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linux-next/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 22:07:57 +08:00
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
/*
* Copyright (C) 1991,1992 Linus Torvalds
*
* entry_32.S contains the system-call and low-level fault and trap handling routines.
*
* Stack layout while running C code:
* ptrace needs to have all registers on the stack.
* If the order here is changed, it needs to be
* updated in fork.c:copy_process(), signal.c:do_signal(),
* ptrace.c and ptrace.h
*
* 0(%esp) - %ebx
* 4(%esp) - %ecx
* 8(%esp) - %edx
* C(%esp) - %esi
* 10(%esp) - %edi
* 14(%esp) - %ebp
* 18(%esp) - %eax
* 1C(%esp) - %ds
* 20(%esp) - %es
* 24(%esp) - %fs
* 28(%esp) - %gs saved iff !CONFIG_X86_32_LAZY_GS
* 2C(%esp) - orig_eax
* 30(%esp) - %eip
* 34(%esp) - %cs
* 38(%esp) - %eflags
* 3C(%esp) - %oldesp
* 40(%esp) - %oldss
*/
#include <linux/linkage.h>
Audit: push audit success and retcode into arch ptrace.h The audit system previously expected arches calling to audit_syscall_exit to supply as arguments if the syscall was a success and what the return code was. Audit also provides a helper AUDITSC_RESULT which was supposed to simplify things by converting from negative retcodes to an audit internal magic value stating success or failure. This helper was wrong and could indicate that a valid pointer returned to userspace was a failed syscall. The fix is to fix the layering foolishness. We now pass audit_syscall_exit a struct pt_reg and it in turns calls back into arch code to collect the return value and to determine if the syscall was a success or failure. We also define a generic is_syscall_success() macro which determines success/failure based on if the value is < -MAX_ERRNO. This works for arches like x86 which do not use a separate mechanism to indicate syscall failure. We make both the is_syscall_success() and regs_return_value() static inlines instead of macros. The reason is because the audit function must take a void* for the regs. (uml calls theirs struct uml_pt_regs instead of just struct pt_regs so audit_syscall_exit can't take a struct pt_regs). Since the audit function takes a void* we need to use static inlines to cast it back to the arch correct structure to dereference it. The other major change is that on some arches, like ia64, MIPS and ppc, we change regs_return_value() to give us the negative value on syscall failure. THE only other user of this macro, kretprobe_example.c, won't notice and it makes the value signed consistently for the audit functions across all archs. In arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_64.c I see that we were using regs[9] in the old audit code as the return value. But the ptrace_64.h code defined the macro regs_return_value() as regs[3]. I have no idea which one is correct, but this patch now uses the regs_return_value() function, so it now uses regs[3]. For powerpc we previously used regs->result but now use the regs_return_value() function which uses regs->gprs[3]. regs->gprs[3] is always positive so the regs_return_value(), much like ia64 makes it negative before calling the audit code when appropriate. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> [for x86 portion] Acked-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> [for ia64] Acked-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> [for uml] Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [for sparc] Acked-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> [for mips] Acked-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> [for ppc]
2012-01-04 03:23:06 +08:00
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <asm/thread_info.h>
#include <asm/irqflags.h>
#include <asm/errno.h>
#include <asm/segment.h>
#include <asm/smp.h>
#include <asm/percpu.h>
#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
#include <asm/irq_vectors.h>
#include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
#include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
#include <asm/asm.h>
#include <asm/smap.h>
#include <asm/frame.h>
x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry assembler indirect jumps Convert indirect jumps in core 32/64bit entry assembler code to use non-speculative sequences when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled. Don't use CALL_NOSPEC in entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath because the return address after the 'call' instruction must be *precisely* at the .Lentry_SYSCALL_64_after_fastpath label for stub_ptregs_64 to work, and the use of alternatives will mess that up unless we play horrid games to prepend with NOPs and make the variants the same length. It's not worth it; in the case where we ALTERNATIVE out the retpoline, the first instruction at __x86.indirect_thunk.rax is going to be a bare jmp *%rax anyway. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-7-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
2018-01-12 05:46:28 +08:00
#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls The STACKLEAK feature (initially developed by PaX Team) has the following benefits: 1. Reduces the information that can be revealed through kernel stack leak bugs. The idea of erasing the thread stack at the end of syscalls is similar to CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING and memzero_explicit() in kernel crypto, which all comply with FDP_RIP.2 (Full Residual Information Protection) of the Common Criteria standard. 2. Blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks (e.g. CVE-2017-17712, CVE-2010-2963). That kind of bugs should be killed by improving C compilers in future, which might take a long time. This commit introduces the code filling the used part of the kernel stack with a poison value before returning to userspace. Full STACKLEAK feature also contains the gcc plugin which comes in a separate commit. The STACKLEAK feature is ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at: https://grsecurity.net/ https://pax.grsecurity.net/ This code is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on our understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are ours and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Performance impact: Hardware: Intel Core i7-4770, 16 GB RAM Test #1: building the Linux kernel on a single core 0.91% slowdown Test #2: hackbench -s 4096 -l 2000 -g 15 -f 25 -P 4.2% slowdown So the STACKLEAK description in Kconfig includes: "The tradeoff is the performance impact: on a single CPU system kernel compilation sees a 1% slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary and you are advised to test this feature on your expected workload before deploying it". Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-08-17 06:16:58 +08:00
#include "calling.h"
x86: Separate out entry text section Put x86 entry code into a separate link section: .entry.text. Separating the entry text section seems to have performance benefits - caused by more efficient instruction cache usage. Running hackbench with perf stat --repeat showed that the change compresses the icache footprint. The icache load miss rate went down by about 15%: before patch: 19417627 L1-icache-load-misses ( +- 0.147% ) after patch: 16490788 L1-icache-load-misses ( +- 0.180% ) The motivation of the patch was to fix a particular kprobes bug that relates to the entry text section, the performance advantage was discovered accidentally. Whole perf output follows: - results for current tip tree: Performance counter stats for './hackbench/hackbench 10' (500 runs): 19417627 L1-icache-load-misses ( +- 0.147% ) 2676914223 instructions # 0.497 IPC ( +- 0.079% ) 5389516026 cycles ( +- 0.144% ) 0.206267711 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.138% ) - results for current tip tree with the patch applied: Performance counter stats for './hackbench/hackbench 10' (500 runs): 16490788 L1-icache-load-misses ( +- 0.180% ) 2717734941 instructions # 0.502 IPC ( +- 0.079% ) 5414756975 cycles ( +- 0.148% ) 0.206747566 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.137% ) Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com Cc: ananth@in.ibm.com Cc: davem@davemloft.net Cc: 2nddept-manager@sdl.hitachi.co.jp LKML-Reference: <20110307181039.GB15197@jolsa.redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2011-03-08 02:10:39 +08:00
.section .entry.text, "ax"
/*
* We use macros for low-level operations which need to be overridden
* for paravirtualization. The following will never clobber any registers:
* INTERRUPT_RETURN (aka. "iret")
* GET_CR0_INTO_EAX (aka. "movl %cr0, %eax")
* ENABLE_INTERRUPTS_SYSEXIT (aka "sti; sysexit").
*
* For DISABLE_INTERRUPTS/ENABLE_INTERRUPTS (aka "cli"/"sti"), you must
* specify what registers can be overwritten (CLBR_NONE, CLBR_EAX/EDX/ECX/ANY).
* Allowing a register to be clobbered can shrink the paravirt replacement
* enough to patch inline, increasing performance.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPTION
# define preempt_stop(clobbers) DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(clobbers); TRACE_IRQS_OFF
#else
# define preempt_stop(clobbers)
#endif
.macro TRACE_IRQS_IRET
#ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS
testl $X86_EFLAGS_IF, PT_EFLAGS(%esp) # interrupts off?
jz 1f
TRACE_IRQS_ON
1:
#endif
.endm
#define PTI_SWITCH_MASK (1 << PAGE_SHIFT)
/*
* User gs save/restore
*
* %gs is used for userland TLS and kernel only uses it for stack
* canary which is required to be at %gs:20 by gcc. Read the comment
* at the top of stackprotector.h for more info.
*
* Local labels 98 and 99 are used.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32_LAZY_GS
/* unfortunately push/pop can't be no-op */
.macro PUSH_GS
pushl $0
.endm
.macro POP_GS pop=0
addl $(4 + \pop), %esp
.endm
.macro POP_GS_EX
.endm
/* all the rest are no-op */
.macro PTGS_TO_GS
.endm
.macro PTGS_TO_GS_EX
.endm
.macro GS_TO_REG reg
.endm
.macro REG_TO_PTGS reg
.endm
.macro SET_KERNEL_GS reg
.endm
#else /* CONFIG_X86_32_LAZY_GS */
.macro PUSH_GS
pushl %gs
.endm
.macro POP_GS pop=0
98: popl %gs
.if \pop <> 0
add $\pop, %esp
.endif
.endm
.macro POP_GS_EX
.pushsection .fixup, "ax"
99: movl $0, (%esp)
jmp 98b
.popsection
_ASM_EXTABLE(98b, 99b)
.endm
.macro PTGS_TO_GS
98: mov PT_GS(%esp), %gs
.endm
.macro PTGS_TO_GS_EX
.pushsection .fixup, "ax"
99: movl $0, PT_GS(%esp)
jmp 98b
.popsection
_ASM_EXTABLE(98b, 99b)
.endm
.macro GS_TO_REG reg
movl %gs, \reg
.endm
.macro REG_TO_PTGS reg
movl \reg, PT_GS(%esp)
.endm
.macro SET_KERNEL_GS reg
movl $(__KERNEL_STACK_CANARY), \reg
movl \reg, %gs
.endm
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_32_LAZY_GS */
/* Unconditionally switch to user cr3 */
.macro SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3 scratch_reg:req
ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_PTI
movl %cr3, \scratch_reg
orl $PTI_SWITCH_MASK, \scratch_reg
movl \scratch_reg, %cr3
.Lend_\@:
.endm
.macro BUG_IF_WRONG_CR3 no_user_check=0
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY
ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_PTI
.if \no_user_check == 0
/* coming from usermode? */
testl $USER_SEGMENT_RPL_MASK, PT_CS(%esp)
jz .Lend_\@
.endif
/* On user-cr3? */
movl %cr3, %eax
testl $PTI_SWITCH_MASK, %eax
jnz .Lend_\@
/* From userspace with kernel cr3 - BUG */
ud2
.Lend_\@:
#endif
.endm
/*
* Switch to kernel cr3 if not already loaded and return current cr3 in
* \scratch_reg
*/
.macro SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg:req
ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_PTI
movl %cr3, \scratch_reg
/* Test if we are already on kernel CR3 */
testl $PTI_SWITCH_MASK, \scratch_reg
jz .Lend_\@
andl $(~PTI_SWITCH_MASK), \scratch_reg
movl \scratch_reg, %cr3
/* Return original CR3 in \scratch_reg */
orl $PTI_SWITCH_MASK, \scratch_reg
.Lend_\@:
.endm
#define CS_FROM_ENTRY_STACK (1 << 31)
#define CS_FROM_USER_CR3 (1 << 30)
#define CS_FROM_KERNEL (1 << 29)
#define CS_FROM_ESPFIX (1 << 28)
.macro FIXUP_FRAME
/*
* The high bits of the CS dword (__csh) are used for CS_FROM_*.
* Clear them in case hardware didn't do this for us.
*/
andl $0x0000ffff, 4*4(%esp)
#ifdef CONFIG_VM86
testl $X86_EFLAGS_VM, 5*4(%esp)
jnz .Lfrom_usermode_no_fixup_\@
#endif
testl $USER_SEGMENT_RPL_MASK, 4*4(%esp)
jnz .Lfrom_usermode_no_fixup_\@
orl $CS_FROM_KERNEL, 4*4(%esp)
/*
* When we're here from kernel mode; the (exception) stack looks like:
*
* 6*4(%esp) - <previous context>
* 5*4(%esp) - flags
* 4*4(%esp) - cs
* 3*4(%esp) - ip
* 2*4(%esp) - orig_eax
* 1*4(%esp) - gs / function
* 0*4(%esp) - fs
*
* Lets build a 5 entry IRET frame after that, such that struct pt_regs
* is complete and in particular regs->sp is correct. This gives us
* the original 6 enties as gap:
*
* 14*4(%esp) - <previous context>
* 13*4(%esp) - gap / flags
* 12*4(%esp) - gap / cs
* 11*4(%esp) - gap / ip
* 10*4(%esp) - gap / orig_eax
* 9*4(%esp) - gap / gs / function
* 8*4(%esp) - gap / fs
* 7*4(%esp) - ss
* 6*4(%esp) - sp
* 5*4(%esp) - flags
* 4*4(%esp) - cs
* 3*4(%esp) - ip
* 2*4(%esp) - orig_eax
* 1*4(%esp) - gs / function
* 0*4(%esp) - fs
*/
pushl %ss # ss
pushl %esp # sp (points at ss)
addl $7*4, (%esp) # point sp back at the previous context
pushl 7*4(%esp) # flags
pushl 7*4(%esp) # cs
pushl 7*4(%esp) # ip
pushl 7*4(%esp) # orig_eax
pushl 7*4(%esp) # gs / function
pushl 7*4(%esp) # fs
.Lfrom_usermode_no_fixup_\@:
.endm
.macro IRET_FRAME
/*
* We're called with %ds, %es, %fs, and %gs from the interrupted
* frame, so we shouldn't use them. Also, we may be in ESPFIX
* mode and therefore have a nonzero SS base and an offset ESP,
* so any attempt to access the stack needs to use SS. (except for
* accesses through %esp, which automatically use SS.)
*/
testl $CS_FROM_KERNEL, 1*4(%esp)
jz .Lfinished_frame_\@
/*
* Reconstruct the 3 entry IRET frame right after the (modified)
* regs->sp without lowering %esp in between, such that an NMI in the
* middle doesn't scribble our stack.
*/
pushl %eax
pushl %ecx
movl 5*4(%esp), %eax # (modified) regs->sp
movl 4*4(%esp), %ecx # flags
movl %ecx, %ss:-1*4(%eax)
movl 3*4(%esp), %ecx # cs
andl $0x0000ffff, %ecx
movl %ecx, %ss:-2*4(%eax)
movl 2*4(%esp), %ecx # ip
movl %ecx, %ss:-3*4(%eax)
movl 1*4(%esp), %ecx # eax
movl %ecx, %ss:-4*4(%eax)
popl %ecx
lea -4*4(%eax), %esp
popl %eax
.Lfinished_frame_\@:
.endm
.macro SAVE_ALL pt_regs_ax=%eax switch_stacks=0 skip_gs=0 unwind_espfix=0
cld
.if \skip_gs == 0
PUSH_GS
.endif
pushl %fs
pushl %eax
movl $(__KERNEL_PERCPU), %eax
movl %eax, %fs
.if \unwind_espfix > 0
UNWIND_ESPFIX_STACK
.endif
popl %eax
FIXUP_FRAME
pushl %es
pushl %ds
pushl \pt_regs_ax
pushl %ebp
pushl %edi
pushl %esi
pushl %edx
pushl %ecx
pushl %ebx
movl $(__USER_DS), %edx
movl %edx, %ds
movl %edx, %es
.if \skip_gs == 0
SET_KERNEL_GS %edx
.endif
/* Switch to kernel stack if necessary */
.if \switch_stacks > 0
SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_STACK
.endif
.endm
.macro SAVE_ALL_NMI cr3_reg:req unwind_espfix=0
SAVE_ALL unwind_espfix=\unwind_espfix
BUG_IF_WRONG_CR3
/*
* Now switch the CR3 when PTI is enabled.
*
* We can enter with either user or kernel cr3, the code will
* store the old cr3 in \cr3_reg and switches to the kernel cr3
* if necessary.
*/
SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=\cr3_reg
.Lend_\@:
.endm
.macro RESTORE_INT_REGS
popl %ebx
popl %ecx
popl %edx
popl %esi
popl %edi
popl %ebp
popl %eax
.endm
.macro RESTORE_REGS pop=0
RESTORE_INT_REGS
1: popl %ds
2: popl %es
3: popl %fs
POP_GS \pop
IRET_FRAME
.pushsection .fixup, "ax"
4: movl $0, (%esp)
jmp 1b
5: movl $0, (%esp)
jmp 2b
6: movl $0, (%esp)
jmp 3b
.popsection
_ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 4b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(2b, 5b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(3b, 6b)
POP_GS_EX
.endm
.macro RESTORE_ALL_NMI cr3_reg:req pop=0
/*
* Now switch the CR3 when PTI is enabled.
*
* We enter with kernel cr3 and switch the cr3 to the value
* stored on \cr3_reg, which is either a user or a kernel cr3.
*/
ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lswitched_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_PTI
testl $PTI_SWITCH_MASK, \cr3_reg
jz .Lswitched_\@
/* User cr3 in \cr3_reg - write it to hardware cr3 */
movl \cr3_reg, %cr3
.Lswitched_\@:
BUG_IF_WRONG_CR3
RESTORE_REGS pop=\pop
.endm
.macro CHECK_AND_APPLY_ESPFIX
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX32
#define GDT_ESPFIX_SS PER_CPU_VAR(gdt_page) + (GDT_ENTRY_ESPFIX_SS * 8)
ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_BUG_ESPFIX
movl PT_EFLAGS(%esp), %eax # mix EFLAGS, SS and CS
/*
* Warning: PT_OLDSS(%esp) contains the wrong/random values if we
* are returning to the kernel.
