Provide backwards-compatiblity for functions, macros and include
files if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT is either not defined or defined less
than the version number of the release in which the feature was
deprecated.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Only two macros CRYPTO_MDEBUG and CRYPTO_MDEBUG_ABORT to control this.
If CRYPTO_MDEBUG is not set, #ifdef out the whole debug machinery.
(Thanks to Jakob Bohm for the suggestion!)
Make the "change wrapper functions" be the only paradigm.
Wrote documentation!
Format the 'set func' functions so their paramlists are legible.
Format some multi-line comments.
Remove ability to get/set the "memory debug" functions at runtme.
Remove MemCheck_* and CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init macros.
Add CRYPTO_mem_debug(int flag) function.
Add test/memleaktest.
Rename CRYPTO_malloc_init to OPENSSL_malloc_init; remove needless calls.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
The protocol selection code is now consolidated in a few consecutive
short functions in a single file and is table driven. Protocol-specific
constraints that influence negotiation are moved into the flags
field of the method structure. The same protocol version constraints
are now applied in all code paths. It is now much easier to add
new protocol versions without reworking the protocol selection
logic.
In the presence of "holes" in the list of enabled client protocols
we no longer select client protocols below the hole based on a
subset of the constraints and then fail shortly after when it is
found that these don't meet the remaining constraints (suiteb, FIPS,
security level, ...). Ideally, with the new min/max controls users
will be less likely to create "holes" in the first place.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
s_server was trying to set the ECDH curve when no-ec was defined. This also
highlighted the fact that the -no_ecdhe option to s_server is broken, and
doesn't make any sense any more (ECDHE is on by default and the only way it
can be disabled is through the cipherstring). Therefore this commit removes
the option.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
SSL_{CTX}_set_tmp_ecdh() allows to set 1 EC curve and then tries to use it. On
the other hand SSL_{CTX_}set1_curves() allows you to set a list of curves, but
only when SSL_{CTX_}set_ecdh_auto() was called to turn it on.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
This only gets used to set a specific curve without actually checking that the
peer supports it or not and can therefor result in handshake failures that can
be avoided by selecting a different cipher.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Add CRYPTO_free_ex_index (for shared libraries)
Unify and complete the documentation for all "ex_data" API's and objects.
Replace xxx_get_ex_new_index functions with a macro.
Added an exdata test.
Renamed the ex_data internal datatypes.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Add some clarifications to the async documentation. Also changed
ASYNC_pause_job() so that it returns success if you are not within the
context of a job. This is so that engines can be used either asynchronously
or synchronously and can treat an error from ASYNC_pause_job() as a real
error.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Remove all the defines for the old state machines states. Mapping old to new
is probably going to cause more problems than it solves so it is probably
better to just remove them.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
SSL_state has been replaced by SSL_get_state and SSL_set_state is no longer
supported.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Rename the enum HANDSHAKE_STATE to OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE to ensure there are
no namespace clashes, and convert it into a typedef.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
There are a number of engines in the OpenSSL source code which are now
obsolete. The following engines have been removed: 4758cca, aep, atalla,
cswift, nuron, sureware.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
This patch updates the "DEFAULT" cipherstring to be
"ALL:!COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT:!eNULL". COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT is now defined
internally by a flag on each ciphersuite indicating whether it should be
excluded from DEFAULT or not. This gives us control at an individual
ciphersuite level as to exactly what is in DEFAULT and what is not.
Finally all DES, RC4 and RC2 ciphersuites are added to COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT
and hence removed from DEFAULT.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Much related/similar work also done by
Ivan Nestlerode <ivan.nestlerode@sonos.com>
+Replace FILE BIO's with dummy ops that fail.
+Include <stdio.h> for sscanf() even with no-stdio (since the declaration
is there). We rely on sscanf() to parse the OPENSSL_ia32cap environment
variable, since it can be larger than a 'long'. And we don't rely on the
availability of strtoull().
+Remove OPENSSL_stderr(); not used.
+Make OPENSSL_showfatal() do nothing (currently without stdio there's
nothing we can do).
+Remove file-based functionality from ssl/. The function
prototypes were already gone, but not the functions themselves.
+Remove unviable conf functionality via SYS_UEFI
+Add fallback definition of BUFSIZ.
+Remove functions taking FILE * from header files.
+Add missing DECLARE_PEM_write_fp_const
+Disable X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir(). X509_LOOKUP_file() was already compiled out,
so remove its prototype.
+Use OPENSSL_showfatal() in CRYPTO_destroy_dynlockid().
+Eliminate SRP_VBASE_init() and supporting functions. Users will need to
build the verifier manually instead.
+Eliminate compiler warning for unused do_pk8pkey_fp().
+Disable TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_PKEY.
+Disable GOST engine as is uses [f]printf all over the place.
+Eliminate compiler warning for unused send_fp_chars().
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Rewrite EVP_DecodeUpdate.
In particular: reject extra trailing padding, and padding in the middle
of the content. Don't limit line length. Add tests.
