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Linux and works. So that is at least a good sign. =) 20010122 - (bal) OpenBSD Resync - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 12:45:26 GMT 2001 by markus [servconf.c ssh.h sshd.c] only auth-chall.c needs #ifdef SKEY - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 15:55:10 GMT 2001 by markus [auth-krb4.c auth-options.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth1.c auth2.c channels.c clientloop.c dh.c dispatch.c nchan.c packet.c pathname.h readconf.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c session.c ssh-add.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c ssh.h ssh1.h sshconnect1.c sshd.c ttymodes.c] move ssh1 definitions to ssh1.h, pathnames to pathnames.h - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 16:48:14 [sshd.8] fix typo; from stevesk@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 16:50:58 [ssh-dss.c] clear and free digest, make consistent with other code (use dlen); from stevesk@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 15:55:20 GMT 2001 by markus [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rsa.c auth2.c] pass the filename to auth_parse_options() - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 17:59:40 GMT 2001 [readconf.c] fix SIGSEGV from -o ""; problem noted by jehsom@togetherweb.com - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 18:20:29 [sshconnect2.c] dh_new_group() does not return NULL. ok markus@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 21:33:42 [ssh-add.c] do not loop forever if askpass does not exist; from andrew@pimlott.ne.mediaone.net - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 23:00:56 [servconf.c] Check for NULL return from strdelim; ok markus - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 23:02:07 [readconf.c] KNF; ok markus - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/21 9:00:33 [ssh-keygen.1] remove -R flag; ok markus@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/21 19:05:40 [atomicio.c automicio.h auth-chall.c auth-krb4.c auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c bufaux.h buffer.c canahost.c canahost.h channels.c cipher.c cli.c clientloop.c clientloop.h compat.c compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c groupaccess.c hmac.c hostfile.c kex.c key.c key.h log-client.c log-server.c log.c log.h login.c login.h match.c misc.c misc.h nchan.c packet.c pty.c radix.h readconf.c readpass.c readpass.h rsa.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c serverloop.h session.c sftp-server.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c tildexpand.c tildexpand.h ttysmodes.c uidswap.c xmalloc.c] split ssh.h and try to cleanup the #include mess. remove unnecessary #includes. rename util.[ch] -> misc.[ch] - (bal) renamed 'PIDDIR' to '_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR' to match OpenBSD tree - (bal) Moved #ifdef KRB4 in auth-krb4.c above the #include to resolve conflict when compiling for non-kerb install - (bal) removed the #ifdef SKEY in auth1.c to match Markus' changes on 1/19.
300 lines
8.1 KiB
C
300 lines
8.1 KiB
C
/*
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* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
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* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
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* All rights reserved
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* RSA-based authentication. This code determines whether to admit a login
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* based on RSA authentication. This file also contains functions to check
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* validity of the host key.
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*
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* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
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* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
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* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
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* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
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* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
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*/
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#include "includes.h"
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RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.38 2001/01/21 19:05:42 markus Exp $");
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#include <openssl/rsa.h>
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#include <openssl/md5.h>
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#include "rsa.h"
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#include "packet.h"
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#include "xmalloc.h"
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#include "ssh1.h"
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#include "mpaux.h"
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#include "uidswap.h"
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#include "match.h"
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#include "auth-options.h"
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#include "pathnames.h"
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#include "log.h"
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#include "servconf.h"
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#include "auth.h"
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/* import */
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extern ServerOptions options;
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/*
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* Session identifier that is used to bind key exchange and authentication
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* responses to a particular session.
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*/
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extern u_char session_id[16];
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/*
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* The .ssh/authorized_keys file contains public keys, one per line, in the
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* following format:
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* options bits e n comment
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* where bits, e and n are decimal numbers,
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* and comment is any string of characters up to newline. The maximum
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* length of a line is 8000 characters. See the documentation for a
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* description of the options.
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*/
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/*
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* Performs the RSA authentication challenge-response dialog with the client,
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* and returns true (non-zero) if the client gave the correct answer to
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* our challenge; returns zero if the client gives a wrong answer.
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*/
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int
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auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(RSA *pk)
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{
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BIGNUM *challenge, *encrypted_challenge;
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BN_CTX *ctx;
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u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16], response[16];
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MD5_CTX md;
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u_int i;
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int plen, len;
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encrypted_challenge = BN_new();
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challenge = BN_new();
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/* Generate a random challenge. */
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BN_rand(challenge, 256, 0, 0);
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ctx = BN_CTX_new();
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BN_mod(challenge, challenge, pk->n, ctx);
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BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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/* Encrypt the challenge with the public key. */
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rsa_public_encrypt(encrypted_challenge, challenge, pk);
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/* Send the encrypted challenge to the client. */
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packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE);
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packet_put_bignum(encrypted_challenge);
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packet_send();
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BN_clear_free(encrypted_challenge);
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packet_write_wait();
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/* Wait for a response. */
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packet_read_expect(&plen, SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
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packet_integrity_check(plen, 16, SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
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for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
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response[i] = packet_get_char();
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/* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */
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len = BN_num_bytes(challenge);
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if (len <= 0 || len > 32)
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fatal("auth_rsa_challenge_dialog: bad challenge length %d", len);
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memset(buf, 0, 32);
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BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 32 - len);
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MD5_Init(&md);
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MD5_Update(&md, buf, 32);
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MD5_Update(&md, session_id, 16);
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MD5_Final(mdbuf, &md);
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BN_clear_free(challenge);
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/* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */
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if (memcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) {
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/* Wrong answer. */
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return 0;
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}
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/* Correct answer. */
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return 1;
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}
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/*
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* Performs the RSA authentication dialog with the client. This returns
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* 0 if the client could not be authenticated, and 1 if authentication was
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* successful. This may exit if there is a serious protocol violation.
