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systemd/units/systemd-importd.service.in

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Add SPDX license headers to unit files
2017-11-19 00:35:03 +08:00
# SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+
#
import: introduce new mini-daemon systemd-importd, and make machinectl a client to it The old "systemd-import" binary is now an internal tool. We still use it as asynchronous backend for systemd-importd. Since the import tool might require some IO and CPU resources (due to qcow2 explosion, and decompression), and because we might want to run it with more minimal priviliges we still keep it around as the worker binary to execute as child process of importd. machinectl now has verbs for pulling down images, cancelling them and listing them.
2015-01-22 10:57:15 +08:00
# This file is part of systemd.
#
# systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
# under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by
# the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or
# (at your option) any later version.
[Unit]
Description=Virtual Machine and Container Download Service
Documentation=man:systemd-importd.service(8)
units: use https for the freedesktop url (#6227)
2017-06-29 10:54:12 +08:00
Documentation=https://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd/importd
import: introduce new mini-daemon systemd-importd, and make machinectl a client to it The old "systemd-import" binary is now an internal tool. We still use it as asynchronous backend for systemd-importd. Since the import tool might require some IO and CPU resources (due to qcow2 explosion, and decompression), and because we might want to run it with more minimal priviliges we still keep it around as the worker binary to execute as child process of importd. machinectl now has verbs for pulling down images, cancelling them and listing them.
2015-01-22 10:57:15 +08:00
[Service]
ExecStart=@rootlibexecdir@/systemd-importd
BusName=org.freedesktop.import1
units: increase watchdog timeout to 3min for all our services Apparently, disk IO issues are more frequent than we hope, and 1min waiting for disk IO happens, so let's increase the watchdog timeout a bit, for all our services. See #1353 for an example where this triggers.
2015-09-23 23:27:39 +08:00
WatchdogSec=3min
units: set KillMode=mixed for our daemons that fork worker processes The daemons should really have the time to kill the workers first, before systemd does it, hence use KillMode=mixed for these daemons. https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90051
2015-04-24 22:12:28 +08:00
KillMode=mixed
units: further lock down our long-running services Let's make this an excercise in dogfooding: let's turn on more security features for all our long-running services. Specifically: - Turn on RestrictRealtime=yes for all of them - Turn on ProtectKernelTunables=yes and ProtectControlGroups=yes for most of them - Turn on RestrictAddressFamilies= for all of them, but different sets of address families for each Also, always order settings in the unit files, that the various sandboxing features are close together. Add a couple of missing, older settings for a numbre of unit files. Note that this change turns off AF_INET/AF_INET6 from udevd, thus effectively turning of networking from udev rule commands. Since this might break stuff (that is already broken I'd argue) this is documented in NEWS.
2016-08-26 19:23:27 +08:00
CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_CHOWN CAP_FOWNER CAP_FSETID CAP_MKNOD CAP_SETFCAP CAP_SYS_ADMIN CAP_SETPCAP CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE
NoNewPrivileges=yes
units: enable MemoryDenyWriteExecute (#3459) Secure daemons shipped by systemd by enabling MemoryDenyWriteExecute. Closes: #3459
2016-06-08 20:23:37 +08:00
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=yes
units: enable ProtectHostname=yes
2019-02-19 06:30:12 +08:00
ProtectHostname=yes
units: further lock down our long-running services Let's make this an excercise in dogfooding: let's turn on more security features for all our long-running services. Specifically: - Turn on RestrictRealtime=yes for all of them - Turn on ProtectKernelTunables=yes and ProtectControlGroups=yes for most of them - Turn on RestrictAddressFamilies= for all of them, but different sets of address families for each Also, always order settings in the unit files, that the various sandboxing features are close together. Add a couple of missing, older settings for a numbre of unit files. Note that this change turns off AF_INET/AF_INET6 from udevd, thus effectively turning of networking from udev rule commands. Since this might break stuff (that is already broken I'd argue) this is documented in NEWS.
2016-08-26 19:23:27 +08:00
RestrictRealtime=yes
units: restrict namespace for a good number of our own services Basically, we turn it on for most long-running services, with the exception of machined (whose child processes need to join containers here and there), and importd (which sandboxes tar in a CLONE_NEWNET namespace). machined is left unrestricted, and importd is restricted to use only "net"
2017-02-09 17:28:23 +08:00
RestrictNamespaces=net
units: further lock down our long-running services Let's make this an excercise in dogfooding: let's turn on more security features for all our long-running services. Specifically: - Turn on RestrictRealtime=yes for all of them - Turn on ProtectKernelTunables=yes and ProtectControlGroups=yes for most of them - Turn on RestrictAddressFamilies= for all of them, but different sets of address families for each Also, always order settings in the unit files, that the various sandboxing features are close together. Add a couple of missing, older settings for a numbre of unit files. Note that this change turns off AF_INET/AF_INET6 from udevd, thus effectively turning of networking from udev rule commands. Since this might break stuff (that is already broken I'd argue) this is documented in NEWS.
2016-08-26 19:23:27 +08:00
RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_UNIX AF_INET AF_INET6
units: switch from system call blacklist to whitelist This is generally the safer approach, and is what container managers (including nspawn) do, hence let's move to this too for our own services. This is particularly useful as this this means the new @system-service system call filter group will get serious real-life testing quickly. This also switches from firing SIGSYS on unexpected syscalls to returning EPERM. This would have probably been a better default anyway, but it's hard to change that these days. When whitelisting system calls SIGSYS is highly problematic as system calls that are newly introduced to Linux become minefields for services otherwise. Note that this enables a system call filter for udev for the first time, and will block @clock, @mount and @swap from it. Some downstream distributions might want to revert this locally if they want to permit unsafe operations on udev rules, but in general this shiuld be mostly safe, as we already set MountFlags=shared for udevd, hence at least @mount won't change anything.
2018-04-19 17:04:17 +08:00
SystemCallFilter=@system-service @mount
SystemCallErrorNumber=EPERM
units: set SystemCallArchitectures=native on all our long-running services
2017-02-09 05:32:37 +08:00
SystemCallArchitectures=native
units: set LockPersonality= for all our long-running services (#6819) Let's lock things down. Also, using it is the only way how to properly test this to the fullest extent.
2017-09-15 01:45:40 +08:00
LockPersonality=yes
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