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Apart from targets.rst, which was written by hand, this is an automated conversion obtained with the following command: makeinfo --force -o - --docbook \ -D 'qemu_system_x86 QEMU_SYSTEM_X86_MACRO' \ -D 'qemu_system QEMU_SYSTEM_MACRO' \ $texi | pandoc -f docbook -t rst+smart | perl -e ' $/=undef; $_ = <>; s/^- − /- /gm; s/QEMU_SYSTEM_MACRO/|qemu_system|/g; s/QEMU_SYSTEM_X86_MACRO/|qemu_system_x86|/g; s/(?=::\n\n +\|qemu)/.. parsed-literal/g; s/:\n\n::$/::/gm; print' > $rst In addition, the following changes were made manually: - target-i386.rst and target-mips.rst: replace CPU model documentation with an include directive - monitor.rst: replace the command section with a comment - images.rst: add toctree - target-arm.rst: Replace use of :math: (which Sphinx complains about) with :sup:, and hide it behind |I2C| and |I2C| substitutions. Content that is not @included remains exclusive to qemu-doc.texi. Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org> Tested-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Message-id: 20200228153619.9906-20-peter.maydell@linaro.org Message-id: 20200226113034.6741-19-pbonzini@redhat.com [PMM: Fixed target-arm.rst use of :math:; remove out of date note about images.rst from commit message; fixed expansion of |qemu_system_x86|; use parsed-literal in invocation.rst when we want to use |qemu_system_x86|; fix incorrect subsection level for "OS requirements" in target-i386.rst; fix incorrect syntax for making links to other sections of the manual] Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
329 lines
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ReStructuredText
329 lines
13 KiB
ReStructuredText
.. _network_005ftls:
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TLS setup for network services
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------------------------------
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Almost all network services in QEMU have the ability to use TLS for
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session data encryption, along with x509 certificates for simple client
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authentication. What follows is a description of how to generate
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certificates suitable for usage with QEMU, and applies to the VNC
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server, character devices with the TCP backend, NBD server and client,
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and migration server and client.
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At a high level, QEMU requires certificates and private keys to be
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provided in PEM format. Aside from the core fields, the certificates
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should include various extension data sets, including v3 basic
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constraints data, key purpose, key usage and subject alt name.
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The GnuTLS package includes a command called ``certtool`` which can be
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used to easily generate certificates and keys in the required format
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with expected data present. Alternatively a certificate management
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service may be used.
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At a minimum it is necessary to setup a certificate authority, and issue
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certificates to each server. If using x509 certificates for
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authentication, then each client will also need to be issued a
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certificate.
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Assuming that the QEMU network services will only ever be exposed to
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clients on a private intranet, there is no need to use a commercial
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certificate authority to create certificates. A self-signed CA is
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sufficient, and in fact likely to be more secure since it removes the
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ability of malicious 3rd parties to trick the CA into mis-issuing certs
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for impersonating your services. The only likely exception where a
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commercial CA might be desirable is if enabling the VNC websockets
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server and exposing it directly to remote browser clients. In such a
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case it might be useful to use a commercial CA to avoid needing to
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install custom CA certs in the web browsers.
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The recommendation is for the server to keep its certificates in either
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``/etc/pki/qemu`` or for unprivileged users in ``$HOME/.pki/qemu``.
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.. _tls_005fgenerate_005fca:
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Setup the Certificate Authority
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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This step only needs to be performed once per organization /
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organizational unit. First the CA needs a private key. This key must be
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kept VERY secret and secure. If this key is compromised the entire trust
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chain of the certificates issued with it is lost.
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::
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# certtool --generate-privkey > ca-key.pem
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To generate a self-signed certificate requires one core piece of
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information, the name of the organization. A template file ``ca.info``
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should be populated with the desired data to avoid having to deal with
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interactive prompts from certtool::
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# cat > ca.info <<EOF
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cn = Name of your organization
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ca
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cert_signing_key
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EOF
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# certtool --generate-self-signed \
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--load-privkey ca-key.pem
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--template ca.info \
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--outfile ca-cert.pem
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The ``ca`` keyword in the template sets the v3 basic constraints
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extension to indicate this certificate is for a CA, while
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``cert_signing_key`` sets the key usage extension to indicate this will
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be used for signing other keys. The generated ``ca-cert.pem`` file
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should be copied to all servers and clients wishing to utilize TLS
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support in the VNC server. The ``ca-key.pem`` must not be
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disclosed/copied anywhere except the host responsible for issuing
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certificates.
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.. _tls_005fgenerate_005fserver:
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Issuing server certificates
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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Each server (or host) needs to be issued with a key and certificate.
