1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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/* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
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1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <time.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include "cryptlib.h"
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1999-09-12 01:54:18 +08:00
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#include <openssl/crypto.h>
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1999-04-24 06:13:45 +08:00
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#include <openssl/lhash.h>
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#include <openssl/buffer.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/asn1.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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1999-11-24 09:31:49 +08:00
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#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
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1999-04-24 06:13:45 +08:00
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#include <openssl/objects.h>
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
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2000-09-06 01:53:58 +08:00
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static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
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static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
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1999-11-24 09:31:49 +08:00
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static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
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1999-11-28 03:43:10 +08:00
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static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
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2001-05-08 06:52:50 +08:00
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static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
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static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
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1999-04-18 05:25:43 +08:00
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const char *X509_version="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
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1999-03-22 20:22:14 +08:00
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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1999-04-20 05:31:43 +08:00
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static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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{
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2000-09-06 22:14:20 +08:00
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return ok;
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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}
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#if 0
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1999-04-20 05:31:43 +08:00
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static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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{
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2000-09-06 22:14:20 +08:00
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return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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}
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#endif
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1999-04-20 05:31:43 +08:00
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int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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{
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X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
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X509_NAME *xn;
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int depth,i,ok=0;
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int num;
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int (*cb)();
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1999-04-13 01:23:57 +08:00
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STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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if (ctx->cert == NULL)
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{
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X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
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2000-09-06 22:14:20 +08:00
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return -1;
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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}
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2000-09-06 01:53:58 +08:00
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cb=ctx->verify_cb;
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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/* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
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* present and that the first entry is in place */
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if (ctx->chain == NULL)
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{
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1999-05-31 06:25:19 +08:00
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if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
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(!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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{
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X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto end;
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}
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CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
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ctx->last_untrusted=1;
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}
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1999-11-17 09:20:29 +08:00
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/* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
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1999-04-13 01:23:57 +08:00
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if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
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&& (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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{
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X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto end;
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}
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1999-05-31 06:25:19 +08:00
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num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
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x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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depth=ctx->depth;
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for (;;)
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{
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/* If we have enough, we break */
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1999-05-12 06:05:39 +08:00
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if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
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1999-08-08 22:06:29 +08:00
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* note of it and, if appropriate, use the
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* X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
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* code later.
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*/
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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/* If we are self signed, we break */
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xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
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2000-09-06 01:53:58 +08:00
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if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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/* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
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if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
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{
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2000-09-06 01:53:58 +08:00
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xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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if (xtmp != NULL)
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{
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1999-05-31 06:25:19 +08:00
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if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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{
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X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto end;
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}
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CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
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1999-04-13 01:23:57 +08:00
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sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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ctx->last_untrusted++;
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x=xtmp;
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num++;
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/* reparse the full chain for
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* the next one */
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continue;
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}
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}
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break;
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}
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/* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
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* certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
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* if possible, otherwise we complain. */
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2000-09-06 01:53:58 +08:00
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/* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
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* is self signed.
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*/
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1999-05-31 06:25:19 +08:00
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i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
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x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
|
1999-11-17 09:20:29 +08:00
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xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
|
2000-09-06 01:53:58 +08:00
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if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
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1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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{
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/* we have a self signed certificate */
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1999-05-31 06:25:19 +08:00
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if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
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{
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1999-11-17 09:20:29 +08:00
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/* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
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* we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
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* match to avoid possible impersonation.
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*/
|
2000-09-06 01:53:58 +08:00
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ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
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if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
|
1999-11-17 09:20:29 +08:00
|
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{
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ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
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ctx->current_cert=x;
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ctx->error_depth=i-1;
|
2000-09-06 21:31:44 +08:00
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if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
|
1999-11-17 09:20:29 +08:00
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ok=cb(0,ctx);
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if (!ok) goto end;
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}
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else
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{
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/* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
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* so we get any trust settings.
