openssh/auth-rsa.c
Damien Miller b0fb6872ed - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/19 18:51:18
[atomicio.c auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c auth-options.c]
     [auth-pam.c auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c]
     [auth-shadow.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth1.c auth2-chall.c]
     [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c]
     [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c buffer.c]
     [canohost.c channels.c cipher-3des1.c cipher-acss.c cipher-aes.c]
     [cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c]
     [compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c dns.c entropy.c fatal.c]
     [groupaccess.c hostfile.c includes.h kex.c kexdh.c kexdhc.c]
     [kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c log.c loginrec.c]
     [loginrec.h logintest.c mac.c match.c md-sha256.c md5crypt.c misc.c]
     [monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_wrap.c msg.c]
     [nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c readpass.c rsa.c]
     [scard.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c session.c sftp-client.c]
     [sftp-common.c sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c]
     [ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c]
     [ssh-rand-helper.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c]
     [sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshlogin.c sshpty.c sshtty.c ttymodes.c]
     [uidswap.c uuencode.c xmalloc.c openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c]
     [openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c]
     [openbsd-compat/bsd-getpeereid.c openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c]
     [openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.c openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c]
     [openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.c openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.c]
     RCSID() can die
2006-03-26 00:03:21 +11:00

331 lines
8.4 KiB
C

/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* RSA-based authentication. This code determines whether to admit a login
* based on RSA authentication. This file also contains functions to check
* validity of the host key.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#include "rsa.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh1.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "misc.h"
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
/*
* Session identifier that is used to bind key exchange and authentication
* responses to a particular session.
*/
extern u_char session_id[16];
/*
* The .ssh/authorized_keys file contains public keys, one per line, in the
* following format:
* options bits e n comment
* where bits, e and n are decimal numbers,
* and comment is any string of characters up to newline. The maximum
* length of a line is SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES characters. See sshd(8) for a
* description of the options.
*/
BIGNUM *
auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *key)
{
BIGNUM *challenge;
BN_CTX *ctx;
if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_new() failed");
/* Generate a random challenge. */
BN_rand(challenge, 256, 0, 0);
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_CTX_new() failed");
BN_mod(challenge, challenge, key->rsa->n, ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return challenge;
}
int
auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16])
{
u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16];
MD5_CTX md;
int len;
/* don't allow short keys */
if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {
error("auth_rsa_verify_response: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits",
BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE);
return (0);
}
/* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */
len = BN_num_bytes(challenge);
if (len <= 0 || len > 32)
fatal("auth_rsa_verify_response: bad challenge length %d", len);
memset(buf, 0, 32);
BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 32 - len);
MD5_Init(&md);
MD5_Update(&md, buf, 32);
MD5_Update(&md, session_id, 16);
MD5_Final(mdbuf, &md);
/* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */
if (memcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) {
/* Wrong answer. */
return (0);
}
/* Correct answer. */
return (1);
}
/*
* Performs the RSA authentication challenge-response dialog with the client,
* and returns true (non-zero) if the client gave the correct answer to
* our challenge; returns zero if the client gives a wrong answer.
*/
int
auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(Key *key)
{
BIGNUM *challenge, *encrypted_challenge;
u_char response[16];
int i, success;
if ((encrypted_challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("auth_rsa_challenge_dialog: BN_new() failed");
challenge = PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key));
/* Encrypt the challenge with the public key. */
rsa_public_encrypt(encrypted_challenge, challenge, key->rsa);
/* Send the encrypted challenge to the client. */
packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE);
packet_put_bignum(encrypted_challenge);
packet_send();
BN_clear_free(encrypted_challenge);
packet_write_wait();
/* Wait for a response. */
packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE);
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
response[i] = packet_get_char();
packet_check_eom();
success = PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_verify_response(key, challenge, response));
BN_clear_free(challenge);
return (success);
}
/*
* check if there's user key matching client_n,
* return key if login is allowed, NULL otherwise
*/
int
auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
{
char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES], *file;
int allowed = 0;
u_int bits;
FILE *f;
u_long linenum = 0;
struct stat st;
Key *key;
/* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
/* The authorized keys. */
file = authorized_keys_file(pw);
debug("trying public RSA key file %s", file);
/* Fail quietly if file does not exist */
if (stat(file, &st) < 0) {
/* Restore the privileged uid. */
restore_uid();
xfree(file);
return (0);
}
/* Open the file containing the authorized keys. */
f = fopen(file, "r");
if (!f) {
/* Restore the privileged uid. */
restore_uid();
xfree(file);
return (0);
}
if (options.strict_modes &&
secure_filename(f, file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) {
xfree(file);
fclose(f);
logit("Authentication refused: %s", line);
restore_uid();
return (0);
}
/* Flag indicating whether the key is allowed. */
allowed = 0;
key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
/*
* Go though the accepted keys, looking for the current key. If
* found, perform a challenge-response dialog to verify that the
* user really has the corresponding private key.
*/
while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
char *cp;
char *key_options;
int keybits;
/* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
;
if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
continue;
/*
* Check if there are options for this key, and if so,
* save their starting address and skip the option part
* for now. If there are no options, set the starting
* address to NULL.
*/
if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '9') {
int quoted = 0;
key_options = cp;
for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
cp++; /* Skip both */
else if (*cp == '"')
quoted = !quoted;
}
} else
key_options = NULL;
/* Parse the key from the line. */
if (hostfile_read_key(&cp, &bits, key) == 0) {
debug("%.100s, line %lu: non ssh1 key syntax",
file, linenum);
continue;
}
/* cp now points to the comment part. */
/* Check if the we have found the desired key (identified by its modulus). */
if (BN_cmp(key->rsa->n, client_n) != 0)
continue;
/* check the real bits */
keybits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n);
if (keybits < 0 || bits != (u_int)keybits)
logit("Warning: %s, line %lu: keysize mismatch: "
"actual %d vs. announced %d.",
file, linenum, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
/* We have found the desired key. */
/*
* If our options do not allow this key to be used,
* do not send challenge.
*/
if (!auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file, linenum))
continue;
/* break out, this key is allowed */
allowed = 1;
break;
}
/* Restore the privileged uid. */
restore_uid();
/* Close the file. */
xfree(file);
fclose(f);
/* return key if allowed */
if (allowed && rkey != NULL)
*rkey = key;
else
key_free(key);
return (allowed);
}
/*
* Performs the RSA authentication dialog with the client. This returns
* 0 if the client could not be authenticated, and 1 if authentication was
* successful. This may exit if there is a serious protocol violation.
*/
int
auth_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, BIGNUM *client_n)
{
Key *key;
char *fp;
struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
/* no user given */
if (!authctxt->valid)
return 0;
if (!PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_key_allowed(pw, client_n, &key))) {
auth_clear_options();
return (0);
}
/* Perform the challenge-response dialog for this key. */
if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(key)) {
/* Wrong response. */
verbose("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge.");
packet_send_debug("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge.");
/*
* Break out of the loop. Otherwise we might send
* another challenge and break the protocol.
*/
key_free(key);
return (0);
}
/*
* Correct response. The client has been successfully
* authenticated. Note that we have not yet processed the
* options; this will be reset if the options cause the
* authentication to be rejected.
*/
fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
verbose("Found matching %s key: %s",
key_type(key), fp);
xfree(fp);
key_free(key);
packet_send_debug("RSA authentication accepted.");
return (1);
}