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Drop cached certificate signature validity flag

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It seems risky in the context of cross-signed certificates when the
same certificate might have multiple potential issuers.  Also rarely
used, since chains in OpenSSL typically only employ self-signed
trust-anchors, whose self-signatures are not checked, while untrusted
certificates are generally ephemeral.

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
This commit is contained in:
Viktor Dukhovni 2016-01-17 02:33:14 -05:00
parent 86334b6a61
commit 0e76014e58
3 changed files with 1 additions and 7 deletions
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1
crypto/include/internal/x509_int.h
View File

@ -192,7 +192,6 @@ struct x509_st {
X509_CINF cert_info;
X509_ALGOR sig_alg;
ASN1_BIT_STRING signature;
int valid;
int references;
char *name;
CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;

6
crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
View File

@ -1618,9 +1618,7 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
* explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
* time.
*/
if (!xs->valid
&& (xs != xi
|| (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) {
if (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)) {
if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
ctx->current_cert = xi;
@ -1636,8 +1634,6 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
}
}
xs->valid = 1;
check_cert:
ok = x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, 0);
if (!ok)

1
crypto/x509/x_x509.c
View File

@ -90,7 +90,6 @@ static int x509_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
switch (operation) {
case ASN1_OP_NEW_POST:
ret->valid = 0;
ret->name = NULL;
ret->ex_flags = 0;
ret->ex_pathlen = -1;