docs/system: Convert qemu-cpu-models.texi to rST
This doc was originally written by Daniel P. Berrangé
<berrange@redhat.com>, introduced via commit[1]: 2544e9e4aa (docs: add
guidance on configuring CPU models for x86, 2018-06-27).
In this patch:
- 1-1 conversion of Texinfo to rST, besides a couple of minor
tweaks that are too trivial to mention. (Thanks to Stephen
Finucane on IRC for the suggestion to use rST "definition lists"
instead of bullets in some places.)
Further modifications will be done via a separate patch.
- rST and related infra changes: manual page generation, Makefile
fixes, clean up references to qemu-cpu-models.texi, update year in
the copyright notice, etc.
[1] https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=2544e9e4aa
As part of the conversion, we use a more generic 'author' attribution
for the manpage than we previously had, as agreed with the original
author Dan Berrange.
Signed-off-by: Kashyap Chamarthy <kchamart@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20200228153619.9906-16-peter.maydell@linaro.org
Message-id: 20200226113034.6741-15-pbonzini@redhat.com
[Move macros to defs.rst.inc, split in x86 and MIPS parts,
make qemu-cpu-models.rst a standalone document. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[PMM: Move defs.rst.inc setup to its own commit;
fix minor issues with MAINTAINERS file updates;
drop copyright date change; keep capitalization of
"QEMU Project developers" consistent with other uses;
minor Makefile fixups]
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
2020-02-28 23:36:01 +08:00
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Recommendations for KVM CPU model configuration on x86 hosts
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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The information that follows provides recommendations for configuring
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CPU models on x86 hosts. The goals are to maximise performance, while
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protecting guest OS against various CPU hardware flaws, and optionally
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enabling live migration between hosts with heterogeneous CPU models.
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Two ways to configure CPU models with QEMU / KVM
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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(1) **Host passthrough**
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This passes the host CPU model features, model, stepping, exactly to
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the guest. Note that KVM may filter out some host CPU model features
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if they cannot be supported with virtualization. Live migration is
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unsafe when this mode is used as libvirt / QEMU cannot guarantee a
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stable CPU is exposed to the guest across hosts. This is the
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recommended CPU to use, provided live migration is not required.
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(2) **Named model**
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QEMU comes with a number of predefined named CPU models, that
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typically refer to specific generations of hardware released by
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Intel and AMD. These allow the guest VMs to have a degree of
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isolation from the host CPU, allowing greater flexibility in live
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migrating between hosts with differing hardware. @end table
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In both cases, it is possible to optionally add or remove individual CPU
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features, to alter what is presented to the guest by default.
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Libvirt supports a third way to configure CPU models known as "Host
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model". This uses the QEMU "Named model" feature, automatically picking
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a CPU model that is similar the host CPU, and then adding extra features
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to approximate the host model as closely as possible. This does not
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guarantee the CPU family, stepping, etc will precisely match the host
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CPU, as they would with "Host passthrough", but gives much of the
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benefit of passthrough, while making live migration safe.
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Preferred CPU models for Intel x86 hosts
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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The following CPU models are preferred for use on Intel hosts.
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Administrators / applications are recommended to use the CPU model that
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matches the generation of the host CPUs in use. In a deployment with a
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mixture of host CPU models between machines, if live migration
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compatibility is required, use the newest CPU model that is compatible
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across all desired hosts.
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qemu-cpu-models.rst: Document -noTSX, mds-no, taa-no, and tsx-ctrl
- Add the '-noTSX' variants for CascadeLake and SkyLake.
- Document the three MSR bits: 'mds-no', 'taa-no', and 'tsx-ctrl'
Two confusing things about 'mds-no' (and the first point applies to
the other two MSRs too):
(1) The 'mds-no' bit will _not_ show up in the guest's /proc/cpuinfo.
Rather it is used to fill in the guest's sysfs:
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds:Not affected
Paolo confirmed on IRC as such.
