mirror of
https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git
synced 2024-12-21 07:53:57 +08:00
2ee1271d8f
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
4388 lines
146 KiB
C
4388 lines
146 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <openssl/objects.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/hmac.h>
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#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
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#include <openssl/conf.h>
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#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
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#include <openssl/dh.h>
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include "ssl_locl.h"
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#include <openssl/ct.h>
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static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, size_t ticklen,
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const unsigned char *sess_id, size_t sesslen,
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SSL_SESSION **psess);
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static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
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static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
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SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
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tls1_enc,
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tls1_mac,
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tls1_setup_key_block,
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tls1_generate_master_secret,
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tls1_change_cipher_state,
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tls1_final_finish_mac,
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TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
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TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
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tls1_alert_code,
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tls1_export_keying_material,
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0,
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ssl3_set_handshake_header,
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tls_close_construct_packet,
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ssl3_handshake_write
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};
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SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
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tls1_enc,
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tls1_mac,
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tls1_setup_key_block,
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tls1_generate_master_secret,
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tls1_change_cipher_state,
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tls1_final_finish_mac,
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TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
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TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
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tls1_alert_code,
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tls1_export_keying_material,
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SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
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ssl3_set_handshake_header,
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tls_close_construct_packet,
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ssl3_handshake_write
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};
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SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
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tls1_enc,
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tls1_mac,
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tls1_setup_key_block,
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tls1_generate_master_secret,
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tls1_change_cipher_state,
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tls1_final_finish_mac,
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TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
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TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
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tls1_alert_code,
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tls1_export_keying_material,
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SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
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| SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
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ssl3_set_handshake_header,
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tls_close_construct_packet,
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ssl3_handshake_write
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};
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SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
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tls1_enc,
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tls1_mac,
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tls1_setup_key_block,
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tls1_generate_master_secret,
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tls1_change_cipher_state,
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tls1_final_finish_mac,
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TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
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TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
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tls1_alert_code,
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tls1_export_keying_material,
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SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
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| SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
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ssl3_set_handshake_header,
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tls_close_construct_packet,
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ssl3_handshake_write
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};
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long tls1_default_timeout(void)
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{
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/*
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* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
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* http, the cache would over fill
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*/
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return (60 * 60 * 2);
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}
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int tls1_new(SSL *s)
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{
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if (!ssl3_new(s))
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return (0);
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s->method->ssl_clear(s);
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return (1);
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}
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void tls1_free(SSL *s)
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{
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OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
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ssl3_free(s);
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}
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void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
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{
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ssl3_clear(s);
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if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
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s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
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else
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s->version = s->method->version;
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}
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
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typedef struct {
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int nid; /* Curve NID */
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int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
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unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
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} tls_curve_info;
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/*
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* Table of curve information.
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* Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
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* table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
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*/
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static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
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{NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
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{NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
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{NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
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{NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
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{NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
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{NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
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{NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
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{NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
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{NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
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{NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
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{NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
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{NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
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{NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
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{NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
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{NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
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{NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
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{NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
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{NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
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{NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
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{NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
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{NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
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{NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
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{NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
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{NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
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{NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
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{NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
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{NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
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{NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
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{NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
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};
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static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
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TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
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TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
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TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
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};
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/* The default curves */
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static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
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0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
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0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
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0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
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0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
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};
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static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
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0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
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0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
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0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
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0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
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0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
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0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
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0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
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/*
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* Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
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* via an explicit callback or parameters.
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*/
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0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
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0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
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0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
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0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
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0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
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0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
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0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
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0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
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0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
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0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
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0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
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0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
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0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
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0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
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0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
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0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
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0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
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0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
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0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
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0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
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0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
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0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
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};
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static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
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0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
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0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
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};
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int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
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{
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const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
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/* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
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if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
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return 0;
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cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
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if (pflags)
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*pflags = cinfo->flags;
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return cinfo->nid;
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}
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int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
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{
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size_t i;
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for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
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if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
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return (int)(i + 1);
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
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* preferred list.
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* Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
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* the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
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* Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
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* The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
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* lists in the first place.
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* TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
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* parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
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* so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
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*/
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static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
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const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
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{
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size_t pcurveslen = 0;
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if (sess) {
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*pcurves = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
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pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
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} else {
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/* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
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switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
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case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
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*pcurves = suiteb_curves;
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pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
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break;
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case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
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*pcurves = suiteb_curves;
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pcurveslen = 2;
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break;
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case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
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*pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
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pcurveslen = 2;
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break;
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default:
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*pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
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pcurveslen = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
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}
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if (!*pcurves) {
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*pcurves = eccurves_default;
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pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
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}
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}
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/* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
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if (pcurveslen & 1) {
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SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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*num_curves = 0;
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return 0;
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} else {
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*num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
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return 1;
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}
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}
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/* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
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static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
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{
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const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
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if (curve[0])
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return 1;
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if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
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return 0;
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cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
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# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
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if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
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return 0;
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# endif
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return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
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}
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/* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
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int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
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{
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const unsigned char *curves;
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size_t num_curves, i;
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unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
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if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
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return 0;
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/* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
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if (suiteb_flags) {
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unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
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if (p[1])
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return 0;
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if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
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if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
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return 0;
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} else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
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if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
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return 0;
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} else /* Should never happen */
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return 0;
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}
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if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
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return 0;
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for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
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if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
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return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/*-
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* For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared group or NID_undef
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* if there is no match.
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* For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
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* For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the group to use for
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* an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
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*/
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int tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
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{
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const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
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size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
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int k;
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/* Can't do anything on client side */
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if (s->server == 0)
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return -1;
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if (nmatch == -2) {
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if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
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/*
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* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
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* these are acceptable due to previous checks.
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*/
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unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
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if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
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return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
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if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
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return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
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/* Should never happen */
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return NID_undef;
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}
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/* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
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nmatch = 0;
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}
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/*
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* Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
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* but s->options is a long...
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*/
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if (!tls1_get_curvelist
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(s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
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&num_supp))
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/* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
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return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
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if (!tls1_get_curvelist
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(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
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return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
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/*
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* If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
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* are allowed.
