bcc_ptr, ses->user_name,
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2013-08-09 20:47:17 +08:00
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CIFS_MAX_USERNAME_LEN, nls_cp);
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2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
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}
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bcc_ptr += 2 * bytes_ret;
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bcc_ptr += 2; /* account for null termination */
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2007-10-17 01:32:19 +08:00
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unicode_domain_string(&bcc_ptr, ses, nls_cp);
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unicode_oslm_strings(&bcc_ptr, nls_cp);
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2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
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*pbcc_area = bcc_ptr;
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}
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2011-05-27 12:34:02 +08:00
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static void ascii_ssetup_strings(char **pbcc_area, struct cifs_ses *ses,
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2007-07-08 03:25:05 +08:00
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const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
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2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
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{
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2007-07-08 03:25:05 +08:00
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char *bcc_ptr = *pbcc_area;
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2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
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/* copy user */
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/* BB what about null user mounts - check that we do this BB */
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2007-07-08 03:25:05 +08:00
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/* copy user */
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2012-02-03 05:28:28 +08:00
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if (ses->user_name != NULL) {
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2013-08-09 20:47:17 +08:00
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strncpy(bcc_ptr, ses->user_name, CIFS_MAX_USERNAME_LEN);
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bcc_ptr += strnlen(ses->user_name, CIFS_MAX_USERNAME_LEN);
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2012-02-03 05:28:28 +08:00
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}
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2011-02-25 15:11:56 +08:00
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/* else null user mount */
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2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
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*bcc_ptr = 0;
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2007-07-08 03:25:05 +08:00
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bcc_ptr++; /* account for null termination */
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2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
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2007-07-08 03:25:05 +08:00
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/* copy domain */
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if (ses->domainName != NULL) {
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2013-07-19 09:01:36 +08:00
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strncpy(bcc_ptr, ses->domainName, CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN);
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bcc_ptr += strnlen(ses->domainName, CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN);
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2007-07-08 03:25:05 +08:00
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} /* else we will send a null domain name
|
2006-11-09 07:10:46 +08:00
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so the server will default to its own domain */
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2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
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*bcc_ptr = 0;
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bcc_ptr++;
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/* BB check for overflow here */
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strcpy(bcc_ptr, "Linux version ");
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bcc_ptr += strlen("Linux version ");
|
2006-10-02 17:18:13 +08:00
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strcpy(bcc_ptr, init_utsname()->release);
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bcc_ptr += strlen(init_utsname()->release) + 1;
|
2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
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strcpy(bcc_ptr, CIFS_NETWORK_OPSYS);
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bcc_ptr += strlen(CIFS_NETWORK_OPSYS) + 1;
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|
2007-07-08 03:25:05 +08:00
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*pbcc_area = bcc_ptr;
|
2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
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}
|
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|
2009-04-30 19:16:21 +08:00
|
|
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static void
|
2011-05-27 12:34:02 +08:00
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decode_unicode_ssetup(char **pbcc_area, int bleft, struct cifs_ses *ses,
|
2009-04-30 19:16:21 +08:00
|
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const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
|
2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
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{
|
2009-04-30 19:16:21 +08:00
|
|
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int len;
|
2007-07-08 03:25:05 +08:00
|
|
|
char *data = *pbcc_area;
|
2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
|
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|
|
2013-05-05 11:12:25 +08:00
|
|
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cifs_dbg(FYI, "bleft %d\n", bleft);
|
2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
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|
2007-08-31 06:09:15 +08:00
|
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kfree(ses->serverOS);
|
2012-01-19 12:32:33 +08:00
|
|
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ses->serverOS = cifs_strndup_from_utf16(data, bleft, true, nls_cp);
|
2013-05-05 11:12:25 +08:00
|
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cifs_dbg(FYI, "serverOS=%s\n", ses->serverOS);
|
2009-04-30 19:16:21 +08:00
|
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len = (UniStrnlen((wchar_t *) data, bleft / 2) * 2) + 2;
|
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data += len;
|
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bleft -= len;
|
|
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|
if (bleft <= 0)
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return;
|
2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
|
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|
2007-08-31 06:09:15 +08:00
|
|
|
kfree(ses->serverNOS);
|
2012-01-19 12:32:33 +08:00
|
|
|
ses->serverNOS = cifs_strndup_from_utf16(data, bleft, true, nls_cp);
|
2013-05-05 11:12:25 +08:00
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(FYI, "serverNOS=%s\n", ses->serverNOS);
|
2009-04-30 19:16:21 +08:00
|
|
|
len = (UniStrnlen((wchar_t *) data, bleft / 2) * 2) + 2;
|
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|
|
data += len;
|
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|
bleft -= len;
|
|
|
|
if (bleft <= 0)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
2007-07-08 03:25:05 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2007-08-31 06:09:15 +08:00
|
|
|
kfree(ses->serverDomain);
|
2012-01-19 12:32:33 +08:00
|
|
|
ses->serverDomain = cifs_strndup_from_utf16(data, bleft, true, nls_cp);
|
2013-05-05 11:12:25 +08:00
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(FYI, "serverDomain=%s\n", ses->serverDomain);
|
2007-07-08 03:25:05 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2009-04-30 19:16:21 +08:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-05-24 19:41:00 +08:00
|
|
|
static void decode_ascii_ssetup(char **pbcc_area, __u16 bleft,
|
|
|
|
struct cifs_ses *ses,
|
|
|
|
const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
|
2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int len;
|
2007-07-08 03:25:05 +08:00
|
|
|
char *bcc_ptr = *pbcc_area;
|
2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2013-05-05 11:12:25 +08:00
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(FYI, "decode sessetup ascii. bleft %d\n", bleft);
|
2007-07-13 08:33:32 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
|
|
|
len = strnlen(bcc_ptr, bleft);
|
2007-07-08 03:25:05 +08:00
|
|
|
if (len >= bleft)
|
2013-05-24 19:41:00 +08:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2007-07-13 08:33:32 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2007-08-31 06:09:15 +08:00
|
|
|
kfree(ses->serverOS);
|
2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ses->serverOS = kzalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
|
2014-08-20 18:39:28 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ses->serverOS) {
|
2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
|
|
|
strncpy(ses->serverOS, bcc_ptr, len);
|
2014-08-20 18:39:28 +08:00
|
|
|
if (strncmp(ses->serverOS, "OS/2", 4) == 0)
|
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(FYI, "OS/2 server\n");
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bcc_ptr += len + 1;
|
|
|
|
bleft -= len + 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
len = strnlen(bcc_ptr, bleft);
|
2007-07-08 03:25:05 +08:00
|
|
|
if (len >= bleft)
|
2013-05-24 19:41:00 +08:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2007-08-31 06:09:15 +08:00
|
|
|
kfree(ses->serverNOS);
|
2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ses->serverNOS = kzalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
|
2007-07-08 03:25:05 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ses->serverNOS)
|
2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
|
|
|
strncpy(ses->serverNOS, bcc_ptr, len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bcc_ptr += len + 1;
|
|
|
|
bleft -= len + 1;
|
|
|
|
|
2007-07-08 03:25:05 +08:00
|
|
|
len = strnlen(bcc_ptr, bleft);
|
|
|
|
if (len > bleft)
|
2013-05-24 19:41:00 +08:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2006-09-30 12:13:17 +08:00
|
|
|
/* No domain field in LANMAN case. Domain is
|
|
|
|
returned by old servers in the SMB negprot response */
|
|
|
|
/* BB For newer servers which do not support Unicode,
|
|
|
|
but thus do return domain here we could add parsing
|
|
|
|
for it later, but it is not very important */
|
2013-05-05 11:12:25 +08:00
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(FYI, "ascii: bytes left %d\n", bleft);
|
2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-12-27 20:22:00 +08:00
|
|
|
int decode_ntlmssp_challenge(char *bcc_ptr, int blob_len,
|
2011-05-27 12:34:02 +08:00
|
|
|
struct cifs_ses *ses)
|
2009-05-04 16:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code
Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of
ntlmv2 authentication.
Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs.
So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic.
For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in
challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can
vary.
Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used
as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server
has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for
authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract
(netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate
ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair
blob.
Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents
of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication.
So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp),
there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets
used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent.
Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined.
To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob.
For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from
the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved,
if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String
as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations.
For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob.
The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error,
this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response)
and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed.
The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer,
5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large
enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible
10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user,
workstation names etc.
Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it,
over the other security mechanisms.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 11:02:18 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned int tioffset; /* challenge message target info area */
|
|
|
|
unsigned int tilen; /* challenge message target info area length */
|
|
|
|
|
2009-05-04 16:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
CHALLENGE_MESSAGE *pblob = (CHALLENGE_MESSAGE *)bcc_ptr;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (blob_len < sizeof(CHALLENGE_MESSAGE)) {
|
2013-05-05 11:12:25 +08:00
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "challenge blob len %d too small\n", blob_len);
|
2009-05-04 16:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (memcmp(pblob->Signature, "NTLMSSP", 8)) {
|
2013-05-05 11:12:25 +08:00
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "blob signature incorrect %s\n",
|
|
|
|
pblob->Signature);
|
2009-05-04 16:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pblob->MessageType != NtLmChallenge) {
|
2013-05-05 11:12:25 +08:00
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Incorrect message type %d\n",
|
|
|
|
pblob->MessageType);
|
2009-05-04 16:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-10-28 22:53:07 +08:00
|
|
|
memcpy(ses->ntlmssp->cryptkey, pblob->Challenge, CIFS_CRYPTO_KEY_SIZE);
|
2009-05-04 16:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
/* BB we could decode pblob->NegotiateFlags; some may be useful */
|
|
|
|
/* In particular we can examine sign flags */
|
|
|
|
/* BB spec says that if AvId field of MsvAvTimestamp is populated then
|
|
|
|
we must set the MIC field of the AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE */
|
2010-10-28 22:53:07 +08:00
|
|
|
ses->ntlmssp->server_flags = le32_to_cpu(pblob->NegotiateFlags);
|
2011-03-13 13:08:25 +08:00
|
|
|
tioffset = le32_to_cpu(pblob->TargetInfoArray.BufferOffset);
|
|
|
|
tilen = le16_to_cpu(pblob->TargetInfoArray.Length);
|
2012-01-31 16:52:01 +08:00
|
|
|
if (tioffset > blob_len || tioffset + tilen > blob_len) {
|
2013-05-05 11:12:25 +08:00
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "tioffset + tilen too high %u + %u",
|
|
|
|
tioffset, tilen);
|
2012-01-31 16:52:01 +08:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2010-10-28 22:53:07 +08:00
|
|
|
if (tilen) {
|
2013-03-12 00:22:32 +08:00
|
|
|
ses->auth_key.response = kmemdup(bcc_ptr + tioffset, tilen,
|
|
|
|
GFP_KERNEL);
|
2010-10-28 22:53:07 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!ses->auth_key.response) {
|
2013-05-05 11:12:25 +08:00
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Challenge target info alloc failure");
|
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code
Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of
ntlmv2 authentication.
Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs.
So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic.
For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in
challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can
vary.
Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used
as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server
has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for
authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract
(netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate
ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair
blob.
Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents
of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication.
So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp),
there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets
used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent.
Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined.
To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob.
For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from
the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved,
if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String
as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations.
For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob.
The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error,
this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response)
and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed.
The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer,
5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large
enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible
10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user,
workstation names etc.
Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it,
over the other security mechanisms.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 11:02:18 +08:00
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2010-10-28 22:53:07 +08:00
|
|
|
ses->auth_key.len = tilen;
|
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code
Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of
ntlmv2 authentication.
Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs.
So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic.
For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in
challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can
vary.
Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used
as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server
has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for
authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract
(netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate
ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair
blob.
Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents
of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication.
So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp),
there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets
used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent.
Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined.
To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob.
For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from
the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved,
if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String
as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations.
For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob.
The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error,
this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response)
and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed.
The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer,
5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large
enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible
10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user,
workstation names etc.
Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it,
over the other security mechanisms.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 11:02:18 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-05-04 16:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* BB Move to ntlmssp.c eventually */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We do not malloc the blob, it is passed in pbuffer, because
|
|
|
|
it is fixed size, and small, making this approach cleaner */
|
2011-12-27 20:22:00 +08:00
|
|
|
void build_ntlmssp_negotiate_blob(unsigned char *pbuffer,
|
2011-05-27 12:34:02 +08:00
|
|
|
struct cifs_ses *ses)
|
2009-05-04 16:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE *sec_blob = (NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE *)pbuffer;
|
|
|
|
__u32 flags;
|
|
|
|
|
2010-12-12 04:19:22 +08:00
|
|
|
memset(pbuffer, 0, sizeof(NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE));
|
2009-05-04 16:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
memcpy(sec_blob->Signature, NTLMSSP_SIGNATURE, 8);
|
|
|
|
sec_blob->MessageType = NtLmNegotiate;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* BB is NTLMV2 session security format easier to use here? */
|
|
|
|
flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 | NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET |
|
|
|
|
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE |
|
2016-11-08 10:20:50 +08:00
|
|
|
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC |
|
|
|
|
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL;
|
|
|
|
if (ses->server->sign)
|
2010-09-09 05:09:27 +08:00
|
|
|
flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
|
2016-11-08 10:20:50 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!ses->server->session_estab || ses->ntlmssp->sesskey_per_smbsess)
|
|
|
|
flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH;
|
2009-05-04 16:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2010-12-12 04:19:22 +08:00
|
|
|
sec_blob->NegotiateFlags = cpu_to_le32(flags);
|
2009-05-04 16:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sec_blob->WorkstationName.BufferOffset = 0;
|
|
|
|
sec_blob->WorkstationName.Length = 0;
|
|
|
|
sec_blob->WorkstationName.MaximumLength = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Domain name is sent on the Challenge not Negotiate NTLMSSP request */
|
|
|
|
sec_blob->DomainName.BufferOffset = 0;
|
|
|
|
sec_blob->DomainName.Length = 0;
|
|
|
|
sec_blob->DomainName.MaximumLength = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-05-26 17:52:25 +08:00
|
|
|
static int size_of_ntlmssp_blob(struct cifs_ses *ses)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int sz = sizeof(AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE) + ses->auth_key.len
|
|
|
|
- CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE + CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE + 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ses->domainName)
|
|
|
|
sz += 2 * strnlen(ses->domainName, CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
sz += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ses->user_name)
|
|
|
|
sz += 2 * strnlen(ses->user_name, CIFS_MAX_USERNAME_LEN);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
sz += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return sz;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int build_ntlmssp_auth_blob(unsigned char **pbuffer,
|
2010-10-20 00:47:52 +08:00
|
|
|
u16 *buflen,
|
2011-05-27 12:34:02 +08:00
|
|
|
struct cifs_ses *ses,
|
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code
Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of
ntlmv2 authentication.
Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs.
So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic.
For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in
challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can
vary.
Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used
as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server
has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for
authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract
(netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate
ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair
blob.
Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents
of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication.
So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp),
there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets
used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent.
Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined.
To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob.
For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from
the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved,
if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String
as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations.
For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob.
The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error,
this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response)
and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed.
The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer,
5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large
enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible
10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user,
workstation names etc.
Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it,
over the other security mechanisms.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 11:02:18 +08:00
|
|
|
const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
|
2009-05-04 16:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code
Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of
ntlmv2 authentication.
Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs.
So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic.
For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in
challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can
vary.
Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used
as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server
has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for
authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract
(netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate
ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair
blob.
Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents
of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication.
So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp),
there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets
used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent.
Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined.
To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob.
For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from
the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved,
if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String
as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations.