(2) There are _three_ variants[+] of CascadeLake CPUs, with different
stepping levels: 5, 6, and 7. To quote wikichip.org[*]:
"note that while steppings 6 & 7 are fully mitigated, earlier
stepping 5 is not protected against MSBDS, MLPDS, nor MDSUM"
The above is also indicated in the Intel's document[+], as
indicated by "No" under the three columns of MFBDS, MSBDS, and
MLPDS.
I've expressed this in the docs without belabouring the details.
[+] https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/processors-affected-microarchitectural-data-sampling
[*] https://en.wikichip.org/wiki/intel/microarchitectures/cascade_lake#Key_changes_from_Skylake
Signed-off-by: Kashyap Chamarthy <kchamart@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200225165618.6571-3-kchamart@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-02-26 00:56:18 +08:00
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``Cascadelake-Server``, ``Cascadelake-Server-noTSX``
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Intel Xeon Processor (Cascade Lake, 2019), with "stepping" levels 6
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or 7 only. (The Cascade Lake Xeon processor with *stepping 5 is
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vulnerable to MDS variants*.)
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``Skylake-Server``, ``Skylake-Server-IBRS``, ``Skylake-Server-IBRS-noTSX``
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docs/system: Convert qemu-cpu-models.texi to rST
This doc was originally written by Daniel P. Berrangé
<berrange@redhat.com>, introduced via commit[1]: 2544e9e4aa (docs: add
guidance on configuring CPU models for x86, 2018-06-27).
In this patch:
- 1-1 conversion of Texinfo to rST, besides a couple of minor
tweaks that are too trivial to mention. (Thanks to Stephen
Finucane on IRC for the suggestion to use rST "definition lists"
instead of bullets in some places.)
Further modifications will be done via a separate patch.
- rST and related infra changes: manual page generation, Makefile
fixes, clean up references to qemu-cpu-models.texi, update year in
the copyright notice, etc.
[1] https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=2544e9e4aa
As part of the conversion, we use a more generic 'author' attribution
for the manpage than we previously had, as agreed with the original
author Dan Berrange.
Signed-off-by: Kashyap Chamarthy <kchamart@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20200228153619.9906-16-peter.maydell@linaro.org
Message-id: 20200226113034.6741-15-pbonzini@redhat.com
[Move macros to defs.rst.inc, split in x86 and MIPS parts,
make qemu-cpu-models.rst a standalone document. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[PMM: Move defs.rst.inc setup to its own commit;
fix minor issues with MAINTAINERS file updates;
drop copyright date change; keep capitalization of
"QEMU Project developers" consistent with other uses;
minor Makefile fixups]
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
2020-02-28 23:36:01 +08:00
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Intel Xeon Processor (Skylake, 2016)
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qemu-cpu-models.rst: Document -noTSX, mds-no, taa-no, and tsx-ctrl
- Add the '-noTSX' variants for CascadeLake and SkyLake.
- Document the three MSR bits: 'mds-no', 'taa-no', and 'tsx-ctrl'
Two confusing things about 'mds-no' (and the first point applies to
the other two MSRs too):
(1) The 'mds-no' bit will _not_ show up in the guest's /proc/cpuinfo.
Rather it is used to fill in the guest's sysfs:
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds:Not affected
Paolo confirmed on IRC as such.
(2) There are _three_ variants[+] of CascadeLake CPUs, with different
stepping levels: 5, 6, and 7. To quote wikichip.org[*]:
"note that while steppings 6 & 7 are fully mitigated, earlier
stepping 5 is not protected against MSBDS, MLPDS, nor MDSUM"
The above is also indicated in the Intel's document[+], as
indicated by "No" under the three columns of MFBDS, MSBDS, and
MLPDS.
I've expressed this in the docs without belabouring the details.
