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e146a2c12f
Set digest_size SHA384 and SHA512 algorithms in pkcs7 and x509, (not set by ported linux code, but needed by __UBOOT__ part). EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE doesn't select these algos but required for correctness if certificates contain sha384WithRSAEncryption or sha512WithRSAEncryption OIDs. Signed-off-by: Dhananjay Phadke <dphadke@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org>
677 lines
18 KiB
C
677 lines
18 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
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/* Verify the signature on a PKCS#7 message.
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*
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* Imported from crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c of linux 5.7
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* with modification marked as __UBOOT__.
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
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*/
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#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS7: "fmt
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#ifdef __UBOOT__
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#include <image.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <linux/bitops.h>
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#include <linux/compat.h>
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#include <linux/asn1.h>
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#include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h>
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#include <crypto/public_key.h>
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#include <crypto/pkcs7_parser.h>
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#else
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/export.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/err.h>
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#include <linux/asn1.h>
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#include <crypto/hash.h>
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#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
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#include <crypto/public_key.h>
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#include "pkcs7_parser.h"
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#endif
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/*
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* pkcs7_digest - Digest the relevant parts of the PKCS#7 data
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* @pkcs7: PKCS7 Signed Data
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* @sinfo: PKCS7 Signed Info
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*
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* Digest the relevant parts of the PKCS#7 data, @pkcs7, using signature
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* information in @sinfo. But if there are authentication attributes,
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* i.e. signed image case, the digest must be calculated against
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* the authentication attributes.
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*
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* Return: 0 - on success, non-zero error code - otherwise
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*/
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#ifdef __UBOOT__
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static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
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struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
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{
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struct public_key_signature *sig = sinfo->sig;
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struct image_region regions[2];
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int ret = 0;
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/*
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* [RFC2315 9.3]
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* If the authenticated attributes are present,
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* the message-digest is calculated on the
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* attributes present in the
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* authenticatedAttributes field and not just
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* the contents field
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*/
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if (!sinfo->authattrs && sig->digest)
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return 0;
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if (!sinfo->sig->hash_algo)
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return -ENOPKG;
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if (!strcmp(sinfo->sig->hash_algo, "sha256"))
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sig->digest_size = SHA256_SUM_LEN;
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else if (!strcmp(sinfo->sig->hash_algo, "sha384"))
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sig->digest_size = SHA384_SUM_LEN;
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else if (!strcmp(sinfo->sig->hash_algo, "sha512"))
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sig->digest_size = SHA512_SUM_LEN;
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else if (!strcmp(sinfo->sig->hash_algo, "sha1"))
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sig->digest_size = SHA1_SUM_LEN;
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else
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return -ENOPKG;
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/*
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* Calculate the hash only if the data is present.
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* In case of authenticated variable and capsule,
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* the hash has already been calculated on the
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* efi_image_regions and populated
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*/
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if (pkcs7->data) {
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sig->digest = calloc(1, sig->digest_size);
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if (!sig->digest) {
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pr_warn("Sig %u: Out of memory\n", sinfo->index);
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return -ENOMEM;
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}
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regions[0].data = pkcs7->data;
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regions[0].size = pkcs7->data_len;
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/* Digest the message [RFC2315 9.3] */
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hash_calculate(sinfo->sig->hash_algo, regions, 1, sig->digest);
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}
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/* However, if there are authenticated attributes, there must be a
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* message digest attribute amongst them which corresponds to the
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* digest we just calculated.
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*/
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if (sinfo->authattrs) {
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u8 tag;
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if (!sinfo->msgdigest) {
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pr_warn("Sig %u: No messageDigest\n", sinfo->index);
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ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
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goto error;
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}
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if (sinfo->msgdigest_len != sig->digest_size) {
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pr_debug("Sig %u: Invalid digest size (%u)\n",
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sinfo->index, sinfo->msgdigest_len);
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ret = -EBADMSG;
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goto error;
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}
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if (memcmp(sig->digest, sinfo->msgdigest,
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sinfo->msgdigest_len) != 0) {
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pr_debug("Sig %u: Message digest doesn't match\n",
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sinfo->index);
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ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
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goto error;
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}
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/* We then calculate anew, using the authenticated attributes
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* as the contents of the digest instead. Note that we need to
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* convert the attributes from a CONT.0 into a SET before we
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* hash it.