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*/
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X509_free(x);
|
2000-09-06 01:53:58 +08:00
|
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x = xtmp;
|
1999-11-17 09:20:29 +08:00
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sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
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ctx->last_untrusted=0;
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}
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
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}
|
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else
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{
|
2000-09-06 01:53:58 +08:00
|
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/* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
|
1999-05-31 06:25:19 +08:00
|
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chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
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ctx->last_untrusted--;
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num--;
|
1999-05-31 06:25:19 +08:00
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x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
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}
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}
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|
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/* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
|
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for (;;)
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{
|
|
|
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/* If we have enough, we break */
|
1999-05-01 11:20:40 +08:00
|
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if (depth < num) break;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
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|
|
|
|
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/* If we are self signed, we break */
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xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
|
2000-09-06 01:53:58 +08:00
|
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if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
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|
2000-09-06 01:53:58 +08:00
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ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
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if (ok < 0) return ok;
|
2000-09-06 21:31:44 +08:00
|
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if (ok == 0) break;
|
2000-09-06 01:53:58 +08:00
|
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x = xtmp;
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|
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if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
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{
|
2000-09-06 01:53:58 +08:00
|
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X509_free(xtmp);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
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X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
2000-09-06 22:14:20 +08:00
|
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return 0;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
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}
|
|
|
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num++;
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|
|
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}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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/* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
|
|
|
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xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
|
2000-09-06 01:53:58 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
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/* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
|
|
|
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if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
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{
|
2000-09-06 01:53:58 +08:00
|
|
|
if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
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if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
|
|
|
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ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
|
|
|
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else
|
|
|
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ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
|
|
|
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ctx->current_cert=x;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
1999-05-31 06:25:19 +08:00
|
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sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
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|
num++;
|
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|
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ctx->last_untrusted=num;
|
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|
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ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
|
|
|
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ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
|
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|
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chain_ss=NULL;
|
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|
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}
|
|
|
|
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|
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ctx->error_depth=num-1;
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ok=cb(0,ctx);
|
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if (!ok) goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-11-24 09:31:49 +08:00
|
|
|
/* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
|
2000-09-06 21:31:44 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ctx->purpose > 0) ok = check_chain_purpose(ctx);
|
1999-11-24 09:31:49 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2000-09-06 21:31:44 +08:00
|
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|
if (!ok) goto end;
|
1999-11-24 09:31:49 +08:00
|
|
|
|
1999-11-28 03:43:10 +08:00
|
|
|
/* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-06 21:31:44 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ctx->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
|
1999-11-28 03:43:10 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2000-09-06 21:31:44 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!ok) goto end;
|
1999-11-28 03:43:10 +08:00
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
/* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
|
|
|
|
X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
|
|
|
|
|
