openssl/test/verify_extra_test.c
Peiwei Hu 8baf61d51b Fix wrong return value checks for some functions
- in particular in use of X509_LOOKUP_load_file, EVP_PKEY_print_params,
EVP_PKEY_keygen, X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d, EVP_PKEY_keygen_init

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25811)
2024-11-22 12:10:26 +01:00

342 lines
8.7 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright 2015-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include "testutil.h"
static const char *certs_dir;
static char *root_f = NULL;
static char *roots_f = NULL;
static char *untrusted_f = NULL;
static char *bad_f = NULL;
static char *req_f = NULL;
static char *sroot_cert = NULL;
static char *ca_cert = NULL;
static char *ee_cert = NULL;
#define load_cert_from_file(file) load_cert_pem(file, NULL)
/*-
* Test for CVE-2015-1793 (Alternate Chains Certificate Forgery)
*
* Chain is as follows:
*
* rootCA (self-signed)
* |
* interCA
* |
* subinterCA subinterCA (self-signed)
* | |
* leaf ------------------
* |
* bad
*
* rootCA, interCA, subinterCA, subinterCA (ss) all have CA=TRUE
* leaf and bad have CA=FALSE
*
* subinterCA and subinterCA (ss) have the same subject name and keys
*
* interCA (but not rootCA) and subinterCA (ss) are in the trusted store
* (roots.pem)
* leaf and subinterCA are in the untrusted list (untrusted.pem)
* bad is the certificate being verified (bad.pem)
*
* Versions vulnerable to CVE-2015-1793 will fail to detect that leaf has
* CA=FALSE, and will therefore incorrectly verify bad
*
*/
static int test_alt_chains_cert_forgery(void)
{
int ret = 0;
int i;
X509 *x = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = NULL;
X509_STORE_CTX *sctx = NULL;
X509_STORE *store = NULL;
X509_LOOKUP *lookup = NULL;
store = X509_STORE_new();
if (store == NULL)
goto err;
lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(store, X509_LOOKUP_file());
if (lookup == NULL)
goto err;
if (X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, roots_f, X509_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0)
goto err;
untrusted = load_certs_pem(untrusted_f);
if ((x = load_cert_from_file(bad_f)) == NULL)
goto err;
sctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
if (sctx == NULL)
goto err;
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(sctx, store, x, untrusted))
goto err;
i = X509_verify_cert(sctx);
if (i == 0 && X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(sctx) == X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA) {
/* This is the result we were expecting: Test passed */
ret = 1;
}
err:
X509_STORE_CTX_free(sctx);
X509_free(x);
OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(untrusted);
X509_STORE_free(store);
return ret;
}
static int test_distinguishing_id(void)
{
X509 *x = NULL;
int ret = 0;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *v = NULL, *v2 = NULL;
char *distid = "this is an ID";
x = load_cert_from_file(bad_f);
if (x == NULL)
goto err;
v = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
if (v == NULL)
goto err;
if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(v, (unsigned char *)distid,
(int)strlen(distid))) {
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(v);
goto err;
}
X509_set0_distinguishing_id(x, v);
v2 = X509_get0_distinguishing_id(x);
if (!TEST_ptr(v2)
|| !TEST_int_eq(ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(v, v2), 0))
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
X509_free(x);
return ret;
}
static int test_req_distinguishing_id(void)
{
X509_REQ *x = NULL;
BIO *bio = NULL;
int ret = 0;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *v = NULL, *v2 = NULL;
char *distid = "this is an ID";
bio = BIO_new_file(req_f, "r");
if (bio == NULL)
goto err;
x = PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ(bio, NULL, 0, NULL);
if (x == NULL)
goto err;
v = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
if (v == NULL)
goto err;
if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(v, (unsigned char *)distid,
(int)strlen(distid))) {
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(v);
goto err;
}
X509_REQ_set0_distinguishing_id(x, v);
v2 = X509_REQ_get0_distinguishing_id(x);
if (!TEST_ptr(v2)
|| !TEST_int_eq(ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(v, v2), 0))
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
X509_REQ_free(x);
BIO_free(bio);
