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- update blowfish to 1.2 (Solar Designer)
This commit is contained in:
Pierre Joye
parent
b7bee05d46
commit
264e5c0567
@ -51,27 +51,40 @@ SUCH DAMAGE.
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6. ext/standard crypt's blowfish implementation
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The crypt_blowfish homepage is:
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http://www.openwall.com/crypt/
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This code comes from John the Ripper password cracker, with reentrant
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and crypt(3) interfaces added, but optimizations specific to password
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cracking removed.
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Written by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 1998-2002 and
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placed in the public domain.
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Written by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 1998-2011.
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No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public
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domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software
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in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is
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Copyright (c) 1998-2011 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the
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general public under the following terms:
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There's absolutely no warranty.
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Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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modification, are permitted.
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There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied.
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It is my intent that you should be able to use this on your system,
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as a part of a software package, or anywhere else to improve security,
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as part of a software package, or anywhere else to improve security,
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ensure compatibility, or for any other purpose. I would appreciate
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it if you give credit where it is due and keep your modifications in
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the public domain as well, but I don't require that in order to let
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you place this code and any modifications you make under a license
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of your choice.
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This implementation is compatible with OpenBSD bcrypt.c (version 2a)
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by Niels Provos <provos at citi.umich.edu>, and uses some of his
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This implementation is mostly compatible with OpenBSD's bcrypt.c (prefix
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"$2a$") by Niels Provos <provos at citi.umich.edu>, and uses some of his
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ideas. The password hashing algorithm was designed by David Mazieres
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<dm at lcs.mit.edu>.
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<dm at lcs.mit.edu>. For more information on the level of compatibility,
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please refer to the comments in BF_set_key() and to the crypt(3) man page
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included in the crypt_blowfish tarball.
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There's a paper on the algorithm that explains its design decisions:
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@ -1,29 +1,39 @@
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/* $Id$ */
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/*
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$Id$
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*/
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/*
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* The crypt_blowfish homepage is:
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*
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* http://www.openwall.com/crypt/
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*
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* This code comes from John the Ripper password cracker, with reentrant
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* and crypt(3) interfaces added, but optimizations specific to password
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* cracking removed.
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*
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* Written by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 1998-2002 and
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* placed in the public domain. Quick self-test added in 2011 and also
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* placed in the public domain.
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* Written by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 1998-2011.
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* No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public
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* domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software
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* in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2011 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the
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* general public under the following terms:
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*
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* There's absolutely no warranty.
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted.
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*
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* There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied.
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*
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* It is my intent that you should be able to use this on your system,
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* as a part of a software package, or anywhere else to improve security,
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* as part of a software package, or anywhere else to improve security,
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* ensure compatibility, or for any other purpose. I would appreciate
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* it if you give credit where it is due and keep your modifications in
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* the public domain as well, but I don't require that in order to let
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* you place this code and any modifications you make under a license
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* of your choice.
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*
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* This implementation is compatible with OpenBSD bcrypt.c (version 2a)
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* by Niels Provos <provos at citi.umich.edu>, and uses some of his
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* This implementation is mostly compatible with OpenBSD's bcrypt.c (prefix
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* "$2a$") by Niels Provos <provos at citi.umich.edu>, and uses some of his
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* ideas. The password hashing algorithm was designed by David Mazieres
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* <dm at lcs.mit.edu>.
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* <dm at lcs.mit.edu>. For more information on the level of compatibility,
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* please refer to the comments in BF_set_key() below and to the crypt(3)
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* man page included in the crypt_blowfish tarball.
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*
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* There's a paper on the algorithm that explains its design decisions:
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*
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@ -41,23 +51,8 @@
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#define __set_errno(val) errno = (val)
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#endif
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#ifndef __const
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#ifdef __GNUC__
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#define __CONST __const
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#else
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#define __CONST
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#endif
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#else
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#define __CONST __const
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#endif
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/*
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* Please keep this enabled. We really don't want incompatible hashes to be
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* produced. The performance cost of this quick self-test is around 0.6% at
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* the "$2a$08" setting.
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*/
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#define BF_SELF_TEST
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/* Just to make sure the prototypes match the actual definitions */
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#include "crypt_blowfish.h"
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#ifdef __i386__
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#define BF_ASM 0
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@ -379,35 +374,21 @@ static unsigned char BF_atoi64[0x60] = {
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43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64
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};
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/*
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* This may be optimized out if built with function inlining and no BF_ASM.
