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Many spelling fixes/typo's corrected.

Browse Source 
Around 138 distinct errors found and fixed; thanks!

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3459)
This commit is contained in:
Josh Soref 2017-11-11 19:03:10 -05:00 committed by Rich Salz
parent b4d0fa49d9
commit 46f4e1bec5
105 changed files with 214 additions and 214 deletions
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46
CHANGES
View File

@ -889,7 +889,7 @@
*) Add support for setting the minimum and maximum supported protocol.
It can bet set via the SSL_set_min_proto_version() and
SSL_set_max_proto_version(), or via the SSL_CONF's MinProtocol and
MaxProtcol. It's recommended to use the new APIs to disable
MaxProtocol. It's recommended to use the new APIs to disable
protocols instead of disabling individual protocols using
SSL_set_options() or SSL_CONF's Protocol. This change also
removes support for disabling TLS 1.2 in the OpenSSL TLS
@ -2853,7 +2853,7 @@
*) OpenSSL 1.0.0 sets SSL_OP_ALL to 0x80000FFFL and OpenSSL 1.0.1 and
1.0.1a set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to 0x00000400L which would unfortunately
mean any application compiled against OpenSSL 1.0.0 headers setting
SSL_OP_ALL would also set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, unintentionally disablng
SSL_OP_ALL would also set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, unintentionally disabling
TLS 1.1 also. Fix this by changing the value of SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to
0x10000000L Any application which was previously compiled against
OpenSSL 1.0.1 or 1.0.1a headers and which cares about SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
@ -2862,7 +2862,7 @@
in unlike event, limit maximum offered version to TLS 1.0 [see below].
[Steve Henson]
*) In order to ensure interoperabilty SSL_OP_NO_protocolX does not
*) In order to ensure interoperability SSL_OP_NO_protocolX does not
disable just protocol X, but all protocols above X *if* there are
protocols *below* X still enabled. In more practical terms it means
that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favor of TLS1.1 and
@ -3630,7 +3630,7 @@
SSL_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input(ssl, src, len) is used to set the
opaque PRF input value to use in the handshake. This will create
an interal copy of the length-'len' string at 'src', and will
an internal copy of the length-'len' string at 'src', and will
return non-zero for success.
To get more control and flexibility, provide a callback function
@ -3740,8 +3740,8 @@
most recently disabled ciphersuites when "HIGH" is parsed).
Also, change ssl_create_cipher_list() (using this new
funcionality) such that between otherwise identical
cihpersuites, ephemeral ECDH is preferred over ephemeral DH in
functionality) such that between otherwise identical
ciphersuites, ephemeral ECDH is preferred over ephemeral DH in
the default order.
[Bodo Moeller]
@ -3920,7 +3920,7 @@
functional reference processing.
[Steve Henson]
*) New functions EVP_Digest{Sign,Verify)*. These are enchance versions of
*) New functions EVP_Digest{Sign,Verify)*. These are enhanced versions of
EVP_{Sign,Verify}* which allow an application to customise the signature
process.
[Steve Henson]
@ -4133,7 +4133,7 @@
*) New option SSL_OP_NO_COMP to disable use of compression selectively
in SSL structures. New SSL ctrl to set maximum send fragment size.
Save memory by seeting the I/O buffer sizes dynamically instead of
Save memory by setting the I/O buffer sizes dynamically instead of
using the maximum available value.
[Steve Henson]
@ -4192,7 +4192,7 @@
Changes between 0.9.8l and 0.9.8m [25 Feb 2010]
*) Always check bn_wexpend() return values for failure. (CVE-2009-3245)
*) Always check bn_wexpand() return values for failure. (CVE-2009-3245)
[Martin Olsson, Neel Mehta]
*) Fix X509_STORE locking: Every 'objs' access requires a lock (to
@ -4325,7 +4325,7 @@
is already buffered was missing. For every new message was memory
allocated, allowing an attacker to perform an denial of service attack
with sending out of seq handshake messages until there is no memory
left. Additionally every future messege was buffered, even if the
left. Additionally every future message was buffered, even if the
sequence number made no sense and would be part of another handshake.
So only messages with sequence numbers less than 10 in advance will be
buffered. (CVE-2009-1378)
@ -4509,7 +4509,7 @@
Changes between 0.9.8g and 0.9.8h [28 May 2008]
*) Fix flaw if 'Server Key exchange message' is omitted from a TLS
handshake which could lead to a cilent crash as found using the
handshake which could lead to a client crash as found using the
Codenomicon TLS test suite (CVE-2008-1672)
[Steve Henson, Mark Cox]
@ -4943,7 +4943,7 @@
*) Disable the padding bug check when compression is in use. The padding
bug check assumes the first packet is of even length, this is not
necessarily true if compresssion is enabled and can result in false
necessarily true if compression is enabled and can result in false
positives causing handshake failure. The actual bug test is ancient
code so it is hoped that implementations will either have fixed it by
now or any which still have the bug do not support compression.
@ -5172,7 +5172,7 @@
we can fix the problem directly in the 'ca' utility.)
[Steve Henson]
*) Reduced header interdepencies by declaring more opaque objects in
*) Reduced header interdependencies by declaring more opaque objects in
ossl_typ.h. As a consequence, including some headers (eg. engine.h) will
give fewer recursive includes, which could break lazy source code - so
this change is covered by the OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED symbol. As always,
@ -5396,7 +5396,7 @@
named like the index file with '.attr' appended to the name.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Generate muti valued AVAs using '+' notation in config files for
*) Generate multi-valued AVAs using '+' notation in config files for
req and dirName.
[Steve Henson]
@ -5937,7 +5937,7 @@
draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-0[01].txt, but do not really
appear there.
Also deactive the remaining ciphersuites from
Also deactivate the remaining ciphersuites from
draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01.txt. These are just as
unofficial, and the ID has long expired.
[Bodo Moeller]
@ -6580,9 +6580,9 @@
*) Add an "init" command to the ENGINE config module and auto initialize
ENGINEs. Without any "init" command the ENGINE will be initialized
after all ctrl commands have been executed on it. If init=1 the
ENGINE is initailized at that point (ctrls before that point are run
ENGINE is initialized at that point (ctrls before that point are run
on the uninitialized ENGINE and after on the initialized one). If
init=0 then the ENGINE will not be iniatialized at all.
init=0 then the ENGINE will not be initialized at all.
[Steve Henson]
*) Fix the 'app_verify_callback' interface so that the user-defined
@ -6839,7 +6839,7 @@
*) Major restructuring to the underlying ENGINE code. This includes
reduction of linker bloat, separation of pure "ENGINE" manipulation
(initialisation, etc) from functionality dealing with implementations
of specific crypto iterfaces. This change also introduces integrated
of specific crypto interfaces. This change also introduces integrated
support for symmetric ciphers and digest implementations - so ENGINEs
can now accelerate these by providing EVP_CIPHER and EVP_MD
implementations of their own. This is detailed in crypto/engine/README
@ -7843,7 +7843,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Steve Henson]
*) Enhance mkdef.pl to be more accepting about spacing in C preprocessor
lines, recognice more "algorithms" that can be deselected, and make
lines, recognize more "algorithms" that can be deselected, and make
it complain about algorithm deselection that isn't recognised.
[Richard Levitte]
@ -8241,7 +8241,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
Changes between 0.9.6h and 0.9.6i [19 Feb 2003]
*) In ssl3_get_record (ssl/s3_pkt.c), minimize information leaked
via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrrect
via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrect
block cipher padding has been found. This is a countermeasure
against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish
between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CVE-2003-0078)
@ -9879,7 +9879,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
ssl_cert_dup, which is used by SSL_new, now copies DH keys in addition
to parameters -- in previous versions (since OpenSSL 0.9.3) the
'default key' from SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh would always be lost, meaning
you effectivly got SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE when using this macro.
you effectively got SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE when using this macro.
[Bodo Moeller]
*) New s_client option -ign_eof: EOF at stdin is ignored, and
@ -10098,7 +10098,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
*) ./config recognizes MacOS X now.
[Andy Polyakov]
*) Bug fix for BN_div() when the first words of num and divsor are
*) Bug fix for BN_div() when the first words of num and divisor are
equal (it gave wrong results if (rem=(n1-q*d0)&BN_MASK2) < d0).
[Ulf Möller]
@ -11771,7 +11771,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
*) Bugfix: In test/testenc, don't test "openssl <cipher>" for
ciphers that were excluded, e.g. by -DNO_IDEA. Also, test
all available cipers including rc5, which was forgotten until now.
all available ciphers including rc5, which was forgotten until now.
In order to let the testing shell script know which algorithms
are available, a new (up to now undocumented) command
"openssl list-cipher-commands" is used.

