2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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/*
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* Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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2016-05-18 02:20:24 +08:00
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* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/bio.h>
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2016-04-08 01:07:50 +08:00
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#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
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2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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#include "handshake_helper.h"
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2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
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HANDSHAKE_RESULT *HANDSHAKE_RESULT_new()
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{
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HANDSHAKE_RESULT *ret;
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ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
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OPENSSL_assert(ret != NULL);
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return ret;
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}
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void HANDSHAKE_RESULT_free(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result)
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{
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OPENSSL_free(result->client_npn_negotiated);
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OPENSSL_free(result->server_npn_negotiated);
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OPENSSL_free(result->client_alpn_negotiated);
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OPENSSL_free(result->server_alpn_negotiated);
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OPENSSL_free(result);
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}
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2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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/*
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* Since there appears to be no way to extract the sent/received alert
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* from the SSL object directly, we use the info callback and stash
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* the result in ex_data.
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*/
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typedef struct handshake_ex_data {
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int alert_sent;
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int alert_received;
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Fix session ticket and SNI
When session tickets are used, it's possible that SNI might swtich the
SSL_CTX on an SSL. Normally, this is not a problem, because the
initial_ctx/session_ctx are used for all session ticket/id processes.
However, when the SNI callback occurs, it's possible that the callback
may update the options in the SSL from the SSL_CTX, and this could
cause SSL_OP_NO_TICKET to be set. If this occurs, then two bad things
can happen:
1. The session ticket TLSEXT may not be written when the ticket expected
flag is set. The state machine transistions to writing the ticket, and
the client responds with an error as its not expecting a ticket.
2. When creating the session ticket, if the ticket key cb returns 0
the crypto/hmac contexts are not initialized, and the code crashes when
trying to encrypt the session ticket.
To fix 1, if the ticket TLSEXT is not written out, clear the expected
ticket flag.
To fix 2, consider a return of 0 from the ticket key cb a recoverable
error, and write a 0 length ticket and continue. The client-side code
can explicitly handle this case.
Fix these two cases, and add unit test code to validate ticket behavior.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1098)
2016-05-13 06:16:52 +08:00
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int session_ticket_do_not_call;
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2016-06-20 23:20:25 +08:00
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ssl_servername_t servername;
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2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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} HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA;
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2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
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typedef struct ctx_data {
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unsigned char *npn_protocols;
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size_t npn_protocols_len;
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unsigned char *alpn_protocols;
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size_t alpn_protocols_len;
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} CTX_DATA;
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/* |ctx_data| itself is stack-allocated. */
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static void ctx_data_free_data(CTX_DATA *ctx_data)
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{
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OPENSSL_free(ctx_data->npn_protocols);
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ctx_data->npn_protocols = NULL;
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OPENSSL_free(ctx_data->alpn_protocols);
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ctx_data->alpn_protocols = NULL;
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}
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2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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static int ex_data_idx;
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2016-06-14 06:44:29 +08:00
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static void info_cb(const SSL *s, int where, int ret)
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2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
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{
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if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT) {
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HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA *ex_data =
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(HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA*)(SSL_get_ex_data(s, ex_data_idx));
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if (where & SSL_CB_WRITE) {
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ex_data->alert_sent = ret;
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} else {
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ex_data->alert_received = ret;
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}
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}
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}
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2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
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/* Select the appropriate server CTX.
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2016-06-20 23:20:25 +08:00
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* Returns SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if a match was found.
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* If |ignore| is 1, returns SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK on mismatch.
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* Otherwise, returns SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL on mismatch.
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* An empty SNI extension also returns SSL_TSLEXT_ERR_NOACK.
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*/
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static int select_server_ctx(SSL *s, void *arg, int ignore)
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2016-06-10 06:39:22 +08:00
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{
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const char *servername = SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name);
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2016-06-20 23:20:25 +08:00
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HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA *ex_data =
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(HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA*)(SSL_get_ex_data(s, ex_data_idx));
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if (servername == NULL) {
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ex_data->servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER1;
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return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
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}
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if (strcmp(servername, "server2") == 0) {
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2016-06-10 06:39:22 +08:00
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SSL_CTX *new_ctx = (SSL_CTX*)arg;
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SSL_set_SSL_CTX(s, new_ctx);
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/*
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* Copy over all the SSL_CTX options - reasonable behavior
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* allows testing of cases where the options between two
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* contexts differ/conflict
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*/
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SSL_clear_options(s, 0xFFFFFFFFL);
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SSL_set_options(s, SSL_CTX_get_options(new_ctx));
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2016-06-20 23:20:25 +08:00
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ex_data->servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER2;
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return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
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} else if (strcmp(servername, "server1") == 0) {
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ex_data->servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER1;
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return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
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} else if (ignore) {
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ex_data->servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER1;
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return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
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} else {
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/* Don't set an explicit alert, to test library defaults. */
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return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
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2016-06-10 06:39:22 +08:00
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}
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2016-06-20 23:20:25 +08:00
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}
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/*
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* (RFC 6066):
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* If the server understood the ClientHello extension but
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* does not recognize the server name, the server SHOULD take one of two
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* actions: either abort the handshake by sending a fatal-level
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* unrecognized_name(112) alert or continue the handshake.
