Remove the support for using system() when executing external programs or scripts

This patch removes the support for the system() call, and enforces the
usage of execve() on the *nix platform and CreateProcessW() on Windows.
This is to enhance the overall security when calling external scripts.
Using system() is prone to shell expansions, which may lead to security
breaches.  Which is also why the execve() approach has been the default
since commit a828135275 which
re-introduced the system() in Nov. 2008.

After having asked on the mailing list and checked around on the IRC
channels, the genereal consensus is that very few uses system() these
days.

The only annoyance I've been made aware of is that this will now
require adding a full path to the script interpreter together with the
script, and not just put in the script name alone.  But to just use the
script name in Windows, you had to configure --script-security with the
'system' flag earlier too.  So my conclusion is that it's better to add
a full path to the script interpreter in Windows and raise the overal
security with OpenVPN, than to continue to have a possible potentially
risky OpenVPN configuration just to make life "easier" for Windows
script users.

Removal of the system() call, also solves a nasty bug related to the
usage of putenv() on the *nix platforms.

For more information please see:
http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.network.openvpn.devel/7090
https://community.openvpn.net/openvpn/ticket/228

Trac-ticket: 228
Signed-off-by: David Sommerseth <davids@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Message-Id: <1351539352-17371-1-git-send-email-dazo@users.sourceforge.net>
URL: http://article.gmane.org/gmane.network.openvpn.devel/7114
(cherry picked from commit 0563473601)
This commit is contained in:
David Sommerseth 2012-10-25 14:22:30 +02:00
parent d442b8dbc4
commit 3cb9f1a62b
8 changed files with 84 additions and 234 deletions

View File

@ -1886,7 +1886,7 @@ is a safety precaution to prevent a LD_PRELOAD style attack
from a malicious or compromised server.
.\"*********************************************************
.TP
.B \-\-script-security level [method]
.B \-\-script-security level
This directive offers policy-level control over OpenVPN's usage of external programs
and scripts. Lower
.B level
@ -1905,24 +1905,40 @@ Allow calling of built-in executables and user-defined scripts.
.B 3 \-\-
Allow passwords to be passed to scripts via environmental variables (potentially unsafe).
The
OpenVPN releases before v2.3 also supported a
.B method
parameter indicates how OpenVPN should call external commands and scripts.
Settings for
.B method:
flag which indicated how OpenVPN should call external commands and scripts. This
could be either
.B execve
or
.B system.
As of OpenVPN v2.3, this flag is no longer accepted. In most *nix environments the execve()
approach has been used without any issues.
.B execve \-\-
(default) Use execve() function on Unix family OSes and CreateProcess() on Windows.
.br
.B system \-\-
Use system() function (deprecated and less safe since the external program command
line is subject to shell expansion).
To run scripts in Windows in earlier OpenVPN
versions you needed to either add a full path to the script interpreter which can parse the
script or use the
.B system
flag to run these scripts. As of OpenVPN v2.3 it is now a strict requirement to have
full path to the script interpreter when running non-executables files.
This is not needed for executable files, such as .exe, .com, .bat or .cmd files. For
example, if you have a Visual Basic script, you must use this syntax now:
The
.B \-\-script-security
option was introduced in OpenVPN 2.1_rc9. For configuration file compatibility
with previous OpenVPN versions, use:
.B \-\-script-security 3 system
.nf
.ft 3
.in +4
\-\-up 'C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\wscript.exe C:\\\\Program\\ Files\\\\OpenVPN\\\\config\\\\my-up-script.vbs'
.in -4
.ft
.fi
Please note the single quote marks and the escaping of the backslashes (\\) and
the space character.
The reason the support for the
.B system
flag was removed is due to the security implications with shell expansions
when executing scripts via the system() call.
.\"*********************************************************
.TP
.B \-\-disable-occ