2
Configurations/README
View File

@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ source as well. However, the files given through SOURCE are expected
to be located in the source tree while files given through DEPEND are
expected to be located in the build tree)
It's also possible to depend on static libraries explicitely:
It's also possible to depend on static libraries explicitly:
DEPEND[foo]=libsomething.a
DEPEND[libbar]=libsomethingelse.a

2
Configurations/common.tmpl
View File

@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
my $extensionlessitem = extensionlesslib($item);
if (grep { $extensionlessitem eq extensionlesslib($_) } @list) {
if ($item ne $extensionlessitem) {
# If this instance of the library is explicitely static, we
# If this instance of the library is explicitly static, we
# prefer that to any shared library name, since it must have
# been done on purpose.
$replace{$extensionlessitem} = $item;

8
Configure
View File

@ -774,7 +774,7 @@ while (@argvcopy)
}
unless ($_ eq $target || /^no-/ || /^disable-/)
{
# "no-..." follows later after implied disactivations
# "no-..." follows later after implied deactivations
# have been derived. (Don't take this too seriously,
# we really only write OPTIONS to the Makefile out of
# nostalgia.)
@ -1767,7 +1767,7 @@ EOF
# Additionally, we set up sharednames for libraries that don't
# have any, as themselves. Only for libraries that aren't
# explicitely static.
# explicitly static.
foreach (grep !/\.a$/, keys %{$unified_info{libraries}}) {
if (!defined $unified_info{sharednames}->{$_}) {
$unified_info{sharednames}->{$_} = $_
@ -1775,13 +1775,13 @@ EOF
}
# Check that we haven't defined any library as both shared and
# explicitely static. That is forbidden.
# explicitly static. That is forbidden.
my @doubles = ();
foreach (grep /\.a$/, keys %{$unified_info{libraries}}) {
(my $l = $_) =~ s/\.a$//;
push @doubles, $l if defined $unified_info{sharednames}->{$l};
}
die "these libraries are both explicitely static and shared:\n ",
die "these libraries are both explicitly static and shared:\n ",
join(" ", @doubles), "\n"
if @doubles;
}

8
NEWS
View File

@ -492,7 +492,7 @@
affected functions.
o Improved platform support for PowerPC.
o New FIPS 180-2 algorithms (SHA-224, -256, -384 and -512).
o New X509_VERIFY_PARAM structure to support parametrisation
o New X509_VERIFY_PARAM structure to support parameterisation
of X.509 path validation.
o Major overhaul of RC4 performance on Intel P4, IA-64 and
AMD64.
@ -778,7 +778,7 @@
o Automation of 'req' application
o Fixes to make s_client, s_server work under Windows
o Support for multiple fieldnames in SPKACs
o New SPKAC command line utilty and associated library functions
o New SPKAC command line utility and associated library functions
o Options to allow passwords to be obtained from various sources
o New public key PEM format and options to handle it
o Many other fixes and enhancements to command line utilities
@ -860,8 +860,8 @@
o Added BIO proxy and filtering functionality
o Extended Big Number (BN) library
o Added RIPE MD160 message digest
o Addeed support for RC2/64bit cipher
o Added support for RC2/64bit cipher
o Extended ASN.1 parser routines
o Adjustations of the source tree for CVS
o Adjustments of the source tree for CVS
o Support for various new platforms

2
README
View File

@ -62,7 +62,7 @@
- Download the latest version from the repository
to see if the problem has already been addressed
- Configure with no-asm
- Remove compiler optimisation flags
- Remove compiler optimization flags
If you wish to report a bug then please include the following information
and create an issue on GitHub:

2
apps/ocsp.c
View File

@ -1106,7 +1106,7 @@ static int do_responder(OCSP_REQUEST **preq, BIO **pcbio, BIO *acbio)
if (*q == ' ')
break;
if (strncmp(q, " HTTP/1.", 8) != 0) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid request -- bad HTTP vesion\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid request -- bad HTTP version\n");
return 1;
}
*q = '\0';

2
apps/progs.pl
View File

@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ my @openssl_source =
@{$unified_info{sources}->{$apps_openssl}};
foreach my $filename (@openssl_source) {
open F, $filename or die "Coudn't open $_: $!\n";
open F, $filename or die "Couldn't open $_: $!\n";
foreach ( grep /$cmdre/, <F> ) {
my @foo = /$cmdre/;
$commands{$1} = 1;

2
apps/vms_term_sock.c
View File

@ -514,7 +514,7 @@ static int TerminalDeviceAst (int astparm)
strcat (TerminalDeviceBuff, "\n");
/*
** Send the data read from the terminal device throught the socket pair
** Send the data read from the terminal device through the socket pair
*/
send (TerminalSocketPair[0], TerminalDeviceBuff,
TerminalDeviceIosb.iosb$w_bcnt + 1, 0);

16
crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl
View File

@ -55,8 +55,8 @@
# better performance on most recent µ-archs...
#
# Third version adds AES_cbc_encrypt implementation, which resulted in
# up to 40% performance imrovement of CBC benchmark results. 40% was
# observed on P4 core, where "overall" imrovement coefficient, i.e. if
# up to 40% performance improvement of CBC benchmark results. 40% was
# observed on P4 core, where "overall" improvement coefficient, i.e. if
# compared to PIC generated by GCC and in CBC mode, was observed to be
# as large as 4x:-) CBC performance is virtually identical to ECB now
# and on some platforms even better, e.g. 17.6 "small" cycles/byte on
@ -159,7 +159,7 @@
# combinations then attack becomes infeasible. This is why revised
# AES_cbc_encrypt "dares" to switch to larger S-box when larger chunk
# of data is to be processed in one stroke. The current size limit of
# 512 bytes is chosen to provide same [diminishigly low] probability
# 512 bytes is chosen to provide same [diminishingly low] probability
# for cache-line to remain untouched in large chunk operation with
# large S-box as for single block operation with compact S-box and
# surely needs more careful consideration...
@ -171,12 +171,12 @@
# yield execution to process performing AES just before timer fires
# off the scheduler, immediately regain control of CPU and analyze the
# cache state. For this attack to be efficient attacker would have to
# effectively slow down the operation by several *orders* of magnitute,
# effectively slow down the operation by several *orders* of magnitude,
# by ratio of time slice to duration of handful of AES rounds, which
# unlikely to remain unnoticed. Not to mention that this also means
# that he would spend correspondigly more time to collect enough
# that he would spend correspondingly more time to collect enough
# statistical data to mount the attack. It's probably appropriate to
# say that if adeversary reckons that this attack is beneficial and
# say that if adversary reckons that this attack is beneficial and
# risks to be noticed, you probably have larger problems having him
# mere opportunity. In other words suggested code design expects you
# to preclude/mitigate this attack by overall system security design.
@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ $small_footprint=1; # $small_footprint=1 code is ~5% slower [on
# contention and in hope to "collect" 5% back
# in real-life applications...
$vertical_spin=0; # shift "verticaly" defaults to 0, because of
$vertical_spin=0; # shift "vertically" defaults to 0, because of
# its proof-of-concept status...
# Note that there is no decvert(), as well as last encryption round is
# performed with "horizontal" shifts. This is because this "vertical"
@ -1606,7 +1606,7 @@ sub decstep()
# no instructions are reordered, as performance appears
# optimal... or rather that all attempts to reorder didn't
# result in better performance [which by the way is not a
# bit lower than ecryption].
# bit lower than encryption].
if($i==3) { &mov ($key,$__key); }
else { &mov ($out,$s[0]); }
&and ($out,0xFF);

2
crypto/aes/asm/aes-mips.pl
View File

@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ my ($i0,$i1,$i2,$i3)=($at,$t0,$t1,$t2);
my ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$t4,$t5,$t6,$t7,$t8,$t9,$t10,$t11) = map("\$$_",(12..23));
my ($key0,$cnt)=($gp,$fp);
# instuction ordering is "stolen" from output from MIPSpro assembler
# instruction ordering is "stolen" from output from MIPSpro assembler
# invoked with -mips3 -O3 arguments...
$code.=<<___;
.align 5

2
crypto/aes/asm/aes-parisc.pl
View File

@ -1015,7 +1015,7 @@ ___
foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/ge;
# translate made up instructons: _ror, _srm
# translate made up instructions: _ror, _srm
s/_ror(\s+)(%r[0-9]+),/shd$1$2,$2,/ or
s/_srm(\s+%r[0-9]+),([0-9]+),/

2
crypto/aes/asm/aes-s390x.pl
View File

@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
# minimize/avoid Address Generation Interlock hazard and to favour
# dual-issue z10 pipeline. This gave ~25% improvement on z10 and
# almost 50% on z9. The gain is smaller on z10, because being dual-
# issue z10 makes it improssible to eliminate the interlock condition:
# issue z10 makes it impossible to eliminate the interlock condition:
# critial path is not long enough. Yet it spends ~24 cycles per byte
# processed with 128-bit key.
#

2
crypto/aes/asm/aes-x86_64.pl
View File

@ -2018,7 +2018,7 @@ AES_cbc_encrypt:
lea ($key,%rax),%rax
mov %rax,$keyend
# pick Te4 copy which can't "overlap" with stack frame or key scdedule
# pick Te4 copy which can't "overlap" with stack frame or key schedule
lea 2048($sbox),$sbox
lea 768-8(%rsp),%rax
sub $sbox,%rax

2
crypto/aes/asm/aesfx-sparcv9.pl
View File

@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
# April 2016
#
# Add "teaser" CBC and CTR mode-specific subroutines. "Teaser" means
# that parallelizeable nature of CBC decrypt and CTR is not utilized
# that parallelizable nature of CBC decrypt and CTR is not utilized
# yet. CBC encrypt on the other hand is as good as it can possibly
# get processing one byte in 4.1 cycles with 128-bit key on SPARC64 X.
# This is ~6x faster than pure software implementation...