For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob.
The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error,
this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response)
and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed.
The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer,
5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large
enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible
10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user,
workstation names etc.
Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it,
over the other security mechanisms.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 11:02:18 +08:00
|
|
|
int rc;
|
2016-05-26 17:52:25 +08:00
|
|
|
AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE *sec_blob;
|
2009-05-04 16:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
__u32 flags;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *tmp;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-05-26 17:52:25 +08:00
|
|
|
rc = setup_ntlmv2_rsp(ses, nls_cp);
|
|
|
|
if (rc) {
|
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Error %d during NTLMSSP authentication\n", rc);
|
|
|
|
*buflen = 0;
|
|
|
|
goto setup_ntlmv2_ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*pbuffer = kmalloc(size_of_ntlmssp_blob(ses), GFP_KERNEL);
|
2018-08-23 18:24:02 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!*pbuffer) {
|
|
|
|
rc = -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Error %d during NTLMSSP allocation\n", rc);
|
|
|
|
*buflen = 0;
|
|
|
|
goto setup_ntlmv2_ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-05-26 17:52:25 +08:00
|
|
|
sec_blob = (AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE *)*pbuffer;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-05-04 16:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
memcpy(sec_blob->Signature, NTLMSSP_SIGNATURE, 8);
|
|
|
|
sec_blob->MessageType = NtLmAuthenticate;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
flags = NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_56 |
|
|
|
|
NTLMSSP_REQUEST_TARGET | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO |
|
|
|
|
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_128 | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE |
|
2016-11-08 10:20:50 +08:00
|
|
|
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM | NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC |
|
|
|
|
NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL;
|
|
|
|
if (ses->server->sign)
|
2009-05-04 16:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN;
|
2016-11-08 10:20:50 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!ses->server->session_estab || ses->ntlmssp->sesskey_per_smbsess)
|
|
|
|
flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH;
|
2009-05-04 16:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2016-05-26 17:52:25 +08:00
|
|
|
tmp = *pbuffer + sizeof(AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE);
|
2010-12-12 04:19:22 +08:00
|
|
|
sec_blob->NegotiateFlags = cpu_to_le32(flags);
|
2009-05-04 16:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.BufferOffset =
|
|
|
|
cpu_to_le32(sizeof(AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE));
|
|
|
|
sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.Length = 0;
|
|
|
|
sec_blob->LmChallengeResponse.MaximumLength = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-05-26 17:52:25 +08:00
|
|
|
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.BufferOffset =
|
|
|
|
cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
|
2016-05-03 16:52:30 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ses->user_name != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
memcpy(tmp, ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
tmp += ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.Length =
|
|
|
|
cpu_to_le16(ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.MaximumLength =
|
|
|
|
cpu_to_le16(ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* don't send an NT Response for anonymous access
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.Length = 0;
|
|
|
|
sec_blob->NtChallengeResponse.MaximumLength = 0;
|
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code
Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of
ntlmv2 authentication.
Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs.
So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic.
For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in
challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can
vary.
Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used
as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server
has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for
authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract
(netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate
ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair
blob.
Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents
of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication.
So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp),
there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets
used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent.
Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined.
To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob.
For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from
the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved,
if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String
as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations.
For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob.
The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error,
this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response)
and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed.
The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer,
5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large
enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible
10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user,
workstation names etc.
Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it,
over the other security mechanisms.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 11:02:18 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-05-04 16:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ses->domainName == NULL) {
|
2016-05-26 17:52:25 +08:00
|
|
|
sec_blob->DomainName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
|
2009-05-04 16:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
sec_blob->DomainName.Length = 0;
|
|
|
|
sec_blob->DomainName.MaximumLength = 0;
|
|
|
|
tmp += 2;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
int len;
|
2012-01-19 12:32:33 +08:00
|
|
|
len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)tmp, ses->domainName,
|
2016-05-26 17:52:24 +08:00
|
|
|
CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN, nls_cp);
|
2009-05-04 16:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
len *= 2; /* unicode is 2 bytes each */
|
2016-05-26 17:52:25 +08:00
|
|
|
sec_blob->DomainName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
|
2009-05-04 16:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
sec_blob->DomainName.Length = cpu_to_le16(len);
|
|
|
|
sec_blob->DomainName.MaximumLength = cpu_to_le16(len);
|
|
|
|
tmp += len;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-02-25 15:11:56 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ses->user_name == NULL) {
|
2016-05-26 17:52:25 +08:00
|
|
|
sec_blob->UserName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
|
2009-05-04 16:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
sec_blob->UserName.Length = 0;
|
|
|
|
sec_blob->UserName.MaximumLength = 0;
|
|
|
|
tmp += 2;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
int len;
|
2012-01-19 12:32:33 +08:00
|
|
|
len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)tmp, ses->user_name,
|
2013-08-09 20:47:17 +08:00
|
|
|
CIFS_MAX_USERNAME_LEN, nls_cp);
|
2009-05-04 16:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
len *= 2; /* unicode is 2 bytes each */
|
2016-05-26 17:52:25 +08:00
|
|
|
sec_blob->UserName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
|
2009-05-04 16:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
sec_blob->UserName.Length = cpu_to_le16(len);
|
|
|
|
sec_blob->UserName.MaximumLength = cpu_to_le16(len);
|
|
|
|
tmp += len;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-05-26 17:52:25 +08:00
|
|
|
sec_blob->WorkstationName.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
|
2009-05-04 16:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
sec_blob->WorkstationName.Length = 0;
|
|
|
|
sec_blob->WorkstationName.MaximumLength = 0;
|
|
|
|
tmp += 2;
|
|
|
|
|
2010-12-12 04:19:22 +08:00
|
|
|
if (((ses->ntlmssp->server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_XCH) ||
|
|
|
|
(ses->ntlmssp->server_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_EXTENDED_SEC))
|
|
|
|
&& !calc_seckey(ses)) {
|
2010-10-28 22:53:07 +08:00
|
|
|
memcpy(tmp, ses->ntlmssp->ciphertext, CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
|
2016-05-26 17:52:25 +08:00
|
|
|
sec_blob->SessionKey.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
|
2010-10-22 03:25:08 +08:00
|
|
|
sec_blob->SessionKey.Length = cpu_to_le16(CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
sec_blob->SessionKey.MaximumLength =
|
|
|
|
cpu_to_le16(CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
tmp += CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2016-05-26 17:52:25 +08:00
|
|
|
sec_blob->SessionKey.BufferOffset = cpu_to_le32(tmp - *pbuffer);
|
2010-10-22 03:25:08 +08:00
|
|
|
sec_blob->SessionKey.Length = 0;
|
|
|
|
sec_blob->SessionKey.MaximumLength = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code
Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of
ntlmv2 authentication.
Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs.
So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic.
For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in
challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can
vary.
Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used
as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server
has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for
authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract
(netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate
ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair
blob.
Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents
of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication.
So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp),
there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets
used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent.
Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined.
To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob.
For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from
the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved,
if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String
as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations.
For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob.
The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error,
this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response)
and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed.
The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer,
5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large
enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible
10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user,
workstation names etc.
Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it,
over the other security mechanisms.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 11:02:18 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2016-05-26 17:52:25 +08:00
|
|
|
*buflen = tmp - *pbuffer;
|
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code
Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of
ntlmv2 authentication.
Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs.
So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic.
For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in
challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can
vary.
Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used
as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server
has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for
authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract
(netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate
ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair
blob.
Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents
of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication.
So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp),
there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets
used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent.
Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined.
To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob.
For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from
the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved,
if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String
as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations.
For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob.
The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error,
this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response)
and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed.
The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer,
5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large
enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible
10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user,
workstation names etc.
Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it,
over the other security mechanisms.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 11:02:18 +08:00
|
|
|
setup_ntlmv2_ret:
|
2010-10-20 00:47:52 +08:00
|
|
|
return rc;
|
2009-05-04 16:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-06-13 08:52:14 +08:00
|
|
|
enum securityEnum
|
2017-01-18 18:05:57 +08:00
|
|
|
cifs_select_sectype(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, enum securityEnum requested)
|
2013-06-13 08:52:14 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
switch (server->negflavor) {
|
|
|
|
case CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_EXTENDED:
|
|
|
|
switch (requested) {
|
|
|
|
case Kerberos:
|
|
|
|
case RawNTLMSSP:
|
|
|
|
return requested;
|
|
|
|
case Unspecified:
|
|
|
|
if (server->sec_ntlmssp &&
|
|
|
|
(global_secflags & CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMSSP))
|
|
|
|
return RawNTLMSSP;
|
|
|
|
if ((server->sec_kerberos || server->sec_mskerberos) &&
|
|
|
|
(global_secflags & CIFSSEC_MAY_KRB5))
|
|
|
|
return Kerberos;
|
|
|
|
/* Fallthrough */
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return Unspecified;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_UNENCAP:
|
|
|
|
switch (requested) {
|
|
|
|
case NTLM:
|
|
|
|
case NTLMv2:
|
|
|
|
return requested;
|
|
|
|
case Unspecified:
|
|
|
|
if (global_secflags & CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLMV2)
|
|
|
|
return NTLMv2;
|
|
|
|
if (global_secflags & CIFSSEC_MAY_NTLM)
|
|
|
|
return NTLM;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
2013-09-28 01:35:42 +08:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2013-06-13 08:52:14 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-11-27 07:01:51 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Fallthrough - to attempt LANMAN authentication next */
|
2013-06-13 08:52:14 +08:00
|
|
|
case CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_LANMAN:
|
|
|
|
switch (requested) {
|
|
|
|
case LANMAN:
|
|
|
|
return requested;
|
|
|
|
case Unspecified:
|
|
|
|
if (global_secflags & CIFSSEC_MAY_LANMAN)
|
|
|
|
return LANMAN;
|
|
|
|
/* Fallthrough */
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return Unspecified;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return Unspecified;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-16 22:35:25 +08:00
|
|
|
struct sess_data {
|
|
|
|
unsigned int xid;
|
|
|
|
struct cifs_ses *ses;
|
|
|
|
struct nls_table *nls_cp;
|
|
|
|
void (*func)(struct sess_data *);
|
|
|
|
int result;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* we will send the SMB in three pieces:
|
|
|
|
* a fixed length beginning part, an optional
|
|
|
|
* SPNEGO blob (which can be zero length), and a
|
|
|
|
* last part which will include the strings
|
|
|
|
* and rest of bcc area. This allows us to avoid
|
|
|
|
* a large buffer 17K allocation
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int buf0_type;
|
|
|
|
struct kvec iov[3];
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
sess_alloc_buffer(struct sess_data *sess_data, int wct)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
struct cifs_ses *ses = sess_data->ses;
|
|
|
|
struct smb_hdr *smb_buf;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = small_smb_init_no_tc(SMB_COM_SESSION_SETUP_ANDX, wct, ses,
|
|
|
|
(void **)&smb_buf);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sess_data->iov[0].iov_base = (char *)smb_buf;
|
|
|
|
sess_data->iov[0].iov_len = be32_to_cpu(smb_buf->smb_buf_length) + 4;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This variable will be used to clear the buffer
|
|
|
|
* allocated above in case of any error in the calling function.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
sess_data->buf0_type = CIFS_SMALL_BUFFER;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* 2000 big enough to fit max user, domain, NOS name etc. */
|
|
|
|
sess_data->iov[2].iov_base = kmalloc(2000, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (!sess_data->iov[2].iov_base) {
|
|
|
|
rc = -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
goto out_free_smb_buf;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
out_free_smb_buf:
|
|
|
|
kfree(smb_buf);
|
|
|
|
sess_data->iov[0].iov_base = NULL;
|
|
|
|
sess_data->iov[0].iov_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
sess_data->buf0_type = CIFS_NO_BUFFER;
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
sess_free_buffer(struct sess_data *sess_data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
free_rsp_buf(sess_data->buf0_type, sess_data->iov[0].iov_base);
|
|
|
|
sess_data->buf0_type = CIFS_NO_BUFFER;
|
|
|
|
kfree(sess_data->iov[2].iov_base);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
sess_establish_session(struct sess_data *sess_data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct cifs_ses *ses = sess_data->ses;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&ses->server->srv_mutex);
|
|
|
|
if (!ses->server->session_estab) {
|
|
|
|
if (ses->server->sign) {
|
|
|
|
ses->server->session_key.response =
|
|
|
|
kmemdup(ses->auth_key.response,
|
|
|
|
ses->auth_key.len, GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (!ses->server->session_key.response) {
|
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&ses->server->srv_mutex);
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ses->server->session_key.len =
|
|
|
|
ses->auth_key.len;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ses->server->sequence_number = 0x2;
|
|
|
|
ses->server->session_estab = true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&ses->server->srv_mutex);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(FYI, "CIFS session established successfully\n");
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
|
|
|
|
ses->status = CifsGood;
|
|
|
|
ses->need_reconnect = false;
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
sess_sendreceive(struct sess_data *sess_data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
struct smb_hdr *smb_buf = (struct smb_hdr *) sess_data->iov[0].iov_base;
|
|
|
|
__u16 count;
|
2016-10-26 02:38:47 +08:00
|
|
|
struct kvec rsp_iov = { NULL, 0 };
|
2014-06-16 22:35:25 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
count = sess_data->iov[1].iov_len + sess_data->iov[2].iov_len;
|
|
|
|
smb_buf->smb_buf_length =
|
|
|
|
cpu_to_be32(be32_to_cpu(smb_buf->smb_buf_length) + count);
|
|
|
|
put_bcc(count, smb_buf);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = SendReceive2(sess_data->xid, sess_data->ses,
|
|
|
|
sess_data->iov, 3 /* num_iovecs */,
|
|
|
|
&sess_data->buf0_type,
|
2016-10-26 02:38:47 +08:00
|
|
|
CIFS_LOG_ERROR, &rsp_iov);
|
|
|
|
cifs_small_buf_release(sess_data->iov[0].iov_base);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&sess_data->iov[0], &rsp_iov, sizeof(struct kvec));
|
2014-06-16 22:35:25 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* LANMAN and plaintext are less secure and off by default.
|
|
|
|
* So we make this explicitly be turned on in kconfig (in the
|
|
|
|
* build) and turned on at runtime (changed from the default)
|
|
|
|
* in proc/fs/cifs or via mount parm. Unfortunately this is
|
|
|
|
* needed for old Win (e.g. Win95), some obscure NAS and OS/2
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
sess_auth_lanman(struct sess_data *sess_data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
|
|
|
struct smb_hdr *smb_buf;
|
|
|
|
SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *pSMB;
|
|
|
|
char *bcc_ptr;
|
|
|
|
struct cifs_ses *ses = sess_data->ses;
|
|
|
|
char lnm_session_key[CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
__u32 capabilities;
|
|
|
|
__u16 bytes_remaining;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* lanman 2 style sessionsetup */
|
|
|
|
/* wct = 10 */
|
|
|
|
rc = sess_alloc_buffer(sess_data, 10);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base;
|
|
|
|
bcc_ptr = sess_data->iov[2].iov_base;
|
|
|
|
capabilities = cifs_ssetup_hdr(ses, pSMB);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 &= ~SMBFLG2_UNICODE;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-05-03 16:52:30 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ses->user_name != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
/* no capabilities flags in old lanman negotiation */
|
|
|
|
pSMB->old_req.PasswordLength = cpu_to_le16(CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
|
2014-06-16 22:35:25 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2016-05-03 16:52:30 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Calculate hash with password and copy into bcc_ptr.
|
|
|
|
* Encryption Key (stored as in cryptkey) gets used if the
|
|
|
|
* security mode bit in Negottiate Protocol response states
|
|
|
|
* to use challenge/response method (i.e. Password bit is 1).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
rc = calc_lanman_hash(ses->password, ses->server->cryptkey,
|
|
|
|
ses->server->sec_mode & SECMODE_PW_ENCRYPT ?
|
|
|
|
true : false, lnm_session_key);
|
2016-06-09 00:02:32 +08:00
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2014-06-16 22:35:25 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2016-05-03 16:52:30 +08:00
|
|
|
memcpy(bcc_ptr, (char *)lnm_session_key, CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
bcc_ptr += CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
pSMB->old_req.PasswordLength = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-16 22:35:25 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* can not sign if LANMAN negotiated so no need
|
|
|
|
* to calculate signing key? but what if server
|
|
|
|
* changed to do higher than lanman dialect and
|
|
|
|
* we reconnected would we ever calc signing_key?
