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linux-next/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c

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/*
BlueZ - Bluetooth protocol stack for Linux
Copyright (C) 2000-2001 Qualcomm Incorporated
Written 2000,2001 by Maxim Krasnyansky <maxk@qualcomm.com>
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
published by the Free Software Foundation;
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OF THIRD PARTY RIGHTS.
IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER(S) AND AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY
CLAIM, OR ANY SPECIAL INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, OR ANY DAMAGES
WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
ALL LIABILITY, INCLUDING LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF ANY PATENTS,
COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS OR OTHER RIGHTS, RELATING TO USE OF THIS
SOFTWARE IS DISCLAIMED.
*/
/* Bluetooth HCI sockets. */
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
#include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
#include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h>
#include <net/bluetooth/hci_mon.h>
static atomic_t monitor_promisc = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
/* ----- HCI socket interface ----- */
static inline int hci_test_bit(int nr, void *addr)
{
return *((__u32 *) addr + (nr >> 5)) & ((__u32) 1 << (nr & 31));
}
/* Security filter */
static struct hci_sec_filter hci_sec_filter = {
/* Packet types */
0x10,
/* Events */
{ 0x1000d9fe, 0x0000b00c },
/* Commands */
{
{ 0x0 },
/* OGF_LINK_CTL */
{ 0xbe000006, 0x00000001, 0x00000000, 0x00 },
/* OGF_LINK_POLICY */
{ 0x00005200, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00 },
/* OGF_HOST_CTL */
{ 0xaab00200, 0x2b402aaa, 0x05220154, 0x00 },
/* OGF_INFO_PARAM */
{ 0x000002be, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00 },
/* OGF_STATUS_PARAM */
{ 0x000000ea, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00 }
}
};
static struct bt_sock_list hci_sk_list = {
.lock = __RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED(hci_sk_list.lock)
};
static bool is_filtered_packet(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct hci_filter *flt;
int flt_type, flt_event;
/* Apply filter */
flt = &hci_pi(sk)->filter;
if (bt_cb(skb)->pkt_type == HCI_VENDOR_PKT)
flt_type = 0;
else
flt_type = bt_cb(skb)->pkt_type & HCI_FLT_TYPE_BITS;
if (!test_bit(flt_type, &flt->type_mask))
return true;
/* Extra filter for event packets only */
if (bt_cb(skb)->pkt_type != HCI_EVENT_PKT)
return false;
flt_event = (*(__u8 *)skb->data & HCI_FLT_EVENT_BITS);
if (!hci_test_bit(flt_event, &flt->event_mask))
return true;
/* Check filter only when opcode is set */
if (!flt->opcode)
return false;
if (flt_event == HCI_EV_CMD_COMPLETE &&
flt->opcode != get_unaligned((__le16 *)(skb->data + 3)))
return true;
if (flt_event == HCI_EV_CMD_STATUS &&
flt->opcode != get_unaligned((__le16 *)(skb->data + 4)))
return true;
return false;
}
/* Send frame to RAW socket */
void hci_send_to_sock(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sock *sk;
struct sk_buff *skb_copy = NULL;
BT_DBG("hdev %p len %d", hdev, skb->len);
read_lock(&hci_sk_list.lock);
hlist: drop the node parameter from iterators I'm not sure why, but the hlist for each entry iterators were conceived list_for_each_entry(pos, head, member) The hlist ones were greedy and wanted an extra parameter: hlist_for_each_entry(tpos, pos, head, member) Why did they need an extra pos parameter? I'm not quite sure. Not only they don't really need it, it also prevents the iterator from looking exactly like the list iterator, which is unfortunate. Besides the semantic patch, there was some manual work required: - Fix up the actual hlist iterators in linux/list.h - Fix up the declaration of other iterators based on the hlist ones. - A very small amount of places were using the 'node' parameter, this was modified to use 'obj->member' instead. - Coccinelle didn't handle the hlist_for_each_entry_safe iterator properly, so those had to be fixed up manually. The semantic patch which is mostly the work of Peter Senna Tschudin is here: @@ iterator name hlist_for_each_entry, hlist_for_each_entry_continue, hlist_for_each_entry_from, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh, for_each_busy_worker, ax25_uid_for_each, ax25_for_each, inet_bind_bucket_for_each, sctp_for_each_hentry, sk_for_each, sk_for_each_rcu, sk_for_each_from, sk_for_each_safe, sk_for_each_bound, hlist_for_each_entry_safe, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu, nr_neigh_for_each, nr_neigh_for_each_safe, nr_node_for_each, nr_node_for_each_safe, for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp, for_each_gfn_sp, for_each_host; type T; expression a,c,d,e; identifier b; statement S; @@ -T b; <+... when != b ( hlist_for_each_entry(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_from(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh(a, - b, c) S | for_each_busy_worker(a, c, - b, d) S | ax25_uid_for_each(a, - b, c) S | ax25_for_each(a, - b, c) S | inet_bind_bucket_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sctp_for_each_hentry(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_rcu(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_from -(a, b) +(a) S + sk_for_each_from(a) S | sk_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | sk_for_each_bound(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_safe(a, - b, c, d, e) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | nr_node_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_node_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d) S | for_each_host(a, - b, c) S | for_each_host_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | for_each_mesh_entry(a, - b, c, d) S ) ...+> [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus change from net/ipv4/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus hunk from net/ipv6/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warnings] [akpm@linux-foudnation.org: redo intrusive kvm changes] Tested-by: Peter Senna Tschudin <peter.senna@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-02-28 09:06:00 +08:00
sk_for_each(sk, &hci_sk_list.head) {
struct sk_buff *nskb;
if (sk->sk_state != BT_BOUND || hci_pi(sk)->hdev != hdev)
continue;
/* Don't send frame to the socket it came from */
if (skb->sk == sk)
continue;
Bluetooth: Introduce new HCI socket channel for user operation This patch introcuces a new HCI socket channel that allows user applications to take control over a specific HCI device. The application gains exclusive access to this device and forces the kernel to stay away and not manage it. In case of the management interface it will actually hide the device. Such operation is useful for security testing tools that need to operate underneath the Bluetooth stack and need full control over a device. The advantage here is that the kernel still provides the service of hardware abstraction and HCI level access. The use of Bluetooth drivers for hardware access also means that sniffing tools like btmon or hcidump are still working and the whole set of transaction can be traced with existing tools. With the new channel it is possible to send HCI commands, ACL and SCO data packets and receive HCI events, ACL and SCO packets from the device. The format follows the well established H:4 protocol. The new HCI user channel can only be established when a device has been through its setup routine and is currently powered down. This is enforced to not cause any problems with current operations. In addition only one user channel per HCI device is allowed. It is exclusive access for one user application. Access to this channel is limited to process with CAP_NET_RAW capability. Using this new facility does not require any external library or special ioctl or socket filters. Just create the socket and bind it. After that the file descriptor is ready to speak H:4 protocol. struct sockaddr_hci addr; int fd; fd = socket(AF_BLUETOOTH, SOCK_RAW, BTPROTO_HCI); memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); addr.hci_family = AF_BLUETOOTH; addr.hci_dev = 0; addr.hci_channel = HCI_CHANNEL_USER; bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *) &addr, sizeof(addr)); The example shows on how to create a user channel for hci0 device. Error handling has been left out of the example. However with the limitations mentioned above it is advised to handle errors. Binding of the user cahnnel socket can fail for various reasons. Specifically if the device is currently activated by BlueZ or if the access permissions are not present. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
2013-08-27 12:40:52 +08:00
if (hci_pi(sk)->channel == HCI_CHANNEL_RAW) {
if (is_filtered_packet(sk, skb))
continue;
} else if (hci_pi(sk)->channel == HCI_CHANNEL_USER) {
if (!bt_cb(skb)->incoming)
continue;
if (bt_cb(skb)->pkt_type != HCI_EVENT_PKT &&
bt_cb(skb)->pkt_type != HCI_ACLDATA_PKT &&
bt_cb(skb)->pkt_type != HCI_SCODATA_PKT)
continue;
} else {
/* Don't send frame to other channel types */
continue;
Bluetooth: Introduce new HCI socket channel for user operation This patch introcuces a new HCI socket channel that allows user applications to take control over a specific HCI device. The application gains exclusive access to this device and forces the kernel to stay away and not manage it. In case of the management interface it will actually hide the device. Such operation is useful for security testing tools that need to operate underneath the Bluetooth stack and need full control over a device. The advantage here is that the kernel still provides the service of hardware abstraction and HCI level access. The use of Bluetooth drivers for hardware access also means that sniffing tools like btmon or hcidump are still working and the whole set of transaction can be traced with existing tools. With the new channel it is possible to send HCI commands, ACL and SCO data packets and receive HCI events, ACL and SCO packets from the device. The format follows the well established H:4 protocol. The new HCI user channel can only be established when a device has been through its setup routine and is currently powered down. This is enforced to not cause any problems with current operations. In addition only one user channel per HCI device is allowed. It is exclusive access for one user application. Access to this channel is limited to process with CAP_NET_RAW capability. Using this new facility does not require any external library or special ioctl or socket filters. Just create the socket and bind it. After that the file descriptor is ready to speak H:4 protocol. struct sockaddr_hci addr; int fd; fd = socket(AF_BLUETOOTH, SOCK_RAW, BTPROTO_HCI); memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); addr.hci_family = AF_BLUETOOTH; addr.hci_dev = 0; addr.hci_channel = HCI_CHANNEL_USER; bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *) &addr, sizeof(addr)); The example shows on how to create a user channel for hci0 device. Error handling has been left out of the example. However with the limitations mentioned above it is advised to handle errors. Binding of the user cahnnel socket can fail for various reasons. Specifically if the device is currently activated by BlueZ or if the access permissions are not present. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
2013-08-27 12:40:52 +08:00
}
if (!skb_copy) {
/* Create a private copy with headroom */
skb_copy = __pskb_copy(skb, 1, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb_copy)
continue;
/* Put type byte before the data */
memcpy(skb_push(skb_copy, 1), &bt_cb(skb)->pkt_type, 1);
}
nskb = skb_clone(skb_copy, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!nskb)
continue;
if (sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, nskb))
kfree_skb(nskb);
}
read_unlock(&hci_sk_list.lock);
kfree_skb(skb_copy);
}
/* Send frame to control socket */
void hci_send_to_control(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *skip_sk)
{
struct sock *sk;
BT_DBG("len %d", skb->len);
read_lock(&hci_sk_list.lock);
hlist: drop the node parameter from iterators I'm not sure why, but the hlist for each entry iterators were conceived list_for_each_entry(pos, head, member) The hlist ones were greedy and wanted an extra parameter: hlist_for_each_entry(tpos, pos, head, member) Why did they need an extra pos parameter? I'm not quite sure. Not only they don't really need it, it also prevents the iterator from looking exactly like the list iterator, which is unfortunate. Besides the semantic patch, there was some manual work required: - Fix up the actual hlist iterators in linux/list.h - Fix up the declaration of other iterators based on the hlist ones. - A very small amount of places were using the 'node' parameter, this was modified to use 'obj->member' instead. - Coccinelle didn't handle the hlist_for_each_entry_safe iterator properly, so those had to be fixed up manually. The semantic patch which is mostly the work of Peter Senna Tschudin is here: @@ iterator name hlist_for_each_entry, hlist_for_each_entry_continue, hlist_for_each_entry_from, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh, for_each_busy_worker, ax25_uid_for_each, ax25_for_each, inet_bind_bucket_for_each, sctp_for_each_hentry, sk_for_each, sk_for_each_rcu, sk_for_each_from, sk_for_each_safe, sk_for_each_bound, hlist_for_each_entry_safe, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu, nr_neigh_for_each, nr_neigh_for_each_safe, nr_node_for_each, nr_node_for_each_safe, for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp, for_each_gfn_sp, for_each_host; type T; expression a,c,d,e; identifier b; statement S; @@ -T b; <+... when != b ( hlist_for_each_entry(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_from(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh(a, - b, c) S | for_each_busy_worker(a, c, - b, d) S | ax25_uid_for_each(a, - b, c) S | ax25_for_each(a, - b, c) S | inet_bind_bucket_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sctp_for_each_hentry(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_rcu(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_from -(a, b) +(a) S + sk_for_each_from(a) S | sk_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | sk_for_each_bound(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_safe(a, - b, c, d, e) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | nr_node_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_node_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d) S | for_each_host(a, - b, c) S | for_each_host_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | for_each_mesh_entry(a, - b, c, d) S ) ...+> [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus change from net/ipv4/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus hunk from net/ipv6/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warnings] [akpm@linux-foudnation.org: redo intrusive kvm changes] Tested-by: Peter Senna Tschudin <peter.senna@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-02-28 09:06:00 +08:00
sk_for_each(sk, &hci_sk_list.head) {
struct sk_buff *nskb;