2001-05-08 06:52:50 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
|
|
|
|
* because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
|
|
|
|
if(!ok) goto end;
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
/* At this point, we have a chain and just need to verify it */
|
2000-09-06 01:53:58 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ctx->verify != NULL)
|
|
|
|
ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
ok=internal_verify(ctx);
|
1998-12-21 19:00:56 +08:00
|
|
|
if (0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
end:
|
1998-12-21 19:00:56 +08:00
|
|
|
X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-04-13 01:23:57 +08:00
|
|
|
if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
|
2000-09-06 22:14:20 +08:00
|
|
|
return ok;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-06 01:53:58 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
X509 *issuer;
|
2000-09-06 21:31:44 +08:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
|
2000-09-06 21:24:10 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2000-09-06 01:53:58 +08:00
|
|
|
issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
|
2000-09-06 21:31:44 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
|
2000-09-06 21:24:10 +08:00
|
|
|
return issuer;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2000-09-06 01:53:58 +08:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
|
2000-09-06 21:24:10 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ret == X509_V_OK)
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2000-09-23 05:32:08 +08:00
|
|
|
/* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
|
|
|
|
if (!(ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->error = ret;
|
|
|
|
ctx->current_cert = x;
|
|
|
|
ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
|
2001-05-09 08:30:39 +08:00
|
|
|
return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
|
2000-09-06 01:53:58 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
*issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
|
2000-09-06 21:24:10 +08:00
|
|
|
if (*issuer)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2000-09-06 01:53:58 +08:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2000-09-06 21:24:10 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2000-09-06 01:53:58 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1999-11-24 09:31:49 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
|
|
|
|
* with the supplied purpose
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2001-02-20 00:06:34 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
|
1999-11-24 09:31:49 +08:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
int i, ok=0;
|
|
|
|
X509 *x;
|
|
|
|
int (*cb)();
|
2000-09-06 01:53:58 +08:00
|
|
|
cb=ctx->verify_cb;
|
1999-11-24 09:31:49 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Check all untrusted certificates */
|
2000-09-06 21:31:44 +08:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
|
2000-09-06 21:24:10 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
1999-11-24 09:31:49 +08:00
|
|
|
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
|
2000-09-06 21:24:10 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->purpose, i))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (i)
|
|
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
|
1999-11-24 09:31:49 +08:00
|
|
|
ctx->error_depth = i;
|
|
|
|
ctx->current_cert = x;
|
|
|
|
ok=cb(0,ctx);
|
2000-09-06 21:24:10 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!ok) goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-11-24 09:31:49 +08:00
|
|
|
/* Check pathlen */
|
2000-09-06 21:31:44 +08:00
|
|
|
if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
|
2000-09-06 21:24:10 +08:00
|
|
|
&& (i > (x->ex_pathlen + 1)))
|
|
|
|
{
|
1999-11-24 09:31:49 +08:00
|
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
|
|
|
|
ctx->error_depth = i;
|
|
|
|
ctx->current_cert = x;
|
|
|
|
ok=cb(0,ctx);
|
2000-09-06 21:24:10 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!ok) goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-11-24 09:31:49 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ok = 1;
|
2000-09-06 21:24:10 +08:00
|
|
|
end:
|
2000-09-06 22:14:20 +08:00
|
|
|
return ok;
|
1999-11-24 09:31:49 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-11-28 03:43:10 +08:00
|
|
|
static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2001-02-20 00:06:34 +08:00
|
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
|
1999-11-28 03:43:10 +08:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
int i, ok;
|
|
|
|
X509 *x;
|
|
|
|
int (*cb)();
|
2000-09-06 01:53:58 +08:00
|
|
|
cb=ctx->verify_cb;
|
1999-11-28 03:43:10 +08:00
|
|
|
/* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
|
|
|
|
i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
|
|
|
|
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
|
1999-11-29 09:09:25 +08:00
|
|
|
ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->trust, 0);
|
2000-09-06 21:24:10 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2001-05-08 06:52:50 +08:00
|
|
|
ctx->error_depth = i;
|
1999-11-28 03:43:10 +08:00
|
|
|
ctx->current_cert = x;
|
2000-09-06 21:24:10 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
|
|
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
|
1999-11-28 03:43:10 +08:00
|
|
|
ok = cb(0, ctx);
|
2000-09-06 22:14:20 +08:00
|
|
|
return ok;
|
1999-11-28 03:43:10 +08:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2001-05-08 06:52:50 +08:00
|
|
|
static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i, last, ok;
|
|
|
|
if (!(ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
|
|
|
|
last = 0;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
|
|
|
|
for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ctx->error_depth = i;
|
|
|
|
ok = check_cert(ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (!ok) return ok;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
|
|
|
|
X509 *x;
|
|
|
|
int ok, cnum;
|
|
|
|
cnum = ctx->error_depth;
|
|
|
|
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
|
|
|
|
ctx->current_cert = x;
|
|
|
|
/* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
|
|
|
|
ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
|
|
|
|
/* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
|
|
|
|
* notify callback
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if(!ok)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
|
2001-05-09 08:30:39 +08:00
|
|
|
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
|
2001-05-08 06:52:50 +08:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ctx->current_crl = crl;
|
|
|
|
ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
|
|
|
|
if (!ok) goto err;
|
|
|
|
ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
ctx->current_crl = NULL;
|
|
|
|
X509_CRL_free(crl);
|
|
|
|
return ok;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Retrieve CRL corresponding to certificate: currently just a
|
|
|
|
* subject lookup: maybe use AKID later...
