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https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git
synced 2024-11-26 19:43:40 +08:00
perform sanity checks on server certificate type as soon as it is received instead of waiting until server key exchange
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@ -1225,6 +1225,15 @@ int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
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if (need_cert)
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{
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int exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
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if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx)
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{
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x=NULL;
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al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
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SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
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goto f_err;
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}
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sc->peer_cert_type=i;
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CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
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/* Why would the following ever happen?
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@ -2800,6 +2800,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
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#define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE 329
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#define SSL_R_USE_SRTP_NOT_NEGOTIATED 369
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#define SSL_R_WRITE_BIO_NOT_SET 260
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#define SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 383
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#define SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED 261
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#define SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE 378
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#define SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE 262
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@ -1889,5 +1889,47 @@ const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *comp)
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return comp->name;
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return NULL;
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}
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#endif
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/* For a cipher return the index corresponding to the certificate type */
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int ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
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{
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unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
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alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
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alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
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if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
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{
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/* we don't need to look at SSL_kEECDH
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* since no certificate is needed for
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* anon ECDH and for authenticated
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* EECDH, the check for the auth
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* algorithm will set i correctly
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* NOTE: For ECDH-RSA, we need an ECC
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* not an RSA cert but for EECDH-RSA
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* we need an RSA cert. Placing the
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* checks for SSL_kECDH before RSA
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* checks ensures the correct cert is chosen.
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*/
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return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
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}
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else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
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return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
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else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
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return SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
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else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
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return SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
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else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
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return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
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else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
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return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
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else if (alg_a & SSL_aKRB5)
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/* VRS something else here? */
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return -1;
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else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
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return SSL_PKEY_GOST94;
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else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
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return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
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return -1;
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}
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@ -607,6 +607,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
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{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE),"unsupported status type"},
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{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_USE_SRTP_NOT_NEGOTIATED),"use srtp not negotiated"},
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{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRITE_BIO_NOT_SET) ,"write bio not set"},
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{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE),"wrong certificate type"},
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{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED) ,"wrong cipher returned"},
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{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE) ,"wrong curve"},
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{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE) ,"wrong message type"},
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@ -2336,56 +2336,15 @@ int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s)
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#endif
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/* THIS NEEDS CLEANING UP */
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static int ssl_get_server_cert_index(SSL *s)
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{
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unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
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alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
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alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
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if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
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{
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/* we don't need to look at SSL_kEECDH
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* since no certificate is needed for
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* anon ECDH and for authenticated
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* EECDH, the check for the auth
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* algorithm will set i correctly
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* NOTE: For ECDH-RSA, we need an ECC
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* not an RSA cert but for EECDH-RSA
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* we need an RSA cert. Placing the
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* checks for SSL_kECDH before RSA
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* checks ensures the correct cert is chosen.
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*/
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return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
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}
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else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
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return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
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else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
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return SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
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else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
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return SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
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else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
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return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
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else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
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{
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if (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509 == NULL)
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return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
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else
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return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
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}
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else if (alg_a & SSL_aKRB5)
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/* VRS something else here? */
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return -1;
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else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
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return SSL_PKEY_GOST94;
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else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
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return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
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else /* if (alg_a & SSL_aNULL) */
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{
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int idx;
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idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
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if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC && !s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509)
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idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
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if (idx == -1)
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_CERT_INDEX,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return -1;
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}
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return idx;
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}
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CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(SSL *s)
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@ -919,7 +919,8 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *meth,
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void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode);
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int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s,const EVP_CIPHER **enc,
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const EVP_MD **md,int *mac_pkey_type,int *mac_secret_size, SSL_COMP **comp);
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int ssl_get_handshake_digest(int i,long *mask,const EVP_MD **md);
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int ssl_get_handshake_digest(int i,long *mask,const EVP_MD **md);
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int ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
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int ssl_cert_set0_chain(CERT *c, STACK_OF(X509) *chain);
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int ssl_cert_set1_chain(CERT *c, STACK_OF(X509) *chain);
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int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x);
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