1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
/* ssl/s3_clnt.c */
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
* All rights reserved.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This package is an SSL implementation written
|
|
|
|
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
|
|
|
|
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
|
|
|
|
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
|
|
|
|
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
|
|
|
|
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
|
|
|
|
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
|
|
|
|
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
|
|
|
|
* the code are not to be removed.
|
|
|
|
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
|
|
|
|
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
|
|
|
|
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
|
|
|
|
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
|
|
|
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
|
|
|
* are met:
|
|
|
|
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
|
|
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
|
|
|
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
|
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
|
|
|
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
|
|
|
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
|
|
|
|
* must display the following acknowledgement:
|
|
|
|
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
|
|
|
|
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
|
|
|
|
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
|
|
|
|
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
|
|
|
|
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
|
|
|
|
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
|
|
|
|
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
|
|
|
|
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
|
|
|
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
|
|
|
|
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
|
|
|
|
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
|
|
|
|
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
|
|
|
|
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
|
|
|
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
|
|
|
|
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
|
|
|
|
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
|
|
|
|
* SUCH DAMAGE.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
|
|
|
|
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
|
|
|
|
* copied and put under another distribution licence
|
|
|
|
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2002-01-15 07:40:26 +08:00
|
|
|
/* ====================================================================
|
2003-02-28 23:37:10 +08:00
|
|
|
* Copyright (c) 1998-2003 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
|
2002-01-15 07:40:26 +08:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
|
|
|
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
|
|
|
* are met:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
|
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
|
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
|
|
|
|
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
|
|
|
|
* distribution.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
|
|
|
|
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
|
|
|
|
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
|
|
|
|
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
|
|
|
|
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
|
|
|
|
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
|
|
|
|
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
|
|
|
|
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
|
|
|
|
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
|
|
|
|
* acknowledgment:
|
|
|
|
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
|
|
|
|
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
|
|
|
|
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
|
|
|
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
|
|
|
|
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
|
|
|
|
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
|
|
|
|
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
|
|
|
|
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
|
|
|
|
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
|
|
|
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
|
|
|
|
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
|
|
|
|
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
|
|
|
|
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
|
|
|
* ====================================================================
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
|
|
|
|
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
|
|
|
|
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
/* ====================================================================
|
|
|
|
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
|
|
|
|
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
|
|
|
|
* license provided above.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
|
|
|
|
* Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <stdio.h>
|
2002-07-10 15:01:54 +08:00
|
|
|
#include "ssl_locl.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "kssl_lcl.h"
|
1999-04-24 06:13:45 +08:00
|
|
|
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <openssl/rand.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <openssl/objects.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <openssl/evp.h>
|
2001-07-31 07:57:25 +08:00
|
|
|
#include <openssl/md5.h>
|
2004-04-20 02:09:28 +08:00
|
|
|
#include <openssl/dh.h>
|
2004-05-18 02:53:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#include <openssl/bn.h>
|
2000-12-01 06:53:34 +08:00
|
|
|
|
1999-02-01 01:30:18 +08:00
|
|
|
static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver);
|
2000-06-01 10:36:58 +08:00
|
|
|
static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a,const X509_NAME * const *b);
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
|
|
static int curve_id2nid(int curve_id);
|
|
|
|
int check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL_CIPHER *cs);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-20 05:31:43 +08:00
|
|
|
static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
return(SSLv3_client_method());
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
return(NULL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-20 05:31:43 +08:00
|
|
|
SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_client_method(void)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
static int init=1;
|
|
|
|
static SSL_METHOD SSLv3_client_data;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (init)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2002-09-23 22:25:07 +08:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_METHOD);
|
|
|
|
|
2002-09-25 23:38:57 +08:00
|
|
|
if (init)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
memcpy((char *)&SSLv3_client_data,(char *)sslv3_base_method(),
|
|
|
|
sizeof(SSL_METHOD));
|
|
|
|
SSLv3_client_data.ssl_connect=ssl3_connect;
|
|
|
|
SSLv3_client_data.get_ssl_method=ssl3_get_client_method;
|
|
|
|
init=0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-09-23 22:25:07 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_METHOD);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return(&SSLv3_client_data);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-20 05:31:43 +08:00
|
|
|
int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2002-12-22 07:49:21 +08:00
|
|
|
BUF_MEM *buf=NULL;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned long Time=time(NULL),l;
|
|
|
|
long num1;
|
2002-01-12 23:56:13 +08:00
|
|
|
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
int ret= -1;
|
|
|
|
int new_state,state,skip=0;;
|
|
|
|
|
2000-01-14 04:59:17 +08:00
|
|
|
RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
clear_sys_error();
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
|
|
|
|
cb=s->info_callback;
|
|
|
|
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
|
|
|
|
cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->in_handshake++;
|
2001-10-25 03:03:22 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (;;)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
state=s->state;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch(s->state)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
|
|
|
|
s->new_session=1;
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 17:22:21 +08:00
|
|
|
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
/* break */
|
|
|
|
case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
|
|
|
|
case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
|
|
|
|
case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
|
|
|
|
case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
|
|
|
|
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 17:22:21 +08:00
|
|
|
s->server=0;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
if ((s->version & 0xff00 ) != 0x0300)
|
2000-09-04 23:34:43 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2001-03-07 09:19:07 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
2000-09-04 23:34:43 +08:00
|
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
/* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
s->type=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->init_buf == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ret= -1;
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ret= -1;
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->init_buf=buf;
|
2002-12-22 07:49:21 +08:00
|
|
|
buf=NULL;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* setup buffing BIO */
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,0)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 17:22:21 +08:00
|
|
|
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->shutdown=0;
|
|
|
|
ret=ssl3_client_hello(s);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
|
|
|
|
s->wbio=BIO_push(s->bbio,s->wbio);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
|
|
|
|
ret=ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
|
|
if (s->hit)
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH */
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ret=ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
skip=1;
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
|
|
|
|
ret=ssl3_get_key_exchange(s);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* at this point we check that we have the
|
|
|
|
* required stuff from the server */
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ret= -1;
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
|
|
|
|
ret=ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
|
|
|
|
ret=ssl3_get_server_done(s);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
|
1999-06-12 09:03:40 +08:00
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
ret=ssl3_send_client_certificate(s);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
|
|
|
|
ret=ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
|
|
l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
|
|
|
|
/* EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert
|
|
|
|
* sent back */
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
/* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain
|
|
|
|
* of nothing is sent, but no verify packet is sent */
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
/* XXX: For now, we do not support client
|
|
|
|
* authentication in ECDH cipher suites with
|
|
|
|
* ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates.