8
crypto/aes/asm/aesni-mb-x86_64.pl
View File

@ -1325,10 +1325,10 @@ se_handler:
mov -48(%rax),%r15
mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx
mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp
mov %r12,216($context) # restore cotnext->R12
mov %r13,224($context) # restore cotnext->R13
mov %r14,232($context) # restore cotnext->R14
mov %r15,240($context) # restore cotnext->R15
mov %r12,216($context) # restore context->R12
mov %r13,224($context) # restore context->R13
mov %r14,232($context) # restore context->R14
mov %r15,240($context) # restore context->R15
lea -56-10*16(%rax),%rsi
lea 512($context),%rdi # &context.Xmm6

2
crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl
View File

@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ sub aesni_generate1 # fully unrolled loop
# can schedule aes[enc|dec] every cycle optimal interleave factor
# equals to corresponding instructions latency. 8x is optimal for
# * Bridge, but it's unfeasible to accommodate such implementation
# in XMM registers addreassable in 32-bit mode and therefore maximum
# in XMM registers addressable in 32-bit mode and therefore maximum
# of 6x is used instead...
sub aesni_generate2

16
crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl
View File

@ -60,7 +60,7 @@
# identical to CBC, because CBC-MAC is essentially CBC encrypt without
# saving output. CCM CTR "stays invisible," because it's neatly
# interleaved wih CBC-MAC. This provides ~30% improvement over
# "straghtforward" CCM implementation with CTR and CBC-MAC performed
# "straightforward" CCM implementation with CTR and CBC-MAC performed
# disjointly. Parallelizable modes practically achieve the theoretical
# limit.
#
@ -143,14 +143,14 @@
# asymptotic, if it can be surpassed, isn't it? What happens there?
# Rewind to CBC paragraph for the answer. Yes, out-of-order execution
# magic is responsible for this. Processor overlaps not only the
# additional instructions with AES ones, but even AES instuctions
# additional instructions with AES ones, but even AES instructions
# processing adjacent triplets of independent blocks. In the 6x case
# additional instructions still claim disproportionally small amount
# of additional cycles, but in 8x case number of instructions must be
# a tad too high for out-of-order logic to cope with, and AES unit
# remains underutilized... As you can see 8x interleave is hardly
# justifiable, so there no need to feel bad that 32-bit aesni-x86.pl
# utilizies 6x interleave because of limited register bank capacity.
# utilizes 6x interleave because of limited register bank capacity.
#
# Higher interleave factors do have negative impact on Westmere
# performance. While for ECB mode it's negligible ~1.5%, other
@ -1550,7 +1550,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
sub \$8,$len
jnc .Lctr32_loop8 # loop if $len-=8 didn't borrow
add \$8,$len # restore real remainig $len
add \$8,$len # restore real remaining $len
jz .Lctr32_done # done if ($len==0)
lea -0x80($key),$key
@ -1667,7 +1667,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
movups $inout2,0x20($out) # $len was 3, stop store
.Lctr32_done:
xorps %xmm0,%xmm0 # clear regiser bank
xorps %xmm0,%xmm0 # clear register bank
xor $key0,$key0
pxor %xmm1,%xmm1
pxor %xmm2,%xmm2
@ -1856,7 +1856,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
lea `16*6`($inp),$inp
pxor $twmask,$inout5
pxor $twres,@tweak[0] # calclulate tweaks^round[last]
pxor $twres,@tweak[0] # calculate tweaks^round[last]
aesenc $rndkey1,$inout4
pxor $twres,@tweak[1]
movdqa @tweak[0],`16*0`(%rsp) # put aside tweaks^round[last]
@ -2342,7 +2342,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
lea `16*6`($inp),$inp
pxor $twmask,$inout5
pxor $twres,@tweak[0] # calclulate tweaks^round[last]
pxor $twres,@tweak[0] # calculate tweaks^round[last]
aesdec $rndkey1,$inout4
pxor $twres,@tweak[1]
movdqa @tweak[0],`16*0`(%rsp) # put aside tweaks^last round key
@ -4515,7 +4515,7 @@ __aesni_set_encrypt_key:
.align 16
.L14rounds:
movups 16($inp),%xmm2 # remaning half of *userKey
movups 16($inp),%xmm2 # remaining half of *userKey
mov \$13,$bits # 14 rounds for 256
lea 16(%rax),%rax
cmp \$`1<<28`,%r10d # AVX, but no XOP

2
crypto/aes/asm/aest4-sparcv9.pl
View File

@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
# instructions with those on critical path. Amazing!
#
# As with Intel AES-NI, question is if it's possible to improve
# performance of parallelizeable modes by interleaving round
# performance of parallelizable modes by interleaving round
# instructions. Provided round instruction latency and throughput
# optimal interleave factor is 2. But can we expect 2x performance
# improvement? Well, as round instructions can be issued one per

4
crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl
View File

@ -929,7 +929,7 @@ if ($flavour =~ /64/) { ######## 64-bit code
s/^(\s+)v/$1/o or # strip off v prefix
s/\bbx\s+lr\b/ret/o;
# fix up remainig legacy suffixes
# fix up remaining legacy suffixes
s/\.[ui]?8//o;
m/\],#8/o and s/\.16b/\.8b/go;
s/\.[ui]?32//o and s/\.16b/\.4s/go;
@ -988,7 +988,7 @@ if ($flavour =~ /64/) { ######## 64-bit code
s/\bv([0-9])\.[12468]+[bsd]\b/q$1/go; # new->old registers
s/\/\/\s?/@ /o; # new->old style commentary
# fix up remainig new-style suffixes
# fix up remaining new-style suffixes
s/\{q([0-9]+)\},\s*\[(.+)\],#8/sprintf "{d%d},[$2]!",2*$1/eo or
s/\],#[0-9]+/]!/o;

4
crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-armv8.pl
View File

@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
# Apple A7(***) 22.7(**) 10.9/14.3 [8.45/10.0 ]
# Mongoose(***) 26.3(**) 21.0/25.0(**) [13.3/16.8 ]
#
# (*) ECB denotes approximate result for parallelizeable modes
# (*) ECB denotes approximate result for parallelizable modes
# such as CBC decrypt, CTR, etc.;
# (**) these results are worse than scalar compiler-generated
# code, but it's constant-time and therefore preferred;
@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ _vpaes_consts:
.quad 0x07E4A34047A4E300, 0x1DFEB95A5DBEF91A
.quad 0x5F36B5DC83EA6900, 0x2841C2ABF49D1E77
.asciz "Vector Permutaion AES for ARMv8, Mike Hamburg (Stanford University)"
.asciz "Vector Permutation AES for ARMv8, Mike Hamburg (Stanford University)"
.size _vpaes_consts,.-_vpaes_consts
.align 6
___

2
crypto/arm_arch.h
View File

@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
# endif
/*
* Why doesn't gcc define __ARM_ARCH__? Instead it defines
* bunch of below macros. See all_architectires[] table in
* bunch of below macros. See all_architectures[] table in
* gcc/config/arm/arm.c. On a side note it defines
* __ARMEL__/__ARMEB__ for little-/big-endian.
*/

2
crypto/asn1/standard_methods.h
View File

@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
*/
/*
* This table MUST be kept in ascening order of the NID each method
* This table MUST be kept in ascending order of the NID each method
* represents (corresponding to the pkey_id field) as OBJ_bsearch
* is used to search it.
*/

2
crypto/bn/asm/c64xplus-gf2m.pl
View File

@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
SHRU $A,16, $Ahi ; smash $A to two halfwords
|| EXTU $A,16,16,$Alo
XORMPY $Alo,$B_2,$Alox2 ; 16x8 bits muliplication
XORMPY $Alo,$B_2,$Alox2 ; 16x8 bits multiplication
|| XORMPY $Ahi,$B_2,$Ahix2
|| EXTU $B,16,24,$B_1
XORMPY $Alo,$B_0,$Alox0

10
crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S
View File

@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
// disclaimed.
// ====================================================================
//
// Version 2.x is Itanium2 re-tune. Few words about how Itanum2 is
// Version 2.x is Itanium2 re-tune. Few words about how Itanium2 is
// different from Itanium to this module viewpoint. Most notably, is it
// "wider" than Itanium? Can you experience loop scalability as
// discussed in commentary sections? Not really:-( Itanium2 has 6
@ -141,7 +141,7 @@
// User Mask I want to excuse the kernel from preserving upper
// (f32-f128) FP register bank over process context switch, thus
// minimizing bus bandwidth consumption during the switch (i.e.
// after PKI opration completes and the program is off doing
// after PKI operation completes and the program is off doing
// something else like bulk symmetric encryption). Having said
// this, I also want to point out that it might be good idea
// to compile the whole toolkit (as well as majority of the
@ -162,7 +162,7 @@
//
// bn_[add|sub]_words routines.
//
// Loops are spinning in 2*(n+5) ticks on Itanuim (provided that the
// Loops are spinning in 2*(n+5) ticks on Itanium (provided that the
// data reside in L1 cache, i.e. 2 ticks away). It's possible to
// compress the epilogue and get down to 2*n+6, but at the cost of
// scalability (the neat feature of this implementation is that it
@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ bn_sqr_words:
// possible to compress the epilogue (I'm getting tired to write this
// comment over and over) and get down to 2*n+16 at the cost of
// scalability. The decision will very likely be reconsidered after the
// benchmark program is profiled. I.e. if perfomance gain on Itanium
// benchmark program is profiled. I.e. if performance gain on Itanium
// will appear larger than loss on "wider" IA-64, then the loop should
// be explicitly split and the epilogue compressed.
.L_bn_sqr_words_ctop:
@ -936,7 +936,7 @@ bn_mul_comba8:
xma.hu f118=f39,f127,f117 }
{ .mfi; xma.lu f117=f39,f127,f117 };;//
//-------------------------------------------------//
// Leaving muliplier's heaven... Quite a ride, huh?
// Leaving multiplier's heaven... Quite a ride, huh?
{ .mii; getf.sig r31=f47
add r25=r25,r24

2
crypto/bn/asm/parisc-mont.pl
View File

@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
# optimal in respect to instruction set capabilities. Fair comparison
# with vendor compiler is problematic, because OpenSSL doesn't define
# BN_LLONG [presumably] for historical reasons, which drives compiler
# toward 4 times 16x16=32-bit multiplicatons [plus complementary
# toward 4 times 16x16=32-bit multiplications [plus complementary
# shifts and additions] instead. This means that you should observe
# several times improvement over code generated by vendor compiler
# for PA-RISC 1.1, but the "baseline" is far from optimal. The actual

2
crypto/bn/asm/ppc-mont.pl
View File

@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
# and squaring procedure operating on lengths divisible by 8. Length
# is expressed in number of limbs. RSA private key operations are
# ~35-50% faster (more for longer keys) on contemporary high-end POWER
# processors in 64-bit builds, [mysterously enough] more in 32-bit
# processors in 64-bit builds, [mysteriously enough] more in 32-bit
# builds. On low-end 32-bit processors performance improvement turned
# to be marginal...

