mirror of
https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git
synced 2024-12-22 16:33:51 +08:00
ce023e77d7
Commit 7823d792d0
added DEFINE_LHASH_OF
to a C source file. DEFINE_LHASH_OF() and DEFINE_STACK_OF() must
be used only in header files to avoid clang warnings for unused
static-inline functions.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
1155 lines
35 KiB
C
1155 lines
35 KiB
C
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
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* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
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* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include "e_os.h"
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#ifndef NO_SYS_TYPES_H
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# include <sys/types.h>
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#endif
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#include "internal/o_dir.h"
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#include <openssl/lhash.h>
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#include <openssl/bio.h>
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#include <openssl/pem.h>
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#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
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# include <openssl/dh.h>
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#endif
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include "ssl_locl.h"
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static int ssl_security_default_callback(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int op,
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int bits, int nid, void *other,
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void *ex);
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int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void)
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{
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static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = -1;
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int got_write_lock = 0;
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CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
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if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0) {
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CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
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CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
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got_write_lock = 1;
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if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0) {
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ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx =
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X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0, "SSL for verify callback",
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NULL, NULL, NULL);
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}
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}
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if (got_write_lock)
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CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
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else
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CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
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return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx;
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}
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CERT *ssl_cert_new(void)
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{
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CERT *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
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if (ret == NULL) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return (NULL);
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}
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ret->key = &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
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ret->references = 1;
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ret->sec_cb = ssl_security_default_callback;
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ret->sec_level = OPENSSL_TLS_SECURITY_LEVEL;
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ret->sec_ex = NULL;
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return (ret);
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}
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CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert)
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{
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CERT *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
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int i;
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if (ret == NULL) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return (NULL);
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}
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ret->references = 1;
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ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - cert->pkeys];
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
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if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL) {
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ret->dh_tmp = cert->dh_tmp;
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EVP_PKEY_up_ref(ret->dh_tmp);
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}
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ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb;
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ret->dh_tmp_auto = cert->dh_tmp_auto;
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#endif
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for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
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CERT_PKEY *cpk = cert->pkeys + i;
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CERT_PKEY *rpk = ret->pkeys + i;
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if (cpk->x509 != NULL) {
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rpk->x509 = cpk->x509;
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X509_up_ref(rpk->x509);
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}
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if (cpk->privatekey != NULL) {
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rpk->privatekey = cpk->privatekey;
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EVP_PKEY_up_ref(cpk->privatekey);
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}
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if (cpk->chain) {
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rpk->chain = X509_chain_up_ref(cpk->chain);
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if (!rpk->chain) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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}
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if (cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo != NULL) {
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/* Just copy everything. */
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ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo =
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OPENSSL_malloc(cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length);
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if (ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo == NULL) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length =
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cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length;
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memcpy(ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo,
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cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo,
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cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length);
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}
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}
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/* Configured sigalgs copied across */
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if (cert->conf_sigalgs) {
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ret->conf_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->conf_sigalgslen);
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if (ret->conf_sigalgs == NULL)
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goto err;
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memcpy(ret->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgslen);
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ret->conf_sigalgslen = cert->conf_sigalgslen;
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} else
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ret->conf_sigalgs = NULL;
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if (cert->client_sigalgs) {
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ret->client_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->client_sigalgslen);
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if (ret->client_sigalgs == NULL)
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goto err;
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memcpy(ret->client_sigalgs, cert->client_sigalgs,
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cert->client_sigalgslen);
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ret->client_sigalgslen = cert->client_sigalgslen;
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} else
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ret->client_sigalgs = NULL;
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/* Shared sigalgs also NULL */
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ret->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
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/* Copy any custom client certificate types */
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if (cert->ctypes) {
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ret->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->ctype_num);
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if (ret->ctypes == NULL)
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goto err;
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memcpy(ret->ctypes, cert->ctypes, cert->ctype_num);
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ret->ctype_num = cert->ctype_num;
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}
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ret->cert_flags = cert->cert_flags;
