Properties are a sequence of comma separated name=value pairs. A name
without a corresponding value is assumed to be a Boolean and have the
true value 'yes'. Values are either strings or numbers. Strings can be
quoted either _"_ or _'_ or unquoted (with restrictions). There are no
escape characters inside strings. Number are either decimal digits or
'0x' followed by hexidecimal digits. Numbers are represented internally
as signed sixty four bit values.
Queries on properties are a sequence comma separated conditional tests.
These take the form of name=value (equality test), name!=value (inequality
test) or name (Boolean test for truth). Queries can be parsed, compared
against a definition or merged pairwise.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8224)
This commit adds a dedicated function in `EC_METHOD` to access a modular
field inversion implementation suitable for the specifics of the
implemented curve, featuring SCA countermeasures.
The new pointer is defined as:
`int (*field_inv)(const EC_GROUP*, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX*)`
and computes the multiplicative inverse of `a` in the underlying field,
storing the result in `r`.
Three implementations are included, each including specific SCA
countermeasures:
- `ec_GFp_simple_field_inv()`, featuring SCA hardening through
blinding.
- `ec_GFp_mont_field_inv()`, featuring SCA hardening through Fermat's
Little Theorem (FLT) inversion.
- `ec_GF2m_simple_field_inv()`, that uses `BN_GF2m_mod_inv()` which
already features SCA hardening through blinding.
From a security point of view, this also helps addressing a leakage
previously affecting conversions from projective to affine coordinates.
This commit also adds a new error reason code (i.e.,
`EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT`) to improve consistency between the three
implementations as all of them could fail for the same reason but
through different code paths resulting in inconsistent error stack
states.
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8254)
The original 1.1.1 design was to use SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START and
SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE to signal start/end of a post-handshake message
exchange in TLSv1.3. Unfortunately experience has shown that this confuses
some applications who mistake it for a TLSv1.2 renegotiation. This means
that KeyUpdate messages are not handled properly.
This commit removes the use of SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START and
SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE to signal the start/end of a post-handshake
message exchange. Individual post-handshake messages are still signalled in
the normal way.
This is a potentially breaking change if there are any applications already
written that expect to see these TLSv1.3 events. However, without it,
KeyUpdate is not currently usable for many applications.
Fixes#8069
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8096)
Changed PKEY/KDF API to call the new API.
Added wrappers for PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC() and EVP_PBE_scrypt() to call the new EVP KDF APIs.
Documentation updated.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6674)
Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7859)
Signed-off-by: Antoine Salon <asalon@vmware.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8172)
Trim trailing whitespace. It doesn't match OpenSSL coding standards,
AFAICT, and it can cause problems with git tooling.
Trailing whitespace remains in test data and external source.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8092)
When computing the end-point shared secret, don't take the
terminating NULL character into account.
Please note that this fix breaks interoperability with older
versions of OpenSSL, which are not fixed.
Fixes#7956
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7957)
Based originally on github.com/dfoxfranke/libaes_siv
This creates an SIV128 mode that uses EVP interfaces for the CBC, CTR
and CMAC code to reduce complexity at the cost of perfomance. The
expected use is for short inputs, not TLS-sized records.
Add multiple AAD input capacity in the EVP tests.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3540)
Signed-off-by: Boris Pismenny <borisp@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5253)
It turns out that the strictness that was implemented in
EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() (see Github openssl/openssl#6880) was badly placed
for some usages, and that it's better to do this check only when the
method is getting registered.
Fixes#7758
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7847)
This applies to the 'master' git branch and OpenSSL version 3.0.0 and
up. Pre-3.0.0 versions retain the previous license.
The boilerplate will change in increments after this change.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7764)
Previously, the API version limit was indicated with a numeric version
number. This was "natural" in the pre-3.0.0 because the version was
this simple number.
With 3.0.0, the version is divided into three separate numbers, and
it's only the major number that counts, but we still need to be able
to support pre-3.0.0 version limits.
Therefore, we allow OPENSSL_API_COMPAT to be defined with a pre-3.0.0
style numeric version number or with a simple major number, i.e. can
be defined like this for any application:
-D OPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10100000L
-D OPENSSL_API_COMPAT=3
Since the pre-3.0.0 numerical version numbers are high, it's easy to
distinguish between a simple major number and a pre-3.0.0 numerical
version number and to thereby support both forms at the same time.
