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1acc058d0a
Some tests have strict requirements on the filesystem permissions for certain files and directories. This adds a regress/check-perm tool that copies the relevant logic from sshd to exactly test the paths in question. This lets us skip tests when the local filesystem doesn't conform to our expectations rather than continuing and failing the test run. ok dtucker@
206 lines
4.3 KiB
C
206 lines
4.3 KiB
C
/*
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* Placed in the public domain
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*/
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/* $OpenBSD: modpipe.c,v 1.6 2013/11/21 03:16:47 djm Exp $ */
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#include "includes.h"
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <stdarg.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <pwd.h>
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#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
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#include <libgen.h>
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#endif
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static void
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fatal(const char *fmt, ...)
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{
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va_list args;
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va_start(args, fmt);
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vfprintf(stderr, fmt, args);
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fputc('\n', stderr);
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va_end(args);
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exit(1);
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}
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/* Based on session.c. NB. keep tests in sync */
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static void
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safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid)
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{
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const char *cp;
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char component[PATH_MAX];
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struct stat st;
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if (*path != '/')
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fatal("chroot path does not begin at root");
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if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(component))
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fatal("chroot path too long");
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/*
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* Descend the path, checking that each component is a
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* root-owned directory with strict permissions.
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*/
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for (cp = path; cp != NULL;) {
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if ((cp = strchr(cp, '/')) == NULL)
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strlcpy(component, path, sizeof(component));
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else {
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cp++;
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memcpy(component, path, cp - path);
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component[cp - path] = '\0';
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}
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/* debug3("%s: checking '%s'", __func__, component); */
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if (stat(component, &st) != 0)
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fatal("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__,
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component, strerror(errno));
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if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)
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fatal("bad ownership or modes for chroot "
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"directory %s\"%s\"",
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cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
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if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))
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fatal("chroot path %s\"%s\" is not a directory",
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cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
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}
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if (chdir(path) == -1)
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fatal("Unable to chdir to chroot path \"%s\": "
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"%s", path, strerror(errno));
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}
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/* from platform.c */
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int
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platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t uid)
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{
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if (uid == 0)
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return 1;
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#ifdef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID
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if (uid == PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID)
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return 1;
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#endif
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return 0;
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}
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/* from auth.c */
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int
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auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
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uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen)
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{
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char buf[PATH_MAX], homedir[PATH_MAX];
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char *cp;
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int comparehome = 0;
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struct stat st;
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if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) {
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snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name,
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strerror(errno));
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return -1;
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}
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if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
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comparehome = 1;
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if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) {
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snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf);
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return -1;
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}
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if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) ||
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(stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) {
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snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
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buf);
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return -1;
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}
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/* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */
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for (;;) {
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if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) {
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snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
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return -1;
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}
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strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
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if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
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(!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) ||
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(st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
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snprintf(err, errlen,
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"bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
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return -1;
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}
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/* If are past the homedir then we can stop */
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if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0)
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break;
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/*
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* dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
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* but we can be paranoid and check for "." too
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*/
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if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0))
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break;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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static void
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usage(void)
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{
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fprintf(stderr, "check-perm -m [chroot | keys-command] [path]\n");
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exit(1);
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}
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int
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main(int argc, char **argv)
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{
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const char *path = ".";
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char errmsg[256];
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int ch, mode = -1;
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extern char *optarg;
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extern int optind;
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struct stat st;
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while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "hm:")) != -1) {
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switch (ch) {
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case 'm':
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if (strcasecmp(optarg, "chroot") == 0)
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mode = 1;
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else if (strcasecmp(optarg, "keys-command") == 0)
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mode = 2;
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else {
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fprintf(stderr, "Invalid -m option\n"),
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usage();
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}
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break;
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default:
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usage();
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}
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}
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argc -= optind;
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argv += optind;
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if (argc > 1)
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usage();
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else if (argc == 1)
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path = argv[0];
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if (mode == 1)
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safely_chroot(path, getuid());
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else if (mode == 2) {
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if (stat(path, &st) < 0)
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fatal("Could not stat %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
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if (auth_secure_path(path, &st, NULL, 0,
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errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0)
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fatal("Unsafe %s: %s", path, errmsg);
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} else {
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fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mode\n");
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usage();
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}
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return 0;
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}
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