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*/
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static void clean(void *data, int size)
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{
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#if BF_ASM
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extern void _BF_clean(void *data);
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#endif
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memset(data, 0, size);
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#if BF_ASM
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_BF_clean(data);
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#endif
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}
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#define BF_safe_atoi64(dst, src) \
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{ \
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tmp = (unsigned char)(src); \
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if (tmp == '$') break; \
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if (tmp == '$') break; /* PHP hack */ \
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if ((unsigned int)(tmp -= 0x20) >= 0x60) return -1; \
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tmp = BF_atoi64[tmp]; \
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if (tmp > 63) return -1; \
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(dst) = tmp; \
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}
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static int BF_decode(BF_word *dst, __CONST char *src, int size)
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static int BF_decode(BF_word *dst, const char *src, int size)
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{
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unsigned char *dptr = (unsigned char *)dst;
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unsigned char *end = dptr + size;
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unsigned char *sptr = (unsigned char *)src;
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const unsigned char *sptr = (const unsigned char *)src;
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unsigned int tmp, c1, c2, c3, c4;
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do {
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@ -424,16 +405,16 @@ static int BF_decode(BF_word *dst, __CONST char *src, int size)
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*dptr++ = ((c3 & 0x03) << 6) | c4;
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} while (dptr < end);
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while (dptr < end)
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while (dptr < end) /* PHP hack */
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*dptr++ = 0;
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return 0;
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}
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static void BF_encode(char *dst, __CONST BF_word *src, int size)
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static void BF_encode(char *dst, const BF_word *src, int size)
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{
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unsigned char *sptr = (unsigned char *)src;
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unsigned char *end = sptr + size;
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const unsigned char *sptr = (const unsigned char *)src;
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const unsigned char *end = sptr + size;
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unsigned char *dptr = (unsigned char *)dst;
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unsigned int c1, c2;
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@ -564,36 +545,117 @@ static void BF_swap(BF_word *x, int count)
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} while (ptr < &data.ctx.S[3][0xFF]);
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#endif
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static void BF_set_key(__CONST char *key, BF_key expanded, BF_key initial, int sign_extension_bug)
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static void BF_set_key(const char *key, BF_key expanded, BF_key initial,
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unsigned char flags)
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{
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__CONST char *ptr = key;
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int i, j;
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BF_word tmp;
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const char *ptr = key;
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unsigned int bug, i, j;
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BF_word safety, sign, diff, tmp[2];
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/*
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* There was a sign extension bug in older revisions of this function. While
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* we would have liked to simply fix the bug and move on, we have to provide
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* a backwards compatibility feature (essentially the bug) for some systems and
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* a safety measure for some others. The latter is needed because for certain
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* multiple inputs to the buggy algorithm there exist easily found inputs to
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* the correct algorithm that produce the same hash. Thus, we optionally
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* deviate from the correct algorithm just enough to avoid such collisions.
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* While the bug itself affected the majority of passwords containing
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* characters with the 8th bit set (although only a percentage of those in a
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* collision-producing way), the anti-collision safety measure affects
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* only a subset of passwords containing the '\xff' character (not even all of
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* those passwords, just some of them). This character is not found in valid
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* UTF-8 sequences and is rarely used in popular 8-bit character encodings.
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* Thus, the safety measure is unlikely to cause much annoyance, and is a
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* reasonable tradeoff to use when authenticating against existing hashes that
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* are not reliably known to have been computed with the correct algorithm.
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*
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* We use an approach that tries to minimize side-channel leaks of password
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* information - that is, we mostly use fixed-cost bitwise operations instead
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* of branches or table lookups. (One conditional branch based on password
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* length remains. It is not part of the bug aftermath, though, and is
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* difficult and possibly unreasonable to avoid given the use of C strings by
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* the caller, which results in similar timing leaks anyway.)
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*
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* For actual implementation, we set an array index in the variable "bug"
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* (0 means no bug, 1 means sign extension bug emulation) and a flag in the
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* variable "safety" (bit 16 is set when the safety measure is requested).