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ret->cert_cb = cert->cert_cb;
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ret->cert_cb_arg = cert->cert_cb_arg;
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if (cert->verify_store) {
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CRYPTO_add(&cert->verify_store->references, 1,
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CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
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ret->verify_store = cert->verify_store;
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}
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if (cert->chain_store) {
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CRYPTO_add(&cert->chain_store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
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ret->chain_store = cert->chain_store;
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}
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ret->sec_cb = cert->sec_cb;
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ret->sec_level = cert->sec_level;
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ret->sec_ex = cert->sec_ex;
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if (!custom_exts_copy(&ret->cli_ext, &cert->cli_ext))
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goto err;
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if (!custom_exts_copy(&ret->srv_ext, &cert->srv_ext))
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goto err;
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
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if (cert->psk_identity_hint) {
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ret->psk_identity_hint = OPENSSL_strdup(cert->psk_identity_hint);
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if (ret->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
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goto err;
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}
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#endif
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return (ret);
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err:
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ssl_cert_free(ret);
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return NULL;
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}
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/* Free up and clear all certificates and chains */
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void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *c)
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{
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int i;
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if (c == NULL)
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return;
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for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
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CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
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X509_free(cpk->x509);
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cpk->x509 = NULL;
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EVP_PKEY_free(cpk->privatekey);
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cpk->privatekey = NULL;
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sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
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cpk->chain = NULL;
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OPENSSL_free(cpk->serverinfo);
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cpk->serverinfo = NULL;
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cpk->serverinfo_length = 0;
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}
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}
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void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c)
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{
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int i;
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if (c == NULL)
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return;
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i = CRYPTO_add(&c->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
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REF_PRINT_COUNT("CERT", c);
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if (i > 0)
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return;
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REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
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EVP_PKEY_free(c->dh_tmp);
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#endif
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ssl_cert_clear_certs(c);
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OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
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OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
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OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
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OPENSSL_free(c->ctypes);
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X509_STORE_free(c->verify_store);
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X509_STORE_free(c->chain_store);
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custom_exts_free(&c->cli_ext);
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custom_exts_free(&c->srv_ext);
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
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OPENSSL_free(c->psk_identity_hint);
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#endif
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OPENSSL_free(c);
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}
|
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int ssl_cert_set0_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
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{
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int i, r;
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CERT_PKEY *cpk = s ? s->cert->key : ctx->cert->key;
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if (!cpk)
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return 0;
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sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
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for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
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r = ssl_security_cert(s, ctx, sk_X509_value(chain, i), 0, 0);
|
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if (r != 1) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_SET0_CHAIN, r);
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return 0;
|
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}
|
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}
|
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cpk->chain = chain;
|
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return 1;
|
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}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_cert_set1_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
|
|
{
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *dchain;
|
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if (!chain)
|
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return ssl_cert_set0_chain(s, ctx, NULL);
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|
dchain = X509_chain_up_ref(chain);
|
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if (!dchain)
|
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return 0;
|
|
if (!ssl_cert_set0_chain(s, ctx, dchain)) {
|
|
sk_X509_pop_free(dchain, X509_free);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
|
|
{
|
|
int r;
|
|
CERT_PKEY *cpk = s ? s->cert->key : ctx->cert->key;
|
|
if (!cpk)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
r = ssl_security_cert(s, ctx, x, 0, 0);
|
|
if (r != 1) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_ADD0_CHAIN_CERT, r);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!cpk->chain)
|
|
cpk->chain = sk_X509_new_null();
|
|
if (!cpk->chain || !sk_X509_push(cpk->chain, x))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(s, ctx, x))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
X509_up_ref(x);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_cert_select_current(CERT *c, X509 *x)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
if (x == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
|
|
CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
|
|
if (cpk->x509 == x && cpk->privatekey) {
|
|
c->key = cpk;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
|
|
CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
|
|
if (cpk->privatekey && cpk->x509 && !X509_cmp(cpk->x509, x)) {
|
|
c->key = cpk;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_cert_set_current(CERT *c, long op)
|
|
{
|
|
int i, idx;
|
|
if (!c)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (op == SSL_CERT_SET_FIRST)
|
|
idx = 0;
|
|
else if (op == SSL_CERT_SET_NEXT) {
|
|
idx = (int)(c->key - c->pkeys + 1);
|
|
if (idx >= SSL_PKEY_NUM)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
} else
|
|
return 0;
|
|
for (i = idx; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
|
|
CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
|
|
if (cpk->x509 && cpk->privatekey) {
|
|
c->key = cpk;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
c->cert_cb = cb;
|
|
c->cert_cb_arg = arg;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
|
|
{
|
|
X509 *x;
|
|
int i;
|
|
X509_STORE *verify_store;
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
|
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
|
|
|
|
if (s->cert->verify_store)
|
|
verify_store = s->cert->verify_store;
|
|
else
|
|
verify_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
|
|
|
|
if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0))
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
|
|
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, verify_store, x, sk)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
param = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx);
|
|
|
|
/* Set suite B flags if needed */
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, tls1_suiteb(s));
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), s);
|
|
|
|
/* Verify via DANE if enabled */
|
|
if (DANETLS_ENABLED(&s->dane))
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(&ctx, &s->dane);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by
|
|
* the context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates or
|
|
* vice versa.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx, s->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server");
|
|
/*
|
|
* Anything non-default in "s->param" should overwrite anything in the ctx.