4
crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont.pl
View File

@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
# key lengths. As it's obviously inappropriate as "best all-round"
# alternative, it has to be complemented with run-time CPU family
# detection. Oh! It should also be noted that unlike other PowerPC
# implementation IALU ppc-mont.pl module performs *suboptimaly* on
# implementation IALU ppc-mont.pl module performs *suboptimally* on
# >=1024-bit key lengths on Power 6. It should also be noted that
# *everything* said so far applies to 64-bit builds! As far as 32-bit
# application executed on 64-bit CPU goes, this module is likely to
@ -1353,7 +1353,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
std $t3,-16($tp) ; tp[j-1]
std $t5,-8($tp) ; tp[j]
add $carry,$carry,$ovf ; comsume upmost overflow
add $carry,$carry,$ovf ; consume upmost overflow
add $t6,$t6,$carry ; can not overflow
srdi $carry,$t6,16
add $t7,$t7,$carry

2
crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl
View File

@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
# in bn_gf2m.c. It's kind of low-hanging mechanical port from C for
# the time being... gcc 4.3 appeared to generate poor code, therefore
# the effort. And indeed, the module delivers 55%-90%(*) improvement
# on haviest ECDSA verify and ECDH benchmarks for 163- and 571-bit
# on heaviest ECDSA verify and ECDH benchmarks for 163- and 571-bit
# key lengths on z990, 30%-55%(*) - on z10, and 70%-110%(*) - on z196.
# This is for 64-bit build. In 32-bit "highgprs" case improvement is
# even higher, for example on z990 it was measured 80%-150%. ECDSA

10
crypto/bn/asm/sparcv8.S
View File

@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
*/
/*
* This is my modest contributon to OpenSSL project (see
* This is my modest contribution to OpenSSL project (see
* http://www.openssl.org/ for more information about it) and is
* a drop-in SuperSPARC ISA replacement for crypto/bn/bn_asm.c
* module. For updates see http://fy.chalmers.se/~appro/hpe/.
@ -159,12 +159,12 @@ bn_mul_add_words:
*/
bn_mul_words:
cmp %o2,0
bg,a .L_bn_mul_words_proceeed
bg,a .L_bn_mul_words_proceed
ld [%o1],%g2
retl
clr %o0
.L_bn_mul_words_proceeed:
.L_bn_mul_words_proceed:
andcc %o2,-4,%g0
bz .L_bn_mul_words_tail
clr %o5
@ -251,12 +251,12 @@ bn_mul_words:
*/
bn_sqr_words:
cmp %o2,0
bg,a .L_bn_sqr_words_proceeed
bg,a .L_bn_sqr_words_proceed
ld [%o1],%g2
retl
clr %o0
.L_bn_sqr_words_proceeed:
.L_bn_sqr_words_proceed:
andcc %o2,-4,%g0
bz .L_bn_sqr_words_tail
clr %o5

10
crypto/bn/asm/sparcv8plus.S
View File

@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
*/
/*
* This is my modest contributon to OpenSSL project (see
* This is my modest contribution to OpenSSL project (see
* http://www.openssl.org/ for more information about it) and is
* a drop-in UltraSPARC ISA replacement for crypto/bn/bn_asm.c
* module. For updates see http://fy.chalmers.se/~appro/hpe/.
@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ bn_mul_add_words:
*/
bn_mul_words:
sra %o2,%g0,%o2 ! signx %o2
brgz,a %o2,.L_bn_mul_words_proceeed
brgz,a %o2,.L_bn_mul_words_proceed
lduw [%o1],%g2
retl
clr %o0
@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ bn_mul_words:
nop
nop
.L_bn_mul_words_proceeed:
.L_bn_mul_words_proceed:
srl %o3,%g0,%o3 ! clruw %o3
andcc %o2,-4,%g0
bz,pn %icc,.L_bn_mul_words_tail
@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ bn_mul_words:
*/
bn_sqr_words:
sra %o2,%g0,%o2 ! signx %o2
brgz,a %o2,.L_bn_sqr_words_proceeed
brgz,a %o2,.L_bn_sqr_words_proceed
lduw [%o1],%g2
retl
clr %o0
@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ bn_sqr_words:
nop
nop
.L_bn_sqr_words_proceeed:
.L_bn_sqr_words_proceed:
andcc %o2,-4,%g0
nop
bz,pn %icc,.L_bn_sqr_words_tail

2
crypto/bn/asm/sparcv9-mont.pl
View File

@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
add $tp,8,$tp
.type $fname,#function
.size $fname,(.-$fname)
.asciz "Montgomery Multipltication for SPARCv9, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
.asciz "Montgomery Multiplication for SPARCv9, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
.align 32
___
$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval($1)/gem;

2
crypto/bn/asm/sparcv9a-mont.pl
View File

@ -865,7 +865,7 @@ $fname:
restore
.type $fname,#function
.size $fname,(.-$fname)
.asciz "Montgomery Multipltication for UltraSPARC, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
.asciz "Montgomery Multiplication for UltraSPARC, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>"
.align 32
___

2
crypto/bn/asm/vis3-mont.pl
View File

@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
# October 2012.
#
# SPARCv9 VIS3 Montgomery multiplicaion procedure suitable for T3 and
# SPARCv9 VIS3 Montgomery multiplication procedure suitable for T3 and
# onward. There are three new instructions used here: umulxhi,
# addxc[cc] and initializing store. On T3 RSA private key operations
# are 1.54/1.87/2.11/2.26 times faster for 512/1024/2048/4096-bit key

2
crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl
View File

@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ $R="mm0";
&xor ($a4,$a2); # a2=a4^a2^a4
&mov (&DWP(5*4,"esp"),$a1); # a1^a4
&xor ($a4,$a1); # a1^a2^a4
&sar (@i[1],31); # broardcast 30th bit
&sar (@i[1],31); # broadcast 30th bit
&and ($lo,$b);
&mov (&DWP(6*4,"esp"),$a2); # a2^a4
&and (@i[1],$b);

2
crypto/bn/asm/x86-mont.pl
View File

@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ $frame=32; # size of above frame rounded up to 16n
&lea ("ebp",&DWP(-$frame,"esp","edi",4)); # future alloca($frame+4*(num+2))
&neg ("edi");
# minimize cache contention by arraning 2K window between stack
# minimize cache contention by arranging 2K window between stack
# pointer and ap argument [np is also position sensitive vector,
# but it's assumed to be near ap, as it's allocated at ~same
# time].

2
crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl
View File

@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ _mul_1x1:
sar \$63,$i0 # broadcast 62nd bit
lea (,$a1,4),$a4
and $b,$a
sar \$63,$i1 # boardcast 61st bit
sar \$63,$i1 # broadcast 61st bit
mov $a,$hi # $a is $lo
shl \$63,$lo
and $b,$i0

4
crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl
View File

@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
mov %rax,($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i]
mov 8($ap,$i,8),%rax # tp[i+1]
lea 1($i),$i # i++
dec $j # doesnn't affect CF!
dec $j # doesn't affect CF!
jnz .Lsub
sbb \$0,%rax # handle upmost overflow bit
@ -750,7 +750,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
mov 56($ap,$i,8),@ri[3]
sbb 40($np,$i,8),@ri[1]
lea 4($i),$i # i++
dec $j # doesnn't affect CF!
dec $j # doesn't affect CF!
jnz .Lsub4x
mov @ri[0],0($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i]

4
crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
View File

@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
mov %rax,($rp,$i,8) # rp[i]=tp[i]-np[i]
mov 8($ap,$i,8),%rax # tp[i+1]
lea 1($i),$i # i++
dec $j # doesnn't affect CF!
dec $j # doesn't affect CF!
jnz .Lsub
sbb \$0,%rax # handle upmost overflow bit
@ -2421,7 +2421,7 @@ my $N=$STRIDE/4; # should match cache line size
$code.=<<___;
movdqa 0(%rax),%xmm0 # 00000001000000010000000000000000
movdqa 16(%rax),%xmm1 # 00000002000000020000000200000002
lea 88-112(%rsp,%r10),%r10 # place the mask after tp[num+1] (+ICache optimizaton)
lea 88-112(%rsp,%r10),%r10 # place the mask after tp[num+1] (+ICache optimization)
lea 128($bp),$bptr # size optimization
pshufd \$0,%xmm5,%xmm5 # broadcast index

2
crypto/c64xpluscpuid.pl
View File

@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ bus_loop1?:
_OPENSSL_instrument_bus2:
.asmfunc
MV A6,B0 ; reassign max
|| MV B4,A6 ; reassing sizeof(output)
|| MV B4,A6 ; reassign sizeof(output)
|| MVK 0x00004030,A3
MV A4,B4 ; reassign output
|| MVK 0,A4 ; return value

4
crypto/camellia/asm/cmllt4-sparcv9.pl
View File

@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
# Camellia for SPARC T4.
#
# As with AES below results [for aligned data] are virtually identical
# to critical path lenths for 3-cycle instruction latency:
# to critical path lengths for 3-cycle instruction latency:
#
# 128-bit key 192/256-
# CBC encrypt 4.14/4.21(*) 5.46/5.52
@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
# misaligned data.
#
# As with Intel AES-NI, question is if it's possible to improve
# performance of parallelizeable modes by interleaving round
# performance of parallelizable modes by interleaving round
# instructions. In Camellia every instruction is dependent on
# previous, which means that there is place for 2 additional ones
# in between two dependent. Can we expect 3x performance improvement?

