mirror of
https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git
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ea26226046
Submitted by: Douglas Stebila <douglas.stebila@sun.com> (Authors: Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta, Sun Microsystems Laboratories)
2510 lines
62 KiB
C
2510 lines
62 KiB
C
/* ssl/s3_srvr.c */
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
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*
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* Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
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* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
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*
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* The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
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* license provided above.
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*
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* In addition, Sun covenants to all licensees who provide a reciprocal
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* covenant with respect to their own patents if any, not to sue under
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* current and future patent claims necessarily infringed by the making,
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* using, practicing, selling, offering for sale and/or otherwise
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* disposing of the Contribution as delivered hereunder
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* (or portions thereof), provided that such covenant shall not apply:
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* 1) for code that a licensee deletes from the Contribution;
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* 2) separates from the Contribution; or
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* 3) for infringements caused by:
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* i) the modification of the Contribution or
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* ii) the combination of the Contribution with other software or
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* devices where such combination causes the infringement.
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*
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* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
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* Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
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*
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*/
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#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
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#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "ssl_locl.h"
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#include "kssl_lcl.h"
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#include <openssl/buffer.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include <openssl/objects.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
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#include <openssl/md5.h>
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#include "cryptlib.h"
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static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
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static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s);
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static int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s);
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static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s);
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static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s);
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static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s);
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static int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s);
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static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s);
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static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s);
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static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s);
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static int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s);
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
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static int nid2curve_id(int nid);
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#endif
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static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
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{
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if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
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return(SSLv3_server_method());
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else
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return(NULL);
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}
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SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_server_method(void)
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{
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static int init=1;
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static SSL_METHOD SSLv3_server_data;
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if (init)
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{
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memcpy((char *)&SSLv3_server_data,(char *)sslv3_base_method(),
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sizeof(SSL_METHOD));
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SSLv3_server_data.ssl_accept=ssl3_accept;
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SSLv3_server_data.get_ssl_method=ssl3_get_server_method;
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init=0;
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}
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return(&SSLv3_server_data);
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}
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int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
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{
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BUF_MEM *buf;
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unsigned long l,Time=time(NULL);
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void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
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long num1;
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int ret= -1;
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int new_state,state,skip=0;
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RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
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ERR_clear_error();
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clear_sys_error();
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if (s->info_callback != NULL)
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cb=s->info_callback;
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else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
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cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
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/* init things to blank */
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s->in_handshake++;
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if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
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if (s->cert == NULL)
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{
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
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return(-1);
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}
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for (;;)
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{
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state=s->state;
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switch (s->state)
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{
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case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
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s->new_session=1;
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/* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
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case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
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case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
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case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
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case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
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s->server=1;
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if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
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if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
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{
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return -1;
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}
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s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
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if (s->init_buf == NULL)
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{
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if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
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{
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ret= -1;
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goto end;
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}
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if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
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{
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ret= -1;
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goto end;
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}
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s->init_buf=buf;
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}
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if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
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{
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ret= -1;
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goto end;
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}
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s->init_num=0;
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if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
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{
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/* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
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* the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
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*/
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if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
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ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
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s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
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s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
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}
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else
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{
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/* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
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* we will just send a HelloRequest */
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s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
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s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
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}
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break;
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case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
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case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