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*/
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memset(sig->digest, 0, sig->digest_size);
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tag = 0x31;
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regions[0].data = &tag;
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regions[0].size = 1;
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regions[1].data = sinfo->authattrs;
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regions[1].size = sinfo->authattrs_len;
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hash_calculate(sinfo->sig->hash_algo, regions, 2, sig->digest);
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ret = 0;
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}
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error:
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return ret;
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}
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#else /* !__UBOOT__ */
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static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
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struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
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{
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struct public_key_signature *sig = sinfo->sig;
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struct crypto_shash *tfm;
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struct shash_desc *desc;
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size_t desc_size;
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int ret;
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kenter(",%u,%s", sinfo->index, sinfo->sig->hash_algo);
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/* The digest was calculated already. */
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if (sig->digest)
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return 0;
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if (!sinfo->sig->hash_algo)
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return -ENOPKG;
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/* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
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* big the hash operational data will be.
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*/
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tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(sinfo->sig->hash_algo, 0, 0);
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if (IS_ERR(tfm))
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return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm);
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desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
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sig->digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
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ret = -ENOMEM;
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sig->digest = kmalloc(sig->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!sig->digest)
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goto error_no_desc;
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desc = kzalloc(desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!desc)
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goto error_no_desc;
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desc->tfm = tfm;
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/* Digest the message [RFC2315 9.3] */
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ret = crypto_shash_digest(desc, pkcs7->data, pkcs7->data_len,
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sig->digest);
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if (ret < 0)
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goto error;
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pr_devel("MsgDigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, sig->digest);
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/* However, if there are authenticated attributes, there must be a
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* message digest attribute amongst them which corresponds to the
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* digest we just calculated.
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*/
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if (sinfo->authattrs) {
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u8 tag;
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if (!sinfo->msgdigest) {
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pr_warn("Sig %u: No messageDigest\n", sinfo->index);
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ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
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goto error;
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}
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if (sinfo->msgdigest_len != sig->digest_size) {
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pr_debug("Sig %u: Invalid digest size (%u)\n",
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sinfo->index, sinfo->msgdigest_len);
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ret = -EBADMSG;
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goto error;
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}
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if (memcmp(sig->digest, sinfo->msgdigest,
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sinfo->msgdigest_len) != 0) {
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pr_debug("Sig %u: Message digest doesn't match\n",
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sinfo->index);
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ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
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goto error;
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}
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/* We then calculate anew, using the authenticated attributes
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* as the contents of the digest instead. Note that we need to
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* convert the attributes from a CONT.0 into a SET before we
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* hash it.
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*/
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memset(sig->digest, 0, sig->digest_size);
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ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
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if (ret < 0)
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goto error;
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tag = ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SET;
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ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, &tag, 1);
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if (ret < 0)
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goto error;
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ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, sinfo->authattrs,
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sinfo->authattrs_len, sig->digest);
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if (ret < 0)
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goto error;
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pr_devel("AADigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, sig->digest);
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}
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error:
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kfree(desc);
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error_no_desc:
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crypto_free_shash(tfm);
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kleave(" = %d", ret);
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return ret;
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}
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int pkcs7_get_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, const u8 **buf, u32 *len,
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enum hash_algo *hash_algo)
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{
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struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos;
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int i, ret;
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/*
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* This function doesn't support messages with more than one signature.
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*/
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if (sinfo == NULL || sinfo->next != NULL)
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return -EBADMSG;
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ret = pkcs7_digest(pkcs7, sinfo);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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*buf = sinfo->sig->digest;
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*len = sinfo->sig->digest_size;
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for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++)
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if (!strcmp(hash_algo_name[i], sinfo->sig->hash_algo)) {
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*hash_algo = i;
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break;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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#endif /* !__UBOOT__ */
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/*
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* Find the key (X.509 certificate) to use to verify a PKCS#7 message. PKCS#7
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* uses the issuer's name and the issuing certificate serial number for
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* matching purposes. These must match the certificate issuer's name (not
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* subject's name) and the certificate serial number [RFC 2315 6.7].