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When connecting the certificate is sent to the client which validates it
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against the CA certificate. The core pieces of information for a server
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certificate are the hostnames and/or IP addresses that will be used by
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clients when connecting. The hostname / IP address that the client
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specifies when connecting will be validated against the hostname(s) and
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IP address(es) recorded in the server certificate, and if no match is
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found the client will close the connection.
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Thus it is recommended that the server certificate include both the
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fully qualified and unqualified hostnames. If the server will have
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permanently assigned IP address(es), and clients are likely to use them
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when connecting, they may also be included in the certificate. Both IPv4
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and IPv6 addresses are supported. Historically certificates only
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included 1 hostname in the ``CN`` field, however, usage of this field
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for validation is now deprecated. Instead modern TLS clients will
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validate against the Subject Alt Name extension data, which allows for
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multiple entries. In the future usage of the ``CN`` field may be
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discontinued entirely, so providing SAN extension data is strongly
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recommended.
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On the host holding the CA, create template files containing the
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information for each server, and use it to issue server certificates.
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::
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# cat > server-hostNNN.info <<EOF
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organization = Name of your organization
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cn = hostNNN.foo.example.com
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dns_name = hostNNN
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dns_name = hostNNN.foo.example.com
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ip_address = 10.0.1.87
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ip_address = 192.8.0.92
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ip_address = 2620:0:cafe::87
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ip_address = 2001:24::92
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tls_www_server
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encryption_key
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signing_key
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EOF
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# certtool --generate-privkey > server-hostNNN-key.pem
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# certtool --generate-certificate \
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--load-ca-certificate ca-cert.pem \
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--load-ca-privkey ca-key.pem \
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--load-privkey server-hostNNN-key.pem \
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--template server-hostNNN.info \
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--outfile server-hostNNN-cert.pem
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The ``dns_name`` and ``ip_address`` fields in the template are setting
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the subject alt name extension data. The ``tls_www_server`` keyword is
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the key purpose extension to indicate this certificate is intended for
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usage in a web server. Although QEMU network services are not in fact
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HTTP servers (except for VNC websockets), setting this key purpose is
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still recommended. The ``encryption_key`` and ``signing_key`` keyword is
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the key usage extension to indicate this certificate is intended for
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usage in the data session.
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The ``server-hostNNN-key.pem`` and ``server-hostNNN-cert.pem`` files
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should now be securely copied to the server for which they were
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generated, and renamed to ``server-key.pem`` and ``server-cert.pem``
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when added to the ``/etc/pki/qemu`` directory on the target host. The
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``server-key.pem`` file is security sensitive and should be kept
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protected with file mode 0600 to prevent disclosure.
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.. _tls_005fgenerate_005fclient:
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Issuing client certificates
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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The QEMU x509 TLS credential setup defaults to enabling client
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verification using certificates, providing a simple authentication
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mechanism. If this default is used, each client also needs to be issued
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a certificate. The client certificate contains enough metadata to
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uniquely identify the client with the scope of the certificate
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authority. The client certificate would typically include fields for
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organization, state, city, building, etc.
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Once again on the host holding the CA, create template files containing
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the information for each client, and use it to issue client
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certificates.
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::
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# cat > client-hostNNN.info <<EOF
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country = GB
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state = London
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locality = City Of London
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organization = Name of your organization
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cn = hostNNN.foo.example.com
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tls_www_client
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encryption_key
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signing_key
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EOF
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# certtool --generate-privkey > client-hostNNN-key.pem
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# certtool --generate-certificate \
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--load-ca-certificate ca-cert.pem \
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--load-ca-privkey ca-key.pem \
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--load-privkey client-hostNNN-key.pem \
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--template client-hostNNN.info \
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--outfile client-hostNNN-cert.pem
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The subject alt name extension data is not required for clients, so the
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the ``dns_name`` and ``ip_address`` fields are not included. The
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``tls_www_client`` keyword is the key purpose extension to indicate this
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certificate is intended for usage in a web client. Although QEMU network
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clients are not in fact HTTP clients, setting this key purpose is still
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recommended. The ``encryption_key`` and ``signing_key`` keyword is the
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key usage extension to indicate this certificate is intended for usage
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in the data session.
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The ``client-hostNNN-key.pem`` and ``client-hostNNN-cert.pem`` files
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should now be securely copied to the client for which they were
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generated, and renamed to ``client-key.pem`` and ``client-cert.pem``
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when added to the ``/etc/pki/qemu`` directory on the target host. The
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``client-key.pem`` file is security sensitive and should be kept
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protected with file mode 0600 to prevent disclosure.
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If a single host is going to be using TLS in both a client and server
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role, it is possible to create a single certificate to cover both roles.