View File

@ -2487,9 +2487,6 @@ do_option_warnings (struct context *c)
msg (M_WARN, "WARNING: the current --script-security setting may allow passwords to be passed to scripts via environmental variables");
else
msg (M_WARN, "NOTE: " PACKAGE_NAME " 2.1 requires '--script-security 2' or higher to call user-defined scripts or executables");
if (script_method == SM_SYSTEM)
msg (M_WARN, "NOTE: --script-security method='system' is deprecated due to the fact that passed parameters will be subject to shell expansion");
}
static void

View File

@ -53,9 +53,6 @@ const char *iproute_path = IPROUTE_PATH; /* GLOBAL */
/* contains an SSEC_x value defined in misc.h */
int script_security = SSEC_BUILT_IN; /* GLOBAL */
/* contains SM_x value defined in misc.h */
int script_method = SM_EXECVE; /* GLOBAL */
/*
* Pass tunnel endpoint and MTU parms to a user-supplied script.
* Used to execute the up/down script/plugins.
@ -303,36 +300,25 @@ openvpn_execve (const struct argv *a, const struct env_set *es, const unsigned i
#if defined(ENABLE_FEATURE_EXECVE)
if (openvpn_execve_allowed (flags))
{
if (script_method == SM_EXECVE)
{
const char *cmd = a->argv[0];
char *const *argv = a->argv;
char *const *envp = (char *const *)make_env_array (es, true, &gc);
pid_t pid;
const char *cmd = a->argv[0];
char *const *argv = a->argv;
char *const *envp = (char *const *)make_env_array (es, true, &gc);
pid_t pid;
pid = fork ();
if (pid == (pid_t)0) /* child side */
{
execve (cmd, argv, envp);
exit (127);
}
else if (pid < (pid_t)0) /* fork failed */
msg (M_ERR, "openvpn_execve: unable to fork");
else /* parent side */
{
if (waitpid (pid, &ret, 0) != pid)
ret = -1;
}
}
else if (script_method == SM_SYSTEM)
{
ret = openvpn_system (argv_system_str (a), es, flags);
}
else
{
ASSERT (0);
}
}
pid = fork ();
if (pid == (pid_t)0) /* child side */
{
execve (cmd, argv, envp);
exit (127);
}
else if (pid < (pid_t)0) /* fork failed */
msg (M_ERR, "openvpn_execve: unable to fork");
else /* parent side */
{
if (waitpid (pid, &ret, 0) != pid)
ret = -1;
}
}
else if (!warn_shown && (script_security < SSEC_SCRIPTS))
{
msg (M_WARN, SCRIPT_SECURITY_WARNING);
@ -352,52 +338,6 @@ openvpn_execve (const struct argv *a, const struct env_set *es, const unsigned i
}
#endif
/*
* Wrapper around the system() call.
*/
int
openvpn_system (const char *command, const struct env_set *es, unsigned int flags)
{
#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEM
int ret;
perf_push (PERF_SCRIPT);
/*
* add env_set to environment.
*/
if (flags & S_SCRIPT)
env_set_add_to_environment (es);
/* debugging */
dmsg (D_SCRIPT, "SYSTEM[%u] '%s'", flags, command);
if (flags & S_SCRIPT)
env_set_print (D_SCRIPT, es);
/*
* execute the command
*/
ret = platform_system(command);
/* debugging */
dmsg (D_SCRIPT, "SYSTEM return=%u", ret);
/*
* remove env_set from environment
*/
if (flags & S_SCRIPT)
env_set_remove_from_environment (es);
perf_pop ();
return ret;
#else
msg (M_FATAL, "Sorry but I can't execute the shell command '%s' because this operating system doesn't appear to support the system() call", command);
return -1; /* NOTREACHED */
#endif
}
/*
* Run execve() inside a fork(), duping stdout. Designed to replicate the semantics of popen() but
* in a safer way that doesn't require the invocation of a shell or the risks

