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a150f8e1fc
This is not done absolutely everywhere, as there are places where the use of ERR_add_error_data() is quite complex, but at least the simple cases are done. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13318)
423 lines
13 KiB
C
423 lines
13 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
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#include "ocsp_local.h"
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <string.h>
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static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs,
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STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned long flags);
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static X509 *ocsp_find_signer_sk(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, OCSP_RESPID *id);
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static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain);
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static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp,
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OCSP_CERTID **ret);
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static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid,
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STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp);
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static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x);
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static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
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const X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
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unsigned long flags);
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/* Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure, or -1 on fatal error */
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static int ocsp_verify_signer(X509 *signer, int response,
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X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags,
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STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted, STACK_OF(X509) **chain)
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{
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X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
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X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vp;
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int ret = -1;
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if (ctx == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto end;
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}
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if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, st, signer, untrusted)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
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goto end;
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}
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if ((vp = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(ctx)) == NULL)
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goto end;
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if ((flags & OCSP_PARTIAL_CHAIN) != 0)
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X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vp, X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN);
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if (response
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&& X509_get_ext_by_NID(signer, NID_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck, -1) >= 0)
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/*
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* Locally disable revocation status checking for OCSP responder cert.
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* Done here for CRLs; TODO should be done also for OCSP-based checks.
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*/
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X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags(vp, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
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X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(ctx, X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER);
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X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(ctx, X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST);
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/* TODO: why is X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST set? Seems to get ignored. */
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ret = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
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if (ret <= 0) {
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ret = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
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ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR,
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"Verify error: %s", X509_verify_cert_error_string(ret));
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goto end;
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}
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if (chain != NULL)
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*chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(ctx);
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end:
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X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
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return ret;
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}
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static int ocsp_verify(OCSP_REQUEST *req, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs,
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X509 *signer, unsigned long flags)
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{
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EVP_PKEY *skey;
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int ret = 1;
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if ((flags & OCSP_NOSIGS) == 0) {
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if ((skey = X509_get0_pubkey(signer)) == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_NO_SIGNER_KEY);
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return -1;
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}
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if (req != NULL)
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ret = OCSP_REQUEST_verify(req, skey);
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else
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ret = OCSP_BASICRESP_verify(bs, skey);
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if (ret <= 0)
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
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}
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return ret;
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}
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/* Verify a basic response message */
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int OCSP_basic_verify(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
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X509_STORE *st, unsigned long flags)
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{
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X509 *signer, *x;
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STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
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STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = NULL;
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int ret = ocsp_find_signer(&signer, bs, certs, flags);
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if (ret == 0) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
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goto end;
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}
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if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER) != 0)
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flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY;
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if ((ret = ocsp_verify(NULL, bs, signer, flags)) <= 0)
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goto end;
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if ((flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY) == 0) {
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ret = -1;
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if ((flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN) != 0) {
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untrusted = NULL;
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} else if (bs->certs != NULL && certs != NULL) {
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untrusted = sk_X509_dup(bs->certs);
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if (!X509_add_certs(untrusted, certs, X509_ADD_FLAG_DEFAULT))
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goto end;
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} else if (certs != NULL) {
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untrusted = certs;
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} else {
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untrusted = bs->certs;
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}
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ret = ocsp_verify_signer(signer, 1, st, flags, untrusted, &chain);
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if (ret <= 0)
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goto end;
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if ((flags & OCSP_NOCHECKS) != 0) {
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ret = 1;
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goto end;
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}
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/*
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* At this point we have a valid certificate chain need to verify it
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* against the OCSP issuer criteria.