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*/
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if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
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supp = eccurves_all;
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num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
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} else if (num_pref == 0 &&
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(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
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pref = eccurves_all;
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num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
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}
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k = 0;
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for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
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const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
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for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
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if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
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if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
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continue;
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if (nmatch == k) {
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int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
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|
return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
k++;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (nmatch == -1)
|
|
return k;
|
|
/* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
|
|
return NID_undef;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls1_set_groups(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
|
|
int *groups, size_t ngroups)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *glist, *p;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
|
|
* ids < 32
|
|
*/
|
|
unsigned long dup_list = 0;
|
|
glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * 2);
|
|
if (glist == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
for (i = 0, p = glist; i < ngroups; i++) {
|
|
unsigned long idmask;
|
|
int id;
|
|
/* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
|
|
id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups[i]);
|
|
idmask = 1L << id;
|
|
if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(glist);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
dup_list |= idmask;
|
|
s2n(id, p);
|
|
}
|
|
OPENSSL_free(*pext);
|
|
*pext = glist;
|
|
*pextlen = ngroups * 2;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# define MAX_CURVELIST 28
|
|
|
|
typedef struct {
|
|
size_t nidcnt;
|
|
int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
|
|
} nid_cb_st;
|
|
|
|
static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
int nid;
|
|
char etmp[20];
|
|
if (elem == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
|
|
etmp[len] = 0;
|
|
nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
|
|
if (nid == NID_undef)
|
|
nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
|
|
if (nid == NID_undef)
|
|
nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
|
|
if (nid == NID_undef)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
|
|
if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
|
|
int tls1_set_groups_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
|
|
{
|
|
nid_cb_st ncb;
|
|
ncb.nidcnt = 0;
|
|
if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (pext == NULL)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
|
|
static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
|
|
EC_KEY *ec)
|
|
{
|
|
int id;
|
|
const EC_GROUP *grp;
|
|
if (!ec)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* Determine if it is a prime field */
|
|
grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
|
|
if (!grp)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* Determine curve ID */
|
|
id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
|
|
id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
|
|
/* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
|
|
if (id == 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
curve_id[0] = 0;
|
|
curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
|
|
if (comp_id) {
|
|
if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
|
|
*comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
|
|
*comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
|
|
else
|
|
*comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
|
|
static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
|
|
unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
|
|
{
|
|
const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
|
|
size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
|
|
int j;
|
|
/*
|
|
* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
|
|
* supported (see RFC4492).
|
|
*/
|
|
if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
|
|
pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
|
|
num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
|
|
if (*comp_id == *pformats)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (i == num_formats)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!curve_id)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
/* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
|
|
for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
|
|
if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
|
|
* RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
|
|
* so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
|
|
* It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
|
|
* extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
|
|
*/
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
|
|
if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (i == num_curves)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* For clients can only check sent curve list */
|
|
if (!s->server)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
|
|
size_t *num_formats)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
|
|
*pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
|
|
*num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
|
|
} else {
|
|
*pformats = ecformats_default;
|
|
/* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
|
|
if (tls1_suiteb(s))
|
|
*num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
|
|
else
|
|
*num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
|
|
* certificates have compatible curves and compression.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
|
|
int rv;
|
|
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
|
|
if (!pkey)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* If not EC nothing to do */
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
|
|
if (!rv)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
|
|
* curves extension.
|
|
*/
|
|
rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
|
|
if (!rv)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
|
|
* SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
|
|
int check_md;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
CERT *c = s->cert;
|
|
if (curve_id[0])
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
|
|
if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
|
|
check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
|
|
else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
|
|
check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
|
|
else
|
|
return 0; /* Should never happen */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
|
|
if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
|
|
break;
|
|
if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (set_ee_md == 2) {
|
|
if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
|
|
s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
|
|
else
|
|
s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
/*
|
|
* tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
|
|
* @s: SSL connection
|
|
* @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
|
|
*
|
|
* Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
|
|
* is compatible with the client extensions.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
|
|
*/
|
|
int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
|
|
* curves permitted.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
|
|
unsigned char curve_id[2];
|
|
/* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
|
|
if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
|
|
curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
|
|
else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
|
|
curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
|
|
else
|
|
return 0;
|
|
curve_id[0] = 0;
|
|
/* Check this curve is acceptable */
|
|
if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Need a shared curve */
|
|
if (tls1_shared_group(s, 0))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
|
|
{
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
|
|
* customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
|
|
#else
|
|
# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
|
# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
|
|
#else
|
|
# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
|
|
#else
|
|
# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
|
|
tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
|
|
tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
|
|
tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
|
|
|
|
static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
|
|
tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
|
|
tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
|
|
tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
|
|
tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
|
|
tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
|
|
TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
|
|
TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
|
|
TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
|
|
#endif
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
|
|
tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
|
|
tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
|
|
};
|
|
#endif
|
|
size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
|
|
* preferences.
|
|
*/
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
|
|
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
|
|
*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
|
|
return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
|
|
|
|
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
|
|
*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
|
|
return 2;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
|
|
*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
|
|
return 2;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
/* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
|
|
if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
|
|
*psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
|
|
return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
|
|
} else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
|
|
*psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
|
|
return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
|
|
} else {
|
|
*psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
|
|
return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
|
|
* algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
|
|
*/
|
|
int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
|
|
const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
|
|
{
|
|
const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
|
|
size_t sent_sigslen, i;
|
|
int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
|
|
/* Should never happen */
|
|
if (sigalg == -1)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
/* Check key type is consistent with signature */
|
|
if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
|
|
unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
|
|
/* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
|
|
if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
|
|
if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
|
|
if (curve_id[0])
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
|
|
if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
|
|
SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
|
|
if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
|
|
SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
} else
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Check signature matches a type we sent */
|
|
sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
|
|
if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
|
|
if (i == sent_sigslen
|
|
&& (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
|
|
|| s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
*pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
|
|
if (*pmd == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
|
|
if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
|
|
EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
|
|
*/
|
|
s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
|
|
* supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
|
|
* by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
|
|
*
|
|
* This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
|
|
* by the client.
