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Add three Suite B modes to TLS code, supporting RFC6460.

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This commit is contained in:
Dr. Stephen Henson 2012-08-15 15:15:05 +00:00
parent 5833e4f5d6
commit 2ea8035460
15 changed files with 375 additions and 80 deletions
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6
CHANGES
View File

@ -4,6 +4,12 @@
Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.1.0 [xx XXX xxxx]
*) New Suite B modes for TLS code. These use and enforce the requirements
of RFC6460: restrict ciphersuites, only permit Suite B algorithms and
only use Suite B curves. The Suite B modes can be set by using the
strings "SUITEB128", "SUITEB192" or "SUITEB128ONLY" for the cipherstring.
[Steve Henson]
*) New chain verification flags for Suite B levels of security. Check
algorithms are acceptable when flags are set in X509_verify_cert.
[Steve Henson]

4
apps/s_server.c
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@ -2623,8 +2623,8 @@ static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con)
BIO_printf(bio_err,"verify error:%s\n",
X509_verify_cert_error_string(verify_error));
}
else
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
/* Always print any error messages */
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
return(0);
}

6
ssl/s23_clnt.c
View File

@ -367,6 +367,12 @@ static int ssl23_client_hello(SSL *s)
version_major = TLS1_2_VERSION_MAJOR;
version_minor = TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR;
}
else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
return -1;
}
else if (version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
{
version_major = TLS1_1_VERSION_MAJOR;

7
ssl/s23_srvr.c
View File

@ -425,6 +425,13 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
}
}
if (s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION && tls1_suiteb(s))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
goto err;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (FIPS_mode() && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION))
{

11
ssl/s3_clnt.c
View File

@ -3154,8 +3154,9 @@ err:
}
/* Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently
* check cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 and if
* static DH client certificates can be used.
* check cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if
* static DH client certificates can be used and optionally checks
* suitability for Suite B.
*/
static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
{
@ -3165,6 +3166,12 @@ static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
/* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && !s->cert->key->digest)
return 0;
/* If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it.
* This also adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
*/
if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
!tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
return 0;
alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */
if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))

57
ssl/s3_lib.c
View File

@ -3966,7 +3966,7 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
}
#endif
if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE)
if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || tls1_suiteb(s))
{
prio = srvr;
allow = clnt;
@ -4040,7 +4040,7 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
/* if we are considering an ECC cipher suite that uses
* an ephemeral EC key check it */
if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
ok = ok && tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(s);
ok = ok && tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(s, c->id);
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
@ -4059,7 +4059,7 @@ int ssl3_get_req_cert_type(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
{
int ret=0;
const unsigned char *sig;
size_t siglen;
size_t i, siglen;
int have_rsa_sign = 0, have_dsa_sign = 0, have_ecdsa_sign = 0;
int nostrict = 1;
unsigned long alg_k;
@ -4070,48 +4070,27 @@ int ssl3_get_req_cert_type(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
memcpy(p, s->cert->ctypes, s->cert->ctype_num);
return (int)s->cert->ctype_num;
}
/* Else see if we have any signature algorithms configured */
if (s->cert->client_sigalgs)
/* get configured sigalgs */
siglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sig);
if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
nostrict = 0;
for (i = 0; i < siglen; i+=2, sig+=2)
{
sig = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
siglen = s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
}
else
{
sig = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
}
/* If we have sigalgs work out if we can sign with RSA, DSA, ECDSA */
if (sig)
{
size_t i;
if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT)
nostrict = 0;
for (i = 0; i < siglen; i+=2, sig+=2)
switch(sig[1])
{
switch(sig[1])
{
case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
have_rsa_sign = 1;
break;
case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
have_rsa_sign = 1;
break;
case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
have_dsa_sign = 1;
break;
case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
have_dsa_sign = 1;
break;
case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
have_ecdsa_sign = 1;
break;
}
case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
have_ecdsa_sign = 1;
break;
}
}
/* Otherwise allow anything */
else
{
have_rsa_sign = 1;
have_dsa_sign = 1;
have_ecdsa_sign = 1;
}
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;

