openvpn/ssl_verify_polarssl.c
Adriaan de Jong be960aad88 Minor cleanup to enable warning-free Windows build:
- Changed int32_t to size_t
- Removed some unused variables
- Added missing include files
- changed ordering to ensure variable declarations are before asserts

Signed-off-by: Adriaan de Jong <dejong@fox-it.com>
Tested-by: Samuli Seppänen <samuli@openvpn.net>
Acked-by: David Sommerseth <davids@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sommerseth <davids@redhat.com>
2011-11-21 11:51:39 +01:00

426 lines
9.8 KiB
C

/*
* OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks
* over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based
* session authentication and key exchange,
* packet encryption, packet authentication, and
* packet compression.
*
* Copyright (C) 2002-2010 OpenVPN Technologies, Inc. <sales@openvpn.net>
* Copyright (C) 2010 Fox Crypto B.V. <openvpn@fox-it.com>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2
* as published by the Free Software Foundation.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program (see the file COPYING included with this
* distribution); if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
* 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
*/
/**
* @file Control Channel Verification Module PolarSSL backend
*/
#include "syshead.h"
#if defined(USE_SSL) && defined(USE_POLARSSL)
#include "ssl_verify.h"
#include <polarssl/sha1.h>
#define MAX_SUBJECT_LENGTH 256
int
verify_callback (void *session_obj, x509_cert *cert, int cert_depth,
int preverify_ok)
{
struct tls_session *session = (struct tls_session *) session_obj;
unsigned char *sha1_hash = NULL;
ASSERT (cert);
ASSERT (session);
session->verified = false;
/* Remember certificate hash */
sha1_hash = x509_get_sha1_hash(cert);
cert_hash_remember (session, cert_depth, sha1_hash);
x509_free_sha1_hash(sha1_hash);
/* did peer present cert which was signed by our root cert? */
if (!preverify_ok)
{
char subject[MAX_SUBJECT_LENGTH] = {0};
/* get the X509 name */
if (x509parse_dn_gets( subject, MAX_SUBJECT_LENGTH, &cert->subject ) < 0)
msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "VERIFY ERROR: depth=%d, could not extract X509 "
"subject string from certificate", cert_depth);
else
msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "VERIFY ERROR: depth=%d, %s", cert_depth, subject);
return 1;
}
/*
* PolarSSL expects 1 on failure, 0 on success
*/
if (SUCCESS == verify_cert(session, cert, cert_depth))
return 0;
return 1;
}
#ifdef ENABLE_X509ALTUSERNAME
# warning "X509 alt user name not yet supported for PolarSSL"
#endif
result_t
x509_get_username (char *cn, int cn_len,
char *x509_username_field, x509_cert *cert)
{
x509_name *name;
ASSERT( cn != NULL );
name = &cert->subject;
/* Find common name */
while( name != NULL )
{
if( memcmp( name->oid.p, OID_CN, OID_SIZE(OID_CN) ) == 0)
break;
name = name->next;
}
/* Not found, return an error if this is the peer's certificate */
if( name == NULL )
return FAILURE;
/* Found, extract CN */
if (cn_len > name->val.len)
memcpy( cn, name->val.p, name->val.len );
else
{
memcpy( cn, name->val.p, cn_len);
cn[cn_len-1] = '\0';
}
return SUCCESS;
}
char *
x509_get_serial (x509_cert *cert)
{
int ret = 0;
int i = 0;
char *buf = NULL;
size_t len = cert->serial.len * 3;
buf = malloc(len);
ASSERT(buf);
if(x509parse_serial_gets(buf, len-1, &cert->serial) < 0)
{
free(buf);
buf = NULL;
}
return buf;
}
void
x509_free_serial (char *serial)
{
if (serial)
free(serial);
}
unsigned char *
x509_get_sha1_hash (x509_cert *cert)
{
unsigned char *sha1_hash = malloc(SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
sha1(cert->tbs.p, cert->tbs.len, sha1_hash);
return sha1_hash;
}
void
x509_free_sha1_hash (unsigned char *hash)
{
if (hash)
free(hash);
}
char *
x509_get_subject(x509_cert *cert)
{
char tmp_subject[MAX_SUBJECT_LENGTH] = {0};
char *subject = NULL;
int ret = 0;
ret = x509parse_dn_gets( tmp_subject, MAX_SUBJECT_LENGTH-1, &cert->subject );
if (ret > 0)
{
/* Allocate the required space for the subject */
subject = malloc(ret + 1);
strncpy(subject, tmp_subject, ret+1);
}
return subject;
}
void
x509_free_subject (char *subject)
{
if (subject)
free(subject);
}
/*
* Save X509 fields to environment, using the naming convention:
*
* X509_{cert_depth}_{name}={value}
*/
void
x509_setenv (struct env_set *es, int cert_depth, x509_cert_t *cert)
{
int i;
unsigned char c;
const x509_name *name;
char s[128];
name = &cert->subject;
memset( s, 0, sizeof( s ) );
while( name != NULL )
{
char name_expand[64+8];
if( name->oid.len == 2 && memcmp( name->oid.p, OID_X520, 2 ) == 0 )
{
switch( name->oid.p[2] )
{
case X520_COMMON_NAME:
openvpn_snprintf (name_expand, sizeof(name_expand), "X509_%d_CN",
cert_depth); break;
case X520_COUNTRY:
openvpn_snprintf (name_expand, sizeof(name_expand), "X509_%d_C",
cert_depth); break;