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*
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* This behaviour is up to the application to configure; we test both
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* configurations to ensure the state machine propagates the result
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* correctly.
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*/
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static int servername_ignore_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
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{
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return select_server_ctx(s, arg, 1);
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}
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static int servername_reject_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
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{
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return select_server_ctx(s, arg, 0);
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2016-06-10 06:39:22 +08:00
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}
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2016-06-14 06:44:29 +08:00
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static int verify_reject_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg) {
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2016-04-08 01:07:50 +08:00
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X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION);
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return 0;
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}
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2016-06-14 06:44:29 +08:00
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static int verify_accept_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg) {
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2016-04-08 01:07:50 +08:00
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return 1;
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}
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2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
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static int broken_session_ticket_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char *key_name, unsigned char *iv,
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2016-06-14 06:44:29 +08:00
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc)
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Fix session ticket and SNI
When session tickets are used, it's possible that SNI might swtich the
SSL_CTX on an SSL. Normally, this is not a problem, because the
initial_ctx/session_ctx are used for all session ticket/id processes.
However, when the SNI callback occurs, it's possible that the callback
may update the options in the SSL from the SSL_CTX, and this could
cause SSL_OP_NO_TICKET to be set. If this occurs, then two bad things
can happen:
1. The session ticket TLSEXT may not be written when the ticket expected
flag is set. The state machine transistions to writing the ticket, and
the client responds with an error as its not expecting a ticket.
2. When creating the session ticket, if the ticket key cb returns 0
the crypto/hmac contexts are not initialized, and the code crashes when
trying to encrypt the session ticket.
To fix 1, if the ticket TLSEXT is not written out, clear the expected
ticket flag.
To fix 2, consider a return of 0 from the ticket key cb a recoverable
error, and write a 0 length ticket and continue. The client-side code
can explicitly handle this case.
Fix these two cases, and add unit test code to validate ticket behavior.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1098)
2016-05-13 06:16:52 +08:00
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{
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return 0;
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}
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2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
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static int do_not_call_session_ticket_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char *key_name,
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2016-06-14 06:44:29 +08:00
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unsigned char *iv,
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
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HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc)
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Fix session ticket and SNI
When session tickets are used, it's possible that SNI might swtich the
SSL_CTX on an SSL. Normally, this is not a problem, because the
initial_ctx/session_ctx are used for all session ticket/id processes.
However, when the SNI callback occurs, it's possible that the callback
may update the options in the SSL from the SSL_CTX, and this could
cause SSL_OP_NO_TICKET to be set. If this occurs, then two bad things
can happen:
1. The session ticket TLSEXT may not be written when the ticket expected
flag is set. The state machine transistions to writing the ticket, and
the client responds with an error as its not expecting a ticket.
2. When creating the session ticket, if the ticket key cb returns 0
the crypto/hmac contexts are not initialized, and the code crashes when
trying to encrypt the session ticket.
To fix 1, if the ticket TLSEXT is not written out, clear the expected
ticket flag.
To fix 2, consider a return of 0 from the ticket key cb a recoverable
error, and write a 0 length ticket and continue. The client-side code
can explicitly handle this case.
Fix these two cases, and add unit test code to validate ticket behavior.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1098)
2016-05-13 06:16:52 +08:00
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{
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HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA *ex_data =
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(HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA*)(SSL_get_ex_data(s, ex_data_idx));
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ex_data->session_ticket_do_not_call = 1;
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return 0;
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}
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2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
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/* Parse the comma-separated list into TLS format. */
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static void parse_protos(const char *protos, unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen)
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{
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size_t len, i, prefix;
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len = strlen(protos);
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/* Should never have reuse. */
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OPENSSL_assert(*out == NULL);
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/* Test values are small, so we omit length limit checks. */
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*out = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1);
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OPENSSL_assert(*out != NULL);
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*outlen = len + 1;
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/*
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* foo => '3', 'f', 'o', 'o'
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* foo,bar => '3', 'f', 'o', 'o', '3', 'b', 'a', 'r'
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*/
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memcpy(*out + 1, protos, len);
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prefix = 0;
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i = prefix + 1;
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while (i <= len) {
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if ((*out)[i] == ',') {
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OPENSSL_assert(i - 1 - prefix > 0);
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(*out)[prefix] = i - 1 - prefix;
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prefix = i;
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}
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i++;
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}
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OPENSSL_assert(len - prefix > 0);
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(*out)[prefix] = len - prefix;
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}
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2016-08-05 23:17:00 +08:00
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
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2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
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/*
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* The client SHOULD select the first protocol advertised by the server that it
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* also supports. In the event that the client doesn't support any of server's
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* protocols, or the server doesn't advertise any, it SHOULD select the first
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* protocol that it supports.
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*/
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static int client_npn_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
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const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen,
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void *arg)
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{
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CTX_DATA *ctx_data = (CTX_DATA*)(arg);
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int ret;
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ret = SSL_select_next_proto(out, outlen, in, inlen,
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ctx_data->npn_protocols,
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ctx_data->npn_protocols_len);
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/* Accept both OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED and OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP. */
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OPENSSL_assert(ret == OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED
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|| ret == OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP);
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return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
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}
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static int server_npn_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **data,
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unsigned int *len, void *arg)
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{
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CTX_DATA *ctx_data = (CTX_DATA*)(arg);
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*data = ctx_data->npn_protocols;
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*len = ctx_data->npn_protocols_len;
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return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
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}
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2016-08-05 23:17:00 +08:00
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#endif
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2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
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/*
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* The server SHOULD select the most highly preferred protocol that it supports
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* and that is also advertised by the client. In the event that the server
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* supports no protocols that the client advertises, then the server SHALL
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* respond with a fatal "no_application_protocol" alert.