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* Valid combinations of settings are:
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*
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* Prefix "$2a$": bug = 0, safety = 0x10000
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* Prefix "$2x$": bug = 1, safety = 0
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* Prefix "$2y$": bug = 0, safety = 0
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*/
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bug = (unsigned int)flags & 1;
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safety = ((BF_word)flags & 2) << 15;
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sign = diff = 0;
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for (i = 0; i < BF_N + 2; i++) {
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tmp = 0;
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tmp[0] = tmp[1] = 0;
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for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
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tmp <<= 8;
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if (sign_extension_bug)
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tmp |= (BF_word_signed)(signed char)*ptr;
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tmp[0] <<= 8;
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tmp[0] |= (unsigned char)*ptr; /* correct */
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tmp[1] <<= 8;
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tmp[1] |= (BF_word_signed)(signed char)*ptr; /* bug */
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/*
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* Sign extension in the first char has no effect - nothing to overwrite yet,
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* and those extra 24 bits will be fully shifted out of the 32-bit word. For
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* chars 2, 3, 4 in each four-char block, we set bit 7 of "sign" if sign
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* extension in tmp[1] occurs. Once this flag is set, it remains set.
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*/
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if (j)
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sign |= tmp[1] & 0x80;
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if (!*ptr)
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ptr = key;
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else
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tmp |= (unsigned char)*ptr;
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if (!*ptr) ptr = key; else ptr++;
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ptr++;
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}
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diff |= tmp[0] ^ tmp[1]; /* Non-zero on any differences */
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expanded[i] = tmp;
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initial[i] = BF_init_state.P[i] ^ tmp;
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expanded[i] = tmp[bug];
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initial[i] = BF_init_state.P[i] ^ tmp[bug];
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}
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/*
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* At this point, "diff" is zero iff the correct and buggy algorithms produced
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* exactly the same result. If so and if "sign" is non-zero, which indicates
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* that there was a non-benign sign extension, this means that we have a
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* collision between the correctly computed hash for this password and a set of
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* passwords that could be supplied to the buggy algorithm. Our safety measure
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* is meant to protect from such many-buggy to one-correct collisions, by
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* deviating from the correct algorithm in such cases. Let's check for this.
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*/
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diff |= diff >> 16; /* still zero iff exact match */
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diff &= 0xffff; /* ditto */
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diff += 0xffff; /* bit 16 set iff "diff" was non-zero (on non-match) */
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sign <<= 9; /* move the non-benign sign extension flag to bit 16 */
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sign &= ~diff & safety; /* action needed? */
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/*
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* If we have determined that we need to deviate from the correct algorithm,
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* flip bit 16 in initial expanded key. (The choice of 16 is arbitrary, but
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* let's stick to it now. It came out of the approach we used above, and it's
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* not any worse than any other choice we could make.)
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*
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* It is crucial that we don't do the same to the expanded key used in the main
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* Eksblowfish loop. By doing it to only one of these two, we deviate from a
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* state that could be directly specified by a password to the buggy algorithm
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* (and to the fully correct one as well, but that's a side-effect).
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*/
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initial[0] ^= sign;
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}