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Negotiating LANMAN setting up strings\n");
|
|
|
|
/* Unicode not allowed for LANMAN dialects */
|
|
|
|
ascii_ssetup_strings(&bcc_ptr, ses, sess_data->nls_cp);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sess_data->iov[2].iov_len = (long) bcc_ptr -
|
|
|
|
(long) sess_data->iov[2].iov_base;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = sess_sendreceive(sess_data);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base;
|
|
|
|
smb_buf = (struct smb_hdr *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* lanman response has a word count of 3 */
|
|
|
|
if (smb_buf->WordCount != 3) {
|
|
|
|
rc = -EIO;
|
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "bad word count %d\n", smb_buf->WordCount);
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (le16_to_cpu(pSMB->resp.Action) & GUEST_LOGIN)
|
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Guest login\n"); /* BB mark SesInfo struct? */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ses->Suid = smb_buf->Uid; /* UID left in wire format (le) */
|
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(FYI, "UID = %llu\n", ses->Suid);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bytes_remaining = get_bcc(smb_buf);
|
|
|
|
bcc_ptr = pByteArea(smb_buf);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* BB check if Unicode and decode strings */
|
|
|
|
if (bytes_remaining == 0) {
|
|
|
|
/* no string area to decode, do nothing */
|
|
|
|
} else if (smb_buf->Flags2 & SMBFLG2_UNICODE) {
|
|
|
|
/* unicode string area must be word-aligned */
|
|
|
|
if (((unsigned long) bcc_ptr - (unsigned long) smb_buf) % 2) {
|
|
|
|
++bcc_ptr;
|
|
|
|
--bytes_remaining;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
decode_unicode_ssetup(&bcc_ptr, bytes_remaining, ses,
|
|
|
|
sess_data->nls_cp);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
decode_ascii_ssetup(&bcc_ptr, bytes_remaining, ses,
|
|
|
|
sess_data->nls_cp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = sess_establish_session(sess_data);
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
sess_data->result = rc;
|
|
|
|
sess_data->func = NULL;
|
|
|
|
sess_free_buffer(sess_data);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-16 22:35:26 +08:00
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
sess_auth_ntlm(struct sess_data *sess_data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
|
|
|
struct smb_hdr *smb_buf;
|
|
|
|
SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *pSMB;
|
|
|
|
char *bcc_ptr;
|
|
|
|
struct cifs_ses *ses = sess_data->ses;
|
|
|
|
__u32 capabilities;
|
|
|
|
__u16 bytes_remaining;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* old style NTLM sessionsetup */
|
|
|
|
/* wct = 13 */
|
|
|
|
rc = sess_alloc_buffer(sess_data, 13);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base;
|
|
|
|
bcc_ptr = sess_data->iov[2].iov_base;
|
|
|
|
capabilities = cifs_ssetup_hdr(ses, pSMB);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pSMB->req_no_secext.Capabilities = cpu_to_le32(capabilities);
|
2016-05-03 16:52:30 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ses->user_name != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseInsensitivePasswordLength =
|
|
|
|
cpu_to_le16(CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseSensitivePasswordLength =
|
|
|
|
cpu_to_le16(CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* calculate ntlm response and session key */
|
|
|
|
rc = setup_ntlm_response(ses, sess_data->nls_cp);
|
|
|
|
if (rc) {
|
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Error %d during NTLM authentication\n",
|
|
|
|
rc);
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-16 22:35:26 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2016-05-03 16:52:30 +08:00
|
|
|
/* copy ntlm response */
|
|
|
|
memcpy(bcc_ptr, ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
bcc_ptr += CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(bcc_ptr, ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
bcc_ptr += CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseInsensitivePasswordLength = 0;
|
|
|
|
pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseSensitivePasswordLength = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-16 22:35:26 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNICODE) {
|
|
|
|
/* unicode strings must be word aligned */
|
|
|
|
if (sess_data->iov[0].iov_len % 2) {
|
|
|
|
*bcc_ptr = 0;
|
|
|
|
bcc_ptr++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
unicode_ssetup_strings(&bcc_ptr, ses, sess_data->nls_cp);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
ascii_ssetup_strings(&bcc_ptr, ses, sess_data->nls_cp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sess_data->iov[2].iov_len = (long) bcc_ptr -
|
|
|
|
(long) sess_data->iov[2].iov_base;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = sess_sendreceive(sess_data);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base;
|
|
|
|
smb_buf = (struct smb_hdr *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (smb_buf->WordCount != 3) {
|
|
|
|
rc = -EIO;
|
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "bad word count %d\n", smb_buf->WordCount);
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (le16_to_cpu(pSMB->resp.Action) & GUEST_LOGIN)
|
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Guest login\n"); /* BB mark SesInfo struct? */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ses->Suid = smb_buf->Uid; /* UID left in wire format (le) */
|
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(FYI, "UID = %llu\n", ses->Suid);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bytes_remaining = get_bcc(smb_buf);
|
|
|
|
bcc_ptr = pByteArea(smb_buf);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* BB check if Unicode and decode strings */
|
|
|
|
if (bytes_remaining == 0) {
|
|
|
|
/* no string area to decode, do nothing */
|
|
|
|
} else if (smb_buf->Flags2 & SMBFLG2_UNICODE) {
|
|
|
|
/* unicode string area must be word-aligned */
|
|
|
|
if (((unsigned long) bcc_ptr - (unsigned long) smb_buf) % 2) {
|
|
|
|
++bcc_ptr;
|
|
|
|
--bytes_remaining;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
decode_unicode_ssetup(&bcc_ptr, bytes_remaining, ses,
|
|
|
|
sess_data->nls_cp);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
decode_ascii_ssetup(&bcc_ptr, bytes_remaining, ses,
|
|
|
|
sess_data->nls_cp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = sess_establish_session(sess_data);
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
sess_data->result = rc;
|
|
|
|
sess_data->func = NULL;
|
|
|
|
sess_free_buffer(sess_data);
|
|
|
|
kfree(ses->auth_key.response);
|
|
|
|
ses->auth_key.response = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
sess_auth_ntlmv2(struct sess_data *sess_data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
|
|
|
struct smb_hdr *smb_buf;
|
|
|
|
SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *pSMB;
|
|
|
|
char *bcc_ptr;
|
|
|
|
struct cifs_ses *ses = sess_data->ses;
|
|
|
|
__u32 capabilities;
|
|
|
|
__u16 bytes_remaining;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* old style NTLM sessionsetup */
|
|
|
|
/* wct = 13 */
|
|
|
|
rc = sess_alloc_buffer(sess_data, 13);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base;
|
|
|
|
bcc_ptr = sess_data->iov[2].iov_base;
|
|
|
|
capabilities = cifs_ssetup_hdr(ses, pSMB);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pSMB->req_no_secext.Capabilities = cpu_to_le32(capabilities);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* LM2 password would be here if we supported it */
|
|
|
|
pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseInsensitivePasswordLength = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-05-03 16:52:30 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ses->user_name != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
/* calculate nlmv2 response and session key */
|
|
|
|
rc = setup_ntlmv2_rsp(ses, sess_data->nls_cp);
|
|
|
|
if (rc) {
|
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Error %d during NTLMv2 authentication\n", rc);
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-16 22:35:26 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2016-05-03 16:52:30 +08:00
|
|
|
memcpy(bcc_ptr, ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE,
|
|
|
|
ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
bcc_ptr += ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE;
|
2014-06-16 22:35:26 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2016-05-03 16:52:30 +08:00
|
|
|
/* set case sensitive password length after tilen may get
|
|
|
|