|
|
|
|
* Also might look up any included CRLs too (e.g PKCS#7 signedData).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **crl, X509 *x)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ok;
|
|
|
|
X509_OBJECT xobj;
|
|
|
|
ok = X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_CRL, X509_get_issuer_name(x), &xobj);
|
|
|
|
if (!ok) return 0;
|
|
|
|
*crl = xobj.data.crl;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Check CRL validity */
|
|
|
|
static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
X509 *issuer = NULL;
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
|
|
|
|
int ok = 0, chnum, cnum, i;
|
|
|
|
time_t *ptime;
|
|
|
|
cnum = ctx->error_depth;
|
|
|
|
chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
|
|
|
|
/* Find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
|
|
|
|
* is next certificate in chain.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if(cnum < chnum)
|
|
|
|
issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
|
|
|
|
/* If not self signed, can't check signature */
|
|
|
|
if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
|
2001-05-09 08:30:39 +08:00
|
|
|
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
|
2001-05-08 06:52:50 +08:00
|
|
|
if(!ok) goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(issuer)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
|
|
|
|
ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(!ikey)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
|
2001-05-09 08:30:39 +08:00
|
|
|
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
|
2001-05-08 06:52:50 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!ok) goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Verify CRL signature */
|
|
|
|
if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
|
2001-05-09 08:30:39 +08:00
|
|
|
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
|
2001-05-08 06:52:50 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!ok) goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* OK, CRL signature valid check times */
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
|
|
|
|
ptime = &ctx->check_time;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
ptime = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
|
|
|
|
if (i == 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
|
2001-05-09 08:30:39 +08:00
|
|
|
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
|
2001-05-08 06:52:50 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!ok) goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (i > 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
|
2001-05-09 08:30:39 +08:00
|
|
|
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
|
2001-05-08 06:52:50 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!ok) goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (i == 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
|
2001-05-09 08:30:39 +08:00
|
|
|
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
|
2001-05-08 06:52:50 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!ok) goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
|
2001-05-09 08:30:39 +08:00
|
|
|
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
|
2001-05-08 06:52:50 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!ok) goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ok = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
|
|
|
|
return ok;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Check certificate against CRL */
|
|
|
|
static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int idx, ok;
|
|
|
|
X509_REVOKED rtmp;
|
|
|
|
/* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL */
|
|
|
|
rtmp.serialNumber = X509_get_serialNumber(x);
|
|
|
|
idx = sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl->revoked, &rtmp);
|
|
|
|
/* Not found: OK */
|
|
|
|
if(idx == -1) return 1;
|
|
|
|
/* Otherwise revoked: want something cleverer than
|
|
|
|
* this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
|
2001-05-09 08:30:39 +08:00
|
|
|
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
|
2001-05-08 06:52:50 +08:00
|
|
|
return ok;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-20 05:31:43 +08:00
|
|
|
static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i,ok=0,n;
|
|
|
|
X509 *xs,*xi;
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
|
2000-09-06 06:30:38 +08:00
|
|
|
time_t *ptime;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
int (*cb)();
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-06 01:53:58 +08:00
|
|
|
cb=ctx->verify_cb;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
1999-05-31 06:25:19 +08:00
|
|
|
n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
ctx->error_depth=n-1;
|
|
|
|
n--;
|
1999-05-31 06:25:19 +08:00
|
|
|
xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
|
2000-09-06 21:24:10 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
|
|
|
|
ptime = &ctx->check_time;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
ptime = NULL;
|
2000-09-06 06:30:38 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
xs=xi;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (n <= 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
|
|
|
|
ctx->current_cert=xi;
|
|
|
|
ok=cb(0,ctx);
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
n--;
|
|
|
|
ctx->error_depth=n;
|
1999-05-31 06:25:19 +08:00
|
|
|
xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* ctx->error=0; not needed */
|
|
|
|
while (n >= 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ctx->error_depth=n;
|
|
|
|
if (!xs->valid)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
|
|
|
|
ctx->current_cert=xi;
|
|
|
|
ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (!ok) goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
|
2001-01-28 22:38:11 +08:00
|
|
|
/* XXX For the final trusted self-signed cert,
|
|
|
|
* this is a waste of time. That check should
|
|
|
|
* optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be
|
|
|
|
* used to detect invalid self-signatures, but
|
|
|
|
* we don't verify again and again in SSL
|
|
|
|
* handshakes and the like once the cert has
|
|
|
|
* been declared trusted. */
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
|
|
|
|
ctx->current_cert=xs;
|