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static char *BF_crypt(__CONST char *key, __CONST char *setting,
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char *output, int size,
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BF_word min)
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static char *BF_crypt(const char *key, const char *setting,
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char *output, int size,
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BF_word min)
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{
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#if BF_ASM
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extern void _BF_body_r(BF_ctx *ctx);
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#endif
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static const unsigned char flags_by_subtype[26] =
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{2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
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0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 4, 0};
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struct {
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BF_ctx ctx;
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BF_key expanded_key;
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@ -615,7 +677,8 @@ static char *BF_crypt(__CONST char *key, __CONST char *setting,
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if (setting[0] != '$' ||
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setting[1] != '2' ||
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(setting[2] != 'a' && setting[2] != 'x') ||
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setting[2] < 'a' || setting[2] > 'z' ||
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!flags_by_subtype[(unsigned int)(unsigned char)setting[2] - 'a'] ||
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setting[3] != '$' ||
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setting[4] < '0' || setting[4] > '3' ||
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setting[5] < '0' || setting[5] > '9' ||
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@ -627,14 +690,13 @@ static char *BF_crypt(__CONST char *key, __CONST char *setting,
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count = (BF_word)1 << ((setting[4] - '0') * 10 + (setting[5] - '0'));
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if (count < min || BF_decode(data.binary.salt, &setting[7], 16)) {
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clean(data.binary.salt, sizeof(data.binary.salt));
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__set_errno(EINVAL);
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return NULL;
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}
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BF_swap(data.binary.salt, 4);
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BF_set_key(key, data.expanded_key, data.ctx.P, setting[2] == 'x');
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BF_set_key(key, data.expanded_key, data.ctx.P,
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flags_by_subtype[(unsigned int)(unsigned char)setting[2] - 'a']);
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memcpy(data.ctx.S, BF_init_state.S, sizeof(data.ctx.S));
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@ -664,51 +726,33 @@ static char *BF_crypt(__CONST char *key, __CONST char *setting,
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} while (ptr < &data.ctx.S[3][0xFF]);
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do {
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data.ctx.P[0] ^= data.expanded_key[0];
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data.ctx.P[1] ^= data.expanded_key[1];
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data.ctx.P[2] ^= data.expanded_key[2];
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data.ctx.P[3] ^= data.expanded_key[3];
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data.ctx.P[4] ^= data.expanded_key[4];
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data.ctx.P[5] ^= data.expanded_key[5];
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data.ctx.P[6] ^= data.expanded_key[6];
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data.ctx.P[7] ^= data.expanded_key[7];
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data.ctx.P[8] ^= data.expanded_key[8];
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data.ctx.P[9] ^= data.expanded_key[9];
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data.ctx.P[10] ^= data.expanded_key[10];
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data.ctx.P[11] ^= data.expanded_key[11];
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data.ctx.P[12] ^= data.expanded_key[12];
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data.ctx.P[13] ^= data.expanded_key[13];
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data.ctx.P[14] ^= data.expanded_key[14];
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data.ctx.P[15] ^= data.expanded_key[15];
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data.ctx.P[16] ^= data.expanded_key[16];
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data.ctx.P[17] ^= data.expanded_key[17];
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int done;
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BF_body();
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for (i = 0; i < BF_N + 2; i += 2) {
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data.ctx.P[i] ^= data.expanded_key[i];
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data.ctx.P[i + 1] ^= data.expanded_key[i + 1];
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}
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tmp1 = data.binary.salt[0];
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tmp2 = data.binary.salt[1];
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tmp3 = data.binary.salt[2];
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tmp4 = data.binary.salt[3];
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data.ctx.P[0] ^= tmp1;
