1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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/* ssl/ssl_sess.c */
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1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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1999-04-24 06:13:45 +08:00
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#include <openssl/lhash.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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#include "ssl_locl.h"
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1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
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static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s);
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static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx,SSL_SESSION *s);
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1999-04-30 06:25:52 +08:00
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static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck);
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1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
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2005-03-30 18:26:02 +08:00
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SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl)
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2000-01-27 06:36:55 +08:00
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/* aka SSL_get0_session; gets 0 objects, just returns a copy of the pointer */
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1999-11-18 05:36:13 +08:00
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{
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return(ssl->session);
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}
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2000-01-27 06:36:55 +08:00
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SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl)
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/* variant of SSL_get_session: caller really gets something */
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1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
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{
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1999-11-16 00:31:31 +08:00
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SSL_SESSION *sess;
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/* Need to lock this all up rather than just use CRYPTO_add so that
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* somebody doesn't free ssl->session between when we check it's
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* non-null and when we up the reference count. */
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2003-09-08 23:47:55 +08:00
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CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
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1999-11-16 00:31:31 +08:00
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sess = ssl->session;
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if(sess)
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sess->references++;
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2003-09-08 23:47:55 +08:00
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CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
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1999-11-16 00:31:31 +08:00
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return(sess);
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1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
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}
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2000-01-24 07:41:49 +08:00
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int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
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CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
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1999-06-08 04:26:51 +08:00
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{
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2001-09-02 04:02:13 +08:00
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return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, argl, argp,
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new_func, dup_func, free_func);
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1999-06-08 04:26:51 +08:00
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}
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1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
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1999-04-20 05:31:43 +08:00
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int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx, void *arg)
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1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
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{
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return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg));
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}
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2005-03-30 18:26:02 +08:00
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void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *s, int idx)
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1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
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{
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return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx));
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}
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1999-04-20 05:31:43 +08:00
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SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void)
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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{
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SSL_SESSION *ss;
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2000-06-02 06:19:21 +08:00
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ss=(SSL_SESSION *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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if (ss == NULL)
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{
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return(0);
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}
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memset(ss,0,sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
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1999-11-17 07:15:41 +08:00
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ss->verify_result = 1; /* avoid 0 (= X509_V_OK) just in case */
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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ss->references=1;
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ss->timeout=60*5+4; /* 5 minute timeout by default */
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ss->time=time(NULL);
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1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
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ss->prev=NULL;
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ss->next=NULL;
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Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 17:22:21 +08:00
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ss->compress_meth=0;
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2001-09-02 04:02:13 +08:00
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CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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return(ss);
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}
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2003-02-16 04:38:57 +08:00
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const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len)
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{
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if(len)
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*len = s->session_id_length;
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return s->session_id;
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}
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2001-02-22 02:06:26 +08:00
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/* Even with SSLv2, we have 16 bytes (128 bits) of session ID space. SSLv3/TLSv1
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* has 32 bytes (256 bits). As such, filling the ID with random gunk repeatedly
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* until we have no conflict is going to complete in one iteration pretty much
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* "most" of the time (btw: understatement). So, if it takes us 10 iterations
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* and we still can't avoid a conflict - well that's a reasonable point to call
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* it quits. Either the RAND code is broken or someone is trying to open roughly
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* very close to 2^128 (or 2^256) SSL sessions to our server. How you might
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* store that many sessions is perhaps a more interesting question ... */
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#define MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS 10
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static int def_generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
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unsigned int *id_len)
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{
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unsigned int retry = 0;
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do
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2005-04-30 04:10:06 +08:00
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if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0)
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return 0;
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2001-02-23 08:02:56 +08:00
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while(SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) &&
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2001-02-22 02:06:26 +08:00
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(++retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS));
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if(retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)
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return 1;
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/* else - woops a session_id match */
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/* XXX We should also check the external cache --
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* but the probability of a collision is negligible, and
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* we could not prevent the concurrent creation of sessions
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* with identical IDs since we currently don't have means
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* to atomically check whether a session ID already exists
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* and make a reservation for it if it does not
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* (this problem applies to the internal cache as well).
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*/
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return 0;
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}
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1999-04-20 05:31:43 +08:00
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int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session)
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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{
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1999-05-13 23:09:38 +08:00
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/* This gets used by clients and servers. */
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2001-02-22 02:06:26 +08:00
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unsigned int tmp;
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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SSL_SESSION *ss=NULL;
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2001-02-22 02:06:26 +08:00
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GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id;
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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if ((ss=SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL) return(0);
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/* If the context has a default timeout, use it */
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Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 17:22:21 +08:00
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if (s->ctx->session_timeout == 0)
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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ss->timeout=SSL_get_default_timeout(s);
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 17:22:21 +08:00
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else
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ss->timeout=s->ctx->session_timeout;
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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if (s->session != NULL)
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{
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SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
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s->session=NULL;
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}
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if (session)
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{
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1999-03-31 20:06:30 +08:00
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if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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{
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1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
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ss->ssl_version=SSL2_VERSION;
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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ss->session_id_length=SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
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}
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1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
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else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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{
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1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
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ss->ssl_version=SSL3_VERSION;
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ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
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}
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else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
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{
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ss->ssl_version=TLS1_VERSION;
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
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}
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2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
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else if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
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{
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ss->ssl_version=DTLS1_VERSION;
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ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
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}
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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else
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{
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION);
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SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
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return(0);
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}
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2001-02-22 02:06:26 +08:00
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/* Choose which callback will set the session ID */
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CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
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if(s->generate_session_id)
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cb = s->generate_session_id;
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else if(s->ctx->generate_session_id)
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cb = s->ctx->generate_session_id;
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CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
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/* Choose a session ID */
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tmp = ss->session_id_length;
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if(!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp))
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{
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/* The callback failed */
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
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SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED);
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SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
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return(0);
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}
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/* Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero.
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* nor set it higher than it was. */
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if(!tmp || (tmp > ss->session_id_length))
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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{
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2001-02-22 02:06:26 +08:00
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/* The callback set an illegal length */
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
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SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH);
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SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
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return(0);
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}
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/* If the session length was shrunk and we're SSLv2, pad it */
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if((tmp < ss->session_id_length) && (s->version == SSL2_VERSION))
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memset(ss->session_id + tmp, 0, ss->session_id_length - tmp);
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else
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ss->session_id_length = tmp;
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/* Finally, check for a conflict */
|
2001-02-23 08:02:56 +08:00
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if(SSL_has_matching_session_id(s, ss->session_id,
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2001-02-22 02:06:26 +08:00
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ss->session_id_length))
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{
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
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SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT);
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SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
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return(0);
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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}
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}