|
|
*
|
|
* Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
|
|
*/
|
|
void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
|
|
ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
|
|
ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
|
/* with PSK there must be client callback set */
|
|
if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
|
|
s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
|
if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
|
|
s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
|
|
* @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
|
|
* @c: cipher to check
|
|
* @op: Security check that you want to do
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
|
|
*/
|
|
int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
|
|
{
|
|
if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
|
|
|| c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
|
|
|| (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
|
|
|| DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
|
|
unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
|
|
if (u1 < u2)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
else if (u1 > u2)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
else
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
|
|
* more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
|
|
* This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
|
|
* out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
|
|
* contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
|
|
* occurred.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
|
|
{
|
|
PACKET extensions = *packet;
|
|
size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
|
|
unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* First pass: count the extensions. */
|
|
while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
|
|
unsigned int type;
|
|
PACKET extension;
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
|
|
!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
num_extensions++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (num_extensions <= 1)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
|
|
if (extension_types == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
|
|
extensions = *packet;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
|
|
PACKET extension;
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
|
|
!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
|
|
/* This should not happen. */
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
|
|
qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
|
|
for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
|
|
if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
done:
|
|
OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
const unsigned char *pcurves = NULL;
|
|
size_t num_curves = 0;
|
|
int using_ecc = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
|
|
if ((s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_2_VERSION)
|
|
|| SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
|
|
int i;
|
|
unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
|
|
const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
|
|
|
|
alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
|
|
alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
|
|
if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
|
|
|| (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
|
|
using_ecc = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (s->version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* TODO(TLS1.3): We always use ECC for TLSv1.3 at the moment. This will
|
|
* change if we implement DH key shares
|
|
*/
|
|
using_ecc = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
if (s->version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen! */
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Add RI if renegotiating */
|
|
if (s->renegotiate) {
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
|
|
s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
|
|
if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
|
|
/* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
|
|
/* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|
|
/* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->tlsext_hostname,
|
|
strlen(s->tlsext_hostname))
|
|
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
|
/* Add SRP username if there is one */
|
|
if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
|
|
/* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
|
|
/* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
|
|
|| !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
|
|
strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
|
|
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
if (using_ecc) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
|
|
*/
|
|
const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurvestmp;
|
|
size_t num_formats;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
|
|
tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
|
|
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
|
|
/* Sub-packet for formats extension */
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
|
|
*/
|
|
/* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */
|
|
pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
|
|
if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
pcurvestmp = pcurves;
|
|
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
|
|
/* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Copy curve ID if supported */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurvestmp += 2) {
|
|
if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[0])
|
|
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[1])) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
|
|
|
|
if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
|
|
size_t ticklen;
|
|
if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
|
|
ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
|
|
else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
|
|
s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
|
|
ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
|
|
s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
|
|
if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
|
|
s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
|
|
s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
|
|
} else
|
|
ticklen = 0;
|
|
if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
|
|
s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
|
|
goto skip_ext;
|
|
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick,
|
|
ticklen)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
skip_ext:
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
|
|
size_t salglen;
|
|
const unsigned char *salg;
|
|
|
|
salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
|
|
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
|
|
/* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|
|
/* Sub-packet for the actual list */
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|
|
|| !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
|
|
if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
|
|
/* Sub-packet for status request extension */
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
|
|
/* Sub-packet for the ids */
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
|
|
unsigned char *idbytes;
|
|
int idlen;
|
|
OCSP_RESPID *id;
|
|
|
|
id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
|
|
idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
|
|
if (idlen <= 0
|
|
/* Sub-packet for an individual id */
|
|
|| !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
|
|
|| i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
|
|
unsigned char *extbytes;
|
|
int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (extlen < 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
|
|
|| i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &extbytes)
|
|
!= extlen) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
|
if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
|
|
* for Next Protocol Negotiation
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
|
|
* this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
|
|
* (see longer comment below)
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
|
|
/* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
|
|
s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
|
|
STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
|
|
SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
|
|
int i, ct;
|
|
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
|
|
/* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|
|
/* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) {
|
|
prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
|
|
if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
|
|
/* Add an empty use_mki value */
|
|
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
|
|
/* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
|
|
if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, pkt, al)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
|
|
if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* TLS1.3 specific extensions */
|
|
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
|
|
int min_version, max_version, reason, currv;
|
|
size_t i, sharessent = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* TODO(TLS1.3): Should we add this extension for versions < TLS1.3? */
|
|
/* supported_versions extension */
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
reason = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version);
|
|
if (reason != 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, reason);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to wheter
|
|
* we should include versions <TLS1.2. For the moment we do. To be
|
|
* reviewed later.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
|
|
/* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this first if clause prior to release!! */
|
|
if (currv == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* key_share extension */
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
|
|
/* Extension data sub-packet */
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|
|
/* KeyShare list sub-packet */
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
|
|
* now, just send one
|
|
*/
|
|
for (i = 0; i < num_curves && sharessent < 1; i++, pcurves += 2) {
|
|
if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
|
|
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
|
|
unsigned int curve_id = 0;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL;
|
|
size_t encodedlen;
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
|
|
/* Shouldn't happen! */
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Generate a key for this key_share */
|
|
curve_id = (pcurves[0] << 8) | pcurves[1];
|
|
key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
|
|
if (key_share_key == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Encode the public key. */
|
|
encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key,
|
|
&encodedPoint);
|
|
if (encodedlen == 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Create KeyShareEntry */
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint,
|
|
encodedlen)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share
|
|
* we're going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY
|
|
* For now we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
|
|
*/
|
|
s->s3->group_id = curve_id;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
|
|
sharessent++;
|
|
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
|
|
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
|
|
* code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
|
|
* appear last.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
|
|
unsigned char *padbytes;
|
|
size_t hlen;
|
|
|
|
if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
|
|
hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
|
|
if (hlen >= 4)
|
|
hlen -= 4;
|
|
else
|
|
hlen = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
|
int next_proto_neg_seen;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
|
unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
|
|
int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
|
|
using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
|
|
!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, pkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
|
|
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
|
|
&& s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
if (using_ecc) {
|
|
const unsigned char *plist;
|
|
size_t plistlen;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
|
|
*/
|
|
tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
|
|
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
|
|
* extension
|
|
*/
|
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
|
|
|
|
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
|
|
* later
|
|
*/
|
|
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
|
|
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
|
|
|| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
|
|
&& (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
|
|
const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
|
|
0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
|
|
0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
|
|
0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
|
|
0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
|
|
0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
|
|
0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
|
|
};
|
|
if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
|
next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
|
|
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
|
|
if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
|
|
const unsigned char *npa;
|
|
unsigned int npalen;
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
|
|
s->
|
|
ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
|
|
if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION && !s->hit) {
|
|
unsigned char *encodedPoint;
|
|
size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
|
|
|
|
ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
|
|
if (ckey == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
|
|
|
|
/* Generate encoding of server key */
|
|
encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint);
|
|
if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey;
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, pkt, al)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
|
|
* for other cases too.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
|
|
|| s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
|
|