|
|
|
ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
|
2000-03-02 08:37:53 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!ok)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
1999-01-03 09:08:33 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
pkey=NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-06 06:30:38 +08:00
|
|
|
i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(xs), ptime);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
if (i == 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
|
|
|
|
ctx->current_cert=xs;
|
|
|
|
ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (!ok) goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (i > 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
|
|
|
|
ctx->current_cert=xs;
|
|
|
|
ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (!ok) goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
xs->valid=1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-06 06:30:38 +08:00
|
|
|
i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(xs), ptime);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
if (i == 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
|
|
|
|
ctx->current_cert=xs;
|
|
|
|
ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (!ok) goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
|
|
|
|
ctx->current_cert=xs;
|
|
|
|
ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (!ok) goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* CRL CHECK */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
|
|
|
|
ctx->current_cert=xs;
|
|
|
|
ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (!ok) goto end;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
n--;
|
|
|
|
if (n >= 0)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
xi=xs;
|
1999-05-31 06:25:19 +08:00
|
|
|
xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ok=1;
|
|
|
|
end:
|
2000-09-06 22:14:20 +08:00
|
|
|
return ok;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2000-07-26 09:18:37 +08:00
|
|
|
int X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm)
|
2000-09-06 06:30:38 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int X509_cmp_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char *str;
|
2000-07-26 09:18:37 +08:00
|
|
|
ASN1_TIME atm;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
time_t offset;
|
|
|
|
char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
|
|
|
|
int i,j;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
p=buff1;
|
|
|
|
i=ctm->length;
|
|
|
|
str=(char *)ctm->data;
|
2000-09-06 21:24:10 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2000-09-06 22:14:20 +08:00
|
|
|
if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
|
2000-07-26 09:18:37 +08:00
|
|
|
memcpy(p,str,10);
|
|
|
|
p+=10;
|
|
|
|
str+=10;
|
2000-09-06 21:24:10 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (i < 13) return 0;
|
2000-07-26 09:18:37 +08:00
|
|
|
memcpy(p,str,12);
|
|
|
|
p+=12;
|
|
|
|
str+=12;
|
2000-09-06 21:24:10 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
|
|
|
|
{ *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
|
2000-07-26 09:18:37 +08:00
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
*(p++)= *(str++);
|
|
|
|
*(p++)= *(str++);
|
|
|
|
/* Skip any fractional seconds... */
|
2000-09-06 21:24:10 +08:00
|
|
|
if (*str == '.')
|
2000-07-26 09:18:37 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
str++;
|
2000-09-06 21:31:44 +08:00
|
|
|
while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
|
2000-07-26 09:18:37 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2000-09-06 21:24:10 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
*(p++)='Z';
|
|
|
|
*(p++)='\0';
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (*str == 'Z')
|
|
|
|
offset=0;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if ((*str != '+') && (str[5] != '-'))
|
2000-09-06 22:14:20 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
|
|
|
|
offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
|
|
|
|
if (*str == '-')
|
1998-12-21 19:00:56 +08:00
|
|
|
offset= -offset;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2000-07-26 09:18:37 +08:00
|
|
|
atm.type=ctm->type;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
|
|
|
|
atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-06 06:30:38 +08:00
|
|
|
X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2000-09-06 21:31:44 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
|
2000-07-26 09:18:37 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
|
|
|
|
if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
|
|
|
|
j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
|
|
|
|
if (j < 50) j+=100;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2000-09-06 22:14:20 +08:00
|
|
|
if (i < j) return -1;
|
|
|
|
if (i > j) return 1;
|
2000-07-26 09:18:37 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
|
|
|
|
if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
|
2000-09-06 22:14:20 +08:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
else
|
2000-09-06 22:14:20 +08:00
|
|
|
return i;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2000-07-26 09:18:37 +08:00
|
|
|
ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
|
2000-09-06 06:30:38 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *in_tm)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
time_t t;
|
2001-01-20 21:38:45 +08:00
|
|
|
int type = -1;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2000-09-06 21:31:44 +08:00
|
|
|
if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
|
2000-09-06 06:30:38 +08:00
|
|
|
else time(&t);
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
t+=adj;
|
2001-01-20 21:38:45 +08:00
|
|
|
if (s) type = s->type;
|
|
|
|
if (type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t);
|
|
|
|
if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s, t);
|
|
|
|
return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-05-31 06:25:19 +08:00
|
|
|
int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
|
|
|
|
int i,j;
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-06 22:14:20 +08:00
|
|
|
if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
|
1999-05-31 06:25:19 +08:00
|
|
|
for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