Previously, the behaviour was ill-defined, and depended on the position
of the padding within the input.
In addition, this appears to fix a possible two-byte oob read.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
If the seed value for dsa key generation is too short (< qsize),
return an error. Also update the documentation.
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Thanks folks:
348 Benjamin Kaduk
317 Christian Brueffer
254 Erik Tews
253 Erik Tews
219 Carl Mehner
155 (ghost)
95 mancha
51 DominikNeubauer
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
This flag was not set anywhere within the codebase (only read). It could
only be set by an app reaching directly into s->s3->flags and setting it
directly. However that method became impossible when libssl was opaquified.
Even in 1.0.2/1.0.1 if an app set the flag directly it is only relevant to
ssl3_connect(), which calls SSL_clear() during initialisation that clears
any flag settings. Therefore it could take effect if the app set the flag
after the handshake has started but before it completed. It seems quite
unlikely that any apps really do this (especially as it is completely
undocumented).
The purpose of the flag is suppress flushing of the write bio on the client
side at the end of the handshake after the client has written the Finished
message whilst resuming a session. This enables the client to send
application data as part of the same flight as the Finished message.
This flag also controls the setting of a second flag SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER.
There is an interesting comment in the code about this second flag in the
implementation of ssl3_write:
/* This is an experimental flag that sends the
* last handshake message in the same packet as the first
* use data - used to see if it helps the TCP protocol during
* session-id reuse */
It seems the experiment did not work because as far as I can tell nothing
is using this code. The above comment has been in the code since SSLeay.
This commit removes support for SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED, as well
as the associated SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
This leaves behind files with names ending with '.iso-8859-1'. These
should be safe to remove. If something went wrong when re-encoding,
there will be some files with names ending with '.utf8' left behind.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Add secure heap for storage of private keys (when possible).
Add BIO_s_secmem(), CBIGNUM, etc.
Add BIO_CTX_secure_new so all BIGNUM's in the context are secure.
Contributed by Akamai Technologies under the Corporate CLA.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
When generating a private key, try to make the output file be readable
only by the owner. Put it in CHANGES file since it might be noticeable.
Add "int private" flag to apps that write private keys, and check that it's
set whenever we do write a private key. Checked via assert so that this
bug (security-related) gets fixed. Thanks to Viktor for help in tracing
the code-paths where private keys are written.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
This is a workaround so old that nobody remembers what buggy clients
it was for. It's also been broken in stable branches for two years and
nobody noticed (see
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/1694/).
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
The return type of BIO_number_read() and BIO_number_written() as well as
the corresponding num_read and num_write members in the BIO structure has
been changed from unsigned long to uint64_t. On platforms where an unsigned
long is 32 bits (e.g. Windows) these counters could overflow if >4Gb is
transferred.
With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Remove support for the two export grade static DH ciphersuites. These two
ciphersuites were newly added (along with a number of other static DH
ciphersuites) to 1.0.2. However the two export ones have *never* worked
since they were introduced. It seems strange in any case to be adding new
export ciphersuites, and given "logjam" it also does not seem correct to
fix them.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Also reorder preferences to prefer prime curves to binary curves, and P-256 to everything else.
The result:
$ openssl s_server -named_curves "auto"
This command will negotiate an ECDHE ciphersuite with P-256:
$ openssl s_client
This command will negotiate P-384:
$ openssl s_client -curves "P-384"
This command will not negotiate ECDHE because P-224 is disabled with "auto":
$ openssl s_client -curves "P-224"
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
The justification for RAND_pseudo_bytes is somewhat dubious, and the reality
is that it is frequently being misused. RAND_bytes and RAND_pseudo_bytes in
the default implementation both end up calling ssleay_rand_bytes. Both may
return -1 in an error condition. If there is insufficient entropy then
both will return 0, but RAND_bytes will additionally add an error to the
error queue. They both return 1 on success.
Therefore the fundamental difference between the two is that one will add an
error to the error queue with insufficient entory whilst the other will not.
Frequently there are constructions of this form:
if(RAND_pseudo_bytes(...) <= 1)
goto err;
In the above form insufficient entropy is treated as an error anyway, so
RAND_bytes is probably the better form to use.
This form is also seen:
if(!RAND_pseudo_bytes(...))
goto err;
This is technically not correct at all since a -1 return value is
incorrectly handled - but this form will also treat insufficient entropy as
an error.
Within libssl it is required that you have correctly seeded your entropy
pool and so there seems little benefit in using RAND_pseudo_bytes.
Similarly in libcrypto many operations also require a correctly seeded
entropy pool and so in most interesting cases you would be better off
using RAND_bytes anyway. There is a significant risk of RAND_pseudo_bytes
being incorrectly used in scenarios where security can be compromised by
insufficient entropy.
If you are not using the default implementation, then most engines use the
same function to implement RAND_bytes and RAND_pseudo_bytes in any case.
Given its misuse, limited benefit, and potential to compromise security,
RAND_pseudo_bytes has been deprecated.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Start ensuring all OpenSSL "free" routines allow NULL, and remove
any if check before calling them.