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s->shutdown=0;
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ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
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if (ret <= 0) goto end;
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s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
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s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
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s->init_num=0;
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ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
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break;
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case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
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s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
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break;
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case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
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case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
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case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
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s->shutdown=0;
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ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
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if (ret <= 0) goto end;
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s->new_session = 2;
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s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
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s->init_num=0;
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break;
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case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
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case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
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ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
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if (ret <= 0) goto end;
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if (s->hit)
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s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
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else
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s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
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s->init_num=0;
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break;
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case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
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case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
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/* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH */
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if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
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{
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ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
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if (ret <= 0) goto end;
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}
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else
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skip=1;
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s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
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s->init_num=0;
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break;
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case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
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case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
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l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
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|
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/* clear this, it may get reset by
|
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* send_server_key_exchange */
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if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
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&& !(l & SSL_KRB5)
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#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
|
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)
|
|
/* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
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* even when forbidden by protocol specs
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* (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
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* be able to handle this) */
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s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
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else
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s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
|
|
* RSA but we have a sign only certificate
|
|
*
|
|
* For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
|
|
* message only if the cipher suite is either
|
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* ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
|
|
* server certificate contains the server's
|
|
* public key for key exchange.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
|
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|| (l & SSL_kECDHE)
|
|
|| (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))
|
|
|| ((l & SSL_kRSA)
|
|
&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
|
|
|| (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
|
|
&& EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
|
|
)
|
|
)
|
|
)
|
|
)
|
|
{
|
|
ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
skip=1;
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
|
|
if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
|
|
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
|
|
/* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
|
|
* don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
|
|
((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
|
|
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
|
|
/* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
|
|
* (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
|
|
* and in RFC 2246): */
|
|
((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&
|
|
/* ... except when the application insists on verification
|
|
* (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
|
|
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
|
|
/* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
|
|
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
|
|
{
|
|
/* no cert request */
|
|
skip=1;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
|
|
ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
|
|
#else
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
|
|
#endif
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
|
|
ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
|
|
/* number of bytes to be flushed */
|
|
num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
|
|
if (num1 > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
|
|
num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
|
|
if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
|
|
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
|
|
/* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
|
|
ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
if (ret == 2)
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
|
|
else {
|
|
/* could be sent for a DH cert, even if we
|
|
* have not asked for it :-) */
|
|
ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
|
|
ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
if (ret == 2)
|
|
{
|
|
/* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
|
|
* the client sends its ECDH pub key in
|
|
* a certificate, the CertificateVerify
|
|
* message is not sent.
|
|
*/
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
|
|
s->init_num = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
|
|
/* We need to get hashes here so if there is
|
|
* a client cert, it can be verified
|
|
*/
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
|
|
&(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
|
|
&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
|
|
&(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
|
|
&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
|
|
|
|
/* we should decide if we expected this one */
|
|
ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
|
|
ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
|
|
SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
if (s->hit)
|
|
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
|
|
else
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
|
|
|
|
s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
|
|
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
|
|
{ ret= -1; goto end; }
|
|
|
|
ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
|
|
SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
|
|
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
|
|
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
|
|
{
|
|
ret= -1;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
|
|
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
|
|
ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
|
|
SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
|
|
if (s->hit)
|
|
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
|
|
else
|
|
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_ST_OK:
|
|
/* clean a few things up */
|
|
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
|
|
|
|
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
|
|
s->init_buf=NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* remove buffering on output */
|
|
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
|
|
if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
|
|
{
|
|
/* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
|
|
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
|
|
|
|
s->new_session=0;
|
|
|
|
ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
|
|
|
|
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
|
|
/* s->server=1; */
|
|
s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
|
|
|
|
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
/* break; */
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
|
|
ret= -1;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
/* break; */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->debug)
|
|
{
|
|
if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
|
|
{
|
|
new_state=s->state;
|
|
s->state=state;
|
|
cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
|
|
s->state=new_state;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
skip=0;
|
|
}
|
|
end:
|
|
/* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
|
|
|
|
s->in_handshake--;
|
|
if (cb != NULL)
|
|
cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
|
|
return(ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
|
|
{
|
|
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
*(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
|
|
*(p++)=0;
|
|
*(p++)=0;
|
|
*(p++)=0;
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
|
|
/* number of bytes to write */
|
|
s->init_num=4;
|
|
s->init_off=0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
|
|
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int ok;
|
|
long n;
|
|
|
|
/* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
|
|
* so permit appropriate message length */
|
|
n=ssl3_get_message(s,
|
|
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
|
|
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
|
|
-1,
|
|
s->max_cert_list,
|
|
&ok);
|
|
if (!ok) return((int)n);
|
|
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
|
|
* which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
|
|
* I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
|
|
* when a handshake is not completed ... */
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
|
|
s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
return 2;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
|
|
long n;
|
|
unsigned long id;
|
|
unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
|
|
SSL_CIPHER *c;
|
|
SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
|
|
* If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
|
|
* This down switching should be handled by a different method.