* See comments in process.c:copy_thread() for details.
*/
movb PT_OLDSS(%esp), %ah
movb PT_CS(%esp), %al
andl $(X86_EFLAGS_VM | (SEGMENT_TI_MASK << 8) | SEGMENT_RPL_MASK), %eax
cmpl $((SEGMENT_LDT << 8) | USER_RPL), %eax
jne .Lend_\@ # returning to user-space with LDT SS
/*
* Setup and switch to ESPFIX stack
*
* We're returning to userspace with a 16 bit stack. The CPU will not
* restore the high word of ESP for us on executing iret... This is an
* "official" bug of all the x86-compatible CPUs, which we can work
* around to make dosemu and wine happy. We do this by preloading the
* high word of ESP with the high word of the userspace ESP while
* compensating for the offset by changing to the ESPFIX segment with
* a base address that matches for the difference.
*/
mov %esp, %edx /* load kernel esp */
mov PT_OLDESP(%esp), %eax /* load userspace esp */
mov %dx, %ax /* eax: new kernel esp */
sub %eax, %edx /* offset (low word is 0) */
shr $16, %edx
mov %dl, GDT_ESPFIX_SS + 4 /* bits 16..23 */
mov %dh, GDT_ESPFIX_SS + 7 /* bits 24..31 */
pushl $__ESPFIX_SS
pushl %eax /* new kernel esp */
/*
* Disable interrupts, but do not irqtrace this section: we
* will soon execute iret and the tracer was already set to
* the irqstate after the IRET:
*/
DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_ANY)
lss (%esp), %esp /* switch to espfix segment */
.Lend_\@:
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX32 */
.endm
/*
* Called with pt_regs fully populated and kernel segments loaded,
* so we can access PER_CPU and use the integer registers.
*
* We need to be very careful here with the %esp switch, because an NMI
* can happen everywhere. If the NMI handler finds itself on the
* entry-stack, it will overwrite the task-stack and everything we
* copied there. So allocate the stack-frame on the task-stack and
* switch to it before we do any copying.
*/
x86/entry/32: Handle Entry from Kernel-Mode on Entry-Stack It is possible that the kernel is entered from kernel-mode and on the entry-stack. The most common way this happens is when an exception is triggered while loading the user-space segment registers on the kernel-to-userspace exit path. The segment loading needs to be done after the entry-stack switch, because the stack-switch needs kernel %fs for per_cpu access. When this happens, make sure to leave the kernel with the entry-stack again, so that the interrupted code-path runs on the right stack when switching to the user-cr3. Detect this condition on kernel-entry by checking CS.RPL and %esp, and if it happens, copy over the complete content of the entry stack to the task-stack. This needs to be done because once the exception handler is entereed, the task might be scheduled out or even migrated to a different CPU, so this cannot rely on the entry-stack contents. Leave a marker in the stack-frame to detect this condition on the exit path. On the exit path the copy is reversed, copy all of the remaining task-stack back to the entry-stack and switch to it. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com> Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca> Cc: joro@8bytes.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-11-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
2018-07-18 17:40:47 +08:00
.macro SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_STACK
ALTERNATIVE "", "jmp .Lend_\@", X86_FEATURE_XENPV
BUG_IF_WRONG_CR3
SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%eax
/*
* %eax now contains the entry cr3 and we carry it forward in
* that register for the time this macro runs
*/
/* Are we on the entry stack? Bail out if not! */
movl PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_entry_area), %ecx
addl $CPU_ENTRY_AREA_entry_stack + SIZEOF_entry_stack, %ecx
subl %esp, %ecx /* ecx = (end of entry_stack) - esp */
cmpl $SIZEOF_entry_stack, %ecx
jae .Lend_\@
/* Load stack pointer into %esi and %edi */
movl %esp, %esi
movl %esi, %edi
/* Move %edi to the top of the entry stack */
andl $(MASK_entry_stack), %edi
addl $(SIZEOF_entry_stack), %edi
/* Load top of task-stack into %edi */
movl TSS_entry2task_stack(%edi), %edi
x86/entry/32: Handle Entry from Kernel-Mode on Entry-Stack It is possible that the kernel is entered from kernel-mode and on the entry-stack. The most common way this happens is when an exception is triggered while loading the user-space segment registers on the kernel-to-userspace exit path. The segment loading needs to be done after the entry-stack switch, because the stack-switch needs kernel %fs for per_cpu access. When this happens, make sure to leave the kernel with the entry-stack again, so that the interrupted code-path runs on the right stack when switching to the user-cr3. Detect this condition on kernel-entry by checking CS.RPL and %esp, and if it happens, copy over the complete content of the entry stack to the task-stack. This needs to be done because once the exception handler is entereed, the task might be scheduled out or even migrated to a different CPU, so this cannot rely on the entry-stack contents. Leave a marker in the stack-frame to detect this condition on the exit path. On the exit path the copy is reversed, copy all of the remaining task-stack back to the entry-stack and switch to it. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com> Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca> Cc: joro@8bytes.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-11-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
2018-07-18 17:40:47 +08:00
/* Special case - entry from kernel mode via entry stack */
x86/entry/32: Check for VM86 mode in slow-path check The SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_STACK macro only checks for CPL == 0 to go down the slow and paranoid entry path. The problem is that this check also returns true when coming from VM86 mode. This is not a problem by itself, as the paranoid path handles VM86 stack-frames just fine, but it is not necessary as the normal code path handles VM86 mode as well (and faster). Extend the check to include VM86 mode. This also makes an optimization of the paranoid path possible. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com> Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: joro@8bytes.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1532103744-31902-3-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
2018-07-21 00:22:23 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_VM86
movl PT_EFLAGS(%esp), %ecx # mix EFLAGS and CS
movb PT_CS(%esp), %cl
andl $(X86_EFLAGS_VM | SEGMENT_RPL_MASK), %ecx
#else
movl PT_CS(%esp), %ecx
andl $SEGMENT_RPL_MASK, %ecx
#endif
cmpl $USER_RPL, %ecx
jb .Lentry_from_kernel_\@
x86/entry/32: Handle Entry from Kernel-Mode on Entry-Stack It is possible that the kernel is entered from kernel-mode and on the entry-stack. The most common way this happens is when an exception is triggered while loading the user-space segment registers on the kernel-to-userspace exit path. The segment loading needs to be done after the entry-stack switch, because the stack-switch needs kernel %fs for per_cpu access. When this happens, make sure to leave the kernel with the entry-stack again, so that the interrupted code-path runs on the right stack when switching to the user-cr3. Detect this condition on kernel-entry by checking CS.RPL and %esp, and if it happens, copy over the complete content of the entry stack to the task-stack. This needs to be done because once the exception handler is entereed, the task might be scheduled out or even migrated to a different CPU, so this cannot rely on the entry-stack contents. Leave a marker in the stack-frame to detect this condition on the exit path. On the exit path the copy is reversed, copy all of the remaining task-stack back to the entry-stack and switch to it. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com> Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca> Cc: joro@8bytes.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-11-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
2018-07-18 17:40:47 +08:00
/* Bytes to copy */
movl $PTREGS_SIZE, %ecx
#ifdef CONFIG_VM86
testl $X86_EFLAGS_VM, PT_EFLAGS(%esi)
jz .Lcopy_pt_regs_\@
/*
* Stack-frame contains 4 additional segment registers when
* coming from VM86 mode
*/
addl $(4 * 4), %ecx
#endif
x86/entry/32: Handle Entry from Kernel-Mode on Entry-Stack It is possible that the kernel is entered from kernel-mode and on the entry-stack. The most common way this happens is when an exception is triggered while loading the user-space segment registers on the kernel-to-userspace exit path. The segment loading needs to be done after the entry-stack switch, because the stack-switch needs kernel %fs for per_cpu access. When this happens, make sure to leave the kernel with the entry-stack again, so that the interrupted code-path runs on the right stack when switching to the user-cr3. Detect this condition on kernel-entry by checking CS.RPL and %esp, and if it happens, copy over the complete content of the entry stack to the task-stack. This needs to be done because once the exception handler is entereed, the task might be scheduled out or even migrated to a different CPU, so this cannot rely on the entry-stack contents. Leave a marker in the stack-frame to detect this condition on the exit path. On the exit path the copy is reversed, copy all of the remaining task-stack back to the entry-stack and switch to it. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com> Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca> Cc: joro@8bytes.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-11-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
2018-07-18 17:40:47 +08:00
.Lcopy_pt_regs_\@:
/* Allocate frame on task-stack */
subl %ecx, %edi
/* Switch to task-stack */
movl %edi, %esp
/*
* We are now on the task-stack and can safely copy over the
* stack-frame
*/
shrl $2, %ecx
cld
rep movsl
x86/entry/32: Handle Entry from Kernel-Mode on Entry-Stack It is possible that the kernel is entered from kernel-mode and on the entry-stack. The most common way this happens is when an exception is triggered while loading the user-space segment registers on the kernel-to-userspace exit path. The segment loading needs to be done after the entry-stack switch, because the stack-switch needs kernel %fs for per_cpu access. When this happens, make sure to leave the kernel with the entry-stack again, so that the interrupted code-path runs on the right stack when switching to the user-cr3. Detect this condition on kernel-entry by checking CS.RPL and %esp, and if it happens, copy over the complete content of the entry stack to the task-stack. This needs to be done because once the exception handler is entereed, the task might be scheduled out or even migrated to a different CPU, so this cannot rely on the entry-stack contents. Leave a marker in the stack-frame to detect this condition on the exit path. On the exit path the copy is reversed, copy all of the remaining task-stack back to the entry-stack and switch to it. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com> Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca> Cc: joro@8bytes.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-11-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
2018-07-18 17:40:47 +08:00
jmp .Lend_\@
.Lentry_from_kernel_\@:
/*
* This handles the case when we enter the kernel from
* kernel-mode and %esp points to the entry-stack. When this
* happens we need to switch to the task-stack to run C code,
* but switch back to the entry-stack again when we approach
* iret and return to the interrupted code-path. This usually
* happens when we hit an exception while restoring user-space
* segment registers on the way back to user-space or when the
* sysenter handler runs with eflags.tf set.
x86/entry/32: Handle Entry from Kernel-Mode on Entry-Stack It is possible that the kernel is entered from kernel-mode and on the entry-stack. The most common way this happens is when an exception is triggered while loading the user-space segment registers on the kernel-to-userspace exit path. The segment loading needs to be done after the entry-stack switch, because the stack-switch needs kernel %fs for per_cpu access. When this happens, make sure to leave the kernel with the entry-stack again, so that the interrupted code-path runs on the right stack when switching to the user-cr3. Detect this condition on kernel-entry by checking CS.RPL and %esp, and if it happens, copy over the complete content of the entry stack to the task-stack. This needs to be done because once the exception handler is entereed, the task might be scheduled out or even migrated to a different CPU, so this cannot rely on the entry-stack contents. Leave a marker in the stack-frame to detect this condition on the exit path. On the exit path the copy is reversed, copy all of the remaining task-stack back to the entry-stack and switch to it. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com> Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca> Cc: joro@8bytes.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-11-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
2018-07-18 17:40:47 +08:00
*
* When we switch to the task-stack here, we can't trust the
* contents of the entry-stack anymore, as the exception handler
* might be scheduled out or moved to another CPU. Therefore we
* copy the complete entry-stack to the task-stack and set a
* marker in the iret-frame (bit 31 of the CS dword) to detect
* what we've done on the iret path.
*
* On the iret path we copy everything back and switch to the
* entry-stack, so that the interrupted kernel code-path
* continues on the same stack it was interrupted with.
*
* Be aware that an NMI can happen anytime in this code.
*
* %esi: Entry-Stack pointer (same as %esp)
* %edi: Top of the task stack
* %eax: CR3 on kernel entry
x86/entry/32: Handle Entry from Kernel-Mode on Entry-Stack It is possible that the kernel is entered from kernel-mode and on the entry-stack. The most common way this happens is when an exception is triggered while loading the user-space segment registers on the kernel-to-userspace exit path. The segment loading needs to be done after the entry-stack switch, because the stack-switch needs kernel %fs for per_cpu access. When this happens, make sure to leave the kernel with the entry-stack again, so that the interrupted code-path runs on the right stack when switching to the user-cr3. Detect this condition on kernel-entry by checking CS.RPL and %esp, and if it happens, copy over the complete content of the entry stack to the task-stack. This needs to be done because once the exception handler is entereed, the task might be scheduled out or even migrated to a different CPU, so this cannot rely on the entry-stack contents. Leave a marker in the stack-frame to detect this condition on the exit path. On the exit path the copy is reversed, copy all of the remaining task-stack back to the entry-stack and switch to it. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com> Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca> Cc: joro@8bytes.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-11-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
2018-07-18 17:40:47 +08:00
*/
/* Calculate number of bytes on the entry stack in %ecx */
movl %esi, %ecx
/* %ecx to the top of entry-stack */
andl $(MASK_entry_stack), %ecx
addl $(SIZEOF_entry_stack), %ecx
/* Number of bytes on the entry stack to %ecx */
sub %esi, %ecx
/* Mark stackframe as coming from entry stack */
orl $CS_FROM_ENTRY_STACK, PT_CS(%esp)
/*
* Test the cr3 used to enter the kernel and add a marker
* so that we can switch back to it before iret.
*/
testl $PTI_SWITCH_MASK, %eax
jz .Lcopy_pt_regs_\@
orl $CS_FROM_USER_CR3, PT_CS(%esp)
x86/entry/32: Handle Entry from Kernel-Mode on Entry-Stack It is possible that the kernel is entered from kernel-mode and on the entry-stack. The most common way this happens is when an exception is triggered while loading the user-space segment registers on the kernel-to-userspace exit path. The segment loading needs to be done after the entry-stack switch, because the stack-switch needs kernel %fs for per_cpu access. When this happens, make sure to leave the kernel with the entry-stack again, so that the interrupted code-path runs on the right stack when switching to the user-cr3. Detect this condition on kernel-entry by checking CS.RPL and %esp, and if it happens, copy over the complete content of the entry stack to the task-stack. This needs to be done because once the exception handler is entereed, the task might be scheduled out or even migrated to a different CPU, so this cannot rely on the entry-stack contents. Leave a marker in the stack-frame to detect this condition on the exit path. On the exit path the copy is reversed, copy all of the remaining task-stack back to the entry-stack and switch to it. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com> Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca> Cc: joro@8bytes.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-11-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
2018-07-18 17:40:47 +08:00
/*
* %esi and %edi are unchanged, %ecx contains the number of
* bytes to copy. The code at .Lcopy_pt_regs_\@ will allocate
* the stack-frame on task-stack and copy everything over
*/
jmp .Lcopy_pt_regs_\@
.Lend_\@:
.endm
/*
* Switch back from the kernel stack to the entry stack.
*
* The %esp register must point to pt_regs on the task stack. It will
* first calculate the size of the stack-frame to copy, depending on
* whether we return to VM86 mode or not. With that it uses 'rep movsl'
* to copy the contents of the stack over to the entry stack.
*
* We must be very careful here, as we can't trust the contents of the
* task-stack once we switched to the entry-stack. When an NMI happens
* while on the entry-stack, the NMI handler will switch back to the top
* of the task stack, overwriting our stack-frame we are about to copy.
* Therefore we switch the stack only after everything is copied over.
*/
.macro SWITCH_TO_ENTRY_STACK
ALTERNATIVE "", "jmp .Lend_\@", X86_FEATURE_XENPV
/* Bytes to copy */
movl $PTREGS_SIZE, %ecx
#ifdef CONFIG_VM86
testl $(X86_EFLAGS_VM), PT_EFLAGS(%esp)
jz .Lcopy_pt_regs_\@
/* Additional 4 registers to copy when returning to VM86 mode */
addl $(4 * 4), %ecx
.Lcopy_pt_regs_\@:
#endif
/* Initialize source and destination for movsl */
movl PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp0), %edi
subl %ecx, %edi
movl %esp, %esi
/* Save future stack pointer in %ebx */
movl %edi, %ebx
/* Copy over the stack-frame */
shrl $2, %ecx
cld
rep movsl
/*
* Switch to entry-stack - needs to happen after everything is
* copied because the NMI handler will overwrite the task-stack
* when on entry-stack
*/
movl %ebx, %esp
.Lend_\@:
.endm
x86/entry/32: Handle Entry from Kernel-Mode on Entry-Stack It is possible that the kernel is entered from kernel-mode and on the entry-stack. The most common way this happens is when an exception is triggered while loading the user-space segment registers on the kernel-to-userspace exit path. The segment loading needs to be done after the entry-stack switch, because the stack-switch needs kernel %fs for per_cpu access. When this happens, make sure to leave the kernel with the entry-stack again, so that the interrupted code-path runs on the right stack when switching to the user-cr3. Detect this condition on kernel-entry by checking CS.RPL and %esp, and if it happens, copy over the complete content of the entry stack to the task-stack. This needs to be done because once the exception handler is entereed, the task might be scheduled out or even migrated to a different CPU, so this cannot rely on the entry-stack contents. Leave a marker in the stack-frame to detect this condition on the exit path. On the exit path the copy is reversed, copy all of the remaining task-stack back to the entry-stack and switch to it. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com> Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca> Cc: joro@8bytes.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-11-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
2018-07-18 17:40:47 +08:00
/*
* This macro handles the case when we return to kernel-mode on the iret
* path and have to switch back to the entry stack and/or user-cr3
x86/entry/32: Handle Entry from Kernel-Mode on Entry-Stack It is possible that the kernel is entered from kernel-mode and on the entry-stack. The most common way this happens is when an exception is triggered while loading the user-space segment registers on the kernel-to-userspace exit path. The segment loading needs to be done after the entry-stack switch, because the stack-switch needs kernel %fs for per_cpu access. When this happens, make sure to leave the kernel with the entry-stack again, so that the interrupted code-path runs on the right stack when switching to the user-cr3. Detect this condition on kernel-entry by checking CS.RPL and %esp, and if it happens, copy over the complete content of the entry stack to the task-stack. This needs to be done because once the exception handler is entereed, the task might be scheduled out or even migrated to a different CPU, so this cannot rely on the entry-stack contents. Leave a marker in the stack-frame to detect this condition on the exit path. On the exit path the copy is reversed, copy all of the remaining task-stack back to the entry-stack and switch to it. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com> Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca> Cc: joro@8bytes.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-11-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
2018-07-18 17:40:47 +08:00
*
* See the comments below the .Lentry_from_kernel_\@ label in the
* SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_STACK macro for more details.