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*/
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static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
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struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
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{
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struct x509_certificate *x509;
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unsigned certix = 1;
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kenter("%u", sinfo->index);
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for (x509 = pkcs7->certs; x509; x509 = x509->next, certix++) {
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/* I'm _assuming_ that the generator of the PKCS#7 message will
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* encode the fields from the X.509 cert in the same way in the
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* PKCS#7 message - but I can't be 100% sure of that. It's
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* possible this will need element-by-element comparison.
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*/
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if (!asymmetric_key_id_same(x509->id, sinfo->sig->auth_ids[0]))
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continue;
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pr_devel("Sig %u: Found cert serial match X.509[%u]\n",
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sinfo->index, certix);
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if (strcmp(x509->pub->pkey_algo, sinfo->sig->pkey_algo) != 0) {
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pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 algo and PKCS#7 sig algo don't match\n",
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sinfo->index);
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continue;
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}
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sinfo->signer = x509;
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return 0;
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}
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/* The relevant X.509 cert isn't found here, but it might be found in
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* the trust keyring.
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*/
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pr_debug("Sig %u: Issuing X.509 cert not found (#%*phN)\n",
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sinfo->index,
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sinfo->sig->auth_ids[0]->len, sinfo->sig->auth_ids[0]->data);
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* pkcs7_verify_sig_chain - Verify the internal certificate chain as best
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* as we can.
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* @pkcs7: PKCS7 Signed Data
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* @sinfo: PKCS7 Signed Info
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* @signer: Singer's certificate
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*
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* Build up and verify the internal certificate chain against a signature
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* in @sinfo, using certificates contained in @pkcs7 as best as we can.
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* If the chain reaches the end, the last certificate will be returned
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* in @signer.
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*
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* Return: 0 - on success, non-zero error code - otherwise
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*/
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#ifdef __UBOOT__
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static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
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struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo,
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struct x509_certificate **signer)
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#else
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static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
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struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
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#endif
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{
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struct public_key_signature *sig;
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struct x509_certificate *x509 = sinfo->signer, *p;
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struct asymmetric_key_id *auth;
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int ret;
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kenter("");
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*signer = NULL;
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for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next)
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p->seen = false;
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for (;;) {
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pr_debug("verify %s: %*phN\n",
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x509->subject,
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x509->raw_serial_size, x509->raw_serial);
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x509->seen = true;
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if (x509->blacklisted) {
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/* If this cert is blacklisted, then mark everything
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* that depends on this as blacklisted too.
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*/
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sinfo->blacklisted = true;
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for (p = sinfo->signer; p != x509; p = p->signer)
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p->blacklisted = true;
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pr_debug("- blacklisted\n");
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#ifdef __UBOOT__
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*signer = x509;
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#endif
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return 0;
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}
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if (x509->unsupported_key)
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goto unsupported_crypto_in_x509;
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pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", x509->issuer);
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sig = x509->sig;
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if (sig->auth_ids[0])
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pr_debug("- authkeyid.id %*phN\n",
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sig->auth_ids[0]->len, sig->auth_ids[0]->data);
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if (sig->auth_ids[1])
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pr_debug("- authkeyid.skid %*phN\n",
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sig->auth_ids[1]->len, sig->auth_ids[1]->data);
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if (x509->self_signed) {
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/* If there's no authority certificate specified, then
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* the certificate must be self-signed and is the root
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* of the chain. Likewise if the cert is its own
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* authority.
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*/
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if (x509->unsupported_sig)
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goto unsupported_crypto_in_x509;
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x509->signer = x509;
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pr_debug("- self-signed\n");
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#ifdef __UBOOT__
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*signer = x509;
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#endif
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return 0;
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}
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/* Look through the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message's
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* list to see if the next one is there.