|
|
* If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
|
|
* TLSv1.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
|
|
{
|
|
s->first_packet=1;
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
|
|
}
|
|
n=ssl3_get_message(s,
|
|
SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
|
|
SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
|
|
SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
|
|
SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
|
|
&ok);
|
|
|
|
if (!ok) return((int)n);
|
|
d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
|
|
|
/* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
|
|
* (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
|
|
s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
|
|
p+=2;
|
|
|
|
if (s->client_version < s->version)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
|
|
if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
|
|
{
|
|
/* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
|
|
s->version = s->client_version;
|
|
}
|
|
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* load the client random */
|
|
memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
/* get the session-id */
|
|
j= *(p++);
|
|
|
|
s->hit=0;
|
|
/* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
|
|
* (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
|
|
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
|
|
* Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
|
|
* but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
|
|
* might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
|
|
* an earlier library version)
|
|
*/
|
|
if (j == 0 || (s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
|
|
{
|
|
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
i=ssl_get_prev_session(s,p,j);
|
|
if (i == 1)
|
|
{ /* previous session */
|
|
s->hit=1;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (i == -1)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
else /* i == 0 */
|
|
{
|
|
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p+=j;
|
|
n2s(p,i);
|
|
if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
|
|
{
|
|
/* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
|
|
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
|
|
{
|
|
/* not enough data */
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
|
|
== NULL))
|
|
{
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
p+=i;
|
|
|
|
/* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
|
|
if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
|
|
{
|
|
j=0;
|
|
id=s->session->cipher->id;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
|
|
printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
|
|
#endif
|
|
for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
|
|
{
|
|
c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
|
|
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
|
|
printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
|
|
i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (c->id == id)
|
|
{
|
|
j=1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (j == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
|
|
{
|
|
/* Very bad for multi-threading.... */
|
|
s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,
|
|
0);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
|
|
* list if we are asked to reuse it */
|
|
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* compression */
|
|
i= *(p++);
|
|
if ((p+i) > (d+n))
|
|
{
|
|
/* not enough data */
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
q=p;
|
|
for (j=0; j<i; j++)
|
|
{
|
|
if (p[j] == 0) break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p+=i;
|
|
if (j >= i)
|
|
{
|
|
/* no compress */
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
|
|
* options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
|
|
* algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
|
|
if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL)
|
|
{ /* See if we have a match */
|
|
int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
|
|
|
|
nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
|
|
for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
|
|
{
|
|
comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
|
|
v=comp->id;
|
|
for (o=0; o<i; o++)
|
|
{
|
|
if (v == q[o])
|
|
{
|
|
done=1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (done) break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (done)
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
|
|
else
|
|
comp=NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */
|
|
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
|
|
{
|
|
if (p < (d+n))
|
|
{
|
|
/* wrong number of bytes,
|
|
* there could be more to follow */
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
|
|
* pick a cipher */
|
|
|
|
if (!s->hit)
|
|
{
|
|
s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
|
|
if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
|
|
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
|
|
s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
|
|
if (ciphers == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
ciphers=NULL;
|
|
c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
|
|
SSL_get_ciphers(s));
|
|
|
|
if (c == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* Session-id reuse */
|
|
#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
|
|
SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
|
|
SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
|
|
{
|
|
sk=s->session->ciphers;
|
|
for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
|
|
{
|
|
c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
|
|
if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL)
|
|
nc=c;
|
|
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
|
|
ec=c;
|
|
}
|
|
if (nc != NULL)
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
|
|
else if (ec != NULL)
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
|
|
else
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* we now have the following setup.
|
|
* client_random
|
|
* cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
|
|
* ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
|
|
* compression - basically ignored right now
|
|
* ssl version is set - sslv3
|
|
* s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
|
|
* s->hit - session reuse flag
|
|
* s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ret=1;
|
|
if (0)
|
|
{
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
|
}
|
|
err:
|
|
if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
|
|
return(ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *buf;
|
|
unsigned char *p,*d;
|
|
int i,sl;
|
|
unsigned long l,Time;
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
|
|
{
|
|
buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
p=s->s3->server_random;
|
|
Time=time(NULL); /* Time */
|
|
l2n(Time,p);
|
|
RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-sizeof(Time));
|
|
/* Do the message type and length last */
|
|
d=p= &(buf[4]);
|
|
|
|
*(p++)=s->version>>8;
|
|
*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
|
|
|
|
/* Random stuff */
|
|
memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
/* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
|
|
* session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
|
|
* old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
|
|
* back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
|
|
* session-id if we want it to be single use.
