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226cfa0378
Linux and works. So that is at least a good sign. =) 20010122 - (bal) OpenBSD Resync - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 12:45:26 GMT 2001 by markus [servconf.c ssh.h sshd.c] only auth-chall.c needs #ifdef SKEY - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 15:55:10 GMT 2001 by markus [auth-krb4.c auth-options.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth1.c auth2.c channels.c clientloop.c dh.c dispatch.c nchan.c packet.c pathname.h readconf.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c session.c ssh-add.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c ssh.h ssh1.h sshconnect1.c sshd.c ttymodes.c] move ssh1 definitions to ssh1.h, pathnames to pathnames.h - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 16:48:14 [sshd.8] fix typo; from stevesk@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 16:50:58 [ssh-dss.c] clear and free digest, make consistent with other code (use dlen); from stevesk@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 15:55:20 GMT 2001 by markus [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rsa.c auth2.c] pass the filename to auth_parse_options() - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 17:59:40 GMT 2001 [readconf.c] fix SIGSEGV from -o ""; problem noted by jehsom@togetherweb.com - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 18:20:29 [sshconnect2.c] dh_new_group() does not return NULL. ok markus@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 21:33:42 [ssh-add.c] do not loop forever if askpass does not exist; from andrew@pimlott.ne.mediaone.net - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 23:00:56 [servconf.c] Check for NULL return from strdelim; ok markus - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 23:02:07 [readconf.c] KNF; ok markus - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/21 9:00:33 [ssh-keygen.1] remove -R flag; ok markus@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/21 19:05:40 [atomicio.c automicio.h auth-chall.c auth-krb4.c auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c bufaux.h buffer.c canahost.c canahost.h channels.c cipher.c cli.c clientloop.c clientloop.h compat.c compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c groupaccess.c hmac.c hostfile.c kex.c key.c key.h log-client.c log-server.c log.c log.h login.c login.h match.c misc.c misc.h nchan.c packet.c pty.c radix.h readconf.c readpass.c readpass.h rsa.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c serverloop.h session.c sftp-server.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c tildexpand.c tildexpand.h ttysmodes.c uidswap.c xmalloc.c] split ssh.h and try to cleanup the #include mess. remove unnecessary #includes. rename util.[ch] -> misc.[ch] - (bal) renamed 'PIDDIR' to '_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR' to match OpenBSD tree - (bal) Moved #ifdef KRB4 in auth-krb4.c above the #include to resolve conflict when compiling for non-kerb install - (bal) removed the #ifdef SKEY in auth1.c to match Markus' changes on 1/19.
140 lines
3.5 KiB
C
140 lines
3.5 KiB
C
/*
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* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
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* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
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* All rights reserved
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* Simple pattern matching, with '*' and '?' as wildcards.
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*
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* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
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* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
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* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
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* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
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* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
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*/
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#include "includes.h"
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RCSID("$OpenBSD: match.c,v 1.11 2001/01/21 19:05:52 markus Exp $");
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#include "match.h"
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/*
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* Returns true if the given string matches the pattern (which may contain ?
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* and * as wildcards), and zero if it does not match.
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*/
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int
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match_pattern(const char *s, const char *pattern)
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{
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for (;;) {
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/* If at end of pattern, accept if also at end of string. */
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if (!*pattern)
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return !*s;
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if (*pattern == '*') {
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/* Skip the asterisk. */
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pattern++;
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/* If at end of pattern, accept immediately. */
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if (!*pattern)
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return 1;
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/* If next character in pattern is known, optimize. */
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if (*pattern != '?' && *pattern != '*') {
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/*
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* Look instances of the next character in
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* pattern, and try to match starting from
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* those.
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*/
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for (; *s; s++)
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if (*s == *pattern &&
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match_pattern(s + 1, pattern + 1))
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return 1;
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/* Failed. */
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Move ahead one character at a time and try to
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* match at each position.
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*/
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for (; *s; s++)
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if (match_pattern(s, pattern))
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return 1;
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/* Failed. */
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* There must be at least one more character in the string.
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* If we are at the end, fail.
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*/
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if (!*s)
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return 0;
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/* Check if the next character of the string is acceptable. */
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if (*pattern != '?' && *pattern != *s)
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return 0;
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/* Move to the next character, both in string and in pattern. */
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s++;
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pattern++;
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}
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/* NOTREACHED */
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}
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/*
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* Tries to match the host name (which must be in all lowercase) against the
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* comma-separated sequence of subpatterns (each possibly preceded by ! to
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* indicate negation). Returns -1 if negation matches, 1 if there is
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* a positive match, 0 if there is no match at all.
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*/
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int
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match_hostname(const char *host, const char *pattern, u_int len)
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{
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char sub[1024];
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int negated;
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int got_positive;
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u_int i, subi;
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got_positive = 0;
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for (i = 0; i < len;) {
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/* Check if the subpattern is negated. */
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if (pattern[i] == '!') {
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negated = 1;
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i++;
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} else
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negated = 0;
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/*
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* Extract the subpattern up to a comma or end. Convert the
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* subpattern to lowercase.
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*/
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for (subi = 0;
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i < len && subi < sizeof(sub) - 1 && pattern[i] != ',';
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subi++, i++)
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sub[subi] = isupper(pattern[i]) ? tolower(pattern[i]) : pattern[i];
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/* If subpattern too long, return failure (no match). */
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if (subi >= sizeof(sub) - 1)
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return 0;
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/* If the subpattern was terminated by a comma, skip the comma. */
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if (i < len && pattern[i] == ',')
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i++;
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/* Null-terminate the subpattern. */
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sub[subi] = '\0';
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/* Try to match the subpattern against the host name. */
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if (match_pattern(host, sub)) {
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if (negated)
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return -1; /* Negative */
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else
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got_positive = 1; /* Positive */
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}
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}
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/*
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* Return success if got a positive match. If there was a negative
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* match, we have already returned -1 and never get here.
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*/
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return got_positive;
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}
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