*/
.macro PARANOID_EXIT_TO_KERNEL_MODE
/*
* Test if we entered the kernel with the entry-stack. Most
* likely we did not, because this code only runs on the
* return-to-kernel path.
*/
testl $CS_FROM_ENTRY_STACK, PT_CS(%esp)
jz .Lend_\@
/* Unlikely slow-path */
/* Clear marker from stack-frame */
andl $(~CS_FROM_ENTRY_STACK), PT_CS(%esp)
/* Copy the remaining task-stack contents to entry-stack */
movl %esp, %esi
movl PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp0), %edi
/* Bytes on the task-stack to ecx */
movl PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp1), %ecx
subl %esi, %ecx
/* Allocate stack-frame on entry-stack */
subl %ecx, %edi
/*
* Save future stack-pointer, we must not switch until the
* copy is done, otherwise the NMI handler could destroy the
* contents of the task-stack we are about to copy.
*/
movl %edi, %ebx
/* Do the copy */
shrl $2, %ecx
cld
rep movsl
/* Safe to switch to entry-stack now */
movl %ebx, %esp
/*
* We came from entry-stack and need to check if we also need to
* switch back to user cr3.
*/
testl $CS_FROM_USER_CR3, PT_CS(%esp)
jz .Lend_\@
/* Clear marker from stack-frame */
andl $(~CS_FROM_USER_CR3), PT_CS(%esp)
SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3 scratch_reg=%eax
x86/entry/32: Handle Entry from Kernel-Mode on Entry-Stack It is possible that the kernel is entered from kernel-mode and on the entry-stack. The most common way this happens is when an exception is triggered while loading the user-space segment registers on the kernel-to-userspace exit path. The segment loading needs to be done after the entry-stack switch, because the stack-switch needs kernel %fs for per_cpu access. When this happens, make sure to leave the kernel with the entry-stack again, so that the interrupted code-path runs on the right stack when switching to the user-cr3. Detect this condition on kernel-entry by checking CS.RPL and %esp, and if it happens, copy over the complete content of the entry stack to the task-stack. This needs to be done because once the exception handler is entereed, the task might be scheduled out or even migrated to a different CPU, so this cannot rely on the entry-stack contents. Leave a marker in the stack-frame to detect this condition on the exit path. On the exit path the copy is reversed, copy all of the remaining task-stack back to the entry-stack and switch to it. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com> Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca> Cc: joro@8bytes.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-11-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
2018-07-18 17:40:47 +08:00
.Lend_\@:
.endm
/*
* %eax: prev task
* %edx: next task
*/
ENTRY(__switch_to_asm)
/*
* Save callee-saved registers
* This must match the order in struct inactive_task_frame
*/
pushl %ebp
pushl %ebx
pushl %edi
pushl %esi
pushfl
/* switch stack */
movl %esp, TASK_threadsp(%eax)
movl TASK_threadsp(%edx), %esp
Kbuild: rename CC_STACKPROTECTOR[_STRONG] config variables The changes to automatically test for working stack protector compiler support in the Kconfig files removed the special STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO option that picked the strongest stack protector that the compiler supported. That was all a nice cleanup - it makes no sense to have the AUTO case now that the Kconfig phase can just determine the compiler support directly. HOWEVER. It also meant that doing "make oldconfig" would now _disable_ the strong stackprotector if you had AUTO enabled, because in a legacy config file, the sane stack protector configuration would look like CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE is not set # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR is not set # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO=y and when you ran this through "make oldconfig" with the Kbuild changes, it would ask you about the regular CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR (that had been renamed from CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR to just CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR), but it would think that the STRONG version used to be disabled (because it was really enabled by AUTO), and would disable it in the new config, resulting in: CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y That's dangerously subtle - people could suddenly find themselves with the weaker stack protector setup without even realizing. The solution here is to just rename not just the old RECULAR stack protector option, but also the strong one. This does that by just removing the CC_ prefix entirely for the user choices, because it really is not about the compiler support (the compiler support now instead automatially impacts _visibility_ of the options to users). This results in "make oldconfig" actually asking the user for their choice, so that we don't have any silent subtle security model changes. The end result would generally look like this: CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR=y CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG=y CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y where the "CC_" versions really are about internal compiler infrastructure, not the user selections. Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-06-14 11:21:18 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR
movl TASK_stack_canary(%edx), %ebx
movl %ebx, PER_CPU_VAR(stack_canary)+stack_canary_offset
#endif
x86/retpoline: Fill RSB on context switch for affected CPUs On context switch from a shallow call stack to a deeper one, as the CPU does 'ret' up the deeper side it may encounter RSB entries (predictions for where the 'ret' goes to) which were populated in userspace. This is problematic if neither SMEP nor KPTI (the latter of which marks userspace pages as NX for the kernel) are active, as malicious code in userspace may then be executed speculatively. Overwrite the CPU's return prediction stack with calls which are predicted to return to an infinite loop, to "capture" speculation if this happens. This is required both for retpoline, and also in conjunction with IBRS for !SMEP && !KPTI. On Skylake+ the problem is slightly different, and an *underflow* of the RSB may cause errant branch predictions to occur. So there it's not so much overwrite, as *filling* the RSB to attempt to prevent it getting empty. This is only a partial solution for Skylake+ since there are many other conditions which may result in the RSB becoming empty. The full solution on Skylake+ is to use IBRS, which will prevent the problem even when the RSB becomes empty. With IBRS, the RSB-stuffing will not be required on context switch. [ tglx: Added missing vendor check and slighty massaged comments and changelog ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515779365-9032-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
2018-01-13 01:49:25 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
/*
* When switching from a shallower to a deeper call stack
* the RSB may either underflow or use entries populated
* with userspace addresses. On CPUs where those concerns
* exist, overwrite the RSB with entries which capture
* speculative execution to prevent attack.
*/
FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %ebx, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW
x86/retpoline: Fill RSB on context switch for affected CPUs On context switch from a shallow call stack to a deeper one, as the CPU does 'ret' up the deeper side it may encounter RSB entries (predictions for where the 'ret' goes to) which were populated in userspace. This is problematic if neither SMEP nor KPTI (the latter of which marks userspace pages as NX for the kernel) are active, as malicious code in userspace may then be executed speculatively. Overwrite the CPU's return prediction stack with calls which are predicted to return to an infinite loop, to "capture" speculation if this happens. This is required both for retpoline, and also in conjunction with IBRS for !SMEP && !KPTI. On Skylake+ the problem is slightly different, and an *underflow* of the RSB may cause errant branch predictions to occur. So there it's not so much overwrite, as *filling* the RSB to attempt to prevent it getting empty. This is only a partial solution for Skylake+ since there are many other conditions which may result in the RSB becoming empty. The full solution on Skylake+ is to use IBRS, which will prevent the problem even when the RSB becomes empty. With IBRS, the RSB-stuffing will not be required on context switch. [ tglx: Added missing vendor check and slighty massaged comments and changelog ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515779365-9032-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
2018-01-13 01:49:25 +08:00
#endif
/* restore callee-saved registers */
popfl
popl %esi
popl %edi
popl %ebx
popl %ebp
jmp __switch_to
END(__switch_to_asm)
Revert "x86/entry: Fix the end of the stack for newly forked tasks" Petr Mladek reported the following warning when loading the livepatch sample module: WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3699 at arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:132 save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable+0x133/0x1a0 ... Call Trace: __schedule+0x273/0x820 schedule+0x36/0x80 kthreadd+0x305/0x310 ? kthread_create_on_cpu+0x80/0x80 ? icmp_echo.part.32+0x50/0x50 ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x40 That warning means the end of the stack is no longer recognized as such for newly forked tasks. The problem was introduced with the following commit: ff3f7e2475bb ("x86/entry: Fix the end of the stack for newly forked tasks") ... which was completely misguided. It only partially fixed the reported issue, and it introduced another bug in the process. None of the other entry code saves the frame pointer before calling into C code, so it doesn't make sense for ret_from_fork to do so either. Contrary to what I originally thought, the original issue wasn't related to newly forked tasks. It was actually related to ftrace. When entry code calls into a function which then calls into an ftrace handler, the stack frame looks different than normal. The original issue will be fixed in the unwinder, in a subsequent patch. Reported-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org Fixes: ff3f7e2475bb ("x86/entry: Fix the end of the stack for newly forked tasks") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f350760f7e82f0750c8d1dd093456eb212751caa.1495553739.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-05-23 23:37:29 +08:00
/*
* The unwinder expects the last frame on the stack to always be at the same
* offset from the end of the page, which allows it to validate the stack.
* Calling schedule_tail() directly would break that convention because its an
* asmlinkage function so its argument has to be pushed on the stack. This
* wrapper creates a proper "end of stack" frame header before the call.
*/
ENTRY(schedule_tail_wrapper)
FRAME_BEGIN
pushl %eax
call schedule_tail
popl %eax
FRAME_END
ret
ENDPROC(schedule_tail_wrapper)
/*
* A newly forked process directly context switches into this address.
*
* eax: prev task we switched from
* ebx: kernel thread func (NULL for user thread)
* edi: kernel thread arg
*/
ENTRY(ret_from_fork)
Revert "x86/entry: Fix the end of the stack for newly forked tasks" Petr Mladek reported the following warning when loading the livepatch sample module: WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3699 at arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:132 save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable+0x133/0x1a0 ... Call Trace: __schedule+0x273/0x820 schedule+0x36/0x80 kthreadd+0x305/0x310 ? kthread_create_on_cpu+0x80/0x80 ? icmp_echo.part.32+0x50/0x50 ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x40 That warning means the end of the stack is no longer recognized as such for newly forked tasks. The problem was introduced with the following commit: ff3f7e2475bb ("x86/entry: Fix the end of the stack for newly forked tasks") ... which was completely misguided. It only partially fixed the reported issue, and it introduced another bug in the process. None of the other entry code saves the frame pointer before calling into C code, so it doesn't make sense for ret_from_fork to do so either. Contrary to what I originally thought, the original issue wasn't related to newly forked tasks. It was actually related to ftrace. When entry code calls into a function which then calls into an ftrace handler, the stack frame looks different than normal. The original issue will be fixed in the unwinder, in a subsequent patch. Reported-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org Fixes: ff3f7e2475bb ("x86/entry: Fix the end of the stack for newly forked tasks") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f350760f7e82f0750c8d1dd093456eb212751caa.1495553739.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-05-23 23:37:29 +08:00
call schedule_tail_wrapper
testl %ebx, %ebx
jnz 1f /* kernel threads are uncommon */
2:
/* When we fork, we trace the syscall return in the child, too. */
Revert "x86/entry: Fix the end of the stack for newly forked tasks" Petr Mladek reported the following warning when loading the livepatch sample module: WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3699 at arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:132 save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable+0x133/0x1a0 ... Call Trace: __schedule+0x273/0x820 schedule+0x36/0x80 kthreadd+0x305/0x310 ? kthread_create_on_cpu+0x80/0x80 ? icmp_echo.part.32+0x50/0x50 ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x40 That warning means the end of the stack is no longer recognized as such for newly forked tasks. The problem was introduced with the following commit: ff3f7e2475bb ("x86/entry: Fix the end of the stack for newly forked tasks") ... which was completely misguided. It only partially fixed the reported issue, and it introduced another bug in the process. None of the other entry code saves the frame pointer before calling into C code, so it doesn't make sense for ret_from_fork to do so either. Contrary to what I originally thought, the original issue wasn't related to newly forked tasks. It was actually related to ftrace. When entry code calls into a function which then calls into an ftrace handler, the stack frame looks different than normal. The original issue will be fixed in the unwinder, in a subsequent patch. Reported-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org Fixes: ff3f7e2475bb ("x86/entry: Fix the end of the stack for newly forked tasks") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f350760f7e82f0750c8d1dd093456eb212751caa.1495553739.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-05-23 23:37:29 +08:00
movl %esp, %eax
call syscall_return_slowpath
x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls The STACKLEAK feature (initially developed by PaX Team) has the following benefits: 1. Reduces the information that can be revealed through kernel stack leak bugs. The idea of erasing the thread stack at the end of syscalls is similar to CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING and memzero_explicit() in kernel crypto, which all comply with FDP_RIP.2 (Full Residual Information Protection) of the Common Criteria standard. 2. Blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks (e.g. CVE-2017-17712, CVE-2010-2963). That kind of bugs should be killed by improving C compilers in future, which might take a long time. This commit introduces the code filling the used part of the kernel stack with a poison value before returning to userspace. Full STACKLEAK feature also contains the gcc plugin which comes in a separate commit. The STACKLEAK feature is ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at: https://grsecurity.net/ https://pax.grsecurity.net/ This code is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on our understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are ours and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Performance impact: Hardware: Intel Core i7-4770, 16 GB RAM Test #1: building the Linux kernel on a single core 0.91% slowdown Test #2: hackbench -s 4096 -l 2000 -g 15 -f 25 -P 4.2% slowdown So the STACKLEAK description in Kconfig includes: "The tradeoff is the performance impact: on a single CPU system kernel compilation sees a 1% slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary and you are advised to test this feature on your expected workload before deploying it". Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-08-17 06:16:58 +08:00
STACKLEAK_ERASE
jmp restore_all
/* kernel thread */
1: movl %edi, %eax
x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry assembler indirect jumps Convert indirect jumps in core 32/64bit entry assembler code to use non-speculative sequences when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled. Don't use CALL_NOSPEC in entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath because the return address after the 'call' instruction must be *precisely* at the .Lentry_SYSCALL_64_after_fastpath label for stub_ptregs_64 to work, and the use of alternatives will mess that up unless we play horrid games to prepend with NOPs and make the variants the same length. It's not worth it; in the case where we ALTERNATIVE out the retpoline, the first instruction at __x86.indirect_thunk.rax is going to be a bare jmp *%rax anyway. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-7-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
2018-01-12 05:46:28 +08:00
CALL_NOSPEC %ebx
/*
* A kernel thread is allowed to return here after successfully
* calling do_execve(). Exit to userspace to complete the execve()
* syscall.
*/
movl $0, PT_EAX(%esp)
jmp 2b
END(ret_from_fork)
/*
* Return to user mode is not as complex as all this looks,
* but we want the default path for a system call return to
* go as quickly as possible which is why some of this is
* less clear than it otherwise should be.
*/
# userspace resumption stub bypassing syscall exit tracing
ALIGN
ret_from_exception:
preempt_stop(CLBR_ANY)
ret_from_intr:
#ifdef CONFIG_VM86
movl PT_EFLAGS(%esp), %eax # mix EFLAGS and CS
movb PT_CS(%esp), %al
andl $(X86_EFLAGS_VM | SEGMENT_RPL_MASK), %eax
#else
/*
* We can be coming here from child spawned by kernel_thread().