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*/
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auth = sig->auth_ids[0];
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if (auth) {
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pr_debug("- want %*phN\n", auth->len, auth->data);
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for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
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pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %*phN\n",
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p->index, p->id->len, p->id->data);
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if (asymmetric_key_id_same(p->id, auth))
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goto found_issuer_check_skid;
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}
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} else if (sig->auth_ids[1]) {
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auth = sig->auth_ids[1];
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pr_debug("- want %*phN\n", auth->len, auth->data);
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for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
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if (!p->skid)
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continue;
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pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %*phN\n",
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p->index, p->skid->len, p->skid->data);
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if (asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, auth))
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goto found_issuer;
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}
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}
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/* We didn't find the root of this chain */
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pr_debug("- top\n");
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#ifdef __UBOOT__
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*signer = x509;
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#endif
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return 0;
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found_issuer_check_skid:
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/* We matched issuer + serialNumber, but if there's an
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* authKeyId.keyId, that must match the CA subjKeyId also.
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*/
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if (sig->auth_ids[1] &&
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!asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, sig->auth_ids[1])) {
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pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 chain contains auth-skid nonmatch (%u->%u)\n",
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sinfo->index, x509->index, p->index);
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return -EKEYREJECTED;
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}
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found_issuer:
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pr_debug("- subject %s\n", p->subject);
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if (p->seen) {
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pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 chain contains loop\n",
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sinfo->index);
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#ifdef __UBOOT__
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*signer = p;
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#endif
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return 0;
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}
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ret = public_key_verify_signature(p->pub, x509->sig);
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if (ret < 0)
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return ret;
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x509->signer = p;
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if (x509 == p) {
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pr_debug("- self-signed\n");
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#ifdef __UBOOT__
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*signer = p;
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#endif
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return 0;
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}
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x509 = p;
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#ifndef __UBOOT__
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might_sleep();
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#endif
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}
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unsupported_crypto_in_x509:
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/* Just prune the certificate chain at this point if we lack some
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* crypto module to go further. Note, however, we don't want to set
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* sinfo->unsupported_crypto as the signed info block may still be
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* validatable against an X.509 cert lower in the chain that we have a
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* trusted copy of.
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*/
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* pkcs7_verify_one - Verify one signed information block from a PKCS#7
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* message.
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* @pkcs7: PKCS7 Signed Data
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* @sinfo: PKCS7 Signed Info
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* @signer: Signer's certificate
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*
|
|
* Verify one signature in @sinfo and follow the certificate chain.
|
|
* If the chain reaches the end, the last certificate will be returned
|
|
* in @signer.
|
|
*
|
|
* Return: 0 - on success, non-zero error code - otherwise
|
|
*/
|
|
#ifdef __UBOOT__
|
|
int pkcs7_verify_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
|
|
struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo,
|
|
struct x509_certificate **signer)
|
|
#else
|
|
static int pkcs7_verify_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
|
|
struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
|
|
#endif
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
kenter(",%u", sinfo->index);
|
|
|
|
/* First of all, digest the data in the PKCS#7 message and the
|
|
* signed information block
|
|
*/
|
|
ret = pkcs7_digest(pkcs7, sinfo);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
/* Find the key for the signature if there is one */
|
|
ret = pkcs7_find_key(pkcs7, sinfo);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
if (!sinfo->signer)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
pr_devel("Using X.509[%u] for sig %u\n",
|
|
sinfo->signer->index, sinfo->index);
|
|
|
|
/* Check that the PKCS#7 signing time is valid according to the X.509
|
|
* certificate. We can't, however, check against the system clock
|
|
* since that may not have been set yet and may be wrong.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (test_bit(sinfo_has_signing_time, &sinfo->aa_set)) {
|
|
if (sinfo->signing_time < sinfo->signer->valid_from ||
|
|
sinfo->signing_time > sinfo->signer->valid_to) {
|
|
pr_warn("Message signed outside of X.509 validity window\n");
|
|
return -EKEYREJECTED;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Verify the PKCS#7 binary against the key */
|
|
ret = public_key_verify_signature(sinfo->signer->pub, sinfo->sig);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
pr_devel("Verified signature %u\n", sinfo->index);
|
|
|
|
/* Verify the internal certificate chain */
|
|
return pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(pkcs7, sinfo, signer);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef __UBOOT__
|
|
/**
|
|
* pkcs7_verify - Verify a PKCS#7 message
|
|
* @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to be verified
|
|
* @usage: The use to which the key is being put
|
|
*
|
|
* Verify a PKCS#7 message is internally consistent - that is, the data digest
|
|
* matches the digest in the AuthAttrs and any signature in the message or one
|
|
* of the X.509 certificates it carries that matches another X.509 cert in the
|
|
* message can be verified.