return ret;
}
static int test_self_signed(const char *filename, int use_trusted, int expected)
{
X509 *cert = load_cert_from_file(filename); /* may result in NULL */
STACK_OF(X509) *trusted = sk_X509_new_null();
X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
int ret;
ret = TEST_int_eq(X509_self_signed(cert, 1), expected);
if (cert != NULL) {
if (use_trusted)
ret = ret && TEST_true(sk_X509_push(trusted, cert));
ret = ret && TEST_true(X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, NULL, cert, NULL));
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(ctx, trusted);
ret = ret && TEST_int_eq(X509_verify_cert(ctx), expected);
}
X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
sk_X509_free(trusted);
X509_free(cert);
return ret;
}
static int test_self_signed_good(void)
{
return test_self_signed(root_f, 1, 1);
}
static int test_self_signed_bad(void)
{
return test_self_signed(bad_f, 1, 0);
}
static int test_self_signed_error(void)
{
return test_self_signed("nonexistent file name", 1, -1);
}
static int test_store_ctx(void)
{
/* Verifying a cert where we have no trusted certs should fail */
return test_self_signed(bad_f, 0, 0);
}
static int do_test_purpose(int purpose, int expected)
{
X509 *eecert = load_cert_from_file(ee_cert); /* may result in NULL */
X509 *untrcert = load_cert_from_file(ca_cert);
X509 *trcert = load_cert_from_file(sroot_cert);
STACK_OF(X509) *trusted = sk_X509_new_null();
STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted = sk_X509_new_null();
X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
int testresult = 0;
if (!TEST_ptr(eecert)
|| !TEST_ptr(untrcert)
|| !TEST_ptr(trcert)
|| !TEST_ptr(trusted)
|| !TEST_ptr(untrusted)
|| !TEST_ptr(ctx))
goto err;
if (!TEST_true(sk_X509_push(trusted, trcert)))
goto err;
trcert = NULL;
if (!TEST_true(sk_X509_push(untrusted, untrcert)))
goto err;
untrcert = NULL;
if (!TEST_true(X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, NULL, eecert, untrusted)))
goto err;
if (!TEST_true(X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(ctx, purpose)))
goto err;
/*
* X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack() is bady named. Despite the set0 name
* we are still responsible for freeing trusted after we have finished with
* it.
*/
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(ctx, trusted);
if (!TEST_int_eq(X509_verify_cert(ctx), expected))
goto err;
testresult = 1;
err:
OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(trusted);
OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(untrusted);
X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
X509_free(eecert);
X509_free(untrcert);
X509_free(trcert);
return testresult;
}
static int test_purpose_ssl_client(void)
{
return do_test_purpose(X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, 0);
}
static int test_purpose_ssl_server(void)
{
return do_test_purpose(X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, 1);
}
static int test_purpose_any(void)
{
return do_test_purpose(X509_PURPOSE_ANY, 1);
}
OPT_TEST_DECLARE_USAGE("certs-dir\n")
int setup_tests(void)
{
if (!test_skip_common_options()) {
TEST_error("Error parsing test options\n");
return 0;
}
if (!TEST_ptr(certs_dir = test_get_argument(0)))
return 0;
if (!TEST_ptr(root_f = test_mk_file_path(certs_dir, "rootCA.pem"))
|| !TEST_ptr(roots_f = test_mk_file_path(certs_dir, "roots.pem"))
|| !TEST_ptr(untrusted_f = test_mk_file_path(certs_dir, "untrusted.pem"))
|| !TEST_ptr(bad_f = test_mk_file_path(certs_dir, "bad.pem"))
|| !TEST_ptr(req_f = test_mk_file_path(certs_dir, "sm2-csr.pem"))
|| !TEST_ptr(sroot_cert = test_mk_file_path(certs_dir, "sroot-cert.pem"))
|| !TEST_ptr(ca_cert = test_mk_file_path(certs_dir, "ca-cert.pem"))
|| !TEST_ptr(ee_cert = test_mk_file_path(certs_dir, "ee-cert.pem")))
goto err;
ADD_TEST(test_alt_chains_cert_forgery);
ADD_TEST(test_store_ctx);
ADD_TEST(test_distinguishing_id);
ADD_TEST(test_req_distinguishing_id);
ADD_TEST(test_self_signed_good);
ADD_TEST(test_self_signed_bad);
ADD_TEST(test_self_signed_error);
ADD_TEST(test_purpose_ssl_client);
ADD_TEST(test_purpose_ssl_server);
ADD_TEST(test_purpose_any);
return 1;
err:
cleanup_tests();
return 0;
}
void cleanup_tests(void)
{
OPENSSL_free(root_f);
OPENSSL_free(roots_f);
OPENSSL_free(untrusted_f);
OPENSSL_free(bad_f);
OPENSSL_free(req_f);
OPENSSL_free(sroot_cert);
OPENSSL_free(ca_cert);
OPENSSL_free(ee_cert);
}