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tree-wide: fix duplicated words
the the in in not not we we
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NEWS
2
NEWS
@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ CHANGES WITH 251:
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image" environments, where the machine ID shall be initialized on
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first boot (as opposed to at installation time before first boot) the
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machine ID is not be available at build time to name the entry
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after. In this case the the --entry-token= switch to bootctl (or the
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after. In this case the --entry-token= switch to bootctl (or the
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/etc/kernel/entry-token file) may be used to override the "token" to
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identify the entry by, and use another ID, for example the IMAGE_ID=
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or ID= fields from /etc/os-release. This will make the OS images
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@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
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/* This TPM PCR is where we extend the kernel command line and any passed credentials here. */
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#define TPM_PCR_INDEX_KERNEL_PARAMETERS 12U
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/* We used to write the the kernel command line/credentials into PCR 8, in systemd <= 250. Let's provide for
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/* We used to write the kernel command line/credentials into PCR 8, in systemd <= 250. Let's provide for
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* some compatibility. (Remove in 2023!) */
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#if EFI_TPM_PCR_COMPAT
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#define TPM_PCR_INDEX_KERNEL_PARAMETERS_COMPAT 8U
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@ -1186,7 +1186,7 @@ static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_pkcs11(
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/* Before using this key as passphrase we base64 encode it. Why? For compatibility
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* with homed's PKCS#11 hookup: there we want to use the key we acquired through
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* PKCS#11 for other authentication/decryption mechanisms too, and some of them do
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* not not take arbitrary binary blobs, but require NUL-terminated strings — most
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* not take arbitrary binary blobs, but require NUL-terminated strings — most
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* importantly UNIX password hashes. Hence, for compatibility we want to use a string
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* without embedded NUL here too, and that's easiest to generate from a binary blob
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* via base64 encoding. */
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@ -1452,7 +1452,7 @@ static int home_deactivate_internal(Home *h, bool force, sd_bus_error *error) {
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}
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/* Let's start a timer to retry deactivation in 15. We'll stop the timer once we manage to deactivate
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* the home directory again, or we we start any other operation. */
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* the home directory again, or we start any other operation. */
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home_start_retry_deactivate(h);
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return r;
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@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ int create_subcgroup(pid_t pid, bool keep_unit, CGroupUnified unified_requested)
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* the unified hierarchy and the container does the same, and we did not create a scope unit for the container
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* move us and the container into two separate subcgroups.
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*
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* Moreover, container payloads such as systemd try to manage the cgroup they run in in full (i.e. including
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* Moreover, container payloads such as systemd try to manage the cgroup they run in full (i.e. including
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* its attributes), while the host systemd will only delegate cgroups for children of the cgroup created for a
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* delegation unit, instead of the cgroup itself. This means, if we'd pass on the cgroup allocated from the
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* host systemd directly to the payload, the host and payload systemd might fight for the cgroup
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@ -2006,7 +2006,7 @@ static int oci_masked_paths(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlags
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if (!path_is_absolute(p))
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return json_log(v, flags, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
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"Path is not not absolute, refusing: %s", p);
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"Path is not absolute, refusing: %s", p);
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if (oci_exclude_mount(p))
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continue;
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@ -2048,7 +2048,7 @@ static int oci_readonly_paths(const char *name, JsonVariant *v, JsonDispatchFlag
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if (!path_is_absolute(p))
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return json_log(v, flags, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
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"Path is not not absolute, refusing: %s", p);
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"Path is not absolute, refusing: %s", p);
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if (oci_exclude_mount(p))
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continue;
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@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ static const NamingScheme naming_schemes[] = {
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};
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const NamingScheme* naming_scheme_from_name(const char *name) {
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/* "latest" may either be defined explicitly by the extra map, in which case we we will find it in
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/* "latest" may either be defined explicitly by the extra map, in which case we will find it in
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* the table like any other name. After iterating through the table, we check for "latest" again,
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* which means that if not mapped explicitly, it maps to the last defined entry, whatever that is. */
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@ -497,7 +497,7 @@ static int worker_process_device(Manager *manager, sd_device *dev) {
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* supposed to be enabled via an option set via udev rules (OPTIONS+="watch"). If we skip the
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* udev rules here however (as we just said we do), we would thus never see that specific
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* udev rule, and thus never turn on inotify watching. But in order to catch up eventually
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* and run them we we need the inotify watching: hence a classic chicken and egg problem.
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* and run them we need the inotify watching: hence a classic chicken and egg problem.
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*
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* Our way out here: if we see the block device locked, unconditionally watch the device via
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* inotify, regardless of any explicit request via OPTIONS+="watch". Thus, a device that is
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@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ class NetworkdTestingUtilities:
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def read_attr(self, link, attribute):
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"""Read a link attributed from the sysfs."""
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# Note we we don't want to check if interface `link' is managed, we
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# Note we don't want to check if interface `link' is managed, we
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# want to evaluate link variable and pass the value of the link to
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# assert_link_states e.g. eth0=managed.
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self.assert_link_states(**{link:'managed'})
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