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*/
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int
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auth_rsa(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n)
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{
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char line[8192], file[MAXPATHLEN];
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int authenticated;
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u_int bits;
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FILE *f;
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u_long linenum = 0;
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struct stat st;
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RSA *pk;
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/* no user given */
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if (pw == NULL)
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return 0;
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/* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
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temporarily_use_uid(pw->pw_uid);
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/* The authorized keys. */
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snprintf(file, sizeof file, "%.500s/%.100s", pw->pw_dir,
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_PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS);
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/* Fail quietly if file does not exist */
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if (stat(file, &st) < 0) {
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/* Restore the privileged uid. */
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restore_uid();
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return 0;
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}
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/* Open the file containing the authorized keys. */
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f = fopen(file, "r");
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if (!f) {
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/* Restore the privileged uid. */
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restore_uid();
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packet_send_debug("Could not open %.900s for reading.", file);
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packet_send_debug("If your home is on an NFS volume, it may need to be world-readable.");
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return 0;
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}
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if (options.strict_modes) {
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int fail = 0;
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char buf[1024];
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/* Check open file in order to avoid open/stat races */
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if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0 ||
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(st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
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(st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
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snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "RSA authentication refused for %.100s: "
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"bad ownership or modes for '%s'.", pw->pw_name, file);
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fail = 1;
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} else {
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/* Check path to _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS */
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int i;
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static const char *check[] = {
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"", _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR, NULL
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};
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for (i = 0; check[i]; i++) {
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snprintf(line, sizeof line, "%.500s/%.100s", pw->pw_dir, check[i]);
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if (stat(line, &st) < 0 ||
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(st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
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(st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
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snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "RSA authentication refused for %.100s: "
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"bad ownership or modes for '%s'.", pw->pw_name, line);
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fail = 1;
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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if (fail) {
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fclose(f);
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log("%s",buf);
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packet_send_debug("%s",buf);
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restore_uid();
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return 0;
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}
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}
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/* Flag indicating whether authentication has succeeded. */
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authenticated = 0;
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pk = RSA_new();
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pk->e = BN_new();
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pk->n = BN_new();
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/*
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* Go though the accepted keys, looking for the current key. If
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* found, perform a challenge-response dialog to verify that the
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* user really has the corresponding private key.
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*/
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while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) {
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char *cp;
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char *options;
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linenum++;
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/* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
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for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
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;
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if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
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continue;
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/*
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* Check if there are options for this key, and if so,
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* save their starting address and skip the option part
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* for now. If there are no options, set the starting
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* address to NULL.
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*/
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if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '9') {
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int quoted = 0;
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options = cp;
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for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
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if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
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cp++; /* Skip both */
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else if (*cp == '"')
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quoted = !quoted;
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}
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} else
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options = NULL;
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/* Parse the key from the line. */
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if (!auth_rsa_read_key(&cp, &bits, pk->e, pk->n)) {
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debug("%.100s, line %lu: bad key syntax",
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file, linenum);
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packet_send_debug("%.100s, line %lu: bad key syntax",
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file, linenum);
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continue;
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}
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/* cp now points to the comment part. */
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/* Check if the we have found the desired key (identified by its modulus). */
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if (BN_cmp(pk->n, client_n) != 0)
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continue;
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/* check the real bits */
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if (bits != BN_num_bits(pk->n))
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log("Warning: %s, line %ld: keysize mismatch: "
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"actual %d vs. announced %d.",
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file, linenum, BN_num_bits(pk->n), bits);
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/* We have found the desired key. */
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/*
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* If our options do not allow this key to be used,
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* do not send challenge.
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*/
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if (!auth_parse_options(pw, options, file, linenum))
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continue;
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/* Perform the challenge-response dialog for this key. */
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if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(pk)) {
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/* Wrong response. */
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verbose("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge.");
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packet_send_debug("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge.");
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continue;
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}
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/*
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* Correct response. The client has been successfully
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* authenticated. Note that we have not yet processed the
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* options; this will be reset if the options cause the
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* authentication to be rejected.
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* Break out of the loop if authentication was successful;
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* otherwise continue searching.
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*/
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authenticated = 1;
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break;
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}
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/* Restore the privileged uid. */
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restore_uid();
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/* Close the file. */
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fclose(f);
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RSA_free(pk);
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if (authenticated)
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packet_send_debug("RSA authentication accepted.");
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else
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auth_clear_options();
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/* Return authentication result. */
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return authenticated;
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}
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