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*/
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static int server_alpn_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out,
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unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in,
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unsigned int inlen, void *arg)
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{
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CTX_DATA *ctx_data = (CTX_DATA*)(arg);
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int ret;
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/* SSL_select_next_proto isn't const-correct... */
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unsigned char *tmp_out;
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/*
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* The result points either to |in| or to |ctx_data->alpn_protocols|.
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* The callback is allowed to point to |in| or to a long-lived buffer,
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* so we can return directly without storing a copy.
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*/
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ret = SSL_select_next_proto(&tmp_out, outlen,
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ctx_data->alpn_protocols,
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ctx_data->alpn_protocols_len, in, inlen);
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*out = tmp_out;
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/* Unlike NPN, we don't tolerate a mismatch. */
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return ret == OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED ? SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
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: SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
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}
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2016-04-08 01:07:50 +08:00
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/*
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* Configure callbacks and other properties that can't be set directly
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* in the server/client CONF.
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*/
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2016-06-10 06:39:22 +08:00
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static void configure_handshake_ctx(SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *server2_ctx,
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SSL_CTX *client_ctx,
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2016-07-21 22:29:48 +08:00
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const SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF *extra,
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2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
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CTX_DATA *server_ctx_data,
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CTX_DATA *server2_ctx_data,
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CTX_DATA *client_ctx_data)
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2016-04-08 01:07:50 +08:00
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{
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2016-07-06 01:06:23 +08:00
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|
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unsigned char *ticket_keys;
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size_t ticket_key_len;
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2016-07-21 22:29:48 +08:00
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switch (extra->client.verify_callback) {
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2016-04-08 01:07:50 +08:00
|
|
|
case SSL_TEST_VERIFY_ACCEPT_ALL:
|
2016-06-14 06:44:29 +08:00
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(client_ctx, &verify_accept_cb,
|
2016-04-08 01:07:50 +08:00
|
|
|
NULL);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_TEST_VERIFY_REJECT_ALL:
|
2016-06-14 06:44:29 +08:00
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(client_ctx, &verify_reject_cb,
|
2016-04-08 01:07:50 +08:00
|
|
|
NULL);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-06-10 06:39:22 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* link the two contexts for SNI purposes */
|
2016-07-21 22:29:48 +08:00
|
|
|
switch (extra->server.servername_callback) {
|
2016-06-20 23:20:25 +08:00
|
|
|
case SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_IGNORE_MISMATCH:
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(server_ctx, servername_ignore_cb);
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(server_ctx, server2_ctx);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_REJECT_MISMATCH:
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(server_ctx, servername_reject_cb);
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(server_ctx, server2_ctx);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-10 06:39:22 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The initial_ctx/session_ctx always handles the encrypt/decrypt of the
|
|
|
|
* session ticket. This ticket_key callback is assigned to the second
|
|
|
|
* session (assigned via SNI), and should never be invoked
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-06-20 23:20:25 +08:00
|
|
|
if (server2_ctx != NULL)
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(server2_ctx,
|
|
|
|
do_not_call_session_ticket_cb);
|
2016-06-10 06:39:22 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2016-07-21 22:29:48 +08:00
|
|
|
if (extra->server.broken_session_ticket) {
|
2016-06-14 06:44:29 +08:00
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(server_ctx, broken_session_ticket_cb);
|
Fix session ticket and SNI
When session tickets are used, it's possible that SNI might swtich the
SSL_CTX on an SSL. Normally, this is not a problem, because the
initial_ctx/session_ctx are used for all session ticket/id processes.
However, when the SNI callback occurs, it's possible that the callback
may update the options in the SSL from the SSL_CTX, and this could
cause SSL_OP_NO_TICKET to be set. If this occurs, then two bad things
can happen:
1. The session ticket TLSEXT may not be written when the ticket expected
flag is set. The state machine transistions to writing the ticket, and
the client responds with an error as its not expecting a ticket.
2. When creating the session ticket, if the ticket key cb returns 0
the crypto/hmac contexts are not initialized, and the code crashes when
trying to encrypt the session ticket.
To fix 1, if the ticket TLSEXT is not written out, clear the expected
ticket flag.
To fix 2, consider a return of 0 from the ticket key cb a recoverable
error, and write a 0 length ticket and continue. The client-side code
can explicitly handle this case.
