openssh/auth2.c
djm@openbsd.org a7ed931cae
upstream: add "ext-info-in-auth@openssh.com" extension
This adds another transport protocol extension to allow a sshd to send
SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO during user authentication, after the server has
learned the username that is being logged in to.

This lets sshd to update the acceptable signature algoritms for public
key authentication, and allows these to be varied via sshd_config(5)
"Match" directives, which are evaluated after the server learns the
username being authenticated.

Full details in the PROTOCOL file

OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1de7da7f2b6c32a46043d75fcd49b0cbb7db7779
2023-12-19 01:51:46 +11:00

858 lines
23 KiB
C

/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.168 2023/12/18 14:45:49 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <time.h>
#include "stdlib.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "kex.h"
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
/* methods */
extern Authmethod method_none;
extern Authmethod method_pubkey;
extern Authmethod method_passwd;
extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
#ifdef GSSAPI
extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
#endif
Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
&method_none,
&method_pubkey,
#ifdef GSSAPI
&method_gssapi,
#endif
&method_passwd,
&method_kbdint,
&method_hostbased,
NULL
};
/* protocol */
static int input_service_request(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_userauth_request(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
/* helper */
static Authmethod *authmethod_byname(const char *);
static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(Authctxt *, const char *);
static char *authmethods_get(Authctxt *authctxt);
#define MATCH_NONE 0 /* method or submethod mismatch */
#define MATCH_METHOD 1 /* method matches (no submethod specified) */
#define MATCH_BOTH 2 /* method and submethod match */
#define MATCH_PARTIAL 3 /* method matches, submethod can't be checked */
static int list_starts_with(const char *, const char *, const char *);
char *
auth2_read_banner(void)
{
struct stat st;
char *banner = NULL;
size_t len, n;
int fd;
if ((fd = open(options.banner, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
return (NULL);
if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
close(fd);
return (NULL);
}
if (st.st_size <= 0 || st.st_size > 1*1024*1024) {
close(fd);
return (NULL);
}
len = (size_t)st.st_size; /* truncate */
banner = xmalloc(len + 1);
n = atomicio(read, fd, banner, len);
close(fd);
if (n != len) {
free(banner);
return (NULL);
}
banner[n] = '\0';
return (banner);
}
static void
userauth_send_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const char *msg)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, msg)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || /* language, unused */
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
debug("%s: sent", __func__);
}
static void
userauth_banner(struct ssh *ssh)
{
char *banner = NULL;
if (options.banner == NULL)
return;
if ((banner = PRIVSEP(auth2_read_banner())) == NULL)
goto done;
userauth_send_banner(ssh, banner);
done:
free(banner);
}
/*
* loop until authctxt->success == TRUE
*/
void
do_authentication2(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &dispatch_protocol_error);
if (ssh->kex->ext_info_c)
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &kex_input_ext_info);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST, &input_service_request);
ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt->success);
ssh->authctxt = NULL;
}
static int
input_service_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
char *service = NULL;
int r, acceptit = 0;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &service, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("input_service_request: no authctxt");
if (strcmp(service, "ssh-userauth") == 0) {
if (!authctxt->success) {
acceptit = 1;
/* now we can handle user-auth requests */
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST,
&input_userauth_request);
}
}
/* XXX all other service requests are denied */
if (acceptit) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
} else {
debug("bad service request %s", service);
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "bad service request %s", service);
}
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &dispatch_protocol_error);
r = 0;
out:
free(service);
return r;
}
#define MIN_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS 0.005
#define MAX_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS 5.0
static double
user_specific_delay(const char *user)
{
char b[512];
size_t len = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA512);
u_char *hash = xmalloc(len);
double delay;
(void)snprintf(b, sizeof b, "%llu%s",
(unsigned long long)options.timing_secret, user);
if (ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, b, strlen(b), hash, len) != 0)
fatal_f("ssh_digest_memory");
/* 0-4.2 ms of delay */
delay = (double)PEEK_U32(hash) / 1000 / 1000 / 1000 / 1000;
freezero(hash, len);
debug3_f("user specific delay %0.3lfms", delay/1000);
return MIN_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS + delay;
}
static void
ensure_minimum_time_since(double start, double seconds)
{
struct timespec ts;
double elapsed = monotime_double() - start, req = seconds, remain;
if (elapsed > MAX_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS) {
debug3_f("elapsed %0.3lfms exceeded the max delay "
"requested %0.3lfms)", elapsed*1000, req*1000);
return;
}
/* if we've already passed the requested time, scale up */
while ((remain = seconds - elapsed) < 0.0)
seconds *= 2;
ts.tv_sec = remain;
ts.tv_nsec = (remain - ts.tv_sec) * 1000000000;
debug3_f("elapsed %0.3lfms, delaying %0.3lfms (requested %0.3lfms)",
elapsed*1000, remain*1000, req*1000);
nanosleep(&ts, NULL);
}
static int
input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
Authmethod *m = NULL;
char *user = NULL, *service = NULL, *method = NULL, *style = NULL;
int r, authenticated = 0;
double tstart = monotime_double();