|
|
* Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
|
|
* 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER))
|
|
s->session->session_id_length=0;
|
|
|
|
sl=s->session->session_id_length;
|
|
if (sl > sizeof s->session->session_id)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
*(p++)=sl;
|
|
memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
|
|
p+=sl;
|
|
|
|
/* put the cipher */
|
|
i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
|
|
p+=i;
|
|
|
|
/* put the compression method */
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
|
|
*(p++)=0;
|
|
else
|
|
*(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
|
|
|
|
/* do the header */
|
|
l=(p-d);
|
|
d=buf;
|
|
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
|
|
l2n3(l,d);
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
|
|
/* number of bytes to write */
|
|
s->init_num=p-buf;
|
|
s->init_off=0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
|
|
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
|
|
{
|
|
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
|
|
/* do the header */
|
|
*(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
|
|
*(p++)=0;
|
|
*(p++)=0;
|
|
*(p++)=0;
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
|
|
/* number of bytes to write */
|
|
s->init_num=4;
|
|
s->init_off=0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
|
|
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
unsigned char *q;
|
|
int j,num;
|
|
RSA *rsa;
|
|
unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
|
|
unsigned int u;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
|
|
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
|
|
int encodedlen = 0;
|
|
int curve_id = 0;
|
|
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
|
|
unsigned char *p,*d;
|
|
int al,i;
|
|
unsigned long type;
|
|
int n;
|
|
CERT *cert;
|
|
BIGNUM *r[4];
|
|
int nr[4],kn;
|
|
BUF_MEM *buf;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
|
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
|
|
{
|
|
type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK;
|
|
cert=s->cert;
|
|
|
|
buf=s->init_buf;
|
|
|
|
r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
|
|
n=0;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
if (type & SSL_kRSA)
|
|
{
|
|
rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
|
|
if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
|
|
{
|
|
rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
|
|
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
|
|
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
|
|
if(rsa == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
RSA_up_ref(rsa);
|
|
cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
|
|
}
|
|
if (rsa == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
r[0]=rsa->n;
|
|
r[1]=rsa->e;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
if (type & SSL_kEDH)
|
|
{
|
|
dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
|
|
if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
|
|
dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
|
|
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
|
|
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
|
|
if (dhp == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
DH_free(dh);
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
|
|
if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
|
|
dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
|
|
(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
|
|
{
|
|
if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
|
|
dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
|
|
if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
|
|
(dh->priv_key == NULL))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
r[0]=dh->p;
|
|
r[1]=dh->g;
|
|
r[2]=dh->pub_key;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
|
|
{
|
|
ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
|
|
if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
|
|
{
|
|
ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
|
|
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
|
|
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
|
|
}
|
|
if (ecdhp == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
|
|
if (ecdhp == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
ecdh = ecdhp;
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
|
|
if ((ecdh->pub_key == NULL) ||
|
|
(ecdh->priv_key == NULL) ||
|
|
(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
|
|
{
|
|
if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((ecdh->group == NULL) ||
|
|
(ecdh->pub_key == NULL) ||
|
|
(ecdh->priv_key == NULL))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
|
|
(EC_GROUP_get_degree(ecdh->group) > 163))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
|
|
* keys over named (not generic) curves. For
|
|
* supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((curve_id =
|
|
nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_nid(ecdh->group)))
|
|
== 0)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Encode the public key.
|
|
* First check the size of encoding and
|
|
* allocate memory accordingly.
|
|
*/
|
|
encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(ecdh->group,
|
|
ecdh->pub_key,
|
|
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
|
|
NULL, 0, NULL);
|
|
|
|
encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
|
|
OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
|
|
bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
|
|
if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(ecdh->group,
|
|
ecdh->pub_key,
|
|
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
|
|
encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (encodedlen == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
|
|
* generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
|
|
* In this situation, we need three additional bytes
|
|
* to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
|
|
* structure.