This gets ASN1_OBJECT_free and ASN1_STRING_free.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Includes VMS fixes from Richard.
Includes Kurt's destest fixes (RT 1290).
Closes tickets 1290 and 1291
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
This removes all code surrounded by '#ifdef undef'
One case is left: memmove() replaced by open-coded for loop,
in crypto/stack/stack.c That needs further review.
Also removed a couple of instances of /* dead code */ if I saw them
while doing the main removal.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
If you examine changes, you are likely to wonder "but what about ILP64,
elusive as they are, don't they fall victim to 16-bit rationalization?"
No, the case was modeled and verified to work.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Rename OPENSSL_SYSNAME_xxx to OPENSSL_SYS_xxx
Remove MS_STATIC; it's a relic from platforms <32 bits.
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Use setbuf(fp, NULL) instead of setvbuf(). This removes some
ifdef complexity because all of our platforms support setbuf.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD160, OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD merged into OPENSSL_NO_RMD160
OPENSSL_NO_FP_API merged into OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
Two typo's on #endif comments fixed:
OPENSSL_NO_ECB fixed to OPENSSL_NO_OCB
OPENSSL_NO_HW_SureWare fixed to OPENSSL_NO_HW_SUREWARE
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
This commit removes NCR, Tandem, Cray.
Regenerates TABLE.
Removes another missing BEOS fluff.
The last platform remaining on this ticket is WIN16.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
OpenSSL clients would tolerate temporary RSA keys in non-export
ciphersuites. It also had an option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA which
enabled this server side. Remove both options as they are a
protocol violation.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
(CVE-2015-0204)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Fix bug where an OpenSSL client would accept a handshake using an
ephemeral ECDH ciphersuites with the server key exchange message omitted.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
CVE-2014-3572
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
This commit removes DG-UX.
It also flushes out some left-behinds in config.
And regenerates TABLE from Configure (hadn't been done in awhile).
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
In keygen, return KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL not INVALID_KEYBITS.
** I also increased the minimum from 256 to 512, which is now
documented in CHANGES file. **
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
the session's version (server).
See also BoringSSL's commit bdf5e72f50e25f0e45e825c156168766d8442dde.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
once the ChangeCipherSpec message is received. Previously, the server would
set the flag once at SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY and again at SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED.
This would allow a second CCS to arrive and would corrupt the server state.
(Because the first CCS would latch the correct keys and subsequent CCS
messages would have to be encrypted, a MitM attacker cannot exploit this,
though.)
Thanks to Joeri de Ruiter for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
The server must send a NewSessionTicket message if it advertised one
in the ServerHello, so make a missing ticket message an alert
in the client.
An equivalent change was independently made in BoringSSL, see commit
6444287806d801b9a45baf1f6f02a0e3a16e144c.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation:
ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends
the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
reuse the old extension state and thus accept a session ticket if one was
announced in the initial ServerHello.
Reviewed-by: Bodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org>
Reencode DigestInto in DER and check against the original: this
will reject any improperly encoded DigestInfo structures.
Note: this is a precautionary measure, there is no known attack
which can exploit this.
Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or
server.
Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for
preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)
(cherry picked from commit 96db9023b8)
Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL
ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack"
by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from:
http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140
Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this
flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix.
(cherry picked from commit 2198be3483)
Conflicts:
CHANGES
For DTLS we might need to retransmit messages from the previous session
so keep a copy of write context in DTLS retransmission buffers instead
of replacing it after sending CCS. CVE-2013-6450.
(cherry picked from commit 34628967f1)
Based on a suggested workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771):
if the TLS Client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and less
that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it is at least 512.
To enable it use an unused extension number (for example 0x4242) using
e.g. -DTLSEXT_TYPE_wtf=0x4242
WARNING: EXPERIMENTAL, SUBJECT TO CHANGE.
Experimental support for encrypt then mac from
draft-gutmann-tls-encrypt-then-mac-02.txt
To enable it set the appropriate extension number (0x10 for the test server)
using e.g. -DTLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac=0x10
For non-compliant peers (i.e. just about everything) this should have no
effect.
Removed prior audit proof logic - audit proof support was implemented using the generic TLS extension API
Tests exercising the new supplemental data registration and callback api can be found in ssltest.c.
Implemented changes to s_server and s_client to exercise supplemental data callbacks via the -auth argument, as well as additional flags to exercise supplemental data being sent only during renegotiation.
Add support for key wrap algorithms via EVP interface.
Generalise AES wrap algorithm and add to modes, making existing
AES wrap algorithm a special case.
Move test code to evptests.txt
Extend OAEP support. Generalise the OAEP padding functions to support
arbitrary digests. Extend EVP_PKEY RSA method to handle the new OAEP
padding functions and add ctrls to set the additional parameters.
Add new methods DTLS_*_method() which support both DTLS 1.0 and DTLS 1.2 and
pick the highest version the peer supports during negotiation.
As with SSL/TLS options can change this behaviour specifically
SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1 and SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2.