2
crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-c64xplus.pl
View File

@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
# faster than code generated by TI compiler. Compiler also disables
# interrupts for some reason, thus making interrupt response time
# dependent on input length. This module on the other hand is free
# from such limiation.
# from such limitation.
$output=pop;
open STDOUT,">$output";

2
crypto/des/asm/des-586.pl
View File

@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ require "x86asm.pl";
require "cbc.pl";
require "desboth.pl";
# base code is in microsft
# base code is in Microsoft
# op dest, source
# format.
#

16
crypto/des/asm/des_enc.m4
View File

@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ $4:
! parameter 3 1 for optional store to [in0]
! parameter 4 1 for load input/output address to local5/7
!
! The final permutation logic switches the halfes, meaning that
! The final permutation logic switches the halves, meaning that
! left and right ends up the the registers originally used.
define(fp_macro, {
@ -731,7 +731,7 @@ define(fp_ip_macro, {
sll $4, 3, local2
xor local4, temp2, $2
! reload since used as temporar:
! reload since used as temporary:
ld [out2+280], out4 ! loop counter
@ -753,7 +753,7 @@ define(fp_ip_macro, {
! parameter 1 address
! parameter 2 destination left
! parameter 3 destination right
! parameter 4 temporar
! parameter 4 temporary
! parameter 5 label
define(load_little_endian, {
@ -802,7 +802,7 @@ $5a:
! parameter 1 address
! parameter 2 destination left
! parameter 3 destination right
! parameter 4 temporar
! parameter 4 temporary
! parameter 4 label
!
! adds 8 to address
@ -927,7 +927,7 @@ $7.jmp.table:
! parameter 1 address
! parameter 2 source left
! parameter 3 source right
! parameter 4 temporar
! parameter 4 temporary
define(store_little_endian, {
@ -1517,7 +1517,7 @@ DES_ncbc_encrypt:
! parameter 7 1 for mov in1 to in3
! parameter 8 1 for mov in3 to in4
ip_macro(in5, out5, out5, in5, in4, 2, 0, 1) ! include decryprion ks in4
ip_macro(in5, out5, out5, in5, in4, 2, 0, 1) ! include decryption ks in4
fp_macro(out5, in5, 0, 1) ! 1 for input and output address to local5/7
@ -1563,7 +1563,7 @@ DES_ncbc_encrypt:
.size DES_ncbc_encrypt, .DES_ncbc_encrypt.end-DES_ncbc_encrypt
! void DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(input, output, lenght, ks1, ks2, ks3, ivec, enc)
! void DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(input, output, length, ks1, ks2, ks3, ivec, enc)
! **************************************************************************
@ -1811,7 +1811,7 @@ DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt:
.byte 240, 240, 240, 240, 244, 244, 244, 244
.byte 248, 248, 248, 248, 252, 252, 252, 252
! 5 numbers for initil/final permutation
! 5 numbers for initial/final permutation
.word 0x0f0f0f0f ! offset 256
.word 0x0000ffff ! 260

2
crypto/des/cfb_enc.c
View File

@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ void DES_cfb_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out, int numbits,
unsigned int sh[4];
unsigned char *ovec = (unsigned char *)sh;
/* I kind of count that compiler optimizes away this assertioni, */
/* I kind of count that compiler optimizes away this assertion, */
assert(sizeof(sh[0]) == 4); /* as this holds true for all, */
/* but 16-bit platforms... */

4
crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-armv4.pl
View File

@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ __ecp_nistz256_add:
@ if a+b >= modulus, subtract modulus.
@
@ But since comparison implies subtraction, we subtract
@ modulus and then add it back if subraction borrowed.
@ modulus and then add it back if subtraction borrowed.
subs $a0,$a0,#-1
sbcs $a1,$a1,#-1
@ -1222,7 +1222,7 @@ __ecp_nistz256_add_self:
@ if a+b >= modulus, subtract modulus.
@
@ But since comparison implies subtraction, we subtract
@ modulus and then add it back if subraction borrowed.
@ modulus and then add it back if subtraction borrowed.
subs $a0,$a0,#-1
sbcs $a1,$a1,#-1

4
crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-avx2.pl
View File

@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ ___
{
# This function receives a pointer to an array of four affine points
# (X, Y, <1>) and rearanges the data for AVX2 execution, while
# (X, Y, <1>) and rearranges the data for AVX2 execution, while
# converting it to 2^29 radix redundant form
my ($X0,$X1,$X2,$X3, $Y0,$Y1,$Y2,$Y3,
@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ ___
{
################################################################################
# This function receives a pointer to an array of four AVX2 formatted points
# (X, Y, Z) convert the data to normal representation, and rearanges the data
# (X, Y, Z) convert the data to normal representation, and rearranges the data
my ($D0,$D1,$D2,$D3, $D4,$D5,$D6,$D7, $D8)=map("%ymm$_",(0..8));
my ($T0,$T1,$T2,$T3, $T4,$T5,$T6)=map("%ymm$_",(9..15));

2
crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-ppc64.pl
View File

@ -696,7 +696,7 @@ __ecp_nistz256_add:
# if a+b >= modulus, subtract modulus
#
# But since comparison implies subtraction, we subtract
# modulus and then add it back if subraction borrowed.
# modulus and then add it back if subtraction borrowed.
subic $acc0,$acc0,-1
subfe $acc1,$poly1,$acc1

6
crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-sparcv9.pl
View File

@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ __ecp_nistz256_add:
! if a+b >= modulus, subtract modulus.
!
! But since comparison implies subtraction, we subtract
! modulus and then add it back if subraction borrowed.
! modulus and then add it back if subtraction borrowed.
subcc @acc[0],-1,@acc[0]
subccc @acc[1],-1,@acc[1]
@ -1592,7 +1592,7 @@ ___
########################################################################
# Following subroutines are VIS3 counterparts of those above that
# implement ones found in ecp_nistz256.c. Key difference is that they
# use 128-bit muliplication and addition with 64-bit carry, and in order
# use 128-bit multiplication and addition with 64-bit carry, and in order
# to do that they perform conversion from uin32_t[8] to uint64_t[4] upon
# entry and vice versa on return.
#
@ -1977,7 +1977,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
srlx $acc0,32,$t1
addxccc $acc3,$t2,$acc2 ! +=acc[0]*0xFFFFFFFF00000001
sub $acc0,$t0,$t2 ! acc0*0xFFFFFFFF00000001, low part
addxc %g0,$t3,$acc3 ! cant't overflow
addxc %g0,$t3,$acc3 ! can't overflow
___
}
$code.=<<___;

2
crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c
View File

@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
if (EC_GROUP_get_mont_data(group) != NULL) {
/*
* We want inverse in constant time, therefore we utilize the fact
* order must be prime and use Fermats Little Theorem instead.
* order must be prime and use Fermat's Little Theorem instead.
*/
if (!BN_set_word(X, 2)) {
ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);

2
crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
View File

@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ typedef limb felem[4];
typedef widelimb widefelem[7];
/*
* Field element represented as a byte arrary. 28*8 = 224 bits is also the
* Field element represented as a byte array. 28*8 = 224 bits is also the
* group order size for the elliptic curve, and we also use this type for
* scalars for point multiplication.
*/

2
crypto/ec/ecp_oct.c
View File

@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_set_compressed_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group,
EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_BIT);
else
/*
* BN_mod_sqrt() should have cought this error (not a square)
* BN_mod_sqrt() should have caught this error (not a square)
*/
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES,
EC_R_INVALID_COMPRESSED_POINT);

6
crypto/engine/README
View File

@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ actually qualitatively different depending on 'nid' (the "des_cbc" EVP_CIPHER is
not an interoperable implementation of "aes_256_cbc"), RSA_METHODs are
necessarily interoperable and don't have different flavours, only different
implementations. In other words, the ENGINE_TABLE for RSA will either be empty,
or will have a single ENGING_PILE hashed to by the 'nid' 1 and that pile
or will have a single ENGINE_PILE hashed to by the 'nid' 1 and that pile
represents ENGINEs that implement the single "type" of RSA there is.
Cleanup - the registration and unregistration may pose questions about how
@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ state will be unchanged. Thus, no cleanup is required unless registration takes
place. ENGINE_cleanup() will simply iterate across a list of registered cleanup
callbacks calling each in turn, and will then internally delete its own storage
(a STACK). When a cleanup callback is next registered (eg. if the cleanup() is
part of a gracefull restart and the application wants to cleanup all state then
part of a graceful restart and the application wants to cleanup all state then
start again), the internal STACK storage will be freshly allocated. This is much
the same as the situation in the ENGINE_TABLE instantiations ... NULL is the
initialised state, so only modification operations (not queries) will cause that
@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ exists) - the idea of providing an ENGINE_cpy() function probably wasn't a good
one and now certainly doesn't make sense in any generalised way. Some of the
RSA, DSA, DH, and RAND functions that were fiddled during the original ENGINE
changes have now, as a consequence, been reverted back. This is because the
hooking of ENGINE is now automatic (and passive, it can interally use a NULL
hooking of ENGINE is now automatic (and passive, it can internally use a NULL
ENGINE pointer to simply ignore ENGINE from then on).
Hell, that should be enough for now ... comments welcome.

