Ooops, revert committed conflict.

This commit is contained in:
Dr. Stephen Henson 2009-11-07 22:22:40 +00:00
parent 71af26b57b
commit 4398222457

View File

@ -1679,18 +1679,13 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
j=0;
for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
{
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL)
|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n)
|| !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
(unsigned int *)&i))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
(unsigned int *)&i);
q+=i;
j+=i;
}
@ -1709,14 +1704,14 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
{
/* lets do DSS */
if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL)
|| !EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
|| !EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
|| !EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n)
|| !EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
(unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
goto err;
}
s2n(i,p);
@ -1728,14 +1723,14 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
{
/* let's do ECDSA */
if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL)
|| !EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
|| !EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
|| !EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n)
|| !EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
(unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
(unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
goto err;
}
s2n(i,p);
@ -2974,7 +2969,7 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
{
unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
int len, slen, rv = 0;
int len, slen;
unsigned int hlen;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
HMAC_CTX hctx;
@ -3029,21 +3024,11 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
else
{
RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
<<<<<<< s3_srvr.c
if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
s->ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
goto evp_err;
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
16, tlsext_tick_md(), NULL))
goto evp_err;
memcpy(key_name, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
=======
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
>>>>>>> 1.180
}
l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
/* Skip ticket length for now */
@ -3056,26 +3041,15 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
/* Encrypt session data */
if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
goto evp_err;
EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
p += len;
if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
goto evp_err;
EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
p += len;
if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
goto evp_err;
if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
goto evp_err;
rv = 1;
evp_err:
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
if (!rv)
return -1;
p += hlen;
/* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */