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At least some s390 cpu models support "Protected Virtualization" (PV), a mechanism to protect guests from eavesdropping by a compromised hypervisor. This is similar in function to other mechanisms like AMD's SEV and POWER's PEF, which are controlled by the "confidential-guest-support" machine option. s390 is a slightly special case, because we already supported PV, simply by using a CPU model with the required feature (S390_FEAT_UNPACK). To integrate this with the option used by other platforms, we implement the following compromise: - When the confidential-guest-support option is set, s390 will recognize it, verify that the CPU can support PV (failing if not) and set virtio default options necessary for encrypted or protected guests, as on other platforms. i.e. if confidential-guest-support is set, we will either create a guest capable of entering PV mode, or fail outright. - If confidential-guest-support is not set, guests might still be able to enter PV mode, if the CPU has the right model. This may be a little surprising, but shouldn't actually be harmful. To start a guest supporting Protected Virtualization using the new option use the command line arguments: -object s390-pv-guest,id=pv0 -machine confidential-guest-support=pv0 Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Tested-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> |
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authz | ||
block | ||
chardev | ||
crypto | ||
disas | ||
exec | ||
fpu | ||
hw | ||
io | ||
libdecnumber | ||
migration | ||
monitor | ||
net | ||
qapi | ||
qemu | ||
qom | ||
scsi | ||
standard-headers | ||
sysemu | ||
tcg | ||
ui | ||
user | ||
elf.h | ||
glib-compat.h | ||
qemu-common.h | ||
qemu-io.h | ||
trace-tcg.h |