diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 5e68e6247d..1ecb0b440b 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -555,7 +555,19 @@
      differing sizes.
      [Richard Levitte]
 
- Changes between 0.9.7b and 0.9.7c  [xx XXX 2003]
+ Changes between 0.9.7b and 0.9.7c  [30 Sep 2003]
+
+  *) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite:
+
+     Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with
+     invalid tags (CAN-2003-0543 and CAN-2003-0544).
+     
+     Free up ASN1_TYPE correctly if ANY type is invalid (CAN-2003-0545).
+
+     If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check
+     certificate signature with the NULL public key.
+
+     [Steve Henson]
 
   *) New -ignore_err option in ocsp application to stop the server
      exiting on the first error in a request.
@@ -2530,7 +2542,27 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
   *) Clean old EAY MD5 hack from e_os.h.
      [Richard Levitte]
 
- Changes between 0.9.6j and 0.9.6k  [xx XXX 2003]
+ Changes between 0.9.6j and 0.9.6k  [30 Sep 2003]
+
+  *) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite:
+
+     Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with
+     invalid tags (CAN-2003-0543 and CAN-2003-0544).
+     
+     If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check
+     certificate signature with the NULL public key.
+
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite:
+
+     Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with
+     invalid tags (CAN-2003-0543 and CAN-2003-0544).
+     
+     If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check
+     certificate signature with the NULL public key.
+
+     [Steve Henson]
 
   *) In ssl3_accept() (ssl/s3_srvr.c) only accept a client certificate
      if the server requested one: as stated in TLS 1.0 and SSL 3.0
diff --git a/FAQ b/FAQ
index 1b129bc5ac..ca5683def7 100644
--- a/FAQ
+++ b/FAQ
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ OpenSSL  -  Frequently Asked Questions
 * Which is the current version of OpenSSL?
 
 The current version is available from <URL: http://www.openssl.org>.
-OpenSSL 0.9.7a was released on February 19, 2003.
+OpenSSL 0.9.7c was released on September 30, 2003.
 
 In addition to the current stable release, you can also access daily
 snapshots of the OpenSSL development version at <URL:
diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index cc9405c3bc..f0282ebb87 100644
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -5,6 +5,13 @@
   This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
   release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
 
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7b and OpenSSL 0.9.7c:
+
+      o Security: fix various ASN1 parsing bugs.
+      o New -ignore_err option to OCSP utility.
+      o Various interop and bug fixes in S/MIME code.
+      o SSL/TLS protocol fix for unrequested client certificates.
+
   Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7a and OpenSSL 0.9.7b:
 
       o Security: counter the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of
@@ -40,11 +47,14 @@
       o New elliptic curve library section.
       o New AES (Rijndael) library section.
       o Support for new platforms: Windows CE, Tandem OSS, A/UX, AIX 64-bit,
-        Linux x86_64
+        Linux x86_64, Linux 64-bit on Sparc v9
       o Extended support for some platforms: VxWorks
       o Enhanced support for shared libraries.
+      o Now only builds PIC code when shared library support is requested.
       o Support for pkg-config.
       o Lots of new manuals.
+      o Makes symbolic links to or copies of manuals to cover all described
+        functions.
       o Change DES API to clean up the namespace (some applications link also
         against libdes providing similar functions having the same name).
         Provide macros for backward compatibility (will be removed in the
@@ -70,6 +80,11 @@
       o SSL/TLS: add callback to retrieve SSL/TLS messages.
       o SSL/TLS: support AES cipher suites (RFC3268).
 
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6j and OpenSSL 0.9.6k:
+
+      o Security: fix various ASN1 parsing bugs.
+      o SSL/TLS protocol fix for unrequested client certificates.
+
   Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6i and OpenSSL 0.9.6j:
 
       o Security: counter the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c b/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c
index 3f7b3aad2a..e100e93bed 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c
@@ -104,10 +104,12 @@ int ASN1_get_object(unsigned char **pp, long *plength, int *ptag, int *pclass,
 			l<<=7L;
 			l|= *(p++)&0x7f;
 			if (--max == 0) goto err;
+			if (l > (INT_MAX >> 7L)) goto err;
 			}
 		l<<=7L;
 		l|= *(p++)&0x7f;
 		tag=(int)l;
+		if (--max == 0) goto err;
 		}
 	else
 		{ 
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c b/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
index 75bbafacd7..e5774fef44 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
@@ -692,6 +692,7 @@ static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char **in, long inl
 
 int asn1_ex_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int len, int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
 {
+	ASN1_VALUE **opval = NULL;
 	ASN1_STRING *stmp;
 	ASN1_TYPE *typ = NULL;
 	int ret = 0;
@@ -706,6 +707,7 @@ int asn1_ex_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int len, int utype, char
 			*pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)typ;
 		} else typ = (ASN1_TYPE *)*pval;
 		if(utype != typ->type) ASN1_TYPE_set(typ, utype, NULL);
+		opval = pval;
 		pval = (ASN1_VALUE **)&typ->value.ptr;
 	}
 	switch(utype) {
@@ -797,7 +799,12 @@ int asn1_ex_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, unsigned char *cont, int len, int utype, char
 
 	ret = 1;
 	err:
-	if(!ret) ASN1_TYPE_free(typ);
+	if(!ret)
+		{
+		ASN1_TYPE_free(typ);
+		if (opval)
+			*opval = NULL;
+		}
 	return ret;
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index f60054bd39..2bb21b443e 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -674,7 +674,7 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 				ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
 				if (!ok) goto end;
 				}
-			if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
+			else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
 				/* XXX  For the final trusted self-signed cert,
 				 * this is a waste of time.  That check should
 				 * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be