|
|
|
|
* We need to skip the certificate verify
|
|
|
|
* message when client's ECDH public key is sent
|
|
|
|
* inside the client certificate.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
|
|
|
|
s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
|
|
|
|
ret=ssl3_send_client_verify(s);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
|
|
s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
|
|
|
|
ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
|
|
|
|
SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
|
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 17:22:21 +08:00
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
|
|
|
|
s->session->compress_meth=0;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
s->session->compress_meth=
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ret= -1;
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ret= -1;
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
|
|
|
|
ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
|
|
|
|
SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
|
2000-01-06 07:11:51 +08:00
|
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
|
|
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* clear flags */
|
|
|
|
s->s3->flags&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
|
|
|
|
if (s->hit)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
|
|
|
|
s->s3->flags|=SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
|
|
|
|
s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret=0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->hit)
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
|
|
|
|
/* number of bytes to be flushed */
|
|
|
|
num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (num1 > 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
|
|
|
|
num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
|
|
|
|
if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
|
|
|
|
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case SSL_ST_OK:
|
|
|
|
/* clean a few things up */
|
|
|
|
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
|
|
|
|
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 17:22:21 +08:00
|
|
|
if (s->init_buf != NULL)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 17:22:21 +08:00
|
|
|
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
|
|
|
|
s->init_buf=NULL;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 17:22:21 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If we are not 'joining' the last two packets,
|
|
|
|
* remove the buffering now */
|
|
|
|
if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
|
|
|
|
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
|
|
|
|
/* else do it later in ssl3_write */
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=0;
|
|
|
|
s->new_session=0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 17:22:21 +08:00
|
|
|
if (s->hit) s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret=1;
|
|
|
|
/* s->server=0; */
|
|
|
|
s->handshake_func=ssl3_connect;
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 17:22:21 +08:00
|
|
|
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
1998-12-21 19:00:56 +08:00
|
|
|
/* break; */
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
|
|
|
|
ret= -1;
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
/* break; */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* did we do anything */
|
|
|
|
if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
if (s->debug)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
new_state=s->state;
|
|
|
|
s->state=state;
|
|
|
|
cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP,1);
|
|
|
|
s->state=new_state;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
skip=0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
end:
|
2001-10-25 16:17:53 +08:00
|
|
|
s->in_handshake--;
|
2002-12-22 07:49:21 +08:00
|
|
|
if (buf != NULL)
|
|
|
|
BUF_MEM_free(buf);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
if (cb != NULL)
|
|
|
|
cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT,ret);
|
|
|
|
return(ret);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *buf;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *p,*d;
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 17:22:21 +08:00
|
|
|
int i,j;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned long Time,l;
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 17:22:21 +08:00
|
|
|
SSL_COMP *comp;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if ((s->session == NULL) ||
|
1998-12-21 19:00:56 +08:00
|
|
|
(s->session->ssl_version != s->version) ||
|
|
|
|
(s->session->not_resumable))
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* else use the pre-loaded session */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
p=s->s3->client_random;
|
|
|
|
Time=time(NULL); /* Time */
|
|
|
|
l2n(Time,p);
|
2005-04-30 04:10:06 +08:00
|
|
|
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Do the message type and length last */
|
|
|
|
d=p= &(buf[4]);
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
*(p++)=s->version>>8;
|
|
|
|
*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 17:22:21 +08:00
|
|
|
s->client_version=s->version;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Random stuff */
|
|
|
|
memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Session ID */
|
|
|
|
if (s->new_session)
|
|
|
|
i=0;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
i=s->session->session_id_length;
|
|
|
|
*(p++)=i;
|
|
|
|
if (i != 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2003-10-30 04:24:15 +08:00
|
|
|
if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
|
2002-08-02 19:48:15 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,i);
|
|
|
|
p+=i;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Ciphers supported */
|
2005-05-12 02:25:49 +08:00
|
|
|
i=ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s,SSL_get_ciphers(s),&(p[2]),0);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
if (i == 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s2n(i,p);
|
|
|
|
p+=i;
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 19:00:56 +08:00
|
|
|
/* COMPRESSION */
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 17:22:21 +08:00
|
|
|
if (s->ctx->comp_methods == NULL)
|
|
|
|
j=0;
|
|
|
|
else
|
1999-04-13 01:23:57 +08:00
|
|
|
j=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 17:22:21 +08:00
|
|
|
*(p++)=1+j;
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; i<j; i++)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1999-04-13 01:23:57 +08:00
|
|
|
comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,i);
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 17:22:21 +08:00
|
|
|
*(p++)=comp->id;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*(p++)=0; /* Add the NULL method */
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
l=(p-d);
|
|
|
|
d=buf;
|
|
|
|
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
|
|
|
|
l2n3(l,d);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
|
|
|
|
/* number of bytes to write */
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=p-buf;
|
|
|
|
s->init_off=0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
|
|
|
|
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
return(-1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
1999-04-13 01:23:57 +08:00
|
|
|
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSL_CIPHER *c;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *p,*d;
|
|
|
|
int i,al,ok;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int j;
|
|
|
|
long n;
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 17:22:21 +08:00
|
|
|
SSL_COMP *comp;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
|
|
|
|
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B,
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
-1,
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
300, /* ?? */
|
|
|
|
&ok);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ok) return((int)n);
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if ( s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else /* already sent a cookie */
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
2005-04-27 02:53:22 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
2005-04-27 02:53:22 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2001-10-16 03:49:25 +08:00
|
|
|
d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