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data.ctx.P[1] ^= tmp2;
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data.ctx.P[2] ^= tmp3;
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data.ctx.P[3] ^= tmp4;
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data.ctx.P[4] ^= tmp1;
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data.ctx.P[5] ^= tmp2;
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data.ctx.P[6] ^= tmp3;
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data.ctx.P[7] ^= tmp4;
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data.ctx.P[8] ^= tmp1;
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data.ctx.P[9] ^= tmp2;
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data.ctx.P[10] ^= tmp3;
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data.ctx.P[11] ^= tmp4;
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data.ctx.P[12] ^= tmp1;
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data.ctx.P[13] ^= tmp2;
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data.ctx.P[14] ^= tmp3;
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data.ctx.P[15] ^= tmp4;
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data.ctx.P[16] ^= tmp1;
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data.ctx.P[17] ^= tmp2;
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done = 0;
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do {
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BF_body();
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if (done)
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break;
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done = 1;
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BF_body();
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tmp1 = data.binary.salt[0];
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tmp2 = data.binary.salt[1];
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tmp3 = data.binary.salt[2];
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tmp4 = data.binary.salt[3];
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for (i = 0; i < BF_N; i += 4) {
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data.ctx.P[i] ^= tmp1;
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data.ctx.P[i + 1] ^= tmp2;
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data.ctx.P[i + 2] ^= tmp3;
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data.ctx.P[i + 3] ^= tmp4;
|
||||
}
|
||||
data.ctx.P[16] ^= tmp1;
|
||||
data.ctx.P[17] ^= tmp2;
|
||||
} while (1);
|
||||
} while (--count);
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < 6; i += 2) {
|
||||
@ -734,64 +778,114 @@ static char *BF_crypt(__CONST char *key, __CONST char *setting,
|
||||
BF_encode(&output[7 + 22], data.binary.output, 23);
|
||||
output[7 + 22 + 31] = '\0';
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef BF_SELF_TEST
|
||||
/* Overwrite the most obvious sensitive data we have on the stack. Note
|
||||
* that this does not guarantee there's no sensitive data left on the
|
||||
* stack and/or in registers; I'm not aware of portable code that does. */
|
||||
clean(&data, sizeof(data));
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
return output;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
char *php_crypt_blowfish_rn(__CONST char *key, __CONST char *setting,
|
||||
char *output, int size)
|
||||
static int _crypt_output_magic(const char *setting, char *output, int size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
#ifdef BF_SELF_TEST
|
||||
__CONST char *test_key = "8b \xd0\xc1\xd2\xcf\xcc\xd8";
|
||||
__CONST char *test_2a =
|
||||
"$2a$00$abcdefghijklmnopqrstuui1D709vfamulimlGcq0qq3UvuUasvEa"
|
||||
"\0"
|
||||
"canary";
|
||||
__CONST char *test_2x =
|
||||
"$2x$00$abcdefghijklmnopqrstuuVUrPmXD6q/nVSSp7pNDhCR9071IfIRe"
|
||||
"\0"
|
||||
"canary";
|
||||
__CONST char *test_hash, *p;
|
||||
int ok;
|
||||
char buf[7 + 22 + 31 + 1 + 6 + 1];
|
||||
if (size < 3)
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
|
||||
output = BF_crypt(key, setting, output, size, 16);
|
||||
output[0] = '*';
|
||||
output[1] = '0';
|
||||
output[2] = '\0';
|
||||
|
||||
/* Do a quick self-test. This also happens to overwrite BF_crypt()'s data. */
|
||||
test_hash = (setting[2] == 'x') ? test_2x : test_2a;
|
||||
memcpy(buf, test_hash, sizeof(buf));
|
||||
memset(buf, -1, sizeof(buf) - (6 + 1)); /* keep "canary" only */
|
||||
p = BF_crypt(test_key, test_hash, buf, sizeof(buf) - 6, 1);
|
||||
if (setting[0] == '*' && setting[1] == '0')
|
||||
output[1] = '1';
|
||||
|
||||
ok = (p == buf && !memcmp(p, test_hash, sizeof(buf)));
|
||||
|
||||
/* This could reveal what hash type we were using last. Unfortunately, we
|
||||
* can't reliably clean the test_hash pointer. */
|
||||
clean(&buf, sizeof(buf));
|
||||
|
||||
if (ok)
|
||||
return output;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Should not happen */
|
||||
__set_errno(EINVAL); /* pretend we don't support this hash type */
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
#else
|
||||
#warning Self-test is disabled, please enable
|
||||
return BF_crypt(key, setting, output, size, 16);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
char *php_crypt_gensalt_blowfish_rn(unsigned long count,
|
||||
__CONST char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size)
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Please preserve the runtime self-test. It serves two purposes at once:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 1. We really can't afford the risk of producing incompatible hashes e.g.
|
||||
* when there's something like gcc bug 26587 again, whereas an application or
|
||||
* library integrating this code might not also integrate our external tests or
|
||||
* it might not run them after every build. Even if it does, the miscompile
|
||||
* might only occur on the production build, but not on a testing build (such
|
||||
* as because of different optimization settings). It is painful to recover
|
||||
* from incorrectly-computed hashes - merely fixing whatever broke is not
|
||||