|
|
*/
|
|
n = 3 + encodedlen;
|
|
|
|
/* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
|
|
* explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
|
|
*/
|
|
r[0]=NULL;
|
|
r[1]=NULL;
|
|
r[2]=NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
|
|
n+=2+nr[i];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
|
|
{
|
|
if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
|
|
== NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
pkey=NULL;
|
|
kn=0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,n+4+kn))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
p= &(d[4]);
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
s2n(nr[i],p);
|
|
BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
|
|
p+=nr[i];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
|
|
{
|
|
/* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
|
|
* In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
|
|
* [1 byte CurveType], [1 byte CurveName]
|
|
* [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
|
|
* the actual encoded point itself
|
|
*/
|
|
*p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
|
|
p += 1;
|
|
*p = curve_id;
|
|
p += 1;
|
|
*p = encodedlen;
|
|
p += 1;
|
|
memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
|
|
(unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
|
|
encodedlen);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
|
|
p += encodedlen;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* not anonymous */
|
|
if (pkey != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
/* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
|
|
* and p points to the space at the end. */
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
|
|
{
|
|
q=md_buf;
|
|
j=0;
|
|
for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
|
|
{
|
|
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
|
|
?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
|
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
|
|
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
|
|
(unsigned int *)&i);
|
|
q+=i;
|
|
j+=i;
|
|
}
|
|
if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
|
|
&(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
s2n(u,p);
|
|
n+=u+2;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
|
|
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
|
|
{
|
|
/* lets do DSS */
|
|
EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
|
|
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
|
|
if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
|
|
(unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
s2n(i,p);
|
|
n+=i+2;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
|
|
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_ECDSA)
|
|
{
|
|
/* let's do ECDSA */
|
|
EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
|
|
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
|
|
if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
|
|
(unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
s2n(i,p);
|
|
n+=i+2;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
{
|
|
/* Is this error check actually needed? */
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
|
|
l2n3(n,d);
|
|
|
|
/* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
|
|
* it off */
|
|
s->init_num=n+4;
|
|
s->init_off=0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
|
|
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
|
err:
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
|
|
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
|
#endif
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
|
|
return(-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *p,*d;
|
|
int i,j,nl,off,n;
|
|
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
|
|
X509_NAME *name;
|
|
BUF_MEM *buf;
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
|
|
{
|
|
buf=s->init_buf;
|
|
|
|
d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
|
|
|
|
/* get the list of acceptable cert types */
|
|
p++;
|
|
n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
|
|
d[0]=n;
|
|
p+=n;
|
|
n++;
|
|
|
|
off=n;
|
|
p+=2;
|
|
n+=2;
|
|
|
|
sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
|
|
nl=0;
|
|
if (sk != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
|
|
{
|
|
name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
|
|
j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
|
|
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,4+n+j+2))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
|
|
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
|
|
{
|
|
s2n(j,p);
|
|
i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
|
|
n+=2+j;
|
|
nl+=2+j;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
d=p;
|
|
i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
|
|
j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
|
|
n+=j;
|
|
nl+=j;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* else no CA names */
|
|
p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
|
|
s2n(nl,p);
|
|
|
|
d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
|
|
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
|
|
l2n3(n,d);
|
|
|
|
/* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
|
|
* it off */
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=n+4;
|
|
s->init_off=0;
|
|
#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
|
|
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
|
|
|
|
/* do the header */
|
|
*(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
|
|
*(p++)=0;
|
|
*(p++)=0;
|
|
*(p++)=0;
|
|
s->init_num += 4;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
|
|
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
err:
|
|
return(-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int i,al,ok;
|
|
long n;
|
|
unsigned long l;
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
RSA *rsa=NULL;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
|
|
DH *dh_srvr;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
|
|
KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
|
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
|
|
EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
|
|
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
n=ssl3_get_message(s,
|
|
SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
|
|
SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
|
|
SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
2048, /* ??? */
|
|
&ok);
|
|
|
|
if (!ok) return((int)n);
|
|
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
|
|
|
l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
if (l & SSL_kRSA)
|
|
{
|
|
/* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
|
|
{
|
|
if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
|
|
rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
|
|
/* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
|
|
* be sent already */
|
|
if (rsa == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
|
|
if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
|
|
(pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
|
|
(pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* TLS */
|
|
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
|
|
{
|
|
n2s(p,i);
|
|
if (n != i+2)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
p-=2;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
n=i;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
|
|
|
|
al = -1;
|
|
|
|
if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
|
|
{
|
|
/* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
|
|
* ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
|
|
* protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
|
|
* However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
|
|
* version instead if the server does not support the requested
|
|
* protocol version.
|
|
* If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
|
|
if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
|
|
(p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (al != -1)
|
|
{
|
|
#if 0
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
#else
|
|
/* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
|
|
* against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
|
|
* (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1).
|
|
* But note that due to length and protocol version checking, the
|
|
* attack is impractical anyway (see section 5 in D. Bleichenbacher:
|
|
* "Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA
|
|
* Encryption Standard PKCS #1", CRYPTO '98, LNCS 1462, pp. 1-12).
