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Don't switch password formats using global state.
To avoid possible race conditions don't switch password format using global state in crypto/pkcs12 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
This commit is contained in:
parent
cc06906707
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0fe17491c3
@ -17,16 +17,6 @@ void PKCS12_PBE_add(void)
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{
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}
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#undef PKCS12_key_gen
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/*
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* See p12_multi.c:PKCS12_verify_mac() for details...
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*/
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extern int (*PKCS12_key_gen)(const char *pass, int passlen,
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unsigned char *salt, int slen,
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int id, int iter, int n,
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unsigned char *out,
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const EVP_MD *md_type);
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int PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
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ASN1_TYPE *param, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher,
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const EVP_MD *md, int en_de)
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@ -41,13 +31,7 @@ int PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
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unsigned char *out,
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const EVP_MD *md_type);
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if (PKCS12_key_gen == NULL || en_de)
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/*
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* Default to UTF-8, but force it in encrypt case.
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*/
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pkcs12_key_gen = PKCS12_key_gen_utf8;
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else
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pkcs12_key_gen = PKCS12_key_gen;
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pkcs12_key_gen = PKCS12_key_gen_utf8;
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if (cipher == NULL)
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return 0;
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@ -41,13 +41,3 @@ struct pkcs12_bag_st {
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ASN1_TYPE *other; /* Secret or other bag */
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} value;
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};
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#undef PKCS12_key_gen
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/*
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* See p12_multi.c:PKCS12_verify_mac() for details...
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*/
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extern int (*PKCS12_key_gen)(const char *pass, int passlen,
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unsigned char *salt, int slen,
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int id, int iter, int n,
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unsigned char *out,
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const EVP_MD *md_type);
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@ -66,32 +66,6 @@ static int pkcs12_gen_gost_mac_key(const char *pass, int passlen,
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return 1;
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}
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#undef PKCS12_key_gen
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/*
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* |PKCS12_key_gen| is used to convey information about old-style broken
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* password being used to PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen in decrypt cases. Workflow
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* is if PKCS12_verify_mac notes that password encoded with compliant
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* PKCS12_key_gen_utf8 conversion subroutine isn't right, while encoded
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* with legacy non-compliant one is, then it sets |PKCS12_key_gen| to
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* legacy PKCS12_key_gen_asc conversion subroutine, which is then picked
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* by PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen. This applies to reading data. Written data
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* on the other hand is protected with standard-compliant encoding, i.e.
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* in backward-incompatible manner. Note that formally the approach is
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* not MT-safe. Rationale is that in order to access PKCS#12 files from
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* MT or even production application, you would be required to convert
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* data to correct interoperable format. In which case this variable
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* won't have to change. Conversion would have to be done with pkcs12
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* utility, which is not MT, and hence can tolerate it. In other words
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* goal is not to make this heuristic approach work in general case,
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* but in one specific one, apps/pkcs12.c.
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*/
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int (*PKCS12_key_gen)(const char *pass, int passlen,
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unsigned char *salt, int slen,
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int id, int iter, int n,
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unsigned char *out,
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const EVP_MD *md_type) = NULL;
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/* Generate a MAC */
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static int pkcs12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
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unsigned char *mac, unsigned int *maclen,
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@ -110,8 +84,6 @@ static int pkcs12_gen_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen,
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const X509_ALGOR *macalg;
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const ASN1_OBJECT *macoid;
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if (pkcs12_key_gen == NULL)
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pkcs12_key_gen = PKCS12_key_gen;
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if (pkcs12_key_gen == NULL)
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pkcs12_key_gen = PKCS12_key_gen_utf8;
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@ -187,30 +159,10 @@ int PKCS12_verify_mac(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, int passlen)
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return 0;
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}
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X509_SIG_get0(p12->mac->dinfo, NULL, &macoct);
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if (maclen != (unsigned int)ASN1_STRING_length(macoct))
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if ((maclen != (unsigned int)ASN1_STRING_length(macoct))
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|| CRYPTO_memcmp(mac, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(macoct), maclen) != 0)
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return 0;
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if (CRYPTO_memcmp(mac, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(macoct), maclen) != 0) {
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if (pass == NULL)
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return 0;
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/*
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* In order to facilitate accessing old data retry with
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* old-style broken password ...
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*/
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if (!pkcs12_gen_mac(p12, pass, passlen, mac, &maclen,
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PKCS12_key_gen_asc)) {
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PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_VERIFY_MAC, PKCS12_R_MAC_GENERATION_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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if ((maclen != (unsigned int)ASN1_STRING_length(macoct))
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|| CRYPTO_memcmp(mac, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(macoct), maclen) != 0)
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return 0;
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else
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PKCS12_key_gen = PKCS12_key_gen_asc;
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/*
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* ... and if suceeded, pass it on to PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen.
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*/
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}
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return 1;
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}
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