if ((p[0] != (s->version>>8)) || (p[1] != (s->version&0xff)))
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
s->version=(s->version&0xff00)|p[1];
|
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p+=2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* load the server hello data */
|
|
|
|
/* load the server random */
|
|
|
|
memcpy(s->s3->server_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* get the session-id */
|
|
|
|
j= *(p++);
|
|
|
|
|
2002-09-19 19:44:07 +08:00
|
|
|
if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE))
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2002-09-19 19:44:07 +08:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2002-11-13 23:43:43 +08:00
|
|
|
|
1999-03-22 20:22:14 +08:00
|
|
|
if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
|
|
|
|
&& memcmp(p,s->session->session_id,j) == 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if(s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
|
|
|
|
|| memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx_length))
|
|
|
|
{
|
2002-09-19 19:44:07 +08:00
|
|
|
/* actually a client application bug */
|
1999-03-22 20:22:14 +08:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->hit=1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
else /* a miss or crap from the other end */
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
/* If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new
|
|
|
|
* SSL_SESSION so we don't stuff up other people */
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
s->hit=0;
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
if (s->session->session_id_length > 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->session->session_id_length=j;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(s->session->session_id,p,j); /* j could be 0 */
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p+=j;
|
|
|
|
c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p);
|
|
|
|
if (c == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* unknown cipher */
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p+=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sk=ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
|
1999-04-13 01:23:57 +08:00
|
|
|
i=sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk,c);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* we did not say we would use this cipher */
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2002-11-20 18:48:58 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
|
|
|
|
and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that
|
|
|
|
cipher_id is set and use it for comparison. */
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->cipher)
|
|
|
|
s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
|
2002-11-15 18:53:33 +08:00
|
|
|
if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id))
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!(s->options &
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG))
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* lets get the compression algorithm */
|
1998-12-21 19:00:56 +08:00
|
|
|
/* COMPRESSION */
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
j= *(p++);
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 17:22:21 +08:00
|
|
|
if (j == 0)
|
|
|
|
comp=NULL;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
comp=ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods,j);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((j != 0) && (comp == NULL))
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 17:22:21 +08:00
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (p != (d+n))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* wrong packet length */
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return(1);
|
|
|
|
f_err:
|
|
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
return(-1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int al,i,ok,ret= -1;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long n,nc,llen,l;
|
|
|
|
X509 *x=NULL;
|
2004-03-16 07:15:26 +08:00
|
|
|
const unsigned char *q,*p;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *d;
|
1999-04-13 01:23:57 +08:00
|
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
|
1999-05-13 23:09:38 +08:00
|
|
|
SESS_CERT *sc;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
|
2003-02-28 23:07:10 +08:00
|
|
|
int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
|
|
|
|
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
|
|
|
|
-1,
|
2001-09-11 21:08:51 +08:00
|
|
|
s->max_cert_list,
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
&ok);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ok) return((int)n);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
|
|
|
|
return(1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-03-16 07:15:26 +08:00
|
|
|
p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
1999-04-13 01:23:57 +08:00
|
|
|
if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
n2l3(p,llen);
|
|
|
|
if (llen+3 != n)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
n2l3(p,l);
|
|
|
|
if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
q=p;
|
|
|
|
x=d2i_X509(NULL,&q,l);
|
|
|
|
if (x == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (q != (p+l))
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-04-13 01:23:57 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
x=NULL;
|
|
|
|
nc+=l+3;
|
|
|
|
p=q;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
|
2001-07-12 16:51:47 +08:00
|
|
|
if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (!i)
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
|
2003-02-28 23:07:10 +08:00
|
|
|
&& (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
|
|
|
|
!= (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5)
|
2001-07-12 16:51:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
|
2003-02-28 23:07:10 +08:00
|
|
|
)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-05-28 06:25:01 +08:00
|
|
|
ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
1999-05-13 23:09:38 +08:00
|
|
|
sc=ssl_sess_cert_new();
|
|
|
|
if (sc == NULL) goto err;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
1999-05-13 23:09:38 +08:00
|
|
|
if (s->session->sess_cert) ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
|
|
|
|
s->session->sess_cert=sc;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
1999-05-13 23:09:38 +08:00
|
|
|
sc->cert_chain=sk;
|
2000-03-28 02:07:45 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's
|
|
|
|
* certificate, which we don't include in s3_srvr.c */
|
1999-04-13 01:23:57 +08:00
|
|
|
x=sk_X509_value(sk,0);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
sk=NULL;
|
2001-07-10 05:46:58 +08:00
|
|
|
/* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end*/
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x);
|
|
|
|
|
2003-02-28 23:07:10 +08:00
|
|
|
/* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
|
|
|
|
need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
|
|
|
|
& (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
|
|
|
|
== (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))? 0: 1;
|
2000-12-01 06:53:34 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
|
|
|
printf("pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey,x);
|
|
|
|
printf("ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x,pkey));
|
|
|
|
printf("cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %d\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
|
2003-02-28 23:07:10 +08:00
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms, need_cert);
|
2000-12-01 06:53:34 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
|
|
|
|
2001-07-10 05:46:58 +08:00
|
|
|
if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)))
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
x=NULL;
|
|
|
|
al=SSL3_AL_FATAL;
|
2001-07-10 05:46:58 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
|
|
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
i=ssl_cert_type(x,pkey);
|
2000-12-01 06:53:34 +08:00
|
|
|
if (need_cert && i < 0)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
x=NULL;
|
|
|
|
al=SSL3_AL_FATAL;
|
2001-07-10 05:46:58 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
|
|
|
|
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2003-02-28 23:07:10 +08:00
|
|
|
if (need_cert)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
sc->peer_cert_type=i;
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
|
|
|
|
/* Why would the following ever happen?