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else
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{
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ss->session_id_length=0;
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}
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2002-08-02 19:48:15 +08:00
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if (s->sid_ctx_length > sizeof ss->sid_ctx)
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{
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SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
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return 0;
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}
|
1999-03-22 20:22:14 +08:00
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memcpy(ss->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx_length);
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ss->sid_ctx_length=s->sid_ctx_length;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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s->session=ss;
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ss->ssl_version=s->version;
|
1999-11-17 07:15:41 +08:00
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ss->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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return(1);
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}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-20 05:31:43 +08:00
|
|
|
int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
1999-05-13 23:09:38 +08:00
|
|
|
/* This is used only by servers. */
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *ret=NULL,data;
|
1999-05-23 21:07:03 +08:00
|
|
|
int fatal = 0;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
data.ssl_version=s->version;
|
|
|
|
data.session_id_length=len;
|
|
|
|
if (len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)
|
1999-05-23 21:07:03 +08:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
1999-03-22 20:22:14 +08:00
|
|
|
memcpy(data.session_id,session_id,len);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
2000-01-31 06:20:28 +08:00
|
|
|
ret=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(s->ctx->sessions,&data);
|
1999-05-24 00:19:08 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ret != NULL)
|
|
|
|
/* don't allow other threads to steal it: */
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ret == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1999-05-23 18:43:46 +08:00
|
|
|
int copy=1;
|
|
|
|
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 17:22:21 +08:00
|
|
|
s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
ret=NULL;
|
1999-03-22 20:22:14 +08:00
|
|
|
if (s->ctx->get_session_cb != NULL
|
|
|
|
&& (ret=s->ctx->get_session_cb(s,session_id,len,©))
|
|
|
|
!= NULL)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 17:22:21 +08:00
|
|
|
s->ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit++;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
1999-05-23 21:07:03 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Increment reference count now if the session callback
|
|
|
|
* asks us to do so (note that if the session structures
|
|
|
|
* returned by the callback are shared between threads,
|
|
|
|
* it must handle the reference count itself [i.e. copy == 0],
|
|
|
|
* or things won't be thread-safe). */
|
|
|
|
if (copy)
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
|
|
|
|
|
2002-10-29 08:33:04 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Add the externally cached session to the internal
|
|
|
|
* cache as well if and only if we are supposed to. */
|
|
|
|
if(!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE))
|
|
|
|
/* The following should not return 1, otherwise,
|
|
|
|
* things are very strange */
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_add_session(s->ctx,ret);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
1999-05-23 21:07:03 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ret == NULL)
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-05-23 21:07:03 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Now ret is non-NULL, and we own one of its reference counts. */
|
|
|
|
|
1999-03-22 20:22:14 +08:00
|
|
|
if((s->verify_mode&SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
|
|
|
|
&& (!s->sid_ctx_length || ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length
|
|
|
|
|| memcmp(ret->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,ret->sid_ctx_length)))
|
|
|
|
{
|
1999-05-23 21:07:03 +08:00
|
|
|
/* We've found the session named by the client, but we don't
|
|
|
|
* want to use it in this context. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->sid_ctx_length == 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* application should have used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context
|
|
|
|
* -- we could tolerate this and just pretend we never heard
|
|
|
|
* of this session, but then applications could effectively
|
|
|
|
* disable the session cache by accident without anyone noticing */
|
|
|
|
|
1999-05-17 19:15:49 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED);
|
1999-05-23 21:07:03 +08:00
|
|
|
fatal = 1;
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
#if 0 /* The client cannot always know when a session is not appropriate,
|
|
|
|
* so we shouldn't generate an error message. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
goto err; /* treat like cache miss */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-03-22 20:22:14 +08:00
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ret->cipher == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1999-04-17 02:13:27 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned char buf[5],*p;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned long l;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
p=buf;
|
|
|
|
l=ret->cipher_id;
|
|
|
|
l2n(l,p);
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
if ((ret->ssl_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
ret->cipher=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,&(buf[2]));
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
ret->cipher=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,&(buf[1]));
|
|
|
|
if (ret->cipher == NULL)
|
1999-05-23 21:07:03 +08:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-05-23 21:07:03 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if 0 /* This is way too late. */
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
/* If a thread got the session, then 'swaped', and another got
|
2000-06-02 06:19:21 +08:00
|
|
|
* it and then due to a time-out decided to 'OPENSSL_free' it we could
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
* be in trouble. So I'll increment it now, then double decrement
|
|
|
|
* later - am I speaking rubbish?. */
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
|
1999-05-23 21:07:03 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((long)(ret->time+ret->timeout) < (long)time(NULL)) /* timeout */
|
|
|
|
{
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 17:22:21 +08:00
|
|
|
s->ctx->stats.sess_timeout++;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
/* remove it from the cache */
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,ret);
|
1999-05-23 21:07:03 +08:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 17:22:21 +08:00
|
|
|
s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* ret->time=time(NULL); */ /* rezero timeout? */
|
|
|
|
/* again, just leave the session
|
|
|
|
* if it is the same session, we have just incremented and
|
|
|
|
* then decremented the reference count :-) */
|
|
|
|
if (s->session != NULL)
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
|
|
|
|
s->session=ret;
|
1999-11-17 07:15:41 +08:00
|
|
|
s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
return(1);
|
1999-05-23 21:07:03 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
if (ret != NULL)
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
|
|
|
|
if (fatal)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-20 05:31:43 +08:00
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
int ret=0;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *s;
|
|
|
|
|
1999-12-29 22:29:32 +08:00
|
|
|
/* add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache
|
|
|
|
* even though it has two ways of access: each session is in a
|
|
|
|
* doubly linked list and an lhash */
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_add(&c->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
|
1999-12-29 22:29:32 +08:00
|
|
|
/* if session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment later */
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
2000-01-31 06:20:28 +08:00
|
|
|
s=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_insert(ctx->sessions,c);
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
|
1999-12-29 22:29:32 +08:00
|
|
|
/* s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID.