/* Skip the original socket */
if (sk == skip_sk)
continue;
if (sk->sk_state != BT_BOUND)
continue;
if (hci_pi(sk)->channel != HCI_CHANNEL_CONTROL)
continue;
nskb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!nskb)
continue;
if (sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, nskb))
kfree_skb(nskb);
}
read_unlock(&hci_sk_list.lock);
}
/* Send frame to monitor socket */
void hci_send_to_monitor(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sock *sk;
struct sk_buff *skb_copy = NULL;
__le16 opcode;
if (!atomic_read(&monitor_promisc))
return;
BT_DBG("hdev %p len %d", hdev, skb->len);
switch (bt_cb(skb)->pkt_type) {
case HCI_COMMAND_PKT:
opcode = __constant_cpu_to_le16(HCI_MON_COMMAND_PKT);
break;
case HCI_EVENT_PKT:
opcode = __constant_cpu_to_le16(HCI_MON_EVENT_PKT);
break;
case HCI_ACLDATA_PKT:
if (bt_cb(skb)->incoming)
opcode = __constant_cpu_to_le16(HCI_MON_ACL_RX_PKT);
else
opcode = __constant_cpu_to_le16(HCI_MON_ACL_TX_PKT);
break;
case HCI_SCODATA_PKT:
if (bt_cb(skb)->incoming)
opcode = __constant_cpu_to_le16(HCI_MON_SCO_RX_PKT);
else
opcode = __constant_cpu_to_le16(HCI_MON_SCO_TX_PKT);
break;
default:
return;
}
read_lock(&hci_sk_list.lock);
hlist: drop the node parameter from iterators I'm not sure why, but the hlist for each entry iterators were conceived list_for_each_entry(pos, head, member) The hlist ones were greedy and wanted an extra parameter: hlist_for_each_entry(tpos, pos, head, member) Why did they need an extra pos parameter? I'm not quite sure. Not only they don't really need it, it also prevents the iterator from looking exactly like the list iterator, which is unfortunate. Besides the semantic patch, there was some manual work required: - Fix up the actual hlist iterators in linux/list.h - Fix up the declaration of other iterators based on the hlist ones. - A very small amount of places were using the 'node' parameter, this was modified to use 'obj->member' instead. - Coccinelle didn't handle the hlist_for_each_entry_safe iterator properly, so those had to be fixed up manually. The semantic patch which is mostly the work of Peter Senna Tschudin is here: @@ iterator name hlist_for_each_entry, hlist_for_each_entry_continue, hlist_for_each_entry_from, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh, for_each_busy_worker, ax25_uid_for_each, ax25_for_each, inet_bind_bucket_for_each, sctp_for_each_hentry, sk_for_each, sk_for_each_rcu, sk_for_each_from, sk_for_each_safe, sk_for_each_bound, hlist_for_each_entry_safe, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu, nr_neigh_for_each, nr_neigh_for_each_safe, nr_node_for_each, nr_node_for_each_safe, for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp, for_each_gfn_sp, for_each_host; type T; expression a,c,d,e; identifier b; statement S; @@ -T b; <+... when != b ( hlist_for_each_entry(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_from(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh(a, - b, c) S | for_each_busy_worker(a, c, - b, d) S | ax25_uid_for_each(a, - b, c) S | ax25_for_each(a, - b, c) S | inet_bind_bucket_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sctp_for_each_hentry(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_rcu(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_from -(a, b) +(a) S + sk_for_each_from(a) S | sk_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | sk_for_each_bound(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_safe(a, - b, c, d, e) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | nr_node_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_node_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d) S | for_each_host(a, - b, c) S | for_each_host_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | for_each_mesh_entry(a, - b, c, d) S ) ...+> [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus change from net/ipv4/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus hunk from net/ipv6/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warnings] [akpm@linux-foudnation.org: redo intrusive kvm changes] Tested-by: Peter Senna Tschudin <peter.senna@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-02-28 09:06:00 +08:00
sk_for_each(sk, &hci_sk_list.head) {
struct sk_buff *nskb;
if (sk->sk_state != BT_BOUND)
continue;
if (hci_pi(sk)->channel != HCI_CHANNEL_MONITOR)
continue;
if (!skb_copy) {
struct hci_mon_hdr *hdr;
/* Create a private copy with headroom */
skb_copy = __pskb_copy(skb, HCI_MON_HDR_SIZE,
GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb_copy)
continue;
/* Put header before the data */
hdr = (void *) skb_push(skb_copy, HCI_MON_HDR_SIZE);
hdr->opcode = opcode;
hdr->index = cpu_to_le16(hdev->id);
hdr->len = cpu_to_le16(skb->len);
}
nskb = skb_clone(skb_copy, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!nskb)
continue;
if (sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, nskb))
kfree_skb(nskb);
}
read_unlock(&hci_sk_list.lock);
kfree_skb(skb_copy);
}
static void send_monitor_event(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sock *sk;
BT_DBG("len %d", skb->len);
read_lock(&hci_sk_list.lock);
hlist: drop the node parameter from iterators I'm not sure why, but the hlist for each entry iterators were conceived list_for_each_entry(pos, head, member) The hlist ones were greedy and wanted an extra parameter: hlist_for_each_entry(tpos, pos, head, member) Why did they need an extra pos parameter? I'm not quite sure. Not only they don't really need it, it also prevents the iterator from looking exactly like the list iterator, which is unfortunate. Besides the semantic patch, there was some manual work required: - Fix up the actual hlist iterators in linux/list.h - Fix up the declaration of other iterators based on the hlist ones. - A very small amount of places were using the 'node' parameter, this was modified to use 'obj->member' instead. - Coccinelle didn't handle the hlist_for_each_entry_safe iterator properly, so those had to be fixed up manually. The semantic patch which is mostly the work of Peter Senna Tschudin is here: @@ iterator name hlist_for_each_entry, hlist_for_each_entry_continue, hlist_for_each_entry_from, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh, for_each_busy_worker, ax25_uid_for_each, ax25_for_each, inet_bind_bucket_for_each, sctp_for_each_hentry, sk_for_each, sk_for_each_rcu, sk_for_each_from, sk_for_each_safe, sk_for_each_bound, hlist_for_each_entry_safe, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu, nr_neigh_for_each, nr_neigh_for_each_safe, nr_node_for_each, nr_node_for_each_safe, for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp, for_each_gfn_sp, for_each_host; type T; expression a,c,d,e; identifier b; statement S; @@ -T b; <+... when != b ( hlist_for_each_entry(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_from(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh(a, - b, c) S | for_each_busy_worker(a, c, - b, d) S | ax25_uid_for_each(a, - b, c) S | ax25_for_each(a, - b, c) S | inet_bind_bucket_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sctp_for_each_hentry(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_rcu(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_from -(a, b) +(a) S + sk_for_each_from(a) S | sk_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | sk_for_each_bound(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_safe(a, - b, c, d, e) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | nr_node_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_node_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d) S | for_each_host(a, - b, c) S | for_each_host_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | for_each_mesh_entry(a, - b, c, d) S ) ...+> [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus change from net/ipv4/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus hunk from net/ipv6/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warnings] [akpm@linux-foudnation.org: redo intrusive kvm changes] Tested-by: Peter Senna Tschudin <peter.senna@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-02-28 09:06:00 +08:00
