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efi_loader: image_loader: add a missing digest verification for signed PE image

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At the last step of PE image authentication, an image's hash value must be
compared with a message digest stored as the content (of SpcPeImageData type)
of pkcs7's contentInfo.

Fixes: commit 4540dabdca ("efi_loader: image_loader: support image authentication")
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
This commit is contained in:
AKASHI Takahiro 2022-07-05 14:48:14 +09:00 committed by Heinrich Schuchardt
parent b72d09fa7d
commit 634f6b2fb1
2 changed files with 61 additions and 2 deletions
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1
lib/efi_loader/Kconfig
View File

@ -366,6 +366,7 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT
select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
select PKCS7_VERIFY
select MSCODE_PARSER
select EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT
help
Select this option to enable EFI secure boot support.

62
lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c
View File

@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <malloc.h>
#include <pe.h>
#include <sort.h>
#include <crypto/mscode.h>
#include <crypto/pkcs7_parser.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
@ -516,6 +517,51 @@ err:
}
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT
/**
* efi_image_verify_digest - verify image's message digest
* @regs: Array of memory regions to digest
* @msg: Signature in pkcs7 structure
*
* @regs contains all the data in a PE image to digest. Calculate
* a hash value based on @regs and compare it with a messaged digest
* in the content (SpcPeImageData) of @msg's contentInfo.
*
* Return: true if verified, false if not
*/
static bool efi_image_verify_digest(struct efi_image_regions *regs,
struct pkcs7_message *msg)
{
struct pefile_context ctx;
void *hash;
int hash_len, ret;
const void *data;
size_t data_len;
size_t asn1hdrlen;
/* get pkcs7's contentInfo */
ret = pkcs7_get_content_data(msg, &data, &data_len, &asn1hdrlen);
if (ret < 0 || !data)
return false;
/* parse data and retrieve a message digest into ctx */
ret = mscode_parse(&ctx, data, data_len, asn1hdrlen);
if (ret < 0)
return false;
/* calculate a hash value of PE image */
hash = NULL;
if (!efi_hash_regions(regs->reg, regs->num, &hash, ctx.digest_algo,
&hash_len))
return false;
/* match the digest */
if (ctx.digest_len != hash_len || memcmp(ctx.digest, hash, hash_len))
return false;
return true;
}
/**
* efi_image_authenticate() - verify a signature of signed image
* @efi: Pointer to image
@ -645,6 +691,9 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size)
}
/*
* verify signatures in pkcs7's signedInfos which are
* to authenticate the integrity of pkcs7's contentInfo.
*
* NOTE:
* UEFI specification defines two signature types possible
* in signature database:
@ -677,12 +726,21 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size)
}
/* try white-list */
if (efi_signature_verify(regs, msg, db, dbx)) {
if (!efi_signature_verify(regs, msg, db, dbx)) {
log_debug("Signature was not verified by \"db\"\n");
continue;
}
/*
* now calculate an image's hash value and compare it with
* a messaged digest embedded in pkcs7's contentInfo
*/
if (efi_image_verify_digest(regs, msg)) {
ret = true;
continue;
}
log_debug("Signature was not verified by \"db\"\n");
log_debug("Message digest doesn't match\n");
}