|
|
*/
|
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(param, s->param);
|
|
|
|
if (s->verify_callback)
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, s->verify_callback);
|
|
|
|
if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL)
|
|
i = s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg);
|
|
else {
|
|
i = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
|
|
# if 0
|
|
/* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
|
|
# endif
|
|
if (i > 0)
|
|
i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, ctx.chain, NULL, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->verify_result = ctx.error;
|
|
sk_X509_pop_free(s->verified_chain, X509_free);
|
|
s->verified_chain = NULL;
|
|
if (X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(&ctx) != NULL) {
|
|
s->verified_chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&ctx);
|
|
if (s->verified_chain == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
i = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Move peername from the store context params to the SSL handle's */
|
|
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_move_peername(s->param, param);
|
|
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
|
|
|
return (i);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list,
|
|
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
|
|
{
|
|
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list, X509_NAME_free);
|
|
*ca_list = name_list;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret;
|
|
X509_NAME *name;
|
|
|
|
ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
|
|
name = X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i));
|
|
if ((name == NULL) || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, name)) {
|
|
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free);
|
|
return (NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
|
|
{
|
|
set_client_CA_list(&(s->client_CA), name_list);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
|
|
{
|
|
set_client_CA_list(&(ctx->client_CA), name_list);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
|
|
{
|
|
return (ctx->client_CA);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!s->server) { /* we are in the client */
|
|
if (((s->version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) && (s->s3 != NULL))
|
|
return (s->s3->tmp.ca_names);
|
|
else
|
|
return (NULL);
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (s->client_CA != NULL)
|
|
return (s->client_CA);
|
|
else
|
|
return (s->ctx->client_CA);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int add_client_CA(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk, X509 *x)
|
|
{
|
|
X509_NAME *name;
|
|
|
|
if (x == NULL)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
if ((*sk == NULL) && ((*sk = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL))
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
if ((name = X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x))) == NULL)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk, name)) {
|
|
X509_NAME_free(name);
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
return (1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *x)
|
|
{
|
|
return (add_client_CA(&(ssl->client_CA), x));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
|
|
{
|
|
return (add_client_CA(&(ctx->client_CA), x));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int xname_sk_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
|
|
{
|
|
return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
|
|
{
|
|
return X509_NAME_cmp(a, b);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static unsigned long xname_hash(const X509_NAME *a)
|
|
{
|
|
return X509_NAME_hash((X509_NAME *)a);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Load CA certs from a file into a ::STACK. Note that it is somewhat misnamed;
|
|
* it doesn't really have anything to do with clients (except that a common use
|
|
* for a stack of CAs is to send it to the client). Actually, it doesn't have
|
|
* much to do with CAs, either, since it will load any old cert.
|
|
* \param file the file containing one or more certs.
|
|
* \return a ::STACK containing the certs.
|
|
*/
|
|
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file)
|
|
{
|
|
BIO *in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
|
|
X509 *x = NULL;
|
|
X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
|
|
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL;
|
|
LHASH_OF(X509_NAME) *name_hash =
|
|
lh_X509_NAME_new(xname_hash, xname_cmp);
|
|
|
|
if ((name_hash == NULL) || (in == NULL)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!BIO_read_filename(in, file))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in, &x, NULL, NULL) == NULL)
|
|
break;
|
|
if (ret == NULL) {
|
|
ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
|
|
if (ret == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if ((xn = X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
/* check for duplicates */
|
|
xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn);
|
|
if (xn == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (lh_X509_NAME_retrieve(name_hash, xn) != NULL) {
|
|
/* Duplicate. */
|
|
X509_NAME_free(xn);
|
|
} else {
|
|
lh_X509_NAME_insert(name_hash, xn);
|
|
sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, xn);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free);
|
|
ret = NULL;
|
|
done:
|
|
BIO_free(in);
|
|
X509_free(x);
|
|
lh_X509_NAME_free(name_hash);
|
|
if (ret != NULL)
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Add a file of certs to a stack.
|
|
* \param stack the stack to add to.
|
|
* \param file the file to add from. All certs in this file that are not
|
|
* already in the stack will be added.