1999-05-31 06:25:19 +08:00
|
|
|
ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ktmp == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
|
2000-09-06 22:14:20 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
{
|
1999-01-03 09:08:33 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
ktmp=NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ktmp == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
|
2000-09-06 22:14:20 +08:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* first, populate the other certs */
|
|
|
|
for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
|
|
|
|
{
|
1999-05-31 06:25:19 +08:00
|
|
|
ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
|
1999-01-03 09:08:33 +08:00
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-01-03 09:08:33 +08:00
|
|
|
if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
|
2000-09-06 22:14:20 +08:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
1998-12-21 18:52:47 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2000-01-24 07:41:49 +08:00
|
|
|
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
|
2000-12-16 00:40:35 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* This function is (usually) called only once, by
|
2001-09-02 04:02:13 +08:00
|
|
|
* SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
|
|
|
|
return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
|
|
|
|
new_func, dup_func, free_func);
|
2000-12-16 00:40:35 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
|
1999-04-20 05:31:43 +08:00
|
|
|
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2000-09-06 22:14:20 +08:00
|
|
|
return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-20 05:31:43 +08:00
|
|
|
void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2000-09-06 22:14:20 +08:00
|
|
|
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-20 05:31:43 +08:00
|
|
|
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2000-09-06 22:14:20 +08:00
|
|
|
return ctx->error;
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-20 05:31:43 +08:00
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ctx->error=err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-20 05:31:43 +08:00
|
|
|
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2000-09-06 22:14:20 +08:00
|
|
|
return ctx->error_depth;
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-20 05:31:43 +08:00
|
|
|
X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2000-09-06 22:14:20 +08:00
|
|
|
return ctx->current_cert;
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-05-31 06:25:19 +08:00
|
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2000-09-06 22:14:20 +08:00
|
|
|
return ctx->chain;
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2000-02-26 09:55:33 +08:00
|
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
2000-01-09 22:21:40 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
X509 *x;
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
|
2000-09-06 21:31:44 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
|
2000-09-06 21:24:10 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2000-01-09 22:21:40 +08:00
|
|
|
x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
|
2000-09-06 21:24:10 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2000-09-06 22:14:20 +08:00
|
|
|
return chain;
|
2000-01-09 22:21:40 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-20 05:31:43 +08:00
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ctx->cert=x;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-20 05:31:43 +08:00
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
|
1998-12-21 18:56:39 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ctx->untrusted=sk;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-11-29 09:09:25 +08:00
|
|
|
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
|
1999-11-24 09:31:49 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
1999-11-29 09:09:25 +08:00
|
|
|
return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
|
1999-11-24 09:31:49 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-11-30 06:35:00 +08:00
|
|
|
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
|
1999-11-24 09:31:49 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
1999-11-30 06:35:00 +08:00
|
|
|
return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
|
1999-11-24 09:31:49 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-11-29 09:09:25 +08:00
|
|
|
/* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
|
|
|
|
* values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
|
|
|
|
* own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
|
|
|
|
* the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
|
|
|
|
* purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
|
|
|
|
* An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
|
|
|
|
* purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
|
|
|
|
* aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
|
|
|
|
int purpose, int trust)
|
1999-11-28 03:43:10 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int idx;
|
1999-11-29 09:09:25 +08:00
|
|
|
/* If purpose not set use default */
|
2000-09-06 21:24:10 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
|
1999-11-29 09:09:25 +08:00
|
|
|
/* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
|
2000-09-06 21:24:10 +08:00
|
|
|
if (purpose)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2000-03-07 22:04:29 +08:00
|
|
|
X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
|
1999-11-29 09:09:25 +08:00
|
|
|
idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
|
2000-09-06 21:31:44 +08:00
|
|
|
if (idx == -1)
|
2000-09-06 21:24:10 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
1999-11-29 09:09:25 +08:00
|
|
|
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
|
|
|
|
X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2000-09-06 21:24:10 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2000-03-07 22:04:29 +08:00
|
|
|
ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
|
2000-09-06 21:31:44 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
|
2000-09-06 21:24:10 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2000-03-07 22:04:29 +08:00
|
|
|
idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
|
2000-09-06 21:31:44 +08:00