if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("input_userauth_request: no authctxt");
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &user, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &service, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &method, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
*style++ = 0;
if (authctxt->attempt >= 1024)
auth_maxtries_exceeded(ssh);
if (authctxt->attempt++ == 0) {
/* setup auth context */
authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(ssh, user));
authctxt->user = xstrdup(user);
if (authctxt->pw && strcmp(service, "ssh-connection")==0) {
authctxt->valid = 1;
debug2_f("setting up authctxt for %s", user);
} else {
authctxt->valid = 0;
/* Invalid user, fake password information */
authctxt->pw = fakepw();
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
PRIVSEP(audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER));
#endif
}
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam)
PRIVSEP(start_pam(ssh));
#endif
ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "%suser %s",
authctxt->valid ? "authenticating " : "invalid ", user);
setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown",
use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
if (use_privsep)
mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
userauth_banner(ssh);
if ((r = kex_server_update_ext_info(ssh)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "kex_server_update_ext_info failed");
if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
"no authentication methods enabled");
} else if (strcmp(user, authctxt->user) != 0 ||
strcmp(service, authctxt->service) != 0) {
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Change of username or service "
"not allowed: (%s,%s) -> (%s,%s)",
authctxt->user, authctxt->service, user, service);
}
/* reset state */
auth2_challenge_stop(ssh);
#ifdef GSSAPI
/* XXX move to auth2_gssapi_stop() */
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
#endif
auth2_authctxt_reset_info(authctxt);
authctxt->postponed = 0;
authctxt->server_caused_failure = 0;
/* try to authenticate user */
m = authmethod_lookup(authctxt, method);
if (m != NULL && authctxt->failures < options.max_authtries) {
debug2("input_userauth_request: try method %s", method);
authenticated = m->userauth(ssh, method);
}
if (!authctxt->authenticated && strcmp(method, "none") != 0)
ensure_minimum_time_since(tstart,
user_specific_delay(authctxt->user));
userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, method, NULL);
r = 0;
out:
free(service);
free(user);
free(method);
return r;
}
void
userauth_finish(struct ssh *ssh, int authenticated, const char *packet_method,
const char *submethod)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
Authmethod *m = NULL;
const char *method = packet_method;
char *methods;
int r, partial = 0;
if (authenticated) {
if (!authctxt->valid) {
fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated invalid user %s",
authctxt->user);
}
if (authctxt->postponed)
fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated and postponed");
/* prefer primary authmethod name to possible synonym */
if ((m = authmethod_byname(method)) == NULL)
fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: bad method %s", method);
method = m->name;
}
/* Special handling for root */
if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
!auth_root_allowed(ssh, method)) {
authenticated = 0;
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
PRIVSEP(audit_event(ssh, SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED));
#endif
}
if (authenticated && options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
if (!auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt, method, submethod)) {
authenticated = 0;
partial = 1;
}
}
/* Log before sending the reply */
auth_log(ssh, authenticated, partial, method, submethod);
/* Update information exposed to session */
if (authenticated || partial)
auth2_update_session_info(authctxt, method, submethod);
if (authctxt->postponed)
return;
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam && authenticated) {
int r, success = PRIVSEP(do_pam_account());
/* If PAM returned a message, send it to the user. */
if (sshbuf_len(loginmsg) > 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, "\0", 1)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
userauth_send_banner(ssh, sshbuf_ptr(loginmsg));
if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) {
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r,
"%s: send PAM banner", __func__);
}
}
if (!success) {
fatal("Access denied for user %s by PAM account "
"configuration", authctxt->user);
}
}
#endif
if (authenticated == 1) {
/* turn off userauth */
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST,
&dispatch_protocol_ignore);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "send success packet");
/* now we can break out */
authctxt->success = 1;
ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "user %s", authctxt->user);
} else {
/* Allow initial try of "none" auth without failure penalty */
if (!partial && !authctxt->server_caused_failure &&
(authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0))
authctxt->failures++;
if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) {
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
PRIVSEP(audit_event(ssh, SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES));
#endif
auth_maxtries_exceeded(ssh);
}
methods = authmethods_get(authctxt);
debug3_f("failure partial=%d next methods=\"%s\"",
partial, methods);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, methods)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, partial)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "send failure packet");
free(methods);
}
}
/*
* Checks whether method is allowed by at least one AuthenticationMethods
* methods list. Returns 1 if allowed, or no methods lists configured.
* 0 otherwise.
*/
int
auth2_method_allowed(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method,
const char *submethod)
{
u_int i;
/*
* NB. authctxt->num_auth_methods might be zero as a result of
* auth2_setup_methods_lists(), so check the configuration.