View File

@ -96,7 +96,6 @@ int openvpn_popen (const struct argv *a, const struct env_set *es);
int openvpn_execve (const struct argv *a, const struct env_set *es, const unsigned int flags);
bool openvpn_execve_check (const struct argv *a, const struct env_set *es, const unsigned int flags, const char *error_message);
bool openvpn_execve_allowed (const unsigned int flags);
int openvpn_system (const char *command, const struct env_set *es, unsigned int flags);
static inline bool
openvpn_run_script (const struct argv *a, const struct env_set *es, const unsigned int flags, const char *hook)
@ -322,10 +321,6 @@ extern const char *iproute_path;
#define SSEC_PW_ENV 3 /* allow calling of built-in programs and user-defined scripts that may receive a password as an environmental variable */
extern int script_security; /* GLOBAL */
#define SM_EXECVE 0 /* call external programs with execve() or CreateProcess() */
#define SM_SYSTEM 1 /* call external programs with system() */
extern int script_method; /* GLOBAL */
/* return the next largest power of 2 */
size_t adjust_power_of_2 (size_t u);

View File

@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ static const char usage_message[] =
"--setenv name value : Set a custom environmental variable to pass to script.\n"
"--setenv FORWARD_COMPATIBLE 1 : Relax config file syntax checking to allow\n"
" directives for future OpenVPN versions to be ignored.\n"
"--script-security level mode : mode='execve' (default) or 'system', level=\n"
"--script-security level: Where level can be:\n"
" 0 -- strictly no calling of external programs\n"
" 1 -- (default) only call built-ins such as ifconfig\n"
" 2 -- allow calling of built-ins and scripts\n"
@ -5293,20 +5293,6 @@ add_option (struct options *options,
{
VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL);
script_security = atoi (p[1]);
if (p[2])
{
if (streq (p[2], "execve"))
script_method = SM_EXECVE;
else if (streq (p[2], "system"))
script_method = SM_SYSTEM;
else
{
msg (msglevel, "unknown --script-security method: %s", p[2]);
goto err;
}
}
else
script_method = SM_EXECVE;
}
else if (streq (p[0], "mssfix"))
{

View File

@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ platform_chdir (const char* dir)
}
/*
* convert system() return into a success/failure value
* convert execve() return into a success/failure value
*/
bool
platform_system_ok (int stat)
@ -217,19 +217,6 @@ platform_system_ok (int stat)
#endif
}
/*
* did system() call execute the given command?
*/
bool
platform_system_executed (int stat)
{
#ifdef WIN32
return stat != -1;
#else
return stat != -1 && WEXITSTATUS (stat) != 127;
#endif
}
int
platform_access (const char *path, int mode)
{
@ -288,18 +275,6 @@ platform_unlink (const char *filename)
#endif
}
int platform_system(const char *command) {
int ret;
#ifdef WIN32
struct gc_arena gc = gc_new ();
ret = _wsystem (wide_string (command, &gc));
gc_free (&gc);
#else
ret = system (command);
#endif
return ret;
}
int platform_putenv(char *string)
{
int status;

View File

@ -113,10 +113,8 @@ void platform_mlockall (bool print_msg); /* Disable paging */
int platform_chdir (const char* dir);
/* interpret the status code returned by system()/execve() */
/* interpret the status code returned by execve() */
bool platform_system_ok (int stat);
bool platform_system_executed (int stat);
int platform_system(const char *command);
int platform_access (const char *path, int mode);

