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Fix PKCS#12 key generation bug.
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6
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@ -3,6 +3,12 @@
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Changes between 0.9.6 and 0.9.7 [xx XXX 2000]
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*) Fix bug in PKCS#12 key generation routines. This was triggered
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if a 3DES key was generated with a 0 initial byte. Include
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PKCS12_BROKEN_KEYGEN compilation option to retain the old
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(but broken) behaviour.
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[Steve Henson]
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*) Enhance bctest to search for a working bc along $PATH and print
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it when found.
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[Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net> via Richard Levitte]
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@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ int PKCS12_key_gen_uni(unsigned char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt,
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const EVP_MD *md_type)
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{
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unsigned char *B, *D, *I, *p, *Ai;
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int Slen, Plen, Ilen;
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int Slen, Plen, Ilen, Ijlen;
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int i, j, u, v;
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BIGNUM *Ij, *Bpl1; /* These hold Ij and B + 1 */
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EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
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@ -180,10 +180,17 @@ int PKCS12_key_gen_uni(unsigned char *pass, int passlen, unsigned char *salt,
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BN_bin2bn (I + j, v, Ij);
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BN_add (Ij, Ij, Bpl1);
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BN_bn2bin (Ij, B);
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Ijlen = BN_num_bytes (Ij);
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/* If more than 2^(v*8) - 1 cut off MSB */
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if (BN_num_bytes (Ij) > v) {
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if (Ijlen > v) {
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BN_bn2bin (Ij, B);
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memcpy (I + j, B + 1, v);
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#ifndef PKCS12_BROKEN_KEYGEN
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/* If less than v bytes pad with zeroes */
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} else if (Ijlen < v) {
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memset(I + j, 0, v - Ijlen);
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BN_bn2bin(Ij, I + j + v - Ijlen);
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#endif
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} else BN_bn2bin (Ij, I + j);
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}
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}
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@ -304,6 +304,26 @@ Include some extra certificates:
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Some would argue that the PKCS#12 standard is one big bug :-)
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Versions of OpenSSL before 0.9.6a had a bug in the PKCS#12 key generation
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routines. Under rare circumstances this could produce a PKCS#12 file encrypted
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with an invalid key. As a result some PKCS#12 files which triggered this bug
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from other implementations (MSIE or Netscape) could not be decrypted
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by OpenSSL and similarly OpenSSL could produce PKCS#12 files which could
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not be decrypted by other implementations. The chances of producing such
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a file are relatively small: less than 1 in 256.
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A side effect of fixing this bug is that any old invalidly encrypted PKCS#12
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files cannot no longer be parsed by the fixed version. Under such circumstances
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the B<pkcs12> utility will report that the MAC is OK but fail with a decryption
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error when extracting private keys.
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This problem can be resolved by extracting the private keys and certificates
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from the PKCS#12 file using an older version of OpenSSL and recreating the PKCS#12
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file from the keys and certificates using a newer version of OpenSSL. For example:
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old-openssl -in bad.p12 -out keycerts.pem
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openssl -in keycerts.pem -export -name "My PKCS#12 file" -out fixed.p12
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=head1 SEE ALSO
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L<pkcs8(1)|pkcs8(1)>
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