Fix these two cases, and add unit test code to validate ticket behavior.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1098)
2016-05-13 06:16:52 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-07-31 18:42:04 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
2016-07-21 22:29:48 +08:00
|
|
|
if (extra->server.npn_protocols != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
parse_protos(extra->server.npn_protocols,
|
2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
|
|
|
&server_ctx_data->npn_protocols,
|
|
|
|
&server_ctx_data->npn_protocols_len);
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(server_ctx, server_npn_cb,
|
|
|
|
server_ctx_data);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-07-21 22:29:48 +08:00
|
|
|
if (extra->server2.npn_protocols != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
parse_protos(extra->server2.npn_protocols,
|
2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
|
|
|
&server2_ctx_data->npn_protocols,
|
|
|
|
&server2_ctx_data->npn_protocols_len);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(server2_ctx != NULL);
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(server2_ctx, server_npn_cb,
|
|
|
|
server2_ctx_data);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-07-21 22:29:48 +08:00
|
|
|
if (extra->client.npn_protocols != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
parse_protos(extra->client.npn_protocols,
|
2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
|
|
|
&client_ctx_data->npn_protocols,
|
|
|
|
&client_ctx_data->npn_protocols_len);
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(client_ctx, client_npn_cb,
|
|
|
|
client_ctx_data);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-08-05 23:17:00 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2016-07-21 22:29:48 +08:00
|
|
|
if (extra->server.alpn_protocols != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
parse_protos(extra->server.alpn_protocols,
|
2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
|
|
|
&server_ctx_data->alpn_protocols,
|
|
|
|
&server_ctx_data->alpn_protocols_len);
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(server_ctx, server_alpn_cb, server_ctx_data);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-07-21 22:29:48 +08:00
|
|
|
if (extra->server2.alpn_protocols != NULL) {
|
2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(server2_ctx != NULL);
|
2016-07-21 22:29:48 +08:00
|
|
|
parse_protos(extra->server2.alpn_protocols,
|
2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
|
|
|
&server2_ctx_data->alpn_protocols,
|
|
|
|
&server2_ctx_data->alpn_protocols_len);
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(server2_ctx, server_alpn_cb, server2_ctx_data);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-07-21 22:29:48 +08:00
|
|
|
if (extra->client.alpn_protocols != NULL) {
|
2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned char *alpn_protos = NULL;
|
|
|
|
size_t alpn_protos_len;
|
2016-07-21 22:29:48 +08:00
|
|
|
parse_protos(extra->client.alpn_protocols,
|
2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
|
|
|
&alpn_protos, &alpn_protos_len);
|
|
|
|
/* Reversed return value convention... */
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(client_ctx, alpn_protos,
|
|
|
|
alpn_protos_len) == 0);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(alpn_protos);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-08-05 23:17:00 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2016-07-06 01:06:23 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Use fixed session ticket keys so that we can decrypt a ticket created with
|
|
|
|
* one CTX in another CTX. Don't address server2 for the moment.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ticket_key_len = SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys(server_ctx, NULL, 0);
|
|
|
|
ticket_keys = OPENSSL_zalloc(ticket_key_len);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(ticket_keys != NULL);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys(server_ctx, ticket_keys,
|
|
|
|
ticket_key_len) == 1);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ticket_keys);
|
Fix session ticket and SNI
When session tickets are used, it's possible that SNI might swtich the
SSL_CTX on an SSL. Normally, this is not a problem, because the
initial_ctx/session_ctx are used for all session ticket/id processes.
However, when the SNI callback occurs, it's possible that the callback
may update the options in the SSL from the SSL_CTX, and this could
cause SSL_OP_NO_TICKET to be set. If this occurs, then two bad things
can happen:
1. The session ticket TLSEXT may not be written when the ticket expected
flag is set. The state machine transistions to writing the ticket, and
the client responds with an error as its not expecting a ticket.
2. When creating the session ticket, if the ticket key cb returns 0
the crypto/hmac contexts are not initialized, and the code crashes when
trying to encrypt the session ticket.
To fix 1, if the ticket TLSEXT is not written out, clear the expected
ticket flag.
To fix 2, consider a return of 0 from the ticket key cb a recoverable
error, and write a 0 length ticket and continue. The client-side code
can explicitly handle this case.
Fix these two cases, and add unit test code to validate ticket behavior.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1098)
2016-05-13 06:16:52 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Configure per-SSL callbacks and other properties. */
|
Fix session ticket and SNI
When session tickets are used, it's possible that SNI might swtich the
SSL_CTX on an SSL. Normally, this is not a problem, because the
initial_ctx/session_ctx are used for all session ticket/id processes.
However, when the SNI callback occurs, it's possible that the callback
may update the options in the SSL from the SSL_CTX, and this could
cause SSL_OP_NO_TICKET to be set. If this occurs, then two bad things
can happen:
1. The session ticket TLSEXT may not be written when the ticket expected
flag is set. The state machine transistions to writing the ticket, and
the client responds with an error as its not expecting a ticket.
2. When creating the session ticket, if the ticket key cb returns 0
the crypto/hmac contexts are not initialized, and the code crashes when
trying to encrypt the session ticket.
To fix 1, if the ticket TLSEXT is not written out, clear the expected
ticket flag.
To fix 2, consider a return of 0 from the ticket key cb a recoverable
error, and write a 0 length ticket and continue. The client-side code
can explicitly handle this case.
Fix these two cases, and add unit test code to validate ticket behavior.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1098)
2016-05-13 06:16:52 +08:00
|
|
|
static void configure_handshake_ssl(SSL *server, SSL *client,
|
2016-07-21 22:29:48 +08:00
|
|
|
const SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF *extra)
|
Fix session ticket and SNI
When session tickets are used, it's possible that SNI might swtich the
SSL_CTX on an SSL. Normally, this is not a problem, because the
initial_ctx/session_ctx are used for all session ticket/id processes.