* assigned, tilen is 0 otherwise.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseSensitivePasswordLength =
|
|
|
|
cpu_to_le16(ses->auth_key.len - CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
pSMB->req_no_secext.CaseSensitivePasswordLength = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-16 22:35:26 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNICODE) {
|
|
|
|
if (sess_data->iov[0].iov_len % 2) {
|
|
|
|
*bcc_ptr = 0;
|
|
|
|
bcc_ptr++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
unicode_ssetup_strings(&bcc_ptr, ses, sess_data->nls_cp);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
ascii_ssetup_strings(&bcc_ptr, ses, sess_data->nls_cp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sess_data->iov[2].iov_len = (long) bcc_ptr -
|
|
|
|
(long) sess_data->iov[2].iov_base;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = sess_sendreceive(sess_data);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base;
|
|
|
|
smb_buf = (struct smb_hdr *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (smb_buf->WordCount != 3) {
|
|
|
|
rc = -EIO;
|
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "bad word count %d\n", smb_buf->WordCount);
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (le16_to_cpu(pSMB->resp.Action) & GUEST_LOGIN)
|
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Guest login\n"); /* BB mark SesInfo struct? */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ses->Suid = smb_buf->Uid; /* UID left in wire format (le) */
|
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(FYI, "UID = %llu\n", ses->Suid);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bytes_remaining = get_bcc(smb_buf);
|
|
|
|
bcc_ptr = pByteArea(smb_buf);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* BB check if Unicode and decode strings */
|
|
|
|
if (bytes_remaining == 0) {
|
|
|
|
/* no string area to decode, do nothing */
|
|
|
|
} else if (smb_buf->Flags2 & SMBFLG2_UNICODE) {
|
|
|
|
/* unicode string area must be word-aligned */
|
|
|
|
if (((unsigned long) bcc_ptr - (unsigned long) smb_buf) % 2) {
|
|
|
|
++bcc_ptr;
|
|
|
|
--bytes_remaining;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
decode_unicode_ssetup(&bcc_ptr, bytes_remaining, ses,
|
|
|
|
sess_data->nls_cp);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
decode_ascii_ssetup(&bcc_ptr, bytes_remaining, ses,
|
|
|
|
sess_data->nls_cp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = sess_establish_session(sess_data);
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
sess_data->result = rc;
|
|
|
|
sess_data->func = NULL;
|
|
|
|
sess_free_buffer(sess_data);
|
|
|
|
kfree(ses->auth_key.response);
|
|
|
|
ses->auth_key.response = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-16 22:35:27 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_UPCALL
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
sess_auth_kerberos(struct sess_data *sess_data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
|
|
|
struct smb_hdr *smb_buf;
|
|
|
|
SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *pSMB;
|
|
|
|
char *bcc_ptr;
|
|
|
|
struct cifs_ses *ses = sess_data->ses;
|
|
|
|
__u32 capabilities;
|
|
|
|
__u16 bytes_remaining;
|
|
|
|
struct key *spnego_key = NULL;
|
|
|
|
struct cifs_spnego_msg *msg;
|
|
|
|
u16 blob_len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* extended security */
|
|
|
|
/* wct = 12 */
|
|
|
|
rc = sess_alloc_buffer(sess_data, 12);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base;
|
|
|
|
bcc_ptr = sess_data->iov[2].iov_base;
|
|
|
|
capabilities = cifs_ssetup_hdr(ses, pSMB);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
spnego_key = cifs_get_spnego_key(ses);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(spnego_key)) {
|
|
|
|
rc = PTR_ERR(spnego_key);
|
|
|
|
spnego_key = NULL;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-21 21:04:48 +08:00
|
|
|
msg = spnego_key->payload.data[0];
|
2014-06-16 22:35:27 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* check version field to make sure that cifs.upcall is
|
|
|
|
* sending us a response in an expected form
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (msg->version != CIFS_SPNEGO_UPCALL_VERSION) {
|
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS,
|
|
|
|
"incorrect version of cifs.upcall (expected %d but got %d)",
|
|
|
|
CIFS_SPNEGO_UPCALL_VERSION, msg->version);
|
|
|
|
rc = -EKEYREJECTED;
|
|
|
|
goto out_put_spnego_key;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ses->auth_key.response = kmemdup(msg->data, msg->sesskey_len,
|
|
|
|
GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (!ses->auth_key.response) {
|
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Kerberos can't allocate (%u bytes) memory",
|
|
|
|
msg->sesskey_len);
|
|
|
|
rc = -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
goto out_put_spnego_key;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ses->auth_key.len = msg->sesskey_len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_EXT_SEC;
|
|
|
|
capabilities |= CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY;
|
|
|
|
pSMB->req.Capabilities = cpu_to_le32(capabilities);
|
|
|
|
sess_data->iov[1].iov_base = msg->data + msg->sesskey_len;
|
|
|
|
sess_data->iov[1].iov_len = msg->secblob_len;
|
|
|
|
pSMB->req.SecurityBlobLength = cpu_to_le16(sess_data->iov[1].iov_len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNICODE) {
|
|
|
|
/* unicode strings must be word aligned */
|
|
|
|
if ((sess_data->iov[0].iov_len
|
|
|
|
+ sess_data->iov[1].iov_len) % 2) {
|
|
|
|
*bcc_ptr = 0;
|
|
|
|
bcc_ptr++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
unicode_oslm_strings(&bcc_ptr, sess_data->nls_cp);
|
|
|
|
unicode_domain_string(&bcc_ptr, ses, sess_data->nls_cp);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* BB: is this right? */
|
|
|
|
ascii_ssetup_strings(&bcc_ptr, ses, sess_data->nls_cp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sess_data->iov[2].iov_len = (long) bcc_ptr -
|
|
|
|
(long) sess_data->iov[2].iov_base;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = sess_sendreceive(sess_data);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
goto out_put_spnego_key;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base;
|
|
|
|
smb_buf = (struct smb_hdr *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (smb_buf->WordCount != 4) {
|
|
|
|
rc = -EIO;
|
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "bad word count %d\n", smb_buf->WordCount);
|
|
|
|
goto out_put_spnego_key;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (le16_to_cpu(pSMB->resp.Action) & GUEST_LOGIN)
|
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Guest login\n"); /* BB mark SesInfo struct? */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ses->Suid = smb_buf->Uid; /* UID left in wire format (le) */
|
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(FYI, "UID = %llu\n", ses->Suid);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bytes_remaining = get_bcc(smb_buf);
|
|
|
|
bcc_ptr = pByteArea(smb_buf);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
blob_len = le16_to_cpu(pSMB->resp.SecurityBlobLength);
|
|
|
|
if (blob_len > bytes_remaining) {
|
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "bad security blob length %d\n",
|
|
|
|
blob_len);
|
|
|
|
rc = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
goto out_put_spnego_key;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bcc_ptr += blob_len;
|
|
|
|
bytes_remaining -= blob_len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* BB check if Unicode and decode strings */
|
|
|
|
if (bytes_remaining == 0) {
|
|
|
|
/* no string area to decode, do nothing */
|
|
|
|
} else if (smb_buf->Flags2 & SMBFLG2_UNICODE) {
|
|
|
|
/* unicode string area must be word-aligned */
|
|
|
|
if (((unsigned long) bcc_ptr - (unsigned long) smb_buf) % 2) {
|
|
|
|
++bcc_ptr;
|
|
|
|
--bytes_remaining;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
decode_unicode_ssetup(&bcc_ptr, bytes_remaining, ses,
|
|
|
|
sess_data->nls_cp);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
decode_ascii_ssetup(&bcc_ptr, bytes_remaining, ses,
|
|
|
|
sess_data->nls_cp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = sess_establish_session(sess_data);
|
|
|
|
out_put_spnego_key:
|
|
|
|
key_invalidate(spnego_key);
|
|
|
|
key_put(spnego_key);
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
sess_data->result = rc;
|
|
|
|
sess_data->func = NULL;
|
|
|
|
sess_free_buffer(sess_data);
|
|
|
|
kfree(ses->auth_key.response);
|
|
|
|
ses->auth_key.response = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif /* ! CONFIG_CIFS_UPCALL */
|