case X520_LOCALITY:
openvpn_snprintf (name_expand, sizeof(name_expand), "X509_%d_L",
cert_depth); break;
case X520_STATE:
openvpn_snprintf (name_expand, sizeof(name_expand), "X509_%d_ST",
cert_depth); break;
case X520_ORGANIZATION:
openvpn_snprintf (name_expand, sizeof(name_expand), "X509_%d_O",
cert_depth); break;
case X520_ORG_UNIT:
openvpn_snprintf (name_expand, sizeof(name_expand), "X509_%d_OU",
cert_depth); break;
default:
openvpn_snprintf (name_expand, sizeof(name_expand),
"X509_%d_0x%02X", cert_depth, name->oid.p[2]);
break;
}
}
else if( name->oid.len == 8 && memcmp( name->oid.p, OID_PKCS9, 8 ) == 0 )
{
switch( name->oid.p[8] )
{
case PKCS9_EMAIL:
openvpn_snprintf (name_expand, sizeof(name_expand),
"X509_%d_emailAddress", cert_depth); break;
default:
openvpn_snprintf (name_expand, sizeof(name_expand),
"X509_%d_0x%02X", cert_depth, name->oid.p[8]);
break;
}
}
else
{
openvpn_snprintf (name_expand, sizeof(name_expand), "X509_%d_\?\?",
cert_depth);
}
for( i = 0; i < name->val.len; i++ )
{
if( i >= (int) sizeof( s ) - 1 )
break;
c = name->val.p[i];
if( c < 32 || c == 127 || ( c > 128 && c < 160 ) )
s[i] = '?';
else s[i] = c;
}
s[i] = '\0';
/* Check both strings, set environment variable */
string_mod (name_expand, CC_PRINT, CC_CRLF, '_');
string_mod ((char*)s, CC_PRINT, CC_CRLF, '_');
setenv_str (es, name_expand, (char*)s);
name = name->next;
}
}
result_t
x509_verify_ns_cert_type(const x509_cert *cert, const int usage)
{
if (usage == NS_CERT_CHECK_NONE)
return SUCCESS;
if (usage == NS_CERT_CHECK_CLIENT)
return ((cert->ext_types & EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE)
&& (cert->ns_cert_type & NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT)) ? SUCCESS : FAILURE;
if (usage == NS_CERT_CHECK_SERVER)
return ((cert->ext_types & EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE)
&& (cert->ns_cert_type & NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER)) ? SUCCESS : FAILURE;
return FAILURE;
}
result_t
x509_verify_cert_ku (x509_cert *cert, const unsigned * const expected_ku,
int expected_len)
{
result_t fFound = FAILURE;
if(!(cert->ext_types & EXT_KEY_USAGE))
{
msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "Certificate does not have key usage extension");
}
else
{
int i;
unsigned nku = cert->key_usage;
msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "Validating certificate key usage");
for (i=0; SUCCESS != fFound && i<expected_len; i++)
{
if (expected_ku[i] != 0)
{
msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "++ Certificate has key usage %04x, expects "
"%04x", nku, expected_ku[i]);
if (nku == expected_ku[i])
{
fFound = SUCCESS;
}
}
}
}
return fFound;
}
result_t
x509_verify_cert_eku (x509_cert *cert, const char * const expected_oid)
{
result_t fFound = FAILURE;
if (!(cert->ext_types & EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE))
{
msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "Certificate does not have extended key usage extension");
}
else
{
x509_sequence *oid_seq = &(cert->ext_key_usage);
msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "Validating certificate extended key usage");
while (oid_seq != NULL)
{
x509_buf *oid = &oid_seq->buf;
char oid_num_str[1024];
const char *oid_str;
oid_str = x509_oid_get_description(oid);
if (oid_str != NULL)
{
msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "++ Certificate has EKU (str) %s, expects %s",
oid_str, expected_oid);
if (!strcmp (expected_oid, oid_str))
{
fFound = SUCCESS;
break;
}
}
if (0 == x509_oid_get_numeric_string( oid_num_str,
sizeof (oid_num_str), oid))
{
msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "++ Certificate has EKU (oid) %s, expects %s",
oid_num_str, expected_oid);
if (!strcmp (expected_oid, oid_num_str))
{
fFound = SUCCESS;
break;
}
}
oid_seq = oid_seq->next;
}
}
return fFound;
}
result_t
x509_write_pem(FILE *peercert_file, x509_cert *peercert)
{
msg (M_WARN, "PolarSSL does not support writing peer certificate in PEM format");
return FAILURE;
}
/*
* check peer cert against CRL
*/
result_t
x509_verify_crl(const char *crl_file, x509_cert *cert, const char *subject)
{
result_t retval = FAILURE;
x509_crl crl = {0};
if (x509parse_crlfile(&crl, crl_file) != 0)
{
msg (M_ERR, "CRL: cannot read CRL from file %s", crl_file);
goto end;
}
if(cert->issuer_raw.len != crl.issuer_raw.len ||
memcmp(crl.issuer_raw.p, cert->issuer_raw.p, crl.issuer_raw.len) != 0)
{
msg (M_WARN, "CRL: CRL %s is from a different issuer than the issuer of "
"certificate %s", crl_file, subject);
retval = SUCCESS;
goto end;
}
if (0 != x509parse_revoked(cert, &crl))
{
msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "CRL CHECK FAILED: %s is REVOKED", subject);
goto end;
}
retval = SUCCESS;
msg (D_HANDSHAKE, "CRL CHECK OK: %s",subject);
end:
x509_crl_free(&crl);
return retval;
}
#endif /* #if defined(USE_SSL) && defined(USE_POLARSSL) */