sk_for_each(sk, &hci_sk_list.head) {
struct sk_buff *nskb;
if (sk->sk_state != BT_BOUND)
continue;
if (hci_pi(sk)->channel != HCI_CHANNEL_MONITOR)
continue;
nskb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!nskb)
continue;
if (sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, nskb))
kfree_skb(nskb);
}
read_unlock(&hci_sk_list.lock);
}
static struct sk_buff *create_monitor_event(struct hci_dev *hdev, int event)
{
struct hci_mon_hdr *hdr;
struct hci_mon_new_index *ni;
struct sk_buff *skb;
__le16 opcode;
switch (event) {
case HCI_DEV_REG:
skb = bt_skb_alloc(HCI_MON_NEW_INDEX_SIZE, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb)
return NULL;
ni = (void *) skb_put(skb, HCI_MON_NEW_INDEX_SIZE);
ni->type = hdev->dev_type;
ni->bus = hdev->bus;
bacpy(&ni->bdaddr, &hdev->bdaddr);
memcpy(ni->name, hdev->name, 8);
opcode = __constant_cpu_to_le16(HCI_MON_NEW_INDEX);
break;
case HCI_DEV_UNREG:
skb = bt_skb_alloc(0, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb)
return NULL;
opcode = __constant_cpu_to_le16(HCI_MON_DEL_INDEX);
break;
default:
return NULL;
}
__net_timestamp(skb);
hdr = (void *) skb_push(skb, HCI_MON_HDR_SIZE);
hdr->opcode = opcode;
hdr->index = cpu_to_le16(hdev->id);
hdr->len = cpu_to_le16(skb->len - HCI_MON_HDR_SIZE);
return skb;
}
static void send_monitor_replay(struct sock *sk)
{
struct hci_dev *hdev;
read_lock(&hci_dev_list_lock);
list_for_each_entry(hdev, &hci_dev_list, list) {
struct sk_buff *skb;
skb = create_monitor_event(hdev, HCI_DEV_REG);
if (!skb)
continue;
if (sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb))
kfree_skb(skb);
}
read_unlock(&hci_dev_list_lock);
}
/* Generate internal stack event */
static void hci_si_event(struct hci_dev *hdev, int type, int dlen, void *data)
{
struct hci_event_hdr *hdr;
struct hci_ev_stack_internal *ev;
struct sk_buff *skb;
skb = bt_skb_alloc(HCI_EVENT_HDR_SIZE + sizeof(*ev) + dlen, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb)
return;
hdr = (void *) skb_put(skb, HCI_EVENT_HDR_SIZE);
hdr->evt = HCI_EV_STACK_INTERNAL;
hdr->plen = sizeof(*ev) + dlen;
ev = (void *) skb_put(skb, sizeof(*ev) + dlen);
ev->type = type;
memcpy(ev->data, data, dlen);
bt_cb(skb)->incoming = 1;
__net_timestamp(skb);
bt_cb(skb)->pkt_type = HCI_EVENT_PKT;
skb->dev = (void *) hdev;
hci_send_to_sock(hdev, skb);
kfree_skb(skb);
}
void hci_sock_dev_event(struct hci_dev *hdev, int event)
{
struct hci_ev_si_device ev;
BT_DBG("hdev %s event %d", hdev->name, event);
/* Send event to monitor */
if (atomic_read(&monitor_promisc)) {
struct sk_buff *skb;
skb = create_monitor_event(hdev, event);
if (skb) {
send_monitor_event(skb);
kfree_skb(skb);
}
}
/* Send event to sockets */
ev.event = event;
ev.dev_id = hdev->id;
hci_si_event(NULL, HCI_EV_SI_DEVICE, sizeof(ev), &ev);
if (event == HCI_DEV_UNREG) {
struct sock *sk;
/* Detach sockets from device */
read_lock(&hci_sk_list.lock);
hlist: drop the node parameter from iterators I'm not sure why, but the hlist for each entry iterators were conceived list_for_each_entry(pos, head, member) The hlist ones were greedy and wanted an extra parameter: hlist_for_each_entry(tpos, pos, head, member) Why did they need an extra pos parameter? I'm not quite sure. Not only they don't really need it, it also prevents the iterator from looking exactly like the list iterator, which is unfortunate. Besides the semantic patch, there was some manual work required: - Fix up the actual hlist iterators in linux/list.h - Fix up the declaration of other iterators based on the hlist ones. - A very small amount of places were using the 'node' parameter, this was modified to use 'obj->member' instead. - Coccinelle didn't handle the hlist_for_each_entry_safe iterator properly, so those had to be fixed up manually. The semantic patch which is mostly the work of Peter Senna Tschudin is here: @@ iterator name hlist_for_each_entry, hlist_for_each_entry_continue, hlist_for_each_entry_from, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh, for_each_busy_worker, ax25_uid_for_each, ax25_for_each, inet_bind_bucket_for_each, sctp_for_each_hentry, sk_for_each, sk_for_each_rcu, sk_for_each_from, sk_for_each_safe, sk_for_each_bound, hlist_for_each_entry_safe, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu, nr_neigh_for_each, nr_neigh_for_each_safe, nr_node_for_each, nr_node_for_each_safe, for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp, for_each_gfn_sp, for_each_host; type T; expression a,c,d,e; identifier b; statement S; @@ -T b; <+... when != b ( hlist_for_each_entry(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_from(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh(a, - b, c) S | for_each_busy_worker(a, c, - b, d) S | ax25_uid_for_each(a, - b, c) S | ax25_for_each(a, - b, c) S | inet_bind_bucket_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sctp_for_each_hentry(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_rcu(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_from -(a, b) +(a) S + sk_for_each_from(a) S | sk_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | sk_for_each_bound(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_safe(a, - b, c, d, e) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | nr_node_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_node_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d) S | for_each_host(a, - b, c) S | for_each_host_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | for_each_mesh_entry(a, - b, c, d) S ) ...+> [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus change from net/ipv4/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus hunk from net/ipv6/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warnings] [akpm@linux-foudnation.org: redo intrusive kvm changes] Tested-by: Peter Senna Tschudin <peter.senna@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-02-28 09:06:00 +08:00
sk_for_each(sk, &hci_sk_list.head) {
bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
if (hci_pi(sk)->hdev == hdev) {
hci_pi(sk)->hdev = NULL;
sk->sk_err = EPIPE;
sk->sk_state = BT_OPEN;
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
hci_dev_put(hdev);
}
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
}
read_unlock(&hci_sk_list.lock);
}
}
static int hci_sock_release(struct socket *sock)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct hci_dev *hdev;
BT_DBG("sock %p sk %p", sock, sk);
if (!sk)
return 0;
hdev = hci_pi(sk)->hdev;
if (hci_pi(sk)->channel == HCI_CHANNEL_MONITOR)
atomic_dec(&monitor_promisc);
bt_sock_unlink(&hci_sk_list, sk);
if (hdev) {