Internally, we define the following macros depending on the value of
OPENSSL_API_COMPAT:
OPENSSL_API_0_9_8
OPENSSL_API_1_0_0
OPENSSL_API_1_1_0
OPENSSL_API_3
They indicate that functions marked for deprecation in the
corresponding major release shall not be built if defined.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7724)
We're strictly use version numbers of the form MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH.
Letter releases are things of days past.
The most central change is that we now express the version number with
three macros, one for each part of the version number:
OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR
OPENSSL_VERSION_MINOR
OPENSSL_VERSION_PATCH
We also provide two additional macros to express pre-release and build
metadata information (also specified in semantic versioning):
OPENSSL_VERSION_PRE_RELEASE
OPENSSL_VERSION_BUILD_METADATA
To get the library's idea of all those values, we introduce the
following functions:
unsigned int OPENSSL_version_major(void);
unsigned int OPENSSL_version_minor(void);
unsigned int OPENSSL_version_patch(void);
const char *OPENSSL_version_pre_release(void);
const char *OPENSSL_version_build_metadata(void);
Additionally, for shared library versioning (which is out of scope in
semantic versioning, but that we still need):
OPENSSL_SHLIB_VERSION
We also provide a macro that contains the release date. This is not
part of the version number, but is extra information that we want to
be able to display:
OPENSSL_RELEASE_DATE
Finally, also provide the following convenience functions:
const char *OPENSSL_version_text(void);
const char *OPENSSL_version_text_full(void);
The following macros and functions are deprecated, and while currently
existing for backward compatibility, they are expected to disappear:
OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER
OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
OPENSSL_VERSION
OpenSSL_version_num()
OpenSSL_version()
Also, this function is introduced to replace OpenSSL_version() for all
indexes except for OPENSSL_VERSION:
OPENSSL_info()
For configuration, the option 'newversion-only' is added to disable all
the macros and functions that are mentioned as deprecated above.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7724)
Also adds missing copyright boilerplate to util/mktar.sh
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7696)
This adds a keyword SUBDIRS for build.info, to be used like this:
SUBDIRS=foo bar
This tells Configure that it should look for 'build.info' in the
relative subdirectories 'foo' and 'bar' as well.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7558)
Remove GMAC demo program because it has been superceded by the EVP MAC one
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7548)
Signed-off-by: Antoine Salon <asalon@vmware.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7345)
Replace ECDH_KDF_X9_62() with internal ecdh_KDF_X9_63()
Signed-off-by: Antoine Salon <asalon@vmware.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7345)
In pull request #4328 the seeding of the DRBG via RAND_add()/RAND_seed()
was implemented by buffering the data in a random pool where it is
picked up later by the rand_drbg_get_entropy() callback. This buffer
was limited to the size of 4096 bytes.
When a larger input was added via RAND_add() or RAND_seed() to the DRBG,
the reseeding failed, but the error returned by the DRBG was ignored
by the two calling functions, which both don't return an error code.
As a consequence, the data provided by the application was effectively
ignored.
This commit fixes the problem by a more efficient implementation which
does not copy the data in memory and by raising the buffer the size limit
to INT32_MAX (2 gigabytes). This is less than the NIST limit of 2^35 bits
but it was chosen intentionally to avoid platform dependent problems
like integer sizes and/or signed/unsigned conversion.
Additionally, the DRBG is now less permissive on errors: In addition to
pushing a message to the openssl error stack, it enters the error state,
which forces a reinstantiation on next call.
Thanks go to Dr. Falko Strenzke for reporting this issue to the
openssl-security mailing list. After internal discussion the issue
has been categorized as not being security relevant, because the DRBG
reseeds automatically and is fully functional even without additional
randomness provided by the application.
Fixes#7381
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7382)
This will allow to have different object files for different products,
even if they share the same source code, and possibly different builds
for those different object files.
For example, one can have something like this:
SOURCES[libfoo]=cookie.c
INCLUDES[libfoo]=include/foo
SOURCES[libbar]=cookie.c
INCLUDES[libbar]=include/bar
This would mean that the object files and libraries would be build
somewhat like this:
$(CC) -Iinclude/foo -o libfoo-lib-cookie.o cookie.c
$(AR) $(ARFLAGS) libfoo.a libfoo-lib-cookie.o
$(CC) -Iinclude/bar -o libbar-lib-cookie.o cookie.c
$(AR) $(ARFLAGS) libbar.a libbar-lib-cookie.o
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7159)
Add a check that the two keys used for AES-XTS are different.
