The plan at the moment is to validate 3.1.2 all going well.
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21962)
Signed-off-by: Philip Prindeville <philipp@redfish-solutions.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21937)
There is a rarely used feature that can be enabled
with `./config enable-crypto-mdebug` when additionally
the environment variable OPENSSL_MALLOC_FAILURES is used.
It turns out to be possible that CRYPTO_zalloc may
create a leak when the memory is allocated and then
the shouldfail happens, then the memory is lost.
Likewise when OPENSSL_realloc is used with size=0,
then the memory is to be free'd but here the shouldfail
check is too early, and the failure may prevent the
memory to be freed thus creating a bogus memory leak.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21944)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21659)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21659)
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21659)
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21959)
The test encrypted RSA key with DES3 which is still
allowed in the 3.0 fips provider.
Instead use the traditional key format that uses MD5
to create the password based key. MD5 is disallowed
in the 3.0 fips provider.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21957)
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21958)
Other similar macros can be implemented later. Right now, this are the most
likely to be actually useful
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21951)
It's needed for platforms that don't define UINT64_MAX and similar macros
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21951)
It is not present in current VMS C headers...
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21951)
This allows PBKDF2 to change the saltlen to something other than the
new default value of 16. Previously this app hardwired the salt length
to a maximum of 8 bytes. Non PBKDF2 mode uses EVP_BytesToKey()
internally, which is documented to only allow 8 bytes.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21858)
The PKCS5 (RFC 8018) standard uses a 64 bit salt length for PBE, and
recommends a minimum of 64 bits for PBES2. For FIPS compliance PBKDF2
requires a salt length of 128 bits.
This affects OpenSSL command line applications such as "genrsa" and "pkcs8"
and API's such as PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey() that are reliant on the
default salt length.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21858)
Implement the dupctx method for the chacha20 cipher, so that
EVP_PKEY_CTX_copy works
Its pretty straightforward, its basically just a memdup. Checking the
pointers that might need fixing up:
in PROV_CHACHA20_CTX all members are statically declared, so memduping
should be fine
in PROV_CHACHA20_CTX->base (PROV_CIPHER_CTX):
Non statically declared members:
*tlsmac needs to get memduped to avoid double free
conditions, but only if base.alloced is set
*hw pointer is always assigned to the chacha20_hw global
variable, so can be left alone
*libctx can be left alone as provctx is always NULL in
chacha20_newctx
*ks appears unused by chacha20, so can be ignored
Fixes#20978
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21878)
clang-cl.exe defines __clang__ and _MSC_VER but not __GNUC__, so a clang-
specific guard is needed to get the correct ALIGNxx versions.
Fixes#21914
Change-Id: Icdc047b182ad1ba61c7b1b06a1e951eda1a0c33d
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21921)
Update commit messages that previously used ssl3_get_message()
to now use tls_get_message_header() and tls_get_message_body()
due to the split in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
CLA: trivial
Fixes#21582
Signed-off-by: Sumitra Sharma <sumitraartsy@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21886)
Changed "than" to "then" for improved clarity and correctness.
CLA: trivial
Fixes#21543
Signed-off-by: Sumitra Sharma <sumitraartsy@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21925)
Test that errors such as SSL_ERROR_WANT_RETRY_VERIFY are properly
handled by QUIC connections.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21922)
SSL_get_error() may respond with some retry errors that are not IO related.
In particular SSL_ERROR_WANT_RETRY_VERIFY and SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP.
These can occur during a TLS handshake. If they occur when a QUIC Connection
is performing a TLS handshake then we need to propagate these up to the QCSO.
We also handle SSL_ERROR_WANT_CLIENT_HELLO_CB. This one will only ever
occur on the server side which we don't currently support. However adding
the handling for it now is identical to all the other handling so including
it is no cost, and will be needed when we do add server support.
We are not concerned with SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC or SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB
since we do not support async operation with QUIC.
Fixesopenssl/project#199
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21922)
This affects some Poly1305 assembler functions
which are only used for certain CPU types.
Remove those functions for Windows targets,
as a simple interim solution.
Fixes#21522
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21808)