|
|
*/
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
|
|
p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
|
|
p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
|
|
RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2); /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->session->master_key_length=
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
|
s->session->master_key,
|
|
p,i);
|
|
memset(p,0,i);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
|
|
{
|
|
n2s(p,i);
|
|
if (n != i+2)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
p-=2;
|
|
i=(int)n;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
|
|
if (pub == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
|
|
|
|
if (i <= 0)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
|
|
s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
|
|
|
|
BN_clear_free(pub);
|
|
pub=NULL;
|
|
s->session->master_key_length=
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
|
s->session->master_key,p,i);
|
|
memset(p,0,i);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
|
|
if (l & SSL_kKRB5)
|
|
{
|
|
krb5_error_code krb5rc;
|
|
krb5_data enc_ticket;
|
|
krb5_data authenticator;
|
|
krb5_data enc_pms;
|
|
KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
|
|
EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
|
|
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
|
|
unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
|
|
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
|
|
int padl, outl;
|
|
krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
|
|
krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
|
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
|
|
|
|
n2s(p,i);
|
|
enc_ticket.length = i;
|
|
enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
|
|
p+=enc_ticket.length;
|
|
|
|
n2s(p,i);
|
|
authenticator.length = i;
|
|
authenticator.data = (char *)p;
|
|
p+=authenticator.length;
|
|
|
|
n2s(p,i);
|
|
enc_pms.length = i;
|
|
enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
|
|
p+=enc_pms.length;
|
|
|
|
/* Note that the length is checked again below,
|
|
** after decryption
|
|
*/
|
|
if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (n != enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
|
|
enc_pms.length + 6)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
|
|
&kssl_err)) != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
|
printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
|
|
krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
|
|
if (kssl_err.text)
|
|
printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
|
|
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
kssl_err.reason);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
|
|
** but will return authtime == 0.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
|
|
&authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
|
printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
|
|
krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
|
|
if (kssl_err.text)
|
|
printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
|
|
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
kssl_err.reason);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
|
kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
|
|
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
|
|
|
enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
|
|
if (enc == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
memset(iv, 0, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH); /* per RFC 1510 */
|
|
|
|
if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
|
|
(unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
outl += padl;
|
|
if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
|
|
|
|
s->session->master_key_length=
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
|
s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
|
|
|
|
if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
|
|
{
|
|
int len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
|
|
if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
|
|
{
|
|
s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
|
|
memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
|
|
** but it caused problems for apache.
|
|
** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
|
|
** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
|
|
*/
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
/* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
|
|
if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Let's get server private key and group information */
|
|
if (l & SSL_kECDH)
|
|
{
|
|
/* use the certificate */
|
|
srvr_ecdh->group = s->cert->key->privatekey-> \
|
|
pkey.eckey->group;
|
|
srvr_ecdh->priv_key = s->cert->key->privatekey-> \
|
|
pkey.eckey->priv_key;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* use the ephermeral values we saved when
|
|
* generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
|
|
*/
|
|
srvr_ecdh->group = s->s3->tmp.ecdh->group;
|
|
srvr_ecdh->priv_key = s->s3->tmp.ecdh->priv_key;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Let's get client's public key */
|
|
if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(srvr_ecdh->group))
|
|
== NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (n == 0L)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
|
|
|
|
if (l & SSL_kECDHE)
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
|
|
== NULL) ||
|
|
(clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_ECDSA))
|
|
{
|
|
/* XXX: For now, we do not support client
|
|
* authentication using ECDH certificates
|
|
* so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
|
|
* never executed. When that support is
|
|
* added, we ought to ensure the key
|
|
* received in the certificate is
|
|
* authorized for key agreement.
|
|
* ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
|
|
* the two ECDH shares are for the same
|
|
* group.