However, when the SNI callback occurs, it's possible that the callback
may update the options in the SSL from the SSL_CTX, and this could
cause SSL_OP_NO_TICKET to be set. If this occurs, then two bad things
can happen:
1. The session ticket TLSEXT may not be written when the ticket expected
flag is set. The state machine transistions to writing the ticket, and
the client responds with an error as its not expecting a ticket.
2. When creating the session ticket, if the ticket key cb returns 0
the crypto/hmac contexts are not initialized, and the code crashes when
trying to encrypt the session ticket.
To fix 1, if the ticket TLSEXT is not written out, clear the expected
ticket flag.
To fix 2, consider a return of 0 from the ticket key cb a recoverable
error, and write a 0 length ticket and continue. The client-side code
can explicitly handle this case.
Fix these two cases, and add unit test code to validate ticket behavior.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1098)
2016-05-13 06:16:52 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2016-07-21 22:29:48 +08:00
|
|
|
if (extra->client.servername != SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_NONE)
|
2016-06-10 06:39:22 +08:00
|
|
|
SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(client,
|
2016-07-21 22:29:48 +08:00
|
|
|
ssl_servername_name(extra->client.servername));
|
2016-04-08 01:07:50 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
|
|
|
typedef enum {
|
|
|
|
PEER_SUCCESS,
|
|
|
|
PEER_RETRY,
|
|
|
|
PEER_ERROR
|
|
|
|
} peer_status_t;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-07-06 01:06:23 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* RFC 5246 says:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Note that as of TLS 1.1,
|
|
|
|
* failure to properly close a connection no longer requires that a
|
|
|
|
* session not be resumed. This is a change from TLS 1.0 to conform
|
|
|
|
* with widespread implementation practice.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* However,
|
|
|
|
* (a) OpenSSL requires that a connection be shutdown for all protocol versions.
|
|
|
|
* (b) We test lower versions, too.
|
|
|
|
* So we just implement shutdown. We do a full bidirectional shutdown so that we
|
|
|
|
* can compare sent and received close_notify alerts and get some test coverage
|
|
|
|
* for SSL_shutdown as a bonus.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static peer_status_t do_handshake_step(SSL *ssl, int shutdown)
|
2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-07-06 01:06:23 +08:00
|
|
|
ret = shutdown ? SSL_shutdown(ssl) : SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
|
2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ret == 1) {
|
|
|
|
return PEER_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
} else if (ret == 0) {
|
2016-07-06 01:06:23 +08:00
|
|
|
return shutdown ? PEER_RETRY : PEER_ERROR;
|
2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
int error = SSL_get_error(ssl, ret);
|
|
|
|
/* Memory bios should never block with SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE. */
|
|
|
|
if (error == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ)
|
|
|
|
return PEER_RETRY;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
return PEER_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
typedef enum {
|
|
|
|
/* Both parties succeeded. */
|
|
|
|
HANDSHAKE_SUCCESS,
|
|
|
|
/* Client errored. */
|
|
|
|
CLIENT_ERROR,
|
|
|
|
/* Server errored. */
|
|
|
|
SERVER_ERROR,
|
|
|
|
/* Peers are in inconsistent state. */
|
|
|
|
INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
|
|
|
/* One or both peers not done. */
|
|
|
|
HANDSHAKE_RETRY
|
|
|
|
} handshake_status_t;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Determine the handshake outcome.
|
|
|
|
* last_status: the status of the peer to have acted last.
|
|
|
|
* previous_status: the status of the peer that didn't act last.
|
|
|
|
* client_spoke_last: 1 if the client went last.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static handshake_status_t handshake_status(peer_status_t last_status,
|
|
|
|
peer_status_t previous_status,
|
|
|
|
int client_spoke_last)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
switch (last_status) {
|
|
|
|
case PEER_SUCCESS:
|
|
|
|
switch (previous_status) {
|
|
|
|
case PEER_SUCCESS:
|
|
|
|
/* Both succeeded. */
|
|
|
|
return HANDSHAKE_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
case PEER_RETRY:
|
|
|
|
/* Let the first peer finish. */
|
|
|
|
return HANDSHAKE_RETRY;
|
|
|
|
case PEER_ERROR:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Second peer succeeded despite the fact that the first peer
|
|
|
|
* already errored. This shouldn't happen.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
return INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case PEER_RETRY:
|
|
|
|
if (previous_status == PEER_RETRY) {
|
|
|
|
/* Neither peer is done. */
|
|
|
|
return HANDSHAKE_RETRY;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Deadlock: second peer is waiting for more input while first
|
|
|
|
* peer thinks they're done (no more input is coming).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
return INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case PEER_ERROR:
|
|
|
|
switch (previous_status) {
|
|
|
|
case PEER_SUCCESS:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* First peer succeeded but second peer errored.