View File

@ -82,51 +82,6 @@ struct semaphore netcmd_semaphore; /* GLOBAL */
*/
static char *win_sys_path = NULL; /* GLOBAL */
/*
* Configure PATH. On Windows, sometimes PATH is not set correctly
* by default.
*/
static void
configure_win_path (void)
{
static bool done = false; /* GLOBAL */
if (!done)
{
FILE *fp;
fp = fopen ("c:\\windows\\system32\\route.exe", "rb");
if (fp)
{
const int bufsiz = 4096;
struct gc_arena gc = gc_new ();
struct buffer oldpath = alloc_buf_gc (bufsiz, &gc);
struct buffer newpath = alloc_buf_gc (bufsiz, &gc);
const char* delim = ";";
DWORD status;
fclose (fp);
status = GetEnvironmentVariable ("PATH", BPTR(&oldpath), (DWORD)BCAP(&oldpath));
#if 0
status = 0;
#endif
if (!status)
{
*BPTR(&oldpath) = '\0';
delim = "";
}
buf_printf (&newpath, "C:\\WINDOWS\\System32;C:\\WINDOWS;C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\Wbem%s%s",
delim,
BSTR(&oldpath));
SetEnvironmentVariable ("PATH", BSTR(&newpath));
#if 0
status = GetEnvironmentVariable ("PATH", BPTR(&oldpath), (DWORD)BCAP(&oldpath));
if (status > 0)
printf ("PATH: %s\n", BSTR(&oldpath));
#endif
gc_free (&gc);
done = true;
}
}
}
void
init_win32 (void)
{
@ -907,53 +862,41 @@ openvpn_execve (const struct argv *a, const struct env_set *es, const unsigned i
{
if (openvpn_execve_allowed (flags))
{
if (script_method == SM_EXECVE)
{
struct gc_arena gc = gc_new ();
STARTUPINFOW start_info;
PROCESS_INFORMATION proc_info;
struct gc_arena gc = gc_new ();
STARTUPINFOW start_info;
PROCESS_INFORMATION proc_info;
char *env = env_block (es);
WCHAR *cl = wide_cmd_line (a, &gc);
WCHAR *cmd = wide_string (a->argv[0], &gc);
char *env = env_block (es);
WCHAR *cl = wide_cmd_line (a, &gc);
WCHAR *cmd = wide_string (a->argv[0], &gc);
CLEAR (start_info);
CLEAR (proc_info);
CLEAR (start_info);
CLEAR (proc_info);
/* fill in STARTUPINFO struct */
GetStartupInfoW(&start_info);
start_info.cb = sizeof(start_info);
start_info.dwFlags = STARTF_USESHOWWINDOW;
start_info.wShowWindow = SW_HIDE;
/* fill in STARTUPINFO struct */
GetStartupInfoW(&start_info);
start_info.cb = sizeof(start_info);
start_info.dwFlags = STARTF_USESHOWWINDOW;
start_info.wShowWindow = SW_HIDE;
if (CreateProcessW (cmd, cl, NULL, NULL, FALSE, 0, env, NULL, &start_info, &proc_info))
{
DWORD exit_status = 0;
CloseHandle (proc_info.hThread);
WaitForSingleObject (proc_info.hProcess, INFINITE);
if (GetExitCodeProcess (proc_info.hProcess, &exit_status))
ret = (int)exit_status;
else
msg (M_WARN|M_ERRNO, "openvpn_execve: GetExitCodeProcess %S failed", cmd);
CloseHandle (proc_info.hProcess);
}
else
{
msg (M_WARN|M_ERRNO, "openvpn_execve: CreateProcess %S failed", cmd);
}
free (env);
gc_free (&gc);
}
else if (script_method == SM_SYSTEM)
{
configure_win_path ();
ret = openvpn_system (argv_system_str (a), es, flags);
}
else
{
ASSERT (0);
}
}
if (CreateProcessW (cmd, cl, NULL, NULL, FALSE, 0, env, NULL, &start_info, &proc_info))
{
DWORD exit_status = 0;
CloseHandle (proc_info.hThread);
WaitForSingleObject (proc_info.hProcess, INFINITE);
if (GetExitCodeProcess (proc_info.hProcess, &exit_status))
ret = (int)exit_status;
else
msg (M_WARN|M_ERRNO, "openvpn_execve: GetExitCodeProcess %S failed", cmd);
CloseHandle (proc_info.hProcess);
}
else
{
msg (M_WARN|M_ERRNO, "openvpn_execve: CreateProcess %S failed", cmd);
}
free (env);
gc_free (&gc);
}
else if (!exec_warn && (script_security < SSEC_SCRIPTS))
{
msg (M_WARN, SCRIPT_SECURITY_WARNING);