Bluetooth: Introduce new HCI socket channel for user operation This patch introcuces a new HCI socket channel that allows user applications to take control over a specific HCI device. The application gains exclusive access to this device and forces the kernel to stay away and not manage it. In case of the management interface it will actually hide the device. Such operation is useful for security testing tools that need to operate underneath the Bluetooth stack and need full control over a device. The advantage here is that the kernel still provides the service of hardware abstraction and HCI level access. The use of Bluetooth drivers for hardware access also means that sniffing tools like btmon or hcidump are still working and the whole set of transaction can be traced with existing tools. With the new channel it is possible to send HCI commands, ACL and SCO data packets and receive HCI events, ACL and SCO packets from the device. The format follows the well established H:4 protocol. The new HCI user channel can only be established when a device has been through its setup routine and is currently powered down. This is enforced to not cause any problems with current operations. In addition only one user channel per HCI device is allowed. It is exclusive access for one user application. Access to this channel is limited to process with CAP_NET_RAW capability. Using this new facility does not require any external library or special ioctl or socket filters. Just create the socket and bind it. After that the file descriptor is ready to speak H:4 protocol. struct sockaddr_hci addr; int fd; fd = socket(AF_BLUETOOTH, SOCK_RAW, BTPROTO_HCI); memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); addr.hci_family = AF_BLUETOOTH; addr.hci_dev = 0; addr.hci_channel = HCI_CHANNEL_USER; bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *) &addr, sizeof(addr)); The example shows on how to create a user channel for hci0 device. Error handling has been left out of the example. However with the limitations mentioned above it is advised to handle errors. Binding of the user cahnnel socket can fail for various reasons. Specifically if the device is currently activated by BlueZ or if the access permissions are not present. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
2013-08-27 12:40:52 +08:00
if (hci_pi(sk)->channel == HCI_CHANNEL_USER) {
mgmt_index_added(hdev);
clear_bit(HCI_USER_CHANNEL, &hdev->dev_flags);
hci_dev_close(hdev->id);
}
atomic_dec(&hdev->promisc);
hci_dev_put(hdev);
}
sock_orphan(sk);
skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_write_queue);
sock_put(sk);
return 0;
}
static int hci_sock_blacklist_add(struct hci_dev *hdev, void __user *arg)
{
bdaddr_t bdaddr;
int err;
if (copy_from_user(&bdaddr, arg, sizeof(bdaddr)))
return -EFAULT;
hci_dev_lock(hdev);
err = hci_blacklist_add(hdev, &bdaddr, 0);
hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
return err;
}
static int hci_sock_blacklist_del(struct hci_dev *hdev, void __user *arg)
{
bdaddr_t bdaddr;
int err;
if (copy_from_user(&bdaddr, arg, sizeof(bdaddr)))
return -EFAULT;
hci_dev_lock(hdev);
err = hci_blacklist_del(hdev, &bdaddr, 0);
hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
return err;
}
/* Ioctls that require bound socket */
static int hci_sock_bound_ioctl(struct sock *sk, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct hci_dev *hdev = hci_pi(sk)->hdev;
if (!hdev)
return -EBADFD;
if (test_bit(HCI_USER_CHANNEL, &hdev->dev_flags))
return -EBUSY;
switch (cmd) {
case HCISETRAW:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (test_bit(HCI_QUIRK_RAW_DEVICE, &hdev->quirks))
return -EPERM;
if (arg)
set_bit(HCI_RAW, &hdev->flags);
else
clear_bit(HCI_RAW, &hdev->flags);
return 0;
case HCIGETCONNINFO:
return hci_get_conn_info(hdev, (void __user *) arg);
case HCIGETAUTHINFO:
return hci_get_auth_info(hdev, (void __user *) arg);
case HCIBLOCKADDR:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return hci_sock_blacklist_add(hdev, (void __user *) arg);
case HCIUNBLOCKADDR:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return hci_sock_blacklist_del(hdev, (void __user *) arg);
}
if (hdev->ioctl)
return hdev->ioctl(hdev, cmd, arg);
return -EINVAL;
}
static int hci_sock_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
void __user *argp = (void __user *) arg;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int err;
BT_DBG("cmd %x arg %lx", cmd, arg);
lock_sock(sk);
if (hci_pi(sk)->channel != HCI_CHANNEL_RAW) {
err = -EBADFD;
goto done;
}
release_sock(sk);
switch (cmd) {
case HCIGETDEVLIST:
return hci_get_dev_list(argp);
case HCIGETDEVINFO:
return hci_get_dev_info(argp);
case HCIGETCONNLIST:
return hci_get_conn_list(argp);
case HCIDEVUP:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return hci_dev_open(arg);
case HCIDEVDOWN:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return hci_dev_close(arg);
case HCIDEVRESET:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return hci_dev_reset(arg);
case HCIDEVRESTAT:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return hci_dev_reset_stat(arg);
case HCISETSCAN:
case HCISETAUTH:
case HCISETENCRYPT:
case HCISETPTYPE:
case HCISETLINKPOL:
case HCISETLINKMODE:
case HCISETACLMTU:
case HCISETSCOMTU:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return hci_dev_cmd(cmd, argp);
case HCIINQUIRY:
return hci_inquiry(argp);
}
lock_sock(sk);
err = hci_sock_bound_ioctl(sk, cmd, arg);
done:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
static int hci_sock_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
int addr_len)
{
struct sockaddr_hci haddr;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct hci_dev *hdev = NULL;
int len, err = 0;
BT_DBG("sock %p sk %p", sock, sk);
if (!addr)
return -EINVAL;
memset(&haddr, 0, sizeof(haddr));
len = min_t(unsigned int, sizeof(haddr), addr_len);
memcpy(&haddr, addr, len);
if (haddr.hci_family != AF_BLUETOOTH)
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state == BT_BOUND) {
err = -EALREADY;
goto done;
}
switch (haddr.hci_channel) {
case HCI_CHANNEL_RAW:
if (hci_pi(sk)->hdev) {
err = -EALREADY;
goto done;
}
if (haddr.hci_dev != HCI_DEV_NONE) {
hdev = hci_dev_get(haddr.hci_dev);
if (!hdev) {
err = -ENODEV;
goto done;
}
atomic_inc(&hdev->promisc);
}
hci_pi(sk)->hdev = hdev;
break;
Bluetooth: Introduce new HCI socket channel for user operation This patch introcuces a new HCI socket channel that allows user applications to take control over a specific HCI device. The application gains exclusive access to this device and forces the kernel to stay away and not manage it. In case of the management interface it will actually hide the device. Such operation is useful for security testing tools that need to operate underneath the Bluetooth stack and need full control over a device. The advantage here is that the kernel still provides the service of hardware abstraction and HCI level access. The use of Bluetooth drivers for hardware access also means that sniffing tools like btmon or hcidump are still working and the whole set of transaction can be traced with existing tools. With the new channel it is possible to send HCI commands, ACL and SCO data packets and receive HCI events, ACL and SCO packets from the device. The format follows the well established H:4 protocol. The new HCI user channel can only be established when a device has been through its setup routine and is currently powered down. This is enforced to not cause any problems with current operations. In addition only one user channel per HCI device is allowed. It is exclusive access for one user application. Access to this channel is limited to process with CAP_NET_RAW capability. Using this new facility does not require any external library or special ioctl or socket filters. Just create the socket and bind it. After that the file descriptor is ready to speak H:4 protocol. struct sockaddr_hci addr; int fd; fd = socket(AF_BLUETOOTH, SOCK_RAW, BTPROTO_HCI); memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); addr.hci_family = AF_BLUETOOTH; addr.hci_dev = 0; addr.hci_channel = HCI_CHANNEL_USER; bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *) &addr, sizeof(addr)); The example shows on how to create a user channel for hci0 device. Error handling has been left out of the example. However with the limitations mentioned above it is advised to handle errors. Binding of the user cahnnel socket can fail for various reasons. Specifically if the device is currently activated by BlueZ or if the access permissions are not present. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