|
|
|
|
* TODO(emilia): we should be able to continue here (with some
|
|
|
|
* application data?) to ensure the first peer receives the
|
|
|
|
* alert / close_notify.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
return client_spoke_last ? CLIENT_ERROR : SERVER_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
case PEER_RETRY:
|
|
|
|
/* We errored; let the peer finish. */
|
|
|
|
return HANDSHAKE_RETRY;
|
|
|
|
case PEER_ERROR:
|
|
|
|
/* Both peers errored. Return the one that errored first. */
|
|
|
|
return client_spoke_last ? SERVER_ERROR : CLIENT_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Control should never reach here. */
|
|
|
|
return INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Convert unsigned char buf's that shouldn't contain any NUL-bytes to char. */
|
|
|
|
static char *dup_str(const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char *ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(len == 0)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Assert that the string does not contain NUL-bytes. */
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(OPENSSL_strnlen((const char*)(in), len) == len);
|
|
|
|
ret = OPENSSL_strndup((const char*)(in), len);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(ret != NULL);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-07-06 01:06:23 +08:00
|
|
|
static HANDSHAKE_RESULT *do_handshake_internal(
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *server2_ctx, SSL_CTX *client_ctx,
|
2016-07-21 22:29:48 +08:00
|
|
|
const SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF *extra, SSL_SESSION *session_in,
|
2016-07-06 01:06:23 +08:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION **session_out)
|
2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSL *server, *client;
|
|
|
|
BIO *client_to_server, *server_to_client;
|
|
|
|
HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA server_ex_data, client_ex_data;
|
2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
|
|
|
CTX_DATA client_ctx_data, server_ctx_data, server2_ctx_data;
|
|
|
|
HANDSHAKE_RESULT *ret = HANDSHAKE_RESULT_new();
|
2016-07-06 01:06:23 +08:00
|
|
|
int client_turn = 1, shutdown = 0;
|
2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
|
|
|
peer_status_t client_status = PEER_RETRY, server_status = PEER_RETRY;
|
|
|
|
handshake_status_t status = HANDSHAKE_RETRY;
|
Fix session ticket and SNI
When session tickets are used, it's possible that SNI might swtich the
SSL_CTX on an SSL. Normally, this is not a problem, because the
initial_ctx/session_ctx are used for all session ticket/id processes.
However, when the SNI callback occurs, it's possible that the callback
may update the options in the SSL from the SSL_CTX, and this could
cause SSL_OP_NO_TICKET to be set. If this occurs, then two bad things
can happen:
1. The session ticket TLSEXT may not be written when the ticket expected
flag is set. The state machine transistions to writing the ticket, and
the client responds with an error as its not expecting a ticket.
2. When creating the session ticket, if the ticket key cb returns 0
the crypto/hmac contexts are not initialized, and the code crashes when
trying to encrypt the session ticket.
To fix 1, if the ticket TLSEXT is not written out, clear the expected
ticket flag.
To fix 2, consider a return of 0 from the ticket key cb a recoverable
error, and write a 0 length ticket and continue. The client-side code
can explicitly handle this case.
Fix these two cases, and add unit test code to validate ticket behavior.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1098)
2016-05-13 06:16:52 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned char* tick = NULL;
|
2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
|
|
|
size_t tick_len = 0;
|
Fix session ticket and SNI
When session tickets are used, it's possible that SNI might swtich the
SSL_CTX on an SSL. Normally, this is not a problem, because the
initial_ctx/session_ctx are used for all session ticket/id processes.
However, when the SNI callback occurs, it's possible that the callback
may update the options in the SSL from the SSL_CTX, and this could
cause SSL_OP_NO_TICKET to be set. If this occurs, then two bad things
can happen:
1. The session ticket TLSEXT may not be written when the ticket expected
flag is set. The state machine transistions to writing the ticket, and
the client responds with an error as its not expecting a ticket.
2. When creating the session ticket, if the ticket key cb returns 0
the crypto/hmac contexts are not initialized, and the code crashes when
trying to encrypt the session ticket.
To fix 1, if the ticket TLSEXT is not written out, clear the expected
ticket flag.
To fix 2, consider a return of 0 from the ticket key cb a recoverable
error, and write a 0 length ticket and continue. The client-side code
can explicitly handle this case.
Fix these two cases, and add unit test code to validate ticket behavior.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1098)
2016-05-13 06:16:52 +08:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION* sess = NULL;
|
2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
|
|
|
const unsigned char *proto = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* API dictates unsigned int rather than size_t. */
|
|
|
|
unsigned int proto_len = 0;
|
2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
|
|
|
memset(&server_ctx_data, 0, sizeof(server_ctx_data));
|
|
|
|
memset(&server2_ctx_data, 0, sizeof(server2_ctx_data));
|
|
|
|
memset(&client_ctx_data, 0, sizeof(client_ctx_data));
|
|
|
|
|
2016-07-21 22:29:48 +08:00
|
|
|
configure_handshake_ctx(server_ctx, server2_ctx, client_ctx, extra,
|
2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
|
|
|
&server_ctx_data, &server2_ctx_data, &client_ctx_data);
|
2016-04-08 01:07:50 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
|
|
|
server = SSL_new(server_ctx);
|
|
|
|
client = SSL_new(client_ctx);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(server != NULL && client != NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
2016-07-21 22:29:48 +08:00
|
|
|
configure_handshake_ssl(server, client, extra);
|
2016-07-06 01:06:23 +08:00
|
|
|
if (session_in != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
/* In case we're testing resumption without tickets. */
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(SSL_CTX_add_session(server_ctx, session_in));
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(SSL_set_session(client, session_in));
|
|
|
|
}
|
Fix session ticket and SNI
When session tickets are used, it's possible that SNI might swtich the
SSL_CTX on an SSL. Normally, this is not a problem, because the
initial_ctx/session_ctx are used for all session ticket/id processes.
