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Fix algorithm handling for ECC ciphersuites: Adapt to recent changes,

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and allow more general RSA OIDs for ECC certs with RSA CA sig.
This commit is contained in:
Bodo Möller 2006-06-15 18:28:00 +00:00
parent 09e20e0bd8
commit 076944d920
2 changed files with 25 additions and 16 deletions
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6
ssl/s3_lib.c
View File

@ -2309,7 +2309,7 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (
/* if we are considering an ECC cipher suite that uses our certificate */
(alg & SSL_aECDSA)
(alg & SSL_aECDSA || alg & SSL_aECDH)
/* and we have an ECC certificate */
&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509 != NULL)
/* and the client specified a Supported Point Formats extension */
@ -2361,7 +2361,7 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
}
if (
/* if we are considering an ECC cipher suite that uses our certificate */
(alg & SSL_aECDSA)
(alg & SSL_aECDSA || alg & SSL_aECDH)
/* and we have an ECC certificate */
&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509 != NULL)
/* and the client specified an EllipticCurves extension */
@ -2411,7 +2411,7 @@ SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt,
}
if (
/* if we are considering an ECC cipher suite that uses an ephemeral EC key */
((alg & SSL_kECDH) || (alg & SSL_kEECDH))
(alg & SSL_kEECDH)
/* and we have an ephemeral EC key */
&& (s->cert->ecdh_tmp != NULL)
/* and the client specified an EllipticCurves extension */

35
ssl/ssl_lib.c
View File

@ -1707,8 +1707,8 @@ void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
emask=0;
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
printf("rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n",
rsa_tmp,rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp,
printf("rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d ecdht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n",
rsa_tmp,rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp,ecdh_tmp,
rsa_enc,rsa_enc_export,rsa_sign,dsa_sign,dh_rsa,dh_dsa);
#endif
@ -1780,14 +1780,20 @@ void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (ecdh_ok)
{
if ((signature_nid == NID_md5WithRSAEncryption) ||
(signature_nid == NID_md4WithRSAEncryption) ||
(signature_nid == NID_md2WithRSAEncryption))
const char *sig = OBJ_nid2ln(signature_nid);
if (sig == NULL)
{
ERR_clear_error();
sig = "unknown";
}
if (strstr(sig, "WithRSA"))
{
mask|=SSL_kECDHr|SSL_aECDH;
if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163)
emask|=SSL_kECDHr|SSL_aECDH;
}
if (signature_nid == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1)
{
mask|=SSL_kECDHe|SSL_aECDH;
@ -1848,14 +1854,14 @@ int check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL_CIPHER *cs)
X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm))
signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
if (alg & SSL_kECDH)
if (alg & SSL_kECDHe || alg & SSL_kECDHr)
{
/* key usage, if present, must allow key agreement */
if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT))
{
return 0;
}
if (alg & SSL_aECDSA)
if (alg & SSL_kECDHe)
{
/* signature alg must be ECDSA */
if (signature_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1)
@ -1863,18 +1869,21 @@ int check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL_CIPHER *cs)
return 0;
}
}
if (alg & SSL_aRSA)
if (alg & SSL_kECDHr)
{
/* signature alg must be RSA */
if ((signature_nid != NID_md5WithRSAEncryption) &&
(signature_nid != NID_md4WithRSAEncryption) &&
(signature_nid != NID_md2WithRSAEncryption))
const char *sig = OBJ_nid2ln(signature_nid);
if (sig == NULL)
{
return 0;
ERR_clear_error();
sig = "unknown";
}
if (strstr(sig, "WithRSA") == NULL)
return 0;
}
}
else if (alg & SSL_aECDSA)
if (alg & SSL_aECDSA)
{
/* key usage, if present, must allow signing */
if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))