|
|
*/
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
|
|
clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.eckey->pub_key);
|
|
ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* Get client's public key from encoded point
|
|
* in the ClientKeyExchange message.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Get encoded point length */
|
|
i = *p;
|
|
p += 1;
|
|
if (EC_POINT_oct2point(srvr_ecdh->group,
|
|
clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
|
|
* currently, so set it to the start
|
|
*/
|
|
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
|
|
i = ECDH_compute_key(p, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh);
|
|
if (i <= 0)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
|
|
EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
|
|
if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
srvr_ecdh->priv_key = NULL;
|
|
srvr_ecdh->group = NULL;
|
|
EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
|
|
}
|
|
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
|
|
|
/* Compute the master secret */
|
|
s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
|
|
generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
|
|
|
|
memset(p, 0, i);
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return(1);
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
|
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
|
|
err:
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef NO_OPENSSL_ECDH
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
|
|
EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
|
|
if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
srvr_ecdh->priv_key = NULL;
|
|
srvr_ecdh->group = NULL;
|
|
EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
|
|
}
|
|
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
|
#endif
|
|
return(-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
int al,ok,ret=0;
|
|
long n;
|
|
int type=0,i,j;
|
|
X509 *peer;
|
|
|
|
n=ssl3_get_message(s,
|
|
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
|
|
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
|
|
-1,
|
|
512, /* 512? */
|
|
&ok);
|
|
|
|
if (!ok) return((int)n);
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->peer != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
peer=s->session->peer;
|
|
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
|
|
type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
peer=NULL;
|
|
pkey=NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
|
|
{
|
|
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
|
|
if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
ret=1;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (peer == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
|
|
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
|
|
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
|
|
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
|
|
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
|
n2s(p,i);
|
|
n-=2;
|
|
if (i > n)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
|
|
if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
|
|
{
|
|
i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
|
|
MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
|
|
pkey->pkey.rsa);
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (i == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
|
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
|
|
{
|
|
j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
|
|
&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
|
|
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
|
|
if (j <= 0)
|
|
{
|
|
/* bad signature */
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
|
|
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_ECDSA)
|
|
{
|
|
j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
|
|
&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
|
|
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.eckey);
|
|
if (j <= 0)
|
|
{
|
|
/* bad signature */
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
|
|
SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret=1;
|
|
if (0)
|
|
{
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
|
}
|
|
end:
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
|
return(ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
|
|
X509 *x=NULL;
|
|
unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
|
|
unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
|
|
|
|
n=ssl3_get_message(s,
|
|
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
|
|
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
|
|
-1,
|
|
s->max_cert_list,
|
|
&ok);
|
|
|
|
if (!ok) return((int)n);
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
|
|
{
|
|
if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
|
|
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
|
|
if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
|
|
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
|
|
return(1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
|
|
|
if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
n2l3(p,llen);
|
|
if (llen+3 != n)
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
|
|
{
|
|
n2l3(p,l);
|
|
if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
q=p;
|
|
x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
|
|
if (x == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (p != (q+l))
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
x=NULL;
|
|
nc+=l+3;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
|
|
{
|
|
/* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
|
|
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
|
|
{
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
|
|
else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
|
|
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
|
|
if (!i)
|
|
{
|
|
al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
|
|
X509_free(s->session->peer);
|
|
s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
|
|
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
|
|
|
|
/* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
|
|
* when we arrive here. */
|
|
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
|
|
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
|
|
sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
|
|
s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
|
|
/* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
|
|
* peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
|
|
|
|
sk=NULL;
|
|
|
|
ret=1;
|
|
if (0)
|
|
{
|
|
f_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
|
}
|
|
err:
|
|
if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
|
|
if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
|
|
return(ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned long l;
|
|
X509 *x;
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
|
|
{
|
|
x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
|
|
if (x == NULL &&
|
|
/* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
|
|
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
|
|
& (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
|
|
!= (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))
|
|
{
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return(0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
|
|
s->init_num=(int)l;
|
|
s->init_off=0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
|
|
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
/* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
|
|
static int nid2curve_id(int nid)
|
|
{
|
|
/* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001) */
|
|
switch (nid) {
|
|
case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
|
|
return 1;
|
|
case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
|
|
return 2;
|
|
case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
|
|
return 3;
|
|
case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
|
|
return 4;
|
|
case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
|
|
return 5;
|
|
case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
|
|
return 6;
|
|
case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
|
|
return 7;
|
|
case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
|
|
return 8;
|
|
case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
|
|
return 9;
|
|
case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
|
|
return 10;
|
|
case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
|
|
return 11;
|
|
case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
|
|
return 12;
|
|
case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
|
|
return 13;
|
|
case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
|
|
return 14;
|
|
case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
|
|
return 15;
|
|
case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
|
|
return 16;
|
|
case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
|
|
return 17;
|
|
case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
|
|
return 18;
|
|
case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
|
|
return 19;
|
|
case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
|
|
return 20;
|
|
case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
|
|
return 21;
|
|
case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
|
|
return 22;
|
|
case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
|
|
return 23;
|
|
case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
|
|
return 24;
|
|
case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
|
|
return 25;
|
|
default:
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|