4
crypto/include/internal/aria.h
View File

@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/* Copyright (c) 2017 National Security Resarch Institute. All rights reserved. */
/* Copyright (c) 2017 National Security Research Institute. All rights reserved. */
#ifndef HEADER_ARIA_H
# define HEADER_ARIA_H
@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
# define ARIA_ENCRYPT 1
# define ARIA_DECRYPT 0
# define ARIA_BLOCK_SIZE 16 /* Size of each encryption/decription block */
# define ARIA_BLOCK_SIZE 16 /* Size of each encryption/decryption block */
# define ARIA_MAX_KEYS 17 /* Number of keys needed in the worst case */
# ifdef __cplusplus

2
crypto/include/internal/evp_int.h
View File

@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ void openssl_add_all_digests_int(void);
void evp_cleanup_int(void);
void evp_app_cleanup_int(void);
/* Pulling defines out of C soure files */
/* Pulling defines out of C source files */
#define EVP_RC4_KEY_SIZE 16
#ifndef TLS1_1_VERSION

2
crypto/modes/asm/ghash-ia64.pl
View File

@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
___
######################################################################
# "528B" (well, "512B" actualy) streamed GHASH
# "528B" (well, "512B" actually) streamed GHASH
#
$Xip="in0";
$Htbl="in1";

2
crypto/modes/asm/ghash-parisc.pl
View File

@ -705,7 +705,7 @@ my $depd = sub {
my ($mod,$args) = @_;
my $orig = "depd$mod\t$args";
# I only have ",z" completer, it's impicitly encoded...
# I only have ",z" completer, it's implicitly encoded...
if ($args =~ /%r([0-9]+),([0-9]+),([0-9]+),%r([0-9]+)/) # format 16
{ my $opcode=(0x3c<<26)|($4<<21)|($1<<16);
my $cpos=63-$2;

2
crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl
View File

@ -103,7 +103,7 @@
#
# Does it make sense to increase Naggr? To start with it's virtually
# impossible in 32-bit mode, because of limited register bank
# capacity. Otherwise improvement has to be weighed agiainst slower
# capacity. Otherwise improvement has to be weighed against slower
# setup, as well as code size and complexity increase. As even
# optimistic estimate doesn't promise 30% performance improvement,
# there are currently no plans to increase Naggr.

2
crypto/modes/asm/ghashp8-ppc.pl
View File

@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
# Relative comparison is therefore more informative. This initial
# version is ~2.1x slower than hardware-assisted AES-128-CTR, ~12x
# faster than "4-bit" integer-only compiler-generated 64-bit code.
# "Initial version" means that there is room for futher improvement.
# "Initial version" means that there is room for further improvement.
# May 2016
#

8
crypto/modes/asm/ghashv8-armx.pl
View File

@ -206,13 +206,13 @@ $code.=<<___;
@ loaded value would have
@ to be rotated in order to
@ make it appear as in
@ alorithm specification
@ algorithm specification
subs $len,$len,#32 @ see if $len is 32 or larger
mov $inc,#16 @ $inc is used as post-
@ increment for input pointer;
@ as loop is modulo-scheduled
@ $inc is zeroed just in time
@ to preclude oversteping
@ to preclude overstepping
@ inp[len], which means that
@ last block[s] are actually
@ loaded twice, but last
@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ if ($flavour =~ /64/) { ######## 64-bit code
s/\bq([0-9]+)\b/"v".($1<8?$1:$1+8).".16b"/geo; # old->new registers
s/@\s/\/\//o; # old->new style commentary
# fix up remainig legacy suffixes
# fix up remaining legacy suffixes
s/\.[ui]?8(\s)/$1/o;
s/\.[uis]?32//o and s/\.16b/\.4s/go;
m/\.p64/o and s/\.16b/\.1q/o; # 1st pmull argument
@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ if ($flavour =~ /64/) { ######## 64-bit code
s/\bv([0-9])\.[12468]+[bsd]\b/q$1/go; # new->old registers
s/\/\/\s?/@ /o; # new->old style commentary
# fix up remainig new-style suffixes
# fix up remaining new-style suffixes
s/\],#[0-9]+/]!/o;
s/cclr\s+([^,]+),\s*([a-z]+)/mov$2 $1,#0/o or

2
crypto/objects/README
View File

@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ The basic syntax for adding an object is as follows:
create the C macros SN_base, LN_base, NID_base and OBJ_base.
Note that if the base name contains spaces, dashes or periods,
those will be converte to underscore.
those will be converted to underscore.
Then there are some extra commands:

4
crypto/objects/objects.txt
View File

@ -855,7 +855,7 @@ internet 6 : snmpv2 : SNMPv2
# Documents refer to "internet 7" as "mail". This however leads to ambiguities
# with RFC2798, Section 9.1.3, where "mail" is defined as the short name for
# rfc822Mailbox. The short name is therefore here left out for a reason.
# Subclasses of "mail", e.g. "MIME MHS" don't consitute a problem, as
# Subclasses of "mail", e.g. "MIME MHS" don't constitute a problem, as
# references are realized via long name "Mail" (with capital M).
internet 7 : : Mail
@ -1502,7 +1502,7 @@ ISO-US 10046 2 1 : dhpublicnumber : X9.42 DH
# RFC 5639 curve OIDs (see http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5639.txt)
# versionOne OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
# iso(1) identifified-organization(3) teletrust(36) algorithm(3)
# iso(1) identified-organization(3) teletrust(36) algorithm(3)
# signature-algorithm(3) ecSign(2) ecStdCurvesAndGeneration(8)
# ellipticCurve(1) 1 }
1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 1 : brainpoolP160r1

6
crypto/perlasm/x86_64-xlate.pl
View File

@ -531,7 +531,7 @@ my %globals;
);
# Following constants are defined in x86_64 ABI supplement, for
# example avaiable at https://www.uclibc.org/docs/psABI-x86_64.pdf,
# example available at https://www.uclibc.org/docs/psABI-x86_64.pdf,
# see section 3.7 "Stack Unwind Algorithm".
my %DW_reg_idx = (
"%rax"=>0, "%rdx"=>1, "%rcx"=>2, "%rbx"=>3,
@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ my %globals;
# [us]leb128 format is variable-length integer representation base
# 2^128, with most significant bit of each byte being 0 denoting
# *last* most significat digit. See "Variable Length Data" in the
# *last* most significant digit. See "Variable Length Data" in the
# DWARF specification, numbered 7.6 at least in versions 3 and 4.
sub sleb128 {
use integer; # get right shift extend sign
@ -1427,6 +1427,6 @@ close STDOUT;
#
# (*) Note that we're talking about run-time, not debug-time. Lack of
# unwind information makes debugging hard on both Windows and
# Unix. "Unlike" referes to the fact that on Unix signal handler
# Unix. "Unlike" refers to the fact that on Unix signal handler
# will always be invoked, core dumped and appropriate exit code
# returned to parent (for user notification).

2
crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-x86.pl
View File

@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ my $extra = shift;
&movdqa ($T0,$T1); # -> base 2^26 ...
&pand ($T1,$MASK);
&paddd ($D0,$T1); # ... and accumuate
&paddd ($D0,$T1); # ... and accumulate
&movdqa ($T1,$T0);
&psrlq ($T0,26);

6
crypto/poly1305/asm/poly1305-x86_64.pl
View File

@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ poly1305_emit:
mov %r9,%rcx
adc \$0,%r9
adc \$0,%r10
shr \$2,%r10 # did 130-bit value overfow?
shr \$2,%r10 # did 130-bit value overflow?
cmovnz %r8,%rax
cmovnz %r9,%rcx
@ -1403,7 +1403,7 @@ poly1305_emit_avx:
mov %r9,%rcx
adc \$0,%r9
adc \$0,%r10
shr \$2,%r10 # did 130-bit value overfow?
shr \$2,%r10 # did 130-bit value overflow?
cmovnz %r8,%rax
cmovnz %r9,%rcx
@ -3734,7 +3734,7 @@ poly1305_emit_base2_44:
mov %r9,%rcx
adc \$0,%r9
adc \$0,%r10
shr \$2,%r10 # did 130-bit value overfow?
shr \$2,%r10 # did 130-bit value overflow?
cmovnz %r8,%rax
cmovnz %r9,%rcx

2
crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-586.pl
View File

@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ if ($alt=0) {
push (@XX,shift(@XX)) if ($i>=0);
}
} else {
# Using pinsrw here improves performane on Intel CPUs by 2-3%, but
# Using pinsrw here improves performance on Intel CPUs by 2-3%, but
# brings down AMD by 7%...
$RC4_loop_mmx = sub {
my $i=shift;

2
crypto/rc4/asm/rc4-x86_64.pl
View File

@ -88,7 +88,7 @@
# The only code path that was not modified is P4-specific one. Non-P4
# Intel code path optimization is heavily based on submission by Maxim
# Perminov, Maxim Locktyukhin and Jim Guilford of Intel. I've used
# some of the ideas even in attempt to optmize the original RC4_INT
# some of the ideas even in attempt to optimize the original RC4_INT
# code path... Current performance in cycles per processed byte (less
# is better) and improvement coefficients relative to previous
# version of this module are:

2
crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
View File

@ -790,7 +790,7 @@ static int pkey_pss_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
if (!rsa_pss_get_param(rsa->pss, &md, &mgf1md, &min_saltlen))
return 0;
/* See if minumum salt length exceeds maximum possible */
/* See if minimum salt length exceeds maximum possible */
max_saltlen = RSA_size(rsa) - EVP_MD_size(md);
if ((RSA_bits(rsa) & 0x7) == 1)
max_saltlen--;

4
crypto/sha/asm/sha1-586.pl
View File

@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
# P4 +85%(!) +45%
#
# As you can see Pentium came out as looser:-( Yet I reckoned that
# improvement on P4 outweights the loss and incorporate this
# improvement on P4 outweighs the loss and incorporate this
# re-tuned code to 0.9.7 and later.
# ----------------------------------------------------------------
@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ for($i=0;$i<20-4;$i+=2) {
# being implemented in SSSE3). Once 8 quadruples or 32 elements are
# collected, it switches to routine proposed by Max Locktyukhin.
#
# Calculations inevitably require temporary reqisters, and there are
# Calculations inevitably require temporary registers, and there are
# no %xmm registers left to spare. For this reason part of the ring
# buffer, X[2..4] to be specific, is offloaded to 3 quadriples ring
# buffer on the stack. Keep in mind that X[2] is alias X[-6], X[3] -

10
crypto/sha/asm/sha1-mb-x86_64.pl
View File

@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ for(;$i<80;$i++) { &BODY_20_39($i,@V); unshift(@V,pop(@V)); }
$code.=<<___;
movdqa (%rbx),@Xi[0] # pull counters
mov \$1,%ecx
cmp 4*0(%rbx),%ecx # examinte counters
cmp 4*0(%rbx),%ecx # examine counters
pxor $t2,$t2
cmovge $Tbl,@ptr[0] # cancel input
cmp 4*1(%rbx),%ecx
@ -1508,10 +1508,10 @@ avx2_handler:
mov -48(%rax),%r15
mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx
mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp
mov %r12,216($context) # restore cotnext->R12
mov %r13,224($context) # restore cotnext->R13
mov %r14,232($context) # restore cotnext->R14
mov %r15,240($context) # restore cotnext->R15
mov %r12,216($context) # restore context->R12
mov %r13,224($context) # restore context->R13
mov %r14,232($context) # restore context->R14
mov %r15,240($context) # restore context->R15
lea -56-10*16(%rax),%rsi
lea 512($context),%rdi # &context.Xmm6

6
crypto/sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl
View File

@ -1984,9 +1984,9 @@ ssse3_handler:
mov -40(%rax),%r14
mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx
mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp
mov %r12,216($context) # restore cotnext->R12
mov %r13,224($context) # restore cotnext->R13
mov %r14,232($context) # restore cotnext->R14
mov %r12,216($context) # restore context->R12
mov %r13,224($context) # restore context->R13
mov %r14,232($context) # restore context->R14
.Lcommon_seh_tail:
mov 8(%rax),%rdi

2
crypto/sha/asm/sha256-586.pl
View File

@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
#
# Performance improvement over compiler generated code varies from
# 10% to 40% [see below]. Not very impressive on some µ-archs, but
# it's 5 times smaller and optimizies amount of writes.
# it's 5 times smaller and optimizes amount of writes.
#
# May 2012.
#

8
crypto/sha/asm/sha256-mb-x86_64.pl
View File

@ -1508,10 +1508,10 @@ avx2_handler:
mov -48(%rax),%r15
mov %rbx,144($context) # restore context->Rbx
mov %rbp,160($context) # restore context->Rbp
mov %r12,216($context) # restore cotnext->R12
mov %r13,224($context) # restore cotnext->R13
mov %r14,232($context) # restore cotnext->R14
mov %r15,240($context) # restore cotnext->R15
mov %r12,216($context) # restore context->R12
mov %r13,224($context) # restore context->R13
mov %r14,232($context) # restore context->R14
mov %r15,240($context) # restore context->R15
lea -56-10*16(%rax),%rsi
lea 512($context),%rdi # &context.Xmm6

2
crypto/sha/asm/sha512-586.pl
View File

@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
# (*) whichever best applicable.
# (**) x86_64 assembler performance is presented for reference
# purposes, the results are for integer-only code.
# (***) paddq is increadibly slow on Atom.
# (***) paddq is incredibly slow on Atom.
#
# IALU code-path is optimized for elder Pentiums. On vanilla Pentium
# performance improvement over compiler generated code reaches ~60%,

2
crypto/sha/asm/sha512-armv8.pl
View File

@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
# on Cortex-A53 (or by 4 cycles per round).
# (***) Super-impressive coefficients over gcc-generated code are
# indication of some compiler "pathology", most notably code
# generated with -mgeneral-regs-only is significanty faster
# generated with -mgeneral-regs-only is significantly faster
# and the gap is only 40-90%.
#
# October 2016.

2
crypto/sha/asm/sha512-parisc.pl
View File

@ -773,7 +773,7 @@ foreach (split("\n",$code)) {
s/shd\s+(%r[0-9]+),(%r[0-9]+),([0-9]+)/
$3>31 ? sprintf("shd\t%$2,%$1,%d",$3-32) # rotation for >=32
: sprintf("shd\t%$1,%$2,%d",$3)/e or
# translate made up instructons: _ror, _shr, _align, _shl
# translate made up instructions: _ror, _shr, _align, _shl
s/_ror(\s+)(%r[0-9]+),/
($SZ==4 ? "shd" : "shrpd")."$1$2,$2,"/e or

2
crypto/sha/asm/sha512-ppc.pl
View File

@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
#
# (*) 64-bit code in 32-bit application context, which actually is
# on TODO list. It should be noted that for safe deployment in
# 32-bit *mutli-threaded* context asyncronous signals should be
# 32-bit *multi-threaded* context asynchronous signals should be
# blocked upon entry to SHA512 block routine. This is because
# 32-bit signaling procedure invalidates upper halves of GPRs.
# Context switch procedure preserves them, but not signaling:-(

2
crypto/sha/asm/sha512p8-ppc.pl
View File

@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
# sha1-ppc.pl and 1.6x slower than aes-128-cbc. Another interesting
# result is degree of computational resources' utilization. POWER8 is
# "massively multi-threaded chip" and difference between single- and
# maximum multi-process benchmark results tells that utlization is
# maximum multi-process benchmark results tells that utilization is
# whooping 94%. For sha512-ppc.pl we get [not unimpressive] 84% and
# for sha1-ppc.pl - 73%. 100% means that multi-process result equals
# to single-process one, given that all threads end up on the same

2
crypto/sha/keccak1600.c
View File

@ -1055,7 +1055,7 @@ static uint64_t BitDeinterleave(uint64_t Ai)
* as blocksize. It is commonly (1600 - 256*n)/8, e.g. 168, 136, 104,
* 72, but can also be (1600 - 448)/8 = 144. All this means that message
* padding and intermediate sub-block buffering, byte- or bitwise, is
* caller's reponsibility.
* caller's responsibility.
*/
size_t SHA3_absorb(uint64_t A[5][5], const unsigned char *inp, size_t len,
size_t r)

2
crypto/sha/sha_locl.h
View File

@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ int HASH_INIT(SHA_CTX *c)
/*
* As pointed out by Wei Dai, F() below can be simplified to the code in
* F_00_19. Wei attributes these optimisations to Peter Gutmann's SHS code,
* F_00_19. Wei attributes these optimizations to Peter Gutmann's SHS code,
* and he attributes it to Rich Schroeppel.
* #define F(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) | ((~(x)) & (z)))
* I've just become aware of another tweak to be made, again from Wei Dai,

2
crypto/x86cpuid.pl
View File

@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ for (@ARGV) { $sse2=1 if (/-DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2/); }
&cmp ("ebp",0);
&jne (&label("notintel"));
&or ("edx",1<<30); # set reserved bit#30 on Intel CPUs
&and (&HB("eax"),15); # familiy ID
&and (&HB("eax"),15); # family ID
&cmp (&HB("eax"),15); # P4?
&jne (&label("notintel"));
&or ("edx",1<<20); # set reserved bit#20 to engage RC4_CHAR

2
demos/bio/cmod.cnf
View File

@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
testapp = test_sect
[test_sect]
# list of confuration modules
# list of configuration modules
# SSL configuration module
ssl_conf = ssl_sect

2
engines/e_afalg.c
View File

@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static int afalg_setup_async_event_notification(afalg_aio *aio)
ALG_WARN("%s: ASYNC_get_wait_ctx error", __func__);
return 0;
}
/* Get waitfd from ASYNC_WAIT_CTX if it is alreday set */
/* Get waitfd from ASYNC_WAIT_CTX if it is already set */
ret = ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_fd(waitctx, engine_afalg_id,
&aio->efd, &custom);
if (ret == 0) {

2
include/openssl/engine.h
View File

@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ int ENGINE_register_complete(ENGINE *e);
int ENGINE_register_all_complete(void);
/*
* Send parametrised control commands to the engine. The possibilities to
* Send parameterised control commands to the engine. The possibilities to
* send down an integer, a pointer to data or a function pointer are
* provided. Any of the parameters may or may not be NULL, depending on the
* command number. In actuality, this function only requires a structural

2
include/openssl/ui.h
View File

@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ int UI_get_result_length(UI *ui, int i);
int UI_process(UI *ui);
/*
* Give a user interface parametrised control commands. This can be used to
* Give a user interface parameterised control commands. This can be used to
* send down an integer, a data pointer or a function pointer, as well as be
* used to get information from a UI.
*/

