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Improves the proxy certificates howto doc.
The current documentation contains a bunch of spelling and grammar mistakes. I also found it hard to understand some paragraphs, so here is my attempt to improve its readability. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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0. WARNING
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NONE OF THE CODE PRESENTED HERE HAVE BEEN CHECKED! They are just an
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example to show you how things can be done. There may be typos or
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type conflicts, and you will have to resolve them.
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NONE OF THE CODE PRESENTED HERE HAS BEEN CHECKED! The code is just examples to
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show you how things could be done. There might be typos or type conflicts, and
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you will have to resolve them.
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1. Introduction
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Proxy certificates are defined in RFC 3820. They are really usual
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certificates with the mandatory extension proxyCertInfo.
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Proxy certificates are defined in RFC 3820. They are really usual certificates
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with the mandatory extension proxyCertInfo.
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Proxy certificates are issued by an End Entity (typically a user),
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either directly with the EE certificate as issuing certificate, or by
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extension through an already issued proxy certificate.. They are used
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to extend rights to some other entity (a computer process, typically,
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or sometimes to the user itself), so it can perform operations in the
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name of the owner of the EE certificate.
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Proxy certificates are issued by an End Entity (typically a user), either
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directly with the EE certificate as issuing certificate, or by extension through
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an already issued proxy certificate. Proxy certificates are used to extend
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rights to some other entity (a computer process, typically, or sometimes to the
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user itself). This allows the entity to perform operations on behalf of the
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owner of the EE certificate.
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See http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3820.txt for more information.
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2. A warning about proxy certificates
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Noone seems to have tested proxy certificates with security in mind.
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Basically, to this date, it seems that proxy certificates have only
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been used in a world that's highly aware of them. What would happen
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if an unsuspecting application is to validate a chain of certificates
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that contains proxy certificates? It would usually consider the leaf
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to be the certificate to check for authorisation data, and since proxy
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certificates are controlled by the EE certificate owner alone, it's
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would be normal to consider what the EE certificate owner could do
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with them.
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No one seems to have tested proxy certificates with security in mind. To this
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date, it seems that proxy certificates have only been used in a context highly
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aware of them.
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subjectAltName and issuerAltName are forbidden in proxy certificates,
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and this is enforced in OpenSSL. The subject must be the same as the
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issuer, with one commonName added on.
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Existing applications might misbehave when trying to validate a chain of
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certificates which use a proxy certificate. They might incorrectly consider the
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leaf to be the certificate to check for authorisation data, which is controlled
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by the EE certificate owner.
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Possible threats are, as far as has been imagined so far:
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subjectAltName and issuerAltName are forbidden in proxy certificates, and this
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is enforced in OpenSSL. The subject must be the same as the issuer, with one
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commonName added on.
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Possible threats we can think of at this time include:
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- impersonation through commonName (think server certificates).
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- use of additional extensions, possibly non-standard ones used in
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certain environments, that would grant extra or different
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authorisation rights.
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- use of additional extensions, possibly non-standard ones used in certain
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environments, that would grant extra or different authorisation rights.
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For this reason, OpenSSL requires that the use of proxy certificates
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be explicitely allowed. Currently, this can be done using the
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following methods:
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For these reasons, OpenSSL requires that the use of proxy certificates be
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explicitly allowed. Currently, this can be done using the following methods:
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- if the application calls X509_verify_cert() itself, it can do the
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following prior to that call (ctx is the pointer passed in the call
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to X509_verify_cert()):
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- if the application directly calls X509_verify_cert(), it can first call:
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X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
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X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
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- in all other cases, proxy certificate validation can be enabled
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before starting the application by setting the envirnoment variable
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OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS with some non-empty value.
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Where ctx is the pointer which then gets passed to X509_verify_cert().
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There are thoughts to allow proxy certificates with a line in the
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default openssl.cnf, but that's still in the future.
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- proxy certificate validation can be enabled before starting the application
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by setting the environment variable OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS.
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In the future, it might be possible to enable proxy certificates by editing
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openssl.cnf.
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3. How to create proxy cerificates
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3. How to create proxy certificates
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It's quite easy to create proxy certificates, by taking advantage of
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the lack of checks of the 'openssl x509' application (*ahem*). But
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first, you need to create a configuration section that contains a
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definition of the proxyCertInfo extension, a little like this:
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Creating proxy certificates is quite easy, by taking advantage of a lack of
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checks in the 'openssl x509' application (*ahem*). You must first create a
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configuration section that contains a definition of the proxyCertInfo extension,
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for example:
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[ v3_proxy ]
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# A proxy certificate MUST NEVER be a CA certificate.
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@ -77,10 +73,10 @@ definition of the proxyCertInfo extension, a little like this:
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# Usual authority key ID
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authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer:always
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# Now, for the extension that marks this certificate as a proxy one
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# The extension which marks this certificate as a proxy
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proxyCertInfo=critical,language:id-ppl-anyLanguage,pathlen:1,policy:text:AB
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It's also possible to give the proxy extension in a separate section:
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It's also possible to specify the proxy extension in a separate section:
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proxyCertInfo=critical,@proxy_ext
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@ -89,38 +85,32 @@ It's also possible to give the proxy extension in a separate section:
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pathlen=0
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policy=text:BC
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The policy value has a specific syntax, {syntag}:{string}, where the
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syntag determines what will be done with the string. The recognised
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syntags are as follows:
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The policy value has a specific syntax, {syntag}:{string}, where the syntag
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determines what will be done with the string. The following syntags are
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recognised:
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text indicates that the string is simply the bytes, not
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encoded in any kind of way:
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text indicates that the string is simply bytes, without any encoding:
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policy=text:räksmörgås
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policy=text:räksmörgås
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Previous versions of this design had a specific tag
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for UTF-8 text. However, since the bytes are copied
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as-is anyway, there's no need for it. Instead, use
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the text: tag, like this:
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Previous versions of this design had a specific tag for UTF-8 text.
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However, since the bytes are copied as-is anyway, there is no need for
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such a specific tag.
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policy=text:räksmörgås
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hex indicates the string is encoded in hex, with colons between each byte
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(every second hex digit):
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hex indicates the string is encoded in hex, with colons
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between each byte (every second hex digit):
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policy=hex:72:E4:6B:73:6D:F6:72:67:E5:73
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policy=hex:72:E4:6B:73:6D:F6:72:67:E5:73
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Previous versions of this design had a tag to insert a complete DER
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blob. However, the only legal use for this would be to surround the
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bytes that would go with the hex: tag with whatever is needed to
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construct a correct OCTET STRING. The DER tag therefore felt
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superfluous, and was removed.
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Previous versions of this design had a tag to insert a
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complete DER blob. However, the only legal use for
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this would be to surround the bytes that would go with
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the hex: tag with what's needed to construct a correct
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OCTET STRING. Since hex: does that, the DER tag felt
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superfluous, and was therefore removed.
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file indicates that the text of the policy should really be
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taken from a file. The string is then really a file
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name. This is useful for policies that are large
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(more than a few of lines) XML documents, for example.
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file indicates that the text of the policy should really be taken from a
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file. The string is then really a file name. This is useful for
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policies that are large (more than a few lines, e.g. XML documents).
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The 'policy' setting can be split up in multiple lines like this:
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@ -128,57 +118,52 @@ The 'policy' setting can be split up in multiple lines like this:
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1.polisy= a multi-
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2.policy=line policy.
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NOTE: the proxy policy value is the part that determines the rights
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granted to the process using the proxy certificate. The value is
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completely dependent on the application reading and interpretting it!
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NOTE: the proxy policy value is the part which determines the rights granted to
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the process using the proxy certificate. The value is completely dependent on
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the application reading and interpreting it!
