shadow/lib/agetpass.c
Tomas Halman dfb4d8fdf9 src/passwd.c: inconsistent password length limit
The passwd utility had hardcoded limit for password lenght set
to 200 characters. In the agetpass.c is used PASS_MAX for
this purpose.

This patch moves the PASS_MAX definition to common place
and uses it in both places.

Signed-off-by: Tomas Halman <tomas@halman.net>
2024-02-16 15:46:08 -06:00

146 lines
3.4 KiB
C

/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2022, Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
#include <config.h>
#include "agetpass.h"
#include <limits.h>
#include <readpassphrase.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#ident "$Id$"
#include "alloc.h"
#if WITH_LIBBSD == 0
#include "freezero.h"
#endif /* WITH_LIBBSD */
/*
* SYNOPSIS
* [[gnu::malloc(erase_pass)]]
* char *agetpass(const char *prompt);
* char *agetpass_stdin();
*
* void erase_pass(char *pass);
*
* ARGUMENTS
* agetpass()
* prompt String to be printed before reading a password.
*
* erase_pass()
* pass password previously returned by agetpass().
*
* DESCRIPTION
* agetpass()
* This function is very similar to getpass(3). It has several
* advantages compared to getpass(3):
*
* - Instead of using a static buffer, agetpass() allocates memory
* through malloc(3). This makes the function thread-safe, and
* also reduces the visibility of the buffer.
*
* - agetpass() doesn't reallocate internally. Some
* implementations of getpass(3), such as glibc, do that, as a
* consequence of calling getline(3). That's a bug in glibc,
* which allows leaking prefixes of passwords in freed memory.
*
* - agetpass() doesn't overrun the output buffer. If the input
* password is too long, it simply fails. Some implementations
* of getpass(3), share the same bug that gets(3) has.
*
* As soon as possible, the password obtained from agetpass() be
* erased by calling erase_pass(), to avoid possibly leaking the
* password.
*
* agetpass_stdin()
* This function is the same as previous one (agetpass). Just the
* password is read from stdin and terminal is not required.
*
* erase_pass()
* This function first clears the password, by calling
* explicit_bzero(3) (or an equivalent call), and then frees the
* allocated memory by calling free(3).
*
* NULL is a valid input pointer, and in such a case, this call is
* a no-op.
*
* RETURN VALUE
* agetpass() returns a newly allocated buffer containing the
* password on success. On error, errno is set to indicate the
* error, and NULL is returned.
*
* ERRORS
* agetpass()
* This function may fail for any errors that malloc(3) or
* readpassphrase(3) may fail, and in addition it may fail for the
* following errors:
*
* ENOBUFS
* The input password was longer than PASS_MAX.
*
* CAVEATS
* If a password is passed twice to erase_pass(), the behavior is
* undefined.
*/
static char *
agetpass_internal(const char *prompt, int flags)
{
char *pass;
size_t len;
/*
* Since we want to support passwords upto PASS_MAX, we need
* PASS_MAX bytes for the password itself, and one more byte for
* the terminating '\0'. We also want to detect truncation, and
* readpassphrase(3) doesn't detect it, so we need some trick.
* Let's add one more byte, and if the password uses it, it
* means the introduced password was longer than PASS_MAX.
*/
pass = MALLOC(PASS_MAX + 2, char);
if (pass == NULL)
return NULL;
if (readpassphrase(prompt, pass, PASS_MAX + 2, flags) == NULL)
goto fail;
len = strlen(pass);
if (len == PASS_MAX + 1) {
errno = ENOBUFS;
goto fail;
}
return pass;
fail:
freezero(pass, PASS_MAX + 2);
return NULL;
}
char *
agetpass(const char *prompt)
{
return agetpass_internal(prompt, RPP_REQUIRE_TTY);
}
char *
agetpass_stdin()
{
return agetpass_internal(NULL, RPP_STDIN);
}
void
erase_pass(char *pass)
{
freezero(pass, PASS_MAX + 2);
}