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*/
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ret = ocsp_check_issuer(bs, chain);
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/* If fatal error or valid match then finish */
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if (ret != 0)
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goto end;
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/*
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* Easy case: explicitly trusted. Get root CA and check for explicit
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* trust
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*/
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if ((flags & OCSP_NOEXPLICIT) != 0)
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goto end;
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x = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1);
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if (X509_check_trust(x, NID_OCSP_sign, 0) != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_ROOT_CA_NOT_TRUSTED);
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ret = 0;
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goto end;
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}
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ret = 1;
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}
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end:
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sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
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if (bs->certs && certs)
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sk_X509_free(untrusted);
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return ret;
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}
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int OCSP_resp_get0_signer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, X509 **signer,
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STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs)
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{
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return ocsp_find_signer(signer, bs, extra_certs, 0) > 0;
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}
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static int ocsp_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_BASICRESP *bs,
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STACK_OF(X509) *certs, unsigned long flags)
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{
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X509 *signer;
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OCSP_RESPID *rid = &bs->tbsResponseData.responderId;
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if ((signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(certs, rid)) != NULL) {
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*psigner = signer;
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return 2;
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}
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if ((flags & OCSP_NOINTERN) == 0 &&
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(signer = ocsp_find_signer_sk(bs->certs, rid))) {
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*psigner = signer;
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return 1;
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}
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/* Maybe lookup from store if by subject name */
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*psigner = NULL;
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return 0;
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}
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static X509 *ocsp_find_signer_sk(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, OCSP_RESPID *id)
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{
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int i;
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unsigned char tmphash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], *keyhash;
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X509 *x;
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/* Easy if lookup by name */
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if (id->type == V_OCSP_RESPID_NAME)
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return X509_find_by_subject(certs, id->value.byName);
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/* Lookup by key hash */
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/* If key hash isn't SHA1 length then forget it */
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if (id->value.byKey->length != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
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return NULL;
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keyhash = id->value.byKey->data;
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/* Calculate hash of each key and compare */
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for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
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x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
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if (!X509_pubkey_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), tmphash, NULL))
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break;
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if (memcmp(keyhash, tmphash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) == 0)
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return x;
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}
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return NULL;
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}
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static int ocsp_check_issuer(OCSP_BASICRESP *bs, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
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{
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STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp = bs->tbsResponseData.responses;
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X509 *signer, *sca;
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OCSP_CERTID *caid = NULL;
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int ret;
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if (sk_X509_num(chain) <= 0) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_IN_CHAIN);
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return -1;
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}
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/* See if the issuer IDs match. */
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ret = ocsp_check_ids(sresp, &caid);
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/* If ID mismatch or other error then return */
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if (ret <= 0)
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return ret;
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signer = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
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/* Check to see if OCSP responder CA matches request CA */
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if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 1) {
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sca = sk_X509_value(chain, 1);
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ret = ocsp_match_issuerid(sca, caid, sresp);
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if (ret < 0)
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return ret;
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if (ret != 0) {
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/* We have a match, if extensions OK then success */
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if (ocsp_check_delegated(signer))
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return 1;
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return 0;
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}
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}
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/* Otherwise check if OCSP request signed directly by request CA */
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return ocsp_match_issuerid(signer, caid, sresp);
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}
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/*
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* Check the issuer certificate IDs for equality. If there is a mismatch with
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* the same algorithm then there's no point trying to match any certificates
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* against the issuer. If the issuer IDs all match then we just need to check
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* equality against one of them.
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*/
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static int ocsp_check_ids(STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp, OCSP_CERTID **ret)
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{
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OCSP_CERTID *tmpid, *cid;
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int i, idcount;
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idcount = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp);
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if (idcount <= 0) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_RESPONSE_CONTAINS_NO_REVOCATION_DATA);
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return -1;
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}
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cid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, 0)->certId;
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*ret = NULL;
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for (i = 1; i < idcount; i++) {
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tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId;
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/* Check to see if IDs match */
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if (OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(cid, tmpid)) {
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/* If algorithm mismatch let caller deal with it */
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if (OBJ_cmp(tmpid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm,
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cid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm))
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return 2;
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/* Else mismatch */
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return 0;
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}
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}
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/* All IDs match: only need to check one ID */
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*ret = cid;
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return 1;
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}
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/*
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* Match the certificate issuer ID.