However, when the SNI callback occurs, it's possible that the callback
may update the options in the SSL from the SSL_CTX, and this could
cause SSL_OP_NO_TICKET to be set. If this occurs, then two bad things
can happen:
1. The session ticket TLSEXT may not be written when the ticket expected
flag is set. The state machine transistions to writing the ticket, and
the client responds with an error as its not expecting a ticket.
2. When creating the session ticket, if the ticket key cb returns 0
the crypto/hmac contexts are not initialized, and the code crashes when
trying to encrypt the session ticket.
To fix 1, if the ticket TLSEXT is not written out, clear the expected
ticket flag.
To fix 2, consider a return of 0 from the ticket key cb a recoverable
error, and write a 0 length ticket and continue. The client-side code
can explicitly handle this case.
Fix these two cases, and add unit test code to validate ticket behavior.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1098)
2016-05-13 06:16:52 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
|
|
|
memset(&server_ex_data, 0, sizeof(server_ex_data));
|
|
|
|
memset(&client_ex_data, 0, sizeof(client_ex_data));
|
2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret->result = SSL_TEST_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
client_to_server = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
|
|
|
|
server_to_client = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(client_to_server != NULL && server_to_client != NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Non-blocking bio. */
|
|
|
|
BIO_set_nbio(client_to_server, 1);
|
|
|
|
BIO_set_nbio(server_to_client, 1);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SSL_set_connect_state(client);
|
|
|
|
SSL_set_accept_state(server);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* The bios are now owned by the SSL object. */
|
|
|
|
SSL_set_bio(client, server_to_client, client_to_server);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(BIO_up_ref(server_to_client) > 0);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(BIO_up_ref(client_to_server) > 0);
|
|
|
|
SSL_set_bio(server, client_to_server, server_to_client);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ex_data_idx = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, "ex data", NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(ex_data_idx >= 0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(SSL_set_ex_data(server, ex_data_idx,
|
|
|
|
&server_ex_data) == 1);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(SSL_set_ex_data(client, ex_data_idx,
|
|
|
|
&client_ex_data) == 1);
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-14 06:44:29 +08:00
|
|
|
SSL_set_info_callback(server, &info_cb);
|
|
|
|
SSL_set_info_callback(client, &info_cb);
|
2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Half-duplex handshake loop.
|
|
|
|
* Client and server speak to each other synchronously in the same process.
|
|
|
|
* We use non-blocking BIOs, so whenever one peer blocks for read, it
|
|
|
|
* returns PEER_RETRY to indicate that it's the other peer's turn to write.
|
|
|
|
* The handshake succeeds once both peers have succeeded. If one peer
|
|
|
|
* errors out, we also let the other peer retry (and presumably fail).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
for(;;) {
|
|
|
|
if (client_turn) {
|
2016-07-06 01:06:23 +08:00
|
|
|
client_status = do_handshake_step(client, shutdown);
|
2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
|
|
|
status = handshake_status(client_status, server_status,
|
|
|
|
1 /* client went last */);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2016-07-06 01:06:23 +08:00
|
|
|
server_status = do_handshake_step(server, shutdown);
|
2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
|
|
|
status = handshake_status(server_status, client_status,
|
|
|
|
0 /* server went last */);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (status) {
|
|
|
|
case HANDSHAKE_SUCCESS:
|
2016-07-06 01:06:23 +08:00
|
|
|
if (shutdown) {
|
|
|
|
ret->result = SSL_TEST_SUCCESS;
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
client_status = server_status = PEER_RETRY;
|
|
|
|
shutdown = 1;
|
|
|
|
client_turn = 1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
|
|
|
case CLIENT_ERROR:
|
2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
|
|
|
ret->result = SSL_TEST_CLIENT_FAIL;
|
2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
case SERVER_ERROR:
|
2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
|
|
|
ret->result = SSL_TEST_SERVER_FAIL;
|
2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
case INTERNAL_ERROR:
|
2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
|
|
|
ret->result = SSL_TEST_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
case HANDSHAKE_RETRY:
|
|
|
|
/* Continue. */
|
|
|
|
client_turn ^= 1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err:
|
2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
|
|
|
ret->server_alert_sent = server_ex_data.alert_sent;
|
|
|
|
ret->server_alert_received = client_ex_data.alert_received;
|
|
|
|
ret->client_alert_sent = client_ex_data.alert_sent;
|
|
|
|
ret->client_alert_received = server_ex_data.alert_received;
|
|
|
|
ret->server_protocol = SSL_version(server);
|
|
|
|
ret->client_protocol = SSL_version(client);
|
|
|
|
ret->servername = server_ex_data.servername;
|
Fix session ticket and SNI
When session tickets are used, it's possible that SNI might swtich the
SSL_CTX on an SSL. Normally, this is not a problem, because the
initial_ctx/session_ctx are used for all session ticket/id processes.