|
|
|
|
* In this case, s == c should hold (then we did not really modify
|
|
|
|
* ctx->sessions), or we're in trouble. */
|
|
|
|
if (s != NULL && s != c)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* We *are* in trouble ... */
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,s);
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(s);
|
|
|
|
/* ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache
|
|
|
|
* (we cannot handle two SSL_SESSION structures with identical
|
|
|
|
* session ID in the same cache, which could happen e.g. when
|
|
|
|
* two threads concurrently obtain the same session from an external
|
|
|
|
* cache) */
|
|
|
|
s = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Put at the head of the queue unless it is already in the cache */
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
if (s == NULL)
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx,c);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s != NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1999-12-29 22:29:32 +08:00
|
|
|
/* existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented reference
|
|
|
|
* count because it already takes into account the cache */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(s); /* s == c */
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
ret=0;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
1999-12-29 22:29:32 +08:00
|
|
|
/* new cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become too large */
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
ret=1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) >
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx))
|
|
|
|
{
|
1999-04-30 06:25:52 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!remove_session_lock(ctx,
|
|
|
|
ctx->session_cache_tail, 0))
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
else
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 17:22:21 +08:00
|
|
|
ctx->stats.sess_cache_full++;
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
|
|
|
return(ret);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-20 05:31:43 +08:00
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c)
|
1999-04-30 06:25:52 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return remove_session_lock(ctx, c, 1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-05-01 08:18:54 +08:00
|
|
|
static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *r;
|
|
|
|
int ret=0;
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
if ((c != NULL) && (c->session_id_length != 0))
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
1999-04-30 06:25:52 +08:00
|
|
|
if(lck) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
2002-02-10 20:46:41 +08:00
|
|
|
if ((r = (SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(ctx->sessions,c)) == c)
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ret=1;
|
2002-02-10 20:46:41 +08:00
|
|
|
r=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_delete(ctx->sessions,c);
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,c);
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
1999-04-30 06:25:52 +08:00
|
|
|
if(lck) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
r->not_resumable=1;
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx,r);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(r);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
ret=0;
|
|
|
|
return(ret);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-20 05:31:43 +08:00
|
|
|
void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ss)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
1999-01-08 03:15:59 +08:00
|
|
|
if(ss == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
i=CRYPTO_add(&ss->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifdef REF_PRINT
|
|
|
|
REF_PRINT("SSL_SESSION",ss);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
if (i > 0) return;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef REF_CHECK
|
|
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr,"SSL_SESSION_free, bad reference count\n");
|
|
|
|
abort(); /* ok */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2001-09-02 04:02:13 +08:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2002-11-28 16:04:36 +08:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->key_arg,sizeof ss->key_arg);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->master_key,sizeof ss->master_key);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->session_id,sizeof ss->session_id);
|
1999-05-13 23:09:38 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ss->sess_cert != NULL) ssl_sess_cert_free(ss->sess_cert);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ss->peer != NULL) X509_free(ss->peer);
|
1999-04-13 01:23:57 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ss->ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ss->ciphers);
|
2002-11-28 16:04:36 +08:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(ss,sizeof(*ss));
|
2000-06-02 06:19:21 +08:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ss);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-20 05:31:43 +08:00
|
|
|
int SSL_set_session(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *session)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret=0;
|
2005-08-15 05:48:33 +08:00
|
|
|
const SSL_METHOD *meth;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (session != NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
meth=s->ctx->method->get_ssl_method(session->ssl_version);
|
|
|
|
if (meth == NULL)
|
|
|
|
meth=s->method->get_ssl_method(session->ssl_version);
|
|
|
|
if (meth == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_SSL_METHOD);
|
|
|
|
return(0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (meth != s->method)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s,meth))
|
|
|
|
return(0);
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 17:22:21 +08:00
|
|
|
if (s->ctx->session_timeout == 0)
|
|
|
|
session->timeout=SSL_get_default_timeout(s);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
session->timeout=s->ctx->session_timeout;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2001-07-31 15:21:06 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
|
|
|
|
if (s->kssl_ctx && !s->kssl_ctx->client_princ &&
|
|
|
|
session->krb5_client_princ_len > 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s->kssl_ctx->client_princ = (char *)malloc(session->krb5_client_princ_len + 1);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(s->kssl_ctx->client_princ,session->krb5_client_princ,
|
|
|
|
session->krb5_client_princ_len);
|
2001-07-31 16:44:28 +08:00
|
|
|
s->kssl_ctx->client_princ[session->krb5_client_princ_len] = '\0';
|