*/
movl PT_CS(%esp), %eax
andl $SEGMENT_RPL_MASK, %eax
#endif
cmpl $USER_RPL, %eax
jb restore_all_kernel # not returning to v8086 or userspace
ENTRY(resume_userspace)
DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_ANY)
x86: fix lockdep warning during suspend-to-ram Andrew Morton wrote: > I've been seeing the below for a long time during suspend-to-ram on the Vaio. > > > PM: Syncing filesystems ... done. > PM: Preparing system for mem sleep > Freezing user space processes ... <4>------------[ cut here ]------------ > WARNING: at kernel/lockdep.c:2658 check_flags+0x4c/0x127() > Modules linked in: i915 drm ipw2200 sonypi ipv6 autofs4 hidp l2cap bluetooth sunrpc nf_conntrack_netbios_ns ipt_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv4 xt_state nf_conntrack xt_tcpudp iptable_filter ip_tables x_tables acpi_cpufreq nvram ohci1394 ieee1394 ehci_hcd uhci_hcd sg joydev snd_hda_intel snd_seq_dummy sr_mod snd_seq_oss cdrom snd_seq_midi_event snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm_oss snd_mixer_oss ieee80211 pcspkr ieee80211_crypt snd_pcm i2c_i801 snd_timer i2c_core ide_pci_generic piix snd soundcore snd_page_alloc button ext3 jbd ide_disk ide_core [last unloaded: ipw2200] > Pid: 3250, comm: zsh Not tainted 2.6.26-rc5 #1 > [<c011c5f5>] warn_on_slowpath+0x41/0x6d > [<c01080e6>] ? native_sched_clock+0x82/0x96 > [<c013789c>] ? mark_held_locks+0x41/0x5c > [<c0315688>] ? _spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x36/0x58 > [<c0137a29>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xe6/0x10d > [<c0138637>] ? __lock_acquire+0xae3/0xb2b > [<c0313413>] ? schedule+0x39b/0x3b4 > [<c0135596>] check_flags+0x4c/0x127 > [<c01386b9>] lock_acquire+0x3a/0x86 > [<c0315075>] _spin_lock+0x26/0x53 > [<c0140660>] ? refrigerator+0x13/0xc3 > [<c0140660>] refrigerator+0x13/0xc3 > [<c012684a>] get_signal_to_deliver+0x3c/0x31e > [<c0102fe7>] do_notify_resume+0x91/0x6ee > [<c01359fd>] ? lock_release_holdtime+0x50/0x56 > [<c0315688>] ? _spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x36/0x58 > [<c0235d24>] ? read_chan+0x0/0x58c > [<c0137a29>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xe6/0x10d > [<c0315694>] ? _spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x42/0x58 > [<c0230afa>] ? tty_ldisc_deref+0x5c/0x63 > [<c0233104>] ? tty_read+0x66/0x98 > [<c014b3f0>] ? audit_syscall_exit+0x2aa/0x2c5 > [<c0109430>] ? do_syscall_trace+0x6b/0x16f > [<c0103a9c>] work_notifysig+0x13/0x1b > ======================= > ---[ end trace 25b49fe59a25afa5 ]--- > possible reason: unannotated irqs-off. > irq event stamp: 58919 > hardirqs last enabled at (58919): [<c0103afd>] syscall_exit_work+0x11/0x26 Joy - I so love entry.S Best I can make of it: syscall_exit_work resume_userspace DISABLE_INTERRUPTS (no TRACE_IRQS_OFF) work_pending work_notifysig do_notify_resume() do_signal() get_signal_to_deliver() try_to_freeze() refrigerator() task_lock() -> check_flags() -> BANG The normal path is: syscall_exit_work resume_userspace DISABLE_INTERRUPTS restore_all TRACE_IRQS_IRET iret No idea why that would not warn.. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-06-06 16:14:08 +08:00
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
movl %esp, %eax
call prepare_exit_to_usermode
jmp restore_all
END(ret_from_exception)
x86/entry: Vastly simplify SYSENTER TF (single-step) handling Due to a blatant design error, SYSENTER doesn't clear TF (single-step). As a result, if a user does SYSENTER with TF set, we will single-step through the kernel until something clears TF. There is absolutely nothing we can do to prevent this short of turning off SYSENTER [1]. Simplify the handling considerably with two changes: 1. We already sanitize EFLAGS in SYSENTER to clear NT and AC. We can add TF to that list of flags to sanitize with no overhead whatsoever. 2. Teach do_debug() to ignore single-step traps in the SYSENTER prologue. That's all we need to do. Don't get too excited -- our handling is still buggy on 32-bit kernels. There's nothing wrong with the SYSENTER code itself, but the #DB prologue has a clever fixup for traps on the very first instruction of entry_SYSENTER_32, and the fixup doesn't work quite correctly. The next two patches will fix that. [1] We could probably prevent it by forcing BTF on at all times and making sure we clear TF before any branches in the SYSENTER code. Needless to say, this is a bad idea. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a30d2ea06fe4b621fe6a9ef911b02c0f38feb6f2.1457578375.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-03-10 11:00:30 +08:00
GLOBAL(__begin_SYSENTER_singlestep_region)
/*
* All code from here through __end_SYSENTER_singlestep_region is subject
* to being single-stepped if a user program sets TF and executes SYSENTER.
* There is absolutely nothing that we can do to prevent this from happening
* (thanks Intel!). To keep our handling of this situation as simple as
* possible, we handle TF just like AC and NT, except that our #DB handler
* will ignore all of the single-step traps generated in this range.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV
x86/entry: Vastly simplify SYSENTER TF (single-step) handling Due to a blatant design error, SYSENTER doesn't clear TF (single-step). As a result, if a user does SYSENTER with TF set, we will single-step through the kernel until something clears TF. There is absolutely nothing we can do to prevent this short of turning off SYSENTER [1]. Simplify the handling considerably with two changes: 1. We already sanitize EFLAGS in SYSENTER to clear NT and AC. We can add TF to that list of flags to sanitize with no overhead whatsoever. 2. Teach do_debug() to ignore single-step traps in the SYSENTER prologue. That's all we need to do. Don't get too excited -- our handling is still buggy on 32-bit kernels. There's nothing wrong with the SYSENTER code itself, but the #DB prologue has a clever fixup for traps on the very first instruction of entry_SYSENTER_32, and the fixup doesn't work quite correctly. The next two patches will fix that. [1] We could probably prevent it by forcing BTF on at all times and making sure we clear TF before any branches in the SYSENTER code. Needless to say, this is a bad idea. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a30d2ea06fe4b621fe6a9ef911b02c0f38feb6f2.1457578375.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-03-10 11:00:30 +08:00
/*
* Xen doesn't set %esp to be precisely what the normal SYSENTER
* entry point expects, so fix it up before using the normal path.
*/
ENTRY(xen_sysenter_target)
addl $5*4, %esp /* remove xen-provided frame */
jmp .Lsysenter_past_esp
x86/entry: Vastly simplify SYSENTER TF (single-step) handling Due to a blatant design error, SYSENTER doesn't clear TF (single-step). As a result, if a user does SYSENTER with TF set, we will single-step through the kernel until something clears TF. There is absolutely nothing we can do to prevent this short of turning off SYSENTER [1]. Simplify the handling considerably with two changes: 1. We already sanitize EFLAGS in SYSENTER to clear NT and AC. We can add TF to that list of flags to sanitize with no overhead whatsoever. 2. Teach do_debug() to ignore single-step traps in the SYSENTER prologue. That's all we need to do. Don't get too excited -- our handling is still buggy on 32-bit kernels. There's nothing wrong with the SYSENTER code itself, but the #DB prologue has a clever fixup for traps on the very first instruction of entry_SYSENTER_32, and the fixup doesn't work quite correctly. The next two patches will fix that. [1] We could probably prevent it by forcing BTF on at all times and making sure we clear TF before any branches in the SYSENTER code. Needless to say, this is a bad idea. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a30d2ea06fe4b621fe6a9ef911b02c0f38feb6f2.1457578375.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-03-10 11:00:30 +08:00
#endif
/*
* 32-bit SYSENTER entry.
*
* 32-bit system calls through the vDSO's __kernel_vsyscall enter here
* if X86_FEATURE_SEP is available. This is the preferred system call
* entry on 32-bit systems.
*
* The SYSENTER instruction, in principle, should *only* occur in the
* vDSO. In practice, a small number of Android devices were shipped
* with a copy of Bionic that inlined a SYSENTER instruction. This
* never happened in any of Google's Bionic versions -- it only happened
* in a narrow range of Intel-provided versions.
*
* SYSENTER loads SS, ESP, CS, and EIP from previously programmed MSRs.
* IF and VM in RFLAGS are cleared (IOW: interrupts are off).
* SYSENTER does not save anything on the stack,
* and does not save old EIP (!!!), ESP, or EFLAGS.
*
* To avoid losing track of EFLAGS.VM (and thus potentially corrupting
* user and/or vm86 state), we explicitly disable the SYSENTER
* instruction in vm86 mode by reprogramming the MSRs.
*
* Arguments:
* eax system call number
* ebx arg1
* ecx arg2
* edx arg3
* esi arg4
* edi arg5
* ebp user stack
* 0(%ebp) arg6
*/
ENTRY(entry_SYSENTER_32)
/*
* On entry-stack with all userspace-regs live - save and
* restore eflags and %eax to use it as scratch-reg for the cr3
* switch.
*/
pushfl
pushl %eax
BUG_IF_WRONG_CR3 no_user_check=1
SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%eax
popl %eax
popfl
/* Stack empty again, switch to task stack */
x86/entry/32: Rename TSS_sysenter_sp0 to TSS_entry2task_stack The stack address doesn't need to be stored in tss.sp0 if the stack is switched manually like on sysenter. Rename the offset so that it still makes sense when its location is changed in later patches. This stackk will also be used for all kernel-entry points, not just sysenter. Reflect that and the fact that it is the offset to the task-stack location in the name as well. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com> Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca> Cc: joro@8bytes.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-3-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
2018-07-18 17:40:39 +08:00
movl TSS_entry2task_stack(%esp), %esp
.Lsysenter_past_esp:
pushl $__USER_DS /* pt_regs->ss */
pushl %ebp /* pt_regs->sp (stashed in bp) */
pushfl /* pt_regs->flags (except IF = 0) */
orl $X86_EFLAGS_IF, (%esp) /* Fix IF */
pushl $__USER_CS /* pt_regs->cs */
pushl $0 /* pt_regs->ip = 0 (placeholder) */
pushl %eax /* pt_regs->orig_ax */
SAVE_ALL pt_regs_ax=$-ENOSYS /* save rest, stack already switched */
/*
x86/entry: Vastly simplify SYSENTER TF (single-step) handling Due to a blatant design error, SYSENTER doesn't clear TF (single-step). As a result, if a user does SYSENTER with TF set, we will single-step through the kernel until something clears TF. There is absolutely nothing we can do to prevent this short of turning off SYSENTER [1]. Simplify the handling considerably with two changes: 1. We already sanitize EFLAGS in SYSENTER to clear NT and AC. We can add TF to that list of flags to sanitize with no overhead whatsoever. 2. Teach do_debug() to ignore single-step traps in the SYSENTER prologue. That's all we need to do. Don't get too excited -- our handling is still buggy on 32-bit kernels. There's nothing wrong with the SYSENTER code itself, but the #DB prologue has a clever fixup for traps on the very first instruction of entry_SYSENTER_32, and the fixup doesn't work quite correctly. The next two patches will fix that. [1] We could probably prevent it by forcing BTF on at all times and making sure we clear TF before any branches in the SYSENTER code. Needless to say, this is a bad idea. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a30d2ea06fe4b621fe6a9ef911b02c0f38feb6f2.1457578375.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-03-10 11:00:30 +08:00
* SYSENTER doesn't filter flags, so we need to clear NT, AC
* and TF ourselves. To save a few cycles, we can check whether
* either was set instead of doing an unconditional popfq.
* This needs to happen before enabling interrupts so that
* we don't get preempted with NT set.
*
x86/entry: Vastly simplify SYSENTER TF (single-step) handling Due to a blatant design error, SYSENTER doesn't clear TF (single-step). As a result, if a user does SYSENTER with TF set, we will single-step through the kernel until something clears TF. There is absolutely nothing we can do to prevent this short of turning off SYSENTER [1]. Simplify the handling considerably with two changes: 1. We already sanitize EFLAGS in SYSENTER to clear NT and AC. We can add TF to that list of flags to sanitize with no overhead whatsoever. 2. Teach do_debug() to ignore single-step traps in the SYSENTER prologue. That's all we need to do. Don't get too excited -- our handling is still buggy on 32-bit kernels. There's nothing wrong with the SYSENTER code itself, but the #DB prologue has a clever fixup for traps on the very first instruction of entry_SYSENTER_32, and the fixup doesn't work quite correctly. The next two patches will fix that. [1] We could probably prevent it by forcing BTF on at all times and making sure we clear TF before any branches in the SYSENTER code. Needless to say, this is a bad idea. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a30d2ea06fe4b621fe6a9ef911b02c0f38feb6f2.1457578375.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-03-10 11:00:30 +08:00
* If TF is set, we will single-step all the way to here -- do_debug
* will ignore all the traps. (Yes, this is slow, but so is
* single-stepping in general. This allows us to avoid having
* a more complicated code to handle the case where a user program
* forces us to single-step through the SYSENTER entry code.)
*
* NB.: .Lsysenter_fix_flags is a label with the code under it moved
* out-of-line as an optimization: NT is unlikely to be set in the
* majority of the cases and instead of polluting the I$ unnecessarily,
* we're keeping that code behind a branch which will predict as
* not-taken and therefore its instructions won't be fetched.
*/
x86/entry: Vastly simplify SYSENTER TF (single-step) handling Due to a blatant design error, SYSENTER doesn't clear TF (single-step). As a result, if a user does SYSENTER with TF set, we will single-step through the kernel until something clears TF. There is absolutely nothing we can do to prevent this short of turning off SYSENTER [1]. Simplify the handling considerably with two changes: 1. We already sanitize EFLAGS in SYSENTER to clear NT and AC. We can add TF to that list of flags to sanitize with no overhead whatsoever. 2. Teach do_debug() to ignore single-step traps in the SYSENTER prologue. That's all we need to do. Don't get too excited -- our handling is still buggy on 32-bit kernels. There's nothing wrong with the SYSENTER code itself, but the #DB prologue has a clever fixup for traps on the very first instruction of entry_SYSENTER_32, and the fixup doesn't work quite correctly. The next two patches will fix that. [1] We could probably prevent it by forcing BTF on at all times and making sure we clear TF before any branches in the SYSENTER code. Needless to say, this is a bad idea. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a30d2ea06fe4b621fe6a9ef911b02c0f38feb6f2.1457578375.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-03-10 11:00:30 +08:00
testl $X86_EFLAGS_NT|X86_EFLAGS_AC|X86_EFLAGS_TF, PT_EFLAGS(%esp)
jnz .Lsysenter_fix_flags
.Lsysenter_flags_fixed:
/*
* User mode is traced as though IRQs are on, and SYSENTER
* turned them off.
[PATCH] vdso: randomize the i386 vDSO by moving it into a vma Move the i386 VDSO down into a vma and thus randomize it. Besides the security implications, this feature also helps debuggers, which can COW a vma-backed VDSO just like a normal DSO and can thus do single-stepping and other debugging features. It's good for hypervisors (Xen, VMWare) too, which typically live in the same high-mapped address space as the VDSO, hence whenever the VDSO is used, they get lots of guest pagefaults and have to fix such guest accesses up - which slows things down instead of speeding things up (the primary purpose of the VDSO). There's a new CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO (default=y) option, which provides support for older glibcs that still rely on a prelinked high-mapped VDSO. Newer distributions (using glibc 2.3.3 or later) can turn this option off. Turning it off is also recommended for security reasons: attackers cannot use the predictable high-mapped VDSO page as syscall trampoline anymore. There is a new vdso=[0|1] boot option as well, and a runtime /proc/sys/vm/vdso_enabled sysctl switch, that allows the VDSO to be turned on/off. (This version of the VDSO-randomization patch also has working ELF coredumping, the previous patch crashed in the coredumping code.) This code is a combined work of the exec-shield VDSO randomization code and Gerd Hoffmann's hypervisor-centric VDSO patch. Rusty Russell started this patch and i completed it. [akpm@osdl.org: cleanups] [akpm@osdl.org: compile fix] [akpm@osdl.org: compile fix 2] [akpm@osdl.org: compile fix 3] [akpm@osdl.org: revernt MAXMEM change] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@suse.de> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Zachary Amsden <zach@vmware.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de> Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 17:53:50 +08:00
*/
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
movl %esp, %eax
call do_fast_syscall_32
/* XEN PV guests always use IRET path */
ALTERNATIVE "testl %eax, %eax; jz .Lsyscall_32_done", \
"jmp .Lsyscall_32_done", X86_FEATURE_XENPV
x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls The STACKLEAK feature (initially developed by PaX Team) has the following benefits: 1. Reduces the information that can be revealed through kernel stack leak bugs. The idea of erasing the thread stack at the end of syscalls is similar to CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING and memzero_explicit() in kernel crypto, which all comply with FDP_RIP.2 (Full Residual Information Protection) of the Common Criteria standard. 2. Blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks (e.g. CVE-2017-17712, CVE-2010-2963). That kind of bugs should be killed by improving C compilers in future, which might take a long time. This commit introduces the code filling the used part of the kernel stack with a poison value before returning to userspace. Full STACKLEAK feature also contains the gcc plugin which comes in a separate commit. The STACKLEAK feature is ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at: https://grsecurity.net/ https://pax.grsecurity.net/ This code is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on our understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are ours and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Performance impact: Hardware: Intel Core i7-4770, 16 GB RAM Test #1: building the Linux kernel on a single core 0.91% slowdown Test #2: hackbench -s 4096 -l 2000 -g 15 -f 25 -P 4.2% slowdown So the STACKLEAK description in Kconfig includes: "The tradeoff is the performance impact: on a single CPU system kernel compilation sees a 1% slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary and you are advised to test this feature on your expected workload before deploying it". Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-08-17 06:16:58 +08:00
STACKLEAK_ERASE
/* Opportunistic SYSEXIT */
TRACE_IRQS_ON /* User mode traces as IRQs on. */
/*
* Setup entry stack - we keep the pointer in %eax and do the
* switch after almost all user-state is restored.