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* Returns -1 on fatal error, 0 if there is no match and 1 if there is a match.
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*/
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static int ocsp_match_issuerid(X509 *cert, OCSP_CERTID *cid,
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STACK_OF(OCSP_SINGLERESP) *sresp)
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{
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/* If only one ID to match then do it */
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if (cid != NULL) {
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const EVP_MD *dgst = EVP_get_digestbyobj(cid->hashAlgorithm.algorithm);
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const X509_NAME *iname;
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int mdlen;
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unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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if (dgst == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
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return -1;
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}
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mdlen = EVP_MD_size(dgst);
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if (mdlen < 0) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_DIGEST_SIZE_ERR);
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return -1;
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}
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if (cid->issuerNameHash.length != mdlen ||
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cid->issuerKeyHash.length != mdlen)
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return 0;
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iname = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
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if (!X509_NAME_digest(iname, dgst, md, NULL)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_DIGEST_NAME_ERR);
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return -1;
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}
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if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerNameHash.data, mdlen) != 0)
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return 0;
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if (!X509_pubkey_digest(cert, dgst, md, NULL)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_DIGEST_ERR);
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return -1;
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}
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if (memcmp(md, cid->issuerKeyHash.data, mdlen) != 0)
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return 0;
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} else {
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/* We have to match the whole lot */
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int i, ret;
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OCSP_CERTID *tmpid;
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for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_num(sresp); i++) {
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tmpid = sk_OCSP_SINGLERESP_value(sresp, i)->certId;
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ret = ocsp_match_issuerid(cert, tmpid, NULL);
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if (ret <= 0)
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return ret;
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}
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static int ocsp_check_delegated(X509 *x)
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{
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if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE)
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&& (X509_get_extended_key_usage(x) & XKU_OCSP_SIGN))
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return 1;
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_MISSING_OCSPSIGNING_USAGE);
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Verify an OCSP request. This is much easier than OCSP response verify.
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* Just find the signer's certificate and verify it against a given trust value.
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* Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure and on fatal error.
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*/
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int OCSP_request_verify(OCSP_REQUEST *req, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
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X509_STORE *store, unsigned long flags)
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{
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X509 *signer;
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const X509_NAME *nm;
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GENERAL_NAME *gen;
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int ret;
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if (!req->optionalSignature) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_REQUEST_NOT_SIGNED);
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return 0;
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}
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gen = req->tbsRequest.requestorName;
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if (!gen || gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_UNSUPPORTED_REQUESTORNAME_TYPE);
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return 0; /* not returning -1 here for backward compatibility*/
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}
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nm = gen->d.directoryName;
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ret = ocsp_req_find_signer(&signer, req, nm, certs, flags);
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if (ret <= 0) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_OCSP, OCSP_R_SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
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return 0; /* not returning -1 here for backward compatibility*/
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}
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if ((ret == 2) && (flags & OCSP_TRUSTOTHER) != 0)
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flags |= OCSP_NOVERIFY;
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if ((ret = ocsp_verify(req, NULL, signer, flags)) <= 0)
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return 0; /* not returning 'ret' here for backward compatibility*/
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if ((flags & OCSP_NOVERIFY) != 0)
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return 1;
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return ocsp_verify_signer(signer, 0, store, flags,
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(flags & OCSP_NOCHAIN) != 0 ?
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NULL : req->optionalSignature->certs, NULL) > 0;
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/* using '> 0' here to avoid breaking backward compatibility returning -1 */
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}
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static int ocsp_req_find_signer(X509 **psigner, OCSP_REQUEST *req,
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const X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
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unsigned long flags)
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{
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X509 *signer;
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if ((flags & OCSP_NOINTERN) == 0) {
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signer = X509_find_by_subject(req->optionalSignature->certs, nm);
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if (signer != NULL) {
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*psigner = signer;
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return 1;
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}
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}
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if ((signer = X509_find_by_subject(certs, nm)) != NULL) {
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*psigner = signer;
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return 2;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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