*/
if (options.num_auth_methods == 0)
return 1;
for (i = 0; i < authctxt->num_auth_methods; i++) {
if (list_starts_with(authctxt->auth_methods[i], method,
submethod) != MATCH_NONE)
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static char *
authmethods_get(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
char *list;
int i, r;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
for (i = 0; authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) {
if (strcmp(authmethods[i]->name, "none") == 0)
continue;
if (authmethods[i]->enabled == NULL ||
*(authmethods[i]->enabled) == 0)
continue;
if (!auth2_method_allowed(authctxt, authmethods[i]->name,
NULL))
continue;
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s%s", sshbuf_len(b) ? "," : "",
authmethods[i]->name)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
}
if ((list = sshbuf_dup_string(b)) == NULL)
fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed");
sshbuf_free(b);
return list;
}
static Authmethod *
authmethod_byname(const char *name)
{
int i;
if (name == NULL)
fatal_f("NULL authentication method name");
for (i = 0; authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) {
if (strcmp(name, authmethods[i]->name) == 0 ||
(authmethods[i]->synonym != NULL &&
strcmp(name, authmethods[i]->synonym) == 0))
return authmethods[i];
}
debug_f("unrecognized authentication method name: %s", name);
return NULL;
}
static Authmethod *
authmethod_lookup(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *name)
{
Authmethod *method;
if ((method = authmethod_byname(name)) == NULL)
return NULL;
if (method->enabled == NULL || *(method->enabled) == 0) {
debug3_f("method %s not enabled", name);
return NULL;
}
if (!auth2_method_allowed(authctxt, method->name, NULL)) {
debug3_f("method %s not allowed "
"by AuthenticationMethods", name);
return NULL;
}
return method;
}
/*
* Check a comma-separated list of methods for validity. Is need_enable is
* non-zero, then also require that the methods are enabled.
* Returns 0 on success or -1 if the methods list is invalid.
*/
int
auth2_methods_valid(const char *_methods, int need_enable)
{
char *methods, *omethods, *method, *p;
u_int i, found;
int ret = -1;
if (*_methods == '\0') {
error("empty authentication method list");
return -1;
}
omethods = methods = xstrdup(_methods);
while ((method = strsep(&methods, ",")) != NULL) {
for (found = i = 0; !found && authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) {
if ((p = strchr(method, ':')) != NULL)
*p = '\0';
if (strcmp(method, authmethods[i]->name) != 0)
continue;
if (need_enable) {
if (authmethods[i]->enabled == NULL ||
*(authmethods[i]->enabled) == 0) {
error("Disabled method \"%s\" in "
"AuthenticationMethods list \"%s\"",
method, _methods);
goto out;
}
}
found = 1;
break;
}
if (!found) {
error("Unknown authentication method \"%s\" in list",
method);
goto out;
}
}
ret = 0;
out:
free(omethods);
return ret;
}
/*
* Prune the AuthenticationMethods supplied in the configuration, removing
* any methods lists that include disabled methods. Note that this might
* leave authctxt->num_auth_methods == 0, even when multiple required auth
* has been requested. For this reason, all tests for whether multiple is
* enabled should consult options.num_auth_methods directly.
*/
int
auth2_setup_methods_lists(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
u_int i;
/* First, normalise away the "any" pseudo-method */
if (options.num_auth_methods == 1 &&
strcmp(options.auth_methods[0], "any") == 0) {
free(options.auth_methods[0]);
options.auth_methods[0] = NULL;
options.num_auth_methods = 0;
}
if (options.num_auth_methods == 0)
return 0;
debug3_f("checking methods");
authctxt->auth_methods = xcalloc(options.num_auth_methods,
sizeof(*authctxt->auth_methods));
authctxt->num_auth_methods = 0;
for (i = 0; i < options.num_auth_methods; i++) {
if (auth2_methods_valid(options.auth_methods[i], 1) != 0) {
logit("Authentication methods list \"%s\" contains "
"disabled method, skipping",
options.auth_methods[i]);
continue;
}
debug("authentication methods list %d: %s",
authctxt->num_auth_methods, options.auth_methods[i]);
authctxt->auth_methods[authctxt->num_auth_methods++] =
xstrdup(options.auth_methods[i]);
}
if (authctxt->num_auth_methods == 0) {
error("No AuthenticationMethods left after eliminating "
"disabled methods");
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static int
list_starts_with(const char *methods, const char *method,
const char *submethod)
{
size_t l = strlen(method);
int match;
const char *p;
if (strncmp(methods, method, l) != 0)
return MATCH_NONE;
p = methods + l;
match = MATCH_METHOD;
if (*p == ':') {
if (!submethod)
return MATCH_PARTIAL;
l = strlen(submethod);
p += 1;
if (strncmp(submethod, p, l))
return MATCH_NONE;
p += l;
match = MATCH_BOTH;
}
if (*p != ',' && *p != '\0')
return MATCH_NONE;
return match;
}
/*
* Remove method from the start of a comma-separated list of methods.