* enough. Thus, a proactive measure like this self-test is needed.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 2. We don't want to leave sensitive data from our actual password hash
|
||||
* computation on the stack or in registers. Previous revisions of the code
|
||||
* would do explicit cleanups, but simply running the self-test after hash
|
||||
* computation is more reliable.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The performance cost of this quick self-test is around 0.6% at the "$2a$08"
|
||||
* setting.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
char *php_crypt_blowfish_rn(const char *key, const char *setting,
|
||||
char *output, int size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const char *test_key = "8b \xd0\xc1\xd2\xcf\xcc\xd8";
|
||||
const char *test_setting = "$2a$00$abcdefghijklmnopqrstuu";
|
||||
static const char * const test_hash[2] =
|
||||
{"VUrPmXD6q/nVSSp7pNDhCR9071IfIRe\0\x55", /* $2x$ */
|
||||
"i1D709vfamulimlGcq0qq3UvuUasvEa\0\x55"}; /* $2a$, $2y$ */
|
||||
char *retval;
|
||||
const char *p;
|
||||
int save_errno, ok;
|
||||
struct {
|
||||
char s[7 + 22 + 1];
|
||||
char o[7 + 22 + 31 + 1 + 1 + 1];
|
||||
} buf;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Hash the supplied password */
|
||||
_crypt_output_magic(setting, output, size);
|
||||
retval = BF_crypt(key, setting, output, size, 16);
|
||||
save_errno = errno;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Do a quick self-test. It is important that we make both calls to BF_crypt()
|
||||
* from the same scope such that they likely use the same stack locations,
|
||||
* which makes the second call overwrite the first call's sensitive data on the
|
||||
* stack and makes it more likely that any alignment related issues would be
|
||||
* detected by the self-test.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
memcpy(buf.s, test_setting, sizeof(buf.s));
|
||||
if (retval)
|
||||
buf.s[2] = setting[2];
|
||||
memset(buf.o, 0x55, sizeof(buf.o));
|
||||
buf.o[sizeof(buf.o) - 1] = 0;
|
||||
p = BF_crypt(test_key, buf.s, buf.o, sizeof(buf.o) - (1 + 1), 1);
|
||||
|
||||
ok = (p == buf.o &&
|
||||
!memcmp(p, buf.s, 7 + 22) &&
|
||||
!memcmp(p + (7 + 22),
|
||||
test_hash[(unsigned int)(unsigned char)buf.s[2] & 1],
|
||||
31 + 1 + 1 + 1));
|
||||
|
||||
{
|
||||
const char *k = "\xff\xa3" "34" "\xff\xff\xff\xa3" "345";
|
||||
BF_key ae, ai, ye, yi;
|
||||
BF_set_key(k, ae, ai, 2); /* $2a$ */
|
||||
BF_set_key(k, ye, yi, 4); /* $2y$ */
|
||||
ai[0] ^= 0x10000; /* undo the safety (for comparison) */
|
||||
ok = ok && ai[0] == 0xdb9c59bc && ye[17] == 0x33343500 &&
|
||||
!memcmp(ae, ye, sizeof(ae)) &&
|
||||
!memcmp(ai, yi, sizeof(ai));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
__set_errno(save_errno);
|
||||
if (ok)
|
||||
return retval;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Should not happen */
|
||||
_crypt_output_magic(setting, output, size);
|
||||
__set_errno(EINVAL); /* pretend we don't support this hash type */
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#if 0
|
||||
char *_crypt_gensalt_blowfish_rn(const char *prefix, unsigned long count,
|
||||
const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (size < 16 || output_size < 7 + 22 + 1 ||
|
||||
(count && (count < 4 || count > 31))) {
|
||||
(count && (count < 4 || count > 31)) ||
|
||||
prefix[0] != '$' || prefix[1] != '2' ||
|
||||
(prefix[2] != 'a' && prefix[2] != 'y')) {
|
||||
if (output_size > 0) output[0] = '\0';
|
||||
__set_errno((output_size < 7 + 22 + 1) ? ERANGE : EINVAL);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
@ -801,14 +895,15 @@ char *php_crypt_gensalt_blowfish_rn(unsigned long count,
|
||||
|
||||
output[0] = '$';
|
||||
output[1] = '2';
|
||||
output[2] = 'a';
|
||||
output[2] = prefix[2];
|
||||
output[3] = '$';
|
||||
output[4] = (char) ('0' + count / 10);
|
||||
output[4] = '0' + count / 10;
|
||||
output[5] = '0' + count % 10;
|
||||
output[6] = '$';
|
||||
|
||||
BF_encode(&output[7], (BF_word *)input, 16);
|
||||
BF_encode(&output[7], (const BF_word *)input, 16);
|
||||
output[7 + 22] = '\0';
|
||||
|
||||
return output;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
32
ext/standard/crypt_blowfish.h
Normal file
32
ext/standard/crypt_blowfish.h
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
|
||||
/* $Id$ */
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Written by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 2000-2011.
|
||||
* No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public
|
||||
* domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software
|
||||
* in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is
|
||||
* Copyright (c) 2000-2011 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the
|
||||
* general public under the following terms:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
||||
* modification, are permitted.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* See crypt_blowfish.c for more information.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef _CRYPT_BLOWFISH_H
|
||||
#define _CRYPT_BLOWFISH_H
|
||||
|
||||
#if 0
|
||||
extern int _crypt_output_magic(const char *setting, char *output, int size);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
extern char *php_crypt_blowfish_rn(const char *key, const char *setting,
|
||||
char *output, int size);
|
||||
#if 0
|
||||
extern char *_crypt_gensalt_blowfish_rn(const char *prefix,
|
||||
unsigned long count,
|
||||
const char *input, int size, char *output, int output_size);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
@ -46,9 +46,9 @@ PHPAPI char *php_crypt_r (const char *__key, const char *__salt, struct php_cryp
|
||||
|
||||
#define MD5_HASH_MAX_LEN 120
|
||||
|
||||
#include "crypt_blowfish.h"
|
||||
|
||||
extern char * php_md5_crypt_r(const char *pw, const char *salt, char *out);
|
||||
extern char * php_crypt_blowfish_rn(__CONST char *key, __CONST char *setting,
|
||||
char *output, int size);
|
||||
extern char * php_sha512_crypt_r (const char *key, const char *salt, char *buffer, int buflen);
|
||||
extern char * php_sha256_crypt_r (const char *key, const char *salt, char *buffer, int buflen);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user