2
ms/segrenam.pl
View File

@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ foreach (@files) {
# read IMAGE_FILE_HEADER
sysread(FD,$coff,20)==20 || die "$file is too short";
($Machine,$NumberOfSections,$TimeDateStamp,
$PointerToSymbolTable,$NumberOfSysmbols,
$PointerToSymbolTable,$NumberOfSymbols,
$SizeOfOptionalHeader,$Characteristics)=unpack("SSIIISS",$coff);
# skip over IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER

2
ssl/ssl_locl.h
View File

@ -1494,7 +1494,7 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st {
uint16_t *peer_sigalgs;
/* Size of above array */
size_t peer_sigalgslen;
/* Sigalg peer actualy uses */
/* Sigalg peer actually uses */
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *peer_sigalg;
/*
* Set if corresponding CERT_PKEY can be used with current

2
test/README.external
View File

@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ explicitly run (with more debugging):
$ VERBOSE=1 make TESTS=test_external_krb5 test
Test-failures suppressions
-------------------------
--------------------------
krb5 will automatically adapt its test suite to account for the configuration
of your system. Certain tests may require more installed packages to run. No

2
test/build.info
View File

@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ IF[{- !$disabled{tests} -}]
DEPEND[libtestutil.a]=../libcrypto
# Special hack for descrip.mms to include the MAIN object module
# explicitely. This will only be done if there isn't a MAIN in the
# explicitly. This will only be done if there isn't a MAIN in the
# program's object modules already.
BEGINRAW[descrip.mms]
INCLUDE_MAIN___test_libtestutil_OLB = /INCLUDE=MAIN

4
test/certs/mkcert.sh
View File

@ -178,11 +178,11 @@ genpc() {
-set_serial 2 -days "${DAYS}"
}
# Usage: $0 genalt keyname certname eekeyname eecertname alt1 alt2 ...
# Usage: $0 geneealt keyname certname eekeyname eecertname alt1 alt2 ...
#
# Note: takes csr on stdin, so must be used with $0 req like this:
#
# $0 req keyname dn | $0 genalt keyname certname eekeyname eecertname alt ...
# $0 req keyname dn | $0 geneealt keyname certname eekeyname eecertname alt ...
geneealt() {
local key=$1; shift
local cert=$1; shift

4
test/pkits-test.pl
View File

@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ my @testlists = (
[ "4.4.7", "Valid Two CRLs Test7", 0 ],
# The test document suggests these should return certificate revoked...
# Subsquent discussion has concluded they should not due to unhandle
# Subsequent discussion has concluded they should not due to unhandle
# critical CRL extensions.
[ "4.4.8", "Invalid Unknown CRL Entry Extension Test8", 36 ],
[ "4.4.9", "Invalid Unknown CRL Extension Test9", 36 ],
@ -705,7 +705,7 @@ my @testlists = (
[ "4.14.29", "Valid cRLIssuer Test29", 0 ],
# Although this test is valid it has a circular dependency. As a result
# an attempt is made to reursively checks a CRL path and rejected due to
# an attempt is made to recursively checks a CRL path and rejected due to
# a CRL path validation error. PKITS notes suggest this test does not
# need to be run due to this issue.
[ "4.14.30", "Valid cRLIssuer Test30", 54 ],

6
test/recipes/25-test_verify.t
View File

@ -322,13 +322,13 @@ ok(!verify("badalt7-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ncca1-cert"], ),
"Name Constraints CN BMPSTRING hostname not permitted");
ok(!verify("badalt8-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ncca1-cert", "ncca3-cert"], ),
"Name constaints nested DNS name not permitted 1");
"Name constraints nested DNS name not permitted 1");
ok(!verify("badalt9-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ncca1-cert", "ncca3-cert"], ),
"Name constaints nested DNS name not permitted 2");
"Name constraints nested DNS name not permitted 2");
ok(!verify("badalt10-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ncca1-cert", "ncca3-cert"], ),
"Name constaints nested DNS name excluded");
"Name constraints nested DNS name excluded");
ok(verify("ee-pss-sha1-cert", "sslserver", ["root-cert"], ["ca-cert"], ),
"Certificate PSS signature using SHA1");

2
test/recipes/70-test_key_share.t
View File

@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ $proxy->start();
ok(TLSProxy::Message->success() && ($selectedgroupid == X25519),
"Multiple acceptable key_shares (part 2)");
#Test 15: Server sends key_share that wasn't offerred should fail
#Test 15: Server sends key_share that wasn't offered should fail
$proxy->clear();
$testtype = SELECT_X25519;
$proxy->clientflags("-curves P-256");

2
test/recipes/70-test_sslmessages.t
View File

@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ $proxy->reneg(1);
$proxy->start();
checkhandshake($proxy, checkhandshake::RENEG_HANDSHAKE,
checkhandshake::DEFAULT_EXTENSIONS,
"Rengotiation handshake test");
"Renegotiation handshake test");
#Test 8: Server name handshake (no client request)
$proxy->clear();

6
test/recipes/70-test_sslrecords.t
View File

@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ SKIP: {
$boundary_test_type = DATA_AFTER_SERVER_HELLO;
$proxy->filter(\&not_on_record_boundary);
$proxy->start();
ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail(), "Record not on bounday in TLS1.3 (ServerHello)");
ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail(), "Record not on boundary in TLS1.3 (ServerHello)");
#Test 17: Sending a Finished which doesn't end on a record boundary
# should fail
@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ SKIP: {
$boundary_test_type = DATA_AFTER_FINISHED;
$proxy->filter(\&not_on_record_boundary);
$proxy->start();
ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail(), "Record not on bounday in TLS1.3 (Finished)");
ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail(), "Record not on boundary in TLS1.3 (Finished)");
#Test 18: Sending a KeyUpdate which doesn't end on a record boundary
# should fail
@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ SKIP: {
$boundary_test_type = DATA_AFTER_KEY_UPDATE;
$proxy->filter(\&not_on_record_boundary);
$proxy->start();
ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail(), "Record not on bounday in TLS1.3 (KeyUpdate)");
ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail(), "Record not on boundary in TLS1.3 (KeyUpdate)");
}

8
test/recipes/70-test_tls13kexmodes.t
View File

@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ use constant {
EMPTY_EXTENSION => 1,
NON_DHE_KEX_MODE_ONLY => 2,
DHE_KEX_MODE_ONLY => 3,
UNKNONW_KEX_MODES => 4,
UNKNOWN_KEX_MODES => 4,
BOTH_KEX_MODES => 5
};
@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ checkhandshake($proxy, checkhandshake::RESUME_HANDSHAKE,
#Test 6: Attempt a resume with only unrecognised kex modes. Should not resume
$proxy->clear();
$proxy->clientflags("-sess_in ".$session);
$testtype = UNKNONW_KEX_MODES;
$testtype = UNKNOWN_KEX_MODES;
$proxy->start();
checkhandshake($proxy, checkhandshake::DEFAULT_HANDSHAKE,
checkhandshake::DEFAULT_EXTENSIONS
@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ checkhandshake($proxy, checkhandshake::HRR_RESUME_HANDSHAKE,
| checkhandshake::PSK_SRV_EXTENSION,
"Resume with both kex modes and HRR");
#Test 9: Attempt a resume with dhe kex mode only and an unnacceptable initial
#Test 9: Attempt a resume with dhe kex mode only and an unacceptable initial
# key_share. Should resume with a key_share following an HRR
$proxy->clear();
$proxy->clientflags("-sess_in ".$session);
@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ sub modify_kex_modes_filter
$ext = pack "C2",
0x01, #List length
0x01; #psk_dhe_ke
} elsif ($testtype == UNKNONW_KEX_MODES) {
} elsif ($testtype == UNKNOWN_KEX_MODES) {
$ext = pack "C3",
0x02, #List length
0xfe, #unknown

2
test/recipes/80-test_pkcs12.t
View File

@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ if (eval { require Win32::API; 1; }) {
$pass = Encode::encode("cp1253",Encode::decode("utf-8",$pass));
}
} else {
# Running MinGW tests transparenly under Wine apparently requires
# Running MinGW tests transparently under Wine apparently requires
# UTF-8 locale...
foreach(`locale -a`) {

2
test/recipes/80-test_ssl_old.t
View File

@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ sub testssl {
plan skip_all => "None of the ciphersuites to test are available in this OpenSSL build"
if $protocolciphersuitecount + scalar(keys %ciphersuites) == 0;
# The count of protocols is because in addition to the ciphersuits
# The count of protocols is because in addition to the ciphersuites
# we got above, we're running a weak DH test for each protocol
plan tests => scalar(@protocols) + $protocolciphersuitecount
+ scalar(keys %ciphersuites);

4
test/sanitytest.c
View File

@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static int test_sanity_sign(void)
return 1;
}
static int test_sanity_unsigned_convertion(void)
static int test_sanity_unsigned_conversion(void)
{
/* Check that unsigned-to-signed conversions preserve bit patterns */
if (!TEST_int_eq((int)((unsigned int)INT_MAX + 1), INT_MIN)
@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
ADD_TEST(test_sanity_enum_size);
ADD_TEST(test_sanity_twos_complement);
ADD_TEST(test_sanity_sign);
ADD_TEST(test_sanity_unsigned_convertion);
ADD_TEST(test_sanity_unsigned_conversion);
ADD_TEST(test_sanity_range);
return 1;
}

2
test/testutil/output.h
View File

@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
/*
* The basic I/O functions used internally by the test framework. These
* can be overriden when needed. Note that if one is, then all must be.
* can be overridden when needed. Note that if one is, then all must be.
*/
void test_open_streams(void);
void test_close_streams(void);

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