* Returns 0 if the list of methods did not start with that method or 1
* if it did.
*/
static int
remove_method(char **methods, const char *method, const char *submethod)
{
char *omethods = *methods, *p;
size_t l = strlen(method);
int match;
match = list_starts_with(omethods, method, submethod);
if (match != MATCH_METHOD && match != MATCH_BOTH)
return 0;
p = omethods + l;
if (submethod && match == MATCH_BOTH)
p += 1 + strlen(submethod); /* include colon */
if (*p == ',')
p++;
*methods = xstrdup(p);
free(omethods);
return 1;
}
/*
* Called after successful authentication. Will remove the successful method
* from the start of each list in which it occurs. If it was the last method
* in any list, then authentication is deemed successful.
* Returns 1 if the method completed any authentication list or 0 otherwise.
*/
int
auth2_update_methods_lists(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method,
const char *submethod)
{
u_int i, found = 0;
debug3_f("updating methods list after \"%s\"", method);
for (i = 0; i < authctxt->num_auth_methods; i++) {
if (!remove_method(&(authctxt->auth_methods[i]), method,
submethod))
continue;
found = 1;
if (*authctxt->auth_methods[i] == '\0') {
debug2("authentication methods list %d complete", i);
return 1;
}
debug3("authentication methods list %d remaining: \"%s\"",
i, authctxt->auth_methods[i]);
}
/* This should not happen, but would be bad if it did */
if (!found)
fatal_f("method not in AuthenticationMethods");
return 0;
}
/* Reset method-specific information */
void auth2_authctxt_reset_info(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
sshkey_free(authctxt->auth_method_key);
free(authctxt->auth_method_info);
authctxt->auth_method_key = NULL;
authctxt->auth_method_info = NULL;
}
/* Record auth method-specific information for logs */
void
auth2_record_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
int i;
free(authctxt->auth_method_info);
authctxt->auth_method_info = NULL;
va_start(ap, fmt);
i = vasprintf(&authctxt->auth_method_info, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
if (i == -1)
fatal_f("vasprintf failed");
}
/*
* Records a public key used in authentication. This is used for logging
* and to ensure that the same key is not subsequently accepted again for
* multiple authentication.
*/
void
auth2_record_key(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated,
const struct sshkey *key)
{
struct sshkey **tmp, *dup;
int r;
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &dup)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "copy key");
sshkey_free(authctxt->auth_method_key);
authctxt->auth_method_key = dup;
if (!authenticated)
return;
/* If authenticated, make sure we don't accept this key again */
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &dup)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "copy key");
if (authctxt->nprev_keys >= INT_MAX ||
(tmp = recallocarray(authctxt->prev_keys, authctxt->nprev_keys,
authctxt->nprev_keys + 1, sizeof(*authctxt->prev_keys))) == NULL)
fatal_f("reallocarray failed");
authctxt->prev_keys = tmp;
authctxt->prev_keys[authctxt->nprev_keys] = dup;
authctxt->nprev_keys++;
}
/* Checks whether a key has already been previously used for authentication */
int
auth2_key_already_used(Authctxt *authctxt, const struct sshkey *key)
{
u_int i;
char *fp;
for (i = 0; i < authctxt->nprev_keys; i++) {
if (sshkey_equal_public(key, authctxt->prev_keys[i])) {
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(authctxt->prev_keys[i],
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
debug3_f("key already used: %s %s",
sshkey_type(authctxt->prev_keys[i]),
fp == NULL ? "UNKNOWN" : fp);
free(fp);
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Updates authctxt->session_info with details of authentication. Should be
* whenever an authentication method succeeds.
*/
void
auth2_update_session_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method,
const char *submethod)
{
int r;
if (authctxt->session_info == NULL) {
if ((authctxt->session_info = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
}
/* Append method[/submethod] */
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(authctxt->session_info, "%s%s%s",
method, submethod == NULL ? "" : "/",
submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "append method");
/* Append key if present */
if (authctxt->auth_method_key != NULL) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(authctxt->session_info, ' ')) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_format_text(authctxt->auth_method_key,
authctxt->session_info)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "append key");
}
if (authctxt->auth_method_info != NULL) {
/* Ensure no ambiguity here */
if (strchr(authctxt->auth_method_info, '\n') != NULL)
fatal_f("auth_method_info contains \\n");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(authctxt->session_info, ' ')) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_putf(authctxt->session_info, "%s",
authctxt->auth_method_info)) != 0) {
fatal_fr(r, "append method info");
}
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(authctxt->session_info, '\n')) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "append");
}