|| s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
|
|
|| s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
|
|
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
|
|
else {
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
|
|
s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)
|
|
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
|
|
* pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
|
|
* al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
|
|
* returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
|
|
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
|
|
do {
|
|
/* Protocol names can't be empty. */
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
} while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
|
|
&s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
|
|
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
|
|
* al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
|
|
* returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
|
|
unsigned char selected_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
|
|
int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
|
|
s->s3->alpn_proposed,
|
|
(unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
|
|
s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
|
|
|
|
if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
|
|
s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
|
|
if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
|
/* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
|
|
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
} else {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
/*-
|
|
* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
|
|
* SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
|
|
* Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
|
|
* SNI,
|
|
* elliptic_curves
|
|
* ec_point_formats
|
|
*
|
|
* We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
|
|
* but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
|
|
* Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
|
|
* 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
|
|
*/
|
|
static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int type;
|
|
PACKET sni, tmppkt;
|
|
size_t ext_len;
|
|
|
|
static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
|
|
0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
|
|
0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
|
|
0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
|
|
0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
|
|
0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
|
|
0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
|
|
|
|
0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
|
|
0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
|
|
0x01, /* 1 point format */
|
|
0x00, /* uncompressed */
|
|
/* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
|
|
0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
|
|
0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
|
|
0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
|
|
0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
|
|
0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
|
|
0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
|
|
0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
|
|
0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
|
|
static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
|
|
|
|
tmppkt = hello->extensions;
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
|
|
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
|
|
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
|
|
sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
|
|
|
|
s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
|
|
ext_len);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Process the supported_groups extension if present. Returns success if the
|
|
* extension is absent, or if it has been successfully processed.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns
|
|
* 1 on success
|
|
* 0 on failure
|
|
*/
|
|
static int tls_process_supported_groups(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
PACKET supported_groups_list;
|
|
RAW_EXTENSION *suppgroups = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
|
|
hello->num_extensions,
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups);
|
|
|
|
if (suppgroups == NULL)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
/* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
|
|
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&suppgroups->data,
|
|
&supported_groups_list)
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
|
|
|| (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!s->hit
|
|
&& !PACKET_memdup(&supported_groups_list,
|
|
&s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist,
|
|
&s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
|
|
* and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
|
|
* used.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns:
|
|
* 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is 1)
|
|
* 0 otherwise
|
|
*/
|
|
static int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id,
|
|
const unsigned char *groups, size_t num_groups,
|
|
int checkallow)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
|
|
if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++, groups += 2) {
|
|
unsigned int share_id = (groups[0] << 8) | (groups[1]);
|
|
if (group_id == share_id
|
|
&& (!checkallow || tls_curve_allowed(s, groups,
|
|
SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (i == num_groups) {
|
|
/* Not in list */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Loop through all remaining ClientHello extensions that we collected earlier
|
|
* and haven't already processed. For each one parse it and update the SSL
|
|
* object as required.
|
|
*
|
|
* Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
|
|
* effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
|
|
* ignored.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
|
|
* Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t loop;
|
|
int renegotiate_seen = 0;
|
|
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
s->servername_done = 0;
|
|
s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
|
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
|
|
s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
|
|
s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
|
|
s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
|
|
s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
|
|
ssl_check_for_safari(s, hello);
|
|
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
|
|
|
|
/* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
|
|
s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
|
|
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
|
|
s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
s->srtp_profile = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We process the supported_groups extension first so that is done before
|
|
* we get to key_share which needs to use the information in it.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!tls_process_supported_groups(s, hello)) {
|
|
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
|
|
* unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
|
|
* resumption.
|
|
*/
|
|
for (loop = 0; loop < hello->num_extensions; loop++) {
|
|
RAW_EXTENSION *currext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[loop];
|
|
|
|
if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
|
|
s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, currext->type,
|
|
PACKET_data(&currext->data),
|
|
PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
|
|
s->tlsext_debug_arg);
|
|
|
|
if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
|
|
if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s,
|
|
&currext->data, al))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
renegotiate_seen = 1;
|
|
} else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
|
|
}
|
|
/*-
|
|
* The servername extension is treated as follows:
|
|
*
|
|
* - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
|
|
* - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
|
|
* in which case an fatal alert is generated.
|
|
* - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
|
|
* - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
|
|
* to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
|
|
* - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
|
|
* it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
|
|
* Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
|
|
* set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
|
|
* case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
|
|
* a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
|
|
* presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
|
|
* the value of the Host: field.
|
|
* - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
|
|
* if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
|
|
* session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
|
|
* extension.
|
|
* - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
|
|
*
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
|
|
unsigned int servname_type;
|
|
PACKET sni, hostname;
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data, &sni)
|
|
/* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Although the server_name extension was intended to be
|
|
* extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
|
|
* syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
|
|
* such.
|
|
* RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
|
|
* is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
|
|
* SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
|
|
*
|
|
* Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
|
|
* i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
|
|
|| servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
|
|
|| !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!s->hit) {
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
|
|
*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
|
|
*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
|
|
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->servername_done = 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/*
|
|
* TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
|
|
* fall back to a full handshake.
|
|
*/
|
|
s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
|
|
&& PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
|
|
strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
|
else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
|
|
PACKET srp_I;
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data, &srp_I))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
|
|
* upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
|
|
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
|
|
PACKET ec_point_format_list;
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data,
|
|
&ec_point_format_list)
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!s->hit) {
|
|
if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
|
|
&s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
|
|
&s->
|
|
session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
|
|
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
|
|
else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
|
|
if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
|
|
!s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s,
|
|
PACKET_data(&currext->data),
|
|
PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
|
|
s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
|
|
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
|
|
PACKET supported_sig_algs;
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data,
|
|
&supported_sig_algs)
|
|
|| (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!s->hit) {
|
|
if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
|
|
PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_1(&currext->data,
|
|
(unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
|
|
if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
|
|
const unsigned char *ext_data;
|
|
PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
|
|
(&currext->data, &responder_id_list))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
|
|
* to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
|
|
*/
|
|
sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
|
|
OCSP_RESPID_free);
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
|
|
s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
|
|
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
|
|
OCSP_RESPID *id;
|
|
PACKET responder_id;
|
|
const unsigned char *id_data;
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
|
|
&responder_id)
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
|
|
/* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
|
|
id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
|
|
(int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
|
|
if (id == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
|
|
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
|
|
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Read in request_extensions */
|
|
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(
|
|
&currext->data, &exts))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
|
|
ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
|
|
sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
|
|
X509_EXTENSION_free);
|
|
s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
|
|
d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
|
|
(int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
|
|
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
|
|
|| ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else
|
|
#endif
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
|
|
*/
|
|
s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
|
else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
|
|
&& s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
|
|
/*-
|
|
* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
|
|
* renegotiation.
|
|
*
|
|
* s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
|
|
* probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
|
|
* the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
|
|
* there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
|
|
* earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
|
|
* anything like that, but this might change).
|
|
*
|
|
* A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
|
|
* in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
|
|
* 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
|
|
* in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
|
|
* Finished message could have been computed.)