One test case uses the same key for both of the AES-XTS keys. This causes
a failure under FIP 140-2 IG A.9. Mark the test as returning a failure.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7120)
The OMC hasn't yet decided what the next release version will be, but
it's at least going to 1.1.2, so we set that value for the moment.
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7180)
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6870)
This commit leverages the Montgomery ladder scaffold introduced in #6690
(alongside a specialized Lopez-Dahab ladder for binary curves) to
provide a specialized differential addition-and-double implementation to
speedup prime curves, while keeping all the features of
`ec_scalar_mul_ladder` against SCA attacks.
The arithmetic in ladder_pre, ladder_step and ladder_post is auto
generated with tooling, from the following formulae:
- `ladder_pre`: Formula 3 for doubling from Izu-Takagi "A fast parallel
elliptic curve multiplication resistant against side channel attacks",
as described at
https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-xz.html#doubling-dbl-2002-it-2
- `ladder_step`: differential addition-and-doubling Eq. (8) and (10)
from Izu-Takagi "A fast parallel elliptic curve multiplication
resistant against side channel attacks", as described at
https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-xz.html#ladder-ladd-2002-it-3
- `ladder_post`: y-coordinate recovery using Eq. (8) from Brier-Joye
"Weierstrass Elliptic Curves and Side-Channel Attacks", modified to
work in projective coordinates.
Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6772)
The old numbers where all generated for an 80 bit security level. But
the number should depend on security level you want to reach. For bigger
primes we want a higher security level and so need to do more tests.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
GH: #6075Fixes: #6012
This changes the security level from 100 to 128 bit.
We only have 1 define, this sets it to the highest level supported for
DSA, and needed for keys larger than 3072 bit.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
GH: #6075
The result is that we don't have to produce different names on
different platforms, and we won't have confusion on Windows depending
on if the script was built with mingw or with MSVC.
Partial fix for #3254
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6764)
This commit uses the new ladder scaffold to implement a specialized
ladder step based on differential addition-and-doubling in mixed
Lopez-Dahab projective coordinates, modified to independently blind the
operands.
The arithmetic in `ladder_pre`, `ladder_step` and `ladder_post` is
auto generated with tooling:
- see, e.g., "Guide to ECC" Alg 3.40 for reference about the
`ladder_pre` implementation;
- see https://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g12o/auto-code/shortw/xz/ladder/mladd-2003-s.op3
for the differential addition-and-doubling formulas implemented in
`ladder_step`;
- see, e.g., "Fast Multiplication on Elliptic Curves over GF(2**m)
without Precomputation" (Lopez and Dahab, CHES 1999) Appendix Alg Mxy
for the `ladder_post` implementation to recover the `(x,y)` result in
affine coordinates.
Co-authored-by: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6690)
for specialized Montgomery ladder implementations
PR #6009 and #6070 replaced the default EC point multiplication path for
prime and binary curves with a unified Montgomery ladder implementation
with various timing attack defenses (for the common paths when a secret
scalar is feed to the point multiplication).
The newly introduced default implementation directly used
EC_POINT_add/dbl in the main loop.
The scaffolding introduced by this commit allows EC_METHODs to define a
specialized `ladder_step` function to improve performances by taking
advantage of efficient formulas for differential addition-and-doubling
and different coordinate systems.
- `ladder_pre` is executed before the main loop of the ladder: by
default it copies the input point P into S, and doubles it into R.
Specialized implementations could, e.g., use this hook to transition
to different coordinate systems before copying and doubling;
- `ladder_step` is the core of the Montgomery ladder loop: by default it
computes `S := R+S; R := 2R;`, but specific implementations could,
e.g., implement a more efficient formula for differential
addition-and-doubling;
- `ladder_post` is executed after the Montgomery ladder loop: by default
it's a noop, but specialized implementations could, e.g., use this
hook to transition back from the coordinate system used for optimizing
the differential addition-and-doubling or recover the y coordinate of
the result point.
This commit also renames `ec_mul_consttime` to `ec_scalar_mul_ladder`,
as it better corresponds to what this function does: nothing can be
truly said about the constant-timeness of the overall execution of this
function, given that the underlying operations are not necessarily
constant-time themselves.
What this implementation ensures is that the same fixed sequence of
operations is executed for each scalar multiplication (for a given
EC_GROUP), with no dependency on the value of the input scalar.
Co-authored-by: Sohaib ul Hassan <soh.19.hassan@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6690)