[+] https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/processors-affected-microarchitectural-data-sampling
[*] https://en.wikichip.org/wiki/intel/microarchitectures/cascade_lake#Key_changes_from_Skylake
Signed-off-by: Kashyap Chamarthy <kchamart@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200225165618.6571-3-kchamart@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-02-26 00:56:18 +08:00
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``Skylake-Client``, ``Skylake-Client-IBRS``, ``Skylake-Client-noTSX-IBRS}``
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docs/system: Convert qemu-cpu-models.texi to rST
This doc was originally written by Daniel P. Berrangé
<berrange@redhat.com>, introduced via commit[1]: 2544e9e4aa (docs: add
guidance on configuring CPU models for x86, 2018-06-27).
In this patch:
- 1-1 conversion of Texinfo to rST, besides a couple of minor
tweaks that are too trivial to mention. (Thanks to Stephen
Finucane on IRC for the suggestion to use rST "definition lists"
instead of bullets in some places.)
Further modifications will be done via a separate patch.
- rST and related infra changes: manual page generation, Makefile
fixes, clean up references to qemu-cpu-models.texi, update year in
the copyright notice, etc.
[1] https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=2544e9e4aa
As part of the conversion, we use a more generic 'author' attribution
for the manpage than we previously had, as agreed with the original
author Dan Berrange.
Signed-off-by: Kashyap Chamarthy <kchamart@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20200228153619.9906-16-peter.maydell@linaro.org
Message-id: 20200226113034.6741-15-pbonzini@redhat.com
[Move macros to defs.rst.inc, split in x86 and MIPS parts,
make qemu-cpu-models.rst a standalone document. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[PMM: Move defs.rst.inc setup to its own commit;
fix minor issues with MAINTAINERS file updates;
drop copyright date change; keep capitalization of
"QEMU Project developers" consistent with other uses;
minor Makefile fixups]
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
2020-02-28 23:36:01 +08:00
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Intel Core Processor (Skylake, 2015)
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``Broadwell``, ``Broadwell-IBRS``, ``Broadwell-noTSX``, ``Broadwell-noTSX-IBRS``
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Intel Core Processor (Broadwell, 2014)
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``Haswell``, ``Haswell-IBRS``, ``Haswell-noTSX``, ``Haswell-noTSX-IBRS``
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Intel Core Processor (Haswell, 2013)
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``IvyBridge``, ``IvyBridge-IBR``
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Intel Xeon E3-12xx v2 (Ivy Bridge, 2012)
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``SandyBridge``, ``SandyBridge-IBRS``
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Intel Xeon E312xx (Sandy Bridge, 2011)
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``Westmere``, ``Westmere-IBRS``
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Westmere E56xx/L56xx/X56xx (Nehalem-C, 2010)
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``Nehalem``, ``Nehalem-IBRS``
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Intel Core i7 9xx (Nehalem Class Core i7, 2008)
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``Penryn``
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Intel Core 2 Duo P9xxx (Penryn Class Core 2, 2007)
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``Conroe``
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Intel Celeron_4x0 (Conroe/Merom Class Core 2, 2006)
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Important CPU features for Intel x86 hosts
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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The following are important CPU features that should be used on Intel
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x86 hosts, when available in the host CPU. Some of them require explicit
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configuration to enable, as they are not included by default in some, or
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all, of the named CPU models listed above. In general all of these
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features are included if using "Host passthrough" or "Host model".
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``pcid``
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Recommended to mitigate the cost of the Meltdown (CVE-2017-5754) fix.
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Included by default in Haswell, Broadwell & Skylake Intel CPU models.
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Should be explicitly turned on for Westmere, SandyBridge, and
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IvyBridge Intel CPU models. Note that some desktop/mobile Westmere
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CPUs cannot support this feature.
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``spec-ctrl``
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Required to enable the Spectre v2 (CVE-2017-5715) fix.
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Included by default in Intel CPU models with -IBRS suffix.
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Must be explicitly turned on for Intel CPU models without -IBRS
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suffix.
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Requires the host CPU microcode to support this feature before it
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can be used for guest CPUs.
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``stibp``
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Required to enable stronger Spectre v2 (CVE-2017-5715) fixes in some
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operating systems.