|
|
*/
|
|
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
else if (currext->type
|
|
== TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
|
|
&& s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
|
|
if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s,
|
|
&currext->data, al))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* session ticket processed earlier */
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
|
|
else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
|
|
&& currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
|
|
if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s,
|
|
&currext->data, al))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
|
|
&& !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
|
|
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
|
|
} else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
|
|
&& s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION && !s->hit) {
|
|
unsigned int group_id;
|
|
PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
|
|
const unsigned char *curves;
|
|
size_t num_curves;
|
|
int group_nid, found = 0;
|
|
unsigned int curve_flags;
|
|
|
|
/* Sanity check */
|
|
if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data, &key_share_list)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
|
|
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
|
|
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list,
|
|
&encoded_pt)
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
|
|
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the
|
|
* rest to verify the structure, but don't process them.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (found)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/* Check this share is in supported_groups */
|
|
if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &curves, &num_curves)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, curves, num_curves, 0)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
|
|
SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Find a share that we can use */
|
|
if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, curves, num_curves, 1)) {
|
|
/* Share not suitable */
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
group_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(group_id, &curve_flags);
|
|
|
|
if (group_nid == 0) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
|
|
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
|
|
/* Can happen for some curves, e.g. X25519 */
|
|
EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
|
|
|
|
if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, group_nid)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(key);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
|
|
if (pctx == NULL
|
|
|| EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
|
|
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx,
|
|
group_nid) <= 0
|
|
|| EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
|
|
pctx = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
s->s3->group_id = group_id;
|
|
|
|
if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
|
|
PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
|
|
PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
found = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Note: extended master secret extension handled in
|
|
* tls_check_client_ems_support()
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
|
|
* nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
|
|
* TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
|
|
* callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
|
|
* ServerHello may be later returned.
|
|
*/
|
|
else if (!s->hit) {
|
|
if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, currext->type,
|
|
PACKET_data(&currext->data),
|
|
PACKET_remaining(&currext->data), al) <= 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Need RI if renegotiating */
|
|
|
|
if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
|
|
!(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
|
|
SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
|
|
* If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
|
|
* The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
|
|
* then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
|
|
*/
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
|
|
{
|
|
int al = -1;
|
|
custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
|
|
if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, hello, &al) <= 0) {
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
|
/*
|
|
* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
|
|
* elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
|
|
* fill the length of the block.
|
|
*/
|
|
static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
PACKET tmp_protocol;
|
|
|
|
while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int length, type, size;
|
|
int tlsext_servername = 0;
|
|
int renegotiate_seen = 0;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
|
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
|
|
s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
|
|
|
|
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
|
|
|
|
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
|
|
goto ri_check;
|
|
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
|
|
const unsigned char *data;
|
|
PACKET spkt;
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
|
|
|| !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
|
|
goto ri_check;
|
|
|
|
if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
|
|
s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
|
|
|
|
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
|
|
if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
renegotiate_seen = 1;
|
|
} else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
|
|
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
|
|
if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
|
|
*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
tlsext_servername = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
|
|
unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
|
|
|| ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
|
|
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!s->hit) {
|
|
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
|
|
if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
|
|
OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
|
|
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
|
|
ecpointformatlist_length;
|
|
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
|
|
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
|
|
ecpointformatlist_length)) {
|
|
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
|
|
|
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
|
|
if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
|
|
!s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
|
|
s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
|
|
{
|
|
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
|
|
*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
|
|
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
|
|
* request message.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
|
|
*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
|
|
s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
|
|
/*
|
|
* Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
|
|
* callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
|
|
* need to let control continue to flow to that.
|
|
*/
|
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
|
|
s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
|
|
/* Simply copy it off for later processing */
|
|
if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
|
|
s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
|
|
if (size > 0) {
|
|
s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
|
|
if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
|
|
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
|
|
s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
|
|
unsigned char *selected;
|
|
unsigned char selected_len;
|
|
/* We must have requested it. */
|
|
if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
|
|
*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/* The data must be valid */
|
|
if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
|
|
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
|
|
size,
|
|
s->
|
|
ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
|
|
SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
|
|
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
|
|
* a single Serverhello
|
|
*/
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
|
|
s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
|
|
if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
|
|
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
|
|
s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
|
|
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
|
|
unsigned len;
|
|
/* We must have requested it. */
|
|
if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
|
|
*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/*-
|
|
* The extension data consists of:
|
|
* uint16 list_length
|
|
* uint8 proto_length;
|
|
* uint8 proto[proto_length];
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
|
|
|| PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
|
|
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
|
|
s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
|
|
if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
|
|
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
|
|
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
|
|
else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
|
|
if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
|
|
/* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
|
|
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) &&
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
|
|
&& s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
|
|
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
|
|
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret &&
|
|
(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->version < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
|
|
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
|
|
if (!s->hit)
|
|
s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
|
|
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
|
|
&& s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
unsigned int group_id;
|
|
PACKET encoded_pt;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Sanity check */
|
|
if (ckey == NULL) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &group_id)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
|
|
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (group_id != s->s3->group_id) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
|
|
* key_share!
|
|
*/
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
|
|
SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
|
|
|
|
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &encoded_pt)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
|
|
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
|
|
PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
|
|
/*
|
|
* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
|
|
* custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
|
|
*/
|
|
} else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
|
|
if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
|
|
if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
|
|
s->session->tlsext_hostname =
|
|
OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
|
|
if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ri_check:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
|
|
* an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
|
|
* because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
|
|
* However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
|
|
* doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
|
|
&& !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
|
|
SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->hit) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
|
|
* original session.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
|
|
!(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
|
|
int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
/*
|
|
* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
|
|
* in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
|
|
*/
|
|
/*
|
|
* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
|
|
* in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
|
|
*/
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
|
|
ret =
|
|
s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
|
|
s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
|
|
else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
|
|
&& s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
|
|
ret =
|
|
s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
|
|
s->
|
|
initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
|
|
|
|
switch (ret) {
|
|
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
|
|
s->servername_done = 0;
|
|
default:
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Initialise digests to default values */
|
|
void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
|
pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
|
|
pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
|
|
else
|
|
pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
|
|
pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
|
|
pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
|
|
pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
|
|
pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int al;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
|
|
/* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
|
|
s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
|
|
s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
|
|
/* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
|
|
s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If sigalgs received process it. */
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
|
|
if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
|
|
if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
|
|
SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
|
|
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
ssl_set_default_md(s);
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Upon success, returns 1.