|
|
|
|
* We just created sc a couple of lines ago. */
|
|
|
|
if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
|
|
|
|
X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
|
|
|
|
sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509=x;
|
|
|
|
sc->peer_key= &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->peer != NULL)
|
|
|
|
X509_free(s->session->peer);
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
|
|
|
|
s->session->peer=x;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
sc->peer_cert_type=i;
|
|
|
|
sc->peer_key= NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->peer != NULL)
|
|
|
|
X509_free(s->session->peer);
|
|
|
|
s->session->peer=NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-11-30 00:04:38 +08:00
|
|
|
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
x=NULL;
|
|
|
|
ret=1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
f_err:
|
|
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err:
|
1999-02-16 05:05:21 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
|
|
|
X509_free(x);
|
1999-04-13 01:23:57 +08:00
|
|
|
sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
return(ret);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2001-02-20 16:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned char *q,md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *param,*p;
|
|
|
|
int al,i,j,param_len,ok;
|
|
|
|
long n,alg;
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
|
2001-02-20 16:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
RSA *rsa=NULL;
|
1999-04-27 11:19:12 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2001-02-20 16:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
DH *dh=NULL;
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
|
|
EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
|
|
|
|
EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
|
|
|
|
int curve_nid = 0;
|
|
|
|
int encoded_pt_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2001-08-07 17:30:18 +08:00
|
|
|
/* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request()
|
|
|
|
* as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped */
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
|
|
|
|
SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
|
|
|
|
-1,
|
2001-09-11 21:08:51 +08:00
|
|
|
s->max_cert_list,
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
&ok);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ok) return((int)n);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
|
|
|
|
return(1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2001-10-16 03:49:25 +08:00
|
|
|
param=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
1999-05-10 05:22:45 +08:00
|
|
|
if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2001-02-20 16:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
1999-05-13 23:09:38 +08:00
|
|
|
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
1999-05-13 23:09:38 +08:00
|
|
|
RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
|
|
|
|
s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=NULL;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2001-02-20 16:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
1999-05-13 23:09:38 +08:00
|
|
|
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
1999-05-13 23:09:38 +08:00
|
|
|
DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
|
|
|
|
s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=NULL;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
|
|
|
|
s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
1999-05-13 23:09:38 +08:00
|
|
|
s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
param_len=0;
|
|
|
|
alg=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
|
2001-07-31 07:57:25 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2001-02-20 16:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
if (alg & SSL_kRSA)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if ((rsa=RSA_new()) == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
n2s(p,i);
|
|
|
|
param_len=i+2;
|
|
|
|
if (param_len > n)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(rsa->n=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->n)))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p+=i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
n2s(p,i);
|
|
|
|
param_len+=i+2;
|
|
|
|
if (param_len > n)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(rsa->e=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->e)))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p+=i;
|
|
|
|
n-=param_len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
|
|
|
|
if (alg & SSL_aRSA)
|
1999-05-13 23:09:38 +08:00
|
|
|
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
2001-03-07 09:19:07 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-05-13 23:09:38 +08:00
|
|
|
s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=rsa;
|
1999-07-12 23:20:08 +08:00
|
|
|
rsa=NULL;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2001-02-20 16:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
|
2000-07-03 03:40:44 +08:00
|
|
|
if (0)
|
|
|
|
;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2001-02-20 16:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
2000-07-03 03:40:44 +08:00
|
|
|
else if (alg & SSL_kEDH)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if ((dh=DH_new()) == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
n2s(p,i);
|
|
|
|
param_len=i+2;
|
|
|
|
if (param_len > n)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(dh->p=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p+=i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
n2s(p,i);
|
|
|
|
param_len+=i+2;
|
|
|
|
if (param_len > n)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(dh->g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p+=i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
n2s(p,i);
|
|
|
|
param_len+=i+2;
|
|
|
|
if (param_len > n)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(dh->pub_key=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p+=i;
|
|
|
|
n-=param_len;
|
|
|
|
|
2001-02-20 16:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
if (alg & SSL_aRSA)
|
1999-05-13 23:09:38 +08:00
|
|
|
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
|
2000-07-03 03:40:44 +08:00
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
if (0)
|
|
|
|
;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2001-02-20 16:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
2000-07-03 03:40:44 +08:00
|
|
|
else if (alg & SSL_aDSS)
|
1999-05-13 23:09:38 +08:00
|
|
|
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
|
|
|
|
|
1999-05-13 23:09:38 +08:00
|
|
|
s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=dh;
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 17:22:21 +08:00
|
|
|
dh=NULL;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else if ((alg & SSL_kDHr) || (alg & SSL_kDHd))
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2001-02-20 16:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
|
|
else if (alg & SSL_kECDHE)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2005-05-16 18:11:04 +08:00
|
|
|
EC_GROUP *ngroup;
|
|
|
|
const EC_GROUP *group;
|
|
|
|
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
if ((ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the
|
|
|
|
* server's ephemeral ECDH public key.