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Must be explicitly turned on for all Intel CPU models.
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Requires the host CPU microcode to support this feature before it can
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be used for guest CPUs.
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``ssbd``
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Required to enable the CVE-2018-3639 fix.
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Not included by default in any Intel CPU model.
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Must be explicitly turned on for all Intel CPU models.
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Requires the host CPU microcode to support this feature before it
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can be used for guest CPUs.
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``pdpe1gb``
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Recommended to allow guest OS to use 1GB size pages.
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Not included by default in any Intel CPU model.
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Should be explicitly turned on for all Intel CPU models.
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Note that not all CPU hardware will support this feature.
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``md-clear``
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Required to confirm the MDS (CVE-2018-12126, CVE-2018-12127,
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CVE-2018-12130, CVE-2019-11091) fixes.
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Not included by default in any Intel CPU model.
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Must be explicitly turned on for all Intel CPU models.
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Requires the host CPU microcode to support this feature before it
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can be used for guest CPUs.
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qemu-cpu-models.rst: Document -noTSX, mds-no, taa-no, and tsx-ctrl
- Add the '-noTSX' variants for CascadeLake and SkyLake.
- Document the three MSR bits: 'mds-no', 'taa-no', and 'tsx-ctrl'
Two confusing things about 'mds-no' (and the first point applies to
the other two MSRs too):
(1) The 'mds-no' bit will _not_ show up in the guest's /proc/cpuinfo.
Rather it is used to fill in the guest's sysfs:
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds:Not affected
Paolo confirmed on IRC as such.
(2) There are _three_ variants[+] of CascadeLake CPUs, with different
stepping levels: 5, 6, and 7. To quote wikichip.org[*]:
"note that while steppings 6 & 7 are fully mitigated, earlier
stepping 5 is not protected against MSBDS, MLPDS, nor MDSUM"
The above is also indicated in the Intel's document[+], as
indicated by "No" under the three columns of MFBDS, MSBDS, and
MLPDS.
I've expressed this in the docs without belabouring the details.
[+] https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/processors-affected-microarchitectural-data-sampling
[*] https://en.wikichip.org/wiki/intel/microarchitectures/cascade_lake#Key_changes_from_Skylake
Signed-off-by: Kashyap Chamarthy <kchamart@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200225165618.6571-3-kchamart@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-02-26 00:56:18 +08:00
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``mds-no``
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Recommended to inform the guest OS that the host is *not* vulnerable
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to any of the MDS variants ([MFBDS] CVE-2018-12130, [MLPDS]
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CVE-2018-12127, [MSBDS] CVE-2018-12126).
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This is an MSR (Model-Specific Register) feature rather than a CPUID feature,
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so it will not appear in the Linux ``/proc/cpuinfo`` in the host or
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guest. Instead, the host kernel uses it to populate the MDS
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vulnerability file in ``sysfs``.
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So it should only be enabled for VMs if the host reports @code{Not
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affected} in the ``/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds`` file.
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``taa-no``
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Recommended to inform that the guest that the host is ``not``
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vulnerable to CVE-2019-11135, TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA).
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This too is an MSR feature, so it does not show up in the Linux
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``/proc/cpuinfo`` in the host or guest.
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It should only be enabled for VMs if the host reports ``Not affected``
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in the ``/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort``
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file.
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``tsx-ctrl``
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Recommended to inform the guest that it can disable the Intel TSX
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(Transactional Synchronization Extensions) feature; or, if the
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processor is vulnerable, use the Intel VERW instruction (a
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processor-level instruction that performs checks on memory access) as
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a mitigation for the TAA vulnerability. (For details, refer to
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Intel's `deep dive into MDS
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<https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-intel-analysis-microarchitectural-data-sampling>`_.)
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Expose this to the guest OS if and only if: (a) the host has TSX
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enabled; *and* (b) the guest has ``rtm`` CPU flag enabled.
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By disabling TSX, KVM-based guests can avoid paying the price of
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mitigating TSX-based attacks.
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Note that ``tsx-ctrl`` too is an MSR feature, so it does not show
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up in the Linux ``/proc/cpuinfo`` in the host or guest.
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To validate that Intel TSX is indeed disabled for the guest, there are
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two ways: (a) check for the *absence* of ``rtm`` in the guest's
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``/proc/cpuinfo``; or (b) the
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``/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort`` file in
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the guest should report ``Mitigation: TSX disabled``.
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|
docs/system: Convert qemu-cpu-models.texi to rST
This doc was originally written by Daniel P. Berrangé
<berrange@redhat.com>, introduced via commit[1]: 2544e9e4aa (docs: add
guidance on configuring CPU models for x86, 2018-06-27).
In this patch:
- 1-1 conversion of Texinfo to rST, besides a couple of minor
tweaks that are too trivial to mention. (Thanks to Stephen
Finucane on IRC for the suggestion to use rST "definition lists"
instead of bullets in some places.)
Further modifications will be done via a separate patch.
- rST and related infra changes: manual page generation, Makefile
fixes, clean up references to qemu-cpu-models.texi, update year in
the copyright notice, etc.
[1] https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=2544e9e4aa
As part of the conversion, we use a more generic 'author' attribution
for the manpage than we previously had, as agreed with the original
author Dan Berrange.
Signed-off-by: Kashyap Chamarthy <kchamart@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20200228153619.9906-16-peter.maydell@linaro.org
Message-id: 20200226113034.6741-15-pbonzini@redhat.com
[Move macros to defs.rst.inc, split in x86 and MIPS parts,
make qemu-cpu-models.rst a standalone document. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[PMM: Move defs.rst.inc setup to its own commit;
fix minor issues with MAINTAINERS file updates;
drop copyright date change; keep capitalization of
"QEMU Project developers" consistent with other uses;
minor Makefile fixups]
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
2020-02-28 23:36:01 +08:00
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Preferred CPU models for AMD x86 hosts
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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The following CPU models are preferred for use on Intel hosts.
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Administrators / applications are recommended to use the CPU model that
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matches the generation of the host CPUs in use. In a deployment with a
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mixture of host CPU models between machines, if live migration
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compatibility is required, use the newest CPU model that is compatible
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across all desired hosts.
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``EPYC``, ``EPYC-IBPB``
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AMD EPYC Processor (2017)
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``Opteron_G5``
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AMD Opteron 63xx class CPU (2012)
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``Opteron_G4``
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AMD Opteron 62xx class CPU (2011)
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``Opteron_G3``
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AMD Opteron 23xx (Gen 3 Class Opteron, 2009)
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``Opteron_G2``
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AMD Opteron 22xx (Gen 2 Class Opteron, 2006)
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``Opteron_G1``
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AMD Opteron 240 (Gen 1 Class Opteron, 2004)
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Important CPU features for AMD x86 hosts
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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The following are important CPU features that should be used on AMD x86
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hosts, when available in the host CPU. Some of them require explicit
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configuration to enable, as they are not included by default in some, or
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all, of the named CPU models listed above. In general all of these
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features are included if using "Host passthrough" or "Host model".
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``ibpb``
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Required to enable the Spectre v2 (CVE-2017-5715) fix.
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Included by default in AMD CPU models with -IBPB suffix.
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Must be explicitly turned on for AMD CPU models without -IBPB suffix.
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Requires the host CPU microcode to support this feature before it
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can be used for guest CPUs.
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``stibp``
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Required to enable stronger Spectre v2 (CVE-2017-5715) fixes in some
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operating systems.
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Must be explicitly turned on for all AMD CPU models.
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Requires the host CPU microcode to support this feature before it
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can be used for guest CPUs.
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``virt-ssbd``
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Required to enable the CVE-2018-3639 fix
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Not included by default in any AMD CPU model.
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Must be explicitly turned on for all AMD CPU models.