4
ssl/s3_srvr.c
View File

@ -1704,8 +1704,8 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
{
/* Get NID of first shared curve */
int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, 0);
/* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
if (nid != NID_undef)
ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
}

15
ssl/ssl.h
View File

@ -654,7 +654,16 @@ struct ssl_session_st
/* Many implementations ignore some aspects of the TLS standards such as
* enforcing certifcate chain algorithms. When this is set we enforce them.
*/
#define SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT 0x00000001L
#define SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT 0x00000001L
/* Suite B modes, takes same values as certificate verify flags */
#define SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY 0x10000
/* Suite B 192 bit only mode */
#define SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS 0x20000
/* Suite B 128 bit mode allowing 192 bit algorithms */
#define SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS 0x30000
/* Flags for building certificate chains */
/* Treat any existing certificates as untrusted CAs */
@ -681,6 +690,8 @@ struct ssl_session_st
#define CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME 0x200
/* Cert type matches client types (always set for server cert) */
#define CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE 0x400
/* Cert chain suitable to Suite B */
#define CERT_PKEY_SUITEB 0x800
/* Note: SSL[_CTX]_set_{options,mode} use |= op on the previous value,
* they cannot be used to clear bits. */
@ -2579,6 +2590,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
#define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST 155
#define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST 156
#define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING 283
#define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST 380
#define SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION 340
#define SSL_R_INVALID_AUDIT_PROOF 371
#define SSL_R_INVALID_AUTHZ_DATA 374
@ -2653,6 +2665,7 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
#define SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED 196
#define SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED 197
#define SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED 344
#define SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE 379
#define SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE 297
#define SSL_R_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_TOO_LONG 327
#define SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 198

4
ssl/ssl_cert.c
View File

@ -692,6 +692,8 @@ int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
return(0);
}
/* Set suite B flags if needed */
X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, tls1_suiteb(s));
#if 0
if (SSL_get_verify_depth(s) >= 0)
X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&ctx, SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
@ -1151,6 +1153,8 @@ int ssl_build_cert_chain(CERT *c, X509_STORE *chain_store, int flags)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
return 0;
}
/* Set suite B flags if needed */
X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&xs_ctx, c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS);
i = X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
if (i > 0)

45
ssl/ssl_ciph.c
View File

@ -1347,10 +1347,49 @@ static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
return(retval);
}
static int check_suiteb_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *meth, CERT *c,
const char **prule_str)
{
unsigned int suiteb_flags = 0;
if (!strcmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128"))
suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS;
else if (!strcmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128ONLY"))
suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
else if (!strcmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB192"))
suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS;
if (suiteb_flags)
{
c->cert_flags &= ~SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS;
c->cert_flags |= suiteb_flags;
}
else
suiteb_flags = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS;
if (!suiteb_flags)
return 1;
/* Check version */
switch(suiteb_flags)
{
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
*prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384";
break;
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
*prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256";
break;
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
*prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384";
break;
}
return 1;
}
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method,
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list,
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list_by_id,
const char *rule_str)
const char *rule_str, CERT *c)
{
int ok, num_of_ciphers, num_of_alias_max, num_of_group_aliases;
unsigned long disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, disabled_mac, disabled_ssl;
@ -1365,6 +1404,10 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method,
if (rule_str == NULL || cipher_list == NULL || cipher_list_by_id == NULL)
return NULL;
if (!check_suiteb_cipher_list(ssl_method, c, &rule_str))
return NULL;
/*
* To reduce the work to do we only want to process the compiled
* in algorithms, so we first get the mask of disabled ciphers.