2013-08-27 12:40:52 +08:00
case HCI_CHANNEL_USER:
if (hci_pi(sk)->hdev) {
err = -EALREADY;
goto done;
}
if (haddr.hci_dev == HCI_DEV_NONE) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
Bluetooth: Introduce new HCI socket channel for user operation This patch introcuces a new HCI socket channel that allows user applications to take control over a specific HCI device. The application gains exclusive access to this device and forces the kernel to stay away and not manage it. In case of the management interface it will actually hide the device. Such operation is useful for security testing tools that need to operate underneath the Bluetooth stack and need full control over a device. The advantage here is that the kernel still provides the service of hardware abstraction and HCI level access. The use of Bluetooth drivers for hardware access also means that sniffing tools like btmon or hcidump are still working and the whole set of transaction can be traced with existing tools. With the new channel it is possible to send HCI commands, ACL and SCO data packets and receive HCI events, ACL and SCO packets from the device. The format follows the well established H:4 protocol. The new HCI user channel can only be established when a device has been through its setup routine and is currently powered down. This is enforced to not cause any problems with current operations. In addition only one user channel per HCI device is allowed. It is exclusive access for one user application. Access to this channel is limited to process with CAP_NET_RAW capability. Using this new facility does not require any external library or special ioctl or socket filters. Just create the socket and bind it. After that the file descriptor is ready to speak H:4 protocol. struct sockaddr_hci addr; int fd; fd = socket(AF_BLUETOOTH, SOCK_RAW, BTPROTO_HCI); memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); addr.hci_family = AF_BLUETOOTH; addr.hci_dev = 0; addr.hci_channel = HCI_CHANNEL_USER; bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *) &addr, sizeof(addr)); The example shows on how to create a user channel for hci0 device. Error handling has been left out of the example. However with the limitations mentioned above it is advised to handle errors. Binding of the user cahnnel socket can fail for various reasons. Specifically if the device is currently activated by BlueZ or if the access permissions are not present. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
2013-08-27 12:40:52 +08:00
err = -EPERM;
goto done;
}
hdev = hci_dev_get(haddr.hci_dev);
if (!hdev) {
err = -ENODEV;
goto done;
}
if (test_bit(HCI_UP, &hdev->flags) ||
test_bit(HCI_INIT, &hdev->flags) ||
test_bit(HCI_SETUP, &hdev->dev_flags)) {
err = -EBUSY;
hci_dev_put(hdev);
goto done;
}
if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_USER_CHANNEL, &hdev->dev_flags)) {
err = -EUSERS;
hci_dev_put(hdev);
goto done;
}
mgmt_index_removed(hdev);
err = hci_dev_open(hdev->id);
if (err) {
clear_bit(HCI_USER_CHANNEL, &hdev->dev_flags);
hci_dev_put(hdev);
goto done;
}
atomic_inc(&hdev->promisc);
hci_pi(sk)->hdev = hdev;
break;
case HCI_CHANNEL_CONTROL:
if (haddr.hci_dev != HCI_DEV_NONE) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
err = -EPERM;
goto done;
}
break;
case HCI_CHANNEL_MONITOR:
if (haddr.hci_dev != HCI_DEV_NONE) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
if (!capable(CAP_NET_RAW)) {
err = -EPERM;
goto done;
}
send_monitor_replay(sk);
atomic_inc(&monitor_promisc);
break;
default:
err = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
hci_pi(sk)->channel = haddr.hci_channel;
sk->sk_state = BT_BOUND;
done:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
static int hci_sock_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
int *addr_len, int peer)
{
struct sockaddr_hci *haddr = (struct sockaddr_hci *) addr;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct hci_dev *hdev;
int err = 0;
BT_DBG("sock %p sk %p", sock, sk);
if (peer)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
lock_sock(sk);
hdev = hci_pi(sk)->hdev;
if (!hdev) {
err = -EBADFD;
goto done;
}
*addr_len = sizeof(*haddr);
haddr->hci_family = AF_BLUETOOTH;
haddr->hci_dev = hdev->id;
haddr->hci_channel= hci_pi(sk)->channel;
done:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
static void hci_sock_cmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
__u32 mask = hci_pi(sk)->cmsg_mask;
if (mask & HCI_CMSG_DIR) {
int incoming = bt_cb(skb)->incoming;
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_HCI, HCI_CMSG_DIR, sizeof(incoming),
&incoming);
}
if (mask & HCI_CMSG_TSTAMP) {
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
struct compat_timeval ctv;
#endif
struct timeval tv;
void *data;
int len;
skb_get_timestamp(skb, &tv);
data = &tv;
len = sizeof(tv);
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (!COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME &&
(msg->msg_flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT)) {
ctv.tv_sec = tv.tv_sec;
ctv.tv_usec = tv.tv_usec;
data = &ctv;
len = sizeof(ctv);
}
#endif
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_HCI, HCI_CMSG_TSTAMP, len, data);
}
}
static int hci_sock_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
{
int noblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int copied, err;
BT_DBG("sock %p, sk %p", sock, sk);
if (flags & (MSG_OOB))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (sk->sk_state == BT_CLOSED)
return 0;
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (!skb)
return err;
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
copied = skb->len;
if (len < copied) {
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copied = len;
}
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
switch (hci_pi(sk)->channel) {
case HCI_CHANNEL_RAW:
hci_sock_cmsg(sk, msg, skb);
break;
Bluetooth: Introduce new HCI socket channel for user operation This patch introcuces a new HCI socket channel that allows user applications to take control over a specific HCI device. The application gains exclusive access to this device and forces the kernel to stay away and not manage it. In case of the management interface it will actually hide the device. Such operation is useful for security testing tools that need to operate underneath the Bluetooth stack and need full control over a device. The advantage here is that the kernel still provides the service of hardware abstraction and HCI level access. The use of Bluetooth drivers for hardware access also means that sniffing tools like btmon or hcidump are still working and the whole set of transaction can be traced with existing tools. With the new channel it is possible to send HCI commands, ACL and SCO data packets and receive HCI events, ACL and SCO packets from the device. The format follows the well established H:4 protocol. The new HCI user channel can only be established when a device has been through its setup routine and is currently powered down. This is enforced to not cause any problems with current operations. In addition only one user channel per HCI device is allowed. It is exclusive access for one user application. Access to this channel is limited to process with CAP_NET_RAW capability. Using this new facility does not require any external library or special ioctl or socket filters. Just create the socket and bind it. After that the file descriptor is ready to speak H:4 protocol. struct sockaddr_hci addr; int fd; fd = socket(AF_BLUETOOTH, SOCK_RAW, BTPROTO_HCI); memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); addr.hci_family = AF_BLUETOOTH; addr.hci_dev = 0; addr.hci_channel = HCI_CHANNEL_USER; bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *) &addr, sizeof(addr)); The example shows on how to create a user channel for hci0 device. Error handling has been left out of the example. However with the limitations mentioned above it is advised to handle errors. Binding of the user cahnnel socket can fail for various reasons. Specifically if the device is currently activated by BlueZ or if the access permissions are not present. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
2013-08-27 12:40:52 +08:00
case HCI_CHANNEL_USER:
case HCI_CHANNEL_CONTROL:
case HCI_CHANNEL_MONITOR:
sock_recv_timestamp(msg, sk, skb);
break;
}
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
return err ? : copied;
}
static int hci_sock_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct hci_dev *hdev;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
BT_DBG("sock %p sk %p", sock, sk);
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_OOB)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (msg->msg_flags & ~(MSG_DONTWAIT|MSG_NOSIGNAL|MSG_ERRQUEUE))
return -EINVAL;
if (len < 4 || len > HCI_MAX_FRAME_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
switch (hci_pi(sk)->channel) {
case HCI_CHANNEL_RAW:
Bluetooth: Introduce new HCI socket channel for user operation This patch introcuces a new HCI socket channel that allows user applications to take control over a specific HCI device. The application gains exclusive access to this device and forces the kernel to stay away and not manage it. In case of the management interface it will actually hide the device. Such operation is useful for security testing tools that need to operate underneath the Bluetooth stack and need full control over a device. The advantage here is that the kernel still provides the service of hardware abstraction and HCI level access. The use of Bluetooth drivers for hardware access also means that sniffing tools like btmon or hcidump are still working and the whole set of transaction can be traced with existing tools. With the new channel it is possible to send HCI commands, ACL and SCO data packets and receive HCI events, ACL and SCO packets from the device. The format follows the well established H:4 protocol. The new HCI user channel can only be established when a device has been through its setup routine and is currently powered down. This is enforced to not cause any problems with current operations. In addition only one user channel per HCI device is allowed. It is exclusive access for one user application. Access to this channel is limited to process with CAP_NET_RAW capability. Using this new facility does not require any external library or special ioctl or socket filters. Just create the socket and bind it. After that the file descriptor is ready to speak H:4 protocol. struct sockaddr_hci addr; int fd; fd = socket(AF_BLUETOOTH, SOCK_RAW, BTPROTO_HCI); memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); addr.hci_family = AF_BLUETOOTH; addr.hci_dev = 0; addr.hci_channel = HCI_CHANNEL_USER; bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *) &addr, sizeof(addr)); The example shows on how to create a user channel for hci0 device. Error handling has been left out of the example. However with the limitations mentioned above it is advised to handle errors. Binding of the user cahnnel socket can fail for various reasons. Specifically if the device is currently activated by BlueZ or if the access permissions are not present. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
2013-08-27 12:40:52 +08:00
case HCI_CHANNEL_USER:
break;
case HCI_CHANNEL_CONTROL:
err = mgmt_control(sk, msg, len);
goto done;
case HCI_CHANNEL_MONITOR:
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto done;
default:
err = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
hdev = hci_pi(sk)->hdev;
if (!hdev) {
err = -EBADFD;
goto done;
}
if (!test_bit(HCI_UP, &hdev->flags)) {
err = -ENETDOWN;
goto done;
}
skb = bt_skb_send_alloc(sk, len, msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err);
if (!skb)
goto done;
if (memcpy_fromiovec(skb_put(skb, len), msg->msg_iov, len)) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto drop;
}
bt_cb(skb)->pkt_type = *((unsigned char *) skb->data);
skb_pull(skb, 1);
skb->dev = (void *) hdev;
Bluetooth: Introduce new HCI socket channel for user operation This patch introcuces a new HCI socket channel that allows user applications to take control over a specific HCI device. The application gains exclusive access to this device and forces the kernel to stay away and not manage it. In case of the management interface it will actually hide the device. Such operation is useful for security testing tools that need to operate underneath the Bluetooth stack and need full control over a device. The advantage here is that the kernel still provides the service of hardware abstraction and HCI level access. The use of Bluetooth drivers for hardware access also means that sniffing tools like btmon or hcidump are still working and the whole set of transaction can be traced with existing tools. With the new channel it is possible to send HCI commands, ACL and SCO data packets and receive HCI events, ACL and SCO packets from the device. The format follows the well established H:4 protocol. The new HCI user channel can only be established when a device has been through its setup routine and is currently powered down. This is enforced to not cause any problems with current operations. In addition only one user channel per HCI device is allowed. It is exclusive access for one user application. Access to this channel is limited to process with CAP_NET_RAW capability. Using this new facility does not require any external library or special ioctl or socket filters. Just create the socket and bind it. After that the file descriptor is ready to speak H:4 protocol. struct sockaddr_hci addr; int fd; fd = socket(AF_BLUETOOTH, SOCK_RAW, BTPROTO_HCI); memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); addr.hci_family = AF_BLUETOOTH; addr.hci_dev = 0; addr.hci_channel = HCI_CHANNEL_USER; bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *) &addr, sizeof(addr)); The example shows on how to create a user channel for hci0 device. Error handling has been left out of the example. However with the limitations mentioned above it is advised to handle errors. Binding of the user cahnnel socket can fail for various reasons. Specifically if the device is currently activated by BlueZ or if the access permissions are not present. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
2013-08-27 12:40:52 +08:00
if (hci_pi(sk)->channel == HCI_CHANNEL_RAW &&
bt_cb(skb)->pkt_type == HCI_COMMAND_PKT) {
u16 opcode = get_unaligned_le16(skb->data);
u16 ogf = hci_opcode_ogf(opcode);
u16 ocf = hci_opcode_ocf(opcode);
if (((ogf > HCI_SFLT_MAX_OGF) ||
!hci_test_bit(ocf & HCI_FLT_OCF_BITS,
&hci_sec_filter.ocf_mask[ogf])) &&
!capable(CAP_NET_RAW)) {
err = -EPERM;
goto drop;
}
if (test_bit(HCI_RAW, &hdev->flags) || (ogf == 0x3f)) {
skb_queue_tail(&hdev->raw_q, skb);
queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &hdev->tx_work);
} else {
/* Stand-alone HCI commands must be flaged as
* single-command requests.