*/
/* Load entry stack pointer and allocate frame for eflags/eax */
movl PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_tss_rw + TSS_sp0), %eax
subl $(2*4), %eax
/* Copy eflags and eax to entry stack */
movl PT_EFLAGS(%esp), %edi
movl PT_EAX(%esp), %esi
movl %edi, (%eax)
movl %esi, 4(%eax)
/* Restore user registers and segments */
movl PT_EIP(%esp), %edx /* pt_regs->ip */
movl PT_OLDESP(%esp), %ecx /* pt_regs->sp */
1: mov PT_FS(%esp), %fs
PTGS_TO_GS
popl %ebx /* pt_regs->bx */
addl $2*4, %esp /* skip pt_regs->cx and pt_regs->dx */
popl %esi /* pt_regs->si */
popl %edi /* pt_regs->di */
popl %ebp /* pt_regs->bp */
/* Switch to entry stack */
movl %eax, %esp
/* Now ready to switch the cr3 */
SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3 scratch_reg=%eax
/*
* Restore all flags except IF. (We restore IF separately because
* STI gives a one-instruction window in which we won't be interrupted,
* whereas POPF does not.)
*/
btrl $X86_EFLAGS_IF_BIT, (%esp)
BUG_IF_WRONG_CR3 no_user_check=1
popfl
popl %eax
/*
* Return back to the vDSO, which will pop ecx and edx.
* Don't bother with DS and ES (they already contain __USER_DS).
*/
sti
sysexit
.pushsection .fixup, "ax"
2: movl $0, PT_FS(%esp)
jmp 1b
.popsection
_ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 2b)
PTGS_TO_GS_EX
.Lsysenter_fix_flags:
pushl $X86_EFLAGS_FIXED
popfl
jmp .Lsysenter_flags_fixed
x86/entry: Vastly simplify SYSENTER TF (single-step) handling Due to a blatant design error, SYSENTER doesn't clear TF (single-step). As a result, if a user does SYSENTER with TF set, we will single-step through the kernel until something clears TF. There is absolutely nothing we can do to prevent this short of turning off SYSENTER [1]. Simplify the handling considerably with two changes: 1. We already sanitize EFLAGS in SYSENTER to clear NT and AC. We can add TF to that list of flags to sanitize with no overhead whatsoever. 2. Teach do_debug() to ignore single-step traps in the SYSENTER prologue. That's all we need to do. Don't get too excited -- our handling is still buggy on 32-bit kernels. There's nothing wrong with the SYSENTER code itself, but the #DB prologue has a clever fixup for traps on the very first instruction of entry_SYSENTER_32, and the fixup doesn't work quite correctly. The next two patches will fix that. [1] We could probably prevent it by forcing BTF on at all times and making sure we clear TF before any branches in the SYSENTER code. Needless to say, this is a bad idea. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/a30d2ea06fe4b621fe6a9ef911b02c0f38feb6f2.1457578375.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-03-10 11:00:30 +08:00
GLOBAL(__end_SYSENTER_singlestep_region)
ENDPROC(entry_SYSENTER_32)
/*
* 32-bit legacy system call entry.
*
* 32-bit x86 Linux system calls traditionally used the INT $0x80
* instruction. INT $0x80 lands here.
*
* This entry point can be used by any 32-bit perform system calls.
* Instances of INT $0x80 can be found inline in various programs and
* libraries. It is also used by the vDSO's __kernel_vsyscall
* fallback for hardware that doesn't support a faster entry method.
* Restarted 32-bit system calls also fall back to INT $0x80
* regardless of what instruction was originally used to do the system
* call. (64-bit programs can use INT $0x80 as well, but they can
* only run on 64-bit kernels and therefore land in
* entry_INT80_compat.)
*
* This is considered a slow path. It is not used by most libc
* implementations on modern hardware except during process startup.
*
* Arguments:
* eax system call number
* ebx arg1
* ecx arg2
* edx arg3
* esi arg4
* edi arg5
* ebp arg6
*/
ENTRY(entry_INT80_32)
ASM_CLAC
pushl %eax /* pt_regs->orig_ax */
SAVE_ALL pt_regs_ax=$-ENOSYS switch_stacks=1 /* save rest */
/*
* User mode is traced as though IRQs are on, and the interrupt gate
* turned them off.
*/
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
movl %esp, %eax
call do_int80_syscall_32
.Lsyscall_32_done:
x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls The STACKLEAK feature (initially developed by PaX Team) has the following benefits: 1. Reduces the information that can be revealed through kernel stack leak bugs. The idea of erasing the thread stack at the end of syscalls is similar to CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING and memzero_explicit() in kernel crypto, which all comply with FDP_RIP.2 (Full Residual Information Protection) of the Common Criteria standard. 2. Blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks (e.g. CVE-2017-17712, CVE-2010-2963). That kind of bugs should be killed by improving C compilers in future, which might take a long time. This commit introduces the code filling the used part of the kernel stack with a poison value before returning to userspace. Full STACKLEAK feature also contains the gcc plugin which comes in a separate commit. The STACKLEAK feature is ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at: https://grsecurity.net/ https://pax.grsecurity.net/ This code is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on our understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are ours and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Performance impact: Hardware: Intel Core i7-4770, 16 GB RAM Test #1: building the Linux kernel on a single core 0.91% slowdown Test #2: hackbench -s 4096 -l 2000 -g 15 -f 25 -P 4.2% slowdown So the STACKLEAK description in Kconfig includes: "The tradeoff is the performance impact: on a single CPU system kernel compilation sees a 1% slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary and you are advised to test this feature on your expected workload before deploying it". Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-08-17 06:16:58 +08:00
STACKLEAK_ERASE
restore_all:
i386: fix return to 16-bit stack from NMI handler Returning to a task with a 16-bit stack requires special care: the iret instruction does not restore the high word of esp in that case. The espfix code fixes this, but currently is not invoked on NMIs. This means that a running task gets the upper word of esp clobbered due intervening NMIs. To reproduce, compile and run the following program with the nmi watchdog enabled (nmi_watchdog=2 on the command line). Using gdb you can see that the high bits of esp contain garbage, while the low bits are still correct. This patch puts the espfix code back into the NMI code path. The patch is slightly complicated due to the irqtrace infrastructure not being NMI-safe. The NMI return path cannot call TRACE_IRQS_IRET. Otherwise, the tail of the normal iret-code is correct for the nmi code path too. To be able to share this code-path, the TRACE_IRQS_IRET was move up a bit. The espfix code exists after the TRACE_IRQS_IRET, but this code explicitly disables interrupts. This short interrupts-off section is now not traced anymore. The return-to-kernel path now always includes the preliminary test to decide if the espfix code should be called. This is never the case, but doing it this way keeps the patch as simple as possible and the few extra instructions should not affect timing in any significant way. #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <asm/ldt.h> int modify_ldt(int func, void *ptr, unsigned long bytecount) { return syscall(SYS_modify_ldt, func, ptr, bytecount); } /* this is assumed to be usable */ #define SEGBASEADDR 0x10000 #define SEGLIMIT 0x20000 /* 16-bit segment */ struct user_desc desc = { .entry_number = 0, .base_addr = SEGBASEADDR, .limit = SEGLIMIT, .seg_32bit = 0, .contents = 0, /* ??? */ .read_exec_only = 0, .limit_in_pages = 0, .seg_not_present = 0, .useable = 1 }; int main(void) { setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IONBF, 0); /* map a 64 kb segment */ char *pointer = mmap((void *)SEGBASEADDR, SEGLIMIT+1, PROT_EXEC|PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0); if (pointer == NULL) { printf("could not map space\n"); return 0; } /* write ldt, new mode */ int err = modify_ldt(0x11, &desc, sizeof(desc)); if (err) { printf("error modifying ldt: %i\n", err); return 0; } for (int i=0; i<1000; i++) { asm volatile ( "pusha\n\t" "mov %ss, %eax\n\t" /* preserve ss:esp */ "mov %esp, %ebp\n\t" "push $7\n\t" /* index 0, ldt, user mode */ "push $65536-4096\n\t" /* esp */ "lss (%esp), %esp\n\t" /* switch to new stack */ "push %eax\n\t" /* save old ss:esp on new stack */ "push %ebp\n\t" "add $17*65536, %esp\n\t" /* set high bits */ "mov %esp, %edx\n\t" "mov $10000000, %ecx\n\t" /* wait... */ "1: loop 1b\n\t" /* ... a bit */ "cmp %esp, %edx\n\t" "je 1f\n\t" "ud2\n\t" /* esp changed inexplicably! */ "1:\n\t" "sub $17*65536, %esp\n\t" /* restore high bits */ "lss (%esp), %esp\n\t" /* restore old ss:esp */ "popa\n\t"); printf("\rx%ix", i); } return 0; } Signed-off-by: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Acked-by: Stas Sergeev <stsp@aknet.ru> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-06-18 06:35:57 +08:00
TRACE_IRQS_IRET
SWITCH_TO_ENTRY_STACK
.Lrestore_all_notrace:
CHECK_AND_APPLY_ESPFIX
.Lrestore_nocheck:
/* Switch back to user CR3 */
SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3 scratch_reg=%eax
BUG_IF_WRONG_CR3
/* Restore user state */
RESTORE_REGS pop=4 # skip orig_eax/error_code
.Lirq_return:
membarrier/x86: Provide core serializing command There are two places where core serialization is needed by membarrier: 1) When returning from the membarrier IPI, 2) After scheduler updates curr to a thread with a different mm, before going back to user-space, since the curr->mm is used by membarrier to check whether it needs to send an IPI to that CPU. x86-32 uses IRET as return from interrupt, and both IRET and SYSEXIT to go back to user-space. The IRET instruction is core serializing, but not SYSEXIT. x86-64 uses IRET as return from interrupt, which takes care of the IPI. However, it can return to user-space through either SYSRETL (compat code), SYSRETQ, or IRET. Given that SYSRET{L,Q} is not core serializing, we rely instead on write_cr3() performed by switch_mm() to provide core serialization after changing the current mm, and deal with the special case of kthread -> uthread (temporarily keeping current mm into active_mm) by adding a sync_core() in that specific case. Use the new sync_core_before_usermode() to guarantee this. Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andrea Parri <parri.andrea@gmail.com> Cc: Andrew Hunter <ahh@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Avi Kivity <avi@scylladb.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com> Cc: David Sehr <sehr@google.com> Cc: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Maged Michael <maged.michael@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180129202020.8515-10-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-01-30 04:20:18 +08:00
/*
* ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_SYNC_CORE rely on IRET core serialization
* when returning from IPI handler and when returning from
* scheduler to user-space.
*/
INTERRUPT_RETURN
restore_all_kernel:
#ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPTION
DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_ANY)
cmpl $0, PER_CPU_VAR(__preempt_count)
jnz .Lno_preempt
testl $X86_EFLAGS_IF, PT_EFLAGS(%esp) # interrupts off (exception path) ?
jz .Lno_preempt
call preempt_schedule_irq
.Lno_preempt:
#endif
TRACE_IRQS_IRET
x86/entry/32: Handle Entry from Kernel-Mode on Entry-Stack It is possible that the kernel is entered from kernel-mode and on the entry-stack. The most common way this happens is when an exception is triggered while loading the user-space segment registers on the kernel-to-userspace exit path. The segment loading needs to be done after the entry-stack switch, because the stack-switch needs kernel %fs for per_cpu access. When this happens, make sure to leave the kernel with the entry-stack again, so that the interrupted code-path runs on the right stack when switching to the user-cr3. Detect this condition on kernel-entry by checking CS.RPL and %esp, and if it happens, copy over the complete content of the entry stack to the task-stack. This needs to be done because once the exception handler is entereed, the task might be scheduled out or even migrated to a different CPU, so this cannot rely on the entry-stack contents. Leave a marker in the stack-frame to detect this condition on the exit path. On the exit path the copy is reversed, copy all of the remaining task-stack back to the entry-stack and switch to it. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <llong@redhat.com> Cc: "David H . Gutteridge" <dhgutteridge@sympatico.ca> Cc: joro@8bytes.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1531906876-13451-11-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
2018-07-18 17:40:47 +08:00
PARANOID_EXIT_TO_KERNEL_MODE
BUG_IF_WRONG_CR3
RESTORE_REGS 4
jmp .Lirq_return
.section .fixup, "ax"
ENTRY(iret_exc )
pushl $0 # no error code
pushl $do_iret_error
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY
/*
* The stack-frame here is the one that iret faulted on, so its a
* return-to-user frame. We are on kernel-cr3 because we come here from
* the fixup code. This confuses the CR3 checker, so switch to user-cr3
* as the checker expects it.
*/
pushl %eax
SWITCH_TO_USER_CR3 scratch_reg=%eax
popl %eax
#endif
jmp common_exception
.previous
_ASM_EXTABLE(.Lirq_return, iret_exc)
ENDPROC(entry_INT80_32)
.macro FIXUP_ESPFIX_STACK
i386: fix/simplify espfix stack switching, move it into assembly The espfix code triggers if we have a protected mode userspace application with a 16-bit stack. On returning to userspace, with iret, the CPU doesn't restore the high word of the stack pointer. This is an "official" bug, and the work-around used in the kernel is to temporarily switch to a 32-bit stack segment/pointer pair where the high word of the pointer is equal to the high word of the userspace stackpointer. The current implementation uses THREAD_SIZE to determine the cut-off, but there is no good reason not to use the more natural 64kb... However, implementing this by simply substituting THREAD_SIZE with 65536 in patch_espfix_desc crashed the test application. patch_espfix_desc tries to do what is described above, but gets it subtly wrong if the userspace stack pointer is just below a multiple of THREAD_SIZE: an overflow occurs to bit 13... With a bit of luck, when the kernelspace stackpointer is just below a 64kb-boundary, the overflow then ripples trough to bit 16 and userspace will see its stack pointer changed by 65536. This patch moves all espfix code into entry_32.S. Selecting a 16-bit cut-off simplifies the code. The game with changing the limit dynamically is removed too. It complicates matters and I see no value in it. Changing only the top 16-bit word of ESP is one instruction and it also implies that only two bytes of the ESPFIX GDT entry need to be changed and this can be implemented in just a handful simple to understand instructions. As a side effect, the operation to compute the original ESP from the ESPFIX ESP and the GDT entry simplifies a bit too, and the remaining three instructions have been expanded inline in entry_32.S. impact: can now reliably run userspace with ESP=xxxxfffc on 16-bit stack segment Signed-off-by: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Acked-by: Stas Sergeev <stsp@aknet.ru> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-06-18 06:35:58 +08:00
/*
* Switch back for ESPFIX stack to the normal zerobased stack
*
* We can't call C functions using the ESPFIX stack. This code reads
* the high word of the segment base from the GDT and swiches to the
* normal stack and adjusts ESP with the matching offset.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX32
i386: fix/simplify espfix stack switching, move it into assembly The espfix code triggers if we have a protected mode userspace application with a 16-bit stack. On returning to userspace, with iret, the CPU doesn't restore the high word of the stack pointer. This is an "official" bug, and the work-around used in the kernel is to temporarily switch to a 32-bit stack segment/pointer pair where the high word of the pointer is equal to the high word of the userspace stackpointer. The current implementation uses THREAD_SIZE to determine the cut-off, but there is no good reason not to use the more natural 64kb... However, implementing this by simply substituting THREAD_SIZE with 65536 in patch_espfix_desc crashed the test application. patch_espfix_desc tries to do what is described above, but gets it subtly wrong if the userspace stack pointer is just below a multiple of THREAD_SIZE: an overflow occurs to bit 13... With a bit of luck, when the kernelspace stackpointer is just below a 64kb-boundary, the overflow then ripples trough to bit 16 and userspace will see its stack pointer changed by 65536. This patch moves all espfix code into entry_32.S. Selecting a 16-bit cut-off simplifies the code. The game with changing the limit dynamically is removed too. It complicates matters and I see no value in it. Changing only the top 16-bit word of ESP is one instruction and it also implies that only two bytes of the ESPFIX GDT entry need to be changed and this can be implemented in just a handful simple to understand instructions. As a side effect, the operation to compute the original ESP from the ESPFIX ESP and the GDT entry simplifies a bit too, and the remaining three instructions have been expanded inline in entry_32.S. impact: can now reliably run userspace with ESP=xxxxfffc on 16-bit stack segment Signed-off-by: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Acked-by: Stas Sergeev <stsp@aknet.ru> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-06-18 06:35:58 +08:00
/* fixup the stack */
mov GDT_ESPFIX_SS + 4, %al /* bits 16..23 */
mov GDT_ESPFIX_SS + 7, %ah /* bits 24..31 */
shl $16, %eax
addl %esp, %eax /* the adjusted stack pointer */
pushl $__KERNEL_DS
pushl %eax
lss (%esp), %esp /* switch to the normal stack segment */
#endif
.endm
.macro UNWIND_ESPFIX_STACK
/* It's safe to clobber %eax, all other regs need to be preserved */
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX32
movl %ss, %eax
/* see if on espfix stack */
cmpw $__ESPFIX_SS, %ax
jne .Lno_fixup_\@
/* switch to normal stack */
FIXUP_ESPFIX_STACK
.Lno_fixup_\@:
#endif
.endm
/*
x86/asm/entry/irq: Simplify interrupt dispatch table (IDT) layout Interrupt entry points are handled with the following code, each 32-byte code block contains seven entry points: ... [push][jump 22] // 4 bytes [push][jump 18] // 4 bytes [push][jump 14] // 4 bytes [push][jump 10] // 4 bytes [push][jump 6] // 4 bytes [push][jump 2] // 4 bytes [push][jump common_interrupt][padding] // 8 bytes [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump common_interrupt][padding] [padding_2] common_interrupt: And there is a table which holds pointers to every entry point, IOW: to every push. In cold cache, two jumps are still costlier than one, even though we get the benefit of them residing in the same cacheline. This change replaces short jumps with near ones to 'common_interrupt', and pads every push+jump pair to 8 bytes. This way, each interrupt takes only one jump. This change replaces ".p2align CONFIG_X86_L1_CACHE_SHIFT" before dispatch table with ".align 8" - we do not need anything stronger than that. The table of entry addresses (the interrupt[] array) is no longer necessary, the address of entries can be easily calculated as (irq_entries_start + i*8). text data bss dec hex filename 12546 0 0 12546 3102 entry_64.o.before 11626 0 0 11626 2d6a entry_64.o The size decrease is because 1656 bytes of .init.rodata are gone. That's initdata, though. The resident size does go up a bit. Run-tested (32 and 64 bits). Acked-and-Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1428090553-7283-1-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-04-04 03:49:13 +08:00
* Build the entry stubs with some assembler magic.