2
ssl/ssl_err.c
View File

@ -398,6 +398,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST) ,"https proxy request"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST) ,"http request"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING) ,"illegal padding"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST) ,"illegal Suite B digest"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION),"inconsistent compression"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_AUDIT_PROOF) ,"invalid audit proof"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_INVALID_AUTHZ_DATA) ,"invalid authz data"},
@ -472,6 +473,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED),"null ssl method passed"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED),"old session cipher not returned"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED),"old session compression algorithm not returned"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE),"only TLS 1.2 allowed in Suite B mode"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE),"only tls allowed in fips mode"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_OPAQUE_PRF_INPUT_TOO_LONG),"opaque PRF input too long"},
{ERR_REASON(SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG),"packet length too long"},

8
ssl/ssl_lib.c
View File

@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx,const SSL_METHOD *meth)
sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&(ctx->cipher_list),
&(ctx->cipher_list_by_id),
meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ctx->cert);
if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION,SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
@ -1333,7 +1333,7 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str)
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&ctx->cipher_list,
&ctx->cipher_list_by_id,str);
&ctx->cipher_list_by_id,str, ctx->cert);
/* ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it
* was unable to find a cipher matching the given rule string
* (for example if the rule string specifies a cipher which
@ -1357,7 +1357,7 @@ int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s,const char *str)
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(s->ctx->method,&s->cipher_list,
&s->cipher_list_by_id,str);
&s->cipher_list_by_id,str, s->cert);
/* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */
if (sk == NULL)
return 0;
@ -1787,7 +1787,7 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method,
&ret->cipher_list,&ret->cipher_list_by_id,
meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ret->cert);
if (ret->cipher_list == NULL
|| sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0)
{

9
ssl/ssl_locl.h
View File

@ -489,6 +489,11 @@ typedef struct cert_pkey_st
*/
int valid_flags;
} CERT_PKEY;
/* Retrieve Suite B flags */
#define tls1_suiteb(s) (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS)
/* Uses to check strict mode: suite B modes are always strict */
#define SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT \
(SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS|SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT)
typedef struct cert_st
{
@ -910,7 +915,7 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p,
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *meth,
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **pref,
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **sorted,
const char *rule_str);
const char *rule_str, CERT *c);
void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode);
int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s,const EVP_CIPHER **enc,
const EVP_MD **md,int *mac_pkey_type,int *mac_secret_size, SSL_COMP **comp);
@ -1184,7 +1189,7 @@ int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
int *curves, size_t ncurves);
int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
const char *str);
int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s);
int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long id);
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT

272
ssl/t1_lib.c
View File

@ -241,6 +241,12 @@ static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
};
static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
{
0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
};
int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
{
/* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
@ -320,13 +326,29 @@ static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
{
*pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
*pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
return;
}
else
/* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
{
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
*pcurves = suiteb_curves;
*pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
break;
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
*pcurves = suiteb_curves;
*pcurveslen = 2;
break;
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
*pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
*pcurveslen = 2;
break;
default:
*pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
*pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
}
/* If not set use default: for now static structure */
if (!*pcurves)
{
*pcurves = eccurves_default;
@ -338,8 +360,28 @@ int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
{
const unsigned char *curves;
size_t curveslen, i;
unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
return 0;
/* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
if (suiteb_flags)
{
unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
if (p[1])
return 0;
if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
{
if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
return 0;
}
else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
{
if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
return 0;
}
else /* Should never happen */
return 0;
}
tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
{
@ -350,7 +392,8 @@ int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
}
/* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
* matches.
* matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
* an EC tmp key.
*/
int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
@ -361,6 +404,25 @@ int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
/* Can't do anything on client side */
if (s->server == 0)
return -1;
if (nmatch == -2)
{
if (tls1_suiteb(s))
{
/* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
* already know these are acceptable due to previous
* checks.
*/
unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
/* Should never happen */
return NID_undef;
}
/* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
nmatch = 0;
}
tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
&supp, &supplen);
tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
@ -540,6 +602,8 @@ static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
if (i == plen)
return 0;
}
if (!curve_id)
return 1;
/* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
{
@ -551,6 +615,9 @@ static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
}
if (i == plen)
return 0;
/* For clients can only check sent curve list */
if (!s->server)
return 1;
}
return 1;
}
@ -558,7 +625,7 @@ static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
/* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
* EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
*/
static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x)
static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
{
unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
@ -576,13 +643,82 @@ static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x)
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (!rv)
return 0;
return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id);
/* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
* supported curves extension.
*/
rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
if (!rv)
return 0;
/* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
* SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
*/
if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
{
int check_md;
size_t i;
CERT *c = s->cert;
if (curve_id[0])
return 0;
/* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
else
return 0; /* Should never happen */
for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
break;
if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
return 0;
if (set_ee_md == 2)
{
if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
else
c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
}
}
return rv;
}
/* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s)
int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
{
unsigned char curve_id[2];
EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
/* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
* no other curves permitted.
*/
if (tls1_suiteb(s))
{
/* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
else
return 0;
curve_id[0] = 0;
/* Check this curve is acceptable */
if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
return 0;
/* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
return 1;
/* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
else
{
unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
if (!ec)
return 0;
if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
return 0;
if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
return 1;
return 0;
}
}
if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
{
/* Need a shared curve */
@ -655,8 +791,31 @@ static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
#endif
};
static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
};
size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
{
/* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
* preferences.
*/
switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
{
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
return 2;
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
return 2;
}
/* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
{
@ -698,6 +857,44 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
return 0;
}
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
{
unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
/* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
return 0;
if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
return 0;
/* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
if (tls1_suiteb(s))
{
if (curve_id[0])
return 0;
if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
{
if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
}
else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
{
if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
}
else
return 0;
}
}
else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
return 0;
/* Check signature matches a type we sent */
sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
@ -706,7 +903,7 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
break;
}
/* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT))
if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
return 0;
@ -3123,27 +3320,21 @@ static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
size_t nmatch;
TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
CERT *c = s->cert;
unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
/* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs)
if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
{
conf = c->client_sigalgs;
conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
}
else if (c->conf_sigalgs)
else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
{
conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
}
else
{
conf = tls12_sigalgs;
conflen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (FIPS_mode())
conflen -= 2;
#endif
}
if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE)
conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
{
pref = conf;
preflen = conflen;
@ -3214,7 +3405,7 @@ int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
/* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
* use the certificate for signing.
*/
if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT))
if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
{
/* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
* not supported it stays as NULL.
@ -3588,14 +3779,22 @@ int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
CERT *c = s->cert;
/* idx != -1 means checking server chains */
unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
/* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
if (idx != -1)
{
cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
/* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
if (idx == -2)
{
cpk = c->key;
idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
}
else
cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
x = cpk->x509;
pk = cpk->privatekey;
chain = cpk->chain;
strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT;
strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
/* If no cert or key, forget it */
if (!x || !pk)
goto end;
@ -3608,13 +3807,27 @@ int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
if (idx == -1)
goto end;
cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT)
if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
else
check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
strict_mode = 1;
}
if (suiteb_flags)
{
int ok;
if (check_flags)
check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
if (ok != X509_V_OK)
{
if (check_flags)
rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
else
goto end;
}
}
/* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
* signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
@ -3702,8 +3915,8 @@ int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
else if(check_flags)
rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
skip_sigs:
/* Check cert parameters are consistent: server certs only */
if (!s->server || tls1_check_cert_param(s, x))
/* Check cert parameters are consistent */
if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
else if (!check_flags)
goto end;
@ -3715,7 +3928,8 @@ int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
{
if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, sk_X509_value(chain, i)))
X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
{
if (check_flags)
{
@ -3832,7 +4046,11 @@ int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
cpk->valid_flags = rv;
else
cpk->valid_flags = 0;
{
/* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
return 0;
}
}
return rv;
}

5
ssl/tls1.h
View File

@ -285,6 +285,11 @@ extern "C" {
/* Flag set for unrecognised algorithms */
#define TLSEXT_nid_unknown 0x1000000
/* ECC curves */
#define TLSEXT_curve_P_256 23
#define TLSEXT_curve_P_384 24
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
#define TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name 255