*/
bt_cb(skb)->req.start = true;
skb_queue_tail(&hdev->cmd_q, skb);
queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &hdev->cmd_work);
}
} else {
if (!capable(CAP_NET_RAW)) {
err = -EPERM;
goto drop;
}
Bluetooth: Introduce new HCI socket channel for user operation This patch introcuces a new HCI socket channel that allows user applications to take control over a specific HCI device. The application gains exclusive access to this device and forces the kernel to stay away and not manage it. In case of the management interface it will actually hide the device. Such operation is useful for security testing tools that need to operate underneath the Bluetooth stack and need full control over a device. The advantage here is that the kernel still provides the service of hardware abstraction and HCI level access. The use of Bluetooth drivers for hardware access also means that sniffing tools like btmon or hcidump are still working and the whole set of transaction can be traced with existing tools. With the new channel it is possible to send HCI commands, ACL and SCO data packets and receive HCI events, ACL and SCO packets from the device. The format follows the well established H:4 protocol. The new HCI user channel can only be established when a device has been through its setup routine and is currently powered down. This is enforced to not cause any problems with current operations. In addition only one user channel per HCI device is allowed. It is exclusive access for one user application. Access to this channel is limited to process with CAP_NET_RAW capability. Using this new facility does not require any external library or special ioctl or socket filters. Just create the socket and bind it. After that the file descriptor is ready to speak H:4 protocol. struct sockaddr_hci addr; int fd; fd = socket(AF_BLUETOOTH, SOCK_RAW, BTPROTO_HCI); memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); addr.hci_family = AF_BLUETOOTH; addr.hci_dev = 0; addr.hci_channel = HCI_CHANNEL_USER; bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *) &addr, sizeof(addr)); The example shows on how to create a user channel for hci0 device. Error handling has been left out of the example. However with the limitations mentioned above it is advised to handle errors. Binding of the user cahnnel socket can fail for various reasons. Specifically if the device is currently activated by BlueZ or if the access permissions are not present. Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
2013-08-27 12:40:52 +08:00
if (hci_pi(sk)->channel == HCI_CHANNEL_USER &&
bt_cb(skb)->pkt_type != HCI_COMMAND_PKT &&
bt_cb(skb)->pkt_type != HCI_ACLDATA_PKT &&
bt_cb(skb)->pkt_type != HCI_SCODATA_PKT) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto drop;
}
skb_queue_tail(&hdev->raw_q, skb);
queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &hdev->tx_work);
}
err = len;
done:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
drop:
kfree_skb(skb);
goto done;
}
static int hci_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int len)
{
struct hci_ufilter uf = { .opcode = 0 };
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int err = 0, opt = 0;
BT_DBG("sk %p, opt %d", sk, optname);
lock_sock(sk);
if (hci_pi(sk)->channel != HCI_CHANNEL_RAW) {
err = -EBADFD;
goto done;
}
switch (optname) {
case HCI_DATA_DIR:
if (get_user(opt, (int __user *)optval)) {
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (opt)
hci_pi(sk)->cmsg_mask |= HCI_CMSG_DIR;
else
hci_pi(sk)->cmsg_mask &= ~HCI_CMSG_DIR;
break;
case HCI_TIME_STAMP:
if (get_user(opt, (int __user *)optval)) {
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (opt)
hci_pi(sk)->cmsg_mask |= HCI_CMSG_TSTAMP;
else
hci_pi(sk)->cmsg_mask &= ~HCI_CMSG_TSTAMP;
break;
case HCI_FILTER:
{
struct hci_filter *f = &hci_pi(sk)->filter;
uf.type_mask = f->type_mask;
uf.opcode = f->opcode;
uf.event_mask[0] = *((u32 *) f->event_mask + 0);
uf.event_mask[1] = *((u32 *) f->event_mask + 1);
}
len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sizeof(uf));
if (copy_from_user(&uf, optval, len)) {
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (!capable(CAP_NET_RAW)) {
uf.type_mask &= hci_sec_filter.type_mask;
uf.event_mask[0] &= *((u32 *) hci_sec_filter.event_mask + 0);
uf.event_mask[1] &= *((u32 *) hci_sec_filter.event_mask + 1);
}
{
struct hci_filter *f = &hci_pi(sk)->filter;
f->type_mask = uf.type_mask;
f->opcode = uf.opcode;
*((u32 *) f->event_mask + 0) = uf.event_mask[0];
*((u32 *) f->event_mask + 1) = uf.event_mask[1];
}
break;
default:
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
done:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
static int hci_sock_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct hci_ufilter uf;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int len, opt, err = 0;
BT_DBG("sk %p, opt %d", sk, optname);
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
lock_sock(sk);
if (hci_pi(sk)->channel != HCI_CHANNEL_RAW) {
err = -EBADFD;
goto done;
}
switch (optname) {
case HCI_DATA_DIR:
if (hci_pi(sk)->cmsg_mask & HCI_CMSG_DIR)
opt = 1;
else
opt = 0;
if (put_user(opt, optval))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
case HCI_TIME_STAMP:
if (hci_pi(sk)->cmsg_mask & HCI_CMSG_TSTAMP)
opt = 1;
else
opt = 0;
if (put_user(opt, optval))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
case HCI_FILTER:
{
struct hci_filter *f = &hci_pi(sk)->filter;
memset(&uf, 0, sizeof(uf));
uf.type_mask = f->type_mask;
uf.opcode = f->opcode;
uf.event_mask[0] = *((u32 *) f->event_mask + 0);
uf.event_mask[1] = *((u32 *) f->event_mask + 1);
}
len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sizeof(uf));
if (copy_to_user(optval, &uf, len))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
default:
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
done:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
static const struct proto_ops hci_sock_ops = {
.family = PF_BLUETOOTH,
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.release = hci_sock_release,
.bind = hci_sock_bind,
.getname = hci_sock_getname,
.sendmsg = hci_sock_sendmsg,
.recvmsg = hci_sock_recvmsg,
.ioctl = hci_sock_ioctl,
.poll = datagram_poll,
.listen = sock_no_listen,
.shutdown = sock_no_shutdown,
.setsockopt = hci_sock_setsockopt,
.getsockopt = hci_sock_getsockopt,
.connect = sock_no_connect,
.socketpair = sock_no_socketpair,
.accept = sock_no_accept,
.mmap = sock_no_mmap
};
static struct proto hci_sk_proto = {
.name = "HCI",
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.obj_size = sizeof(struct hci_pinfo)
};
static int hci_sock_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
int kern)
{
struct sock *sk;
BT_DBG("sock %p", sock);
if (sock->type != SOCK_RAW)
return -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
sock->ops = &hci_sock_ops;
sk = sk_alloc(net, PF_BLUETOOTH, GFP_ATOMIC, &hci_sk_proto);
if (!sk)
return -ENOMEM;
sock_init_data(sock, sk);
sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED);
sk->sk_protocol = protocol;
sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
sk->sk_state = BT_OPEN;
bt_sock_link(&hci_sk_list, sk);
return 0;
}
static const struct net_proto_family hci_sock_family_ops = {
.family = PF_BLUETOOTH,
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.create = hci_sock_create,
};
int __init hci_sock_init(void)
{
int err;
err = proto_register(&hci_sk_proto, 0);
if (err < 0)
return err;
err = bt_sock_register(BTPROTO_HCI, &hci_sock_family_ops);
if (err < 0) {
BT_ERR("HCI socket registration failed");
goto error;
}
err = bt_procfs_init(&init_net, "hci", &hci_sk_list, NULL);
if (err < 0) {
BT_ERR("Failed to create HCI proc file");
bt_sock_unregister(BTPROTO_HCI);
goto error;
}
BT_INFO("HCI socket layer initialized");
return 0;
error:
proto_unregister(&hci_sk_proto);
return err;
}
void hci_sock_cleanup(void)
{
bt_procfs_cleanup(&init_net, "hci");
bt_sock_unregister(BTPROTO_HCI);
proto_unregister(&hci_sk_proto);
}