* We pack 1 stub into every 8-byte block.
*/
x86/asm/entry/irq: Simplify interrupt dispatch table (IDT) layout Interrupt entry points are handled with the following code, each 32-byte code block contains seven entry points: ... [push][jump 22] // 4 bytes [push][jump 18] // 4 bytes [push][jump 14] // 4 bytes [push][jump 10] // 4 bytes [push][jump 6] // 4 bytes [push][jump 2] // 4 bytes [push][jump common_interrupt][padding] // 8 bytes [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump common_interrupt][padding] [padding_2] common_interrupt: And there is a table which holds pointers to every entry point, IOW: to every push. In cold cache, two jumps are still costlier than one, even though we get the benefit of them residing in the same cacheline. This change replaces short jumps with near ones to 'common_interrupt', and pads every push+jump pair to 8 bytes. This way, each interrupt takes only one jump. This change replaces ".p2align CONFIG_X86_L1_CACHE_SHIFT" before dispatch table with ".align 8" - we do not need anything stronger than that. The table of entry addresses (the interrupt[] array) is no longer necessary, the address of entries can be easily calculated as (irq_entries_start + i*8). text data bss dec hex filename 12546 0 0 12546 3102 entry_64.o.before 11626 0 0 11626 2d6a entry_64.o The size decrease is because 1656 bytes of .init.rodata are gone. That's initdata, though. The resident size does go up a bit. Run-tested (32 and 64 bits). Acked-and-Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1428090553-7283-1-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-04-04 03:49:13 +08:00
.align 8
ENTRY(irq_entries_start)
x86/asm/entry/irq: Simplify interrupt dispatch table (IDT) layout Interrupt entry points are handled with the following code, each 32-byte code block contains seven entry points: ... [push][jump 22] // 4 bytes [push][jump 18] // 4 bytes [push][jump 14] // 4 bytes [push][jump 10] // 4 bytes [push][jump 6] // 4 bytes [push][jump 2] // 4 bytes [push][jump common_interrupt][padding] // 8 bytes [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump common_interrupt][padding] [padding_2] common_interrupt: And there is a table which holds pointers to every entry point, IOW: to every push. In cold cache, two jumps are still costlier than one, even though we get the benefit of them residing in the same cacheline. This change replaces short jumps with near ones to 'common_interrupt', and pads every push+jump pair to 8 bytes. This way, each interrupt takes only one jump. This change replaces ".p2align CONFIG_X86_L1_CACHE_SHIFT" before dispatch table with ".align 8" - we do not need anything stronger than that. The table of entry addresses (the interrupt[] array) is no longer necessary, the address of entries can be easily calculated as (irq_entries_start + i*8). text data bss dec hex filename 12546 0 0 12546 3102 entry_64.o.before 11626 0 0 11626 2d6a entry_64.o The size decrease is because 1656 bytes of .init.rodata are gone. That's initdata, though. The resident size does go up a bit. Run-tested (32 and 64 bits). Acked-and-Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1428090553-7283-1-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-04-04 03:49:13 +08:00
vector=FIRST_EXTERNAL_VECTOR
.rept (FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR - FIRST_EXTERNAL_VECTOR)
pushl $(~vector+0x80) /* Note: always in signed byte range */
x86/asm/entry/irq: Simplify interrupt dispatch table (IDT) layout Interrupt entry points are handled with the following code, each 32-byte code block contains seven entry points: ... [push][jump 22] // 4 bytes [push][jump 18] // 4 bytes [push][jump 14] // 4 bytes [push][jump 10] // 4 bytes [push][jump 6] // 4 bytes [push][jump 2] // 4 bytes [push][jump common_interrupt][padding] // 8 bytes [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump common_interrupt][padding] [padding_2] common_interrupt: And there is a table which holds pointers to every entry point, IOW: to every push. In cold cache, two jumps are still costlier than one, even though we get the benefit of them residing in the same cacheline. This change replaces short jumps with near ones to 'common_interrupt', and pads every push+jump pair to 8 bytes. This way, each interrupt takes only one jump. This change replaces ".p2align CONFIG_X86_L1_CACHE_SHIFT" before dispatch table with ".align 8" - we do not need anything stronger than that. The table of entry addresses (the interrupt[] array) is no longer necessary, the address of entries can be easily calculated as (irq_entries_start + i*8). text data bss dec hex filename 12546 0 0 12546 3102 entry_64.o.before 11626 0 0 11626 2d6a entry_64.o The size decrease is because 1656 bytes of .init.rodata are gone. That's initdata, though. The resident size does go up a bit. Run-tested (32 and 64 bits). Acked-and-Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1428090553-7283-1-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-04-04 03:49:13 +08:00
vector=vector+1
jmp common_interrupt
.align 8
.endr
END(irq_entries_start)
x86/irq: Seperate unused system vectors from spurious entry again Quite some time ago the interrupt entry stubs for unused vectors in the system vector range got removed and directly mapped to the spurious interrupt vector entry point. Sounds reasonable, but it's subtly broken. The spurious interrupt vector entry point pushes vector number 0xFF on the stack which makes the whole logic in __smp_spurious_interrupt() pointless. As a consequence any spurious interrupt which comes from a vector != 0xFF is treated as a real spurious interrupt (vector 0xFF) and not acknowledged. That subsequently stalls all interrupt vectors of equal and lower priority, which brings the system to a grinding halt. This can happen because even on 64-bit the system vector space is not guaranteed to be fully populated. A full compile time handling of the unused vectors is not possible because quite some of them are conditonally populated at runtime. Bring the entry stubs back, which wastes 160 bytes if all stubs are unused, but gains the proper handling back. There is no point to selectively spare some of the stubs which are known at compile time as the required code in the IDT management would be way larger and convoluted. Do not route the spurious entries through common_interrupt and do_IRQ() as the original code did. Route it to smp_spurious_interrupt() which evaluates the vector number and acts accordingly now that the real vector numbers are handed in. Fixup the pr_warn so the actual spurious vector (0xff) is clearly distiguished from the other vectors and also note for the vectored case whether it was pending in the ISR or not. "Spurious APIC interrupt (vector 0xFF) on CPU#0, should never happen." "Spurious interrupt vector 0xed on CPU#1. Acked." "Spurious interrupt vector 0xee on CPU#1. Not pending!." Fixes: 2414e021ac8d ("x86: Avoid building unused IRQ entry stubs") Reported-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190628111440.550568228@linutronix.de
2019-06-28 19:11:54 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC
.align 8
ENTRY(spurious_entries_start)
vector=FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR
.rept (NR_VECTORS - FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR)
pushl $(~vector+0x80) /* Note: always in signed byte range */
vector=vector+1
jmp common_spurious
.align 8
.endr
END(spurious_entries_start)
common_spurious:
ASM_CLAC
addl $-0x80, (%esp) /* Adjust vector into the [-256, -1] range */
SAVE_ALL switch_stacks=1
ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
movl %esp, %eax
call smp_spurious_interrupt
jmp ret_from_intr
ENDPROC(common_spurious)
x86/irq: Seperate unused system vectors from spurious entry again Quite some time ago the interrupt entry stubs for unused vectors in the system vector range got removed and directly mapped to the spurious interrupt vector entry point. Sounds reasonable, but it's subtly broken. The spurious interrupt vector entry point pushes vector number 0xFF on the stack which makes the whole logic in __smp_spurious_interrupt() pointless. As a consequence any spurious interrupt which comes from a vector != 0xFF is treated as a real spurious interrupt (vector 0xFF) and not acknowledged. That subsequently stalls all interrupt vectors of equal and lower priority, which brings the system to a grinding halt. This can happen because even on 64-bit the system vector space is not guaranteed to be fully populated. A full compile time handling of the unused vectors is not possible because quite some of them are conditonally populated at runtime. Bring the entry stubs back, which wastes 160 bytes if all stubs are unused, but gains the proper handling back. There is no point to selectively spare some of the stubs which are known at compile time as the required code in the IDT management would be way larger and convoluted. Do not route the spurious entries through common_interrupt and do_IRQ() as the original code did. Route it to smp_spurious_interrupt() which evaluates the vector number and acts accordingly now that the real vector numbers are handed in. Fixup the pr_warn so the actual spurious vector (0xff) is clearly distiguished from the other vectors and also note for the vectored case whether it was pending in the ISR or not. "Spurious APIC interrupt (vector 0xFF) on CPU#0, should never happen." "Spurious interrupt vector 0xed on CPU#1. Acked." "Spurious interrupt vector 0xee on CPU#1. Not pending!." Fixes: 2414e021ac8d ("x86: Avoid building unused IRQ entry stubs") Reported-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190628111440.550568228@linutronix.de
2019-06-28 19:11:54 +08:00
#endif
/*
* the CPU automatically disables interrupts when executing an IRQ vector,
* so IRQ-flags tracing has to follow that:
*/
.p2align CONFIG_X86_L1_CACHE_SHIFT
common_interrupt:
ASM_CLAC
addl $-0x80, (%esp) /* Adjust vector into the [-256, -1] range */
SAVE_ALL switch_stacks=1
x86/entry/unwind: Create stack frames for saved interrupt registers With frame pointers, when a task is interrupted, its stack is no longer completely reliable because the function could have been interrupted before it had a chance to save the previous frame pointer on the stack. So the caller of the interrupted function could get skipped by a stack trace. This is problematic for live patching, which needs to know whether a stack trace of a sleeping task can be relied upon. There's currently no way to detect if a sleeping task was interrupted by a page fault exception or preemption before it went to sleep. Another issue is that when dumping the stack of an interrupted task, the unwinder has no way of knowing where the saved pt_regs registers are, so it can't print them. This solves those issues by encoding the pt_regs pointer in the frame pointer on entry from an interrupt or an exception. This patch also updates the unwinder to be able to decode it, because otherwise the unwinder would be broken by this change. Note that this causes a change in the behavior of the unwinder: each instance of a pt_regs on the stack is now considered a "frame". So callers of unwind_get_return_address() will now get an occasional 'regs->ip' address that would have previously been skipped over. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/8b9f84a21e39d249049e0547b559ff8da0df0988.1476973742.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-10-21 00:34:40 +08:00
ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
movl %esp, %eax
call do_IRQ
jmp ret_from_intr
ENDPROC(common_interrupt)
#define BUILD_INTERRUPT3(name, nr, fn) \
ENTRY(name) \
ASM_CLAC; \
pushl $~(nr); \
SAVE_ALL switch_stacks=1; \
ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER; \
TRACE_IRQS_OFF \
movl %esp, %eax; \
call fn; \
jmp ret_from_intr; \
ENDPROC(name)
#define BUILD_INTERRUPT(name, nr) \
BUILD_INTERRUPT3(name, nr, smp_##name); \
/* The include is where all of the SMP etc. interrupts come from */
#include <asm/entry_arch.h>
ENTRY(coprocessor_error)
ASM_CLAC
pushl $0
pushl $do_coprocessor_error
jmp common_exception
END(coprocessor_error)
ENTRY(simd_coprocessor_error)
ASM_CLAC
pushl $0
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INVD_BUG
/* AMD 486 bug: invd from userspace calls exception 19 instead of #GP */
ALTERNATIVE "pushl $do_general_protection", \
"pushl $do_simd_coprocessor_error", \
X86_FEATURE_XMM
#else
pushl $do_simd_coprocessor_error
#endif
jmp common_exception
END(simd_coprocessor_error)
ENTRY(device_not_available)
ASM_CLAC
pushl $-1 # mark this as an int
pushl $do_device_not_available
jmp common_exception
END(device_not_available)
#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT
ENTRY(native_iret)
iret
_ASM_EXTABLE(native_iret, iret_exc)
END(native_iret)
#endif
ENTRY(overflow)
ASM_CLAC
pushl $0
pushl $do_overflow
jmp common_exception
END(overflow)
ENTRY(bounds)
ASM_CLAC
pushl $0
pushl $do_bounds
jmp common_exception
END(bounds)
ENTRY(invalid_op)
ASM_CLAC
pushl $0
pushl $do_invalid_op
jmp common_exception
END(invalid_op)
ENTRY(coprocessor_segment_overrun)
ASM_CLAC
pushl $0
pushl $do_coprocessor_segment_overrun
jmp common_exception
END(coprocessor_segment_overrun)
ENTRY(invalid_TSS)
ASM_CLAC
pushl $do_invalid_TSS
jmp common_exception
END(invalid_TSS)
ENTRY(segment_not_present)
ASM_CLAC
pushl $do_segment_not_present
jmp common_exception
END(segment_not_present)
ENTRY(stack_segment)
ASM_CLAC
pushl $do_stack_segment
jmp common_exception
END(stack_segment)
ENTRY(alignment_check)
ASM_CLAC
pushl $do_alignment_check
jmp common_exception
END(alignment_check)
[PATCH] x86: error_code is not safe for kprobes This patch moves the entry.S:error_entry to .kprobes.text section, since code marked unsafe for kprobes jumps directly to entry.S::error_entry, that must be marked unsafe as well. This patch also moves all the ".previous.text" asm directives to ".previous" for kprobes section. AK: Following a similar i386 patch from Chuck Ebbert AK: Also merged Jeremy's fix in. +From: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org> KPROBE_ENTRY does a .section .kprobes.text, and expects its users to do a .previous at the end of the function. Unfortunately, if any code within the function switches sections, for example .fixup, then the .previous ends up putting all subsequent code into .fixup. Worse, any subsequent .fixup code gets intermingled with the code its supposed to be fixing (which is also in .fixup). It's surprising this didn't cause more havok. The fix is to use .pushsection/.popsection, so this stuff nests properly. A further cleanup would be to get rid of all .section/.previous pairs, since they're inherently fragile. +From: Chuck Ebbert <76306.1226@compuserve.com> Because code marked unsafe for kprobes jumps directly to entry.S::error_code, that must be marked unsafe as well. The easiest way to do that is to move the page fault entry point to just before error_code and let it inherit the same section. Also moved all the ".previous" asm directives for kprobes sections to column 1 and removed ".text" from them. Signed-off-by: Chuck Ebbert <76306.1226@compuserve.com> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
2006-09-26 16:52:34 +08:00
ENTRY(divide_error)
ASM_CLAC
pushl $0 # no error code
pushl $do_divide_error
jmp common_exception
END(divide_error)
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
ENTRY(machine_check)
ASM_CLAC
pushl $0
pushl machine_check_vector
jmp common_exception
END(machine_check)
#endif
ENTRY(spurious_interrupt_bug)
ASM_CLAC
pushl $0
pushl $do_spurious_interrupt_bug
jmp common_exception
END(spurious_interrupt_bug)
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 09:37:04 +08:00
ENTRY(xen_hypervisor_callback)
/*
* Check to see if we got the event in the critical
* region in xen_iret_direct, after we've reenabled
* events and checked for pending events. This simulates
* iret instruction's behaviour where it delivers a
* pending interrupt when enabling interrupts:
*/
cmpl $xen_iret_start_crit, (%esp)
jb 1f
cmpl $xen_iret_end_crit, (%esp)
jae 1f
call xen_iret_crit_fixup
1:
pushl $-1 /* orig_ax = -1 => not a system call */
SAVE_ALL
ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
mov %esp, %eax
call xen_evtchn_do_upcall
#ifndef CONFIG_PREEMPTION
call xen_maybe_preempt_hcall
#endif
jmp ret_from_intr
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 09:37:04 +08:00
ENDPROC(xen_hypervisor_callback)
/*
* Hypervisor uses this for application faults while it executes.
* We get here for two reasons:
* 1. Fault while reloading DS, ES, FS or GS
* 2. Fault while executing IRET
* Category 1 we fix up by reattempting the load, and zeroing the segment
* register if the load fails.
* Category 2 we fix up by jumping to do_iret_error. We cannot use the
* normal Linux return path in this case because if we use the IRET hypercall
* to pop the stack frame we end up in an infinite loop of failsafe callbacks.
* We distinguish between categories by maintaining a status value in EAX.