However, when the SNI callback occurs, it's possible that the callback
may update the options in the SSL from the SSL_CTX, and this could
cause SSL_OP_NO_TICKET to be set. If this occurs, then two bad things
can happen:
1. The session ticket TLSEXT may not be written when the ticket expected
flag is set. The state machine transistions to writing the ticket, and
the client responds with an error as its not expecting a ticket.
2. When creating the session ticket, if the ticket key cb returns 0
the crypto/hmac contexts are not initialized, and the code crashes when
trying to encrypt the session ticket.
To fix 1, if the ticket TLSEXT is not written out, clear the expected
ticket flag.
To fix 2, consider a return of 0 from the ticket key cb a recoverable
error, and write a 0 length ticket and continue. The client-side code
can explicitly handle this case.
Fix these two cases, and add unit test code to validate ticket behavior.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1098)
2016-05-13 06:16:52 +08:00
|
|
|
if ((sess = SSL_get0_session(client)) != NULL)
|
2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket(sess, &tick, &tick_len);
|
|
|
|
if (tick == NULL || tick_len == 0)
|
|
|
|
ret->session_ticket = SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_NO;
|
Fix session ticket and SNI
When session tickets are used, it's possible that SNI might swtich the
SSL_CTX on an SSL. Normally, this is not a problem, because the
initial_ctx/session_ctx are used for all session ticket/id processes.
However, when the SNI callback occurs, it's possible that the callback
may update the options in the SSL from the SSL_CTX, and this could
cause SSL_OP_NO_TICKET to be set. If this occurs, then two bad things
can happen:
1. The session ticket TLSEXT may not be written when the ticket expected
flag is set. The state machine transistions to writing the ticket, and
the client responds with an error as its not expecting a ticket.
2. When creating the session ticket, if the ticket key cb returns 0
the crypto/hmac contexts are not initialized, and the code crashes when
trying to encrypt the session ticket.
To fix 1, if the ticket TLSEXT is not written out, clear the expected
ticket flag.
To fix 2, consider a return of 0 from the ticket key cb a recoverable
error, and write a 0 length ticket and continue. The client-side code
can explicitly handle this case.
Fix these two cases, and add unit test code to validate ticket behavior.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1098)
2016-05-13 06:16:52 +08:00
|
|
|
else
|
2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
|
|
|
ret->session_ticket = SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_YES;
|
|
|
|
ret->session_ticket_do_not_call = server_ex_data.session_ticket_do_not_call;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-07-31 18:42:04 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
|
|
|
SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(client, &proto, &proto_len);
|
|
|
|
ret->client_npn_negotiated = dup_str(proto, proto_len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(server, &proto, &proto_len);
|
|
|
|
ret->server_npn_negotiated = dup_str(proto, proto_len);
|
2016-08-05 23:17:00 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SSL_get0_alpn_selected(client, &proto, &proto_len);
|
|
|
|
ret->client_alpn_negotiated = dup_str(proto, proto_len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SSL_get0_alpn_selected(server, &proto, &proto_len);
|
|
|
|
ret->server_alpn_negotiated = dup_str(proto, proto_len);
|
2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2016-07-06 01:06:23 +08:00
|
|
|
ret->client_resumed = SSL_session_reused(client);
|
|
|
|
ret->server_resumed = SSL_session_reused(server);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (session_out != NULL)
|
|
|
|
*session_out = SSL_get1_session(client);
|
|
|
|
|
2016-07-05 02:16:14 +08:00
|
|
|
ctx_data_free_data(&server_ctx_data);
|
|
|
|
ctx_data_free_data(&server2_ctx_data);
|
|
|
|
ctx_data_free_data(&client_ctx_data);
|
2016-07-06 01:06:23 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2016-03-17 22:14:30 +08:00
|
|
|
SSL_free(server);
|
|
|
|
SSL_free(client);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-07-06 01:06:23 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
HANDSHAKE_RESULT *do_handshake(SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *server2_ctx,
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX *client_ctx, SSL_CTX *resume_server_ctx,
|
2016-07-21 20:04:00 +08:00
|
|
|
SSL_CTX *resume_client_ctx,
|
2016-07-06 01:06:23 +08:00
|
|
|
const SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result;
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *session = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
result = do_handshake_internal(server_ctx, server2_ctx, client_ctx,
|
2016-07-21 22:29:48 +08:00
|
|
|
&test_ctx->extra, NULL, &session);
|
2016-07-06 01:06:23 +08:00
|
|
|
if (test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_SIMPLE)
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_assert(test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RESUME);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (result->result != SSL_TEST_SUCCESS) {
|
|
|
|
result->result = SSL_TEST_FIRST_HANDSHAKE_FAILED;
|
|
|
|
return result;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
HANDSHAKE_RESULT_free(result);
|
|
|
|
/* We don't support SNI on second handshake yet, so server2_ctx is NULL. */
|
2016-07-21 20:04:00 +08:00
|
|
|
result = do_handshake_internal(resume_server_ctx, NULL, resume_client_ctx,
|
2016-07-21 22:29:48 +08:00
|
|
|
&test_ctx->resume_extra, session, NULL);
|
2016-07-06 01:06:23 +08:00
|
|
|
end:
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(session);
|
|
|
|
return result;
|
|
|
|
}
|