|
|
|
|
* Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
|
|
|
|
* param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves
|
|
|
|
* and the ECParameters in this case is just two bytes.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
param_len=2;
|
|
|
|
if ((param_len > n) ||
|
|
|
|
(*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) ||
|
|
|
|
((curve_nid = curve_id2nid(*(p + 1))) == 0))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-05-16 18:11:04 +08:00
|
|
|
ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
|
|
|
|
if (ngroup == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0)
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-05-16 18:11:04 +08:00
|
|
|
EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
|
2005-05-16 18:11:04 +08:00
|
|
|
(EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
p+=2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
|
2005-05-16 18:11:04 +08:00
|
|
|
if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */
|
|
|
|
p+=1;
|
|
|
|
param_len += (1 + encoded_pt_len);
|
|
|
|
if ((param_len > n) ||
|
2005-05-16 18:11:04 +08:00
|
|
|
(EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
n-=param_len;
|
|
|
|
p+=encoded_pt_len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention
|
|
|
|
* the use of DSA to sign ECParameters in the server
|
|
|
|
* key exchange message. We do support RSA and ECDSA.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (0) ;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
|
|
|
else if (alg & SSL_aRSA)
|
|
|
|
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
|
|
|
|
else if (alg & SSL_aECDSA)
|
|
|
|
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
|
2005-05-16 18:11:04 +08:00
|
|
|
EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=ecdh;
|
|
|
|
ecdh=NULL;
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
2005-05-16 18:11:04 +08:00
|
|
|
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else if (alg & SSL_kECDH)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
|
1998-12-21 19:00:56 +08:00
|
|
|
if (alg & SSL_aFZA)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* if it was signed, check the signature */
|
|
|
|
if (pkey != NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
n2s(p,i);
|
|
|
|
n-=2;
|
|
|
|
j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* wrong packet length */
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
|
1998-12-21 19:00:56 +08:00
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2001-02-20 16:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int num;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
j=0;
|
|
|
|
q=md_buf;
|
|
|
|
for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2001-10-16 09:24:29 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
|
|
|
|
?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
|
2001-10-16 09:24:29 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,(unsigned int *)&i);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
q+=i;
|
|
|
|
j+=i;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-09-19 06:37:44 +08:00
|
|
|
i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n,
|
|
|
|
pkey->pkey.rsa);
|
|
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-09-19 06:37:44 +08:00
|
|
|
if (i == 0)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* bad signature */
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2001-02-20 16:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* lets do DSS */
|
2001-10-16 09:24:29 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
|
|
|
|
if (!EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* bad signature */
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
|
2002-08-12 16:47:41 +08:00
|
|
|
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* let's do ECDSA */
|
|
|
|
EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
|
|
|
|
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
|
|
|
|
if (!EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* bad signature */
|
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
{
|
2001-03-07 09:19:07 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* still data left over */
|
|
|
|
if (!(alg & SSL_aNULL))
|
|
|
|
{
|
2001-03-07 09:19:07 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (n != 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-02-16 05:05:21 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
2001-07-31 07:57:25 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
return(1);
|
|
|
|
f_err:
|
|
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
|
|
|
|
err:
|
1999-02-16 05:05:21 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
2001-02-20 16:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
1999-07-12 23:20:08 +08:00
|
|
|
if (rsa != NULL)
|
|
|
|
RSA_free(rsa);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2001-02-20 16:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
1999-07-12 23:20:08 +08:00
|
|
|
if (dh != NULL)
|
|
|
|
DH_free(dh);
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
|
|
|
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
|
|
|
|
if (ecdh != NULL)
|
|
|
|
EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
|
1999-07-12 23:20:08 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2001-07-31 07:57:25 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
return(-1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ok,ret=0;
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned long n,nc,l;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int llen,ctype_num,i;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
|
2004-03-16 07:15:26 +08:00
|
|
|
const unsigned char *p,*q;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *d;
|
1999-04-13 01:23:57 +08:00
|
|
|
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk=NULL;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
|
|
|
|
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B,
|
|
|
|
-1,
|
2001-09-11 21:08:51 +08:00
|
|
|
s->max_cert_list,
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
&ok);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ok) return((int)n);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
|
|
|
|
return(1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
/* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
|
|
|
|
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
|
|
|
|
if (l & SSL_aNULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-03-16 07:15:26 +08:00
|
|
|
p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
1999-04-13 01:23:57 +08:00
|
|
|
if ((ca_sk=sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* get the certificate types */
|
|
|
|
ctype_num= *(p++);
|
|
|
|
if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER)
|
|
|
|
ctype_num=SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; i<ctype_num; i++)
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.ctype[i]= p[i];
|
|
|
|
p+=ctype_num;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* get the CA RDNs */
|
|
|
|
n2s(p,llen);
|
1998-12-21 19:00:56 +08:00
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
FILE *out;
|
|
|
|
out=fopen("/tmp/vsign.der","w");
|
|
|
|
fwrite(p,1,llen,out);
|
|
|
|
fclose(out);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
if ((llen+ctype_num+2+1) != n)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
n2s(p,l);
|
|
|
|
if ((l+nc+2) > llen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
goto cont; /* netscape bugs */
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
q=p;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((xn=d2i_X509_NAME(NULL,&q,l)) == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2000-02-04 07:23:24 +08:00
|
|
|
/* If netscape tolerance is on, ignore errors */
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
goto cont;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (q != (p+l))
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-04-13 01:23:57 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk,xn))
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
p+=l;
|
|
|
|
nc+=l+2;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
cont:
|
|
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2000-02-04 07:23:24 +08:00
|
|
|
/* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.cert_req=1;
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.ctype_num=ctype_num;
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
|
1999-04-13 01:23:57 +08:00
|
|
|
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names,X509_NAME_free);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.ca_names=ca_sk;
|
|
|
|
ca_sk=NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret=1;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
1999-04-13 01:23:57 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ca_sk != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk,X509_NAME_free);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
return(ret);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2000-06-01 10:36:58 +08:00
|
|
|
static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return(X509_NAME_cmp(*a,*b));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ok,ret=0;
|
|
|
|
long n;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A,
|
|
|
|
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B,
|
|
|
|
SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE,
|
|
|
|
30, /* should be very small, like 0 :-) */
|
|
|
|
&ok);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ok) return((int)n);
|
|
|
|
if (n > 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* should contain no data */
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
|
2002-01-14 20:37:59 +08:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret=1;
|
|
|
|
return(ret);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2003-02-28 23:37:10 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const int KDF1_SHA1_len = 20;
|
2005-04-23 18:11:16 +08:00
|
|
|
static void *KDF1_SHA1(const void *in, size_t inlen, void *out, size_t *outlen)
|
2003-02-28 23:37:10 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
|
2005-04-23 18:11:16 +08:00
|
|
|
if (*outlen < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
|
2003-02-28 23:37:10 +08:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
2005-04-23 18:11:16 +08:00
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
*outlen = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
|
2003-02-28 23:37:10 +08:00
|
|
|
return SHA1(in, inlen, out);
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
1999-04-27 11:19:12 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned char *p,*d;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
int n;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long l;
|
2001-02-20 16:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
1999-04-27 11:19:12 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned char *q;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
|
1999-04-27 11:19:12 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2001-02-20 16:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
|
2003-02-28 23:07:10 +08:00
|
|
|
KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
|
2001-02-20 16:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
|
|
EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
|