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This would be quite common for the migration and NBD services, where a
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QEMU process will be started by accepting a TLS protected incoming
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migration, and later itself be migrated out to another host. To generate
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a single certificate, simply include the template data from both the
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client and server instructions in one.
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::
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# cat > both-hostNNN.info <<EOF
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country = GB
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state = London
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locality = City Of London
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organization = Name of your organization
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cn = hostNNN.foo.example.com
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dns_name = hostNNN
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dns_name = hostNNN.foo.example.com
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ip_address = 10.0.1.87
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ip_address = 192.8.0.92
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ip_address = 2620:0:cafe::87
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ip_address = 2001:24::92
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tls_www_server
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tls_www_client
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encryption_key
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signing_key
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EOF
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# certtool --generate-privkey > both-hostNNN-key.pem
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# certtool --generate-certificate \
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--load-ca-certificate ca-cert.pem \
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--load-ca-privkey ca-key.pem \
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--load-privkey both-hostNNN-key.pem \
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--template both-hostNNN.info \
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--outfile both-hostNNN-cert.pem
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When copying the PEM files to the target host, save them twice, once as
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``server-cert.pem`` and ``server-key.pem``, and again as
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``client-cert.pem`` and ``client-key.pem``.
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.. _tls_005fcreds_005fsetup:
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TLS x509 credential configuration
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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QEMU has a standard mechanism for loading x509 credentials that will be
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used for network services and clients. It requires specifying the
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``tls-creds-x509`` class name to the ``--object`` command line argument
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for the system emulators. Each set of credentials loaded should be given
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a unique string identifier via the ``id`` parameter. A single set of TLS
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credentials can be used for multiple network backends, so VNC,
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migration, NBD, character devices can all share the same credentials.
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Note, however, that credentials for use in a client endpoint must be
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loaded separately from those used in a server endpoint.
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When specifying the object, the ``dir`` parameters specifies which
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directory contains the credential files. This directory is expected to
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contain files with the names mentioned previously, ``ca-cert.pem``,
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``server-key.pem``, ``server-cert.pem``, ``client-key.pem`` and
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``client-cert.pem`` as appropriate. It is also possible to include a set
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of pre-generated Diffie-Hellman (DH) parameters in a file
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``dh-params.pem``, which can be created using the
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``certtool --generate-dh-params`` command. If omitted, QEMU will
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dynamically generate DH parameters when loading the credentials.
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The ``endpoint`` parameter indicates whether the credentials will be
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used for a network client or server, and determines which PEM files are
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loaded.
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The ``verify`` parameter determines whether x509 certificate validation
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should be performed. This defaults to enabled, meaning clients will
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always validate the server hostname against the certificate subject alt
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name fields and/or CN field. It also means that servers will request
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that clients provide a certificate and validate them. Verification
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should never be turned off for client endpoints, however, it may be
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turned off for server endpoints if an alternative mechanism is used to
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authenticate clients. For example, the VNC server can use SASL to
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authenticate clients instead.
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To load server credentials with client certificate validation enabled
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.. parsed-literal::
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|qemu_system| -object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/etc/pki/qemu,endpoint=server
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while to load client credentials use
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.. parsed-literal::
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|qemu_system| -object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/etc/pki/qemu,endpoint=client
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Network services which support TLS will all have a ``tls-creds``
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parameter which expects the ID of the TLS credentials object. For
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example with VNC:
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.. parsed-literal::
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|qemu_system| -vnc 0.0.0.0:0,tls-creds=tls0
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.. _tls_005fpsk:
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TLS Pre-Shared Keys (PSK)
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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Instead of using certificates, you may also use TLS Pre-Shared Keys
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(TLS-PSK). This can be simpler to set up than certificates but is less
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scalable.
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Use the GnuTLS ``psktool`` program to generate a ``keys.psk`` file
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containing one or more usernames and random keys::
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mkdir -m 0700 /tmp/keys
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psktool -u rich -p /tmp/keys/keys.psk
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TLS-enabled servers such as qemu-nbd can use this directory like so::
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qemu-nbd \
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-t -x / \
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--object tls-creds-psk,id=tls0,endpoint=server,dir=/tmp/keys \
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--tls-creds tls0 \
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image.qcow2
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When connecting from a qemu-based client you must specify the directory
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containing ``keys.psk`` and an optional username (defaults to "qemu")::
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qemu-img info \
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--object tls-creds-psk,id=tls0,dir=/tmp/keys,username=rich,endpoint=client \
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--image-opts \
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file.driver=nbd,file.host=localhost,file.port=10809,file.tls-creds=tls0,file.export=/
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