|
|
*
|
|
* This does not look to match the contents of the PKCS#7 message against any
|
|
* external public keys.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns, in order of descending priority:
|
|
*
|
|
* (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a key was selected that had a usage restriction at
|
|
* odds with the specified usage, or:
|
|
*
|
|
* (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a signature failed to match for which we found an
|
|
* appropriate X.509 certificate, or:
|
|
*
|
|
* (*) -EBADMSG if some part of the message was invalid, or:
|
|
*
|
|
* (*) 0 if a signature chain passed verification, or:
|
|
*
|
|
* (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a blacklisted key was encountered, or:
|
|
*
|
|
* (*) -ENOPKG if none of the signature chains are verifiable because suitable
|
|
* crypto modules couldn't be found.
|
|
*/
|
|
int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
|
|
enum key_being_used_for usage)
|
|
{
|
|
struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
|
|
int actual_ret = -ENOPKG;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
kenter("");
|
|
|
|
switch (usage) {
|
|
case VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE:
|
|
if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_data) {
|
|
pr_warn("Invalid module sig (not pkcs7-data)\n");
|
|
return -EKEYREJECTED;
|
|
}
|
|
if (pkcs7->have_authattrs) {
|
|
pr_warn("Invalid module sig (has authattrs)\n");
|
|
return -EKEYREJECTED;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE:
|
|
if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_data) {
|
|
pr_warn("Invalid firmware sig (not pkcs7-data)\n");
|
|
return -EKEYREJECTED;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!pkcs7->have_authattrs) {
|
|
pr_warn("Invalid firmware sig (missing authattrs)\n");
|
|
return -EKEYREJECTED;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE:
|
|
if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_msIndirectData) {
|
|
pr_warn("Invalid kexec sig (not Authenticode)\n");
|
|
return -EKEYREJECTED;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Authattr presence checked in parser */
|
|
break;
|
|
case VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE:
|
|
if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_data) {
|
|
pr_warn("Invalid unspecified sig (not pkcs7-data)\n");
|
|
return -EKEYREJECTED;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) {
|
|
ret = pkcs7_verify_one(pkcs7, sinfo);
|
|
if (sinfo->blacklisted) {
|
|
if (actual_ret == -ENOPKG)
|
|
actual_ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
if (ret == -ENOPKG) {
|
|
sinfo->unsupported_crypto = true;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
kleave(" = %d", ret);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
actual_ret = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
kleave(" = %d", actual_ret);
|
|
return actual_ret;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_verify);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* pkcs7_supply_detached_data - Supply the data needed to verify a PKCS#7 message
|
|
* @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message
|
|
* @data: The data to be verified
|
|
* @datalen: The amount of data
|
|
*
|
|
* Supply the detached data needed to verify a PKCS#7 message. Note that no
|
|
* attempt to retain/pin the data is made. That is left to the caller. The
|
|
* data will not be modified by pkcs7_verify() and will not be freed when the
|
|
* PKCS#7 message is freed.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns -EINVAL if data is already supplied in the message, 0 otherwise.
|
|
*/
|
|
int pkcs7_supply_detached_data(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
|
|
const void *data, size_t datalen)
|
|
{
|
|
if (pkcs7->data) {
|
|
pr_debug("Data already supplied\n");
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
pkcs7->data = data;
|
|
pkcs7->data_len = datalen;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* __UBOOT__ */
|