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Now that you have created an extension section for your proxy
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certificate, you can now easily create a proxy certificate like this:
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Now that you have created an extension section for your proxy certificate, you
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can easily create a proxy certificate by doing:
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openssl req -new -config openssl.cnf \
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-out proxy.req -keyout proxy.key
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openssl x509 -req -CAcreateserial -in proxy.req -days 7 \
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-out proxy.crt -CA user.crt -CAkey user.key \
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-extfile openssl.cnf -extensions v3_proxy
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openssl req -new -config openssl.cnf -out proxy.req -keyout proxy.key
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openssl x509 -req -CAcreateserial -in proxy.req -days 7 -out proxy.crt \
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-CA user.crt -CAkey user.key -extfile openssl.cnf -extensions v3_proxy
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It's just as easy to create a proxy certificate using another proxy
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certificate as issuer (note that I'm using a different configuration
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section for it):
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You can also create a proxy certificate using another proxy certificate as
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issuer (note: I'm using a different configuration section for it):
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openssl req -new -config openssl.cnf \
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-out proxy2.req -keyout proxy2.key
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openssl x509 -req -CAcreateserial -in proxy2.req -days 7 \
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-out proxy2.crt -CA proxy.crt -CAkey proxy.key \
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-extfile openssl.cnf -extensions v3_proxy2
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openssl req -new -config openssl.cnf -out proxy2.req -keyout proxy2.key
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openssl x509 -req -CAcreateserial -in proxy2.req -days 7 -out proxy2.crt \
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-CA proxy.crt -CAkey proxy.key -extfile openssl.cnf -extensions v3_proxy2
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4. How to have your application interpret the policy?
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The basic way to interpret proxy policies is to prepare some default
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rights, then do a check of the proxy certificate against the a chain
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of proxy certificates, user certificate and CA certificates, and see
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what rights came out by the end. Sounds easy, huh? It almost is.
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The basic way to interpret proxy policies is to start with some default rights,
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then compute the resulting rights by checking the proxy certificate against
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the chain of proxy certificates, user certificate and CA certificates. You then
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use the final computed rights. Sounds easy, huh? It almost is.
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The slightly complicated part is how to pass data between your
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The slightly complicated part is figuring out how to pass data between your
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application and the certificate validation procedure.
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You need the following ingredients:
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- a callback routing that will be called for every certificate that's
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validated. It will be called several times for each certificates,
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so you must be attentive to when it's a good time to do the proxy
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policy interpretation and check, as well as to fill in the defaults
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when the EE certificate is checked.
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- a callback function that will be called for every certificate being
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validated. The callback be called several times for each certificate,
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so you must be careful to do the proxy policy interpretation at the right
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time. You also need to fill in the defaults when the EE certificate is
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checked.
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- a structure of data that's shared between your application code and
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the callback.
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- a data structure that is shared between your application code and the
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callback.
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- a wrapper function that sets it all up.
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- an ex_data index function that creates an index into the generic
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ex_data store that's attached to an X509 validation context.
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- an ex_data index function that creates an index into the generic ex_data
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store that is attached to an X509 validation context.
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This is some cookbook code for you to fill in:
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Here is some skeleton code you can fill in:
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/* In this example, I will use a view of granted rights as a bit
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array, one bit for each possible right. */
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@ -210,7 +195,7 @@ This is some cookbook code for you to fill in:
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static int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
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{
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if (ok == 1) /* It's REALLY important you keep the proxy policy
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check within this secion. It's important to know
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check within this section. It's important to know
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that when ok is 1, the certificates are checked
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from top to bottom. You get the CA root first,
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followed by the possible chain of intermediate
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@ -250,7 +235,7 @@ This is some cookbook code for you to fill in:
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bit array and fill it with the rights granted by
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the current proxy certificate, then use it as a
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mask on the accumulated rights bit array, and
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voilà, you now have a new accumulated rights bit
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voilà, you now have a new accumulated rights bit
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array. */
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{
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int i;
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