|
|
* Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
|
|
*/
|
|
int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
|
|
{
|
|
s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
|
|
* called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
|
|
* and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
|
|
* influence which certificate is sent
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
|
|
int ret;
|
|
CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
|
|
certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
|
|
/* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
|
|
if (certpkey != NULL) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
|
|
* et al can pick it up.
|
|
*/
|
|
s->cert->key = certpkey;
|
|
ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
|
|
switch (ret) {
|
|
/* We don't want to send a status request response */
|
|
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
|
|
s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
/* status request response should be sent */
|
|
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
|
|
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
|
|
s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
/* something bad happened */
|
|
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
|
|
default:
|
|
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
|
|
int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
|
|
* suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
|
|
* must contain uncompressed.
|
|
*/
|
|
unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
|
unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
|
|
if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
|
|
&& (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
|
|
&& (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
|
|
&& (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
|
|
&& ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
|
|
/* we are using an ECC cipher */
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
unsigned char *list;
|
|
int found_uncompressed = 0;
|
|
list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
|
|
if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
|
|
found_uncompressed = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!found_uncompressed) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
|
|
SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
|
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
|
|
|
|
if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
|
|
ret =
|
|
s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
|
|
s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
|
|
else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
|
|
&& s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
|
|
ret =
|
|
s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
|
|
s->
|
|
initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
|
|
* that we don't receive a status message
|
|
*/
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
|
|
s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
|
|
s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = 0;
|
|
|
|
switch (ret) {
|
|
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
|
|
s->servername_done = 0;
|
|
default:
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
|
|
{
|
|
int al = -1;
|
|
if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Given a list of extensions that we collected earlier, find one of a given
|
|
* type and return it.
|
|
*
|
|
* |exts| is the set of extensions previously collected.
|
|
* |numexts| is the number of extensions that we have.
|
|
* |type| the type of the extension that we are looking for.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns a pointer to the found RAW_EXTENSION data, or NULL if not found.
|
|
*/
|
|
RAW_EXTENSION *tls_get_extension_by_type(RAW_EXTENSION *exts, size_t numexts,
|
|
unsigned int type)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t loop;
|
|
|
|
for (loop = 0; loop < numexts; loop++) {
|
|
if (exts[loop].type == type)
|
|
return &exts[loop];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
|
|
*
|
|
* hello: The parsed ClientHello data
|
|
* ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
|
|
* point to the resulting session.
|
|
*
|
|
* If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
|
|
* ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
|
|
* never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns:
|
|
* -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
|
|
* 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
|
|
* 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
|
|
* session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
|
|
* 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
|
|
* couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
|
|
* 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
|
|
*
|
|
* Side effects:
|
|
* Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
|
|
* a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
|
|
* (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
|
|
* a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
|
|
* s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
|
|
* Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
|
|
*/
|
|
int tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
|
|
SSL_SESSION **ret)
|
|
{
|
|
int retv;
|
|
const unsigned char *etick;
|
|
size_t size;
|
|
RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
|
|
|
|
*ret = NULL;
|
|
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
|
|
* resumption.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
ticketext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
|
|
hello->num_extensions,
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket);
|
|
if (ticketext == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
|
|
if (size == 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
|
|
* one.
|
|
*/
|
|
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
|
|
* generating the session from ticket now, trigger
|
|
* abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
|
|
* calculate the master secret later.
|
|
*/
|
|
return 2;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ticketext->data, &etick, size)) {
|
|
/* Shouldn't ever happen */
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, hello->session_id,
|
|
hello->session_id_len, ret);
|
|
switch (retv) {
|
|
case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
|
|
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
|
|
return 2;
|
|
|
|
case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
|
|
return 3;
|
|
|
|
case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
|
|
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
|
|
return 3;
|
|
|
|
default: /* fatal error */
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Sets the extended master secret flag if the extension is present in the
|
|
* ClientHello and we can support it
|
|
* Returns:
|
|
* 1 on success
|
|
* 0 on error
|
|
*/
|
|
int tls_check_client_ems_support(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
|
|
{
|
|
RAW_EXTENSION *emsext;
|
|
|
|
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
|
|
|
|
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION
|
|
|| s->version > TLS1_2_VERSION))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
emsext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
|
|
hello->num_extensions,
|
|
TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* No extensions is a success - we have successfully discovered that the
|
|
* client doesn't support EMS.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (emsext == NULL)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
/* The extensions must always be empty */
|
|
if (PACKET_remaining(&emsext->data) != 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
|
|
*
|
|
* etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
|
|
* eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
|
|
* sess_id: points at the session ID.
|
|
* sesslen: the length of the session ID.
|
|
* psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
|
|
* point to the resulting session.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns:
|
|
* -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
|
|
* -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
|
|
* 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
|
|
* 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
|
|
* 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
|
|
size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
|
|
size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL_SESSION *sess;
|
|
unsigned char *sdec;
|
|
const unsigned char *p;
|
|
int slen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1, declen;
|
|
size_t mlen;
|
|
unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
|
HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
|
|
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
|
|
hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
|
|
if (hctx == NULL)
|
|
return -2;
|
|
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
|
|
if (ctx == NULL) {
|
|
ret = -2;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
|
|
unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
|
|
int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
|
|
ctx, hctx, 0);
|
|
if (rv < 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
if (rv == 0) {
|
|
ret = 2;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (rv == 2)
|
|
renew_ticket = 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Check key name matches */
|
|
if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
|
|
sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
|
|
ret = 2;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
|
|
sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
|
|
EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
|
|
|| EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
|
|
tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
|
|
etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
|
|
0) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
|
|
* checks on ticket.