2005-05-16 18:11:04 +08:00
|
|
|
const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
|
|
|
|
int encoded_pt_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX * bn_ctx = NULL;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
|
|
p= &(d[4]);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
|
|
|
|
|
2003-02-28 23:07:10 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Fool emacs indentation */
|
|
|
|
if (0) {}
|
2001-02-20 16:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
2000-12-01 06:53:34 +08:00
|
|
|
else if (l & SSL_kRSA)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
RSA *rsa;
|
1998-12-21 19:00:56 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
1999-05-13 23:09:38 +08:00
|
|
|
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
|
|
|
|
rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
1999-05-13 23:09:38 +08:00
|
|
|
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
if ((pkey == NULL) ||
|
|
|
|
(pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
|
|
|
|
(pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
|
|
|
|
{
|
2001-03-07 09:19:07 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
|
1999-07-13 01:15:42 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Updates to the new SSL compression code
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed
via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3
(because the server will not accept higher), that the version number
is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00
[Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)]
Submitted by:
Reviewed by:
PR:
1999-02-16 17:22:21 +08:00
|
|
|
tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8;
|
|
|
|
tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff;
|
2002-11-13 23:43:43 +08:00
|
|
|
if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0)
|
2000-01-21 09:15:56 +08:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2002-11-13 23:43:43 +08:00
|
|
|
s->session->master_key_length=sizeof tmp_buf;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
q=p;
|
|
|
|
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
|
|
|
|
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
|
|
|
|
p+=2;
|
2002-11-13 23:43:43 +08:00
|
|
|
n=RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf,
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
tmp_buf,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
|
1998-12-21 19:00:56 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
|
|
|
|
if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1) p[1]++;
|
|
|
|
if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2) tmp_buf[0]=0x70;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
if (n <= 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
|
|
|
|
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s2n(n,q);
|
|
|
|
n+=2;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
s->session->master_key_length=
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
s->session->master_key,
|
2002-11-13 23:43:43 +08:00
|
|
|
tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
|
2002-11-28 16:04:36 +08:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2000-12-01 06:53:34 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2001-02-20 16:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
|
2000-12-01 06:53:34 +08:00
|
|
|
else if (l & SSL_kKRB5)
|
2003-02-28 23:07:10 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
krb5_error_code krb5rc;
|
|
|
|
KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
|
|
|
|
/* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
|
|
|
|
krb5_data *enc_ticket;
|
|
|
|
krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
|
2001-07-10 05:46:58 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
|
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
|
|
|
|
unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
|
|
|
|
unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
|
|
|
|
+ EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
|
|
|
|
int padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
|
2000-12-01 06:53:34 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2002-03-15 02:22:23 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
2000-12-01 06:53:34 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
2003-02-28 23:07:10 +08:00
|
|
|
printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
|
|
|
|
l, SSL_kKRB5);
|
2000-12-01 06:53:34 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
|
|
|
|
2001-07-10 05:46:58 +08:00
|
|
|
authp = NULL;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
|
|
|
|
if (KRB5SENDAUTH) authp = &authenticator;
|
|
|
|
#endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
|
|
|
|
|
2003-02-28 23:07:10 +08:00
|
|
|
krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp,
|
2001-07-10 05:46:58 +08:00
|
|
|
&kssl_err);
|
|
|
|
enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
|
2003-02-28 23:07:10 +08:00
|
|
|
if (enc == NULL)
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
2000-12-01 06:53:34 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
|
2003-02-28 23:07:10 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
|
|
|
|
if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
|
2001-07-10 05:46:58 +08:00
|
|
|
printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text);
|
2003-02-28 23:07:10 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2000-12-01 06:53:34 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
|
|
|
|
|
2003-02-28 23:07:10 +08:00
|
|
|
if (krb5rc)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,
|
2001-07-10 05:46:58 +08:00
|
|
|
SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
2003-02-28 23:07:10 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
2001-07-10 05:46:58 +08:00
|
|
|
kssl_err.reason);
|
2003-02-28 23:07:10 +08:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-12-01 06:53:34 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2001-07-10 05:46:58 +08:00
|
|
|
/* 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
|
|
|
|
** in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
|
|
|
|
**
|
2003-02-28 23:07:10 +08:00
|
|
|
** Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
|
|
|
|
** n = krb5_ap_req.length;
|
|
|
|
** memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
|
|
|
|
** if (krb5_ap_req.data)
|
|
|
|
** kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
|
|
|
|
**
|
2001-07-10 05:46:58 +08:00
|
|
|
** Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
|
|
|
|
** (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
|
|
|
|
** Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
|
|
|
|
** with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
|
|
|
|
** Example:
|
|
|
|
** KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
|
|
|
|
** Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
|
|
|
|
** optional authenticator omitted.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
|
|
|
|
s2n(enc_ticket->length,p);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
|
|
|
|
p+= enc_ticket->length;
|
|
|
|
n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
|
|
|
|
if (authp && authp->length)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s2n(authp->length,p);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
|
|
|
|
p+= authp->length;
|
|
|
|
n+= authp->length + 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
free(authp->data);
|
|
|
|
authp->data = NULL;
|
|
|
|
authp->length = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s2n(0,p);/* null authenticator length */
|
|
|
|
n+=2;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2002-11-13 23:43:43 +08:00
|
|
|
if (RAND_bytes(tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf) <= 0)
|
2001-07-10 05:46:58 +08:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
|
2001-10-17 08:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
|
2001-07-10 05:46:58 +08:00
|
|
|
** EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
|
|
|
|
** kssl_ctx->length);
|
2001-10-17 08:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
|
2001-07-10 05:46:58 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2002-11-13 23:43:43 +08:00
|
|
|
memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
|
2001-10-18 00:03:42 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,
|
|
|
|
kssl_ctx->key,iv);
|
2001-07-10 05:46:58 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx,epms,&outl,tmp_buf,
|
2002-11-13 23:43:43 +08:00
|
|
|
sizeof tmp_buf);
|
2001-10-17 08:37:12 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(epms[outl]),&padl);
|
2001-07-10 05:46:58 +08:00
|
|
|
outl += padl;
|
2002-08-02 19:48:15 +08:00
|
|
|
if (outl > sizeof epms)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2001-07-10 05:46:58 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
|
|
|
|
s2n(outl,p);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(p, epms, outl);
|
|
|
|
p+=outl;
|
|
|
|
n+=outl + 2;
|
|
|
|
|
2003-02-28 23:07:10 +08:00
|
|
|
s->session->master_key_length=
|
|
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
2001-07-10 05:46:58 +08:00
|
|
|
s->session->master_key,
|
2002-11-13 23:43:43 +08:00
|
|
|
tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
|
2001-07-10 05:46:58 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2002-11-28 16:04:36 +08:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
|
2003-02-28 23:07:10 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2001-02-20 16:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
2000-12-01 06:53:34 +08:00
|
|
|
else if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt;
|
|
|
|
|
1999-05-13 23:09:38 +08:00
|
|
|
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
|
|
|
|
dh_srvr=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* we get them from the cert */
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* generate a new random key */
|
|
|
|
if ((dh_clnt=DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but
|
|
|
|
* make sure to clear it out afterwards */
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
n=DH_compute_key(p,dh_srvr->pub_key,dh_clnt);
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
if (n <= 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* generate master key from the result */
|
|
|
|
s->session->master_key_length=
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
s->session->master_key,p,n);
|
|
|
|
/* clean up */
|
|
|
|
memset(p,0,n);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* send off the data */
|
|
|
|
n=BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
|
|
|
|
s2n(n,p);
|
|
|
|
BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key,p);
|
|
|
|
n+=2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
DH_free(dh_clnt);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY*/
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
|
|
else if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
|
|
|
|
{
|
2005-05-16 18:11:04 +08:00
|
|
|
const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
|
|
|
|
EC_KEY *tkey;
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
|
2003-07-22 20:34:21 +08:00
|
|
|
int field_size = 0;
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Did we send out the client's
|
|
|
|
* ECDH share for use in premaster
|
|
|
|
* computation as part of client certificate?