2014-06-16 22:35:26 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The required kvec buffers have to be allocated before calling this
|
|
|
|
* function.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
_sess_auth_rawntlmssp_assemble_req(struct sess_data *sess_data)
|
2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct smb_hdr *smb_buf;
|
|
|
|
SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *pSMB;
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
struct cifs_ses *ses = sess_data->ses;
|
2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
|
|
|
__u32 capabilities;
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
char *bcc_ptr;
|
2006-06-04 13:53:15 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base;
|
|
|
|
smb_buf = (struct smb_hdr *)pSMB;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
capabilities = cifs_ssetup_hdr(ses, pSMB);
|
|
|
|
if ((pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 & SMBFLG2_UNICODE) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "NTLMSSP requires Unicode support\n");
|
|
|
|
return -ENOSYS;
|
2013-05-24 19:41:01 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
pSMB->req.hdr.Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_EXT_SEC;
|
|
|
|
capabilities |= CAP_EXTENDED_SECURITY;
|
|
|
|
pSMB->req.Capabilities |= cpu_to_le32(capabilities);
|
2014-06-16 22:35:25 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
bcc_ptr = sess_data->iov[2].iov_base;
|
|
|
|
/* unicode strings must be word aligned */
|
|
|
|
if ((sess_data->iov[0].iov_len + sess_data->iov[1].iov_len) % 2) {
|
|
|
|
*bcc_ptr = 0;
|
|
|
|
bcc_ptr++;
|
2013-06-13 08:52:14 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
unicode_oslm_strings(&bcc_ptr, sess_data->nls_cp);
|
2013-06-13 08:52:14 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
sess_data->iov[2].iov_len = (long) bcc_ptr -
|
|
|
|
(long) sess_data->iov[2].iov_base;
|
2014-06-16 22:35:25 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
sess_auth_rawntlmssp_authenticate(struct sess_data *sess_data);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
sess_auth_rawntlmssp_negotiate(struct sess_data *sess_data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
struct smb_hdr *smb_buf;
|
|
|
|
SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *pSMB;
|
|
|
|
struct cifs_ses *ses = sess_data->ses;
|
|
|
|
__u16 bytes_remaining;
|
|
|
|
char *bcc_ptr;
|
|
|
|
u16 blob_len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(FYI, "rawntlmssp session setup negotiate phase\n");
|
2013-08-29 21:35:10 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* if memory allocation is successful, caller of this function
|
|
|
|
* frees it.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ses->ntlmssp = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ntlmssp_auth), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (!ses->ntlmssp) {
|
|
|
|
rc = -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2010-10-28 22:53:07 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
ses->ntlmssp->sesskey_per_smbsess = false;
|
2010-10-28 22:53:07 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
/* wct = 12 */
|
|
|
|
rc = sess_alloc_buffer(sess_data, 12);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2009-05-04 16:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base;
|
2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Build security blob before we assemble the request */
|
|
|
|
build_ntlmssp_negotiate_blob(pSMB->req.SecurityBlob, ses);
|
|
|
|
sess_data->iov[1].iov_len = sizeof(NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE);
|
|
|
|
sess_data->iov[1].iov_base = pSMB->req.SecurityBlob;
|
|
|
|
pSMB->req.SecurityBlobLength = cpu_to_le16(sizeof(NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = _sess_auth_rawntlmssp_assemble_req(sess_data);
|
2007-07-08 03:25:05 +08:00
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
rc = sess_sendreceive(sess_data);
|
2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base;
|
|
|
|
smb_buf = (struct smb_hdr *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base;
|
2006-06-27 14:28:30 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
/* If true, rc here is expected and not an error */
|
|
|
|
if (sess_data->buf0_type != CIFS_NO_BUFFER &&
|
|
|
|
smb_buf->Status.CifsError ==
|
|
|
|
cpu_to_le32(NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED))
|
|
|
|
rc = 0;
|
2007-11-17 07:37:35 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(FYI, "rawntlmssp session setup challenge phase\n");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (smb_buf->WordCount != 4) {
|
|
|
|
rc = -EIO;
|
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "bad word count %d\n", smb_buf->WordCount);
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2007-08-18 08:15:20 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
ses->Suid = smb_buf->Uid; /* UID left in wire format (le) */
|
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(FYI, "UID = %llu\n", ses->Suid);
|
2007-11-17 07:37:35 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
bytes_remaining = get_bcc(smb_buf);
|
|
|
|
bcc_ptr = pByteArea(smb_buf);
|
2011-01-08 00:30:28 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
blob_len = le16_to_cpu(pSMB->resp.SecurityBlobLength);
|
|
|
|
if (blob_len > bytes_remaining) {
|
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "bad security blob length %d\n",
|
|
|
|
blob_len);
|
|
|
|
rc = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-05-04 16:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
rc = decode_ntlmssp_challenge(bcc_ptr, blob_len, ses);
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
sess_free_buffer(sess_data);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!rc) {
|
|
|
|
sess_data->func = sess_auth_rawntlmssp_authenticate;
|
|
|
|
return;
|
2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Else error. Cleanup */
|
|
|
|
kfree(ses->auth_key.response);
|
|
|
|
ses->auth_key.response = NULL;
|
|
|
|
kfree(ses->ntlmssp);
|
|
|
|
ses->ntlmssp = NULL;
|
2007-11-17 07:37:35 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
sess_data->func = NULL;
|
|
|
|
sess_data->result = rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
sess_auth_rawntlmssp_authenticate(struct sess_data *sess_data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
struct smb_hdr *smb_buf;
|
|
|
|
SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *pSMB;
|
|
|
|
struct cifs_ses *ses = sess_data->ses;
|
|
|
|
__u16 bytes_remaining;
|
|
|
|
char *bcc_ptr;
|
2016-05-26 17:52:25 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned char *ntlmsspblob = NULL;
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
u16 blob_len;
|
2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(FYI, "rawntlmssp session setup authenticate phase\n");
|
2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
/* wct = 12 */
|
|
|
|
rc = sess_alloc_buffer(sess_data, 12);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Build security blob before we assemble the request */
|
|
|
|
pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base;
|
|
|
|
smb_buf = (struct smb_hdr *)pSMB;
|
2016-05-26 17:52:25 +08:00
|
|
|
rc = build_ntlmssp_auth_blob(&ntlmsspblob,
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
&blob_len, ses, sess_data->nls_cp);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
goto out_free_ntlmsspblob;
|
|
|
|
sess_data->iov[1].iov_len = blob_len;
|
|
|
|
sess_data->iov[1].iov_base = ntlmsspblob;
|
|
|
|
pSMB->req.SecurityBlobLength = cpu_to_le16(blob_len);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Make sure that we tell the server that we are using
|
|
|
|
* the uid that it just gave us back on the response
|
|
|
|
* (challenge)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
smb_buf->Uid = ses->Suid;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = _sess_auth_rawntlmssp_assemble_req(sess_data);
|
2009-05-04 16:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
goto out_free_ntlmsspblob;
|
2009-05-04 16:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
rc = sess_sendreceive(sess_data);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
goto out_free_ntlmsspblob;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pSMB = (SESSION_SETUP_ANDX *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base;
|
|
|
|
smb_buf = (struct smb_hdr *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base;
|
2014-06-16 22:35:26 +08:00
|
|
|
if (smb_buf->WordCount != 4) {
|
2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
|
|
|
rc = -EIO;
|
2013-05-05 11:12:25 +08:00
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "bad word count %d\n", smb_buf->WordCount);