*/
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 09:37:04 +08:00
ENTRY(xen_failsafe_callback)
pushl %eax
movl $1, %eax
1: mov 4(%esp), %ds
2: mov 8(%esp), %es
3: mov 12(%esp), %fs
4: mov 16(%esp), %gs
xen/x86: don't corrupt %eip when returning from a signal handler In 32 bit guests, if a userspace process has %eax == -ERESTARTSYS (-512) or -ERESTARTNOINTR (-513) when it is interrupted by an event /and/ the process has a pending signal then %eip (and %eax) are corrupted when returning to the main process after handling the signal. The application may then crash with SIGSEGV or a SIGILL or it may have subtly incorrect behaviour (depending on what instruction it returned to). The occurs because handle_signal() is incorrectly thinking that there is a system call that needs to restarted so it adjusts %eip and %eax to re-execute the system call instruction (even though user space had not done a system call). If %eax == -514 (-ERESTARTNOHAND (-514) or -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK (-516) then handle_signal() only corrupted %eax (by setting it to -EINTR). This may cause the application to crash or have incorrect behaviour. handle_signal() assumes that regs->orig_ax >= 0 means a system call so any kernel entry point that is not for a system call must push a negative value for orig_ax. For example, for physical interrupts on bare metal the inverse of the vector is pushed and page_fault() sets regs->orig_ax to -1, overwriting the hardware provided error code. xen_hypervisor_callback() was incorrectly pushing 0 for orig_ax instead of -1. Classic Xen kernels pushed %eax which works as %eax cannot be both non-negative and -RESTARTSYS (etc.), but using -1 is consistent with other non-system call entry points and avoids some of the tests in handle_signal(). There were similar bugs in xen_failsafe_callback() of both 32 and 64-bit guests. If the fault was corrected and the normal return path was used then 0 was incorrectly pushed as the value for orig_ax. Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-10-20 00:29:07 +08:00
/* EAX == 0 => Category 1 (Bad segment)
EAX != 0 => Category 2 (Bad IRET) */
testl %eax, %eax
popl %eax
lea 16(%esp), %esp
jz 5f
jmp iret_exc
5: pushl $-1 /* orig_ax = -1 => not a system call */
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 09:37:04 +08:00
SAVE_ALL
x86/entry/unwind: Create stack frames for saved interrupt registers With frame pointers, when a task is interrupted, its stack is no longer completely reliable because the function could have been interrupted before it had a chance to save the previous frame pointer on the stack. So the caller of the interrupted function could get skipped by a stack trace. This is problematic for live patching, which needs to know whether a stack trace of a sleeping task can be relied upon. There's currently no way to detect if a sleeping task was interrupted by a page fault exception or preemption before it went to sleep. Another issue is that when dumping the stack of an interrupted task, the unwinder has no way of knowing where the saved pt_regs registers are, so it can't print them. This solves those issues by encoding the pt_regs pointer in the frame pointer on entry from an interrupt or an exception. This patch also updates the unwinder to be able to decode it, because otherwise the unwinder would be broken by this change. Note that this causes a change in the behavior of the unwinder: each instance of a pt_regs on the stack is now considered a "frame". So callers of unwind_get_return_address() will now get an occasional 'regs->ip' address that would have previously been skipped over. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/8b9f84a21e39d249049e0547b559ff8da0df0988.1476973742.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-10-21 00:34:40 +08:00
ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
jmp ret_from_exception
.section .fixup, "ax"
6: xorl %eax, %eax
movl %eax, 4(%esp)
jmp 1b
7: xorl %eax, %eax
movl %eax, 8(%esp)
jmp 2b
8: xorl %eax, %eax
movl %eax, 12(%esp)
jmp 3b
9: xorl %eax, %eax
movl %eax, 16(%esp)
jmp 4b
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 09:37:04 +08:00
.previous
_ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 6b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(2b, 7b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(3b, 8b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(4b, 9b)
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 09:37:04 +08:00
ENDPROC(xen_failsafe_callback)
#endif /* CONFIG_XEN_PV */
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 09:37:04 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PVHVM
BUILD_INTERRUPT3(xen_hvm_callback_vector, HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR,
xen_evtchn_do_upcall)
#endif
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
BUILD_INTERRUPT3(hyperv_callback_vector, HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR,
hyperv_vector_handler)
x86/hyperv: Reenlightenment notifications support Hyper-V supports Live Migration notification. This is supposed to be used in conjunction with TSC emulation: when a VM is migrated to a host with different TSC frequency for some short period the host emulates the accesses to TSC and sends an interrupt to notify about the event. When the guest is done updating everything it can disable TSC emulation and everything will start working fast again. These notifications weren't required until now as Hyper-V guests are not supposed to use TSC as a clocksource: in Linux the TSC is even marked as unstable on boot. Guests normally use 'tsc page' clocksource and host updates its values on migrations automatically. Things change when with nested virtualization: even when the PV clocksources (kvm-clock or tsc page) are passed through to the nested guests the TSC frequency and frequency changes need to be know.. Hyper-V Top Level Functional Specification (as of v5.0b) wrongly specifies EAX:BIT(12) of CPUID:0x40000009 as the feature identification bit. The right one to check is EAX:BIT(13) of CPUID:0x40000003. I was assured that the fix in on the way. Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Stephen Hemminger <sthemmin@microsoft.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com> Cc: "Michael Kelley (EOSG)" <Michael.H.Kelley@microsoft.com> Cc: Roman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: devel@linuxdriverproject.org Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "K. Y. Srinivasan" <kys@microsoft.com> Cc: Cathy Avery <cavery@redhat.com> Cc: Mohammed Gamal <mmorsy@redhat.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180124132337.30138-4-vkuznets@redhat.com
2018-01-24 21:23:33 +08:00
BUILD_INTERRUPT3(hyperv_reenlightenment_vector, HYPERV_REENLIGHTENMENT_VECTOR,
hyperv_reenlightenment_intr)
BUILD_INTERRUPT3(hv_stimer0_callback_vector, HYPERV_STIMER0_VECTOR,
hv_stimer0_vector_handler)
#endif /* CONFIG_HYPERV */
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 09:37:04 +08:00
ENTRY(page_fault)
ASM_CLAC
pushl $do_page_fault
jmp common_exception_read_cr2
END(page_fault)
common_exception_read_cr2:
/* the function address is in %gs's slot on the stack */
SAVE_ALL switch_stacks=1 skip_gs=1 unwind_espfix=1
ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
/* fixup %gs */
GS_TO_REG %ecx
movl PT_GS(%esp), %edi
REG_TO_PTGS %ecx
SET_KERNEL_GS %ecx
GET_CR2_INTO(%ecx) # might clobber %eax
/* fixup orig %eax */
movl PT_ORIG_EAX(%esp), %edx # get the error code
movl $-1, PT_ORIG_EAX(%esp) # no syscall to restart
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
movl %esp, %eax # pt_regs pointer
CALL_NOSPEC %edi
jmp ret_from_exception
END(common_exception_read_cr2)
common_exception:
/* the function address is in %gs's slot on the stack */
SAVE_ALL switch_stacks=1 skip_gs=1 unwind_espfix=1
x86/entry/unwind: Create stack frames for saved interrupt registers With frame pointers, when a task is interrupted, its stack is no longer completely reliable because the function could have been interrupted before it had a chance to save the previous frame pointer on the stack. So the caller of the interrupted function could get skipped by a stack trace. This is problematic for live patching, which needs to know whether a stack trace of a sleeping task can be relied upon. There's currently no way to detect if a sleeping task was interrupted by a page fault exception or preemption before it went to sleep. Another issue is that when dumping the stack of an interrupted task, the unwinder has no way of knowing where the saved pt_regs registers are, so it can't print them. This solves those issues by encoding the pt_regs pointer in the frame pointer on entry from an interrupt or an exception. This patch also updates the unwinder to be able to decode it, because otherwise the unwinder would be broken by this change. Note that this causes a change in the behavior of the unwinder: each instance of a pt_regs on the stack is now considered a "frame". So callers of unwind_get_return_address() will now get an occasional 'regs->ip' address that would have previously been skipped over. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/8b9f84a21e39d249049e0547b559ff8da0df0988.1476973742.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-10-21 00:34:40 +08:00
ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
/* fixup %gs */
GS_TO_REG %ecx
movl PT_GS(%esp), %edi # get the function address
REG_TO_PTGS %ecx
SET_KERNEL_GS %ecx
/* fixup orig %eax */
movl PT_ORIG_EAX(%esp), %edx # get the error code
movl $-1, PT_ORIG_EAX(%esp) # no syscall to restart
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
movl %esp, %eax # pt_regs pointer
x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry assembler indirect jumps Convert indirect jumps in core 32/64bit entry assembler code to use non-speculative sequences when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled. Don't use CALL_NOSPEC in entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath because the return address after the 'call' instruction must be *precisely* at the .Lentry_SYSCALL_64_after_fastpath label for stub_ptregs_64 to work, and the use of alternatives will mess that up unless we play horrid games to prepend with NOPs and make the variants the same length. It's not worth it; in the case where we ALTERNATIVE out the retpoline, the first instruction at __x86.indirect_thunk.rax is going to be a bare jmp *%rax anyway. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-7-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk
2018-01-12 05:46:28 +08:00
CALL_NOSPEC %edi
jmp ret_from_exception
END(common_exception)
ENTRY(debug)
x86/entry/32: Simplify and fix up the SYSENTER stack #DB/NMI fixup Right after SYSENTER, we can get a #DB or NMI. On x86_32, there's no IST, so the exception handler is invoked on the temporary SYSENTER stack. Because the SYSENTER stack is very small, we have a fixup to switch off the stack quickly when this happens. The old fixup had several issues: 1. It checked the interrupt frame's CS and EIP. This wasn't obviously correct on Xen or if vm86 mode was in use [1]. 2. In the NMI handler, it did some frightening digging into the stack frame. I'm not convinced this digging was correct. 3. The fixup didn't switch stacks and then switch back. Instead, it synthesized a brand new stack frame that would redirect the IRET back to the SYSENTER code. That frame was highly questionable. For one thing, if NMI nested inside #DB, we would effectively abort the #DB prologue, which was probably safe but was frightening. For another, the code used PUSHFL to write the FLAGS portion of the frame, which was simply bogus -- by the time PUSHFL was called, at least TF, NT, VM, and all of the arithmetic flags were clobbered. Simplify this considerably. Instead of looking at the saved frame to see where we came from, check the hardware ESP register against the SYSENTER stack directly. Malicious user code cannot spoof the kernel ESP register, and by moving the check after SAVE_ALL, we can use normal PER_CPU accesses to find all the relevant addresses. With this patch applied, the improved syscall_nt_32 test finally passes on 32-bit kernels. [1] It isn't obviously correct, but it is nonetheless safe from vm86 shenanigans as far as I can tell. A user can't point EIP at entry_SYSENTER_32 while in vm86 mode because entry_SYSENTER_32, like all kernel addresses, is greater than 0xffff and would thus violate the CS segment limit. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b2cdbc037031c07ecf2c40a96069318aec0e7971.1457578375.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-03-10 11:00:32 +08:00
/*
* Entry from sysenter is now handled in common_exception
x86/entry/32: Simplify and fix up the SYSENTER stack #DB/NMI fixup Right after SYSENTER, we can get a #DB or NMI. On x86_32, there's no IST, so the exception handler is invoked on the temporary SYSENTER stack. Because the SYSENTER stack is very small, we have a fixup to switch off the stack quickly when this happens. The old fixup had several issues: 1. It checked the interrupt frame's CS and EIP. This wasn't obviously correct on Xen or if vm86 mode was in use [1]. 2. In the NMI handler, it did some frightening digging into the stack frame. I'm not convinced this digging was correct. 3. The fixup didn't switch stacks and then switch back. Instead, it synthesized a brand new stack frame that would redirect the IRET back to the SYSENTER code. That frame was highly questionable. For one thing, if NMI nested inside #DB, we would effectively abort the #DB prologue, which was probably safe but was frightening. For another, the code used PUSHFL to write the FLAGS portion of the frame, which was simply bogus -- by the time PUSHFL was called, at least TF, NT, VM, and all of the arithmetic flags were clobbered. Simplify this considerably. Instead of looking at the saved frame to see where we came from, check the hardware ESP register against the SYSENTER stack directly. Malicious user code cannot spoof the kernel ESP register, and by moving the check after SAVE_ALL, we can use normal PER_CPU accesses to find all the relevant addresses. With this patch applied, the improved syscall_nt_32 test finally passes on 32-bit kernels. [1] It isn't obviously correct, but it is nonetheless safe from vm86 shenanigans as far as I can tell. A user can't point EIP at entry_SYSENTER_32 while in vm86 mode because entry_SYSENTER_32, like all kernel addresses, is greater than 0xffff and would thus violate the CS segment limit. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b2cdbc037031c07ecf2c40a96069318aec0e7971.1457578375.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-03-10 11:00:32 +08:00
*/
ASM_CLAC
pushl $-1 # mark this as an int
pushl $do_debug
jmp common_exception
END(debug)
/*
x86/entry/32: Simplify and fix up the SYSENTER stack #DB/NMI fixup Right after SYSENTER, we can get a #DB or NMI. On x86_32, there's no IST, so the exception handler is invoked on the temporary SYSENTER stack. Because the SYSENTER stack is very small, we have a fixup to switch off the stack quickly when this happens. The old fixup had several issues: 1. It checked the interrupt frame's CS and EIP. This wasn't obviously correct on Xen or if vm86 mode was in use [1]. 2. In the NMI handler, it did some frightening digging into the stack frame. I'm not convinced this digging was correct. 3. The fixup didn't switch stacks and then switch back. Instead, it synthesized a brand new stack frame that would redirect the IRET back to the SYSENTER code. That frame was highly questionable. For one thing, if NMI nested inside #DB, we would effectively abort the #DB prologue, which was probably safe but was frightening. For another, the code used PUSHFL to write the FLAGS portion of the frame, which was simply bogus -- by the time PUSHFL was called, at least TF, NT, VM, and all of the arithmetic flags were clobbered. Simplify this considerably. Instead of looking at the saved frame to see where we came from, check the hardware ESP register against the SYSENTER stack directly. Malicious user code cannot spoof the kernel ESP register, and by moving the check after SAVE_ALL, we can use normal PER_CPU accesses to find all the relevant addresses. With this patch applied, the improved syscall_nt_32 test finally passes on 32-bit kernels. [1] It isn't obviously correct, but it is nonetheless safe from vm86 shenanigans as far as I can tell. A user can't point EIP at entry_SYSENTER_32 while in vm86 mode because entry_SYSENTER_32, like all kernel addresses, is greater than 0xffff and would thus violate the CS segment limit. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b2cdbc037031c07ecf2c40a96069318aec0e7971.1457578375.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-03-10 11:00:32 +08:00
* NMI is doubly nasty. It can happen on the first instruction of
* entry_SYSENTER_32 (just like #DB), but it can also interrupt the beginning
* of the #DB handler even if that #DB in turn hit before entry_SYSENTER_32
* switched stacks. We handle both conditions by simply checking whether we
* interrupted kernel code running on the SYSENTER stack.
*/
ENTRY(nmi)
ASM_CLAC
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX32
/*
* ESPFIX_SS is only ever set on the return to user path
* after we've switched to the entry stack.
