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tpm2: change tpm2_unseal() to accept Tpm2Context instead of device string

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This matches the change to tpm2_seal(), which now accepts a Tpm2Context instead
of a device string.

This also allows using the same TPM context for sealing and unsealing, which
will be required by (future) test code when sealing/unsealing using a transient
key.
This commit is contained in:
Dan Streetman 2023-08-31 09:10:40 -04:00
parent 7014006906
commit db7fdf152b
6 changed files with 22 additions and 16 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

2
src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll-tpm2.c
View File

@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd,
size_t secret2_size;
log_debug("Unsealing for verification...");
r = tpm2_unseal(device,
r = tpm2_unseal(tpm2_context,
hash_pcr_mask,
hash_pcr_bank,
pubkey, pubkey_size,

7
src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup-tokens/luks2-tpm2.c
View File

@ -80,7 +80,12 @@ int acquire_luks2_key(
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to load PCR signature: %m");
}
r = tpm2_unseal(device,
_cleanup_(tpm2_context_unrefp) Tpm2Context *tpm2_context = NULL;
r = tpm2_context_new(device, &tpm2_context);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to create TPM2 context: %m");
r = tpm2_unseal(tpm2_context,
hash_pcr_mask,
pcr_bank,
pubkey, pubkey_size,

9
src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup-tpm2.c
View File

@ -129,8 +129,13 @@ int acquire_tpm2_key(
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to load pcr signature: %m");
}
_cleanup_(tpm2_context_unrefp) Tpm2Context *tpm2_context = NULL;
r = tpm2_context_new(device, &tpm2_context);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to create TPM2 context: %m");
if (!(flags & TPM2_FLAGS_USE_PIN)) {
r = tpm2_unseal(device,
r = tpm2_unseal(tpm2_context,
hash_pcr_mask,
pcr_bank,
pubkey, pubkey_size,
@ -177,7 +182,7 @@ int acquire_tpm2_key(
/* no salting needed, backwards compat with non-salted pins */
b64_salted_pin = TAKE_PTR(pin_str);
r = tpm2_unseal(device,
r = tpm2_unseal(tpm2_context,
hash_pcr_mask,
pcr_bank,
pubkey, pubkey_size,

7
src/shared/creds-util.c
View File

@ -1203,9 +1203,14 @@ int decrypt_credential_and_warn(
le32toh(z->size));
}
_cleanup_(tpm2_context_unrefp) Tpm2Context *tpm2_context = NULL;
r = tpm2_context_new(tpm2_device, &tpm2_context);
if (r < 0)
return r;
// TODO: Add the SRK data to the credential structure so it can be plumbed
// through and used to verify the TPM session.
r = tpm2_unseal(tpm2_device,
r = tpm2_unseal(tpm2_context,
le64toh(t->pcr_mask),
le16toh(t->pcr_bank),
z ? z->data : NULL,

11
src/shared/tpm2-util.c
View File

@ -4081,7 +4081,7 @@ int tpm2_seal(Tpm2Context *c,
#define RETRY_UNSEAL_MAX 30u
int tpm2_unseal(const char *device,
int tpm2_unseal(Tpm2Context *c,
uint32_t hash_pcr_mask,
uint16_t pcr_bank,
const void *pubkey,
@ -4112,10 +4112,6 @@ int tpm2_unseal(const char *device,
assert(TPM2_PCR_MASK_VALID(hash_pcr_mask));
assert(TPM2_PCR_MASK_VALID(pubkey_pcr_mask));
r = dlopen_tpm2();
if (r < 0)
return r;
/* So here's what we do here: We connect to the TPM2 chip. As we do when sealing we generate a
* "primary" key on the TPM2 chip, with the same parameters as well as a PCR-bound policy session.
* Given we pass the same parameters, this will result in the same "primary" key, and same policy
@ -4132,11 +4128,6 @@ int tpm2_unseal(const char *device,
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Could not extract parts from blob: %m");
_cleanup_(tpm2_context_unrefp) Tpm2Context *c = NULL;
r = tpm2_context_new(device, &c);
if (r < 0)
return r;
/* Older code did not save the pcr_bank, and unsealing needed to detect the best pcr bank to use,
* so we need to handle that legacy situation. */
if (pcr_bank == UINT16_MAX) {

2
src/shared/tpm2-util.h
View File

@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ int tpm2_unmarshal_blob(const void *blob, size_t blob_size, TPM2B_PUBLIC *ret_pu
int tpm2_get_or_create_srk(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *session, TPM2B_PUBLIC **ret_public, TPM2B_NAME **ret_name, TPM2B_NAME **ret_qname, Tpm2Handle **ret_handle);
int tpm2_seal(Tpm2Context *c, const TPM2B_DIGEST *policy, const char *pin, void **ret_secret, size_t *ret_secret_size, void **ret_blob, size_t *ret_blob_size, uint16_t *ret_primary_alg, void **ret_srk_buf, size_t *ret_srk_buf_size);
int tpm2_unseal(const char *device, uint32_t hash_pcr_mask, uint16_t pcr_bank, const void *pubkey, size_t pubkey_size, uint32_t pubkey_pcr_mask, JsonVariant *signature, const char *pin, uint16_t primary_alg, const void *blob, size_t blob_size, const void *policy_hash, size_t policy_hash_size, const void *srk_buf, size_t srk_buf_size, void **ret_secret, size_t *ret_secret_size);
int tpm2_unseal(Tpm2Context *c, uint32_t hash_pcr_mask, uint16_t pcr_bank, const void *pubkey, size_t pubkey_size, uint32_t pubkey_pcr_mask, JsonVariant *signature, const char *pin, uint16_t primary_alg, const void *blob, size_t blob_size, const void *policy_hash, size_t policy_hash_size, const void *srk_buf, size_t srk_buf_size, void **ret_secret, size_t *ret_secret_size);
#if HAVE_OPENSSL
int tpm2_tpm2b_public_to_openssl_pkey(const TPM2B_PUBLIC *public, EVP_PKEY **ret);