2001-07-31 15:21:06 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
/* CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);*/
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_add(&session->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
|
|
|
|
if (s->session != NULL)
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
|
|
|
|
s->session=session;
|
2000-11-30 00:04:38 +08:00
|
|
|
s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
/* CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);*/
|
|
|
|
ret=1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (s->session != NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
|
|
|
|
s->session=NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 17:22:21 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
meth=s->ctx->method;
|
|
|
|
if (meth != s->method)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s,meth))
|
|
|
|
return(0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret=1;
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
return(ret);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-20 05:31:43 +08:00
|
|
|
long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (s == NULL) return(0);
|
|
|
|
s->timeout=t;
|
|
|
|
return(1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-03-30 18:26:02 +08:00
|
|
|
long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (s == NULL) return(0);
|
|
|
|
return(s->timeout);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-03-30 18:26:02 +08:00
|
|
|
long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (s == NULL) return(0);
|
|
|
|
return(s->time);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-20 05:31:43 +08:00
|
|
|
long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (s == NULL) return(0);
|
|
|
|
s->time=t;
|
|
|
|
return(t);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-20 05:31:43 +08:00
|
|
|
long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *s, long t)
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 17:22:21 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
long l;
|
|
|
|
if (s == NULL) return(0);
|
|
|
|
l=s->session_timeout;
|
|
|
|
s->session_timeout=t;
|
|
|
|
return(l);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-03-30 18:26:02 +08:00
|
|
|
long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *s)
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 17:22:21 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (s == NULL) return(0);
|
|
|
|
return(s->session_timeout);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
typedef struct timeout_param_st
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX *ctx;
|
|
|
|
long time;
|
|
|
|
LHASH *cache;
|
|
|
|
} TIMEOUT_PARAM;
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-20 05:31:43 +08:00
|
|
|
static void timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, TIMEOUT_PARAM *p)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if ((p->time == 0) || (p->time > (s->time+s->timeout))) /* timeout */
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
/* The reason we don't call SSL_CTX_remove_session() is to
|
|
|
|
* save on locking overhead */
|
2000-01-31 06:20:28 +08:00
|
|
|
lh_delete(p->cache,s);
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(p->ctx,s);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
s->not_resumable=1;
|
|
|
|
if (p->ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
|
|
|
|
p->ctx->remove_session_cb(p->ctx,s);
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(s);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2001-01-09 08:24:38 +08:00
|
|
|
static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(timeout, SSL_SESSION *, TIMEOUT_PARAM *)
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-20 05:31:43 +08:00
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *s, long t)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned long i;
|
|
|
|
TIMEOUT_PARAM tp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tp.ctx=s;
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 17:22:21 +08:00
|
|
|
tp.cache=s->sessions;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
if (tp.cache == NULL) return;
|
|
|
|
tp.time=t;
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
|
|
|
i=tp.cache->down_load;
|
|
|
|
tp.cache->down_load=0;
|
2001-01-09 08:24:38 +08:00
|
|
|
lh_doall_arg(tp.cache, LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(timeout), &tp);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
tp.cache->down_load=i;
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-20 05:31:43 +08:00
|
|
|
int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if ( (s->session != NULL) &&
|
|
|
|
!(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) &&
|
|
|
|
!(SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
|
|
|
|
return(1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
return(0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* locked by SSL_CTX in the calling function */
|
1999-04-20 05:31:43 +08:00
|
|
|
static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s)
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if ((s->next == NULL) || (s->prev == NULL)) return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail))
|
|
|
|
{ /* last element in list */
|
|
|
|
if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head))
|
|
|
|
{ /* only one element in list */
|
|
|
|
ctx->session_cache_head=NULL;
|
|
|
|
ctx->session_cache_tail=NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ctx->session_cache_tail=s->prev;
|
|
|
|
s->prev->next=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head))
|
|
|
|
{ /* first element in list */
|
|
|
|
ctx->session_cache_head=s->next;
|
|
|
|
s->next->prev=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{ /* middle of list */
|
|
|
|
s->next->prev=s->prev;
|
|
|
|
s->prev->next=s->next;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->prev=s->next=NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-20 05:31:43 +08:00
|
|
|
static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s)
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if ((s->next != NULL) && (s->prev != NULL))
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,s);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->session_cache_head == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ctx->session_cache_head=s;
|
|
|
|
ctx->session_cache_tail=s;
|
|
|
|
s->prev=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
|
|
|
|
s->next=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s->next=ctx->session_cache_head;
|
|
|
|
s->next->prev=s;
|
|
|
|
s->prev=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
|
|
|
|
ctx->session_cache_head=s;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|