*/
pushl %eax
movl %ss, %eax
cmpw $__ESPFIX_SS, %ax
popl %eax
je .Lnmi_espfix_stack
#endif
x86/entry/32: Simplify and fix up the SYSENTER stack #DB/NMI fixup Right after SYSENTER, we can get a #DB or NMI. On x86_32, there's no IST, so the exception handler is invoked on the temporary SYSENTER stack. Because the SYSENTER stack is very small, we have a fixup to switch off the stack quickly when this happens. The old fixup had several issues: 1. It checked the interrupt frame's CS and EIP. This wasn't obviously correct on Xen or if vm86 mode was in use [1]. 2. In the NMI handler, it did some frightening digging into the stack frame. I'm not convinced this digging was correct. 3. The fixup didn't switch stacks and then switch back. Instead, it synthesized a brand new stack frame that would redirect the IRET back to the SYSENTER code. That frame was highly questionable. For one thing, if NMI nested inside #DB, we would effectively abort the #DB prologue, which was probably safe but was frightening. For another, the code used PUSHFL to write the FLAGS portion of the frame, which was simply bogus -- by the time PUSHFL was called, at least TF, NT, VM, and all of the arithmetic flags were clobbered. Simplify this considerably. Instead of looking at the saved frame to see where we came from, check the hardware ESP register against the SYSENTER stack directly. Malicious user code cannot spoof the kernel ESP register, and by moving the check after SAVE_ALL, we can use normal PER_CPU accesses to find all the relevant addresses. With this patch applied, the improved syscall_nt_32 test finally passes on 32-bit kernels. [1] It isn't obviously correct, but it is nonetheless safe from vm86 shenanigans as far as I can tell. A user can't point EIP at entry_SYSENTER_32 while in vm86 mode because entry_SYSENTER_32, like all kernel addresses, is greater than 0xffff and would thus violate the CS segment limit. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b2cdbc037031c07ecf2c40a96069318aec0e7971.1457578375.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-03-10 11:00:32 +08:00
pushl %eax # pt_regs->orig_ax
SAVE_ALL_NMI cr3_reg=%edi
x86/entry/unwind: Create stack frames for saved interrupt registers With frame pointers, when a task is interrupted, its stack is no longer completely reliable because the function could have been interrupted before it had a chance to save the previous frame pointer on the stack. So the caller of the interrupted function could get skipped by a stack trace. This is problematic for live patching, which needs to know whether a stack trace of a sleeping task can be relied upon. There's currently no way to detect if a sleeping task was interrupted by a page fault exception or preemption before it went to sleep. Another issue is that when dumping the stack of an interrupted task, the unwinder has no way of knowing where the saved pt_regs registers are, so it can't print them. This solves those issues by encoding the pt_regs pointer in the frame pointer on entry from an interrupt or an exception. This patch also updates the unwinder to be able to decode it, because otherwise the unwinder would be broken by this change. Note that this causes a change in the behavior of the unwinder: each instance of a pt_regs on the stack is now considered a "frame". So callers of unwind_get_return_address() will now get an occasional 'regs->ip' address that would have previously been skipped over. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/8b9f84a21e39d249049e0547b559ff8da0df0988.1476973742.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-10-21 00:34:40 +08:00
ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
xorl %edx, %edx # zero error code
movl %esp, %eax # pt_regs pointer
x86/entry/32: Simplify and fix up the SYSENTER stack #DB/NMI fixup Right after SYSENTER, we can get a #DB or NMI. On x86_32, there's no IST, so the exception handler is invoked on the temporary SYSENTER stack. Because the SYSENTER stack is very small, we have a fixup to switch off the stack quickly when this happens. The old fixup had several issues: 1. It checked the interrupt frame's CS and EIP. This wasn't obviously correct on Xen or if vm86 mode was in use [1]. 2. In the NMI handler, it did some frightening digging into the stack frame. I'm not convinced this digging was correct. 3. The fixup didn't switch stacks and then switch back. Instead, it synthesized a brand new stack frame that would redirect the IRET back to the SYSENTER code. That frame was highly questionable. For one thing, if NMI nested inside #DB, we would effectively abort the #DB prologue, which was probably safe but was frightening. For another, the code used PUSHFL to write the FLAGS portion of the frame, which was simply bogus -- by the time PUSHFL was called, at least TF, NT, VM, and all of the arithmetic flags were clobbered. Simplify this considerably. Instead of looking at the saved frame to see where we came from, check the hardware ESP register against the SYSENTER stack directly. Malicious user code cannot spoof the kernel ESP register, and by moving the check after SAVE_ALL, we can use normal PER_CPU accesses to find all the relevant addresses. With this patch applied, the improved syscall_nt_32 test finally passes on 32-bit kernels. [1] It isn't obviously correct, but it is nonetheless safe from vm86 shenanigans as far as I can tell. A user can't point EIP at entry_SYSENTER_32 while in vm86 mode because entry_SYSENTER_32, like all kernel addresses, is greater than 0xffff and would thus violate the CS segment limit. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b2cdbc037031c07ecf2c40a96069318aec0e7971.1457578375.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-03-10 11:00:32 +08:00
/* Are we currently on the SYSENTER stack? */
movl PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_entry_area), %ecx
addl $CPU_ENTRY_AREA_entry_stack + SIZEOF_entry_stack, %ecx
subl %eax, %ecx /* ecx = (end of entry_stack) - esp */
cmpl $SIZEOF_entry_stack, %ecx
x86/entry/32: Simplify and fix up the SYSENTER stack #DB/NMI fixup Right after SYSENTER, we can get a #DB or NMI. On x86_32, there's no IST, so the exception handler is invoked on the temporary SYSENTER stack. Because the SYSENTER stack is very small, we have a fixup to switch off the stack quickly when this happens. The old fixup had several issues: 1. It checked the interrupt frame's CS and EIP. This wasn't obviously correct on Xen or if vm86 mode was in use [1]. 2. In the NMI handler, it did some frightening digging into the stack frame. I'm not convinced this digging was correct. 3. The fixup didn't switch stacks and then switch back. Instead, it synthesized a brand new stack frame that would redirect the IRET back to the SYSENTER code. That frame was highly questionable. For one thing, if NMI nested inside #DB, we would effectively abort the #DB prologue, which was probably safe but was frightening. For another, the code used PUSHFL to write the FLAGS portion of the frame, which was simply bogus -- by the time PUSHFL was called, at least TF, NT, VM, and all of the arithmetic flags were clobbered. Simplify this considerably. Instead of looking at the saved frame to see where we came from, check the hardware ESP register against the SYSENTER stack directly. Malicious user code cannot spoof the kernel ESP register, and by moving the check after SAVE_ALL, we can use normal PER_CPU accesses to find all the relevant addresses. With this patch applied, the improved syscall_nt_32 test finally passes on 32-bit kernels. [1] It isn't obviously correct, but it is nonetheless safe from vm86 shenanigans as far as I can tell. A user can't point EIP at entry_SYSENTER_32 while in vm86 mode because entry_SYSENTER_32, like all kernel addresses, is greater than 0xffff and would thus violate the CS segment limit. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b2cdbc037031c07ecf2c40a96069318aec0e7971.1457578375.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-03-10 11:00:32 +08:00
jb .Lnmi_from_sysenter_stack
/* Not on SYSENTER stack. */
call do_nmi
jmp .Lnmi_return
x86/entry/32: Simplify and fix up the SYSENTER stack #DB/NMI fixup Right after SYSENTER, we can get a #DB or NMI. On x86_32, there's no IST, so the exception handler is invoked on the temporary SYSENTER stack. Because the SYSENTER stack is very small, we have a fixup to switch off the stack quickly when this happens. The old fixup had several issues: 1. It checked the interrupt frame's CS and EIP. This wasn't obviously correct on Xen or if vm86 mode was in use [1]. 2. In the NMI handler, it did some frightening digging into the stack frame. I'm not convinced this digging was correct. 3. The fixup didn't switch stacks and then switch back. Instead, it synthesized a brand new stack frame that would redirect the IRET back to the SYSENTER code. That frame was highly questionable. For one thing, if NMI nested inside #DB, we would effectively abort the #DB prologue, which was probably safe but was frightening. For another, the code used PUSHFL to write the FLAGS portion of the frame, which was simply bogus -- by the time PUSHFL was called, at least TF, NT, VM, and all of the arithmetic flags were clobbered. Simplify this considerably. Instead of looking at the saved frame to see where we came from, check the hardware ESP register against the SYSENTER stack directly. Malicious user code cannot spoof the kernel ESP register, and by moving the check after SAVE_ALL, we can use normal PER_CPU accesses to find all the relevant addresses. With this patch applied, the improved syscall_nt_32 test finally passes on 32-bit kernels. [1] It isn't obviously correct, but it is nonetheless safe from vm86 shenanigans as far as I can tell. A user can't point EIP at entry_SYSENTER_32 while in vm86 mode because entry_SYSENTER_32, like all kernel addresses, is greater than 0xffff and would thus violate the CS segment limit. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b2cdbc037031c07ecf2c40a96069318aec0e7971.1457578375.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-03-10 11:00:32 +08:00
.Lnmi_from_sysenter_stack:
/*
* We're on the SYSENTER stack. Switch off. No one (not even debug)
* is using the thread stack right now, so it's safe for us to use it.
*/
x86/entry/unwind: Create stack frames for saved interrupt registers With frame pointers, when a task is interrupted, its stack is no longer completely reliable because the function could have been interrupted before it had a chance to save the previous frame pointer on the stack. So the caller of the interrupted function could get skipped by a stack trace. This is problematic for live patching, which needs to know whether a stack trace of a sleeping task can be relied upon. There's currently no way to detect if a sleeping task was interrupted by a page fault exception or preemption before it went to sleep. Another issue is that when dumping the stack of an interrupted task, the unwinder has no way of knowing where the saved pt_regs registers are, so it can't print them. This solves those issues by encoding the pt_regs pointer in the frame pointer on entry from an interrupt or an exception. This patch also updates the unwinder to be able to decode it, because otherwise the unwinder would be broken by this change. Note that this causes a change in the behavior of the unwinder: each instance of a pt_regs on the stack is now considered a "frame". So callers of unwind_get_return_address() will now get an occasional 'regs->ip' address that would have previously been skipped over. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/8b9f84a21e39d249049e0547b559ff8da0df0988.1476973742.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-10-21 00:34:40 +08:00
movl %esp, %ebx
x86/entry/32: Simplify and fix up the SYSENTER stack #DB/NMI fixup Right after SYSENTER, we can get a #DB or NMI. On x86_32, there's no IST, so the exception handler is invoked on the temporary SYSENTER stack. Because the SYSENTER stack is very small, we have a fixup to switch off the stack quickly when this happens. The old fixup had several issues: 1. It checked the interrupt frame's CS and EIP. This wasn't obviously correct on Xen or if vm86 mode was in use [1]. 2. In the NMI handler, it did some frightening digging into the stack frame. I'm not convinced this digging was correct. 3. The fixup didn't switch stacks and then switch back. Instead, it synthesized a brand new stack frame that would redirect the IRET back to the SYSENTER code. That frame was highly questionable. For one thing, if NMI nested inside #DB, we would effectively abort the #DB prologue, which was probably safe but was frightening. For another, the code used PUSHFL to write the FLAGS portion of the frame, which was simply bogus -- by the time PUSHFL was called, at least TF, NT, VM, and all of the arithmetic flags were clobbered. Simplify this considerably. Instead of looking at the saved frame to see where we came from, check the hardware ESP register against the SYSENTER stack directly. Malicious user code cannot spoof the kernel ESP register, and by moving the check after SAVE_ALL, we can use normal PER_CPU accesses to find all the relevant addresses. With this patch applied, the improved syscall_nt_32 test finally passes on 32-bit kernels. [1] It isn't obviously correct, but it is nonetheless safe from vm86 shenanigans as far as I can tell. A user can't point EIP at entry_SYSENTER_32 while in vm86 mode because entry_SYSENTER_32, like all kernel addresses, is greater than 0xffff and would thus violate the CS segment limit. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b2cdbc037031c07ecf2c40a96069318aec0e7971.1457578375.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-03-10 11:00:32 +08:00
movl PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %esp
call do_nmi
x86/entry/unwind: Create stack frames for saved interrupt registers With frame pointers, when a task is interrupted, its stack is no longer completely reliable because the function could have been interrupted before it had a chance to save the previous frame pointer on the stack. So the caller of the interrupted function could get skipped by a stack trace. This is problematic for live patching, which needs to know whether a stack trace of a sleeping task can be relied upon. There's currently no way to detect if a sleeping task was interrupted by a page fault exception or preemption before it went to sleep. Another issue is that when dumping the stack of an interrupted task, the unwinder has no way of knowing where the saved pt_regs registers are, so it can't print them. This solves those issues by encoding the pt_regs pointer in the frame pointer on entry from an interrupt or an exception. This patch also updates the unwinder to be able to decode it, because otherwise the unwinder would be broken by this change. Note that this causes a change in the behavior of the unwinder: each instance of a pt_regs on the stack is now considered a "frame". So callers of unwind_get_return_address() will now get an occasional 'regs->ip' address that would have previously been skipped over. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/8b9f84a21e39d249049e0547b559ff8da0df0988.1476973742.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-10-21 00:34:40 +08:00
movl %ebx, %esp
.Lnmi_return:
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX32
testl $CS_FROM_ESPFIX, PT_CS(%esp)
jnz .Lnmi_from_espfix
#endif
CHECK_AND_APPLY_ESPFIX
RESTORE_ALL_NMI cr3_reg=%edi pop=4
jmp .Lirq_return
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX32
.Lnmi_espfix_stack:
x86/debug: Remove perpetually broken, unmaintainable dwarf annotations So the dwarf2 annotations in low level assembly code have become an increasing hindrance: unreadable, messy macros mixed into some of the most security sensitive code paths of the Linux kernel. These debug info annotations don't even buy the upstream kernel anything: dwarf driven stack unwinding has caused problems in the past so it's out of tree, and the upstream kernel only uses the much more robust framepointers based stack unwinding method. In addition to that there's a steady, slow bitrot going on with these annotations, requiring frequent fixups. There's no tooling and no functionality upstream that keeps it correct. So burn down the sick forest, allowing new, healthier growth: 27 files changed, 350 insertions(+), 1101 deletions(-) Someone who has the willingness and time to do this properly can attempt to reintroduce dwarf debuginfo in x86 assembly code plus dwarf unwinding from first principles, with the following conditions: - it should be maximally readable, and maximally low-key to 'ordinary' code reading and maintenance. - find a build time method to insert dwarf annotations automatically in the most common cases, for pop/push instructions that manipulate the stack pointer. This could be done for example via a preprocessing step that just looks for common patterns - plus special annotations for the few cases where we want to depart from the default. We have hundreds of CFI annotations, so automating most of that makes sense. - it should come with build tooling checks that ensure that CFI annotations are sensible. We've seen such efforts from the framepointer side, and there's no reason it couldn't be done on the dwarf side. Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Frédéric Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-05-28 18:21:47 +08:00
/*
* Create the pointer to LSS back
*/
pushl %ss
pushl %esp
addl $4, (%esp)
/* Copy the (short) IRET frame */
pushl 4*4(%esp) # flags
pushl 4*4(%esp) # cs
pushl 4*4(%esp) # ip
pushl %eax # orig_ax
SAVE_ALL_NMI cr3_reg=%edi unwind_espfix=1
x86/entry/unwind: Create stack frames for saved interrupt registers With frame pointers, when a task is interrupted, its stack is no longer completely reliable because the function could have been interrupted before it had a chance to save the previous frame pointer on the stack. So the caller of the interrupted function could get skipped by a stack trace. This is problematic for live patching, which needs to know whether a stack trace of a sleeping task can be relied upon. There's currently no way to detect if a sleeping task was interrupted by a page fault exception or preemption before it went to sleep. Another issue is that when dumping the stack of an interrupted task, the unwinder has no way of knowing where the saved pt_regs registers are, so it can't print them. This solves those issues by encoding the pt_regs pointer in the frame pointer on entry from an interrupt or an exception. This patch also updates the unwinder to be able to decode it, because otherwise the unwinder would be broken by this change. Note that this causes a change in the behavior of the unwinder: each instance of a pt_regs on the stack is now considered a "frame". So callers of unwind_get_return_address() will now get an occasional 'regs->ip' address that would have previously been skipped over. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/8b9f84a21e39d249049e0547b559ff8da0df0988.1476973742.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-10-21 00:34:40 +08:00
ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
/* clear CS_FROM_KERNEL, set CS_FROM_ESPFIX */
xorl $(CS_FROM_ESPFIX | CS_FROM_KERNEL), PT_CS(%esp)
xorl %edx, %edx # zero error code
movl %esp, %eax # pt_regs pointer
jmp .Lnmi_from_sysenter_stack
.Lnmi_from_espfix:
RESTORE_ALL_NMI cr3_reg=%edi
/*
* Because we cleared CS_FROM_KERNEL, IRET_FRAME 'forgot' to
* fix up the gap and long frame:
*
* 3 - original frame (exception)
* 2 - ESPFIX block (above)
* 6 - gap (FIXUP_FRAME)
* 5 - long frame (FIXUP_FRAME)
* 1 - orig_ax
*/
lss (1+5+6)*4(%esp), %esp # back to espfix stack
jmp .Lirq_return
#endif
END(nmi)
ENTRY(int3)
ASM_CLAC
pushl $-1 # mark this as an int
SAVE_ALL switch_stacks=1
x86/entry/unwind: Create stack frames for saved interrupt registers With frame pointers, when a task is interrupted, its stack is no longer completely reliable because the function could have been interrupted before it had a chance to save the previous frame pointer on the stack. So the caller of the interrupted function could get skipped by a stack trace. This is problematic for live patching, which needs to know whether a stack trace of a sleeping task can be relied upon. There's currently no way to detect if a sleeping task was interrupted by a page fault exception or preemption before it went to sleep. Another issue is that when dumping the stack of an interrupted task, the unwinder has no way of knowing where the saved pt_regs registers are, so it can't print them. This solves those issues by encoding the pt_regs pointer in the frame pointer on entry from an interrupt or an exception. This patch also updates the unwinder to be able to decode it, because otherwise the unwinder would be broken by this change. Note that this causes a change in the behavior of the unwinder: each instance of a pt_regs on the stack is now considered a "frame". So callers of unwind_get_return_address() will now get an occasional 'regs->ip' address that would have previously been skipped over. Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/8b9f84a21e39d249049e0547b559ff8da0df0988.1476973742.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-10-21 00:34:40 +08:00
ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
xorl %edx, %edx # zero error code
movl %esp, %eax # pt_regs pointer
call do_int3
jmp ret_from_exception
END(int3)
ENTRY(general_protection)
pushl $do_general_protection
jmp common_exception
END(general_protection)
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST
ENTRY(async_page_fault)
ASM_CLAC
pushl $do_async_page_fault
jmp common_exception_read_cr2
END(async_page_fault)
#endif
ENTRY(rewind_stack_do_exit)
/* Prevent any naive code from trying to unwind to our caller. */
xorl %ebp, %ebp
movl PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %esi
leal -TOP_OF_KERNEL_STACK_PADDING-PTREGS_SIZE(%esi), %esp
call do_exit
1: jmp 1b
END(rewind_stack_do_exit)