|
|
* \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some
|
|
* certs may have been added to \c stack.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
|
|
const char *file)
|
|
{
|
|
BIO *in;
|
|
X509 *x = NULL;
|
|
X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
|
|
int ret = 1;
|
|
int (*oldcmp) (const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
|
|
|
|
oldcmp = sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, xname_sk_cmp);
|
|
|
|
in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
|
|
|
|
if (in == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,
|
|
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!BIO_read_filename(in, file))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in, &x, NULL, NULL) == NULL)
|
|
break;
|
|
if ((xn = X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn);
|
|
if (xn == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack, xn) >= 0)
|
|
X509_NAME_free(xn);
|
|
else
|
|
sk_X509_NAME_push(stack, xn);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
done:
|
|
BIO_free(in);
|
|
X509_free(x);
|
|
(void)sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, oldcmp);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Add a directory of certs to a stack.
|
|
* \param stack the stack to append to.
|
|
* \param dir the directory to append from. All files in this directory will be
|
|
* examined as potential certs. Any that are acceptable to
|
|
* SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack() that are not already in the stack will be
|
|
* included.
|
|
* \return 1 for success, 0 for failure. Note that in the case of failure some
|
|
* certs may have been added to \c stack.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
|
|
const char *dir)
|
|
{
|
|
OPENSSL_DIR_CTX *d = NULL;
|
|
const char *filename;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
|
|
|
|
/* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */
|
|
|
|
while ((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&d, dir))) {
|
|
char buf[1024];
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
if (strlen(dir) + strlen(filename) + 2 > sizeof buf) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,
|
|
SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
|
|
r = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s%s", dir, filename);
|
|
#else
|
|
r = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", dir, filename);
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (r <= 0 || r >= (int)sizeof(buf))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack, buf))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (errno) {
|
|
SYSerr(SYS_F_OPENDIR, get_last_sys_error());
|
|
ERR_add_error_data(3, "OPENSSL_DIR_read(&ctx, '", dir, "')");
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
if (d)
|
|
OPENSSL_DIR_end(&d);
|
|
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Add a certificate to a BUF_MEM structure */
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x)
|
|
{
|
|
int n;
|
|
unsigned char *p;
|
|
|
|
n = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
|
|
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, (int)(n + (*l) + 3))) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]);
|
|
l2n3(n, p);
|
|
i2d_X509(x, &p);
|
|
*l += n + 3;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Add certificate chain to internal SSL BUF_MEM strcuture */
|
|
int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk, unsigned long *l)
|
|
{
|
|
BUF_MEM *buf = s->init_buf;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
X509 *x;
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
|
|
X509_STORE *chain_store;
|
|
|
|
/* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */
|
|
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, 10)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!cpk || !cpk->x509)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
x = cpk->x509;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (cpk->chain)
|
|
extra_certs = cpk->chain;
|
|
else
|
|
extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs;
|
|
|
|
if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
|
|
chain_store = NULL;
|
|
else if (s->cert->chain_store)
|
|
chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
|
|
else
|
|
chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
|
|
|
|
if (chain_store) {
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
|
|
|
|
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
|
|
* don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
|
|
* ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
|
|
* the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
|
|
*/
|
|
X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
|
|
/* Don't leave errors in the queue */
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, xs_ctx.chain, NULL, 0);
|
|
if (i != 1) {
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++) {
|
|
x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i);
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x)) {
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
|
|
} else {
|
|
i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0);
|
|
if (i != 1) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) {
|
|
x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i);
|
|
if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Build a certificate chain for current certificate */
|
|
int ssl_build_cert_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
CERT *c = s ? s->cert : ctx->cert;
|
|
CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key;
|
|
X509_STORE *chain_store = NULL;
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL, *untrusted = NULL;
|
|
X509 *x;
|
|
int i, rv = 0;
|
|
unsigned long error;
|
|
|
|
if (!cpk->x509) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Rearranging and check the chain: add everything to a store */
|
|
if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK) {
|
|
chain_store = X509_STORE_new();
|
|
if (chain_store == NULL)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(cpk->chain); i++) {
|
|
x = sk_X509_value(cpk->chain, i);
|
|
if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, x)) {
|
|
error = ERR_peek_last_error();
|
|