|
|
*/
|
|
mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
|
|
if (mlen == 0) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
|
|
if (eticklen <=
|
|
TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
|
|
ret = 2;
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
eticklen -= mlen;
|
|
/* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
|
|
if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
|
|
|| HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
|
|
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
|
|
return 2;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
|
|
/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
|
|
p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
|
|
eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
|
|
sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
|
|
if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
|
|
(int)eticklen) <= 0) {
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
|
|
return 2;
|
|
}
|
|
slen += declen;
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
|
|
ctx = NULL;
|
|
p = sdec;
|
|
|
|
sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
|
|
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
|
|
if (sess) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
|
|
* that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
|
|
* structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
|
|
* standard.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (sesslen)
|
|
memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
|
|
sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
|
|
*psess = sess;
|
|
if (renew_ticket)
|
|
return 4;
|
|
else
|
|
return 3;
|
|
}
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
/*
|
|
* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
|
|
*/
|
|
return 2;
|
|
err:
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
|
|
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
|
|
|
|
typedef struct {
|
|
int nid;
|
|
int id;
|
|
} tls12_lookup;
|
|
|
|
static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
|
|
{NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
|
|
{NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
|
|
{NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
|
|
{NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
|
|
{NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
|
|
{NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
|
|
{NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
|
|
{NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
|
|
{NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
|
|
{EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
|
|
{EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
|
|
{EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
|
|
{NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
|
|
{NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
|
|
{NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
|
|
if (table[i].nid == nid)
|
|
return table[i].id;
|
|
}
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
|
|
if ((table[i].id) == id)
|
|
return table[i].nid;
|
|
}
|
|
return NID_undef;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls12_get_sigandhash(WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
|
|
{
|
|
int sig_id, md_id;
|
|
|
|
if (md == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
|
|
if (md_id == -1)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
|
|
if (sig_id == -1)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, md_id) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, sig_id))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
|
|
{
|
|
return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
typedef struct {
|
|
int nid;
|
|
int secbits;
|
|
int md_idx;
|
|
unsigned char tlsext_hash;
|
|
} tls12_hash_info;
|
|
|
|
static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
|
|
{NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
|
|
{NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
|
|
{NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
|
|
{NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
|
|
{NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
|
|
{NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
|
|
{NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
|
|
{NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
|
|
TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
|
|
{NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
|
|
TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int i;
|
|
if (hash_alg == 0)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
|
|
if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
|
|
return tls12_md_info + i;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
|
|
{
|
|
const tls12_hash_info *inf;
|
|
if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
|
|
if (!inf)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (sig_alg) {
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
|
|
return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
|
case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
|
|
return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
|
|
return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
|
|
case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
|
|
return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
|
|
|
|
case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
|
|
return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
|
|
|
|
case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
|
|
return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
|
|
static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
|
|
int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
|
|
{
|
|
int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
|
|
if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
|
|
return;
|
|
if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
|
|
hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
|
|
if (phash_nid)
|
|
*phash_nid = hash_nid;
|
|
}
|
|
if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
|
|
sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
|
|
if (psign_nid)
|
|
*psign_nid = sign_nid;
|
|
}
|
|
if (psignhash_nid) {
|
|
if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
|
|
|| OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
|
|
*psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
|
|
static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
|
|
{
|
|
/* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
|
|
const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
|
|
if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* See if public key algorithm allowed */
|
|
if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* Finally see if security callback allows it */
|
|
return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
|
|
* algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
|
|
* disabled.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
|
|
{
|
|
const unsigned char *sigalgs;
|
|
size_t i, sigalgslen;
|
|
int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
|
|
* RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
|
|
* down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
|
|
*/
|
|
sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
|
|
switch (sigalgs[1]) {
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
|
|
if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
|
|
have_rsa = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
|
case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
|
|
if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
|
|
have_dsa = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
|
|
if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
|
|
have_ecdsa = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!have_rsa)
|
|
*pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
|
|
if (!have_dsa)
|
|
*pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
|
|
if (!have_ecdsa)
|
|
*pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
|
|
const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
|
|
if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
|
|
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[0])
|
|
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[1]))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
|
|
static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
|
|
const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
|
|
const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
|
|
{
|
|
const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
|
|
size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
|
|
for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
|
|
/* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
|
|
if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
|
|
continue;
|
|
for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
|
|
if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
|
|
nmatch++;
|
|
if (shsig) {
|
|
shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
|
|
shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
|
|
tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
|
|
&shsig->sign_nid,
|
|
&shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
|
|
shsig++;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return nmatch;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
|
|
static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
|
|
size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
|
|
size_t nmatch;
|
|
TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
|
|
CERT *c = s->cert;
|
|
unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
|
|
c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
|
|
c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
|
|
/* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
|
|
if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
|
|
conf = c->client_sigalgs;
|
|
conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
|
|
} else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
|
|
conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
|
|
conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
|
|
} else
|
|
conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
|
|
if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
|
|
pref = conf;
|
|
preflen = conflen;
|
|
allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
|
|
allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
|
|
} else {
|
|
allow = conf;
|
|
allowlen = conflen;
|
|
pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
|
|
preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
|
|
}
|
|
nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
|
|
if (nmatch) {
|
|
salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
|
|
if (salgs == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
|
|
} else {
|
|
salgs = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
|
|
c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
|
|
|
|
int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, size_t dsize)
|
|
{
|
|
CERT *c = s->cert;
|
|
/* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
|
|
if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
/* Should never happen */
|
|
if (!c)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
|
|
s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
|
|
memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int idx;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
const EVP_MD *md;
|
|
const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
|
|
uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
|
|
CERT *c = s->cert;
|
|
TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
|
|
if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
|
|
i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
|
|
idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
|
|
if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
|
|
md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
|
|
pmd[idx] = md;
|
|
pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
|
|
if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
|
|
pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
|
|
pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
|
|
* the certificate for signing.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
|
|
* supported it stays as NULL.