|
|
|
|
* If so, set ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ((l & SSL_kECDH) && (s->cert != NULL))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* XXX: For now, we do not support client
|
|
|
|
* authentication using ECDH certificates.
|
|
|
|
* To add such support, one needs to add
|
|
|
|
* code that checks for appropriate
|
|
|
|
* conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
|
|
|
|
* For example, the cert have an ECC
|
|
|
|
* key on the same curve as the server's
|
|
|
|
* and the key should be authorized for
|
|
|
|
* key agreement.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
|
|
|
|
* to skip sending the certificate verify
|
|
|
|
* message.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
|
|
|
|
* (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
|
2002-08-12 16:51:30 +08:00
|
|
|
* EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
* ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2005-05-16 18:11:04 +08:00
|
|
|
tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
|
|
|
|
srvr_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session-> \
|
|
|
|
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
|
|
|
|
if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL) ||
|
2002-08-12 16:47:41 +08:00
|
|
|
(srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) ||
|
2005-05-16 18:11:04 +08:00
|
|
|
(srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL))
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-05-16 18:11:04 +08:00
|
|
|
tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-05-16 18:11:04 +08:00
|
|
|
srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
|
|
|
|
srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
|
|
|
|
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((clnt_ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-05-16 18:11:04 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ecdh_clnt_cert)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2003-02-28 23:07:10 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Reuse key info from our certificate
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
* We only need our private key to perform
|
|
|
|
* the ECDH computation.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-05-16 18:11:04 +08:00
|
|
|
const BIGNUM *priv_key;
|
|
|
|
tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
|
|
|
|
priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
|
|
|
|
if (priv_key == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
|
|
|
|
if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh)))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2003-02-28 23:07:10 +08:00
|
|
|
/* use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but
|
|
|
|
* make sure to clear it out afterwards
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2005-05-16 18:11:04 +08:00
|
|
|
field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
|
2003-07-22 20:34:21 +08:00
|
|
|
if (field_size <= 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
|
|
ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If field size is not more than 24 octets, then use SHA-1 hash of result;
|
|
|
|
* otherwise, use result (see section 4.8 of draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt;
|
|
|
|
* this is new with this version of the Internet Draft).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (field_size <= 24 * 8)
|
|
|
|
n=ECDH_compute_key(p, KDF1_SHA1_len, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, KDF1_SHA1);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
n=ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL);
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
if (n <= 0)
|
2003-02-28 23:07:10 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
|
2003-02-28 23:07:10 +08:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2003-02-28 23:07:10 +08:00
|
|
|
/* generate master key from the result */
|
|
|
|
s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
-> generate_master_secret(s,
|
|
|
|
s->session->master_key,
|
|
|
|
p, n);
|
|
|
|
|
2003-02-28 23:07:10 +08:00
|
|
|
memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ecdh_clnt_cert)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Send empty client key exch message */
|
|
|
|
n = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* First check the size of encoding and
|
|
|
|
* allocate memory accordingly.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
encoded_pt_len =
|
2005-05-16 18:11:04 +08:00
|
|
|
EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
|
|
|
|
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
|
|
|
|
NULL, 0, NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len *
|
|
|
|
sizeof(unsigned char));
|
|
|
|
bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
|
|
|
|
if ((encodedPoint == NULL) ||
|
|
|
|
(bn_ctx == NULL))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Encode the public key */
|
2005-05-16 18:11:04 +08:00
|
|
|
n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
|
|
|
|
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
|
|
|
|
encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*p = n; /* length of encoded point */
|
2003-02-28 23:07:10 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Encoded point will be copied here */
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
p += 1;
|
|
|
|
/* copy the point */
|
|
|
|
memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n);
|
|
|
|
/* increment n to account for length field */
|
|
|
|
n += 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Free allocated memory */
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
|
|
|
|
if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
|
|
|
|
EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
|
2000-12-01 06:53:34 +08:00
|
|
|
else
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
|
|
|
|
SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
|
|
|
|
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
|
|
|
|
l2n3(n,d);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
|
|
|
|
/* number of bytes to write */
|
|
|
|
s->init_num=n+4;
|
|
|
|
s->init_off=0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
|
|
|
|
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
|
|
err:
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
|
|
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
|
|
|
|
if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
|
|
|
|
EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
|
2003-02-28 23:07:10 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
return(-1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *p,*d;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
|
2001-02-20 16:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
1999-09-25 03:10:57 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned u=0;
|
1999-04-27 11:19:12 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
unsigned long n;
|
2001-02-20 16:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
int j;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
|
|
|
|
p= &(d[4]);
|
|
|
|
pkey=s->cert->key->privatekey;
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,&(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
|
|
|
|
&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2001-02-20 16:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
|
|
|
|
&(s->s3->finish_dgst1),&(data[0]));
|
1999-09-19 06:37:44 +08:00
|
|
|
if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
|
|
|
|
MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
|
1999-09-25 03:10:57 +08:00
|
|
|
&(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0 )
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-09-25 03:10:57 +08:00
|
|
|
s2n(u,p);
|
|
|
|
n=u+2;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2001-02-20 16:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
|
|
|
|
&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
|
|
|
|
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]),
|
|
|
|
(unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.dsa))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s2n(j,p);
|
|
|
|
n=j+2;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
|
2002-08-12 16:47:41 +08:00
|
|
|
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
|
|
|
|
&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
|
|
|
|
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]),
|
2005-05-16 18:11:04 +08:00
|
|
|
(unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.ec))
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
|
|
|
|
ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s2n(j,p);
|
|
|
|