if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) != ERR_LIB_X509 ||
|
|
ERR_GET_REASON(error) !=
|
|
X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Add EE cert too: it might be self signed */
|
|
if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, cpk->x509)) {
|
|
error = ERR_peek_last_error();
|
|
if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) != ERR_LIB_X509 ||
|
|
ERR_GET_REASON(error) != X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (c->chain_store)
|
|
chain_store = c->chain_store;
|
|
else if (s)
|
|
chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
|
|
else
|
|
chain_store = ctx->cert_store;
|
|
|
|
if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_UNTRUSTED)
|
|
untrusted = cpk->chain;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx, chain_store, cpk->x509, untrusted)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Set suite B flags if needed */
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&xs_ctx,
|
|
c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS);
|
|
|
|
i = X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
|
|
if (i <= 0 && flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERROR) {
|
|
if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CLEAR_ERROR)
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
i = 1;
|
|
rv = 2;
|
|
}
|
|
if (i > 0)
|
|
chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&xs_ctx);
|
|
if (i <= 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
|
|
i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&xs_ctx);
|
|
ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
|
|
X509_verify_cert_error_string(i));
|
|
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
|
|
/* Remove EE certificate from chain */
|
|
x = sk_X509_shift(chain);
|
|
X509_free(x);
|
|
if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_NO_ROOT) {
|
|
if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 0) {
|
|
/* See if last cert is self signed */
|
|
x = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1);
|
|
if (X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) {
|
|
x = sk_X509_pop(chain);
|
|
X509_free(x);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check security level of all CA certificates: EE will have been checked
|
|
* already.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
|
|
x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
|
|
rv = ssl_security_cert(s, ctx, x, 0, 0);
|
|
if (rv != 1) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, rv);
|
|
sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
|
|
rv = 0;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
|
|
cpk->chain = chain;
|
|
if (rv == 0)
|
|
rv = 1;
|
|
err:
|
|
if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK)
|
|
X509_STORE_free(chain_store);
|
|
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_cert_set_cert_store(CERT *c, X509_STORE *store, int chain, int ref)
|
|
{
|
|
X509_STORE **pstore;
|
|
if (chain)
|
|
pstore = &c->chain_store;
|
|
else
|
|
pstore = &c->verify_store;
|
|
X509_STORE_free(*pstore);
|
|
*pstore = store;
|
|
if (ref && store)
|
|
CRYPTO_add(&store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_security_default_callback(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int op,
|
|
int bits, int nid, void *other,
|
|
void *ex)
|
|
{
|
|
int level, minbits;
|
|
static const int minbits_table[5] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 };
|
|
if (ctx)
|
|
level = SSL_CTX_get_security_level(ctx);
|
|
else
|
|
level = SSL_get_security_level(s);
|
|
|
|
if (level <= 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* No EDH keys weaker than 1024-bits even at level 0, otherwise,
|
|
* anything goes.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (op == SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH && bits < 80)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (level > 5)
|
|
level = 5;
|
|
minbits = minbits_table[level - 1];
|
|
switch (op) {
|
|
case SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED:
|
|
case SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SHARED:
|
|
case SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK:
|
|
{
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *c = other;
|
|
/* No ciphers below security level */
|
|
if (bits < minbits)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* No unauthenticated ciphersuites */
|
|
if (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* No MD5 mac ciphersuites */
|
|
if (c->algorithm_mac & SSL_MD5)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* SHA1 HMAC is 160 bits of security */
|
|
if (minbits > 160 && c->algorithm_mac & SSL_SHA1)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* Level 2: no RC4 */
|
|
if (level >= 2 && c->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* Level 3: forward secure ciphersuites only */
|
|
if (level >= 3 && !(c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH)))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
case SSL_SECOP_VERSION:
|
|
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
/* SSLv3 not allowed at level 2 */
|
|
if (nid <= SSL3_VERSION && level >= 2)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* TLS v1.1 and above only for level 3 */
|
|
if (nid <= TLS1_VERSION && level >= 3)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* TLS v1.2 only for level 4 and above */
|
|
if (nid <= TLS1_1_VERSION && level >= 4)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* DTLS v1.2 only for level 4 and above */
|
|
if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(nid, DTLS1_2_VERSION) && level >= 4)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION:
|
|
if (level >= 2)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_SECOP_TICKET:
|
|
if (level >= 3)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
if (bits < minbits)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_security(SSL *s, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other)
|
|
{
|
|
return s->cert->sec_cb(s, NULL, op, bits, nid, other, s->cert->sec_ex);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_ctx_security(SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other)
|
|
{
|
|
return ctx->cert->sec_cb(NULL, ctx, op, bits, nid, other,
|
|
ctx->cert->sec_ex);
|
|
}
|