|
|
*/
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
|
if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
|
|
pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
|
|
pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
|
|
pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
|
if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
|
|
pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
|
|
if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
|
|
pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
|
|
if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
|
|
pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
|
|
EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
|
|
if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
|
|
pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
|
|
EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
|
|
int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
|
|
unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
|
|
{
|
|
const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
|
|
size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
|
|
if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (idx >= 0) {
|
|
idx <<= 1;
|
|
if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
psig += idx;
|
|
if (rhash)
|
|
*rhash = psig[0];
|
|
if (rsig)
|
|
*rsig = psig[1];
|
|
tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
|
|
}
|
|
return (int)numsigalgs;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
|
|
int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
|
|
unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
|
|
{
|
|
TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
|
|
if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
|
|
|| s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
shsigalgs += idx;
|
|
if (phash)
|
|
*phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
|
|
if (psign)
|
|
*psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
|
|
if (psignhash)
|
|
*psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
|
|
if (rsig)
|
|
*rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
|
|
if (rhash)
|
|
*rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
|
|
return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
|
|
|
|
typedef struct {
|
|
size_t sigalgcnt;
|
|
int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
|
|
} sig_cb_st;
|
|
|
|
static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
|
|
{
|
|
if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
|
|
*psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
|
|
} else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
|
|
*psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
|
|
} else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
|
|
*psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
|
|
} else {
|
|
*phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
|
|
if (*phash == NID_undef)
|
|
*phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
char etmp[20], *p;
|
|
int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
|
|
if (elem == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
|
|
etmp[len] = 0;
|
|
p = strchr(etmp, '+');
|
|
if (!p)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
*p = 0;
|
|
p++;
|
|
if (!*p)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
|
|
get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
|
|
|
|
if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
|
|
if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
|
|
sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
|
|
* form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
|
|
*/
|
|
int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
|
|
{
|
|
sig_cb_st sig;
|
|
sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
|
|
if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (c == NULL)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
|
|
int rhash, rsign;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
if (salglen & 1)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
|
|
if (sigalgs == NULL)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
|
|
rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
|
|
rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
|
|
|
|
if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
*sptr++ = rhash;
|
|
*sptr++ = rsign;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (client) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
|
|
c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
|
|
c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
|
|
} else {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
|
|
c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
|
|
c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
|
|
{
|
|
int sig_nid;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
if (default_nid == -1)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
|
|
if (default_nid)
|
|
return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
|
|
if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
|
|
static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
|
|
{
|
|
X509_NAME *nm;
|
|
int i;
|
|
nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
|
|
if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
|
|
* server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
|
|
* passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
|
|
* attempting to use them.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
|
|
|
|
#define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
|
|
(CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
|
|
/* Strict mode flags */
|
|
#define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
|
|
(CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
|
|
| CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
|
|
|
|
int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
|
|
int idx)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
int rv = 0;
|
|
int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
|
|
CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
|
|
CERT *c = s->cert;
|
|
uint32_t *pvalid;
|
|
unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
|
|
/* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
|
|
if (idx != -1) {
|
|
/* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
|
|
if (idx == -2) {
|
|
cpk = c->key;
|
|
idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
|
|
} else
|
|
cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
|
|
pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
|
|
x = cpk->x509;
|
|
pk = cpk->privatekey;
|
|
chain = cpk->chain;
|
|
strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
|
|
/* If no cert or key, forget it */
|
|
if (!x || !pk)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (!x || !pk)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
|
|
if (idx == -1)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
|
|
|
|
if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
|
|
check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
|
|
else
|
|
check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
|
|
strict_mode = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (suiteb_flags) {
|
|
int ok;
|
|
if (check_flags)
|
|
check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
|
|
ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
|
|
if (ok == X509_V_OK)
|
|
rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
|
|
else if (!check_flags)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
|
|
* algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
|
|
int default_nid;
|
|
unsigned char rsign = 0;
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
|
|
default_nid = 0;
|
|
/* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
|
|
else {
|
|
switch (idx) {
|
|
case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
|
|
case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
|
|
rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
|
|
default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
|
|
rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
|
|
default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
|
|
rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
|
|
default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
|
|
rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
|
|
default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
|
|
rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
|
|
default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
|
|
rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
|
|
default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
default_nid = -1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
|
|
* preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
|
|
size_t j;
|
|
const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
|
|
for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
|
|
if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
|
|
if (check_flags)
|
|
goto skip_sigs;
|
|
else
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
|
|
if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
|
|
if (!check_flags)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
} else
|
|
rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
|
|
rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
|
|
if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
|
|
if (check_flags) {
|
|
rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
|
|
break;
|
|
} else
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
|
|
else if (check_flags)
|
|
rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
|
|
skip_sigs:
|
|
/* Check cert parameters are consistent */
|
|
if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
|
|
rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
|
|
else if (!check_flags)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
if (!s->server)
|
|
rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
|
|
/* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
|
|
else if (strict_mode) {
|
|
rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
|
|
X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
|
|
if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
|
|
if (check_flags) {
|
|
rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
|
|
break;
|
|
} else
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
|
|
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
|
|
int check_type = 0;
|
|
switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
|
|
check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
|
|
break;
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
|
|
check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
|
|
break;
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_EC:
|
|
check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (check_type) {
|
|
const unsigned char *ctypes;
|
|
int ctypelen;
|
|
if (c->ctypes) {
|
|
ctypes = c->ctypes;
|
|
ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
|
|
} else {
|
|
ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
|
|
ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
|
|
}
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
|
|
if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
|
|
rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
|
|
goto end;
|
|
} else
|
|
rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
|
|
|
|
ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
|
|
|
|
if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
|
|
rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
|
|
|
|
if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
|
|
if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
|
|
rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
|
|
X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
|
|
if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
|
|
rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
|
|
goto end;
|
|
} else
|
|
rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
|
|
|
|
if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
|
|
rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
|
|
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
|
|
if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
|
|
rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
|
|
else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
|
|
rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
|
|
} else
|
|
rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
|
|
* chain is invalid.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!check_flags) {
|
|
if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
|
|
*pvalid = rv;
|
|
else {
|
|
/* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
|
|
*pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
|
|
void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
|
|
tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
|
|
tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
|
|
tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
|
|
tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
|
|
tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
|
|
tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
|
|
int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
|
|
{
|
|
return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
|
DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int dh_secbits = 80;
|
|
if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
|
|
return DH_get_1024_160();
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
|
|
dh_secbits = 128;
|
|
else
|
|
dh_secbits = 80;
|
|
} else {
|
|
CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
|
|
dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
|
|
DH *dhp = DH_new();
|
|
BIGNUM *p, *g;
|
|
if (dhp == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
g = BN_new();
|
|
if (g != NULL)
|
|
BN_set_word(g, 2);
|
|
if (dh_secbits >= 192)
|
|
p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
|
|
else
|
|
p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
|
|
if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
|
|
DH_free(dhp);
|
|
BN_free(p);
|
|
BN_free(g);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
return dhp;
|
|
}
|
|
if (dh_secbits >= 112)
|
|
return DH_get_2048_224();
|
|
return DH_get_1024_160();
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
|
|
{
|
|
int secbits = -1;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
|
|
if (pkey) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
|
|
* security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
|
|
* reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
|
|
* omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
|
|
*/
|
|
secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
|
|
}
|
|
if (s)
|
|
return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
|
|
else
|
|
return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
|
|
int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
|
|
/* Don't check signature if self signed */
|
|
if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
|
|
if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
|
|
const EVP_MD *md;
|
|
if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
|
|
secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
|
|
}
|
|
if (s)
|
|
return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
|
|
else
|
|
return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
|
|
{
|
|
if (vfy)
|
|
vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
|
|
if (is_ee) {
|
|
if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
|
|
return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
|
|
return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
|
|
return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
|
|
* x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
|
|
* one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
|
|
{
|
|
int rv, start_idx, i;
|
|
if (x == NULL) {
|
|
x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
|
|
start_idx = 1;
|
|
} else
|
|
start_idx = 0;
|
|
|
|
rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
|
|
if (rv != 1)
|
|
return rv;
|
|
|
|
for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
|
|
x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
|
|
rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
|
|
if (rv != 1)
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|