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This should be provided to guests, even if amd-ssbd is also provided,
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for maximum guest compatibility.
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Note for some QEMU / libvirt versions, this must be force enabled when
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when using "Host model", because this is a virtual feature that
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doesn't exist in the physical host CPUs.
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``amd-ssbd``
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Required to enable the CVE-2018-3639 fix
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Not included by default in any AMD CPU model.
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Must be explicitly turned on for all AMD CPU models.
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This provides higher performance than ``virt-ssbd`` so should be
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exposed to guests whenever available in the host. ``virt-ssbd`` should
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none the less also be exposed for maximum guest compatibility as some
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kernels only know about ``virt-ssbd``.
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``amd-no-ssb``
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Recommended to indicate the host is not vulnerable CVE-2018-3639
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Not included by default in any AMD CPU model.
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Future hardware generations of CPU will not be vulnerable to
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CVE-2018-3639, and thus the guest should be told not to enable
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its mitigations, by exposing amd-no-ssb. This is mutually
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exclusive with virt-ssbd and amd-ssbd.
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``pdpe1gb``
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Recommended to allow guest OS to use 1GB size pages
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Not included by default in any AMD CPU model.
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Should be explicitly turned on for all AMD CPU models.
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Note that not all CPU hardware will support this feature.
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Default x86 CPU models
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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The default QEMU CPU models are designed such that they can run on all
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hosts. If an application does not wish to do perform any host
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compatibility checks before launching guests, the default is guaranteed
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to work.
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The default CPU models will, however, leave the guest OS vulnerable to
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various CPU hardware flaws, so their use is strongly discouraged.
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Applications should follow the earlier guidance to setup a better CPU
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configuration, with host passthrough recommended if live migration is
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not needed.
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``qemu32``, ``qemu64``
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QEMU Virtual CPU version 2.5+ (32 & 64 bit variants)
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``qemu64`` is used for x86_64 guests and ``qemu32`` is used for i686
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guests, when no ``-cpu`` argument is given to QEMU, or no ``<cpu>`` is
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provided in libvirt XML.
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Other non-recommended x86 CPUs
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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The following CPUs models are compatible with most AMD and Intel x86
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hosts, but their usage is discouraged, as they expose a very limited
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featureset, which prevents guests having optimal performance.
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``kvm32``, ``kvm64``
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Common KVM processor (32 & 64 bit variants).
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Legacy models just for historical compatibility with ancient QEMU
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versions.
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``486``, ``athlon``, ``phenom``, ``coreduo``, ``core2duo``, ``n270``, ``pentium``, ``pentium2``, ``pentium3``
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Various very old x86 CPU models, mostly predating the introduction
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of hardware assisted virtualization, that should thus not be
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required for running virtual machines.
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Syntax for configuring CPU models
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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The examples below illustrate the approach to configuring the various
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CPU models / features in QEMU and libvirt.
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QEMU command line
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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Host passthrough:
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.. parsed-literal::
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|qemu_system| -cpu host
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Host passthrough with feature customization:
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.. parsed-literal::
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|qemu_system| -cpu host,-vmx,...
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Named CPU models:
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.. parsed-literal::
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|qemu_system| -cpu Westmere
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Named CPU models with feature customization:
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.. parsed-literal::
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|qemu_system| -cpu Westmere,+pcid,...
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Libvirt guest XML
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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Host passthrough::
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<cpu mode='host-passthrough'/>
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Host passthrough with feature customization::
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<cpu mode='host-passthrough'>
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<feature name="vmx" policy="disable"/>
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...
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</cpu>
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Host model::
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<cpu mode='host-model'/>
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Host model with feature customization::
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<cpu mode='host-model'>
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<feature name="vmx" policy="disable"/>
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...
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</cpu>
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Named model::
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<cpu mode='custom'>
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<model name="Westmere"/>
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</cpu>
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Named model with feature customization::
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<cpu mode='custom'>
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<model name="Westmere"/>
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<feature name="pcid" policy="require"/>
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...
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</cpu>
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