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
goto out_free_ntlmsspblob;
|
2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (le16_to_cpu(pSMB->resp.Action) & GUEST_LOGIN)
|
2013-05-05 11:12:25 +08:00
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Guest login\n"); /* BB mark SesInfo struct? */
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-12-03 20:26:36 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ses->Suid != smb_buf->Uid) {
|
|
|
|
ses->Suid = smb_buf->Uid;
|
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(FYI, "UID changed! new UID = %llu\n", ses->Suid);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-01-21 02:36:51 +08:00
|
|
|
bytes_remaining = get_bcc(smb_buf);
|
2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
|
|
|
bcc_ptr = pByteArea(smb_buf);
|
2014-06-16 22:35:26 +08:00
|
|
|
blob_len = le16_to_cpu(pSMB->resp.SecurityBlobLength);
|
|
|
|
if (blob_len > bytes_remaining) {
|
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "bad security blob length %d\n",
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
blob_len);
|
2014-06-16 22:35:26 +08:00
|
|
|
rc = -EINVAL;
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
goto out_free_ntlmsspblob;
|
2007-07-08 03:25:05 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-16 22:35:26 +08:00
|
|
|
bcc_ptr += blob_len;
|
|
|
|
bytes_remaining -= blob_len;
|
2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
|
|
|
/* BB check if Unicode and decode strings */
|
2011-04-28 01:25:51 +08:00
|
|
|
if (bytes_remaining == 0) {
|
|
|
|
/* no string area to decode, do nothing */
|
|
|
|
} else if (smb_buf->Flags2 & SMBFLG2_UNICODE) {
|
2009-04-14 23:00:53 +08:00
|
|
|
/* unicode string area must be word-aligned */
|
|
|
|
if (((unsigned long) bcc_ptr - (unsigned long) smb_buf) % 2) {
|
|
|
|
++bcc_ptr;
|
|
|
|
--bytes_remaining;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
decode_unicode_ssetup(&bcc_ptr, bytes_remaining, ses,
|
|
|
|
sess_data->nls_cp);
|
2009-04-14 23:00:53 +08:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
decode_ascii_ssetup(&bcc_ptr, bytes_remaining, ses,
|
|
|
|
sess_data->nls_cp);
|
2009-04-14 23:00:53 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-07-13 08:33:32 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
out_free_ntlmsspblob:
|
cifs NTLMv2/NTLMSSP ntlmv2 within ntlmssp autentication code
Attribue Value (AV) pairs or Target Info (TI) pairs are part of
ntlmv2 authentication.
Structure ntlmv2_resp had only definition for two av pairs.
So removed it, and now allocation of av pairs is dynamic.
For servers like Windows 7/2008, av pairs sent by server in
challege packet (type 2 in the ntlmssp exchange/negotiation) can
vary.
Server sends them during ntlmssp negotiation. So when ntlmssp is used
as an authentication mechanism, type 2 challenge packet from server
has this information. Pluck it and use the entire blob for
authenticaiton purpose. If user has not specified, extract
(netbios) domain name from the av pairs which is used to calculate
ntlmv2 hash. Servers like Windows 7 are particular about the AV pair
blob.
Servers like Windows 2003, are not very strict about the contents
of av pair blob used during ntlmv2 authentication.
So when security mechanism such as ntlmv2 is used (not ntlmv2 in ntlmssp),
there is no negotiation and so genereate a minimal blob that gets
used in ntlmv2 authentication as well as gets sent.
Fields tilen and tilbob are session specific. AV pair values are defined.
To calculate ntlmv2 response we need ti/av pair blob.
For sec mech like ntlmssp, the blob is plucked from type 2 response from
the server. From this blob, netbios name of the domain is retrieved,
if user has not already provided, to be included in the Target String
as part of ntlmv2 hash calculations.
For sec mech like ntlmv2, create a minimal, two av pair blob.
The allocated blob is freed in case of error. In case there is no error,
this blob is used in calculating ntlmv2 response (in CalcNTLMv2_response)
and is also copied on the response to the server, and then freed.
The type 3 ntlmssp response is prepared on a buffer,
5 * sizeof of struct _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE, an empirical value large
enough to hold _AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE plus a blob with max possible
10 values as part of ntlmv2 response and lmv2 keys and domain, user,
workstation names etc.
Also, kerberos gets selected as a default mechanism if server supports it,
over the other security mechanisms.
Signed-off-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
2010-09-19 11:02:18 +08:00
|
|
|
kfree(ntlmsspblob);
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
sess_free_buffer(sess_data);
|
2013-08-29 21:35:09 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!rc)
|
|
|
|
rc = sess_establish_session(sess_data);
|
2013-08-29 21:35:09 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Cleanup */
|
2013-08-29 21:35:09 +08:00
|
|
|
kfree(ses->auth_key.response);
|
|
|
|
ses->auth_key.response = NULL;
|
|
|
|
kfree(ses->ntlmssp);
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
ses->ntlmssp = NULL;
|
2013-08-29 21:35:09 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
sess_data->func = NULL;
|
|
|
|
sess_data->result = rc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-16 22:35:25 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2014-07-11 20:47:01 +08:00
|
|
|
static int select_sec(struct cifs_ses *ses, struct sess_data *sess_data)
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int type;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-18 18:05:57 +08:00
|
|
|
type = cifs_select_sectype(ses->server, ses->sectype);
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(FYI, "sess setup type %d\n", type);
|
|
|
|
if (type == Unspecified) {
|
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS,
|
|
|
|
"Unable to select appropriate authentication method!");
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (type) {
|
|
|
|
case LANMAN:
|
|
|
|
/* LANMAN and plaintext are less secure and off by default.
|
|
|
|
* So we make this explicitly be turned on in kconfig (in the
|
|
|
|
* build) and turned on at runtime (changed from the default)
|
|
|
|
* in proc/fs/cifs or via mount parm. Unfortunately this is
|
|
|
|
* needed for old Win (e.g. Win95), some obscure NAS and OS/2 */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH
|
|
|
|
sess_data->func = sess_auth_lanman;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
case NTLM:
|
|
|
|
sess_data->func = sess_auth_ntlm;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case NTLMv2:
|
|
|
|
sess_data->func = sess_auth_ntlmv2;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case Kerberos:
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_UPCALL
|
|
|
|
sess_data->func = sess_auth_kerberos;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Kerberos negotiated but upcall support disabled!\n");
|
|
|
|
return -ENOSYS;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_CIFS_UPCALL */
|
|
|
|
case RawNTLMSSP:
|
|
|
|
sess_data->func = sess_auth_rawntlmssp_negotiate;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
cifs_dbg(VFS, "secType %d not supported!\n", type);
|
|
|
|
return -ENOSYS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int CIFS_SessSetup(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_ses *ses,
|
|
|
|
const struct nls_table *nls_cp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
|
|
|
struct sess_data *sess_data;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ses == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
WARN(1, "%s: ses == NULL!", __func__);
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sess_data = kzalloc(sizeof(struct sess_data), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (!sess_data)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rc = select_sec(ses, sess_data);
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sess_data->xid = xid;
|
|
|
|
sess_data->ses = ses;
|
|
|
|
sess_data->buf0_type = CIFS_NO_BUFFER;
|
|
|
|
sess_data->nls_cp = (struct nls_table *) nls_cp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (sess_data->func)
|
|
|
|
sess_data->func(sess_data);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Store result before we free sess_data */
|
2014-06-16 22:35:25 +08:00
|
|
|
rc = sess_data->result;
|
2014-06-16 22:35:28 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
out:
|
2014-06-16 22:35:25 +08:00
|
|
|
kfree(sess_data);
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
2006-06-01 06:40:51 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|