n=j+2;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
{
|
2001-03-07 09:19:07 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
|
|
|
|
l2n3(n,d);
|
|
|
|
|
2003-09-28 03:32:06 +08:00
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
s->init_num=(int)n+4;
|
|
|
|
s->init_off=0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
return(-1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
X509 *x509=NULL;
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long l;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if ((s->cert == NULL) ||
|
|
|
|
(s->cert->key->x509 == NULL) ||
|
|
|
|
(s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL))
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We need to get a client cert */
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* If we get an error, we need to
|
|
|
|
* ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return(-1);
|
|
|
|
* We then get retied later */
|
|
|
|
i=0;
|
|
|
|
if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb != NULL)
|
|
|
|
i=s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s,&(x509),&(pkey));
|
|
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
|
|
|
|
return(-1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
|
|
if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
|
|
|
|
if ( !SSL_use_certificate(s,x509) ||
|
|
|
|
!SSL_use_PrivateKey(s,pkey))
|
|
|
|
i=0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else if (i == 1)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
i=0;
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (x509 != NULL) X509_free(x509);
|
|
|
|
if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
|
|
|
if (i == 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0;
|
|
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
|
|
|
|
return(1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.cert_req=2;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Ok, we have a cert */
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
|
|
|
|
(s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2)?NULL:s->cert->key->x509);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
s->init_num=(int)l;
|
|
|
|
s->init_off=0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
|
|
|
|
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-27 00:02:40 +08:00
|
|
|
int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i,idx;
|
|
|
|
long algs;
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
|
1999-05-13 23:09:38 +08:00
|
|
|
SESS_CERT *sc;
|
2001-02-20 16:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
RSA *rsa;
|
1999-04-27 11:19:12 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2001-02-20 16:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
DH *dh;
|
1999-04-27 11:19:12 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
1999-05-13 23:09:38 +08:00
|
|
|
sc=s->session->sess_cert;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
1999-05-13 23:09:38 +08:00
|
|
|
if (sc == NULL)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2001-03-07 09:19:07 +08:00
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
algs=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* we don't have a certificate */
|
2000-12-01 06:53:34 +08:00
|
|
|
if (algs & (SSL_aDH|SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5))
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
return(1);
|
|
|
|
|
2001-02-20 16:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
1999-05-13 23:09:38 +08:00
|
|
|
rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
|
1999-04-27 11:19:12 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2001-02-20 16:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
1999-05-13 23:09:38 +08:00
|
|
|
dh=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
|
1999-04-27 11:19:12 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* This is the passed certificate */
|
|
|
|
|
1999-05-13 23:09:38 +08:00
|
|
|
idx=sc->peer_cert_type;
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
|
|
if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,
|
|
|
|
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) == 0)
|
|
|
|
{ /* check failed */
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
1999-05-13 23:09:38 +08:00
|
|
|
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
|
|
|
|
i=X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,pkey);
|
1999-02-16 05:05:21 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
|
|
|
|
if ((algs & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2001-02-20 16:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
else if ((algs & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2001-02-20 16:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
if ((algs & SSL_kRSA) &&
|
|
|
|
!(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_ENC) || (rsa != NULL)))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-04-27 11:19:12 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2001-02-20 16:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
1999-04-27 11:19:12 +08:00
|
|
|
if ((algs & SSL_kEDH) &&
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
!(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL)))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else if ((algs & SSL_kDHr) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_RSA))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2001-02-20 16:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
else if ((algs & SSL_kDHd) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_DSA))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2000-01-22 11:17:06 +08:00
|
|
|
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PKT_EXP))
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2001-02-20 16:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
if (algs & SSL_kRSA)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1999-02-22 04:03:24 +08:00
|
|
|
if (rsa == NULL
|
2003-11-29 07:03:14 +08:00
|
|
|
|| RSA_size(rsa)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2001-02-20 16:13:47 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
if (algs & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
|
1999-02-22 04:03:24 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (dh == NULL
|
2003-11-29 07:03:14 +08:00
|
|
|
|| DH_size(dh)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
|
|
|
|
goto f_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return(1);
|
|
|
|
f_err:
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
return(0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
|
|
|
/* This is the complement of nid2curve_id in s3_srvr.c. */
|
|
|
|
static int curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2003-07-22 20:34:21 +08:00
|
|
|
/* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
|
|
|
|
* (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
|
2002-08-09 16:56:08 +08:00
|
|
|
static int nid_list[26] =
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
0,
|
|
|
|
NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
|
|
|
|
NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
|
|
|
|
NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
|
|
|
|
NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
|
|
|
|
NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
|
|
|
|
NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
|
|
|
|
NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
|
|
|
|
NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
|
|
|
|
NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
|
|
|
|
NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
|
|
|
|
NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
|
|
|
|
NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
|
|
|
|
NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
|
|
|
|
NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
|
|
|
|
NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
|
|
|
|
NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
|
|
|
|
NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
|
|
|
|
NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
|
|
|
|
NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
|
|
|
|
NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
|
|
|
|
NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
|
|
|
|
NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
|
|
|
|
NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
|
|
|
|
NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
|
|
|
|
NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((curve_id < 1) || (curve_id > 25)) return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return nid_list[curve_id];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|