|
|
|
if (idx == -1)
|
2000-09-06 21:24:10 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
2000-03-07 22:04:29 +08:00
|
|
|
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
|
|
|
|
X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2000-09-06 21:24:10 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2000-02-26 16:36:46 +08:00
|
|
|
ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
|
2000-09-06 21:24:10 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2000-03-07 22:04:29 +08:00
|
|
|
/* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
|
2000-09-06 21:31:44 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
|
2000-09-06 21:24:10 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
2000-09-06 21:31:44 +08:00
|
|
|
if (trust)
|
2000-09-06 21:24:10 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
1999-11-29 09:09:25 +08:00
|
|
|
idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
|
2000-09-06 21:31:44 +08:00
|
|
|
if (idx == -1)
|
2000-09-06 21:24:10 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
1999-11-29 09:09:25 +08:00
|
|
|
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
|
|
|
|
X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2000-09-06 21:24:10 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
1999-11-29 09:09:25 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2001-05-09 08:30:39 +08:00
|
|
|
if (purpose && !ctx->purpose) ctx->purpose = purpose;
|
|
|
|
if (trust && !ctx->trust) ctx->trust = trust;
|
1999-11-28 03:43:10 +08:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2000-09-06 01:53:58 +08:00
|
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
|
|
|
|
ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
|
2001-09-02 04:02:13 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!ctx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
|
2000-09-06 01:53:58 +08:00
|
|
|
return ctx;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2001-09-02 04:02:13 +08:00
|
|
|
int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
|
2000-09-06 01:53:58 +08:00
|
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ctx->ctx=store;
|
|
|
|
ctx->current_method=0;
|
|
|
|
ctx->cert=x509;
|
|
|
|
ctx->untrusted=chain;
|
|
|
|
ctx->last_untrusted=0;
|
2001-05-09 08:30:39 +08:00
|
|
|
ctx->purpose=store->purpose;
|
|
|
|
ctx->trust=store->trust;
|
2000-09-06 21:24:10 +08:00
|
|
|
ctx->check_time=0;
|
|
|
|
ctx->flags=0;
|
|
|
|
ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
|
2000-09-06 01:53:58 +08:00
|
|
|
ctx->valid=0;
|
|
|
|
ctx->chain=NULL;
|
|
|
|
ctx->depth=9;
|
|
|
|
ctx->error=0;
|
2000-09-06 21:24:10 +08:00
|
|
|
ctx->error_depth=0;
|
2000-09-06 01:53:58 +08:00
|
|
|
ctx->current_cert=NULL;
|
|
|
|
ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
|
2001-05-09 08:30:39 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
|
|
|
|
* use defaults.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->flags = store->flags;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (store->check_issued)
|
|
|
|
ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (store->get_issuer)
|
|
|
|
ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (store->verify_cb)
|
|
|
|
ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (store->verify)
|
|
|
|
ctx->verify = store->verify;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
ctx->verify = internal_verify;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (store->check_revocation)
|
|
|
|
ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (store->get_crl)
|
|
|
|
ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
ctx->get_crl = get_crl;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (store->check_crl)
|
|
|
|
ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (store->cert_crl)
|
|
|
|
ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
|
|
|
|
|
2001-09-02 04:02:13 +08:00
|
|
|
/* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
|
|
|
|
* X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
|
|
|
|
* corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
|
|
|
|
/* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
|
|
|
|
if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
|
|
|
|
&(ctx->ex_data)))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
|
|
|
|
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2000-09-06 01:53:58 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
|
|
|
|
* This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ctx->other_ctx = sk;
|
|
|
|
ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2000-09-06 21:31:44 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
|
2000-09-06 01:53:58 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ctx->chain != NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
|
|
|
|
ctx->chain=NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2001-09-02 04:02:13 +08:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
|
2000-09-06 01:53:58 +08:00
|
|
|
memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-11-29 09:09:25 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2000-09-06 06:30:38 +08:00
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, long flags)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2000-09-06 22:14:20 +08:00
|
|
|
ctx->flags |= flags;
|
2000-09-06 06:30:38 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, long flags, time_t t)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2000-09-06 22:14:20 +08:00
|
|
|
ctx->check_time = t;
|
|
|
|
ctx->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME;
|
2000-09-06 06:30:38 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2001-07-30 19:50:37 +08:00
|
|
|
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
|
|
|
|
int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
1999-04-13 01:23:57 +08:00
|
|
|
IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
|
|
|
|
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
|
1999-05-02 02:08:44 +08:00
|
|
|
|
1999-04-13 01:23:57 +08:00
|
|
|
IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
|
1999-05-02 02:08:44 +08:00
|
|
|
|
1999-04-20 09:10:33 +08:00
|
|
|
IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
|
1999-05-02 02:08:44 +08:00
|
|
|
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
|